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VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 28th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. Roche (Canada)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.45 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 51 TO 69, 139, 141 AND 145 (continued)

CONSIDERATION OF AND ACTION ON DRAFT RESOLUTIONS ON DISARMAMENT ITEMS (continued)

Mr. FUGLIESE (Italy): On behalf of the delegations of Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and of my own delegation, I have the honour to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/43/L.27 on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space plays a very important role in the debates of this Committee and of the Conference on Disarmament. We believe that this is rightly so because arms control issues related to space have a very significant bearing on international stability and therefore on international peace and security. There is no doubt that the international community has an important role to play in the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

We also reaffirm in this context our view that the exploration and use of outer space should be carried out for the benefit of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development.

The delegations sponsoring this draft resolution are convinced that space activities can make an important contribution to international peace and security and to arms control and disarmament. They believe also that arms control issues concerning nuclear and space arms must be considered in their interrelationship in order to facilitate agreements that would enhance strategic stability.

There seems to be no doubt that a great responsibility towards mankind as a whole falls on the two major space and nuclear Powers in the search for effective and verifiable agreements on the prevention of an arms race in outer space and its termination on earth, and that they should continue their efforts in this direction.

(Mr. Pugliese, Italy)

The text of our draft resolution reflects a realistic approach to this complex problem and seeks to address the item in a pragmatic and concrete way. It takes into account the efforts made so far in the multilateral field and expresses the conviction that further efforts should be made. It calls attention, however, to the progress made in the bilateral negotiations between the United States of America and the USSR and underlines the fact that significant progress in the multilateral domain is dependent on basic understandings achieved in the aforementioned bilateral negotiations.

(Mr. Pugliese, Italy)

The relative emphasis that the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/43/L.27 have placed on the bilateral talks does not detract from the essential role the General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament can and must play in the area of preventing an arms race in outer space. Our delegations believe that the multilateral and the bilateral processes may be mutually complementary. We are convinced that the Conference on Disarmament can contribute to the consideration of issues related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Conference on Disarmament has for some years done useful work on the subject. Substantive questions have been identified. Relevant aspects of the legal régime of arms control and outer space have been considered and proposals have been brought forward. In that spirit the sponsors of the draft resolution have also welcomed the agreement reached in 1988 on the re-establishment of an ad hoc committee to consider our consideration of that question.

The work undertaken during 1988 by the Conference on Disarmament on the prevention of an arms race in outer space again showed the complexity of the problems under consideration, the numerous approaches of many individual States to the issue and the major disagreements that exist, and various interpretations of terminology. It is clear that the subject of the prevention of an arms race in outer space remains extremely sensitive. To attain the positive goals being aimed at it is therefore necessary to maintain a constructive and realistic approach. Polemics, finger-pointing and premature initiatives must be avoided if a productive environment is to be generated and maintained. We must also carry out a thorough analysis of the area in order to obtain full knowledge and arrive at the interpretations suitable for supporting our endeavour. We believe it is advisable for that purpose, to re-establish, at the beginning of the 1989 session of the Conference on Disarmament, the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race

(Mr. Pugliese, Italy)

in Outer Space, ensuring that all efforts are made for the continuation and intensification of substantive work. We are convinced that the approach followed during 1988 was a constructive and realistic one.

That is the background against which the sponsoring delegations would like the draft resolution to be viewed by other interested delegations. The draft resolution is not intended to conflict with other draft resolutions on the subject. Rather, it is the expression of a sincere will to co-operate.

I wish to conclude by expressing the most fervent hope that the efforts made by the sponsors and their intention to avoid controversy and promote co-operation and understanding will be favourably received. We are open to co-operative efforts by others.

Mr. KENYON (United Kingdom): The year 1988 has seen the twentieth anniversary of the adoption by the United Nations General Assembly of resolution 2373 (XXII) of 12 June 1968, which recognized the completion of the negotiations on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It is also three years since the Third Review Conference on the Treaty, and, in accordance with the wish of the parties expressed in the final document adopted at that Conference, it is time for the three depository Powers to start the process of convening the Fourth Review Conference, which is to be held in 1990. In compliance with that duty the United Kingdom, on behalf of the three depositories, convened a meeting of parties to the Treaty on 25 October, over which Ambassador Badawi of Egypt presided. That meeting agreed that the Fourth Review Conference should be held at Geneva in the August-September period of 1990. It also agreed to form a Preparatory Committee on the same basis as that which prepared the Third Review Conference, that is, an open-ended committee formed of parties to the Treaty serving on the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency or

(Mr. Kenyon, United Kingdom)

represented in the Conference on Disarmament, as well as any party to the Treaty that may express its interest in participating in the work of the Preparatory Committee. It was agreed that the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee should be held from 1 to 5 May 1989. Different views were expressed as to the appropriate venue for that meeting, and discussions among the parties on that question still continue.

