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IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE
STRENGTHENING OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
THE SITUATION IN KAMPUCHEA

SECURITY COUNCIL
Thirty-fourth year

Letter dated 1 November 1979 from the Permanent Representative
of Viet Nam to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-
General

I have the honour to transmit to you the enclosed documents as evidence of the military involvement of the People's Republic of China in Kampuchea under the régime of the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique:

1. Extract from the statement made by Wang Shang Rung, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Chinese Army, during talks with Son Sen, dated 6 February 1976 (annex I);
2. Note from the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army of China addressed to the General Staff of the Revolutionary Army of Democratic Kampuchea, dated 5 October 1977 (annex II);
3. Itemized specification of the weapons and military equipment which China supplied as non-reimbursable aid to Kampuchea for the Army, the Navy and the Air Force during the period 1976-1978 (annex III).

These documents were published in August 1979 by the Revolutionary People's Tribunal of the People's Republic of Kampuchea held in Phnom Penh for the trial of the crime of genocide committed by the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique (original in Khmer and translated into French). They were seized in Tasseing, the refuge of the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique, during the mopping-up operation carried out in March 1979 by the armed forces of the People's Republic of Kampuchea.

On the basis of this irrefutable evidence, it is clear that:

(a) Since April 1975, Ieng Sary, Deputy Prime Minister in Charge of Foreign Affairs of the Pol Pot régime, has been to Peking for discussions on Chinese military aid, the first consignment of which was estimated at about 13,300 tons.

(b) An agreement was concluded in Phnom Penh on 10 February 1976 between the Pol Pot leaders and the Peking leaders, under which China was to supply the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique with a large quantity of weapons and military equipment during the period 1976 to 1978 to be used by that clique to wage a war of aggression against Viet Nam on the south-western border.

(c) These weapons and military equipment include offensive weapons for the Army, Navy and Air Force, as is clearly stated in documents Nos. 1 and 3 referred to above, including combat aircraft, fighters, bombers, hunter submarines, fast destroyers, 130 mm guns, amphibious tanks, etc.

(d) These weapons and military equipment were to be supplied before the end of 1978, in other words, just before the date on which the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary troops launched large-scale attacks on the Tay Ninh Province on the south-western Vietnamese border. This is eloquent proof of the guilt of the Chinese leaders in the war of aggression waged by the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique on the south-western Vietnamese border at the end of 1978, which has been denounced by the Vietnamese side.

(e) In addition to aid in the form of arms and other war matériel, China has also sent military personnel of all categories to Kampuchea to serve in and train cadres for the three branches of the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary armed forces; the "number of such personnel rose to approximately 500 in 1976 and will increase progressively" and "the duration of their assignment will have to be extended".

(f) China has, moreover, undertaken to train military cadres of the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique in China: 471 from the Air Force and 157 from the Navy in 1976 alone.

(g) China has likewise undertaken to construct five military installations for the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique in Kampuchea:

- (i) a new naval base,
- (ii) an airfield,
- (iii) a munitions dump,
- (iv) an extension of a factory for the repair of weapons,
- (v) a depot at Kep.

Even more serious, during the same period, China also undertook to "construct new airfields" for the purposes of the war of aggression which it has instigated.

(h) It is clear from this irrefutable evidence that, in pursuit of their expansionist and hegemonistic policy in South-East Asia, the Peking leaders have used the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique as an instrument of aggression against neighbouring

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countries, in particular Viet Nam, and have transformed Kampuchea into a military base with a view to achieving their aggressive and expansionist aims in Indo-China and South-East Asia.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and the enclosures circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 46 and 123, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) HA VAN LAU
Ambassador Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of the
Socialist Republic of Viet Nam
to the United Nations

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ANNEX I

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA
Independence Peace Happiness

REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE'S TRIBUNAL HELD IN PHNOM PENH FOR THE TRIAL
OF THE GENOCIDE CRIME OF THE POL POT-ENG SARY CLIQUE

August 1979

Document No. 2.5.05

EXTRACT FROM THE STATEMENT MADE BY WANG SHANG RUNG, DEPUTY
CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE CHINESE ARMY, DURING
TALKS WITH SON SEN

(6 February 1976)

Proposed object of the talks

In accordance with the principles of military aid discussed at the June 1975 talks between the two sides, between August and October last year we sent a number of our comrades to Kampuchea to examine the situation. After due study, we have drawn up a draft plan for military aid. This draft plan and the draft agreement were submitted on 12 October last year to our Kampuchean comrades by Comrade Ambassador Sun Hao and our Military Attaché, Deng Kunshan, and were favourably accepted by our Kampuchean comrades. We are now submitting the text of the agreement that was discussed by the two sides, in order to request your ratification. If you agree, may we take this as the text to be signed?

