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4980th meeting

Friday, 28 May 2004, 10 a.m. New York


President:	Mr. Akram	(Pakistan)
Members:	Algeria	Mr. Baali
	Angola	Mr. Gaspar Martins
	Benin	Mr. Adechi
	Brazil	Mr. Sardenberg
	Chile	Mr. Maquieira
	China	Mr. Wang Guangya
	France	Mr. Duclos
	Germany	Mr. Trautwein
	Philippines	
	Romania	·
	Russian Federation	Mr. Konuzin
	Spain	Mr. Yáñez-Barnuevo
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	
	United States of America	

Agenda

Complex crises and United Nations response

Letter dated 24 May 2004 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2004/423)

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Provisional

The meeting was called to order at 10.15 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Complex crises and United Nations response

Letter dated 24 May 2004 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2004/423)

The President: In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council's prior consultations, I shall take it that the Security Council agrees to extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Jan Egeland, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

I invite Mr. Jan Egeland to take a seat at the Council table.

In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council' prior consultations, I shall take it that the Security Council agrees to extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Ms. Marjatta Rasi, President of the Economic and Social Council.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

I invite Ms. Marjatta Rasi to take a seat at the Council table.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

Members of the Council have before them a letter dated 24 May 2004 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan addressed to the Secretary-General, contained in document S/2004/423.

The Security Council is holding an important debate today. Over the past several years, complex crises and emergencies have increasingly afflicted different parts of the world, particularly in Africa.

Complex crises are characterized by the interlinkages among their military, security, political, economic, social and humanitarian dimensions. The overall political, economic and humanitarian costs imposed by these complex crises are of serious concern to the entire international community. Preventing and effectively responding to these crises must therefore be a matter of high priority for the Security Council in particular and for the United Nations system as a whole.

Over the past several months, the Security Council has held several debates focusing on individual aspects of complex crises and the international response to them, including, among other issues, the protection of civilians in armed conflict, the proliferation of mercenaries, small arms and light weapons, justice and the rule of law, cooperation with regional organizations, the role of the United Nations in post-conflict stabilization and the role of business in conflict prevention, peacekeeping and post-conflict peace-building.

This debate on complex crises and the United Nations response is intended to take a strategic look at the interrelated issues constituting complex crises and to see how long-term, comprehensive, integrated and composite approaches can be developed and implemented with enhanced, system-wide coordination.

I shall now give the floor to the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Mr. Jan Egeland, to give the Council the perspective of the United Nations Secretariat on this issue.

Mr. Egeland: A discussion of complex crises and the United Nations response is important to have at a time when so many people remain trapped by conflict and caught up in long-term complex crises, issues which are integral to my role as Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator.

Complex emergencies and their aftermath embody not only military and security dimensions but fundamental political, economic, social and humanitarian dimensions as well. They are longerrunning crises where the very process of conflict has had a dramatic impact on societal structures, government institutions and the ability of extended families and communities to support each other. That is why there is a responsibility and a need for international assistance. A comprehensive and integrated approach is crucial if real and sustainable achievements are to be made. In situations of transition, for example, progress on security and political developments need to be accompanied by corresponding progress on the humanitarian, social and economic fronts if the peace is to take hold.

It is therefore the collective responsibility of all of us — the Security Council, the General Assembly, individual Member States, regional organizations, the various United Nations departments, agencies and programmes and non-governmental organizations not only to perform our respective roles as effectively as possible, but to respond to these issues together, as a cohesive whole. We all have an important role to play, whether in addressing the underlying causes of conflict, preventing armed conflicts from taking root, intervening during armed conflict to protect civilians and provide lifesaving humanitarian assistance, supporting peace processes or assisting countries emerging from conflict through the delicate period of transition into situations of consolidated peace and sustainable development.

Every day men, women and children in conflicts around the world are being actively and deliberately targeted by parties to conflicts and subjected to extreme violence and other grave human rights abuse. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo alone, more than 2 million people have been killed as a result of long-term conflict, and tens of thousands of women and children have been subjected to unspeakable forms of sexual violence. Currently, a staggering 50 million people have been displaced from their homes by conflict, and many of them are struggling to survive in harsh conditions. The suffering inflicted on civilians in complex emergencies is all too often aggravated by the denial or restrictions on humanitarian access to populations in need.

The current crisis in the Darfur region of the Sudan provides an alarming example: more than 1 million civilians, mostly women and children, have been displaced and are in dire need of shelter, water, food and medical supplies. Complex emergencies increase vulnerability, and when natural disasters occur concurrently the effects are extreme, as the devastating floods in Haiti this week demonstrate. These grave concerns demand a concerted response by us all.

In situations of armed conflict, Governments bear the primary responsibility to provide humanitarian assistance and to protect civilians. It is when Governments do not have the capacity or are unwilling to provide assistance and protection that the United Nations must execute its special role and responsibilities. All United Nations departments and humanitarian agencies stand ready to carry out this important work whenever and wherever it is required. But we cannot do so when we are denied access to populations in need, when the safety and security of our personnel is threatened and when we do not receive adequate funding for our humanitarian work.

Tragically, it is those who most need our assistance who are often denied it. In 20 conflicts around the world, humanitarian access is being either denied or obstructed for an estimated 10 million people in need of food, water, shelter and medical care. Restrictions on access continue to deny life-saving assistance to some 500,000 civilians in Liberia, 2.2 million in the Central African Republic and 1.5 million in Côte d'Ivoire. A similar situation exists in Afghanistan, where access to 1 million people in rural areas in the southern and eastern parts of the country is very limited and insecure.

Assistance to civilians in need is also undermined by the skewed flows of humanitarian funding for complex emergencies. In 2003, humanitarian appeals for 13 African crises sought \$2.2 billion, and less than half of that amount was received. Meanwhile, the \$1 billion sought by the United Nations appeal for Iraq alone was fully met by donors. This reflects the harsh reality that political interests, strategic priorities and the media spotlight create enormously disproportionate responses. I encourage the Security Council to consider carefully the links between the maintenance international peace and security and inadequate funding in certain crises.

Post-conflict situations exemplify the importance of ensuring that adequate funding is provided not only for life-sustaining humanitarian assistance, but also for other programmes that will impact significantly on sustainable peace. Effective peace and reconciliation processes require effective social and administrative structures. It is important, therefore, that schools and their teachers, health centres and their workers, local administrative offices and local welfare and community structures not be neglected by the international community.

Our experience with the consolidated appeals process, however, reveals that while donor countries

are willing to support initiatives that address immediate humanitarian needs, the longer-term or medium-term tools of peace, such as education, health care and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, are often under-funded.

The Security Council has a critical role in responding to complex emergencies and protecting civilians. Thus, in resolution 1296 (2000), the Council requests the Secretary-General to bring to its attention situations of grave concern in respect of the protection of civilians in armed conflict. We should make more frequent use of that mechanism. It is equally critical that we bring situations of concern to the attention of the Council as early as possible. Greater use should therefore be made of resolution 1366 (2001) on the prevention of armed conflict, which encourages the Secretary-General to convey to the Security Council his assessment of potential threats to international peace and security.

Early warning is critical to conflict prevention. Timely and effective early-warning analyses play a key role in helping the United Nations and the broader international community to detect and prevent complex humanitarian crises. For example, in Guinea-Bissau, contingency planning enhanced United Nations preparedness in the event that humanitarian assistance is required. But there is no point in contingency planning if we do not have the resources to do something about it.

Today's conflict management cannot be successful without the strong and decisive involvement of regional organizations. For example, the African Union's current involvement in the Darfur crisis is critical to the international community's response. Similarly, the timely deployment of the Economic Community of West African States Mission in Liberia forces was instrumental in responding to the political opportunity of bringing stability to that war-torn country.

Issues such as human trafficking, the illicit flow of arms, the illegal exploitation of natural resources and the cross-border movement of displaced persons and combatants require regional mechanisms and commitments if they are to be properly addressed. The regional and international communities, in turn, have a responsibility to provide targeted long-term assistance to weak States to strengthen their institutions, to respond at an earlier stage in humanitarian crises and to maintain a robust presence in post-conflict countries to promote respect for human rights, the consolidation of good governance and peace-building processes.

At the root of most conflicts are issues of poverty, corruption, deliberate manipulation of minority groups and social inequity and exclusion. Dealing effectively with complex crises requires us to address these root causes. In countries recovering from conflict, peace and national reconciliation ultimately depend on changes in attitude and behaviour within society. This is particularly the case in societies that have become polarized. Far too often, peace processes are seen as the prerogative of combatant forces, but lasting peace and national reconciliation will depend on developing a social climate that seeks to sustain peace. All sectors and elements of society, not just fighting forces, need to be brought together to this end of reconciliation. The critical role of women in peace processes must be recognized and actively supported.

It is the millions of voiceless that require our attention and commitment. It is the father who is powerless to protect his family from brutal attacks, the mother who has no access to medical care and is helpless to save her sick child, the young child who wakes up each morning faced with the trauma of war and violence and a life without a future, and the teenage girl who has been brutally raped and may never fully recover from the internal injuries she has suffered.

Those are the people who are depending on us. They will judge our success, a success that will be determined by the number of people we are able to assist and protect as a result of swift and decisive action. The Security Council's continued commitment to this shared goal is vital.

The President: I thank Mr. Jan Egeland for his very insightful briefing.

I now give the floor to Ms. Marjatta Rasi, President of the Economic and Social Council.

Ms. Rasi: Thank you very much, Mr. President, for inviting me to participate in this important discussion in my capacity as President of the Economic and Social Council. It is indeed an honour for me to be here today.

I warmly welcome today's debate on complex crises, which continues and consolidates the Security Council's debates held over the past years focusing on individual aspects of complex crises and international response. Complex crises necessitate collaborative responses in which the various organs of the United Nations have a complementary role.

Recently, the most important contribution of the Economic and Social Council to the response by the United Nations to countries in crisis has been its involvement in African countries emerging from conflict. This involvement materialized with the creation of Ad Hoc Advisory Groups on Guinea-Bissau and on Burundi, whose mandate is to examine the humanitarian and economic needs of the countries in question, review international support programmes, provide advice on their effectiveness and make recommendations for a long-term programme of support based on a comprehensive approach to peace, security and stability.

The Economic and Social Council has started to assess the work of these Groups in preparation for the debate to be held at the substantive session of the Council in July. The discussions held so far have clearly highlighted the relevance and usefulness of the Groups as mechanisms for promoting a comprehensive approach to peace and development and mobilizing support for the countries to avoid their relapse into conflict. Although the Groups are mandated to work on countries emerging from conflict, the lessons learned from their work are also relevant to other crisis situations, as what is at stake here is to ensure a coordinated approach between major stakeholders and proper consideration of the multiplicity of causes behind a conflict.

The Economic and Social Council's Ad Hoc Advisory Groups have fostered a coordinated approach to the situations in Guinea-Bissau and in Burundi within the United Nations system at large: the Secretariat and its political, economic and social and humanitarian branches; the heads of United Nations political offices in the countries concerned; the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), both at headquarters and at the field level; and the funds, programmes and specialized agencies of the United Nations. The Groups have had to rely on them all to have a clear picture of the situation, make policy recommendations and propose mechanisms to support those countries. By doing so, the intergovernmental process has advocated and pushed for greater coherence in the work of the United Nations system. The Economic and Social Council, as an open forum

involving United Nations agencies, civil society and, increasingly, the private sector, is in a unique position for this task.