The parties also agreed that a draft resolution should be placed before this Committee requesting the Secretary-General to render the necessary assistance and provide such services, including summary records, as may be required for the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its preparation. I have the honour to present that draft resolution now, document A/C.1/43/L.45, on behalf of 47 States parties to the Treaty. The text of the draft resolution contains no more than I have just outlined. It is completely procedural, and it is the hope of the States parties to the NPT that the Committee will agree to adopt it without a vote, as was the case with the very similar resolution adopted for the same purpose at the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly.

Mr. AL-KITTAL (Iraq): I should like to make a few remarks concerning agenda item 54, "The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East." It is our view that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones would strengthen the drive towards nuclear-arms control and disarmament and would also enhance the confidence-building process. With a nuclear-free zone we are one step further away from the arms race and the possibility of war and one step closer to peace and security.

(Mr. Al-Kittai, Iraq)

We are also aware that the creation of a nuclear-free zone acquires special importance in special regions owing to circumstances and characteristics of those regions. The Middle East is one such region, and that is why we support the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Now, one may ask what is needed to achieve this goal?

(Mr. Al-Kittai, Iraq)

To respond objectively and realistically to such a question, one should identify the existing facts in the region which are relevant to the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. These facts can be summed up as follows.

First, there are nuclear weapons in the region. Israel has introduced the weapons, and it is the only party which possesses such weapons.

Secondly, all parties which have nuclear programmes of any size in the region have acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Israel remains the only exception.

Thirdly, the only significant nuclear facilities capable of producing nuclear material usable for the manufacturing of weapons are those located in Israel. These facilities are not under international safeguards.

Those are important facts that deserve to be kept clear and ready in our minds. I say that because I believe awareness of them will leave no room for ambiguity as to the process of identifying the necessary conditions for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. As a matter of fact, we believe that the only practical way to establish that zone is to take practical steps to correct the situation I have just outlined. In our opinion, this requires the following action.

First, the immediate removal of existing nuclear-weapons stockpiles from the region, taking into account that Israel is the party in possession of those stockpiles;

Secondly, the undertaking by all parties not to manufacture or in any way acquire nuclear weapons or explosive devices; all parties in the region except Israel are committed to this goal by their adherence to the NPT - it is for Israel to do so and without further delay;

Thirdly, the placing of all nuclear facilities in the region under international safeguards; this can be achieved only if Israel accepts, as do the



(Mr. Al-Kittal, Iraq)

other parties in the region, to submit all its nuclear facilities to the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguard;

Fourthly, the undertaking by all parties not to accept the deployment on their territories of nuclear weapons that belong to other States and not to join a military alliance if a nuclear-weapon State is party to that alliance. Israel is the only party in the region known to have a strategic alliance with a nuclear-weapon State.

An important consideration in this regard is that such practical steps should have no negative effects on the right of all parties to develop nuclear energy for peaceful applications.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): It is my honour to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/43/L.40 on item 51 of the agenda of the General Assembly, "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 42/25 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)".

The draft is sponsored by the delegations of the following countries: Bahamas, Barbados, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela and Mexico. Its first preambular paragraph contains an impressive list of the 15 resolutions approved by the General Assembly relating to the signing and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

In the second preambular paragraph attention is drawn to the fact that: "within the zone of application of that Treaty, to which 23 sovereign States are already parties, there are some territories which, in spite of not being sovereign political entities, are nevertheless in a position to receive the

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

benefits deriving from the Treaty through its Additional Protocol I, to which the four States that de jure or de facto are internationally responsible for those territories may become parties".

In the third preambular paragraph the following is added:

"... it is not fair that the peoples of some of those territories are deprived of such benefits without being given the opportunity to express their opinion in this connection".

The fourth preambular paragraph recalls that

"three of the States to which Additional Protocol I is opened - the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United States of America - became parties to the said Protocol in 1969, 1971 and 1981 respectively".

