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REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE  
UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN CYPRUS

(For the period 11 March to 10 June 1966)

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#### INTRODUCTION

1. This report on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus covers developments from 11 March to 10 June 1966 and brings up to date the record of United Nations activities in the Island pursuant to the mandate laid down in the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964 and subsequent resolutions of the Council relating to Cyprus.
2. During the period under review, the military situation, with the exception of an increase in shooting incidents, remained stable, although there was increased tension in areas of confrontation.

I. THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS

A. Composition and deployment

3. Near the end of the period covered by my last report, the strength of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was 4,853 military personnel and 173 civilian police (S/7191, para. 3). On 7 June 1966, the composition of the Force was as follows:

<u>Military</u>		<u>Total</u>
Austria	- Field Hospital . . . . .	52
Canada	- HQ UNFICYP and Military Police . . . . .	65
	- Battalion and reconnaissance squadron . . . . .	819
	- Contingent HQ and administrative support group . . . . .	<u>108</u>
		992
Denmark	- HQ UNFICYP and Military Police . . . . .	28
	- Battalion . . . . .	<u>631</u>
		659
Finland	- HQ UNFICYP and Military Police . . . . .	23
	- Battalion . . . . .	<u>629</u>
		652
Ireland	- HQ UNFICYP and Military Police . . . . .	17
	- Battalion . . . . .	<u>505</u>
		522
Sweden	- HQ UNFICYP and Military Police . . . . .	19
	- Battalion . . . . .	<u>738</u>
		757
United Kingdom	- HQ UNFICYP and Military Police . . . . .	154
	- Battalion and reconnaissance squadron . . . . .	674
	- Light aircraft and helicopter support . . . . .	56
	- UNFICYP logistic support units . . . . .	<u>169</u>
		<u>1,055</u>
	<u>Total military personnel:</u>	4,687
 <u>Civilian Police</u>		 <u>Total</u>
Australia . . . . .		40
Austria . . . . .		34
Denmark . . . . .		40
New Zealand . . . . .		20
Sweden . . . . .		<u>40</u>
	<u>Total Civilian Police:</u>	<u>174</u>
	TOTAL UNFICYP:	4,861

4. The following changes took place during the period of this report:

Rotations

(a) Canada: A rotation between 3 and 9 April 1966 involved 820 all ranks. The 2nd Battalion, Royal Highlanders of Canada relieved the 2nd Battalion, Canadian Guards. The present strength of the Canadian Contingent is 992.

(b) Denmark: A rotation during the period 10 to 18 May 1966 involved 471 all ranks. The present strength of the Danish Contingent is 659.

(c) Finland: A rotation between 27 March and 2 April 1966 involved 518 all ranks. The present strength of the Finnish Contingent is 652.

(d) Ireland: A rotation between 3 and 16 April 1966 involved 513 all ranks. The present strength of the Irish Contingent is 523.

(e) Sweden: A rotation between 6 and 26 April 1966 involved 658 all ranks. The present strength of the Swedish Contingent is 757.

(f) United Kingdom: A rotation between 13 and 23 April 1966 involved 530 all ranks. The Royal Welsh Fusiliers relieved the Royal Highland Fusiliers. The present strength of the British Contingent is 1,053.

5. The Force is deployed as follows (see attached map):

HQ UNFICYP (international) including HQ UNCIVPOL

Nicosia West District

Danish Contingent  
Danish Civilian Police  
Austrian Civilian Police

Nicosia East District

Finnish Contingent  
Austrian Civilian Police

Famagusta Zone

Swedish Contingent  
Swedish Civilian Police

Limassol Zone

British Contingent  
New Zealand Civilian Police  
Australian Civilian Police

Lefka District

Irish Contingent  
Australian Civilian Police

Kyrenia District

Canadian Contingent  
Danish Civilian Police

6. During the period under review, it was necessary to redeploy parts of the Force three times owing to (a) the withdrawal of the Irish 5th Infantry Group; (b) the subsequent arrival of the Irish 6th Infantry Group after a short interval; and (c) changes in the relative strengths of various contingents. The redeployment proceeded smoothly, with no loss of operational effectiveness by the Force. This reflects credit on the flexibility and standard of training of the contingents concerned as well as the good control exercised by Force Headquarters.
7. With effect from 16 May 1966, UNFICYP has been under the Command of Major General I.A.E. Martola, the new Force Commander. Mr. C.A. Bernardes continues as may Special Representative in Cyprus.
8. I should like to repeat on this occasion what I said on the appointment of the new Force Commander concerning the outstanding services rendered to the United Nations by Brigadier A.J. Wilson in the four and a half months during which he was the Acting Commander of UNFICYP. During that time he showed the highest qualities of leadership and diplomacy and carried on in an exemplary manner the work of his distinguished predecessors.

B. Function and guiding principles

9. The function of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus was defined by the Security Council, in its resolution of 4 March 1964, in the following terms:

"in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance of law and order and a return to normal conditions".

That resolution was reaffirmed by the Council in its subsequent resolutions of 13 March, 20 June, 9 August, 25 September and 18 December 1964, and 19 March, 15 June, 10 August and 17 December 1965, and in its resolution of 16 March 1966.

10. The guiding principles governing the operation of the Force, as summarized in my report of 10 September 1964 (S/5950, para. 7), remain in effect. The duties of the civilian police element of the Force are described in my reports of 2 May 1964 (S/5679, para. 4), 11 March 1965 (S/6228, paras. 112-113), 10 December 1965 (S/7001, para. 91), 10 March 1966 (S/7191, para. 78) and in the present report (see para. 73 below).

11. The Political Liaison Committee has continued to meet regularly to deal with the problems of implementation of the mandate and questions involving relationships between the Government and the Turkish Cypriot community. The Deputy Chief of Staff, the UNFICYP Senior Political and Legal Adviser and his staff, and the Police Adviser have continued to meet in the Committee separately with Liaison Officers representing the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership. Between 11 March 1966 and 10 June 1966, the Committee held twenty-one meetings; eleven with the Government Political Liaison Officer and ten with the Turkish Cypriot Political Liaison Officer.

#### Casualties and discipline

12. During the period of this report, UNFICYP suffered no casualties as a result of intercommunal fighting. One officer was killed in a helicopter accident, one man died of undetermined causes, and eight men were seriously injured in accidents.

13. The discipline, understanding and bearing of the officers and men of the United Nations Force continue to be of a high order, reflecting great credit on the Contingent Commanders and their staffs and on the armed forces of the contributing countries.

#### C. Relations with the Government and with the communities

14. UNFICYP has continued to maintain close liaison at every level with both the Cyprus Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership.

15. Negotiation, good offices and mediation are still the most suitable methods of determining one side or the other from taking action which might have serious consequences for the peace and tranquility of the Island. Cases have occurred, however, where measures have been taken without prior consultation with UNFICYP or

in disregard of its advice, for example near Larnaca and at Pileri (see paras. 35 and 64 below).

D. Freedom of movement of the United Nations Force

16. During the period covered by this report, there were six incidents involving a denial of freedom of movement to UNFICYP elements. All six cases were the result of poor briefing of subordinates and did not reflect decisions taken either by the Cyprus Government or the Turkish Cypriot leadership. In one instance, the Force Commander was prevented by the National Guard from inspecting the Hala Sultan Tekke Mosque situated south of Larnaca. The Government expressed its regrets and explained that sentries had acted without authority.

II. ACTIVITIES TOWARDS PREVENTING A RECURRENCE OF FIGHTING  
AND CONTRIBUTING TO THE RESTORATION AND MAINTENANCE OF  
LAW AND ORDER

A. Military situation

(i) Armed forces in Cyprus other than UNFICYP

(a) Government armed forces

17. During the period covered by this report the National Guard did not undergo any substantial changes in its regular strength, which still consists mainly of the conscripted elements of the 1940, 1941, 1946 and 1947 age-groups. No reporting date has yet been announced for the 1948 age-group, which is subject to call-up under a decision taken by the Council of Ministers in January (S/7191, paras. 20-22).

18. Instruction and training, including firing exercises with heavy weapons, seem to be following the normal sequence of the general training programme. No large-scale field exercises or activities of any great significance have been observed by UNFICYP during the period of this report; improvements in coastal defences, some of them situated in sensitive areas, have been, however, steadily continued by the National Guard (S/7191, para. 26). So far as UNFICYP knows, no shipments of military goods, except for maintenance supplies of various items, have arrived in the Island in recent months.

19. Although there has been a protracted political dispute over the Supreme Command of the National Guard, no changes have so far occurred in the command structure. UNFICYP has no precise information on the strength of Greek officers and other categories of military personnel from Greece who since my last report have been confirmed - in public statements concerning the command structure - as being members of the National Guard (S/7191, para. 24).

(b) Turkish Cypriot armed elements

20. The various Turkish Cypriot fighter organizations do not appear to have undergone any noteworthy changes during the past three months and there has been no sign of any marked change in their morale. There have been some new inductions of young men, in limited numbers, especially in areas where the local fighter organization is on a permanent footing. Except for training, which is mostly carried out as a daily routine, the main activity of the fighters in all confrontation areas is guard duty and the maintenance of existing positions.

21. Precise figures for the total strength of the Turkish Cypriot armed elements are not available to UNFICYP (S/7191, para. 34). In the present relatively calm situation, however, only a part of the total fighting potential of Turkish Cypriot armed elements is being used, and UNFICYP's estimate is that the existing strength of fighters constantly under arms or employed on a permanent basis for special duties within the various organizations is approximately 5,000.

22. The standard of dress and equipment used by the fighters has further improved. Where the fighters in the past sometimes wore civilian clothes while on duty, they appear today in uniform. UNFICYP has no evidence that weapons or other categories of military equipment have been received by the Turkish Cypriots from outside the Island during the period under review.

(c) The Greek and Turkish National Contingents

23. No apparent change in the total strengths or the locations of the two national contingents has occurred during the period under review.

24. As indicated in my last report, UNFICYP was informed in February that Turkey intended to replace part of its contingent in Cyprus towards the end of March and was also asked to extend, as in the past, its good offices and facilities for this operation (S/7191, para. 39). The Government of Cyprus, while maintaining its position regarding the Treaty of Alliance, did not oppose the rotation, but it objected to some items and quantities on the list of stores and ammunition to be imported by the incoming troops. Most of these problems were eventually resolved as a result of negotiations with UNFICYP's assistance, and the rotation took place without incident on 29 March 1966 through the port of Famagusta. The outgoing and incoming parties were of equal strength, namely, 40 officers and 310 other ranks.

25. One significant change from past procedure was the decision by the Government of Turkey to send back disputed items in the returning ship. Thus, UNFICYP was not involved in any further negotiations after the rotation was completed.

26. On 27 May, two officers of the Turkish National Contingent were arrested by the Cyprus Police at the Famagusta Gate checkpoint in Nicosia. The officers, who were riding a motorcycle, were in mufti and had neither identity documents nor driving licences. At the request of the Turkish Embassy, UNFICYP used its good offices and arranged for the officers' release on the following day.

(ii) General assessment of the situation with regard to preventing a recurrence of fighting

27. The general situation on the Island has remained quiet, but there has been a steady succession of local incidents, all of them potentially dangerous. In spite of continued efforts by UNFICYP to persuade both the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership to take peaceful steps to eliminate the lines of armed confrontation on the Island, the situation in this respect has, on the whole, not changed for the better during the period under review.