In addition, the Groups have engaged in close interaction with the Bretton Woods institutions, a major aspect of the evolution of the work of the United Nations in the economic and social fields. Working relations between the Economic and Social Council and those institutions are a reality today in the financing for development process and in the debates sustainable development. They remain less on systematic in the security and political fields, and could be strengthened so that Bretton Woods institutions' analysis and capacity of action can be fully used in synergy with United Nations efforts. The role of those institutions in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, as in the case of Burundi, also awaits stronger ties between us.

To ensure coherence, these initiatives by the Economic and Social Council must be linked to the work of the Security Council. I am pleased that our respective bodies are interacting in a more frequent and coherent way, as illustrated by the reference to the Economic and Social Council Groups in the Security Council's presidential statements on issues of common concern. We must not lose this progress through which our two Councils, with their respective roles and responsibilities under the Charter, can make the comprehensive approach to peace and development that the United Nations system has called for a reality.

The United Nations Development Group/United Nations Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs working group on transition issues, established by the Economic and Social Council in response to the Secretary-General's 2002 report on strengthening the United Nations (A/57/387), recently submitted its report. The report on transition issues is based on experience from very different countries. It reflects a number of variations of transition and reveals clearly the problems in the system-wide response. Key findings of the report, for which we now need to find concrete solutions, include the following.

Humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction can and will overlap. These actions must often be accompanied by continuous crisis mitigation and prevention to avoid setbacks.

Peacekeeping and security must be part of a coherent approach. Ownership at the central

Government level and the local level in the affected country is essential. As the responsibility rests with the country itself, capacity-building, a participatory approach and strengthening of the decision-making process are key elements of a real transition. Crosscutting issues of gender and human rights must be taken into account in all planning and action.

Questions related to justice and rule of law issues are often at the core of conflicts, and their importance is becoming increasingly recognized in planning the response of the international community to various crisis situations. As addressing issues related to the rule of law is necessary throughout the conflict cycle, the development of an effective response by the United Nations system to the challenges posed by complex crisis situations would benefit from increased cooperation between our respective bodies and throughout the United Nations system.

Adequate, flexible and sustained funding is required. There are important ongoing discussions regarding external donors and conflict-related assistance, and this will surely be reflected in the various segments of the Economic and Social Council as well.

In conclusion, I would like to draw the attention of the Council to the upcoming Economic and Social Council event on 12 July, as part of its substantive session, on the transition from relief to development. That event is a significant start and the first initiative of its kind at the intergovernmental level. It deserves an inclusive follow-up in some form. I trust that the debates at, and outcomes of, that event will also be of great relevance to the Security Council, as they will contribute to improved United Nations interventions in this critical phase of crisis situations.

The President: I thank the President of the Economic and Social Council for her statement.

Mr. Yáñez-Barnuevo (Spain) (*spoke in Spanish*): At the outset, Sir, let me welcome the initiative taken by your country's presidency to convene this open meeting of the Security Council. This provides an excellent opportunity for joint reflection on United Nations response to so-called complex crises.

As the presidency emphasizes in the paper that has been distributed as a basis for our discussions, such complex crises are conflicts that have not only military and security dimensions but also political, economic, social and humanitarian aspects. They often spill over national borders and increasingly are taking on regional dimensions.

The briefing we heard this morning — for which we are most appreciative — by Mr. Jan Egeland, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, emphasizes the tremendous challenges posed by such complex crises for the peoples afflicted, the regions most directly affected, the entire international community and, of course, the United Nations system.

It is generally agreed that the emergence of failed or collapsed States poses a threat to regional stability and even, in some cases, to global stability. Accordingly, the international community must decisively tackle such situations.

Political instability is but one factor — although an important one — in the emergence of such complex crises. Other factors also play an important role, whether by provoking such crises or by aggravating them, and are often a result of the crises themselves. I refer here to environmental aspects and to problems such as extreme poverty, inadequate sanitation, difficulties resulting from serious social or genderrelated inequalities, and the forced displacement of peoples, among others.

The challenges inherent in complex crises are quite unlike those posed by other, more traditional, types of threats, and, as a result, prompt the international community to engage in a discussion on the necessary balance between State sovereignty and collective action. We are speaking here of threats that do not respect borders and can be dealt with only through international cooperation and effective international action.

In an analysis of complex crises, the line between conflict prevention and the maintenance and building of peace becomes blurred. Peace-building often starts in the peacekeeping phase, as reflected in the mandates adopted in recent years by the Security Council for certain complex and multidimensional missions. The peace-building phase also has an important preventive aspect, in order to prevent the fragile situation typical of States emerging from a crisis from degenerating into yet another armed conflict.

Let us not forget that the majority of conflicts today are essentially internal and that they often recur. Approximately 40 per cent of States that have emerged from a conflict situation find themselves once again involved in a dynamic of armed confrontation relatively soon — a percentage that rises to 60 per cent in the case of Africa. Thus the prevention of conflict recurrence is as important — perhaps even more important — than prevention of conflict emergence. That aspect must be given due consideration in the work of the Security Council.

In tackling complex crises, prevention, as emphasized by Mr. Egeland, plays a pivotal role. Conflict prevention must be based on a broad concept of security that comprises political aspects, good governance, sustainable development, respect for human rights, and combating inequality and marginalization.

In terms of prevention, early warning must be accompanied by an early response. It is not very useful to get the necessary information on a potential crisis if the international community is not prepared to take decisive action to prevent it. Sometimes the need to deal with ongoing crises distracts us from potential conflicts. Early warning is of no use either if no effort is made to contain and mitigate the conflict situation immediately. Early warning and response require an analysis of the situation that includes the root causes of the crisis, follow-up to the processes and factors involved, and an intervention complemented by mechanisms and measures geared to responding to the root causes of the crisis.

Early warning and response require an understanding of a situation achieved by analyzing the bases of a conflict, anticipation through an analysis of the processes of a conflict and its particular contextual circumstances, and intervention based on a broad inventory of ways and means suitable to that situation.

While there are many early warning systems within the United Nations, we believe that the time has come to give serious consideration to how they can be coordinated so that the information at their disposal can contribute effectively and immediately to the decisionmaking process. In that connection, the role of the Secretary-General pursuant to Article 99 of the Charter is critical. In particular, the Secretary-General's initiative to appoint a special adviser for the prevention of genocide and other especially serious crimes is promising, in that it will ensure that the relevant information will reach the highest decision-making bodies early enough. In the prevention of a crisis or its recurrence, the Security Council should not be the only body involved. The task must be shared by the system's agencies and organizations. This raises the crucial issue of the Organization's requisite institutional architecture. We must determine whether it is suitable, in particular in the post-conflict transitional phase, for moving towards stabilization, rehabilitation and reconstruction.

Increased interaction between the Security Council, other major United Nations bodies and the High Commissioners for Refugees and Human Rights has become ever more necessary to providing a consistent and integrated response to the challenges inherent in complex crises. In this regard, I wish to welcome among us the President of the Economic and Social Council. We highly appreciate her contribution to the discharge of tasks and the adoption of measures undertaken by the Security Council in this connection. The Economic and Social Council is certainly highly suited to performing such work, pursuant to Article 65 of the Charter. One specific example of the increased interaction between the Economic and Social Council and the Security Council will be the participation of representatives from one of the Economic and Social Council's ad hoc advisory groups in the Security Council's forthcoming mission to West Africa in June.

Once a crisis has erupted and the Security Council and other bodies of the United Nations system have begun to respond to it, it must be met by the joint and consistent implementation of the following measures.

First, there must be strong local leadership with a broad social base that enjoys the firm support of the international community. Otherwise, international efforts to provide assistance may be doomed to failure, particularly in the humanitarian sphere. Secondly, we must prepare an integrated plan, adapted to the situation on the ground, and resist the temptation to make a hasty exit. Initial military success does not guarantee the resolution of the deep-rooted cause of a complex crisis or emergency. Thirdly, we must mobilize sufficient resources to implement the integrated plan and make consistent use of the appropriate tools with a view to ensuring that those resources are not wasted. Fourthly, we must maintain constant monitoring of the plan and of the evolution of the situation on the ground with a view to responding to changing circumstances.

In the context of complex crises, we cannot fail to note the relevant role of the competent regional organizations and, with respect to African crises, of the African Union and such bodies as the Economic Community of West African States in particular. In the European sphere, of which Spain is a part, we would emphasize the active work of the European Union to implement the Joint Declaration on strengthening cooperation in the civil management of crises, signed with the United Nations in September 2003.

The role of international civil society, in cooperation with Governments and international organizations, is also critical. In this connection, I would note the adoption in Dublin in April of an Action Agenda on the Prevention of Violent Conflict. The Agenda is the outcome of dialogue among more than 200 participants, including organizations from society, civil Governments and multilateral organizations. It contains interesting recommendations on cooperation between civil society and the United Nations system in the areas of early warning and response and of assessing post-conflict situations.

Ultimately, the success of efforts to change the dynamics of conflict that characterize complex crises into a dynamic for peace depends on the firm long-term commitment of the international community, including through an integrated plan with clear objectives, the firm resolve of the authorities of the State emerging from crisis, the implementation of measures necessary to building peace and ensuring national reconciliation, the political and financial support of the international community for transitional institutions, and the provision of tools adapted to the challenges of peacebuilding in the post-conflict period.

Mr. Wang Guangya (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): I wish to thank you, Sir, for taking the initiative to convene today's meeting. I also welcome the presence and statements of the President of the Economic and Social Council, Ambassador Rasi, and Under-Secretary-General Egeland.

Since the end of the cold war, some regions of the world have been afflicted by frequent conflicts, mostly intra-State, with ethnic and religious dimensions as well as political, economic, social and humanitarian facets. In many cases, such conflicts also affect the peace and stability of neighbouring countries and regions. The important issue of how effectively to address such complex crises calls for serious consideration by the Security Council and the United Nations membership as a whole. In that context, I wish to make the following comments.

First, priority must be accorded to prevention. Conflict prevention is the first and a significant step in the resolution of complex crises. In recent years, in the face of multiplying complex crises, the Secretary-General has repeatedly emphasized that the United Nations should move from a culture of response to a culture of prevention. The Security Council and the General Assembly have adopted resolutions on the prevention of conflicts. We support the increased efforts of the United Nations to add preventive diplomacy to the arsenal of important instruments available to fulfil its functions.

The Security Council, with its primary responsibilities in that regard, should formulate an integrated preventive strategy suited to the characteristics of complex crises. The General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the various United Nations agencies, on the basis of their comparative advantages and acting within their respective competences, should develop synergy in their conflict prevention efforts.

Secondly, priority must be attached to development. Granted, the resolution of complex crises calls for a series of measures, including the containment and resolution of conflicts, security sector reforms, the provision of humanitarian relief, the establishment of the rule of law and the promotion of good governance. To eliminate the underlying root causes of crises, development must be made a top priority.

Post-cold war crises and conflicts occur mostly in underdeveloped countries and regions, basically because of their chronic poverty and backwardness and failure to benefit from economic globalization. Therefore, the United Nations should devote greater attention to development, vigorously foster a culture of development, strive to help developing countries eradicate poverty and develop their economies and increase its involvement in post-conflict regional and national reconstruction. The Economic and Social Council can play an even greater role in that regard.

Thirdly, the synergy and coordination between United Nations and regional organizations must be enhanced. Regional organizations have a unique advantage in maintaining the stability of regions. In recent years, the Security Council has had fruitful cooperation with the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and other regional and subregional organizations on the questions of Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire and Burundi. In order to further enhance such synergy and cooperation the Security Council, in addressing complex crises, should seek the views of regional organizations on a wider basis, share its information with regional organizations and achieve mutual complementarity with them.