The draft resolution ends with three operative paragraphs, the last of which, as is customary in such cases, decides to include the item in the provisional agenda of the next session of the Assembly. The two previous paragraphs, which faithfully reflect the feelings of Latin America, are drafted as follows:

"Deplores that the signature of Additional Protocol I by France, which took place on 2 March 1979, has not been followed by the corresponding ratification, notwithstanding the time already elapsed and the pressing invitations which the General Assembly has addressed to it;

"Once more urges France not to delay any further such ratification, which has been requested so many times and which appears all the more advisable, since France is the only one of the four States to which the Protocol is open that is not yet party to it".

In conclusion, I believe it appropriate by way of epilogue to recall certain facts that should be borne in mind in connection with this subject: that last year

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saw the twentieth anniversary of the opening for signature of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and its two Additional Protocols; that there are already 23 States parties to this Treaty; that Additional Protocol II is in force for the five States which possess nuclear weapons and to which the Treaty has been opened; that Additional Protocol I, as is stated in the draft resolution I am introducing, is already in force for three of the four States to which it is open; that France is the only one of these States that has not yet become a party to this instrument, though France signed it on 2 March 1979, that is more than eight years ago; that, as has so often been said at the United Nations, it would not be right for the peoples of the territories situated within the zone of application of the Treaty of Tlatelolco - over which the States to whom Additional Protocol I has been opened, to use the terms actually found in the Treaty "de jure or de facto have international responsibility" - to be deprived of the benefits deriving from the Treaty "without having had an opportunity to express their opinion on it".

Mr. KAMAL (Pakistan): We have asked to speak today to introduce two draft resolutions sponsored by Pakistan. The first, which has also been sponsored by Bangladesh, relates to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and has been circulated in document A/C.1/43/L.5. The second deals with the conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and has been circulated in document A/C.1/43/L.18. Our interest in these two issues stems from Pakistan's unwavering commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and its deep concern over the grave threat which humanity faces as a result of the existence of nuclear weapons.

Pakistan has always supported and pursued a comprehensive approach to nuclear disarmament. In our view all disarmament measures, whether global, regional or bilateral, interim or of a collateral nature, deserve support. Pending the realization of the vital objective of nuclear disarmament we believe that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones represents an important collateral measure that can make a significant contribution towards preventing nuclear proliferation and in providing a measure of security to non-nuclear-weapon States of the region concerned.

In paragraph 61 of the Final Document of its first special session devoted to disarmament the General Assembly unanimously recognized the need to encourage the process of establishing such zones in different parts of the world, with the ultimate objective of achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world. The immediate objective for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in a specific region would be to insulate it against the threat of nuclear attack or nuclear blackmail, as well as to prevent the geographical spread of nuclear weapons, and thereby contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. The first special session also called upon the nuclear-weapon States to give undertakings to respect strictly the status of nuclear-weapon-free zones and to refrain from the use or threat of use of

nuclear weapons against the States in such a region.

The Movement of Non-Aligned States has also supported the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones. The political declaration issued at the conclusion of the Eighth Non-Aligned Summit Conference held in Harare in September 1986, called, inter alia, for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in different parts of the world with the objective of achieving, ultimately, a world entirely free of nuclear weapons.

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world is by no means an end in itself nor is it a substitute for a global, general and comprehensive approach to disarmament. However, nuclear-weapon-free zones constitute an important partial measure, in a step-by-step approach, to general and complete disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament. Additionally, they derive their relevance from being important confidence-building measures.

Pakistan shares with the other States of the South Asian region a deep commitment to the objective of keeping our area free of nuclear weapons. All the States of South Asia have made unilateral declarations, at the highest level, that they will not acquire or develop nuclear weapons. We believe, therefore, that appropriate conditions exist in the South Asian region to carry forward the objective of transforming it into a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

Pakistan's commitment to nuclear non-proliferation has been demonstrated by various proposals it has made over the years to ensure the permanent denuclearization of South Asia. We believe that a regional approach, with each State accepting equal and non-discriminatory obligations, is the most feasible and effective means to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons in our region. We are therefore in favour of exploring all avenues to find an agreed basis for promoting any arrangement to ensure nuclear non-proliferation on an equitable and non-discriminatory basis.

We remain hopeful that the adoption of our draft resolution (A/C.1/43/L.5) will encourage the States of our region to enter into consultations for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia.