28. Some of the more important and dangerous local situations which involved action under the United Nations mandate of preventing a recurrence of fighting are detailed in section B of this chapter.

(iii) Developments towards reducing areas of tension

29. As previously indicated, the most important factor contributing to tension and the danger of a recurrence of fighting in Cyprus is the armed confrontation that exists around the periphery of a number of "islands" of Turkish Cypriot population. Since its arrival in Cyprus the Force has therefore always tried to promote a process of "de-confrontation", that is, it has tried to interpose its own forces in sensitive areas, increase the distance between opposing armed elements and secure agreement for the elimination of the checkpoints, road barriers, bunkers and other fortifications that constitute the instruments of confrontation. Because it has so far not been very successful in its efforts in this direction, UNFICYP has had to do the next best thing by taking a particularly strong stand against any action that tends to intensify armed confrontation, such as the strengthening of existing forward positions or the establishment of any new position that might improve the military posture of either side in relation to the other. UNFICYP is sometimes criticized by one side or the other for this policy, which can only keep tension within tolerable limits but cannot eliminate it. Nevertheless, in spite of the resistance to "de-confrontation", the policy is being consistently applied and, whenever the parties can be induced to co-operate, it has usually been a determining factor in restoring situations that have begun to deteriorate.

30. One major defortification agreement, arrived at in December 1965 with respect to Famagusta, has had a salutary effect and there have been no serious incidents. Since my last report (S/7191, paras. 55-57) there have been a number of complaints of violations from both the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leaders, but these have resulted from minor incidents, which UNFICYP has tried to keep to a minimum by prompt discussion with both sides. In that connexion, an investigation was ordered by the Acting Force Commander on 4 May 1966 to examine all reported violations. As a result, an UNFICYP board of inquiry has made recommendations on the future implementation of the December 1965 arrangements which are being discussed with both sides. At the same time difficult negotiations are still proceeding with a view to obtaining agreement on the definition of the western boundary of the defortified area (S/7191, para. 57). There is some doubt whether or not the Ayios Loukas School, which is still occupied by the National Guard, comes within the scope of the arrangements. Until the disagreements which caused the above-mentioned incidents are settled, the Famagusta situation will continue to harbour elements of surprise which could, at any moment, lead to renewed confrontation.

B. Specific developments and action taken by UNFICYP

(i) National Guard coastal defences - Larnaca/Scala

31. Problems have continued to arise in connexion with the construction by the Government of coastal defences. Every State has a right to prepare defences against external attack and, of itself, this cannot be regarded as offensive or as giving grounds for reprisal. At the same time, in line with its policy of preventing the intensification of armed confrontation on the Island, UNFICYP has urged the National Guard not to site its coastal defences in the immediate vicinity of Turkish Cypriot villages and, where the purposes they are designed to serve make it necessary to locate them not very far from such villages, to take precautions to prevent them from becoming a military threat to the inhabitants.

32. As I mentioned in my last report (S/7191, para. 53), UNFICYP had inspected and judged non-provocative a coastal bunker, south of Scala, the Turkish Cypriot quarter of Larnaca, but negotiated for it to remain unmanned. This was

subsequently agreed to. UNFICYP also inspected the site of a second bunker, at position S 291364, and raised no objection to it provided that once constructed it would not be manned and that its arcs of fire would be restricted to approaches from the sea, thus ensuring that they would not pass over the Turkish Cypriot area of Scala. UNFICYP did not consider this proposed position as in any way a threat to the Turkish Cypriots of Scala.

33. On 8 March a joint board of officers from UNFICYP and the National Guard confirmed that the bunker would not be occupied when construction was completed and that its garrison would remain at a post approximately 150 yards away. In addition, UNFICYP undertook to establish an observation post between the bunker site and the Turkish Cypriot positions in Scala during its construction. It was also agreed that after construction was completed UNFICYP would place an observation post in close proximity to the National Guard garrison, to ensure that the bunker would not be manned without prior UNFICYP agreement. On 11 April 1966, the National Guard informed UNFICYP that construction of the new bunker at S 291364 would start. The Turkish Cypriots were informed on 12 April and the National Guard began construction on 13 April. UNFICYP interposed the post previously agreed upon.

34. As soon as construction began, the Turkish Cypriots in Scala reacted strongly and retaliated by improving two existing positions and constructing three new positions on a dominating ridge to the north. All these positions were concreted. During April, the Acting Force Commander attempted, through negotiation, to reduce the tension that was building up in the area and had frequent discussions with the Turkish Cypriot leadership and the Government. The Government confirmed its adherence to the previous conditions for the construction of the bunker and stated it would take no action against the new Turkish Cypriot positions while UNFICYP attempted to solve the problem.

35. In discussions with the Turkish Cypriot leadership, the Acting Force Commander clearly presented UNFICYP's position, both verbally and in writing, that the National Guard coastal defence bunker was a genuine defence installation against external attack and did not constitute a threat to the Turkish Cypriot positions in Scala, that as it was located approximately 1,400 yards from the forward Turkish Cypriot positions, small arms fire could not be effective against them, while a hill feature between the bunker and Scala would prevent any direct fire from being brought to bear against the town. He also stated that UNFICYP would ensure that the National Guard bunker would not be manned once construction was completed and

therefore it was quite unnecessary for the Turkish Cypriots to construct positions as a reprisal, that the action taken by the Turkish Cypriots was thus against UNFICYP's considered military advice and was liable to lead to fighting.

36. This, however, did not satisfy the Turkish Cypriots, who continued to improve all their positions, rejected two formal requests by UNFICYP to demolish the new positions, and established a road checkpoint at S 293374. The Turkish Cypriot leadership expressed the view that the building of the bunker was one of a series of Greek Cypriot actions designed to increase tension without any provocation attributable to the Turkish Cypriots, that it had been the decision to build bunkers south of Larnaca which had disturbed the peaceful atmosphere in the area, that whatever UNFICYP might say the bunker could be used to attack the Turkish Cypriot quarter of Larnaca and to interfere with individual Turkish Cypriots bathing at the adjacent beach, that it was unfair of UNFICYP to deny to the Turkish Cypriots their right to take counter-measures in self-defence, instead of trying to remove the original cause of the tension, and that as soon as the National Guard demolished its new positions they would do the same. In this connexion it must be pointed out that the National Guard complied fully with the conditions for the construction of the bunker as agreed to with UNFICYP. On the other hand, it was the Turkish Cypriot reaction, unnecessary and unjustified in UNFICYP's view, that has been responsible for the tension in an area which had been quiet for a long period of time.

37. The Acting Force Commander ordered additional UNFICYP troops to deploy in the zone between the opposing forces to guard against an outbreak of fighting while negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the incident continued through the latter part of April and the first week of May. On 4 May a provisional arrangement was agreed upon under which the Turkish Cypriots would withdraw from the positions they had occupied after 12 April without prejudice to their right to re-occupy them, while further negotiation with the Government took place with a view to requesting it, as a gesture of good faith, to adjust the location of the National Guard garrison of the bunker to a further distance from the bunker. In the meantime, UNFICYP would deploy observation posts to reassure both sides that all the new positions, both Government and Turkish Cypriot, remained unmanned.

38. At the time this report is written, the situation is unsatisfactory but quiet from the military standpoint. The Government, resenting the Turkish Cypriot refusal to demolish their new fortifications south of Scala, has introduced some

economic restrictions as a reprisal, especially in relation to the supply of kerosene to the Turkish Cypriot quarter of Scala. This action, coupled with denial of Turkish Cypriot access and allegations of damage to the Hala Sultan Tekke, a Moslem shrine nearby by National Guard soldiers, and some additional National Guard coastal defence constructions south of Scala, has further disturbed the Turkish Cypriots, who remain adamant in their refusal to demolish their disputed fortifications. Negotiations continue for a solution.

(ii) Temblos

39. Another area which, as in the past, has received UNFICYP's attention because of problems connected with coastal defence is Temblos, a demilitarized Turkish Cypriot village on the northern slope of the Kyrenia range whose population has been swelled by a large number of refugees from nearby mixed villages.

40. On 8 March 1966 the National Guard commenced the erection of a barbed wire fence forward of their positions north and east of Temblos. Since then, the fence has been extended to a length of approximately one mile. There are gaps, closed with movable knife-rests (movable barriers), where the fence crosses the two roads leading into the village. When construction began the Turkish Cypriots protested it strongly on the grounds that the National Guard had no legal right to build anything on private property without the owners' permission and that the fence was designed eventually to encircle the village. The National Guard maintained that the fence was being erected as a measure against invasion and a possible attempt for a sea landing to link up with Turkish Cypriot fighter positions in the Kyrenia range.

41. UNFICYP is of the opinion that so long as the fence is not developed so as to threaten encirclement of the village, it can be regarded as a legitimate defence measure. At the same time, it is concerned that the interests of the villagers should not be adversely affected. During the building of the fence some damage was caused to olive trees owned by Turkish Cypriots, and the fence has cut off some inhabitants of Temblos from their land lying to the north of it. This is an unsatisfactory situation and UNFICYP is negotiating through the Political Liaison Committee to secure the Government's agreement to allow complete freedom of movement for farmers in the area to and from their fields and freedom of movement for the people of Temblos through the fence.

42. During the period under review, the agreed conditions for the use and maintenance of the Temblos-St. Hilarion track (S/6426, para. 75) have in general been observed. On 16 April and 4 May there were some minor breaches when the Turkish Cypriots attempted to widen the track. As the only maintenance permitted is that required to keep the track in the condition it was on 10 May 1965, UNFICYP temporarily closed the track and the work was stopped.
43. Temblos was also the scene of a serious shooting incident. Although sporadic shooting is heard almost daily in the area, the only sustained firing occurred on the morning of 1 April, EOKA Day, when the National Guard fired between 100 and 250 rounds from small arms for a period of approximately one hour. The shots were fired indiscriminately and did not appear to be aimed. Although the Turkish Cypriots in the area were obviously perturbed by the firing they exhibited remarkable restraint. After a strong protest from UNFICYP at the local level, the local National Guard Commander explained that the occurrence had been merely a part of the EOKA Day celebrations.
44. During the firing, a number of rounds fell close to two UNFICYP observation posts in the area, four of them actually striking the perimeter of one position, and the post commanders were obliged to deploy their men in trenches for protection. Fortunately no casualties were sustained as a result of the shooting.
45. Subsequently, the Government denied that the National Guard had participated in the shooting at all, and asserted that the statement of the local National Guard commander, that the shooting was part of EOKA Day celebrations, was in error. A joint UNFICYP/National Guard investigation was conducted into the incident and in the opinion of UNFICYP the National Guard was clearly responsible for the shooting. It is considered that the shooting was an attempt to provoke return-fire from Temblos, since the National Guard has consistently claimed that there are armed fighters in the village, although UNFICYP troops stationed in the village have seen no evidence of their presence. On 3 June, about 100 rounds were fired towards Temblos village by rifles and automatic weapons. Preliminary investigations by UNFICYP indicated that shooting originated from National Guard positions, situated north-east of the village, and that the fire was not returned.