The Secretary-General's special envoys can join the special envoys of the AU and other regional organizations in their good offices and mediation efforts. In addition, the United Nations should increase assistance to regional organizations such as the AU, to help them enhance their overall capacity in early warning, peacekeeping and other endeavours.

United Nations experience has shown that there is no single formula that is universally applicable to the resolution of complex crises. Any solution must be tailored to local conditions, varying cultures and historical backgrounds. At the same time, in the process of crisis resolution the will of the people of the countries concerned should be respected and their views fully sought. Only thus can the settlement plans surely contribute to the resolution of crises and the attainment of peace.

Mr. Sardenberg (Brazil): Mr. President, I wish to express our appreciation to you for convening this public meeting on a fundamental issue such as complex crises, which call for a United Nations response. We are also pleased to have among us Under-Secretary-General Jan Egeland, head of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, and Ambassador Marjatta Rasi, President of the Economic and Social Council.

We believe that our response to crises throughout the world has not been entirely appropriate — the military approach to security has been superseding the human approach, and as stated in your non-paper of 18 May, we consider that "the intrinsic link between peace and development must remain at the core of UN response" to complex crises.

The President has laid down a series of questions that this debate on complex crises should attempt to address with clarity and objectivity. My comments shall focus on two of those topics: preventive diplomatic action and post-conflict peace-building.

Concerning preventive diplomatic action — or what we could call conflict avoidance — we believe that a much more energetic and consistent role must be played by the whole collective security mechanism provided by the United Nations Charter. That actually means a rededication of our Organization and all its Members to the resolve of "the peoples of the United Nations" made clear in the Charter's Preamble. That also means a renewed commitment to the lofty aims of the Purposes and Principles contained in the Charter. The sixtieth anniversary of the United Nations in 2005 represents a golden opportunity that must not be missed. It should be the culmination of the many efforts now being carried out in the field of peace and security.

International realities are changing at an alarming pace, thus requiring institutional change in the Organization, including a reform of the Security Council, as its composition and procedures have clearly become inadequate for current needs related to its primary responsibility — the maintenance of international peace and security.

A revitalization of the General Assembly is also required. Along with updating its work methods, it must make full use of the potentialities envisaged in Articles 10, 11 and 13 of the Charter.

In that connection, the General Assembly should play a larger role in considering the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security and in drawing the attention of the Council to situations that are likely to endanger peace and security. The Assembly should also significantly increase its role in promoting cooperation in the political field, thus enhancing its contribution to the strengthening of international peace and security. Appropriate recommendations should be made to that effect.

The instrumentalities relating to the pacific settlement of disputes, and actions with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression, as well as regional arrangements, should be urgently revisited. I refer to Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the United Nations Charter.

Regional organizations have an increasingly important role to play in the overall international effort

for peace and security. Some weeks ago we had examples when we were briefed by the Chairman-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

But we see the primary role of the regional organizations as one of a preventive nature. Their particularly important contribution lies in addressing the root causes of conflict and violations of human rights before they escalate into major conflicts. Smaller regional organizations are more flexible and are closer to the sources of conflict than the United Nations. They are in a better position to detect the early symptoms and act promptly, thus preventing intrastate differences from evolving into intolerance, prejudice, hatred and conflict.

Moreover, the root causes of conflict are often region-specific: in Kosovo they might be very different from those in Darfur, which might in turn widely differ from the Haitian question. Preventive diplomacy should be consistently taken up by regional organizations. We believe that partnership between those organizations and the United Nations ought to be expanded.

We welcome the periodic meetings with regional organizations promoted by the United Nations and aimed at optimizing the use of resources and avoiding duplication. In many cases, the international community must provide assistance to enable regional organizations to shoulder their responsibilities.

Needless to say, when prevention fails and enforcement actions are needed, military action should remain the prerogative of this Council. The Council may, as well, empower regional arrangements to enforce action, as stated in Article 53 of the Charter, when such possibility is foreseen in their constitutive act.

Underdevelopment and under-education are found at the root of most conflicts in the world. Economic inequalities and poverty exacerbate differences and intolerance and invariably kindle friction and, ultimately, conflict. From a strictly academic perspective, it is worth noting that the root causes of conflict will recur after any peacekeeping intervention if sufficient attention is not paid to sustained development, thus creating a very vicious circle. This brings me to the second topic: peacebuilding, in the sense of post-conflict efforts that must follow a peacekeeping operation. As we have seen in our recent debate on the issue, among the 15 peacekeeping operations now being deployed by the United Nations, eight are considered complex.

In complex crises, the State and society have eroded. Therefore, the United Nations cannot limit itself to military security. A much broader concept of security has to be applied to these situations: the population must be protected, humanitarian assistance delivered, reconciliation among factions forged, combatants disarmed and reintegrated, interim authorities put in place, law and order reestablished, elections organized, Government institutions reformed, and infrastructure and the economy rebuilt. That is a long list, but it may not be a complete one.

We believe that the element of economic reconstruction has not been underscored enough in our resolutions. We need to apply more time and energy and to spend our resources more effectively in quickimpact economic programmes that could in a short period of time transform the daily reality of individuals and of small communities. We believe that the only way to sustain peace is by enhancing the development components of peacekeeping operations.

Since the Council is the primary organ for peace and security in the world, it is therefore our responsibility to ensure that peacekeeping operations are effective. But they can be effective — and costeffective — only if we incorporate mechanisms of sustained peace into our resolutions. Otherwise countries and populations may easily fall back into conflict. We have to be more creative in our common objective of sustained peace, requesting direct involvement of the Economic and Social Council and of United Nations development agencies. Our concept of exit strategies must primarily be linked to realistic benchmarks, rather than observing rigid deadlines.

Successive recent events demonstrate that we are likely to remain mired in a long-term struggle for peace and security. They also lead us to believe that much more must be done by the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council to ensure that the apparent risk of regional or global systemic failure ceases to exist. Peacekeeping operations are our established response to these events, and their record shows many success stories. But whenever peacekeeping is needed, conflict prevention has been needed before and peace-building will be needed afterwards.

We might evolve in the future to the establishment of conflict-avoiding operations. While we work within the current framework of peacekeeping, however, we should be able to implement institutional change in the United Nations and to stimulate regional organizations to enhance their reach for the root causes of conflict. We should also incorporate ever more elements of peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction, in particular development and education capacities, into peacekeeping operations.

Mr. Baali (Algeria) (*spoke in French*): As the Council holds its final public meeting of the month, I wish, Mr. President, to extend to you and to the other members of your delegation the appreciation of my delegation for the manner in which you have guided our work, which has been praiseworthy in every respect. I wish also to thank you for your choice of subject for today's debate; its relevance to the work of the Council has been acknowledged by all members. Here, the contributions by Ms. Rasi and Mr. Egeland were most illuminating and provided a new dimension that will broaden our view and will help us hone our response to the challenges before us.

The subject of today's debate is of great interest because it links the United Nations — which is itself an inherently complex system — with complex crisis situations. As observed in the Millennium Declaration, the multidimensional nature of the challenges facing the Organization demands a multidisciplinary approach involving multiple actors in both assessing and addressing crises.

Let me make a key observation with regard specifically to complex crises: most of the situations of which the Council is seized in the context of its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security fall into that category. Moreover, the other principal organs and the agencies of the United Nations system are facing the same situation.

Although it is not appropriate to propose a single definition of these situations, observing them enables us to identify a number of recurrent characteristic elements. Among the causes of complex conflicts and crises are, almost invariably: poverty; corruption; ethnic or religious tensions fuelled by extremism; denial of citizenship; seizure of wealth by social groups, either alone or in association with foreign actors; and the exclusion and social inequality that those practices engender.

The factors causing the outbreak of these crises can vary, but the consequences are constant. They include massive flows of displaced persons and refugees fleeing the fighting and the lack of security, along with a concomitant deterioration of the productive sector. The breakdown of the economy then accelerates that of the State, whose powers and prerogatives are challenged by criminal systems that rise out of its ruins to grasp control of natural resources, whose illegal exploitation enables them to prolong the crisis, because a settlement would run counter to their interests.

But the complexity of a crisis does not stop there. Border-area flows of refugee populations and ethnic situations that cross borders in most conflict zones impose an additional, most often unbearable, burden on the economies of neighbouring countries; the result is to involve States in the crisis. At this point, the crisis reaches a higher level of complexity with interference by neighbouring States. These States are sometimes motivated by a legitimate desire to spare themselves the negative consequences of instability. But more frequently they are motivated by the interplay of tribal or ethnic solidarity, behind which is quickly seen the notion of compensation for harm suffered, which in turn barely conceals covetous designs on the resources of the neighbouring State which has collapsed or is in the process of doing so. The convergence of interests among the criminal armed groups, neighbours and foreign mercenaries and adventurers who never fail to appear in these situations gives rise to a conflict economy which is designed — and which functions to prolong the crisis and to prevent the regrowth of the State.

We are all aware of those facts, but they are indispensable to understanding the nature of the United Nations response. I think it is only fair to acknowledge that the Organization has for several years fully understood this complexity and that it has begun a process of conceptual and structural adaptation. Concrete progress towards a comprehensive, integrated approach is reflected both in decisions taken by the Secretary-General in areas within his purview in the sphere of inter-agency coordination, and in the progressive, ongoing implementation of the recommendations the Working of Group on

Peacekeeping Operations. Indeed, it cannot be denied that peacekeeping and peace-building operations are increasingly multidisciplinary in nature.

Moreover, in the context of conflict prevention and settlement, recourse to the resources of Chapter VIII of the Charter is becoming more systematic, with a view to integrating the contributions of regional and subregional organizations into this approach. Here, I should highlight the important role played by Special Representatives of the Secretary-General.

However, we believe it premature to talk about genuine comprehensive and integrated strategies for dealing with complex crises at all stages of conflict prevention, conflict settlement and peace-building. In fact, the current situation of a rapidly growing number of crises is generating huge needs. Current operations now employ more than 50,000 individuals and might soon employ 60,000, with an unprecedented annual budget of \$3.5 billion. That amount, approaching the amount pledged for development at the Monterrey International Conference on Financing for Development, underlines the gap in the comprehensive, integrated response sought by the international community for conflict prevention and ensuring human security.

We believe that, without question, this gap should be overcome by means of a bolder, more precise approach to detecting and preventing conflicts and by making development a dimension of complex United Nations operations, at the same integral level as the humanitarian and human rights dimensions, whose inclusion in missions is now widely accepted and is made necessary by the massive violations of human rights and other atrocities committed during armed conflicts.

We are aware that this assertion touches upon the Charter, which entrusts other organs with the responsibility for development issues. Yet, we have been inspired to make this assertion by the lucid analysis of the Economic and Social Council's Ad Hoc Advisory Group on African countries emerging from conflict, which spells out the objective limits of the post-conflict involvement of the United Nations Development Group. The debate now under way on United Nations reform provides an opportunity to consider adjusting the Charter with a view to creating the desired integrated response. We believe that a regional approach to complex crises requires the creation of regional pillars to optimize the use of the resources made available by the pre-existing international security framework. On the African continent in particular, that means that the regional security framework that the African countries are seeking to establish, a process that culminated this week in the launch of the Peace and Security Council, should receive the same level of attention in terms of resource allocation as international operations. In that connection, my delegation welcomes the establishment by the European Union of a financing mechanism to support this process and, in particular, its support of the principle of an African standing force.

Finally, my delegation believes that thorough reform of how the interventions of the international community are carried out is necessary. That necessarily entails reforming the financing of those operations and enlarging the Security Council.

