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NOTE VERBALE DATED 27 FEBRUARY 1967 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE  
OF BOTSWANA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Representative of the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Botswana to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to refer to the Secretary-General's note No. PO SORH (1) of 13 January 1967, addressed to the Minister of State for External Affairs of Botswana, transmitting the text of resolution 232 (1966) adopted by the Security Council on 16 December 1966, in regard to the situation in Southern Rhodesia and requesting information on the measures taken by the Government of Botswana in accordance with the provisions of that resolution.

The Permanent Representative of the Republic of Botswana has the honour ..... to transmit herewith the enclosed memorandum received from the Minister of State for External Affairs in respect of the above-mentioned resolution.

The Permanent Representative wishes to state that, as requested by the Secretary-General, completed statistical questionnaires on imports and exports of the commodities listed in operative paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 232 can only be submitted six weeks after the end of the month to which they refer, e.g., January statistics will be available about 15 March 1967.

It would be appreciated if this memorandum were circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

The Permanent Representative of the Republic of Botswana to the United Nations avails himself, etc.

(Signed) Dr. Z.K. MATTHEWS  
Ambassador and  
Permanent Representative

MEMORANDUM BY THE GOVERNMENT OF BOTSWANA TO SECURITY COUNCIL  
RESOLUTION 232 (1966)

1. The Botswana Government is concerned that the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia has not yet been brought to an end and is anxious that there should be a return to constitutional rule in that country in the very near future. It must be apparent, from the policies pursued by the Botswana Government, that it is utterly opposed to the policy of the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia.
2. The Botswana Government is anxious to take all reasonable steps to contribute to the downfall of the illegal régime. Since achieving independence, it has licensed the B.B.C. relay station in Francistown and has thus enabled this station to continue to beam uncensored news and commentaries to the peoples of Southern Rhodesia. It has at all times maintained, and intends to continue to maintain, laws designed to enforce certain of the previous voluntary sanctions by prohibiting the entry from Botswana of arms, ammunition and military equipment to Southern Rhodesia, and to prohibit the export to that country of petrol, oil and lubricants from Botswana stocks. It is also the case that no person who has sought political asylum in Botswana from Southern Rhodesia has been returned to that country and since the illegal declaration of independence, ninety-five people, who for a variety of political and para-political reasons have left Southern Rhodesia, have been granted asylum in Botswana.
3. However, whilst the Botswana Government is deeply conscious of its international duties and obligations and acknowledges the fact that it is only through a concerted effort by all nations that sanity and justice can be restored in Southern Rhodesia, it is apparent to it that full compliance with resolution 232 (1966) would pose special economic problems for Botswana.

ECONOMY OF BOTSWANA

4. Botswana covers an area of approximately 220,000 square miles and mainly comprises a vast dry tableland with an annual rainfall varying from 12 to 19 inches. The population is approximately 600,000 people. The country is entirely land-locked, being bounded by Rhodesia, South Africa, South West Africa, the Caprivi Strip and Zambia (the country has a very small common boundary with Zambia measuring only a few hundred yards). The main supply route is the railway line joining

Bulawayo in Rhodesia to Mafeking in South Africa; the line of rail runs north-south through eastern Botswana where over 80 per cent of the population lives. For many years there has been talk both in Southern Rhodesia and in South Africa of building a direct rail link between the Rhodesian system and the South African system at Beit Bridge. At present, however, the only direct rail link between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa is through Botswana. This railway is owned and operated by Rhodesia Railways.

5. Botswana's only substantial industry is its cattle industry. Meat and other livestock products comprises over seven-eighths of the country's exports. There is only one export abattoir in Botswana. This is situated on the line of rail, at Lobatsi, in the south-eastern tip of the country. Approximately 75 per cent of the cattle supplied to the abattoir are transported there by rail. Over 90 per cent of the exports of meat and related products leave Botswana by rail.