The draft resolution is on the same lines as the corresponding resolution 42/29 which was adopted by the General Assembly last year. Its preambular part, inter alia, recognizes the importance of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones as one of the measures which can contribute most effectively to the objective of nuclear non-proliferation and general and complete disarmament. The operative part of the draft resolution urges the South Asian States to continue to make all possible efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and, pending that, to refrain from any action contrary to this objective.

The draft resolution also requests the Secretary-General to ascertain the views of the regional as well as other concerned States and to promote consultations among them with a view to exploring the best possibilities of furthering the efforts for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia.

We hope that the draft resolution will receive widespread support in the First Committee and in the General Assembly.

The second resolution (A/C.1/43/L.18) deals with the conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Pakistan is aware of the fact that the most effective assurance against the nuclear threat remains the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. However, until the objective of nuclear disarmament is achieved the critical importance of credible guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States cannot be over-emphasized. Such assurances have become all the more essential since meaningful progress on nuclear disarmament does not appear to be in sight.

In this context Pakistan has actively participated in the search for a viable and acceptable international agreement. It is a source of deep disappointment for us that while there are no objections, in principle, to the concept of negative security assurances, the Conference on Disarmament has failed to register any progress on negotiating an internationally binding legal instrument on the subject. We therefore consider it important that the General Assembly call upon the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its efforts towards reaching an agreement on a formula which would enable it to elaborate and conclude effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The unilateral declarations made by some nuclear-weapon States on this subject do not adequately meet the concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States. Those declarations reflect the security concerns of the nuclear-weapon Powers themselves. My delegation continues to believe that assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States, in order to be effective, must be unconditional and of a legally binding nature.

Draft resolution A/C.1/43/L.18, submitted by my delegation, has been prepared along the lines of the resolution adopted last year. In its operative paragraphs it appeals to the nuclear-weapon States to demonstrate the political will necessary to reach agreement of a legally binding character. It is the hope of my delegation that the draft resolution will receive the unanimous support of this Committee.

Ms. THEORIN (Sweden): I have asked to speak today under the agenda item "Verification in all its aspects", in order to introduce, on behalf of the States represented in the Six-Nation Initiative - Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania - draft resolution A/C.1/43/L.2, entitled "Verification within the United Nations".

The process of disarmament affects the vital security interests of all States. The brief history of post-war confidence-building and disarmament negotiations has amply demonstrated the significance of verification measures. By their very scope and nature, major disarmament agreements, particularly those on weapons of mass destruction, have global consequences.

The international community therefore has a stake in all major disarmament agreements and a fundamental interest in the verification of compliance with them. All nations concerned have a legitimate aspiration to be in a position to ascertain that such agreements are strictly complied with. The critical importance of verification of, and compliance with, arms limitation and disarmament agreements is now universally recognized.

The reality, however, is that countries have quite different capabilities in terms of national technical means of verification. International verification arrangements are one way to even out such differences. International verification is not meant to replace bilateral or other verification measures already agreed upon, but to complement them.

The United Nations has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament. It stands to reason that the United Nations should be entrusted with a corresponding role and responsibility in the field of verification.

At the special ministerial meeting devoted to disarmament issues of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries held on the eve of the third special session of



(Ms. Theorin, Sweden)

the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (SSOD III), the concept of a multilateral verification system within the United Nations was endorsed.

When a proposal for such a system was presented at SSOD III we noted with great satisfaction that other countries interested in the field of verification stated that it was a most welcome initiative.

In his address at the opening of SSOD III, the Secretary-General affirmed that:

"This is an area in which the United Nations might be able to make an important contribution. The United Nations might be able to help apply, by all the means accepted by the parties concerned, the verification measures provided for in multilateral treaties. The United Nations might be able to co-ordinate international debates on questions related to verification, to provide technical advice and to carry out research. Generally speaking, the participation of our Organization in the search for generally acceptable and effective verification measures for observance of the agreements and the expansion of the functions of information and advice might make it possible in the future to create, under its auspices, verification machinery."

(A/S-15/PV.1, p. 28)

In fact, the United Nations already performs an important role in the field of verification, inter alia, in relation to alleged violations of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and of other rules of customary international law prohibiting the use of chemical and bacteriological or toxin weapons. Such a role is also envisaged in the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction of 1972. Furthermore, it may be recalled that in 1987, the

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Disarmament Commission agreed that the United Nations should examine the possibility of compiling and managing a verification data base.