Mr. Adechi (Benin) (*spoke in French*): We thank you, Mr. President, for your initiative of inviting the Council to reflect on the United Nations response to complex crises.

The past two decades have been particularly marked by a considerable development of the United Nations role in armed conflicts. The complexity of those conflicts has led the international community more thoroughly to study their root causes and to find new ways to deal with them effectively. That is the result of a broader approach to threats to international security, responding to the urgent need henceforth to include non-military threats and to take greater account of the preventive dimension of the maintenance of international peace and security.

That led the Security Council to state at the end of its first summit meeting, held on 31 January 1992, that

"The absence of war and military conflicts amongst States does not in itself ensure international peace and security. The non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security. The United Nations membership as a whole, working through the appropriate bodies, needs to give the highest priority to the solution of these matters." (S/PV.3046, p. 143) The changes that have taken place are due, above all, to awareness of the many factors contributing to the gestation and persistence of crises and to the outbreak of armed conflict: factors which must be more precisely examined in settlement and peace-building efforts. Thus, the United Nations system has been led, on the one hand, to outline a strategy for gradually transforming a culture of reaction into one of conflict prevention and, on the other hand, to replace its practice of unsystematic, separate actions with globally coordinated interventions.

In that connection, development assistance must provide a framework for enhancing and intensifying dialogue between donors and recipients to promote the creation of inclusive structures and the greatest possible national absorption capacities. That way, development assistance can become a preferred instrument for promoting peace and preventing conflict.

Broadening the concept of peacekeeping and international security also touches upon the issue of the legitimacy of the Security Council's mandate with respect to the new challenges and the legality of its legislating initiatives in areas where international law has not yet established norms and regulations.

The changing nature of conflicts makes the commitment of significant resources necessary over a longer term. There is unanimous agreement that development is the best way to prevent conflicts. The Security Council, which has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, has many duties and must henceforth deal with both the nature of crises and the prevention of the grave violations of humanitarian principles that are at the origin of these conflicts — or that result from them.

The presence at this meeting of the President of the Economic and Social Council and of the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator is highly significant in that regard. Increasingly, the main criterion for deciding when to intervene is the actual or foreseen human and social cost of complex crises. That requires the Council to monitor the development of crises and to take the appropriate measures within its purview to protect populations and ensure their right to life where necessary.

The Council has at its disposition a wide range of instruments that it has used over recent years to bring

critical situations under control and to steer them towards a more positive outcome. More than in the past, the obligation to act flows from the Council's responsibility to protect and its exclusive right to authorize the legal use of force for that purpose. That is why the Council is more often questioned on its slowness to respond: humanitarian crises bring greater attention to the principle of protecting human dignity.

From this perspective, it is particularly important that the Secretary-General fully and effectively exercise his power to draw the attention of the Security Council to any matter that in his opinion could threaten the maintenance of international peace and security, as set out in Article 99 of the Charter.

It is true that, for a long time, the historical circumstances surrounding the creation of the United Nations and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of States as set out in the Charter have led to priority being accorded to international crises and conflicts. The increase in intra-State conflict, however, has given rise to a new factor in terms of the exercise of the responsibilities of the Secretariat and the Security Council in the area of preventive diplomacy. In that respect, they have an important asset: the representation of the United Nations in the great majority of countries throughout the world. We must therefore accord high priority to the functions of preventive diplomacy, which, based on the Organization's global representation and on its legitimacy, must refine its ability to analyse and anticipate crises and help defuse them in the early stages of development by the use of good offices in the context of joint action by the Security Council and the competent bodies of the regional and subregional organizations concerned.

In terms of policy planning, actions aimed at eradicating the deep-rooted causes of conflict, peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assistance, post-conflict peace-building and national reconciliation efforts and long-term development cannot, therefore, be seen as separate stages or isolated issues. In this regard, we are pleased to note that a clear awareness of the need to include the response to complex crises in a strategy that is both global and regional in nature is beginning to emerge in the international community, especially the United Nations system. Thus the Security Council is required to provide strategic momentum in a multidisciplinary approach, including in its field of action all of the institutions of the United Nations system, because of the linkage between the causes of conflict and the way in which they interact with one another — hence the need for coordinated action on the part of all those involved.

Such action on the part of the Security Council would enable it to reaffirm, in a durable manner, its leadership in the promotion of international peace and security. To that end, the way in which the Council cooperates with and consults the relevant bodies of the United Nations system should be reconsidered and improved. It goes without saying that, in this context, the question arises of a more flexible reading of the Security Council's mandate.

The Council should also take another look at its own instruments, such as general or targeted sanctions, commissions of inquiry, observation missions, preventive disarmament and the establishment of demilitarized zones — all useful tools available to the Council for the effective conduct of preventive diplomacy.

Because of the level of financial resources that are now required, the creation of special trust funds, especially for short-term initiatives, requires some thought. Recent successes have made clear the relevance of another underutilized tool: the group of friends. That concept, which has been used in a number of different ways, has had varied degrees of success, most recently in the context of the situation in Haiti.

Given the role that regional and subregional organizations could play in the prevention and management of conflict, in reconstruction and in maintaining peace, the Council should promote the strengthening of such institutions and make full use of the potential that they offer so as to enable them better to fulfil their responsibilities.

In this regard, I welcome the fact that this debate is taking place a few days after the launching of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. That noteworthy development should be supported and encouraged. My delegation would therefore like to repeat the appeal made by the African Union to the entire international community to provide support for that significant example of progress in Africa's determination to manage its own affairs in dealing with problems that have hindered its prosperity and development. **Mr. Baja** (Philippines): I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for having convened this meeting on complex crises and the United Nations response. We are also grateful to the President of the Economic and Social Council and the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs for their insightful statements on the subject.

Simple problems call for simple solutions. But complex problems do not necessarily require complex solutions. The key to solving complex crises faced by the international community today is to have a comprehensive, coordinated and sustainable response from the United Nations system. A comprehensive and integrated approach would ensure that we would have a sustained effort in addressing the complexity and multidimensionality of each crisis.

Crises confronting the United Nations have grown in complexity. They often have intertwining and overlapping dimensions. The mere mention of conflict areas — for example, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Bosnia, Liberia and Sierra Leone — is enough to conjure up in our minds the complex nature of these crises, what the response from the United Nations was and what it could have been. The experience in Rwanda, for example, continues to remind us that that so-called preventable genocide should not be repeated. At this stage, we are confronted by yet another complex situation: the United Nations is called upon to engage in peace-building in Iraq. We are in the process of defining and refining the United Nations response and its strategy on that issue.

Conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding lie at the heart of the United Nations mandate for the maintenance of international peace and security. The activities of the United Nations in this regard are not new. In fact, many of the programmes and projects of this global body have a so-called preventive effect, or at least preventive potential. Unfortunately, they are often disparate and inchoate. We need to address the overlapping concerns relating to conflict prevention and post-conflict peace-building, as well as the blurred distinction of when conflict prevention ends and when post-conflict peace-building begins.

United Nations activities in the area of conflict prevention and post-conflict peace-building are embodied in the Secretary-General's report to the General Assembly and the Security Council entitled "Prevention of armed conflict" (S/2001/574). The Secretary-General also submitted a framework for cooperation in peace-building in his letter of 12 February 2001 to the President of the Security Council (S/2001/138).

The Philippines believes that those documents are central to our discussion. Allow me to highlight some seminal elements which the Philippines considers important and which could form part of our future follow-up actions in the field of conflict prevention and post-conflict peace-building.

On the conflict prevention strategy, the Philippines agrees with many of the Secretary-General's observations. First, conflict prevention and sustainable and equitable development are mutually reinforcing activities. Secondly, an effective preventive strategy requires a comprehensive approach that encompasses both short-term and long-term political, economic, diplomatic, humanitarian, human rights, developmental, institutional and other measures taken by the international community in cooperation with national and regional actors.

Thirdly, preventive action should address the deep-rooted socio-economic, cultural, environmental, institutional and other structural causes that often underlie the immediate political symptoms of conflicts. Fourthly, we need to address the structural and operational aspects of conflict prevention and peace-building. This means addressing the need to define the mandates of the various actors in the United Nations system and the need to ensure synergy and coordination of those mandated functions.

As regards the framework for cooperation in peace-building, the Philippines supports the guiding principles and possible cooperative activities that will help build an enabling environment for peace-building activities. These include the need to ensure a speedy operational response and the optimum mobilization of human, technical and financial resources as well as the need to direct efforts at preventing the outbreak or recurrence of conflicts. The Philippines also supports the idea of establishing an information exchange mechanism for early warning analysis and a better understanding of the root causes of conflict.

The Philippines commends the Secretary-General for his efforts to address those concerns. We note, however, that some of those efforts have been limited to certain sectors and involve only certain actors. There is no comprehensive and integrated approach that includes the participation of all stakeholders and addresses the multidimensional and complex aspects of crisis situations.

For example, the Ad Hoc Advisory Groups on Guinea-Bissau and Burundi are laudable efforts by the Economic and Social Council. But the advisory role and the ad hoc nature of these working groups are not adequate. There are concerns, for instance, about what to do after the mandate has lapsed. We therefore need continuity and an institutional mechanism that will integrate security policy, economic development and institution-building in those areas.

There is a need to integrate the various programmes undertaken by the United Nations and other multi-stakeholders on conflict prevention and peace-building and to mould them into a general strategy that will address the various concerns in a comprehensive, coordinated and sustainable manner. We need to develop a practical road map to implement the specific recommendations of the Secretary-General in his seminal reports on conflict prevention and postconflict peace-building. More important, we need to follow-up on those mechanisms that have already been identified.

We also need to develop or formulate an overall conflict prevention strategy that will ensure the integrated and comprehensive work of the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the International Court of Justice and the Secretary-General and the participation of other actors including regional organizations, funds and programmes, civil society, non-governmental organizations, the business community and the Bretton Woods institutions, among other players.

The best possible United Nations response in addressing complex crises is and has always been to root out the major causes of conflict. The big challenge for the United Nations is how to prevent the outbreak or recurrence of conflict. This is possible only if the United Nations can address the root causes of conflicts and channel scarce resources to development. Unfortunately, while global defence and military expenditures amount to \$900 billion, only about \$500 million goes to development. If we want to have a genuine approach to conflict prevention and postconflict peace-building, we should address and confront this harsh irony. Mr. President, again, I wish to thank you and your delegation for choosing this very timely and relevant topic. The need for a comprehensive United Nations response to complex crises also underlies a theme of next month's presidency: the issue of the role of civil society in post-conflict peace-building. The search for an appropriate United Nations response to complex crises should involve those who are able — and those who will be able — to contribute to an effective response to such crises.

Mr. Duclos (France) (*spoke in French*): I would like at the outset, Sir, to say how pleased we are to have worked over the past weeks under your distinguished and effective presidency. I would also like to thank you for having chosen the important subject that brings us together today.

As shown by the experience acquired over recent years and by our daily work, the United Nations is increasingly confronted by complex crises, which obviously call for a special effort towards coherence and coordination. In that connection, I welcome the statements made at the beginning of the meeting by the President of the Economic and Social Council and by Mr. Egeland, which clearly highlighted both the expectations arising from the United Nations response to such crises and the need to improve our tools. My delegation is particularly pleased to have participated in the Economic and Social Council Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Burundi, which has provided us with valuable lessons.