I should now like to clarify a few points:

1. This draft agreement is relatively succinct. It specifies only the equipment that is strictly necessary for the organization and reinforcement of the Army; the other necessary related arms and munitions with which it will be supplied and the technical equipment cannot be specified in detail in the same way at the present time, because of the great variety of the nature and types of such equipment and the large quantity involved. The draft agreement therefore merely clarifies these principles. In our opinion, we should allow the Chiefs of the General Staff of the two Armies time to discuss the specific details and then exchange the instruments of ratification.

2. With regard to the proposed deadline for the delivery of equipment, arms and ammunition, we are prepared to complete final delivery by the end of 1978. With regard to the schedule for the delivery of various types of equipment over the period 1976-1978, we should like to set forth our views below:

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In 1976, we shall first deliver the equipment and arms necessary for on-the-spot training of basic cadres. The essential components are as follows:

1. Part of the equipment for an anti-aircraft artillery regiment, part of the equipment for a radar regiment and the equipment for a military airfield;

Four escort vessels and four fast destroyers for the Navy;

Part of the equipment for a tank regiment, part of the equipment for a liaison regiment, part of the equipment for three ground artillery regiments, and the equipment for a battalion of pontoons for ground troops.

The other equipment and arms to be delivered are as follows:

The anti-aircraft guns for the Air Force will be delivered in 1977. The radar delivery will be effected in 1977 and 1978 successively. The fighter aircraft and bombers will be delivered progressively as the training of pilots and the construction of new airfields proceeds. The delivery of another part of the equipment for airfields will keep pace with the construction of new airfields.

Four of the six escort vessels for the Navy will be delivered in 1977 and two in 1978. Four of the eight fast destroyers will be delivered in 1977 and four in 1978.

The equipment for three ground artillery regiments of the Army could be delivered at the beginning of 1977, with the exception of the 130 mm guns. The remaining equipment will be delivered all together during the last six months of 1976. The equipment for the tank regiment will be delivered in 1977 and 1978 successively. The equipment and arms for the liaison regiment will be delivered in 1977; since 300 kilometres of span wire are being delivered in 1976, there will be 1,000 kilometres outstanding. Kindly specify your wishes regarding this, and we shall make arrangements.

All of the foregoing is merely an expression of our thinking, because the output of military plants is closely linked with that of other branches of the economy and the equipment may, by way of exception, be delivered earlier or later. We should hold a joint discussion regarding the appropriateness of our plans; please let us have your comments.

3. With regard to the procedure for delivery and receipt and the method of delivering equipment, most of this equipment can be carried by ship and unloaded at the port of Sihanouk-ville. The aircraft will have to be disassembled and packed for shipping, and upon arrival in Kampuchea will have to be reassembled. The hunter submarines and tankers could sail direct for Kampuchea, but the question of the necessary measures to ensure a safe voyage and the security of the vessels is a relatively complex one that will have to be resolved by a discussion of specific details at a later date.

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With regard to the practical co-ordination of the transport, we shall notify you of the date of departure of the vessels a fortnight in advance, in order to facilitate your preparations, but the arrangements for the carriers are closely linked with railroad transport, ports, merchant vessels, etc. If any link in this chain malfunctions, that will prejudice all transport operations. For example, in the recent case of the escort vessel, we set 5 January as the date for loading the vessel Da Fu at Zhan Jiang, but this vessel was behind schedule in returning from abroad and therefore the unloading and subsequent reloading took more time, which explains the delay in loading. If such a thing happens in the future, we will notify you in time.

With regard to the procedure for delivery and receipt, on our side the office of the Military Attaché will be responsible for consulting with you. For delivery, two copies will be made of the certificate of delivery and receipt and the detailed list of equipment and weapons, one in the Chinese language and one in the Kampuchean language. We are able to draft the Chinese language version, but we will have difficulties in drafting the document in the Kampuchean or French language, in view of the limited number of our translators. Perhaps it will be sufficient to use only the Chinese text. If you see no difficulty in using English instead of Kampuchean and French, we could meet your requirements. We put the matter to you so that we can work it out together and find a satisfactory solution.