(iii) "Green line"

46. Starting on 19 April, many complaints were received from the Turkish Cypriot leadership alleging that the Cyprus Police had started a system of patrolling on the "green line" within the walled city of Nicosia. UNFICYP's own observations have not confirmed the existence of a definite patrolling scheme but have established that there has been a marked increase in the number of Cyprus policemen using the streets along the "green line". Meetings with the police authorities and the Government Political Liaison Officer brought out that the increased activity was due mainly to a Government order instructing all Government employees to shop on the "green line" streets - which had been important business thoroughfares before 1964 - in a bid to help the merchants and restore normal conditions. The police authorities assured UNFICYP that none of this amounted to organized patrolling and confirmed that the only patrolling along the "line" was that carried out by the established joint patrols of Cyprus Police and UNFICYP Civilian Police.

47. The Turkish Cypriot reaction to this activity has been very strong. The Turkish Cypriot leadership has condemned it as a provocation and part of a plan to create incidents, and has asked UNFICYP to put a stop to it. During May, fire-crackers were thrown from the Turkish Cypriot quarter at vehicles passing along Paphos Street and for a few days a loud-speaker system was installed through which Turkish Cypriots shouted provocative remarks on two occasions at policemen and shopkeepers.

48. UNFICYP is attempting to deal with this new source of friction. It has asked the Turkish Cypriots to refrain from further unwise retaliatory action, which has only served to add to the tension. At the same time it has urged the Government to instruct the Cyprus Police not to undertake any activity on the "green line" of a nature or on a scale different from that obtaining during the previous quiet period.

(iv) Trypimeni-Vitsadha road project

49. On 24 April, the Government began improving a track between the Greek Cypriot villages of Trypimeni and Vitsadha as part of a general programme to improve village roads on the Island. The work on this road was given a high priority because the two villages are situated north and south of a cluster of

Turkish Cypriot villages centred on Chatos, and any inhabitants of Trypimeni wishing to reach the main Nicosia-Famagusta road at Vitsadha are now forced to travel an additional distance of approximately 40 kilometers by way of Lefkoniko. The only existing paved road between Trypimeni and Vitsadha passes through the Turkish Cypriot village of Knodhara, where Turkish Cypriot roadblocks have interfered with the free passage of Greek Cypriots for more than two years (S/6426, para. 80).

50. Shortly after construction began, the Turkish Cypriots in the area reacted strongly. The Turkish Cypriot leadership protested it as an attempt to split a purely Turkish Cypriot area with a strategic road that could be exploited to attack the Turkish Cypriot villages, and it expressed its lack of confidence in Government promises to pay fair compensation for any Turkish Cypriot land that had to be compulsorily acquired to widen the track.

51. Armed Turkish Cypriots in the area soon began to take up positions along the proposed route south of Trypimeni and by 5 May had deployed a total of ten manned positions. As early as 26 April, anticipating a confrontation in this area, UNFICYP had deployed a reserve in the area of Chatos. Later, on 5 May, it interposed an observation post between the village of Trypimeni and the most northerly Turkish Cypriot positions to guard against any confrontation between the Turkish Cypriots and members of the National Guard near Trypimeni. In addition, a number of UNFICYP scout-cars were ordered to be in readiness for immediate deployment as additional observation posts in the area to prevent any possibility of an incident that might precipitate a recurrence of fighting.

52. Meanwhile, during the latter part of April, UNFICYP engaged in urgent negotiations on the problem with the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership. As a result, the Government agreed to suspend the work on the road for a period of time while a solution was being sought. For its part, the Turkish Cypriot leadership offered, as an alternative to the road project, to discuss arrangements for free passage through Knodhara of Greek Cypriot civilian traffic, and the Government has accepted this in principle.

53. Negotiations are still in progress but tension in the area is rising: the Turkish Cypriots are continuing to set up new positions, the National Guard has established several new positions of its own, and UNFICYP has had to commit

additional forces and increase its military and police patrols. Moreover, some Greek Cypriot farmers have interrupted their harvesting although the Turkish Cypriots have given categorical assurances that they would not be interfered with.

54. UNFICYP is pressing for rapid implementation of the free-passage plan before an incident occurs that could touch off serious fighting in the area.

(v) The Kyrenia Road

55. In my last two reports (S/7001, para. 59, and S/7191, para. 58), I indicated that because of the greatly reduced number of incidents on the Kyrenia Road and in order to achieve greater economy in the use of troops, all UNFICYP military personnel - with the exception of those accompanying and protecting the convoys - had been withdrawn from positions along the road, although operational control of the road remained the responsibility of the Commander, Kyrenia Zone. The UNFICYP Civilian Police thus became responsible not only for searching the vehicles in the convoys but for marshalling and dispersing them, ensuring security and traffic control in the villages of Orta Keuy and Geunyeli during the passage of the convoys, and manning the checkpoints at both ends of the road during daylight hours.

56. Because of the continued low rate of incidents and the increasing co-operation shown by the Turkish Cypriots in the implementation of the Kyrenia Road Agreement (S/6102, annex I), it was subsequently decided to limit UNFICYP's official presence on the road to the convoys, and to cease the manning of checkpoints altogether.

57. While the convoy system has continued to operate smoothly enough, UNFICYP noted a tendency in the Turkish Cypriot enclave during the earlier part of the period covered by this report to pay less attention to some of the provisions of the Kyrenia Road Agreement than when UNFICYP military personnel manned a number of posts along the road. An UNFICYP board of inquiry convened by the Acting Force Commander on 2 May found that there had been contraventions to some provisions of the Agreement.

58. The board's findings were brought to the attention of the Turkish Cypriot leadership and the Commander of the Turkish National Contingent. This has already

resulted in an improvement in the way in which the Agreement is being observed and it is hoped that it will not be necessary to re-establish military posts along the road in order to ensure full compliance.

59. Another development that is giving UNFICYP cause for concern has been the efforts of Turkish Cypriot fighters to establish new positions at the Kyrenia Pass. On 29 April they began to construct three positions on the northern side of the Pass beside the Kyrenia Road which would have had the effect of advancing the Turkish Cypriot fighter defences another 1,000 yards closer to the National Guard forward defences and, by establishing positions in the low ground alongside the road, of bringing the possibility of conflict into an area UNFICYP has always managed to maintain free of fortifications.

60. On 6 May, UNFICYP protested strongly to the local Turkish Cypriot leadership concerning these positions which formed a new forward strongpoint for the Turkish Cypriot fighters and it asked that the new positions should be destroyed. This protest was repeated on 8 and 13 May. While construction work on the positions ceased on 8 May, no action was taken by the Turkish Cypriot leadership to have the emplacements filled in. On 15 May, therefore, United Nations troops themselves destroyed all three positions without incident.

61. On 21 May, Turkish Cypriot fighters were again found to have dug two new positions in the area. The positions were temporarily occupied by United Nations soldiers until the Turkish Cypriots gave an undertaking not to man the positions and also agreed to a joint board of inquiry to fix firmly the cease-fire line in this area. During the negotiations leading to this agreement, the seven-man UNFICYP section occupying the disputed positions was at times covered by as many as seventy-five armed Turkish fighters, some of them with Bren guns, and UNFICYP had to move three scout cars into the area to provide additional support.

62. On 28 April, the Turkish Cypriot Political Liaison Officer drew attention to the fact that the Kyrenia Road was in need of repair. A number of pot-holes had appeared and the edges of the road had crumbled in many places as a result of the heavy traffic of Turkish Cypriot, Turkish National Contingent, Greek Cypriot and United Nations vehicles using the road, and further deterioration was likely under the even heavier traffic load expected during the summer months. He suggested that the cost of repairs should be shared, the labour being provided by the Turkish Cypriots and the materials by the Greek Cypriots.

63. UNFICYP presented this suggestion to the Government, offering to see to it that the materials furnished were used exclusively for the work of repair. The suggestion is still being considered by the Government.

(vi) Pileri

64. During the period under review, the Pileri area has continued to be a potential focus of danger. The Turkish Cypriots have still not accepted UNFICYP's advice to withdraw from a disputed position and continue to occupy a bunker forward of the accepted cease-fire line (S/7001, paras. 61-64, and S/7191, paras. 63 and 64).

65. Moreover, during the period under review, they have periodically attempted to improve the position and their means of access to the area. UNFICYP's successive protests to the Turkish Cypriot leadership concerning this provocative position have had practically no effect. The Turkish Cypriots continue to argue that they cannot rely on UNFICYP to prevent the National Guard's occupying the position if they withdraw (S/7191, para. 63).

(vii) Kokkina and Limnitis

66. The Kokkina and Limnitis enclaves continue to be areas where much care is required on the part of UNFICYP to prevent possibly serious incidents. Since my last report (S/7191, paras. 68-71), there have again been cases near Limnitis in which one side or the other has attempted to narrow the neutral zone by constructing additional fortifications forward of its established defence line. Instances of digging are most prevalent in the north-east and south-east corners of the enclave. During the period under review there have been a total of twenty-two confirmed instances of irregular attempts to fortify positions, twelve attributed to the National Guard and ten to Turkish Cypriot fighters, including "renovations" of alleged old positions and improvements of existing ones. In all of these cases UNFICYP has succeeded in having the fortification stopped or the positions removed.

67. Although there have been no serious shooting incidents in these areas since early March (S/7191, para. 71) the situation remains potentially dangerous. Digging and fortification tend to aggravate it and might subsequently lead to a

further outbreak of fighting. As I mentioned in my previous report, conditions would seem propitious for demilitarization, particularly in the Kokkina area. It would also be a forward step towards a return to normal conditions in the area if the refugees now in Kokkina could be resettled in their home villages and if the ban on Greek Cypriot transit traffic through that enclave could be lifted. UNFICYP continues its efforts in that direction. Given the will by both sides to solve these problems, there is no reason why real progress towards normality should not be achieved in the areas of Kokkina and Limnitis.

(viii) Observance of the cease-fire

68. Shooting incidents during the period covered are summarized below. The figures from previous periods are also given for purposes of comparison. It will be seen that there has been a definite increase in the number of shooting incidents.

Zone or district	8 March to 7 June 1966	2 Dec. 1965 to 7 March 1966	11 June to 1 Dec. 1965	8 March to 10 June 1965	9 Dec. 1964 to 7 March 1965	9 Sept. to 8 Dec. 1964	9 June to 8 Sept. 1964
Nicosia Zone	Not operative	Not operative	17	89	97	124	191
Nicosia West District	2	0	3	Not operative during these periods			
Nicosia East District	3	1	3	Not operative during these periods			
Famagusta Zone	2	0	14	10	44	16	10
Limassol Zone	1	4	9	5	7	6	5
Paphos District	Not operative	Not operative	6	2	7	4	} 53
Morphou District	Not operative	Not operative	4	153	67	10	
Lefka District	7	1	3	Not operative during these periods			
Kyrenia District	19	11	10	Not operative during these periods			

69. In the opinion of UNFICYP, twenty-two of the shooting incidents constituted deliberate breaches of the cease-fire. Three occurred in Nicosia East District, six in Lefka District and thirteen in Kyrenia District. Sixteen were attributed to the National Guard and six to Turkish Cypriot fighters. The figures for deliberate breaches represent a marked increase over the previous three months.