The non-paper you conveyed to us, Mr. President, sums up the situation clearly, and I subscribe entirely to your analysis of the various aspects of the problem. As already recommended by the Brahimi report (S/2000/809), we must devise more complete and better integrated strategies to truly build peace. We must also provide ourselves with the means to implement them and to follow up on their implementation. This must be one of the highest priorities in future years if we wish to avoid some of the errors of the past. Our States collectively made that commitment at the Millennium Summit, as you said in your non-paper. We therefore think that this question will become one of the important issues at the meeting of heads of State or Government in 2005, the principle of which has been decided by the General Assembly and which is to be devoted precisely to the Millennium Declaration goals. The High-Level Panel established by the Secretary-General to address threats to

international security and necessary reforms can undoubtedly also make useful contributions.

I would like to make only a few specific comments today, based on the questions that the President suggested to us regarding strategies for responding to and following up on crises and on the inclusion of peacekeeping operations in such strategies.

First, the concept of integrated strategy has made considerable headway over recent years. I would like in particular to welcome the efforts of the specialized agencies — in particular the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) — to work with the World Bank to prepare joint need evaluations, as occurred in the cases of Iraq and Liberia, and, I believe, will soon occur in Haiti. This is an indispensable tool, of course, in designing global strategies. We can therefore only hope that the methodology for such joint assessments will be further refined and that it will set a standard.

Work on ways to guide a country from humanitarian emergency to sustainable development has also made considerable headway. It is clear that the various problems relating to transition cannot be dealt with sequentially, for example by dealing with security before humanitarian issues and humanitarian issues before development. To the contrary, responses must be devised at the outset in an integrated and coherent fashion. The inter-agency report prepared under the aegis of Ms. Carol Bellamy posits these principles clearly and proposes concrete action to adapt our traditional instruments to crisis situations and to strengthen coordination. We must support their implementation and continue the exercise, expanding it to the World Bank, for example. It is particularly important to articulate the various aspects of these strategies in areas where diverse competencies must be combined. Programmes of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, which are, as we know, crucial, provide an example. The Secretariat and the agencies, together with the international financial institutions, could, based on past experience, agree to define a framework that could then be applied according to specific situations. We must also think about financial instruments that would be best suited to these integrated strategies. This is a complex issue, and a realistic analysis of the options might be a first step.

Finally, I should like to emphasize the question of follow-up to strategies, which is probably one of the

greatest weaknesses in the systems established by the international community. The lack of stringent followup machinery is, from our standpoint, quite probably one of the causes of some of the failures that have occurred. Experience has shown that, once the crisis has passed, political attention and international mobilization decline sharply. However, transition requires a sustained commitment over several years; a capacity to adapt to priorities depending on how events unfold; and, if necessary, immediate responses if serious difficulties arise.

We must therefore consider political and administrative mechanisms that enable an effective follow-up of the progress made, warn of obstacles and propose remedies. Such mechanisms must involve the members of the Security Council, the countries concerned, major donors, regional and subregional organizations, and international financial agencies and institutions. They must be active in the field as well as in New York or Geneva. The small group that we established under the resolution on Haiti falls into that category. Groups established by the Economic and Social Council are also designed to devise a response. This formula, to which we are quite naturally turning, must be more clearly defined and used more widely.

Secondly, as many of us said in the course of our discussions on 17 May, peacekeeping operations, which often play a decisive role, must be part of overall peace-building strategies. This is particularly true in the case of complex crises, whose various aspects are interdependent and could each doom to failure the activities undertaken by the international community.

I will not reiterate the suggestions made by our delegation, among others, during our initial discussions under the presidency of Pakistan, but I would like to stress two points in particular.

First, planning for peacekeeping operations is crucial. Is it possible to involve, at an earlier stage of the process, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and his assistants, including the person in charge of humanitarian action and development? Could we not make better use of the experience of United Nations agencies, which often are already active in the area at the time when planning begins? Could we bring the phase of the assessment of economic and social needs — which must involve the World Bank — closer to that of the design of a peacekeeping operation? We believe that these questions should be considered by the Secretariat, which could then share its observations with us.

Secondly, the institutional structure of a peacekeeping operation and the selection of its personnel must also take into account this requirement for coherence. The appointment of an assistant special representative of the Secretary-General who would also be a resident coordinator and humanitarian coordinator would be part of that framework. The skills and experience of such an individual, whose task is indeed complex, obviously are an important factor in the success if the operation as a whole. Special representatives themselves should also be, insofar as possible, familiar with humanitarian and economic issues. If that is not the case, appropriate training could be provided in order to enable them better to discharge their duties.

Experience has shown that, perhaps in this kind of situation more than in any other, the United Nations is indispensable in the process of the design and implementation of responses to complex crises. The United Nations, however, must be able to meet such expectations through its own resources and by bringing together all of the actors involved. It seems to me that our discussion today is itself a contribution to that effort.

Mr. Maquieira (Chile) (*spoke in Spanish*): First, let me thank you, Sir, for having taken the initiative of asking the Council to reflect on this topic, which I believe to be very important. I would also like to welcome the presence of, and the statements made by, Ambassador Marjatta Rasi, President of the Economic and Social Council, and the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Mr. Jan Egeland, which provided the framework for today's debate.

Future efforts to ensure peace and security must, in our view, focus increasingly on resolving problems before they escalate and turn into actual conflicts or crises. Various international agencies, nongovernmental organizations and Governments have proposed approaches that would make such coherence possible, but the truth is that the various kinds of intervention — humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation, and development cooperation post-conflict reconstruction — continue to differ in terms of logic and are sometimes contradictory in their methods.

Accordingly, the Council should focus on aspects which, while essential to conflict resolution, nonetheless appear somewhat limited in the broad context of complex crises. The organs of the United Nations focus on aspects that are important in the context of long-term solutions, but lack the capacity effectively to interact with the Security Council. That is the institutional dilemma confronting the United Nations and its Members, to which no appropriate solution has yet emerged.

One aspect that is deserving of consideration is the better use of inter-agency working groups in the context of the Secretariat, which could be one way of approaching the issue. I recall that the Brahimi report proposed coordinated work in the areas of peacekeeping operations, political affairs, development cooperation and reconstruction. In terms of complex crises, this would translate into the creation in the Secretariat of a culture conducive to the establishment of such inter-agency working groups. If an incident were to occur, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Economic and Social Affairs would come together in the framework of such groups, so as to address the conflict from multiple perspectives and inform the Council on that basis. It would not be important who presented the report, as long as it provided the Council with a comprehensive view of the situation so as to enable it to resolve it.

It seems to me that that, although this system works well in the economic and social sector of the United Nations, a major mechanism is still needed in terms of the political and security sector of the institution.

Today it is crucial to discuss new methods of association — and that is my second point — that will enable the United Nations system and its Member States, together with non-governmental organizations, to respond collectively to the challenges posed by complex crises. Our delegation believes that it has been an extraordinarily complex task for Governments, United Nations bodies, development banks and nongovernmental organizations to follow joint comprehensive strategies aimed at alleviating the effects of conflicts, and to provide continuity in the growing trend towards an integrated and holistic focus that brings together a number of methods. Political consensus must be generated in the long term on the basis of political, diplomatic and economic efforts to facilitate the peace process.

However, the greatest challenge may be overcoming the lack of coordination among participating agencies, Governments and organizations in this process. The Ad Hoc Advisory Groups on Guinea-Bissau and Burundi are excellent examples of how this might be done. We also believe preventive action to be the most effective way to prevent future threats and to promote collective security.

The means of identifying preventive measures are well known. We have listened this morning to eloquent statements on what is needed to develop a genuinely preventive policy, but it would appear that our search for a way to implement such a policy is being thwarted. One way to do so would be under Article 99 of the Charter, which allows the Secretary-General to draw the Security Council's attention to situations that threaten international peace and security. With the tools currently available to the Secretary-General and the system, it would appear that the Security Council is called upon only when a crisis is imminent and that little preventive action can therefore be undertaken in advance.

In 1992, An Agenda for Peace was issued by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, who rightly noted that tools which could be made available to the Secretariat — and which, he felt, did not necessarily depend on Member States — would allow the elaboration of an appropriate preventive policy. Furthermore, Dag Hammarskjöld also resorted to Article 99 to initiate peacekeeping operations. It might be interesting for the Security Council and its subsidiary bodies to look into how the Secretary-General might be given better tools for pursuing preventive policies and thereby achieve the objective of involving the Security Council in situations that might evolve into conflict.

In conclusion, we are faced with circumstances that, as you, Sir, and others have noted, are extraordinary. I believe that the Security Council and other bodies in the economic, social and political arenas are gradually making progress towards finding ways and means of effectively addressing complex crises. Today's debate and the statements made here are important. The tasks entrusted to peacekeeping operations are important. We will ultimately need to find a way to devise tools that will allow us to assess the effectiveness of decisions adopted and machinery created and how they contribute to the achievement of our goals.

Mr. Gaspar Martins (Angola): I would like to start by expressing appreciation to you, Sir, and the Pakistani presidency for the opportunity provided to us to address this important topic once again in this Chamber. This is a burning issue in contemporary international life and I thank you very much for having chosen it as a topic to end your very successful presidency.

I would like to say that we are very pleased with the statements and the presence here of Ambassador Rasi, President of the Economic and Social Council, and the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Mr. Egeland.

It is our expectation that today's discussion will be a contribution to improving the methods and to further identifying appropriate means to deal with the complex crises that, in recent years, have so negatively impacted on the lives of so many people and become the cause of great concern to the international community and a real threat to peace and security. A number of very relevant suggestions have been advanced this morning and we would like to welcome and register them for further discussion.

The complex crises we are dealing with today stem invariably from situations of total insecurity, often with a regional dimension, including ethnic conflict, genocide, uncontrolled violence, civilian deaths in overwhelming numbers, generalized suffering and massive displacement of populations within and across borders. Contemporary complex crises have led the international community, and the United Nations in particular, to an awareness of the need to address the issue from a three-fold perspective: by establishing a link between security and development, by recognizing that what happens inside a given country may impact international peace and security, and by on understanding that human security and peace-building are areas of legitimate international concern and are interlinked. Policies envisaged to address this new security threat have been developed by the United Nations, international regional organizations, nongovernmental organizations, civil society and even the business community.

The Secretary-General's report on the prevention of armed conflict spelled out the basic premises of

those policies and how the United Nations system can best interact in order to prevent armed conflicts and enhance States' capacity to prevent them. Three main ideas emerged from the report. First, conflict prevention is one of the primary responsibilities of Member States and preventive action should be initiated at the earliest possible stage of a conflict cycle in order to be more effective. Secondly, an effective preventive strategy requires a comprehensive approach, both short- and long-term, and conflict prevention and sustainable and equitable development are mutually reinforcing activities. Thirdly, a successful preventive strategy depends on the cooperation of many actors in the United Nations, as well as the Bretton Woods institutions, Member States, international, regional and organizations, non-governmental subregional organizations, civil society and so on.

While assigning a key role to the Security Council in the prevention of armed conflicts, the report recognized that, in reality, the focus of the Council remains almost exclusively on crises and emergencies. As the primary centre for international efforts in crisis management and peace-building, the Security Council has in the past decade established a number of peacekeeping operations with the primary aims of stopping bloodshed, enforcing peace and addressing the root causes of conflicts.

Contrary to the disengaged nature of past United Nations operations, the main operations presently deployed are multi-dimensional in character. By involving civilian and military tasks, their objective is to end wars and to promote long-term peace-building by encroaching upon domains that were once seen as the exclusive realms of sovereign States or primarily dealt with through development assistance. Some of today's operations involve the direct administration of territories and populations and the rebuilding of States against the background of the grossest violations of human rights and the total destruction of the social and economic fabric, as was the case of Kosovo and Timor-Leste.