6. Although Botswana has a modest economic potential which given the time and capital it will realize, it is at present a poor country. The gross national product is roughly R25 million (R40 per capita) making Botswana one of the poorest countries in Africa if not in the world. Good rains this year have broken a calamitous and brutal six-year drought during which approximately 400,000 cattle out of a pre-drought population of 1.4 million perished. Roughly one third of the population are at present on emergency food supplies and this emergency feeding will continue until the harvest is reaped in the middle of 1967.

7. Botswana is heavily grant-aided by the United Kingdom. The revised estimate of expenditure for 1966/67 is R11 million and of revenue R6 million. The Grant-in-Aid by the United Kingdom Government amounts to R5 million which is supplemented by C.D. and W. grants of R2.5 million. It is unlikely that there will be any substantial general revenue balance at the end of the current financial year. Botswana therefore has no reserves and there are indications that the United Kingdom can only provide aid of up to R9 million for the year 1967/68.

THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES TO BOTSWANA IF IT IMPLEMENTED  
RESOLUTION 232 (1966)

8. With regard to the export by Southern Rhodesia of the commodities listed in operative paragraph 2 (a) of resolution 232 (1966), Botswana does not import from

that country for its own use any of the following: asbestos, iron ore, chrome, pig iron, copper, skins, hides or leather.

9. With regard to the import of other commodities specified in operative paragraph 2 (a) the following are the 1966 import figures:

	<u>R</u>
Sugar . . . . .	875,586
Tobacco and cigarettes . . . . .	139,000
Meat and meat products . . . . .	21,094

The import of these goods could be prohibited. This would result in a loss of export earnings to Southern Rhodesia of approximately R1 million. The result in Botswana would be that the cost of living would rise. The increase would be greatest in north and north-west Botswana. Sugar, an important item in the diet of the poorer inhabitants of Botswana, would have to be imported from South Africa and would cost about 1 cent per pound more in southern Botswana (an increase of 14 per cent); this increase would rise in the north to about 2 cents per pound (an increase of 27 per cent) and as the existing road transport rebate would not be obtained, the increase in the north in areas distant from the line of rail, would be about 3 cents per pound (an increase of 35 per cent). It is probable that tobacco imported from South Africa, which would be the nearest source if Rhodesian supplies were cut off, would not cost much, if any, more than tobacco imported from Southern Rhodesia. Meat and manufactured meat products (i.e. bacon, polony, etc.) would cost more if imported from South Africa, but this increase would not be significant and in any event the people of Botswana could at no great sacrifice go without these commodities. However, the prohibition of the import of sugar from Southern Rhodesia would cause a significant rise in the cost of living, and in a country with as much poverty as Botswana this would cause hardship.

10. With regard to the export from Southern Rhodesia of all the commodities mentioned in operative paragraph 2 (a) of resolution 232 (1966), in the opinion of the Botswana Government only limited quantities of them travel either to South Africa or through that country en route for world markets via the railway line which passes through Botswana. Since this Government no longer maintains official communications with the illegal regime, no statistics can be quoted to support this contention, but from the information available it seems that the bulk of the

sanctioned commodities are exported from Southern Rhodesia via channels over which Botswana has no control.

11. Apart from the loss of profits which would attend any diminution in the through goods traffic carried by Rhodesia Railways through Botswana to Southern Rhodesia, little direct harm would be done to Botswana if she enforced such of the other provisions of resolution 232 (1966) as she does not already enforce. However, the illegal régime's capacity to retaliate in the event of Botswana applying severer sanctions than it does at present cannot be disregarded. The illegal régime could:

- (a) ban all exports from Southern Rhodesia to Botswana;
- (b) prohibit the export of commodities from Botswana to or through Southern Rhodesia;
- (c) prevent the supply of petrol, oil and lubricants to Botswana from Lourenco Marques through Southern Rhodesia;
- (c) cause the withdrawal of Rhodesian rolling stock and staff from the railway in Botswana.

If such retaliation occurred the result would be disastrous in Botswana.