4. With regard to the sending of technicians, cadres should, in accordance with the principles adopted by the two sides, be trained on the spot if possible, and we shall assume responsibility for training skeleton staff. Later on, when you are in a position to raise the training level of the cadres, we believe that the technicians we will send will, in principle, arrive in Kampuchea with the first delivery of equipment. Thus, in 1976, the number of technicians arriving successively in Kampuchea will include the following: radar, artillery and anti-aircraft technicians, air force ground staff, pilots from the carrier aircraft group and aircraft repair workers, totalling in all approximately 320, including the technicians currently working in Kampuchea; and the liaison service, totalling 32 in all, including 12 who are already in Kampuchea. There will be approximately 120 staff for the guard vessels, the fast destroyers and the repair service for the naval equipment; 23 staff for the tanks; 25 staff for the ground artillery; and 6 staff for the pontoons, making a total of approximately 500. These technicians will arrive successively in Kampuchea to work. In our opinion, when these comrades arrive in your country, they will assist you, essentially, in understanding the technical properties and the method of using and manoeuvring these kinds of equipment and weapons. With regard to the duration of their assignment, we shall give them orders to withdraw when their Kampuchean comrades deem themselves capable of using and manoeuvring the equipment and weapons in question, so that the presence of our technicians will no longer be necessary. These technicians will arrive in Kampuchea in order to assist you and at the same time to learn from you. However, we believe that the number of these technicians will increase and that the duration of their assignment will have to be extended,

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which will inevitably create difficulties. We urge you to regard them as your own cadres and to educate and supervise them. If they make mistakes, we beg you to help them to correct themselves. Should you feel that it is not appropriate for you to carry out this educational function, we would request you to notify our Ambassador or Military Attaché so that they may communicate the fact to our General Staff and we can carry out this task ourselves. With regard to the procedure for the appointment of technicians, we ask you to consider the question whether or not it is necessary for our two General Staffs to exchange letters of approval on the subject.

5. On the question of receiving trainees, particularly trainees from the Navy and the Air Force, in 1976, the total number of trainees who will need to come to us to raise their level of training will be 471 for the Air Force and 157 for the Navy. The two sides will continue to discuss the practical arrangements for selecting these trainees and fixing their departure dates.

6. The Chinese Government has agreed to assume responsibility for the five full-scale equipment projects, namely: the construction of a new naval base, an airfield and a munitions dump, the extension of a factory for the repair of weapons, and a depot at Kep. The Chinese Minister of Foreign Trade will be responsible for the organization of these projects because they fall within the category of full-scale equipment projects. The Minister of Foreign Trade will consult you regarding the procedure for confirmation. After studying these projects, we will communicate to you, during joint discussions, our views concerning the exact scale and construction schedules of these projects. We request you to inform us of a suitable date on which those who are drawing up the plans can visit Kampuchea so that we can make preparations.

7. With regard to the question which you raised concerning the repair and reuse of a certain amount of captured equipment, if you consider that this equipment would really be useful and needs repair and requires from us only technical servicing, accessories and raw materials, we are resolved to help you as far as possible. In our view, the work can be carried out before the General Staffs of our two armies exchange letters of confirmation.

8. With regard to translation, on the basis of the military aid situation mentioned above, there is a great need for translators. For 1976, as a whole, 100 translators will be needed in view of the number of specialized technicians and planners to be sent out by us and the number of trainees we will receive. Since we have at present only 10 translators, we request you to seek a partial solution to this problem.

These are some points which will help to clarify the problem of the implementation of this agreement.

There is one other matter. That is the question of military aid for the year 1976, which was naturally discussed by the two sides during Comrade Ieng Sary's visit to Peking in April 1975. This portion of aid amounts to approximately

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13,300 tons. Total deliveries from 1975 to the day of the liberation of Phnom Penh amounted to over 3,200 tons, so that there is still over 10,000 tons to be delivered (including 4,000 tons of weapons and ammunition and 1,301 vehicles of different types). Since Comrade Ieng Sary wished to postpone the delivery, we have not continued to transport the equipment. We estimate that, with the exception of the vehicles which, because of the large number involved, cannot all be delivered during the month of March (each ship can transport no more than 200 vehicles), the 100 120 mm guns which need to be checked for quality, and the shells for 120 mm guns, all the rest of the equipment is ready to be delivered during the month of March. You have agreed to stagger the deliveries of the remaining amount of petrol and the empty drums and we are at present discussing this question with the sectors concerned in order to find a solution.