The international community's response to the challenges of peace-building has been translated into practice by the implementation of programmes in the spheres of governance, security reform and the rule of law, aimed fundamentally at managing change peacefully and advancing constitutional and lateral processes, ensuring disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes and advancing the fundamental structuring or restructuring of security institutions such as the police and army, and putting them under civilian control. That response also includes promoting national reconciliation through accountability for past crimes and justice for the victims, and by promoting human rights and legal and penal reform.

The Economic and Social Council has been called upon to play an ever-increasing role in the prevention of conflict, in the framework of an integrated approach recognized by the international community as valuable to achieve peace, security, respect for human rights and sustainable development. Specific cases of the involvement of the Economic and Social Council and the Security Council in Africa — in Guinea Bissau and in Burundi — are very good examples, which have been cited several times this morning.

The critical role that the Economic and Social Council plays in addressing the root causes of conflict and its contribution to a comprehensive and multidisciplinary discussion on the prevention of armed conflicts in the regional context are recognized as valuable contributions to the prevention of armed conflict and to peace-building. In addition, the ad hoc working groups and advisory groups on countries emerging from conflict have produced commendable work, and their recommendations are important contributions in conflict prevention and resolution.

After more than a decade in which large number of multidimensional United Nations peace-building missions have been established, with some drawing to a close, the international community, with the lessons learned through this cycle of peace-building, is in a better position to evaluate the outcomes of key components of the peace-building agenda with regard to inter-agency collaboration and coordination and to apply the best practices to peace-building. This morning's meeting is again a very valuable contribution to the debate.

It is our conviction that the major investments to be made by the international community — including political, diplomatic, financial, economic, cultural, analytical and moral — must be in prevention. The main and subsidiary bodies of the United Nations the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council and the Secretariat regional and subregional organizations, financial institutions and civil society, non-governmental organizations, schools, the press and all social actors should make conflict prevention the cornerstone of a universal and common endeavour to promote a more peaceful, equitable and prosperous world. That objective is an attainable one.

Mr. Konuzin (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): We are pleased to see participating in today's meeting of the Security Council, Ms. Marjatta Rasi, President of the Economic and Social Council, and Mr. Jan Egeland, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs. Their participation is further testimony to the cooperation of the major organs of the United Nations, in accordance with their prerogatives in solving tasks common to the Organization.

The nature of current global challenges and threats determines the need for a collective reaction to them, on the basis of comprehensive concern and respect for the legitimate interests of all members of the international community in strict observance of the existing international legal norms, and the comprehensive involvement of the potential of various multilateral institutions at the global and regional levels.

We note with satisfaction that, over a relatively short period of time, within the framework of the United Nations it has been possible to achieve substantial success in settling complex regional conflicts. The examples include the operations in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste, Liberia and in a number of other crisis regions. They clearly demonstrate the indissolubly linked tasks involved in ensuring that the establishment of peace and the rebirth of statehood and the full-fledged social and economic recovery of countries suffering from conflict take place.

The experience of the conduct of peacekeeping operations under the leadership of the United Nations, and with its approval, has shown, in the past decade, a radical change in the nature of the tasks facing us — a transition from traditional ceasefire monitoring to the complex settlement of problems which go as far as the full-fledged governing of territories. We believe that the United Nations Secretariat and the international community must significantly restructure their work in peacekeeping in keeping with the new tasks. So it is that the interdepartmental groups established within the framework of the United Nations Secretariat are effectively working on the preparation of complex operations for peacekeeping and the subsequent social and economic recovery and nation-building of countries suffering from conflicts.

A good example of that type of innovation, in enhancing the effectiveness and output from United Nations peacekeeping operations, is the coordination meeting of the special representatives of the Secretary-General to harmonize joint action and solve common cross-border problems connected, inter alia, with illegal arms deliveries and supplies, uncontrolled movement of armed groups, regulating refugee flows and providing humanitarian assistance in a number of African States.

The example of the Afghan settlement gives us an effective scheme for international support for the peace process. The political timetable worked out on the basis of the Bonn Agreement was materially complemented by decisions taken at the Tokyo donors conference and has been consistently carried out by the team headed by Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi. Essential assistance in stabilizing the situation has been lent by the International Security Assistance Force. Important work is being carried out by lead countries in the areas of military and legal reforms, establishing national police and combating drug trafficking. It seems to us that the broad consensus, with regard to helping the Afghan settlement which took place under the aegis of the United Nations, is showing its effectiveness. For that reason, it is no happenstance that the Afghan model is being applied by many to Iraq.

The agreed-upon international steps taken under the aegis of the United Nations have turned out to be successful because of the unique ability of the Organization to combine its leading role in the area of security and restoring peace with the division of labour within the regional and subregional organizations in accordance with Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. That potential should, in fact, be developed to ensure a truly legitimate collective reaction to complex emergency situations under conditions of international conflict.

The experience already accumulated by the Organization in this sphere quite obviously shows that the most effective results in the United Nations have been achieved in those cases where constructive interaction was ensured between international structures, and local institutions and national Governments. On the other hand, problems have arisen. Even now, there are difficulties in carrying out the mandates of the United Nations missions in Ethiopia and Eritrea and Côte d'Ivoire and the activities of United Nations agencies in the western regions of Sudan. Moreover, the proper level of support for the United Nations mission in Kosovo has not been received from the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of that province of Serbia and Montenegro. We are convinced that only close cooperation among all players, combined with the United Nations presence, will enable us to ensure the most effective and comprehensive treatment of crises.

There is special significance in the further development of a new kind of partnership between the United Nations and regional organizations. Positive examples of such cooperation are the conduct, under a Security Council mandate, of a European Union mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the International Security Assistance Force under the leadership of NATO in Afghanistan, the deployment of multinational forces of Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) members in Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire, the military contingents of the African Union mission in Burundi and their subsequent replacement by a United Nations peacekeeping operation and the joint peacekeeping mission of the United Nations and the Commonwealth of Independent States in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict zone.

A great deal remains to be done to improve the peacekeeping potential of the United Nations, especially in such areas as rapid response, the effective use of material resources, financing, transport, the training of staff, et cetera. It is precisely in that manner that we must all go forward, in the light of our collective desire to make United Nations peacekeeping as effective as possible in order to settle the various international and regional conflicts.

Mr. Holliday (United States of America): Thank you, Mr. President, for convening today's meeting on complex crises and the United Nations response. It presents an opportunity to tie together a number of the Council's recent thematic debates and to step back and consider more broadly some of the interrelated issues and challenges of the United Nations role in peacekeeping and peace-building.

Most crises that the Council addresses, or would seek to prevent, are complex. They represent a failure of political, economic and sometimes social institutions and therefore require solutions to meet both security and development needs. We believe the United Nations role in the international response to this mix of security and development needs should draw on various bodies within the United Nations system and be carefully coordinated with various other non-United-Nations sources of expertise and resources.

The Council focuses its energies and the peacekeeping budget's assessed funds primarily on meeting security needs. In that effort, the Council has authorized military observers, peacekeepers and civilian police. In conflicts around the globe, those dedicated peacekeepers have helped bring security. Stability, political solutions and economic development have followed. I note that tomorrow we shall be marking the International United Nations Day of Peacekeepers.

The Council, however, has also recognized that to ensure the sustainability of peace and security, it is important to develop national institutions and structures that will assume security functions when the United Nations departs. The Council has also acknowledged that the dimensions of crises may be so complex that non-security-related resources and personnel are also needed to address them fully to prevent the resurgence of violence. In such cases increasingly, in most cases — the Council has authorized the inclusion of human rights staff, authorized the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to coordinate — although not administer -United Nations development activities or included a training component in the new peacekeeping operations.

In Liberia, the Council saw a country that had been ravaged by years of civil war and, accordingly, had been left with few functioning institutions. The Council responded by authorizing а robust peacekeeping operation with responsibility for a range of multidisciplinary tasks. The United Nations identified key agencies — the United Nations Development Programme, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs to address returnee issues. Although the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) has responsibility in Liberia for the disarmament and demobilization of combatants, those activities are only the first step in assisting only one component of the war-affected community. Ex-combatants subsequently require

reintegration and return assistance. In that regard, the assistance they receive is similar to the assistance for returning refugees and internally displaced persons. To meet the long-term complex needs of security, stability and reconciliation, the United Nations, UNMIL and the other agencies must focus on the process of reintegration and return for those returning — both combatants and non-combatants — and for the communities receiving them.

In Afghanistan, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) is a unique example of the ability of the United Nations to coordinate a comprehensive development and aid programme in coordination with a massive military coalition, led by the United States, and a separate security force, the International Security Assistance Force, led by NATO. For the first two years of the programme, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Lakhdar Brahimi, broke new ground by working on the political, humanitarian, economic and security fronts simultaneously and assisting the transitional Government of Hamid Karzai. After national elections are held in September, UNAMA will have overseen the entirety of the so-called Bonn Agreement process, which set out a series of benchmarks leading to Afghan independence.

My delegation recognizes that in most complex crises, the economic, political and social routes of a conflict cannot be disentangled or dealt with *ad seriatim*. However, we believe that the response should continue to come from the whole United Nations family, including the funds, programmes and agencies that have the requisite knowledge and experience, as well as from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Political Affairs.

We also believe that the specific combination of agencies, the structure and functions of a peacekeeping operation and the responsibilities of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General should vary depending on the specifics of the crisis. Unfortunately, there can be no template. Complex crises require complex and case-specific responses.

The Council has recently moved to empower Special Representatives of the Secretary-General who lead United Nations peacekeeping operations to coordinate all United Nations activities in-country. That move makes sense in order to ensure a coordinated approach to meet the needs of security and development and to respond to the complexity of most crises. But again, that model may not be appropriate in all cases.

Our focus today is on the United Nations response to complex crises, but it is important to recall that the United Nations does not operate in a vacuum. There are also bilateral responses that should be coordinated with the United Nations. The United Nations and the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General can play a useful role in coordinating and encouraging bilateral actors and donors, rather than discouraging them by suggesting that the United Nations has it all under control.

We have seen, for example, training for civilian police on a bilateral basis in Kosovo that is coordinated with the civilian police programme of the United Nations peacekeeping operation. As well, my Government is administering reintegration for more than half the disarmed fighters in Liberia in coordination with UNMIL's disarmament, demobilization. repatriation reintegration and programme in that country.

In addition, a national response is appropriate and should be encouraged. National actors from civil society and the Government have the local knowledge and the long-term commitment necessary to resolve complex crises. Their potential contribution should not be underestimated, and their capacity for response should be strengthened.

I appreciate hearing some of the valuable ideas of my colleagues on the Security Council as well as of the representatives of the Economic and Social Council and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

Mr. Thomson (United Kingdom): We are grateful to Under-Secretary-General Egeland and Ambassador Rasi for their time and their insights today. I am grateful to you, Mr. President, for giving the Council the opportunity to discuss this daunting subject. Perhaps because it is so daunting, we have got very limited attendance here; that is disappointing because the subject is very important.

Your excellent non-paper, Sir, has helped pose many of the questions. I want to focus on just three areas: first, the need for good early-warning systems; secondly, the need to translate early warning into early action; and thirdly, the need to tackle the root causes underlying instability. Under each of those headings, I am at least in part addressing the question of conflict prevention. I would like to note how striking it is that virtually every speaker this morning has stressed the importance of the Council's addressing itself to conflict prevention.