12. Approximately 23 per cent of Botswana's total import requirements come from Southern Rhodesia in normal times. The following table sets out the total imports to Botswana by commodity groups and the proportion of these which came from Southern Rhodesia. The figures are in respect of 1965 which was a normal trading year.

Commodity Group	Total	From	Percentage
	Imports	Rhodesia	from Rhodesia
	R	R	
Food and non-alcoholic beverages	4,387,200	694,800	15.8
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco	582,000	325,000	55.9
Livestock and livestock feed	321,500	7,200	2.2
Clothing and textiles	2,350,000	781,000	33.2
Building materials	2,035,000	1,240,400	60.9
Machinery and equipment	3,411,000	178,700	5.2
Fuels, chemicals and drugs	2,064,300	521,800	25.3
Others	1,513,200	131,300	8.7
	<u>16,664,200</u>	<u>3,880,200</u>	<u>23.4</u>

/...

The case for importing these commodities from Southern Rhodesia is basically a matter of costs. Most of northern Botswana can be supplied more economically, because of transport costs, with goods from Southern Rhodesia than with goods from South Africa. Francistown which is in northern Botswana, is the railhead for the remote north-west. It is doubtless unlikely that Southern Rhodesia would retaliate in this way but should she cut off supplies of foodstuffs, clothing and building materials, all items in which that country commands a large share of the Botswana market, the cost of living in Botswana, particularly in the north and the north-west, would rise significantly.

13. A greater risk arises from the fact that approximately 17.1 per cent of Botswana's total exports of meat and related products go to or pass through Southern Rhodesia. The following table sets out these exports in 1965 - a normal trading year.

Commodity	Total Botswana exports	Exports to or through Rhodesia	Expressed as a per cent of total
Cattle (live)	838,000	380,649	45.5
Cattle (carcasses)	5,802,000	1,003,000	17.3
Sheep, goats, etc.	54,000	44,757	83.0
Hides and skins	658,000	123,187	18.7
Canned meat	753,000	527	0.7
Meat extract	432,000	nil	-
Abattoir by-products	369,000	nil	-
Bone meal	184,000	5,640	3.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>9,090,000</b>	<b>1,557,760</b>	<b>17.1</b>

Total Botswana exports: 10,238,700.

14. Approximately 20 per cent of Botswana's requirements of petrol and diesel fuel are imported from depots in Lourenco Marques and enter Botswana by rail via Southern Rhodesia. Almost all of Botswana's supplies of aviation spirit are imported via this route. If this import route were blocked supplies would have to be imported from South Africa and the cost of these commodities would rise in northern Botswana because of increased transport costs. For instance, it is estimated that the cost of petrol at Francistown would rise by 3 cents per gallon, an increase of between 6 and 7 per cent. Outlying areas with considerable concentrations of population and at distances of up to 400 miles from the line of rail, rely solely on motor transport for the conveyance of goods from the railhead at Francistown and therefore any increase in the cost of petrol or diesel fuel would have an immediate effect on the cost of living.

15. If the consequences of Botswana applying resolution 232 (1966) would only be as have been listed so far, the Botswana Government considers that although they would be harmful to Botswana, they may not be disastrous. But these consequences could be infinitely more serious to Botswana. The implementation of the resolution could well have serious effects on the operation of the railway within Botswana. It is possible that the introduction of any additional measures by Botswana to impose sanctions against Southern Rhodesia would cause the illegal regime to suspend railway operations within Botswana and as an emergency exercise complete the Beit Bridge rail link and thus establish a direct rail link with South Africa which would by-pass Botswana. Any substantial curtailment in the operation of the railway through Botswana would contribute an economic blow which would be so serious that Botswana could never recover without the injection of substantial additional aid in the form of the provision of capital and technical assistance.

16. It has already been mentioned that the economy of Botswana depends on the cattle industry and that meat and meat products constitute over seven eighths of national exports. Agriculture, which provides employment for nine out of ten workers in the labour force, is based primarily on cattle ranching. In 1966 the abattoir slaughtered and processed approximately 130,000 head of cattle; over 75 per cent (103,000 head) of these cattle were moved to the abattoir by rail.