It is against this background that draft resolution A/C.1/43/L.2 endorses the principle of a multilateral verification system within the United Nations as an integral part of a strengthened multilateral framework required to ensure peace and security during the process of disarmament and in a nuclear-free world. Also, the Secretary-General is requested to undertake, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts, an in-depth study of the role of the United Nations in the field of verification of arms limitation and disarmament agreements, including preparations for an outline of a multilateral verification system within the United Nations, and to submit a comprehensive report on the subject to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session in 1990.

Mr. BAGBENI ADEITO NZENGEYA (Zaire) (interpretation from French): Allow me first of all, Sir, to praise the efforts you made since your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee to assist it in the progress it has made.

Having begun the stage of submission of draft resolutions for consideration and adoption, I wish, on behalf of the African Group and as its Chairman for this month, to introduce three draft resolutions produced by it.

These are the drafts found in documents A/C.1/43/L.72, A/C.1/43/L.31 and A/C.1/43/L.41 dealing respectively with the dumping of nuclear and industrial wastes in Africa, implementation of the Declaration on the denuclearization of Africa and the nuclear capability of South Africa and the United Nations regional centre for peace and disarmament in Africa at Lomé.

(Mr. Bagbeni Adeito Nzengaya,  
Zaire)

The placing of item 64 K on the agenda of the forty-third session of the General Assembly by the Group of African States is in response to the serious concern expressed by the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity during their twenty-fourth summit meeting, held in Addis Ababa from 25 to 28 May 1987, with regard to a new phenomenon which has been occurring over the last two years in Africa. This is the spreading practice of the dumping of nuclear and industrial wastes in African countries by transnational corporations and other enterprises of the industrialized countries - wastes which they cannot dispose of within their own territory or in the countries in which those wastes are produced

How can such a practice be explained? How can there be continents dedicated to improve the quality of life and the environment while others are exposed to radioactive elements of nuclear and industrial wastes which are harmful and dangerous to mankind, marine fauna and those ecosystems on which the survival of mankind depends?

Under what logic or what ethics can the pollution of a continent be allowed, a continent which is so full of hope and resources as Africa and which, in addition, produces numerous commodities and raw materials which are used by those same industrialized countries in their industrial and manufacturing processes?

Although the collusion of certain Africans in this operation has been acknowledged, the crime of dumping these wastes continues and that collusion in no way absolves its authors.

Thus, the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity have decided to undertake vigorous action to ban the dumping of these wastes in Africa.

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Zaire)

The African Group has therefore been entrusted with the task of presenting a draft resolution whose main points are as follows. It condemns all practices of dumping nuclear and industrial wastes in Africa; demands that such dangerous, immoral and illegal practices cease forthwith; urges all Member States to ensure effective control of a transboundary movement of nuclear and industrial wastes; requests the Conference on Disarmament to consider the matter and adopt a convention prohibiting the dumping of nuclear and radioactive wastes in the territory of other States; and requests the Secretary-General of our Organization, in consultation with the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to submit to the General Assembly a report at its forty-fourth session on this question in all its aspects, including the adoption of a convention to ban the dumping of such wastes.

I am submitting this draft resolution in accordance with the following resolutions of the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity (OAU): CM/Res.38 (III), on the denuclearization of Africa, adopted in Cairo in 1964, and CM/Res.1153 (XLVIII-23), on the dumping of nuclear and industrial wastes in Africa, adopted in Addis Ababa last May.

I hope that the reasons I have given, Mr. Chairman, are sufficient to enable you to have the draft resolution adopted without a vote. Here I recall that the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency has already adopted its resolution GC (XXXII)/Res.490 on the question.

The second draft resolution (A/C.1/43/L.31) consists of two parts: A, "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa" and B, "Nuclear capability of South Africa". The two parts are linked by South Africa's persistence in acquiring that capability, thus frustrating the Declaration

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on the Denuclearization of Africa, whose aim is to keep Africa as a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

In fact, the SAFARI research reactor, the Koeberg power reactor and the Pelindaba hot cell complex give clear proof of South Africa's nuclear capability and have persuaded the International Atomic Energy Agency to impose safeguards on those installations, which contain nuclear material. But South Africa's semi-commercial enrichment plant is still not covered by Agency safeguards; the Agency is waiting for South Africa's adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons before concluding a safeguards agreement with that country.