70. The increase in the number of shooting incidents largely reflects the frequent firing which took place in Kyrenia District in the period 29 March - 12 April 1966, mainly in the Pileri and Temblos areas, when fourteen shooting incidents in the District were registered, of which ten constituted breaches of the cease-fire. Nine of these were attributed to the National Guard. The shooting reached a height on 1 April when between 100 and 250 rounds were fired, and two UNFICYP observation posts were hit by several rounds (see para. 44 above).

71. Another instance of intense firing proved to be an isolated case without serious repercussions. The Trachonas suburb north of Nicosia, at one time turbulent, had been quiet for many months, when, on the evening of 14 April, a sharp exchange of fire between the National Guard and Turkish Cypriot fighters occurred in the northern part of the suburb. The shooting lasted for approximately 30 minutes during which an estimated 200 to 300 rounds were fired. There were no casualties. United Nations troops took prompt action and successfully arranged a cease-fire.

72. The case turned out to be the result of a misunderstanding. The Turkish Cypriots admitted opening fire first because they thought, mistakenly, that the National Guard had manned new positions in the area. The National Guard replied when fire was directed towards their positions. While the ease with which the shooting started illustrates the continuing suspicion and lamentable "trigger happiness" that still exists between the two sides, it is encouraging that both parties took responsible action to prevent the situation from deteriorating and assisted UNFICYP in gaining a prompt cease-fire.

### C. Developments relating to the maintenance of law and order

#### (i) The work of the UNFICYP Civilian Police

73. The UNFICYP Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) continue to give the United Nations forces valuable assistance by performing duties that are more in line with normal police work than with strictly military functions. In addition to liaison with the

Cyprus Police and the Turkish Cypriot Police elements, these duties comprise the investigation of incidents involving members of the two communities and the manning of posts in sensitive areas. UNCIVFOL maintains observation at Cyprus Police stationary checkpoints in Nicosia City, Famagusta City and Lefka District, and at mobile checkpoints in Limassol and Paphos Districts. It conducts joint patrols with Cyprus Police in Nicosia and Ktima, and it is also responsible for the marshalling and dispersal of the Kyrenia Road convoys.

74. Between 7 March and 7 June 1966, UNCIVFOL investigated sixty-six cases containing elements of intercommunal strife, including one of homicide, two of attempted homicide, four of assault, thirteen of shooting from vehicles passing through villages or at persons working in fields, sixteen of larceny, and nineteen of damage to property - twelve at the expense of Turkish Cypriots and seven of Greek Cypriots. These figures are roughly the same as those of the preceding three-month period. UNCIVFOL has also investigated three cases of defectors and seven instances of Greek Cypriots who found themselves in difficulty after crossing into the Turkish Cypriot enclave of Nicosia. It also assisted in one case in which a Turkish Cypriot family sought Government protection, and one case in which a Greek Cypriot took refuge in a Turkish Cypriot enclave.

75. During the same period, observations were made in connexion with arrests of two Turkish nationals and seventeen Turkish Cypriots, the temporary detention by Cyprus Police of more than forty-three others, as well as eighty seizures of items from Turkish Cypriots passing Cyprus Police checkpoints.

76. In addition to co-operating with the Cyprus Police in investigations contributing to a normal state of affairs in matters affecting law and order, a continuing concern for UNCIVFOL has been the tracing of persons missing since the turbulent first months of 1964. Only one case of the 212 Turkish Cypriots listed as missing has been closed since my last report, a man now found to have been killed in April 1964. Forty-one Greek Cypriots, three British nationals, and one German and one Greek national, a soldier, are still listed as missing.

(ii) Investigation of crime and intercommunal strife

77. Several assassinations referred to in my previous reports either remain unsolved or suspects have for various reasons not yet been brought to justice. Such

is the case with the murder of two trade-union leaders, the Greek Cypriot Costas Mishaolis and the Turkish Cypriot Dervish Gavazoglu (S/7001, para. 94); of the Greek Cypriot Kyriakos Savva Tsiattos (S/7001, para. 96); of the Turkish Cypriot Mehmet Kadir (S/7001, para. 98) and the Greek Cypriot Kyriakos Solomu (S/7001, para. 99).

78. Two Greek Cypriots from the village of Paralimni were detained on 12 March in the Turkish quarter of Nicosia, on charges of carrying explosives in their car. They are still being held in the Turkish quarter. Although so far unsuccessful in negotiation for their release, UNFICYP has used its good offices to arrange visits by the representative of a Red Cross Society and by relatives, who found the two men in good health.

79. On the morning of 20 March, twenty Turkish Cypriots were arrested by Cyprus Police at a checkpoint outside Larnaca. Fifteen of them had been travelling in a bus and some were alleged to have been wearing clothing resembling a uniform. All those arrested were released later the same day, but some complained of ill-treatment and assault, and showed an UNFICYP doctor wounds consistent with their complaints. UNFICYP protested to the Government and asked that it inquire into the allegations of ill-treatment. This was not done on the grounds that no Government doctor had been present during the physical examination by the UNFICYP doctor. In other cases of alleged assault the Government has denied the allegations.

80. A tense situation arose in Ayia Varvara on 19 March when a Turkish Cypriot was shot and seriously wounded by a fellow Turkish Cypriot. The Cyprus Police requested the local Turkish Cypriot authorities to hand over the culprit but this was refused. Against UNFICYP advice, forty armed Cyprus Police entered the village under the cover of a section of the National Guard and arrested the wanted man. UNCIVPOL preceded the Police and advised the villagers to remain calm. Although feeling ran high, no incident occurred and tension subsided when the Police withdrew.

81. In the evening of 2 April, a serious shooting incident occurred at the village of Stavrokomo in Paphos District. An UNFICYP patrol from the outpost near Stavrokomo, which had heard repeated firing, rushed to the spot, administered first aid to an injured Turkish Cypriot and arranged for his transport to hospital. An inquiry by UNCIVPOL showed that three other Turkish Cypriots were receiving medical treatment at the Akrotiri and Limassol hospitals, one of them succumbing to

his wounds. The shooting, it was alleged, was connected with a dispute between rival factions of the Turkish Cypriot villages of Stavrokomo, Fhasoula and Koukklia. Although full light could not be shed on the affair, it was later established that, in all, three Turkish Cypriots had lost their lives and a further six had been wounded in the affray.

82. A Greek Cypriot blacksmith, Petros Anastassi Kyparissos, was fatally shot on the night of 12 May while entering his house south of Nicosia. Verifying information from the Cyprus Police, UNCIVFOL established two days later that the suspected murderer, a Greek Cypriot, Adamos Panteli, had taken refuge in the Turkish Cypriot village of Louroujina. The Vice-President's Office, which was approached on the matter, confirmed that the person in question was in Louroujina and free to leave, but indicated that it would not itself take any action to hand over the suspect to the Cyprus Police authorities. UNFICYP remains in touch with both sides in this case.

(iii) Bomb explosions

83. In the period under review, the bomb explosions in Government-controlled areas of the larger towns of the Island have continued. Some were said by the Government to be the work of "Turkish terrorists" in an effort "to blunt the impression created by the discovery of their conspiracy with the French saboteurs" (S/7191, para. 84). One of the accused French nationals was put on trial and on 12 May was sentenced to 12 years imprisonment by the Assize Court of Larnaca after pleading guilty to charges of having planted the bombs responsible for the big fire at the Larnaca petrol installations in October 1965. Another alien, a national of the United Kingdom, taken into custody by Cyprus Police allegedly in connexion with the planting of bombs in Nicosia, was deported to the United Kingdom in April. For their part, the Turkish Cypriots have accused the Government of attributing to them crimes committed by Government agents or by Greek Cypriots hostile to the Government's policies.

84. UNFICYP is deeply disturbed by the continuation of these bombing incidents, which, whoever their authors may be, are increasing tension, strengthening old suspicions and creating new ones, and threatening to place new obstacles in the path of its efforts to promote freedom of movement and the restoration of normal conditions in a number of important public services. The UNFICYP Civilian Police

stand ready to assist in the investigation of these crimes and in bringing the perpetrators to justice.

85. Regrettably, in one instance, the Government's Public Information Office issued a press release on 14 March prematurely implicating members of UNFICYP in a bomb explosion which occurred in Nicosia two days before. It protested to the Representative of Cyprus against the fact that such a statement could have been made while investigations were still proceeding. Subsequently, the investigations carried out by UNFICYP, with the assistance of the Cyprus Police, failed to reveal evidence implicating any member of UNFICYP in the bombing, although it was established that four UNFICYP soldiers had transported some weapons and ammunition and other items in UNFICYP vehicles for Turkish Cypriots in Nicosia and Famagusta. The soldiers concerned were tried and pleaded guilty in a court-martial of their national contingent; they were sentenced on charges of conduct to the prejudice of good order and military discipline and of having failed to observe relevant contingent orders.

86. In connexion with earlier bomb explosions, in March, the Cyprus Government implicated a Turkish diplomat, Mr. Koskun, in activities prejudicial to the security of the State and declared him persona non grata (S/7191, paras. 84-85).

Dr. Fazil Kuchuk, the Vice-President, rejected as groundless all the Government's allegations against Mr. Koskun and, invoking article 50 of the Constitution, under which the Vice-President and Deputy Head of State had a say in matters relating to foreign affairs, he stated that he had not been consulted and the requirements of the Constitution had therefore not been complied with; the demand made to the Turkish Embassy was of no effect whatsoever.

87. Thereafter the Foreign Minister of Cyprus issued a statement in which he upheld the Government's demand to the Turkish Embassy and added that not even before the troubles did Dr. Kuchuk have a right of veto in such cases. The Foreign Minister noted that Mr. Koskun had not left the country by the time-limit set for his departure. His name had therefore been deleted from the diplomatic list and his diplomatic privileges cancelled. So far as is known, Mr. Koskun is still in the Turkish quarter of Nicosia.

### III. ACTIVITIES TOWARDS A RETURN TO NORMAL CONDITIONS

#### A. General assessment

88. In my previous reports to the Council, I have repeatedly emphasized that a return to normal conditions is made by one or both communities to depend almost wholly on progress towards a settlement of the main political issue and that progress in this direction is dependent upon their determination to achieve it. In the present situation, as part of the paralysing mistrust between them, the tendency exists in the Government and in the Turkish Cypriot leadership to see each small step on the road towards normality as an erosion of their political position. This attitude makes UNFICYP's efforts to build bridges between opposing views and to find practical solutions and exacting task requiring great patience and resourcefulness. For example, almost all questions affecting every-day life contain elements which may be related directly or indirectly to the central issue of the Government's authority. The Government of Cyprus maintains that it has a sovereign right to exercise its authority over the whole area of the Republic, while the Turkish Cypriot leadership contests the status of the Government as unconstitutional and, wherever it can, resists placing Turkish Cypriots in situations exposing them to the Government's administration.

89. Somewhat less affected by this basic political dispute are economic matters, but even here progress is painfully slow. UNFICYP's best efforts to secure the reactivation of idle factories, which could only serve the interests of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots and the country as a whole, have made practically no headway.