First, long-range early warning is difficult and is that nearly all Governments something and international organizations struggle with. My own Government is working through the issues involved and trying to develop a more systematic methodology for horizon-scanning for future crises. But short-term early warning is less difficult. Over a time scale required for planning humanitarian responses of some six to 12 months, it is not too difficult to spot a crisis coming. The humanitarian community, in the form of non-governmental organizations and the United Nations, has some of the best short-term early-warning systems in the world. The United Nations, in particular, has one of the best information-gathering networks in the world — agencies and offices spread throughout the globe, experts working on issues from human rights, economic development, humanitarian issues, health, education and the environment to political analysis.

So the United Nations should be one of the best informed institutions in the world. But in fact it is not. One reason is that we, the Member States, have been reluctant to give the Secretariat the additional capacity needed to analyse and assess the vast amount of information it has access to — a real problem, in the view of my delegation. A second reason is the question of how well the United Nations system, in all its complexity, uses its existing capacities to coordinate and apply the information already available to it.

A third area to look at under early warning relates to the capacities outside the United Nations system. Perhaps enabling the United Nations to tap into these capacities in non-governmental organizations, the private sector, regional organizations and academic institutions would be one way of providing the United Nations with the tools it needs. We hope that that can be explored.

In short, the United Kingdom believes that to be truly effective and to keep its staff safe in conflict prevention and peacekeeping situations, United Nations systems need to be strengthened somehow to deal with short- and long-range early-warning factors. I would like to turn now to translating early warning into early action, but on the way to note that if we can manage to lend greater support to a United Nations capacity for early warning, we will in the process make it easier for ourselves to address conflict avoidance, for which several delegations have called.

Translating early-warning information into early action is, however, a complex task. Political will and resources are essential. The Security Council can play a role. In resolution 1366 (2001), the Council confirmed that the prevention of armed conflict was an integral part of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security. But the Council has not kept situations of potential conflict under close review since that resolution was adopted. We rarely invite briefings on complex crises that are not already under consideration. Of course there are sensitivities about including new crisis situations on the Council's agenda. But we have to find ways to make the inclusion of new situations more welcome to all concerned — a point that the Chinese delegation made this morning.

In this context, the United Kingdom would welcome greater use of one old, one existing and one new mechanism. The old one, referred to by at least four other delegations — Brazil, Chile, Benin and Spain — is Article 99 of the Charter. The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his or her opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. We would like to see that mechanism used.

The existing tool, which was provided for under resolution 1366 (2001), is the ability of the Council to invite the Emergency Relief Coordinator and relevant United Nations agencies to brief its members on emergency situations which it deems represent a threat to international peace and security. This is a valuable tool for the Council to use in order to prevent complex crises from deteriorating. Recent briefings on Darfur and on northern Uganda by Under-Secretary-General Egeland have been very valuable. My Government believes that such briefings can play an important role in reminding the Council about so-called forgotten emergencies.

Thirdly, a new and potentially helpful development is — as the delegation of Spain noted — the Secretary-General's intention to appoint a special adviser on the prevention of genocide. That role could

be crucial in bringing complex crises to the attention of the Council.

My third area is tackling the root causes of conflict and instability. As many delegations have pointed out, it is necessary to address not only easily understood threats, such as those from uncontrolled militia, arms proliferation and terrorism, but also harder-to-measure threats, such as human rights abuses, the spread of disease, population movements, the scarcity of resources, weak governance, lack of democracy, poverty, social injustice, environmental degradation and an almost endless list of other important issues. Clearly, as most delegations have said this morning, sustainable security is intimately bound up with development. The United Nations family, including the Bretton Woods institutions, have an indispensable role to play in mitigating these threats. That does not in any sense contradict the point just made by the United States delegation that there has to be space for bilateral efforts alongside those of the United Nations.

I have three suggestions about how the United Nations system and its Member States can address the full spread of threats more effectively. The first relates to strengthening partnerships between the Council, the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council on peace and security matters — several delegations have made this point. It is useful to remind ourselves of Article 65 of the Charter, which says that the Economic and Social Council may furnish information to the Security Council and shall assist the Security Council upon its request. Do we use that enough? We are pleased that Ambassador Rasi is here today. The ad hoc groups of the Economic and Social Council on Burundi and Guinea-Bissau are interesting developments to build on. Perhaps those groups signal an emerging role for the Economic and Social Council to work with countries to build their conflict prevention and peace-building capacities and to raise awareness of potential needs among the wider United Nations membership.

Secondly, we need to make sure that Council mandates for peacekeeping operations take sufficient account of the less tangible threats. I believe that we are doing better on this. It does not mean that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations need carry out all the activities or that all of these activities be funded by the assessed budget, but simply that the Council should recognize the full range of issues needed to bring a given situation to stability and peace.

Thirdly, the United Nations system needs to strengthen the coordination of conflict-prevention and peace-building activities. Many speakers this morning have mentioned this. However, speaking as a donor country, it is worth noting that donors too need to improve their coordination. Within the United Nations system, we welcome recent work by the United Nations Development Group/Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs working group on transition issues to try to define better tools for working in countries moving from conflict to reconstruction. We also fully support efforts amongst United Nations agencies working on the peacekeeping surge to strengthen their coordination, a subject we covered at length on 17 May (see S/PV.4970).

In conclusion, I would note that many of the issues raised in today's debate are being examined by the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. These are difficult issues; we do not envy the Panel its task. But we hope that it will provide strong direction to the United Nations and its Member States on the key issues that we must get right and that it will point us to vital areas for further work, with a view to taking decisions in the course of the sixtieth session of the General Assembly. The United Kingdom looks forward to engaging fully in that process.

Mr. Trautwein (Germany): I would like to thank the Pakistani presidency for this opportunity for the Security Council to address this important topic: important for the United Nations, but also important for every single State Member of the Organization. The participation of the President of the Economic and Social Council and of the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator underline that importance.

Over the last few months, the Council has looked at the various and complex facets of conflict resolution, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building. The Council has discussed the issues of conflict prevention, of justice and the rule of law, of national reconciliation, of the role of the private sector in conflict and postconflict situations and, most recently, of peacekeeping. The Council has also considered the role of women, both as potential victims of conflict and as indispensable actors in peace-building, and it has taken action to address the plight of children associated with armed conflict.

The Council's attention to those questions, which are all essential to securing the sustainability of the Council's peace-building efforts, is a welcome development; it can, of course, be attributed to the fact that a number of complex crisis situations have been, and still are, on the Council's agenda. Currently, the outstanding item on everybody's mind is the highly complex situation in Iraq, where serious security problems, the transition from occupation to sovereignty, efforts to address the humanitarian situation and to rebuild the economy and issues of justice and reconciliation pose a formidable mix of intertwined challenges. But other very difficult situations, such as those in Darfur, Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti, require no less attention.

Most crises share the fate of being complex. However, the reasons for their complexity almost always vary. Therefore, rather than discussing any onesize-fits-all solution, I will attempt to lay out three common denominators that can, in our view, be extracted from the Council's previous debates and that may deserve to be retained, particularly at a time when the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change has embarked on a broad-scale effort to suggest fundamental reforms that will, one hopes, enable the United Nations to respond in the most adequate manner to today's threats and challenges and to those of tomorrow.

The first point in this regard is that our actions must be guided by a close look at the underlying causes of conflict. These may include a mix of poverty, socioeconomic inequalities, weak governance institutions and practices, and deficits in — if not a total lack of justice and the rule of law. Addressing root causes is not only the key to conflict prevention, it is also the key to securing the sustainability of peacekeeping and peace-building efforts.

Germany, like many other Governments and the United Nations, has moved to apply a broad concept of peace and security which includes the political, socioeconomic, rule of law and ecological dimensions. We are aware, as others are — and here, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is a vivid expression of that awareness — that peace and security, to be sustainable, must be rooted in societies endowed with institutions that are inclusive and participatory. Those institutions must guarantee everybody's dignity, well-being and chance to live up to his or her human potential. They must provide and guarantee social justice, equal rights and procedures that allow for a fair and inclusive resolution of conflicts.

The European Security Strategy, adopted in December 2003, seeks to promote a rules-based international order, and we fully endorse that objective. Our adherence to, and compliance with, international treaties in the fields of human rights, disarmament, trade and environmental protection, as well as our support for the International Criminal Court translate this philosophy into practical commitments.

The second point is that, while the United Nations needs to apply a broad concept of security, the Council should not be overburdened with tasks for which it is ill-equipped. A far better way to address the multidimensional aspects of conflict is to find meaningful arrangements for the division of labour among those who, in one way or another, have comparative advantages in dealing with a given complex situation.

The Secretariat has gone a long way to facilitate cross-sectoral communication and cooperation within the United Nations. In that context, I recall the establishment of the Executive Committees, notably the Executive Committee on Peace and Security. Progress towards a coherent and coordinated United Nations system response in transition situations has been made under the leadership of the Executive Director of the United Nations Children's Fund, through the joint work of the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) and the Executive Committee on Humanitarian Assistance (ECHA). Important lessons can also be learned from the Integrated Mission Task Force established in the context of Afghanistan, following up on а recommendation in the landmark Brahimi report on peacekeeping (S/2000/809).

In the specific case of justice and the rule of law, we realize that the United Nations, including various parts of the Secretariat and specialized agencies, funds and programmes, have by now accumulated considerable know-how. We await with great anticipation the Secretary-General's report on justice and the rule of law and any suggestions as to how this know-how can be translated into more coherent action. Building on experiences with the Security Council's Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa, and the Economic and Social Council's Ad Hoc Advisory Groups on African countries emerging from conflict, possible arrangements for more intensive cooperation between the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council could be explored.

Last but not least, meaningful cooperation between the United Nations and regional arrangements has proven, in very recent experiences gained in West Africa, the Caribbean and the Balkans among others, to be an effective way to respond to complex crises. In that context, we welcome the fact that the Peace and Security Council of the African Union had its inaugural meeting only three days ago, and we encourage that body to live up to the words of its Chair, Nigeria's President Obasanjo: "Africa is poised for action". The international community should stand ready to assist regional arrangements in their needs for capacitybuilding, when necessary and appropriate.

The third point is that the United Nations is increasingly called upon to look beyond its intergovernmental horizons. The emergence of non-State actors is not only a debit on the challenges side of the equation, it is also — and perhaps much more so an asset on the side of expertise, public communication and action. While decision-making in the United Nations will remain the business of Governments, the integration of non-State stakeholders and non-State expertise in the deliberative process is in everybody's best interest: in the interest of informed decisionmaking and in the interest of popular acceptance. That point has been given considerable emphasis in the context of our deliberations on justice, the rule of law and national reconciliation. Our debate on the role that the private sector can play in addressing conflict and post-conflict situations has been yet another opportunity to demonstrate the complementarity between State and non-State efforts.

The Council already has some experience in bringing together State and non-State stakeholders, be it through the convening of Arria-type Council meetings or the very effective collaboration of interested Member States, United Nations system stakeholders and non-governmental organizations, such as on the issue of children and armed conflict. We encourage not only the Council, but indeed the United Nations as a whole, to further explore such approaches. I would like to conclude on a point that is easily overlooked. Giving thought to better crisis management, as we are doing today, implies the recognition that, all too often, conflict prevention is failing. Crisis prevention — based on early warning, the vigilance and determination of effective and welllegitimized United Nations bodies, credible deterrence whenever feasible, and universally accepted norms must remain at the core of our endeavours.

Mr. Dumitru (Romania): Mr. President, let me begin by congratulating you for having arranged this important discussion on a topical theme. I would also like to welcome the presence in this meeting of Ambassador Marjatta Rasi, President of the Economic and Social Council, and of Mr. Jan Egeland, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator.