South Africa is an important exporter of uranium and has a well-developed nuclear programme and capability. Its adherence to the non-proliferation Treaty raises difficulties, which that country puts in the form of conditions. The problems are: first, rights and privileges under Article IV of the Treaty, particularly regarding the exchange of equipment, material and technology; secondly, possibilities for South Africa, if it adheres to the Treaty, to trade in nuclear raw materials - uranium - as do all other producers, subject solely to the application of Agency safeguards or similar safeguards; thirdly, the existence at present of discriminatory national legislation in a number of countries which are signatories of the Treaty, which is contrary to the principles and spirit of several Articles of the Treaty; fourthly, the existence of United Nations resolutions calling for a complete halt to nuclear co-operation with South Africa; fifthly, objections to the credentials of South African representatives at sessions of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency and Review Conferences of the parties to the Treaty; and, sixthly, the discriminatory nature

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of the Treaty in so far as it distinguishes between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States.

Those are the conditions that the South African delegation has raised with representatives of the three depository Governments of the Treaty - the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom - during talks in Vienna on 11 and 12 August last on South Africa's possible adherence to the Treaty.

According to a letter dated 16 September 1988 from the Permanent Representative of South Africa to the Director-General of the IAEA:

"The South African Government is convinced, however, that the international community will understand that South Africa cannot allow itself to exercise its sovereign right to adhere to such an important Treaty before carrying out a very careful consideration of all the questions that such adherence raises."

In view of those matters, the Group of African States proposes in part A of the draft resolution that the General Assembly call upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa and its surrounding areas as a nuclear-weapon-free zone; reaffirms that the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, would be an important measure to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote international peace and security; expresses once again its grave alarm at South Africa's possession and continued development of nuclear-weapon capability; condemns South Africa's continued pursuit of a nuclear capability and all forms of nuclear collaboration by any State, corporation, institution or individual with the racist régime that enable it to frustrate the objective of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, which seeks to keep Africa free from

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nuclear weapons; demands that the racist régime of South Africa refrain from manufacturing, testing, deploying, transporting, storing, using or threatening to use nuclear weapons and that it submit forthwith all its nuclear installations to inspection by the IAEA; and requests the Secretary-General to assist the African States in the preparation of the relevant convention or treaty on the denuclearization of Africa - of course, under the control of the consultative services for disarmament studies.

In the same context, part B of the draft resolution suggests that the Assembly condemn the massive build up of South Africa's military machine, in particular, its frenzied acquisition of nuclear-weapon capability for repressive and aggressive purposes and as an instrument of blackmail; demands that South Africa and all other foreign interests put an immediate end to the exploration for and exploitation of uranium resources in Namibia; requests the Disarmament Commission to consider once again as a matter of priority during its substantive session in 1989 South Africa's nuclear capability; and requests the Secretary-General to follow very closely South Africa's evolution in the nuclear field and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session.

On behalf of the African Group, Mr. Chairman, I request you to have both parts of draft resolution A/C.1/43/L.31 adopted without a vote in order to stress the support of the whole international community for the denuclearization of Africa and its being made a real nuclear-weapon-free zone.

The last draft resolution that I have the honour to present on behalf of the African States (A/C.1/43/L.41) deals with the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, established in Lomé, Togo, on 24 October 1986.

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Zaire)

Members will recall the colloquium, organized jointly by the Department for Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity, which was held in Lomé from 11 to 15 August 1985 and whose theme was: peace, security and disarmament in Africa. This colloquium, which was in fact organized within the framework of the World Disarmament Campaign and in which I personally participated, adopted the Lomé Declaration on Security, Disarmament and Development in Africa and the Programme of Action for Peace, Security and Co-operation in Africa. Endorsed by the Eighth Summit Conference of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Harare in September 1986, and by the twenty-third Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity in July 1987, this Lomé Declaration, containing a programme of action, is being implemented by the Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, at Lomé.

If these activities are to continue, there must be sufficient resources coming from voluntary contributions by Member States and international, governmental and non-governmental organizations.

In that context, the General Assembly, under the draft resolution now before the Committee, would, first, commend the Secretary-General for his efforts to ensure the functioning of the Centre; and, then, appeal to Member States and to international, governmental and non-governmental organizations to make voluntary contributions in order to strengthen the effective functioning of the Centre.

I do not think there can be any objection whatsoever to this draft resolution, for it fits within the very objectives of our Committee.

I should like to revert to draft resolution A/C.1/43/L.72 - the first text that I submitted today - and to announce that Romania has become a sponsor.



Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): I have the honour of introducing a draft resolution, co-sponsored by the delegation of Mexico, relating to the item entitled "Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions".

The preamble to this draft resolution - contained in document A/C.1/43/L.13 and sponsored by the delegations of nine countries: Ecuador, Indonesia, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Mexico - summarizes the major facts that are necessary to gain a clear understanding of it. Among those facts are the following:

The complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests has been examined for more than 30 years, and the General Assembly has adopted more than 50 resolutions on the subject. It is a basic objective of the United Nations in this sphere of disarmament, to the attainment of which the Organization has repeatedly assigned the highest priority. On eight different occasions the Assembly has condemned such tests in the strongest terms, and since 1974 it has stated its conviction that the continuance of such tests will intensify the arms race, thus increasing the danger of nuclear war.

It should be recalled that the Secretary-General, addressing a plenary meeting of the General Assembly on 12 December 1984, emphasized that no single multilateral agreement could have a greater effect on limiting the further refinement of nuclear weapons and that a comprehensive test-ban treaty was the litmus test of the real willingness to pursue nuclear disarmament.

In the preamble to the draft resolution the General Assembly would also recall that the three nuclear-weapon States that act as depositaries of the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear-Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water - the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union - undertook in article I of the Treaty to conclude another treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

nuclear-test explosions, including all those explosions underground, and that such an undertaking was reiterated in 1968 in the preamble to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, article VI of which further embodies their solemn and legally binding commitment to take effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear-arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.

It was perhaps for that reason that the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in its Final Declaration, adopted on 21 September 1985, called on the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to resume trilateral negotiations in 1985 and on all the nuclear-weapon States to participate in the urgent negotiation and conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, as a matter of the highest priority, in the Conference on Disarmament.

Similarly, it is recalled that the leaders of the six States associated with the five-continent peace and disarmament initiative affirmed in the Stockholm Declaration, adopted on 21 January 1988, that "any agreement that leaves room for continued testing would not be acceptable".

The operative part of the draft resolution on which I am commenting proposes that the General Assembly reiterate once again

"its grave concern that nuclear-weapon testing continues unabated, against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of Member States";  
and reaffirm its conviction that

"a treaty to achieve the prohibition of all nuclear-test explosions by all States for all time is a matter of the highest priority",  
and that

"such a treaty would constitute a contribution of the utmost importance to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race". (A/C.1/43/L.13, paras. 1, 2 and 3)

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

The draft resolution concludes with the customary request for the inclusion in the agenda of the Assembly's next session - that is, the forty-fourth session - of an item on this subject. It is preceded by three other paragraphs which can be regarded as the principal provisions of the draft resolution and under which the Assembly would: urge once more all nuclear-weapon States, in particular the three depositary Powers of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to seek to achieve the early discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons and to expedite negotiations to that end; appeal to all States members of the Conference on Disarmament to promote the establishment by the Conference at the beginning of its 1989 session of an ad hoc committee with the objective of carrying out the multilateral negotiation of a treaty on the complete cessation of nuclear-test explosions; and recommend to the Conference on Disarmament that such an ad hoc committee should comprise two working groups dealing, respectively, with the following interrelated questions: contents and scope of the treaty, and compliance and verification.

The CHAIRMAN: Does any other delegation wish to speak on the draft resolution? It appears not.

The Committee will recall that I informed it last week of my intention to distribute as early as possible this week an informal paper containing a list of all the draft resolutions on the disarmament agenda items rearranged in appropriate clusters. Following intensive consultations among the officers of the Committee, I am now in a position to present a paper dated 7 November setting out the Chairman's suggested programme, listing those draft resolutions under 15 different clusters. It is now in the process of being distributed to the Committee.

In this connection, I should like to indicate that I have tried to distribute the paper listing the clusters as early as possible in order to enable delegations to undertake the necessary consultations and to seek instructions, as appropriate, from their respective capitals, with a view to facilitating the smooth conduct of the work of the Committee during the voting procedure. These clusters were devised by the officers of the Committee on the basis of the pattern that has evolved during the past several years. In the process of grouping the various draft resolutions, the Bureau took into account the most logical and practical criteria available and made every effort at the same time to group them according to related subject matter, to the extent feasible.

I should like to stress that no other significance should be attached to the endeavours of the officers of the Committee than their desire to facilitate and expedite the work of the Committee with a view to utilizing our time and the conference services allotted for this phase of the Committee's work in the most effective and efficient manner possible.