90. During the period under review, UNFICYP continued to offer its assistance, inter alia, to facilitate the movement of individuals, to supervise the disposal in Turkish Cypriot areas of certain materials whose use is restricted by the Government, to implement the payment of pensions to Turkish Cypriots, and to alleviate the difficulties of individual Greek Cypriots affected by the location of certain official records in the Turkish Cypriot quarter of Nicosia. It also continued to seek technical agreements on such matters as postal services, land records and birth certificates.

91. One of the main political events during this period was the appointment on 19 April of new Greek Cypriot ministers. Mr. George Tombazos and

Mr. Constantinos Fanos were appointed Minister of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Minister of Communications and Works, respectively, while Mr. Tassos Papadopoulos, the Minister of Labour and Social Insurance, was also assigned the Ministry of Health. At the time of the December 1963 disturbances, the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Ministry of Health were held by Turkish Cypriot ministers.

92. In a cable addressed to me (S/7267), the Vice-President vigorously protested against this action. The Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations rebutted the protest in his reply (S/7276).

93. In the context of normalization it may be mentioned that, in a discussion with my Special Representative, the President proposed that consideration be given to a plan under which, with the exception of coastal defences, all fortifications, checkpoints and military posts - Government and Turkish Cypriot alike - would be removed. Complete freedom of movement would thus be restored, including access to Turkish Cypriot enclaves by Greek Cypriots. The defortification of Turkish Cypriot enclaves and villages would be controlled by mixed Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot police patrols on the understanding that Turkish Cypriot policemen in such patrols would come under Government authority. My Special Representative pursued this proposal with the Turkish Cypriot leaders, and they reiterated their long-standing objection that such measures would be feasible only in the context of the 1960 Constitution or of an agreed political settlement.

94. In my last report I stated that "the advances towards normalization remain modest" (S/7191, para. 87). Since then, regrettably, no really significant progress has been achieved, despite the widespread desire among the people of Cyprus to see normal conditions restored.

#### B. Freedom of movement of the population

95. In UNFICYP's view, one of the chief prerequisites for a return to normal conditions in Cyprus is the restoration of the freedom of movement of the civilian population. The extent to which such movement is denied or circumscribed provides a reliable barometer of the degree of tension prevailing between the two communities, in general as well as in any given area at a particular time. Incidents of one kind or another at once intensify checks and controls, which then

slowly resume their routine character only after periods of quiet. However, on the whole and in terms of policy, no noticeable tendency to reduce these restrictions has taken place since my last report. If anything, the trend has been in the other direction.

56. The two sides justify differently the limitations they impose on freedom of movement. In addition to denying Greek Cypriots access to the main Turkish Cypriot enclaves, even if accompanied by UNFICYP personnel when security considerations cannot possibly be invoked, the Turkish Cypriot leadership continues to discourage or to prevent members of their community from moving beyond the limits of the enclaves, controlling such movement on the grounds that it wishes to protect them from humiliating searches and possibly arbitrary arrest by the Cyprus Police. The Government, on the other hand, maintains that, except for the enclave around Kokkina and in special circumstances elsewhere, there is complete freedom of movement in the areas under its control, and that current checks of personal identity and of goods at the points of entry and exist of the Turkish Cypriot enclaves are necessary security measures with respect to areas controlled by persons regarded as rebels.

57. Citing bodily searches, interrogations, undue delays and seizures of personal belongings at Cyprus Police checkpoints as well as occasional arrests and manhandling, the Turkish Cypriot leadership rejects as illusory the Government's claim that Turkish Cypriots are allowed to move freely. A case in point was its request in May that special arrangements be made for residents of the principal Turkish Cypriot enclave in Nicosia District to travel during the coming summer months to the Kyrenia seaside. The leadership proposed, in particular, that UNFICYP convoy protection be provided for this purpose. The Government took the position that Turkish Cypriots were free to go as individuals to any beach not situated in a military area and to mingle freely with other bathers, and that there was consequently no need for organized arrangements. The matter is still under consideration by the Political Liaison Committee, and UNFICYP has suggested that the question be discussed directly between representatives of the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership in the presence of UNFICYP officials.

58. In practice, a considerable movement of Turkish Cypriots into and out of the enclaves already exists. Between 800 and 900 Turkish Cypriots pass daily in and out of the Turkish quarter of Nicosia through the Famagusta Gate checkpoint. The

great majority of these persons, however, are not residents of the Nicosia District enclave but visitors from other parts of the Island coming for business or personal reasons. About thirty Turkish Cypriots cross the "green line" in Nicosia daily at Ayios Kassianos (Mogensen's checkpoint) for shopping purposes. Approximately 200 residents of the enclaves travel to work in the British Sovereign Base Areas and about another thirty Turkish Cypriot employees of embassies in Nicosia move daily to and from their place of work. Conversely, Greek Cypriots - though only a handful - work in the ice-making plant of the cold stores in the Turkish quarter of Nicosia.

99. There has been no significant interference with the movement of Turkish Cypriots to and from Nicosia Airport in connexion with foreign travel. However, the Government has continued to prohibit the return from Turkey of male students of military age (S/7001, para. 114).

100. A serious restriction on the freedom of movement of the Turkish Cypriot population was imposed by the Government on 1 June when it closed off the Turkish quarter of Nicosia for three days, prohibiting the Turkish Cypriots from entering or leaving the quarter. Food and other supplies were not affected, although in the first hours of the ban a number of trucks bringing supplies were turned back by the Cyprus Police. The ban was lifted seventy-two hours after it was imposed.

101. The Minister of the Interior explained that in spite of the Government's repeated warnings, the Turkish Cypriot leader had continued the placing of bombs in Government-controlled areas and that in spite of pacification measures taken by the Government and the full freedom of movement accorded to Turkish Cypriots throughout the Island there had been no response on the part of the Turkish Cypriot leaders, who on the contrary had responded with a series of provocative acts. The ban was described by the Government as "a warning action" and was taken immediately after two bombs had exploded in a residential Greek quarter of Nicosia.

102. The Turkish Cypriots categorically rejected the accusations made by the Minister of the Interior and declared that the Turkish Cypriot community and leadership had nothing whatever to do with the bombs. In a message addressed to me by Dr. N. Manyera (S/7337), the Government's measure was described as a form of collective punishment, and a threat of all-out attacks for the purpose of imposing a unilateral solution on the Turkish community.

103. Elsewhere on the Island, conditions vary. As a result of the defortification agreement at Famagusta (S/7001, para. 56), Turkish Cypriot residents are no longer subjected to search when leaving or entering the walled city, although roads of access are manned at three points by the Cyprus Police on a round-the-clock basis. In the areas of Limassol and Paphos, control of Turkish Cypriots is carried out chiefly by police at mobile checkpoints. Their activities still give rise to complaints of intensive searches and prolonged interrogations at nearby police stations. Wherever possible, the UNFICYP Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) endeavour to be present at such checkpoints and this has usually led to fewer complaints.

104. An example of a reasonably satisfactory working arrangement with regard to movement through a Turkish Cypriot area is the travel of Greek Cypriots through the Limnitis enclave (S/6426, para. 114). Turkish Cypriots do not themselves search vehicles moving through the enclave; instead, UNCIVPOL halts vehicles from time to time to ensure that the terms of the arrangement relating to uniforms, weapons, etc. are observed. Greek Cypriot travellers have, nevertheless, on several occasions complained of provocative behaviour by armed Turkish Cypriot elements. Some complaints have proved, on investigation, to have little substance. In other cases, the provocation was attributable to an individual's initiative and not to a general policy.

105. On the other hand, Greek Cypriots wishing to travel between Nicosia and Kyrenia by the short route through the largest Turkish Cypriot enclave are still obliged to use the UNFICYP convoys. With the approaching summer a major increase is expected in the number of vehicles requiring convoy protection. For example, on Sunday, 22 May, approximately 250 vehicles travelled in the afternoon convoy from Kyrenia to Nicosia, necessitating the break-up of the convoy into several "packets".

106. In a number of individual cases UNFICYP has facilitated journeys of Turkish Cypriots to and from Kokkina and elsewhere by obtaining the Government's advance clearance. It has also assisted with inquiries about Greek Cypriots who have been detained in the Turkish Cypriot quarters.

107. Unfortunately, the hopes expressed in my last report for a relaxation of measures tending to restrict the freedom of movement of the population (S/7191, paras. 93 and 94) have not materialized. If anything, such measures have been

intensified, especially in the last few weeks. The indiscriminate planting of bombs that has continued during the period of this report (see paras. 83-87 above) has had much to do with the increased security-consciousness of the Government and a resulting hardening of attitudes on the part of the Turkish Cypriot leadership. In this connexion I earnestly appeal to responsible men on both sides to remain calm and not to allow these acts of terrorism - whose authors are no doubt hoping to increase tensions and rekindle feelings of animosity between Greek and Turkish Cypriots - to interfere with progress towards reconciliation or to undo what has so far been achieved as a result of the United Nations presence in the Island.

108. There is still scope, I believe, for further measures to expand the already existing movement of people across the lines of confrontation, without prejudice to security conditions or to an ultimate political settlement. The introduction of policies involving a less rigid attitude on the part of the Turkish Cypriot leadership towards the entry of Greek Cypriots into the enclaves and the travel of Turkish Cypriots outside their areas, and, on the part of the Government, the avoidance of unreasonable measures at police checkpoints, would not fail to have beneficial effects on the situation in the Island. UNFICYP is ready to lend all possible assistance in the execution of any steps designed to liberalize the movement of the civilian population.

### C. Efforts to restore normal economic activities

#### Introduction

109. In the economic field, the first five months of 1966 have consolidated the advances made during 1965, when the economy fully recovered from the decline suffered in the previous year as a result of the disturbances. Provisional data indicate that under the impetus of bumper crops and good prices, the gross national product (GNP) in 1965 even exceeded that of 1963. The balance-of-payments position was strengthened in spite of a widening trade gap. "Invisible exports" more than made up for the trade deficit, through foreign military spending in Cyprus, in particular by the British Sovereign Base Areas, remittances from Cypriots overseas and a modest revival of tourism. In spite of increased liquidity, wages and prices have remained fairly stable. At the same time, investment has been stepped up, in construction especially. The general economic picture for 1966 continues to look

favourable, although crops are expected to fall back to average levels following the rather sub-normal rainfall during the winter season. In the potentially important field of tourism, prospects have been improving owing to the return of more normal conditions of personal safety and a Government publicity campaign: the number of tourists visiting the Island in the first quarter of 1966 increased by about 50 per cent as compared with the corresponding period of 1965.

110. In this economic expansion, the Turkish Cypriot enclaves are having little or no part, a situation mitigated to some extent by the good harvest of 1965 and the resumed payment of Government subsidies to grain and vine producers. Most of the unemployment in Cyprus is concentrated in the Turkish Cypriot enclaves which still contain approximately 20,000 displaced persons and about twice that number of people who are, to varying degrees, in need of assistance. Commerce as well as public and private employment have been seriously affected by relative isolation from the general economy, and the economic life of the Turkish Cypriot enclaves has been supported mainly by the relief supplies and the financial assistance received from Turkey.

#### Economic restrictions and movement of supplies

111. The Government has not relaxed its policy of imposing restrictions on the import into Turkish Cypriot controlled areas of materials that could be used to improve the fighting capacity of armed elements. The official list of restricted goods still comprises thirty-one items. Most of these goods, however, have extensive civilian use, such as building materials and automobile replacement parts. In addition, other items which are not on the official list but which qualify under similar headings are often subjected to seizure at Cyprus Police checkpoints, giving cause for complaints. In many cases such items are again released through the good offices of UNFICYP.