My presentation will focus first on the definition of complex crises; secondly, on the progress made by the United Nations family in formulating a comprehensive and integrated response to complex crises; and, thirdly, on recommendations aimed at overcoming existing theoretical and practical challenges confronting the development of a sustainable approach.

From the definitional point of view, complex crises are raging in numerous parts of the world, with the situations in Somalia, Haiti and Côte d'Ivoire - to mention but a few of them — serving as compelling examples. They encompass an array of issues ranging from failed economic policies, social services incapable of responding to population growth or pandemics such as HIV/AIDS, poor and corrupt governance, religious tension, ethnic discrimination, natural resource scarcity or competition, widespread poverty and absence of hope. Appearing at a critical juncture of the conflict cycle, complex crises require specific and immediate attention. Left unattended, the persistence of underdevelopment, political repression, social injustice and deep-rooted grievances results in a complete disruption of authority, as violence erupts and the State implodes, threatening regional stability.

A comprehensive and integrated strategy aimed at responding to complex crises must support structures aimed at strengthening peace, thus transforming the conditions that allow crises to grow. The symptoms and root causes of complex crises are intertwined in a mutually reinforcing relationship. For that reason, a sustainable approach to complex crises must include complementary and systematic security and development components in order to resolve crises and address their structural derivations. As pointed out in the non-paper for today's meeting, the intrinsic link between peace and development must remain at the core of the United Nations response.

Romania welcomes the advances made by the United Nations family in formulating a comprehensive and integrated response to complex crises. Here we can point to the fact that the development agencies are revisiting traditional conceptions of economic aid.

In full appreciation of the fact that good domestic policies and institutions are necessary for aid to have a positive impact, United Nations agencies have established tools and mechanisms to bridge the gap between relief and development, linking their approaches to that of the security community. In addition, approaches to development focus on longterm and locally driven capacity-building development programmes, contributing to the establishment of a positive environment for sustainable stability.

Similarly, the United Nations security community has expanded its conflict-management activities. The Security Council has broadened its conception of peace and security, acknowledging the human dimension as a security threat. In addition to mandating a number of multidimensional peacekeeping operations, the Council has chosen as the subject of its monthly debates issues such as peace-building, HIV/AIDS and the protection of civilians in armed conflict.

Central coordination mechanisms now exist, allowing for cross-sectoral cooperation on thematic and country-specific task forces in the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Department for Political Affairs (DPA) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).

While those developments demonstrate the emerging trend within the United Nations of the convergence of the development and security sides of the House, challenges remain at the political, institutional and operational levels. I would like to suggest a few recommendations aimed at improving the United Nations response to complex crises as well as the effectiveness of peace-building programmes and activities. First, in cases of complex crises with prolonged violence, development programmes should not focus on short-term humanitarian assistance to the exclusion of support for long-term needs, as this makes the civilian population dependent on external aid and less capable of recovering from war.

Second, the United Nations family should increasingly rely on regional and subregional organizations, given the success achieved by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union in preventing and resolving crises in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Burundi and, most recently, in the Sudan. In recognition of the importance of regional organizations in the prevention, resolution and management of conflicts, Romania will host a debate on cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations during its presidency of the Security Council in the month of July.

Third, further to its presidential statement on its role in the pacific settlement of disputes of 13 May 2003, the Security Council should make greater use of Chapter VI procedures to promote conflict prevention. Mechanisms such as commissions, fact-finding missions and direct dialogue with the parties to a dispute offer opportunities to identify and address the root causes of complex crises in the early stages of their development.

Fourth, the practice of forming groups of friends and of appointing special representatives and envoys of the Secretary-General should be continued as a means of enhancing cooperation and harnessing collaboration with the Secretary-General, building on the successes achieved in Afghanistan and in Haiti.

Fifth, the Security Council should further support United Nations organs and mechanisms in their security and development efforts. It should convene a meeting to review the relationship between the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council, drawing from the experience in Guinea-Bissau, and explore the possibility of greater interaction with the General Assembly.

Sixth, mechanisms for cooperation and collaboration among security and development communities should be enhanced, as development agencies are often the only international presence in a pre-crisis country and thus have the ability to foresee and perhaps avert violence.

Seventh, the evaluation of lessons learned and best practices should be initiated. It should, for instance, determine whether appointing the resident coordinator as deputy to the special representative, as applied in United Nations missions in Sierra Leone, Tajikistan and Haiti, is indeed the most effective method of improving coordination between conflict management and development practitioners. It should also assess the possibility of creating future integrated mission task forces, as used in Afghanistan. Generally, consideration should be given to using UNAMA as a model for a new integrated approach to complex crises.

Eighth, Member States should provide increased support and clear mandates to United Nations efforts in integrated and comprehensive activities. Programmes should be better planned and delivered and mandates should be flexible enough to allow the fulfilment of tasks.

Finally, to enhance the capacity of the United Nations in the implementation of a response to complex crises, the participation of non-governmental organizations, civil society, the business sector and international financial institutions should include devising methods for generating resources from a peace-building perspective.

The President: I shall now make a statement in my capacity as representative of Pakistan.

At the outset, I would like to express our thanks to Under-Secretary-General Jan Egeland, as well as to the President of the Economic and Social Council, Ambassador Marjatta Rasi, for their participation in today's debate. We are grateful for their insightful statements.

Jan Egeland mentioned 20 current crises affecting millions of people. Most of these are complex crises and most are within the purview of the Security Council.

Evolving a comprehensive, integrated and coherent response to these crises remains a formidable challenge for the international community. In the United Nations, we have an institution best suited to generating responses in a timely, effective and coherent manner.

At the policy level, the first priority must always be preventive diplomatic action. A credible early warning capacity based on impartial and accurate analysis of situations remains an essential requirement, and I am glad that our colleague from the United Kingdom spoke on this point. If this analysis points in the direction of a potential conflict, then the United Nations system must act promptly and with cohesion to prevent it. As somebody has quipped, prevention is better than a Security Council resolution. There are several means at our disposal, ranging from the Secretary-General's good offices and the initiative that can be taken by the General Assembly to the mechanisms prescribed in Article 34 of Chapter VI of the Charter. All these can be usefully employed to address situations the continuance of which could endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

There is, however, greater need for a calibrated policy response, with the Secretary-General, the Security Council, the General Assembly and the United Nations system at large working in synergy, within their respective roles and mandates. We think that Brazil's idea of a conflict-avoidance action deserves further consideration.

In the event of the outbreak of a conflict, the Security Council's role becomes clear and pre-eminent. The Council has evolved many instruments for conflict management. Its standard operating procedures are clear: first, to halt the fighting and, secondly, to disengage the conflicting parties, if necessary through the interposition of a peacekeeping force. Peacekeeping missions help contain conflict, save lives and create space for peacemaking. It is no accident that eight of our 15 peacekeeping operations are complex in nature. Speedy action to adopt resolutions establishing peacekeeping operations and to appoint special representatives of the Secretary-General is critical to the success of these efforts in the initial phase.

The quality of the Council's engagement whether direct or indirect — is of crucial significance. Of late, the Council's missions to regions of crisis have become an important tool for gaining a better understanding of ground realities and for finding ways of containing conflict and promoting peace processes. The Council's interaction with regional and subregional organizations, consistent with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter, is also increasing. Cooperation with the Economic Community of West African States has shown that this partnership is and can always be mutually beneficial. It was instrumental in helping to stabilize conflict situations before the deployment of United Nations peacekeeping operations in Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire. Cooperation with the newly-established Peace and Security Council of the African Union should also develop along similar lines.

But the Council must go beyond conflict management in addressing complex crises. While peacekeeping missions working within their mandates can help in different ways, they are not a panacea for the whole range of complex issues and underlying causes. Sierra Leone is a relevant example.

Therefore, the Council must pay greater attention to resolving conflicts. Chapter VI of the Charter contains a whole inventory of measures that the Council could employ in the pursuit of this objective. There has to be a clear recognition that durable peace can be established only when the underlying causes of conflict are effectively addressed.

The root causes of conflicts are many and diverse. They are political, social, economic, historical and cultural in nature. In the long list of root causes, however, poverty and underdevelopment seem to be omnipresent. A look at the issues on the agenda of the Security Council reveals that the theatre of nearly all the conflict situations we are dealing with is the developing world — a striking observation indeed, but not a startling one. The inter-linkage between peace and development is now well recognized. This was also at the heart of the Millennium Summit, which took a number of far-reaching and important decisions concerning the dual objectives of peace and development.

The international community's approach to complex crises must take into account this vital interlinkage between peace and development. Again, at the policy level, strategic coherence is a prerequisite. This entails enhanced coordination within the United Nations system. Apart from being within the purview of the Security Council, complex crises, because of their multidimensional character, also involve, in varying degrees, the areas of responsibility of other principal organs of the United Nations: the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council. It is therefore crucial for the United Nations to bring synergy to its work through cooperation, coordination and complementarity in the work of its principal organs.

Peace-building is now seen as a crucial component of any strategy for sustainable peace and

development. In post-conflict situations — such as in Guinea Bissau and Burundi — peace-building has elicited cooperation and coordination between the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council. We have heard about this from Ambassador Rasi. Peace-building in most complex crises is also not possible without the active involvement and support of the Bretton Woods institutions.

Intra-organ coordination must be accompanied by closer coordination between the Secretariat and the agencies, funds and programmes. By deepening system-wide coordination, we would ensure timely, effective and coherent responses to the crises that often test the will and the capacity of our Organization.

Several proposals have been advanced to promote coherence in response to multifarious challenges. Recently, the President of Mozambique and the Prime Minister of Portugal proposed the creation of a new commission to promote peace and development, mandated by and in conjunction with the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council. Pakistan itself has proposed the establishment of ad hoc composite committees of the three principal organs of the United Nations — the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council - to effectively address complex crises and emergencies, including in Africa. The Pakistan delegation is informally circulating today a non-paper outlining our proposal for the creation of ad hoc composite committees.

We hope that this proposal and similar initiatives will be considered by the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly and will be taken into account in the context of the proposals for institutional reform of the United Nations system.

One thing which was underlined by Under-Secretary-General Egeland in his remarks is relevant throughout the system: the requirement for adequate and full funding of the actions required to prevent, manage and ameliorate conflicts and to restore peace and stability. Peacekeeping does, indeed, cost \$3.5 billion today, and it may increase further. But we must not lose perspective. Not only are the United Nations and its family of organizations the only available instrument for dealing with complex crises: they are also the most cost-effective. Much more needs to be done to project and propagate that simple truth. We agree with those who said that all the issues which we have considered will come together and should be considered on the auspicious occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of the United Nations.

I now resume my functions as President of the Council.

I wish to mention in concluding our discussion that this debate has more than lived up to the expectations held by the Pakistan presidency when it proposed consideration of the item.

In accordance with the understanding previously reached, the Pakistan presidency will prepare and circulate a summary of the many useful and important ideas and suggestions which have been made by almost every delegation in this debate.

Since this is — I hope — our last public meeting for this month, I wish to take this opportunity to thank all Council members and the general membership of the United Nations for their unfailing support and cooperation to the Pakistan presidency during the month. It has been a real pleasure serving the Council in the capacity of President.

I also wish to thank the Secretariat and all the support staff, including the conference officers, interpreters, security officers and all other personnel for their dedicated work. I express our best wishes to Ambassador Baja and the team of the Philippines delegation for a very successful presidency next month.

There are no further speakers inscribed on my list. The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.