If the railway ceased to operate effectively in Botswana cattle would either have to be trekked to the abattoir or moved there by road transport if the meat industry were to survive.

17. It would be virtually impossible to trek the majority of the cattle at present transported by rail to the abattoir. When cattle are transported by rail, the owners are informed several weeks ahead of the numbers of cattle they can send and the day on which they are to be delivered at the rail loading points which are all situated along the line of rail. Since there are no grazing facilities at the loading points, it is vital that the cattle are delivered as instructed. As there are no grazing facilities at Lobatsi it is equally important that cattle should arrive there when the abattoir can handle them without delay. The supply of trek cattle, even assuming that adequate grazing and watering facilities were available along the trek routes, could not reach the abattoir in an even flow. The abattoir cannot operate economically in fits and starts so an assured and even flow of cattle is essential. Such a flow would be impossible to achieve if cattle were trekked to the abattoir.

18. It would be very difficult and costly to move the cattle to the abattoir by road transport. Apart from very short stretches through the main towns - Lobatsi, Francistown and Gaborone - the north-south road, which runs along the line of rail, is constructed of gravel, sand or earth. With the resources available to the Botswana Government it is just possible to maintain this road in a reasonably satisfactory condition at present. There is no doubt that as it is now constructed and maintained, this road could not carry sustained heavy traffic. Any pounding by such traffic would break up the surface of the road and lead to its early destruction. It is estimated that to keep the cattle moving to the abattoir, to move meat and meat products from the abattoir to the South African railways system thirty miles to the south, to distribute foodstuffs and other essential commodities within Botswana, and to maintain postal services, 103 x 25-ton lorries and 4-5-ton trucks would be required. The capital cost of buying such a fleet is estimated at over R3 million and to run the fleet would cost approximately R3 million per annum.

19. It is relevant to point out that there are very few drivers in Botswana who are trained to drive very heavy vehicles of the types envisaged. It is also



relevant to note that unless the costs of the operation were very heavily subsidized the cost of moving cattle to the abattoir, at present at the most R2-50 per head by rail, would increase considerably as road transport would be more expensive than rail transport, particularly as there would be a lot of dead mileage as the flow of cattle to the south would far exceed the return flow of food-stuffs and other essential materials to the north.

20. The operation of a fleet of lorries on the scale contemplated and considered to be necessary would naturally lead to considerable increased requirements of petrol, oil and lubricants. The fuel consumption of the vehicle fleet would probably be in the region of 50,000 gallons of diesel fuel per month. Diesel fuel imports into Botswana in 1965 amounted to 161,000 gallons per month. As all of the fuel would have to be transported by road, the additional requirements would lead to increased congestion on the roads. The normal petrol tankers in use in southern Africa have an average capacity of 1,500 gallons.

21. The necessity of maintaining an even flow of cattle to the abattoir was described in paragraph 17 above. It is doubtful whether such a flow could be achieved with road transport. It is also fairly certain that if the driving was not of a very high standard and the cattle were not properly watered and rested on the longer journeys from the north, the cattle would not arrive at the abattoir in marketable condition. Prices therefore would be reduced and the producer would suffer unless some sort of subsidy system were introduced.

22. It seems that the only feasible way of moving cattle to the abattoir and therefore the only way of sustaining Botswana's main industry is to maintain the railway. It is not simply a question of moving cattle to the abattoir by rail. Over 90 per cent of Botswana's exports of meat and meat products leave the country by rail. Such exports which go to or through South Africa could be carried by road to the South African railway system - a distance of some thirty miles - but special refrigerated lorries would be required. It would not be economical to transport carcass meat north by road for export to Zambia and the Congo even if the illegal regime would, in the event of their closing the railway in Botswana, permit such meat to travel through Southern Rhodesia. To lose the Zambian and the Congo market would be a severe blow to Botswana. In 1965, 1,295 tons of meat valued at R223,000 were exported to Zambia by rail and 3,284 tons valued at

R780,000 to the Congo also by rail (Botswana's total exports of carcass meat, as has been mentioned, amounted to R5,802,000 worth in 1965). These countries are particularly valuable markets to Botswana in view of the fact that they will accept meat originating from areas which have been free of foot and mouth disease for three months. The United Kingdom and other countries will not accept such meat until areas have been clear of disease for six months.