112. As yet, the Government has not taken any action on the estimates of building materials submitted by the Turkish Cypriot leadership in October 1965 (S/7001, para. 125 and S/7191, para. 99). UNFICYP has repeatedly indicated its willingness to supervise the distribution and civilian use of any building materials that could be diverted to military construction. The possibility of easing restrictions on building materials for repairs to private houses and public institutions has again recently been taken up by my Special Representative in discussions with the

President and the Foreign Minister, who undertook to review the matter once more. This is one of the questions that, in my opinion, could suitably be made the subject of direct talks between representatives of the two sides.

113. In certain instances, the import of restricted items into Turkish Cypriot controlled areas has been permitted subject to UNFICYP's supervision of their use, but such clearance has been limited to agriculture and requirements of public necessity. Thus, the Government gave its approval for the movement of 150 bags of cement to repair a water-pumping station on the Limnitis River, provided that UNFICYP took custody of the cement and controlled its utilization and that an official from the Water Department was allowed to inspect the work when completed. The Turkish Cypriot leadership gave its concurrence to this inspection and on 26 April 1966 the cement was delivered to the United Nations camp at Limnitis. In the case of Temblos, where village wells are in need of reinforcement with cement, the Government agreed to release the required quantity of cement on similar conditions. However, the Turkish Cypriot leadership would not allow final inspection by a Government water inspector. Accordingly, the repairs could not proceed and the village continues to depend on a daily water lift of 600 gallons by UNFICYP.

114. The movement of non-restricted supplies into Turkish Cypriot controlled areas continues to be subjected to inspection by the Cyprus Police. UNFICYP personnel have, wherever possible, regularly observed the inspection process. In the great majority of cases such inspections are of a routine nature, although complaints are often received of intensive searches of vehicles and containers.

#### Industry

115. The reactivation of industrial plants which have remained idle since the disturbances has continued to be a major UNFICYP concern. However, untiring efforts over two years to obtain even partial progress in this field has as yet not met with success.

116. A comprehensive solution to the problem, allowing for the reopening of all plants on both sides, put forward by the Chairman of the Cyprus Chamber of Commerce (S/7191), was acceptable to the Turkish Cypriot leadership only if the Government lifted the economic restrictions imposed on the Turkish Cypriot enclaves. In the absence of any indication that the Government was prepared to make this

concession, the leadership proposed that a two-stage approach be attempted. It suggested, notably, that to begin with and as a counterpart for the reactivation of a Greek Cypriot-owned limekiln and stone-quarry near Boghaz, a Turkish Cypriot-owned limekiln at Ambelikou, a tyre-retreading plant and a steel-wool factory be enabled to resume normal operations.

117. However, the Government was prepared to accept this departure from a comprehensive approach only if the first stage included a Greek Cypriot co-operative farm, situated near Boghaz. This added condition was rejected by the Turkish Cypriot leadership. As in the case of the Greek Cypriot limekiln and stone-quarry, which would require a limited number of Greek Cypriot staff, a reactivation of the farm appears to hinge on the question of admitting Greek Cypriots into a border area of the enclave.

#### Agriculture

118. On the whole, the agricultural situation remains satisfactory. However, owing weather conditions during the winter months, crops are well below those of 1965 and, in some areas, diminishing ground-water resources have created difficulties requiring such remedial measures as reduction of cultivated areas and irrigation restrictions.

119. The period under review has, in the main, been taken up by harvesting. Citrus, tobacco and potato crops have been marketed without difficulty. As to cereals, the representatives of the Turkish Cypriot co-operative movement in March made known their desire to normalize further the grain concentration procedures and to improve upon the agreement reached in 1965 with UNFICYP's assistance. Under that agreement the Grain Commission had undertaken to purchase the crops of Turkish Cypriot farmers at subsidized prices, subject to the liquidation of the liabilities of Turkish Cypriot co-operative societies outstanding since the 1963 concentration (S/7001, paras. 133-136). These debts were liquidated in 1965. In particular, the Turkish Cypriot side wished to reinstate its co-operative societies as authorized and paid agents of the Grain Commission on an equal footing with Greek Cypriot societies. The Grain Commission has indicated its willingness to implement integrally last year's agreement, but as it planned to dispense altogether with payments to co-operative societies acting as agents, it was not prepared to commission Turkish Cypriot co-operatives as such agents.

120. In general, the Government authorities have released sufficient quantities of gas-oil, lubricants and spare parts to enable Turkish Cypriot farmers to operate their agricultural machinery, although there have been complaints that administrative delays sometimes caused difficulties in the timely supply of such items. In the Turkish Cypriot enclave north of Nicosia farmers continue to experience difficulty in obtaining diesel oil and lubricants for unlicensed tractors; these can be licensed free of charge only after inspection in the villages by government officials, a procedure not acceptable to the Turkish Cypriot leadership (S/7001, para. 132).

121. For the first time, Turkish Cypriots have been able to carry out livestock inoculations throughout the Island in their own vehicles without UNFICYP escort or observation. The required vaccines were provided by the Government without charge. UNFICYP has continued its efforts, with some success, to reduce illegal cultivation of the land of absent owners by promoting leasing arrangements between members of the two communities. When requested, observation patrols, in preference to escorts, continue to be sent out to protect ploughing and harvesting activities in sensitive areas. During the present harvesting season observers have been provided to farmers of both communities on an almost daily basis.

D. Measures to assist refugees and other distressed persons

Problem of resettlement of refugees

122. Two and a half years after the outbreak of the disturbances in the Island there are still some 20,000 Turkish Cypriot refugees and displaced persons living in camps and overcrowded Turkish Cypriot villages. Their number, except for the movement of individuals and small groups, has not appreciably varied. In the largest refugee camp at Hamid Mandres, near Nicosia, there are no longer any refugees under canvas (S/7191, para. 109). In other areas, notably Kokkina, Polis, Paphos, Lefka, Louroujina and elsewhere, the living conditions of refugees and displaced persons, as described in my last report (S/7191, paras. 109 through 114), have not basically changed. Conditions at Kokkina continue to give rise to occasional emergency medical evacuations.

125. The Turkish Cypriot leadership continues to press, through UNFICYP, for the lifting of the Government's ban on building materials for refugee housing. The Government, on the other hand, still disapproves of the permanent settlement of displaced Turkish Cypriots in the places where they now live, and invites them to return to their former homes, offering them necessary financial assistance. During the period under review, it completed repairs and improvements, to thirty-six houses in the mixed village of Potamia, at a cost of £C4,500. Some Turkish Cypriot families have taken advantage of the Government's offer and have occupied five of these houses. Despite this initial poor response, the Government has indicated that it is determined to pursue its programme to encourage Turkish Cypriot displaced persons to emerge from the enclaves and return to their former homes. As previously reported, the Turkish Cypriot leadership resists this programme on the grounds that it tends to restore conditions dangerous to the security of the Turkish Cypriots concerned.

#### Red Crescent relief

124. Apart from the problems of shelter for displaced Turkish Cypriots mentioned above, there is also the wider problem of assistance to them and to a great number of other distressed Turkish Cypriots. Most of these depend for their daily subsistence on the relief shipments of the Red Crescent Society of Turkey.

125. An eleventh Red Crescent shipment arrived at Famagusta on 23 May. The total weight of its cargo was 1,497 tons, the largest such shipment sent to Cyprus.

126. More than two thirds of the shipment consisted of food-stuffs (rice, beans, peas, lentils, margarine, bulgur and milk powder), the remainder being medicines, clothing for children, blankets, tent material, woollen, linen and other cloth, woollen and cotton underwear. These items had been approved by the Government for duty-free import.

127. The Government agreed to the import of certain other items, especially clothing and wearing apparel for adults, subject to the payment of normal customs duty, but it refused the import of raincoats and raincoat jackets for men. The items subject to the payment of customs duty and those prohibited were notified in advance by the Government to the Turkish Embassy in Cyprus and subsequently they were not included by the Red Crescent Society in the shipment which arrived in Cyprus.

128. The only difference that arose concerned 205 tons of fish. The original information from Turkey had indicated that frozen fish would be shipped and the Government approved it for import duty-free. However, when the fish arrived, it was found to be tinned fish instead of frozen fish. The Government decided that it would have to levy the normal 12 per cent customs duty in order to protect the domestic market for this item. The Red Crescent Society declined to pay any customs duties and the ship returned the fish to Turkey.

129. As in the past, UNFICYP lent its good offices and assistance in connexion with the unloading of the relief vessel and the transport of the supplies from the Red Crescent central warehouse in Famagusta to distribution centres throughout the Island, in accordance with a programme drawn up by the Turkish Cypriot leadership.

130. UNFICYP also carried out most of the functions performed in the past by the International Committee of the Red Cross in connexion with Red Crescent relief shipments.

#### E. Normalization of the public services

##### Introduction

131. As can easily be imagined, the existence of Turkish Cypriot enclaves surrounded by armed men confronting each other has had serious effects on public administration. In some public services, essential for human life and divorced from political implications, such as electricity and water supply, the effects have been minimal and all concerned are naturally anxious to ensure that the services continue without interruption.

132. In other spheres which cannot be integrated without reaching certain understandings in the political field and which are susceptible of separate organization, administration is exercised separately by the Government and by the Turkish Cypriot leadership in the areas under their control.

133. There is, however, a third category: the important but not indispensable public services which by their nature cannot be fragmented and which have consequently been almost at a standstill ever since the events of December 1963. It is here that UNFICYP has concentrated its main efforts towards the restoration of normal conditions in the public services.

### Postal services

154. In my last report I indicated that the normalization of postal services was one of the problems ripe for settlement (S/7191, para. 148) and during the period under review UNFICYP has been making a major effort in this field. In April it prepared new draft provisions for an arrangement that was submitted to the Government and to the Turkish Cypriot leadership for consideration.

155. The proposed arrangement included new formulas on the points that had prevented agreement in the past (S/6426, paras. 157 and 158). In April, the Turkish Cypriots informed UNFICYP that most of the draft provisions were acceptable, although a few amendments were suggested for further discussion. No comments were received from the Government until 26 May when it informed UNFICYP that it was not prepared to discuss the question for the time being because of a bomb explosion a few days previously at the central post-office in Nicosia which it attributed to Turkish Cypriot terrorists. The Turkish Cypriots categorically rejected the accusation that they were in any way responsible for the bomb explosion and stated that the Government was only having recourse to still another pretext to deprive them of normal postal services.

### Land records

156. As I indicated in my last report (S/7191, para. 148), I had also hoped at this time to be able to report substantial progress towards the settlement of outstanding differences preventing agreement on the use by the Nicosia District Lands Office of the land records housed in the Turkish quarter of Nicosia. However, in spite of intensive efforts by UNFICYP officers, agreement has not yet been reached, and the interests of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots wishing to buy, sell or mortgage immovable property continue to be seriously prejudiced by the existing situation.