With respect to the timetable for action on the draft resolutions, it will be my intention to move, as far as possible, from one cluster to another in sequence

(The Chairman)

the conclusion of action on each cluster. At the same time, in applying this procedure an attempt will be made to maintain the required degree of flexibility.

I hope members will understand when I say that I cannot give any precise indication now of the days on which any particular clusters will be taken up, but at the meeting on Thursday morning we will start with cluster 1, and then proceed. To the degree possible, I shall try to provide advance information as to how we shall proceed at successive meetings of the Committee. It depends on the speed at which we are able to handle the various clusters.

As for action on each individual cluster, members of the Committee will first have the opportunity to make any statement, other than explanations of vote, which they regard as necessary with respect to the draft resolutions in that cluster. Subsequently, delegations wishing to explain their positions or votes on any or all draft resolutions in a particular cluster before a decision is taken, will be able to do so. Then, after the Committee has taken a decision on the draft resolutions in a given cluster, delegations wishing to explain their positions or votes after the decision is taken will be able to do so. I would urge delegations to the extent feasible to make a consolidated statement on the draft resolutions contained in any individual cluster with respect to the statements and explanations of vote or positions concerned. I hope that the suggested programme of work and the procedure that I have just outlined will be acceptable.

I should now like to draw to the Committee's attention document A/C.1/43/8, dated 2 November 1988, which contains a letter addressed to me by the President of the General Assembly, transmitting a letter from the Chairman of the Second Committee concerning agenda item 12, entitled "Report of the Economic and Social Council".

(The Chairman)

The Chairman of the Second Committee requests that any views which members of the Main Committees, including the First Committee, might wish to express on aspects of the guidelines for international decades which may fall under the mandate of their respective Committees, be communicated to the Second Committee no later than the second week of November 1988. After discussing the matter, this Committee's Bureau concluded that members of the First Committee could express their views on the subject in writing to the Chairman. Accordingly, I invite those members of the Committee who may wish to communicate their views on the subject to do so in writing to me by 10 November, so that I may transmit them to the Chairman of the Second Committee within the required time period.

Mr. KENYON (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, I wish to make a statement in connection with the discussion in the First Committee on Friday, 4 November, about your reply to the letter of 12 October from the Chairman of the Fifth Committee.

My delegation fully shares the concern of all in this Committee for the maintenance of international peace and security and for the advancement of arms limitation and disarmament efforts. It believes that it is proper for this Committee to draw these concerns to the attention of the Fifth Committee, and therefore supports the points made to this effect in your proposed reply. My delegation believes, however, that it is not for the First Committee to proffer advice to the Fifth Committee as regards the selection of Secretariat staff.

(Mr. Kenyon, United Kingdom)

My delegation believes that the Secretary-General should be guided in his selection of staff by Article 101, paragraph 3, of the United Nations Charter, which states that the paramount consideration shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity and that due regard shall be paid to recruitment on as wide a geographical basis as possible. My delegation much regrets that the amendment to your draft reply which we proposed to take account of the first of these criteria, and which to the best of our knowledge met with no objection from any delegation, was not included in your proposed reply.

Mr. Chairman, in the final moments on Friday, when you declared the draft adopted, my delegation attempted to catch your eye to register its objection on this point, without success. For the record, therefore, I must state that my delegation did not join consensus on paragraph 6, that is the penultimate paragraph, of your proposed reply to the Fifth Committee Chairman.

Mr. AKALOVSKY (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, the United States delegation finds itself in a position very similar to that of the delegation of the United Kingdom. Like that delegation, in the closing moments of the Committee's meeting last Friday, 4 November, my delegation attempted to ask to speak when you were about to pronounce as adopted the penultimate paragraph of your proposed letter to the Chairman of the Fifth Committee. Unfortunately we also failed to catch your eye before you made that announcement.

Had my delegation had an opportunity to speak at that moment it would have reiterated its position that it is not for this Committee to advise the Fifth Committee on matters relating to personnel policies in the United Nations Secretariat and certainly not to deviate from or interpret the provision of the Charter, namely, Article 101, paragraph 3, which is to guide those policies. Regrettably, the pertinent language in your proposed letter is in conflict with

(Mr. Akalovsky, United States)

this position. In the circumstances my delegation is obliged to make it clear for the record that the penultimate paragraph of that letter does not command consensus in this Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: I have noted those comments.

The meeting rose at 12 noon.