With regard to the above-mentioned unresolved questions of military aid for 1976, the procedure needs to be completed in the form of an agreement. In this connexion, we should also like to submit for your consideration the question of whether it will be possible to complete the procedure during the current year: if you agree, on our return we will immediately begin to prepare documents which will be discussed jointly by the Kampuchean comrades and our Embassy in order to find a solution.

I have the honour thus to state my views on the subject of our discussions. I hope that you will inform me of your point of view.

6 February 1976

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ANNEX II

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA

Independence Peace Happiness

REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE'S TRIBUNAL HELD IN PHNOM PENH FOR THE
TRIAL OF THE GENOCIDE CRIME OF THE POL POT-ING SARY CLIQUE

1 August 1979

Document No. 2.5.25

TO THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMY OF
DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

Phnom Penh

Under article 2 of the agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Democratic Kampuchea regarding the provision by China of non-reimbursable aid to Kampuchea in the form of weapons and military equipment, signed between the two Governments on 10 February 1976, at Phnom Penh, we have prepared a draft itemized specification of the weapons and military equipment supplied by China as non-reimbursable aid to Kampuchea (attached hereto). If you agree, this letter of ratification (including the itemized specification) will form an integral part of the Agreement.

With greetings inspired by noble revolutionary sentiments.

5 October 1977

General Staff of the People's
Liberation Army of China

(seal)

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ANNEX III

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA

Independence Peace Happiness

REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE'S TRIBUNAL HELD IN PHNOM PENH FOR THE
TRIAL OF THE GENOCIDE CRIME OF THE POL POT-ING SARY CLIQUE

August 1979

Document No. 2.5.25-b

ITEMIZED SPECIFICATION

Weapons and military equipment which China supplied as non-reimbursable aid to Kampuchea during the period 1976-1978:

I. FOR THE ARMY

1. Equipment and weapons for three artillery regiments, one DCA battalion (85 mm guns of the 56 type, 122 mm mortars of the 54 type, 130 mm guns of the 59-1 type, 36 (thirty-six) units of each type; and 18 (eighteen) units of DCA double-barrelled 37 mm guns of the 65 type).

Shells for 85 mm guns of the 56 type: 8,640 (eight thousand six hundred and forty).

Funk/ 3-1-336/338 (13)

Shells for 130 mm guns of the 59 type: 4,320 (four thousand three hundred and twenty).

Funk/ 3-1-335/353 (13)

2. Equipment and weapons for a tank regiment: 72 (seventy-two) light tanks of the 62 type and 32 (thirty-two) amphibious tanks of the 63 type.

Shells for 85 mm tank guns of the 56 type: 10,058 (ten thousand and fifty-eight).

Funk/ 3-1-333/335 (7)

3. Equipment and weapons for a transmission and liaison regiment:
459 (four hundred and fifty-nine) transmitter-receiver sets, 2,203 (two thousand two hundred and three) telephones, 910 (nine hundred and ten) kilometres of

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various types of wire, and 1,300 (one thousand three hundred) kilometres of aerial wire.

884 radios: 360 (three hundred and sixty) units.

Funk/ 3-4-4

II. FOR THE NAVY

Equipment and weapons for a unit of hunter submarines, a company of destroyers, a company of escort destroyers (four O37 rescue destroyers, ten escort vessels of the 62C type, twelve torpedo boats of the 026 type, one 80 (eighty)-ton minesweeper and one 300 (three hundred)-ton tanker.

533 W torpedoes: 48 (forty-eight)

Funk/ 3-3-506

III. FOR THE AIR FORCE

1. Equipment and weapons for a regiment of fighter aircraft (thirty fighter-6 aircraft and six training aircraft of the fighter-6 type).
2. Equipment and spare parts for a regiment of bombers (equipment and weapons for 17 (seventeen) bombers and 3 (three) training aircraft of the bomber-5 type).

5A turbines: 20 (twenty) - Funk 02

Shells for the DCA units 23-2: 36,720 (thirty-six thousand seven hundred and twenty).

3. Equipment and weapons for two DCA regiments: 48 (forty-eight) 100 mm guns of the 59 type, 48 (forty-eight) 57 mm guns of the 59 type; 36 (thirty-six) 37 mm double-barrelled guns of the 65 type.

4. Equipment and spare parts for a radar regiment (for 20 (twenty) monitoring and guidance radars).