157. In March, UNFICYP submitted to both the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership the draft provisions for an arrangement to normalize land registration operations referred to in my last report (S/7191, para. 132). In line with earlier negotiations on the question, the draft provided for the orderly transfer of all the land record books from the Turkish quarter to premises occupied by UNFICYP in the "green line" area and the moving of the District Lands Office to those premises,

where a combined Greek and Turkish Cypriot staff would be employed. Once transferred, the books would remain on those premises in the custody of the United Nations. The draft also provided for the microfilming of the land registers and the delivery of a microfilm copy to the Turkish Cypriot leadership in the event of the withdrawal of the United Nations from Cyprus before a permanent solution concerning the land records was reached. It further envisaged the opening of an official sub-office in the Turkish quarter twice weekly where Turkish Cypriots could make applications and declarations regarding land transactions which would then be brought to the new District Office for further processing in accordance with normal procedure.

138. During March and April, UNFICYP discussed this draft with both sides. The Government would not agree to UNFICYP's custody of the books and maintained that, as their rightful owner, it must be free to take such measures for their protection as it deemed necessary. It did agree, however, to the opening of a sub-office in the Turkish quarter provided that the Director of the Department of Lands and Surveys, or his representative, had access to it. For its part, the Turkish Cypriot leadership requested that the sub-office should be opened on a full-time basis. As to the question of UNFICYP custody, it pointed out that it had indicated its readiness to reach an understanding on the condition that the United Nations would be responsible for the books and, in the event of its withdrawal from Cyprus, would return to the Turkish quarter at least those pertaining to Turkish Cypriot property. If, however, the Government wished to have possession of the books, the Turkish Cypriot leadership was prepared to relinquish those for the predominantly Greek Cypriot villages and town quarters, provided that the books for Turkish Cypriot villages and quarters were allowed to remain where they were; when needed they could be brought individually to the new District Lands Office for the registration of specific transactions and then returned.

139. The Government could not accept this suggestion because it implied recognition of the Turkish Cypriot demand for separation of the communities and no progress could be made on the problem during most of May. Towards the end of the month, the Government submitted to UNFICYP amended draft provisions to the effect that land registers relating to villages and quarters that had exclusively Turkish local authorities in 1963 would remain on premises in the area of the "green line", and

under United Nations custody until they were microfilmed. Microfilm copies would be delivered to the Government and the Turkish Cypriots. The Government agreed, further, to the opening of a sub-office in the Turkish quarter on a full-time basis, on condition that it was accessible to the Director or his representative.

140. At the time of the writing of this report, the Turkish Cypriot leadership was considering the Government's draft. I earnestly hope that agreement on this purely technical service will be reached in the near future and I am convinced that it can be reached if both sides are mindful of the benefits of such agreement to Greek and Turkish Cypriots alike.

141. Finally, I would mention that during these lengthy negotiations the Government has refrained from enacting the proposed law for the establishment of new land registers (S/7191, para. 128). At the same time, the Turkish Cypriot leadership has, for the first time in two years, agreed to make the land records temporarily available under UNFICYP guarantee for the registration of almost fifty urgent transactions involving Greek Cypriots by officers of the District Lands Office on United Nations premises. However, this is a time-consuming procedure and cannot cope with the great backlog of cases, which continues to mount.

#### Payment of social insurance benefits

142. As mentioned in my last report (S/7191, paras. 118-120), the Government had indicated that it was prepared to consider favourably the resumption of payment of pensions, without inspection, to old and infirm Turkish Cypriot beneficiaries provided that their entitlement had been established before the December 1965 disturbances and they applied in person to the competent government offices. During the period under review, it was arranged that all such beneficiaries in Nicosia District should visit the Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance to submit the necessary applications. If eligibility was established, widow's and old-age pensions would be paid retrospectively as from 1 March 1966 at current rates, which are 50 per cent higher than those in 1965. A similar procedure might be applied in the other districts. As at 1 June, 130 beneficiaries had applied to the Ministry and 120 applications were approved. The remaining ten are still under consideration. UNFICYP is gratified that definite progress is being made in this matter.

145. A number of other questions in the field of social insurance remain to be solved. Among them are the payment of arrears to beneficiaries for the period between December 1963 and February 1966, the payment of benefits to Turkish Cypriot applicants whose entitlement arose after December 1963, home visits to such applicants by government inspectors, the resumption of payment of contributions by all Turkish Cypriot employees and employers in the enclaves, the exchange of old insurance cards which has already begun with the assistance of UNFICYP, and accounting to the Government for insurance stamps sold in the enclaves.

#### Birth certificates

144. An instance of how mistrust complicates even minor and comparatively straightforward technical questions may be observed in the impasse that has developed in the transfer from the Nicosia Turkish sector of Greek Cypriot birth registers. The Turkish Cypriots require blank birth certificates and have offered to hand over some of the Greek Cypriot registers which remain in their possession, in exchange for such blanks; they are also prepared to account to the Nicosia District authorities, for the fees received for birth certificates they have issued in the past to Turkish Cypriots. The District Office has declared itself ready to supply blank certificates, as the need arises, but will not do so until all the Greek birth registers for Nicosia and its suburbs have been handed over. However, the Turkish Cypriot leadership maintains that it cannot rely on such promises which imply a degree of mutual confidence that still does not exist. So far, UNFICYP's suggestions for an arrangement satisfactory to both sides have not met with success.

#### Public utilities

145. As before, water and electricity continue to be supplied regularly to all areas and urban quarters (S/7301, paras. 171-175); no change has occurred in the system by which the Turkish Cypriot leadership withholds payment of rates collected from consumers, which are credited to a special "frozen" account.

146. Owing to below-normal rainfall during the past winter, water shortages of approximately 10 per cent of normal consumption are expected during the dry summer months, and the public has been urged to co-operate in conservation measures. The Turkish Cypriot leadership has assured UNFICYP of its willingness to co-operate in such measures.

Problems of public revenue

147. The claims and counter-claims between the Government and Evkaf, the Turkish Cypriot religious trust, have been mentioned in my previous reports. In February, Evkaf contested the Government's view that their outstanding mutual obligations left a balance in the Government's favour. Evkaf claimed in particular £60,000 in respect of water rates collected by the authorities in Larnaca for the Bekir Pasha water system (S/7191, para. 126), whose management, it asserts, was illegally taken over by the Administration.

148. In a communication dated 21 April 1966, the Government replied in some detail to Evkaf's presentation of accounts. It rejected claims for Government contributions that had been of a voluntary nature, and for rents of premises situated in the Turkish Cypriot enclaves. It established Evkaf's arrears on obligations to the Government, as at 28 February 1966, at £23,111. As to the Bekir Pasha water system, the Government pointed out that the deed of dedication had committed Evkaf to administer the water system without any profit to itself, and Evkaf was therefore not in a position to claim water rates, without having incurred corresponding administrative costs. The Government finally invited Evkaf, if it still disputed the Government's case, to have it settled by a court of law.

149. The substance of the Government's communication has been transmitted to Evkaf for its consideration.

Payment of rent to Turkish Cypriot owners of property occupied by UNFICYP

150. In my last report, I referred to the procedure that had been established for the payment by the Government of rents for Turkish Cypriot houses occupied by UNFICYP (S/7191, para. 123). During the period under review, the investigations on a few houses were completed and payments in those cases are to begin as soon as the owners supply proof of ownership. Additional cases are expected to be ready for payments shortly.

F. The functioning of the law courts and the administration  
of justice

151. Until 3 June the situation with respect to the judiciary had remained as described in my previous reports to the Security Council. The judges of both

communities continued to attend the courts, which carried out their functions without interference although in civil cases their activities were almost entirely confined to those cases in which the parties were Greek Cypriots. Turkish Cypriots living in the enclaves are still reluctant to make use of the courts and have not been available for litigation. In the Turkish Cypriot enclaves there appear to be instances of ad hoc judicial proceedings outside the normal system of courts of the Republic.

152. Early in 1964, Turkish Cypriot judges returned to the law courts and with the assistance of UNFICYP practical arrangements were worked on to ensure the complete freedom of movement of all judges of the Republic throughout the Island. Under the Administration of Cyprus (miscellaneous provisions) Law of 1964, a Supreme Court of Justice was created by a merger of the Supreme Constitutional Court and the High Court of Justice. The new Supreme Court consisted of the three Greek and two Turkish Cypriot judges of the two earlier courts, and one of the Turkish Cypriot judges became its president. The enactment was regarded by the Government as a temporary measure, necessitated by the abnormal conditions in the country, which prevented the administration of justice under the previous procedure based on communal consideration.

153. The Turkish Cypriots considered the enactment of the new law a violation of the 1960 Constitution. In a letter dated 28 September 1964 addressed to President Makarios, Vice-President Kuchuk appealed to the Greek Cypriot authorities to repeal the law and to bring the judicial system back into line with the relevant provisions of the Constitution within a reasonable period. The Vice-President said that if that appeal did not meet with a positive response, the Turkish Cypriot judges would find themselves in the impossible position of having to administer justice in direct contravention of the judicial guarantees afforded to the Turkish community by the Constitution and contrary to the very principles of justice and the rule of law, and, what was more, in violation of the solemn oath they had taken on their appointment to uphold the Constitution (S/6102, paras. 101-104).

154. On 3 June, the Turkish Cypriot leadership reported that on the previous day Cyprus police enforcing the three-day blockade of the Turkish quarter of Nicosia had prevented Turkish Cypriot judges from going to their offices and one judge of the Nicosia district court, already on the court premises, had been ordered to go

back to the Turkish quarter under humiliating circumstances. In that connexion, the Turkish Cypriot leadership considered that the period mentioned in the Vice-President's appeal of 28 September 1964 had come to an end and that all Turkish Cypriot judges should be free to discontinue attending their offices if they so wished. Since then, Turkish Cypriot judges have not come to any of their offices throughout the Island.

155. In my previous reports to the Council on the work of UNFICYP, it was noted with satisfaction that Turkish Cypriot judges were continuing to work in full harmony with their Greek Cypriot colleagues and that they were free to travel throughout the Island without any interference. This new development, therefore, is especially deplored and it must be hoped that their decision to withdraw from their functions is only a temporary one and that they will find it possible to resume their duties in the near future.

IV. GOOD OFFICES OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE  
SECRETARY-GENERAL IN CYPRUS

156. In keeping with my instruction of 2 March 1966 broadening his scope of activity in and outside Cyprus (S/7180), Mr. C.A. Bernardes, my Special Representative, began consultations on 7 March with the President and the Vice-President. In these consultations, both of them assured him of their full co-operation in carrying out his new responsibilities.
157. The President cautioned against beginning direct talks between the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership before prior exploration had shown that the views of both sides were close. If such talks were held he felt that they should be outside the forum of the Political Liaison Committee, but they should not be started unless there were definite prospects of success: they would have no value and might even be harmful if they served only to emphasize differences and no common ground could be found.
158. The Vice-President expressed himself in favour of the discussion of technical problems through the machinery of the Political Liaison Committee and of broader political questions in direct discussions held within the framework of the 1960 Constitution.
159. No progress could be made in this matter during the months of March and April when the Government's attention was concentrated on discussions concerning the question of the command structure of the National Guard. In May, after his return from his visits to Ankara and Athens, Mr. Bernardes again had talks with the President and Vice-President and later suggested to them a number of questions which he thought might be discussed in the same way as other matters had been discussed in the past, between representatives designated by the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership at meetings held on UNFICYP premises in the presence of United Nations officials. Those questions included land record arrangements (see paras. 136-141 above), postal services (see paras. 134-135), repairs to the Kyrenia Road (see paras. 62-63), bathing facilities for Turkish Cypriots in the Kyrenia area (see para. 97), free passage for Greek Cypriots through the Turkish Cypriot villages of Knodhara (see paras. 52-54) and Kokkina (see para. 67), clearance for building materials to be used for repairs by Turkish Cypriots under UNFICYP's supervision (see para. 112).

160. At the beginning of June, however, he was informed by the Foreign Minister that it would be difficult for the time being to discuss any of the suggested questions because of the bombing incidents which had been occurring in the Government-controlled part of Nicosia and elsewhere in the Island and for which the Government held Turkish Cypriots responsible.

161. Outside Cyprus, Mr. Bernardes had consultations within the framework of his new responsibilities with the Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of Turkey and Greece in the early part of May. Both Governments promised him their full co-operation in his new tasks and expressed their dedication to a solution of the Cyprus problem only by peaceful means. Both paid tribute to UNFICYP for its success in restoring and maintaining peaceful conditions in Cyprus. When informed by my Special Representative that the problems of financing the Force might make it necessary either to withdraw it or to modify its terms of reference, both Governments strongly urged that the Force should be maintained as it stands unless a radical improvement should occur in the prevailing conditions in Cyprus.

162. The Turkish Government indicated its serious concern about the prevailing restrictions affecting Turkish Cypriots and urged that a number of measures be taken with a view to alleviating their situation.

163. The Governments of both Turkey and Greece expressed an interest in bilateral talks on the Cyprus question and on the subject of Greco-Turkish relations as a whole, and shortly after the return of Mr. Bernardes to Cyprus they issued communiqués announcing a first high-level contact on the subject in Brussels on 9 June.

164. During the coming months, the good offices of Mr. Bernardes will continue to be available to both the Government of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot leadership and to the Greek and Turkish Governments with a view to promoting and facilitating any negotiations that might contribute to a solution on local problems or on the question of Cyprus as a whole.

V. MEDIATION EFFORT

165. In my last report (S/7191, paras. 136-138), I informed the Council that my efforts towards achieving a resumption of the mediation function, following the resignation of Mr. Galo Plaza from the position of United Nations Mediator on Cyprus, had been unavailing, due primarily to the widely differing and firmly held views on the matter of the three Governments most directly concerned. I also indicated that I had felt it incumbent upon me to take any other step possible and reasonable which might offer some hope for a fruitful approach to the solution of any of the divisive issues and problems of Cyprus and that consequently, following informal consultations with the parties directly concerned and after informing them in advance, I had sent to my Special Representative in Cyprus, Mr. C.A. Bernardes, instructions broadening his scope of activity.

166. The situation regarding a resumption of the mediation function has remained unchanged since my last report.

## VI. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

167. My latest estimates of the operating costs of the Force to be paid by the United Nations and the estimated amounts claimed or to be claimed by Governments providing contingents to the Force as reimbursements of their extra costs from the United Nations, for the period from the inception of the Force on 27 March 1964 through 26 June 1966, total \$49,800,000. This estimate does not include the cost of the final repatriation of contingents or the liquidation costs that would arise after the Force is finally withdrawn.

168. The amount of voluntary contributions pledged by thirty-eight Member and four non-member Governments for the same period totals \$46,681,000 as at 10 June 1966.

169. Accordingly, unless additional pledges are received, there will be a deficit on 26 June 1966 of approximately \$3,119,000 between the amount required for full payment of all operating costs and reimbursement claims, and the amount of voluntary contributions pledged for support of the Force.

170. If the Security Council should decide to extend the period during which the Force is to be stationed in Cyprus for an additional six-month period from 27 June to 26 December 1966, it is estimated that the additional costs to the Organization, including an amount of \$610,000 as the cost for final repatriation of contingents and liquidation costs, assuming continuance of reimbursement commitments, would be approximately \$10,240,000 as follows:

UNFICYP Cost Estimates by Major Categories of Expense  
for the Period 27 June 1966 to 26 December 1966

(in thousands of U.S. dollars)

<u>I. Operating Costs incurred by the United Nations</u>	
A. Movement of Contingents . . . . .	1,020
B. Operational Expenses . . . . .	1,100
C. Rental of Premises . . . . .	150
D. Rations . . . . .	550
E. Non-Military Personnel, salaries, travel, etc. . .	560
F. Miscellaneous and Contingencies . . . . .	<u>110</u>
Total, Part I	3,490
<u>II. Reimbursement of Extra Costs to Governments</u> <u>Providing Contingents</u>	
A. Pay and Allowances . . . . .	5,800
B. Contingent-Owned Equipment . . . . .	850
C. Death and Disability Awards . . . . .	<u>100</u>
Total, Part II	<u>6,750</u>
Grand Total, Part I and Part II	<u>10,240</u>

171. The above estimate, it should be pointed out, does not reflect the full cost of UNFICYP to Member and non-member States since it excludes the extra costs which Members providing contingents to the Force have agreed to absorb at their own expense rather than to seek reimbursement from the United Nations. The estimated amounts of such extra costs which certain of the Governments providing contingents or police units to the Force have reported they will absorb in respect of the six-month period from 27 June through 26 December 1966 if the mandate of UNFICYP is extended and the Governments concerned agree to continue their participation to the latter date, are as follows: Australia, \$145,000; Canada, \$1,183,792; Denmark, \$129,000; New Zealand, \$30,240; Sweden, \$294,000 and the United Kingdom, \$1,000,000. Of the other Governments providing contingents or units, namely, Austria, Finland and Ireland, some may also absorb certain UNFICYP costs at their own expense but have not as yet notified the Secretary-General of the estimated amounts involved.

## VII. OBSERVATIONS

172. The conditions in Cyprus today and the situation of UNFICYP there tend strongly to underscore the maxim that peace-keeping is a means and not an end. Peace-keeping, if successful, as it surely has been in Cyprus, can provide an atmosphere of quiet and can buy a reasonable time for peace-making, for resolving the differences which give rise to the conflict. It is, however, and can only be, a first step toward pacific settlement. We must face the fact squarely that affairs in Cyprus have as yet not advanced beyond this first stage. Indeed, it is becoming apparent that in order to move the situation effectively towards a solution, efforts at the highest level may have to be undertaken to resolve a problem which has lasted already far too long and which continues to pose a threat to the peace and stability of the eastern Mediterranean area.

173. Once again I have to report, and with increasing regret, that nothing has occurred in the past three months to change significantly the views and recommendations set forth in my last report (S/7191). Indeed, as this report indicates, while there have been a few changes for the better, a number of developments during the past three months can only be regarded as manifestations of a disturbing deterioration in the basic relationship between the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership. Armed confrontation, instead of diminishing, is becoming more intense, as can be seen from the increase in shooting incidents, many of them deliberate breaches of the cease-fire, and from the emergence of new areas of confrontation. There has also been an increasing tendency to establish new, provocative fortified positions, which are stubbornly clung to, are neutralized only after prolonged negotiations, and more often than in the past have required the local commitment of larger United Nations forces.

174. In civil matters, most of UNFICYP's efforts towards the restoration of normal conditions are being hampered by the continuing tendency of both sides to adhere to entrenched positions and to attach more and more conditions, thus widening the ramifications of problems which would be susceptible of solution if kept within narrower limits. This tendency, in the face of the obvious advantages for the people of both communities of a full return to normal conditions, carries the implication that the Cypriot people, Greek and Turkish, are hostages of the intransigent positions taken in their behalf. They are victims of a lack of resolve to find that mutual accommodation of viewpoint and position which is essential to pacific settlement.

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175. In the past three months a series of bombing incidents, most of which the Government attributes to Turkish Cypriots, while Turkish Cypriots deny any responsibility for them, has made the Government unwilling to discuss a number of important matters. These terrorist bombings - whoever may be responsible for them - are totally irresponsible acts which threaten to increase tension, to revive old suspicions, and, in general, to frustrate efforts to restore normal conditions. They could, if they continue, even jeopardize the fragile framework of quiet and stability which UNFICYP has managed to achieve in Cyprus. Because of these ominous developments, I most earnestly appeal to the responsible leaders of both communities to do all in their power to prevent irresponsible terrorist activities and, above all, when such acts occur, not to let them cause a setback to the process of reconciliation or provide the occasion for undoing the good work which has already been done in collaboration with UNFICYP toward restoring normal conditions. It is in the interests of all responsible persons to frustrate the kind of disruptions and retrogressions which are clearly the aim of the terrorists.

176. In this connexion, I find particularly disheartening the recent developments as a result of which Turkish Cypriot judges, for the first time since 1964, have refrained from sitting in the Courts of the Republic. I appeal to the Government and to the Turkish Cypriot leadership to make it possible for the Courts to resume functioning normally. Given a minimum of goodwill on both sides, this can readily be achieved without prejudice to the position of either side and in the interest of the future of Cyprus.

177. In particular, all efforts should be made to ensure that terrorist outrages do not cause unnecessary restrictions on freedom of movement or delay or prevent the restoration of services, such as the postal service, which have already been denied to many of the people of Cyprus for far too long.

178. I feel obliged again to renew my appeal to the responsible leaders in Cyprus to make an earnest effort to respond positively to the yearning and impatience of the ordinary people of Cyprus for a full return to normal conditions. In the passages of this report relating to the consultations and good offices of my Special Representative, I have outlined his efforts to deal with certain questions which might be susceptible of an agreed solution with beneficial results for the population of Cyprus. I hope that, despite the present reticence of the Government

On these matters, it will soon be possible for some form of talks to be held, in the presence of UNFICYP, between representatives of the Government and of the Turkish Cypriots on certain questions which have been suggested by my Special Representative as being ripe for settlement.

179. I note with great interest the talks now taking place between the Governments of Greece and Turkey and express the hope that they will contribute toward a solution of the Cyprus problem.

180. Financial support for UNFICYP continues to be uncertain and inadequate and is not conducive to good planning, efficient and economical operation. I need only repeat, therefore, the firm conclusion I have stated in these reports in the past, namely that the method of voluntary contributions affords at best an inadequate, inequitable and insecure basis for financing a United Nations peace operation. In the light of the experience in Cyprus, the voluntary contributions method should not be considered as a feasible means of financing any future United Nations peace operation should one become necessary. In view, particularly, of the numerous favourable votes on UNFICYP in the Security Council, all of them unanimous, one could hope that the number of States making voluntary contributions in support of the operation would be much greater than it has been.

181. Under the circumstances now prevailing in Cyprus, as described in this report, it is clear that UNFICYP's continued presence is indispensable if a disastrous reversion to violence and conflict is to be avoided. Nor does the present situation allow for any further reduction in the size of the Force beyond the reduction of about 350 men planned for the coming months. I therefore recommend the continuance of UNFICYP for a further period of six months which, in the prevailing circumstances, is a reasonable projection and which will ensure better planning and greater economy than a shorter period. If in the course of this six-month period there are developments so favourable as to make a withdrawal of the Force or its substantial reduction possible, the necessary steps could be taken and the Council would, of course, be kept fully informed.