23. It is apparent that the railway must continue to operate within Botswana. If the illegal regime interfered with the operation of the Botswana section of the railway, then the Botswana Government could theoretically take over the line and maintain operations. It is estimated that three trains per day would be required to transport cattle during the flush period - February/July - which would be more than what would be required for the carriage of food, etc., to the north. However, the frequency of trains does not affect, to more than a very marginal extent, the over-all cost of the operation because, whether there is one train per day or three, the cost of station staff, track maintenance, etc., remains broadly constant. It is estimated that to purchase rolling stock, to provide maintenance depots and to establish a stock of maintenance materials could cost as much or even more than R10 million. In addition, recurrent expenditure in salaries, etc., would cost about R1 million per annum.

24. It is certain that the staff to run the railways could not be found within Botswana. It is doubtful whether such staff could be recruited from South Africa and Rhodesia unless substantial financial rewards were offered because in general the attitudes of the majority of skilled railway employees in Rhodesia and South Africa are such that they approve of the policies of the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia and they would be reluctant to participate in an exercise calculated to promote the downfall of that regime.

25. In addition to the railway being essential for the survival of Botswana's only substantial industry, it is also the case that the diversification of the economy of the country depends upon its continued operation. There is ample indication that Botswana is on the verge of mineral development which would transform the economy. These developments which would involve the exploitation of copper, brine deposits and coal could not proceed without the railway. If they do not proceed, Botswana's progress towards economic independence will be halted.

26. If the railway cease to operate within Botswana or if its operation were to be put on to a radically different basis which excluded its use by Southern Rhodesia, Botswana's losses in direct revenue would exceed R500,000 per annum, because at present it recovers this amount in way leave and mail transit payments. As a heavily grant-aided country, Botswana could ill afford this loss.

#### CONCLUSION

27. After a careful study of all the factors involved, it is the opinion of the Botswana Government that if it complied with resolution 232 (1966) to a greater extent than it has been doing, and if the illegal regime retaliated by:

(a) banning all exports from Southern Rhodesia to Botswana;

(b) prohibiting the export of commodities from Botswana to or through Southern Rhodesia; and

(c) preventing the supply of petrol, oil and lubricants to Botswana from Lourenco Marques through Southern Rhodesia;

harmful economic consequences to Botswana would follow due to the fact that the people of Botswana would be required to endure a significant rise in the cost of living.

28. But if in addition to the retaliatory action listed above, the illegal regime took action which seriously curtailed the operation of the railway within Botswana, then this Government would be faced with an economic threat to this country of the utmost gravity. It is abundantly clear that Botswana could not survive without the railway and it is pertinent to point out that this railway is not vital to Southern Rhodesia since goods could be moved to and from South Africa by alternative routes without much difficulty albeit at increased expense. For the survival of Botswana as an economic entity the railway must be kept going. Botswana is heavily grant-aided and struggling to prove and develop its modest resources, and could not run the railway without substantial additional financial and technical aid. Even if this aid could be made available it is doubtful, if the illegal regime were intent on extreme retaliation, whether it would wait until Botswana was in a position to run the railways before it withdrew its rolling stock and staff. Any breakdown in the service for a prolonged period, and it

the time to assemble the engines, trucks, carriages and staff, would have very serious consequences for this country.

In these circumstances the Botswana Government feels that the application by Southern Rhodesia of any additional sanctions against Southern Rhodesia under resolution 252 (1966) would pose, in the terms of Article 50 of the Charter, special economic problems for Botswana.

STATISTICAL DATA ON BOTSWANA

(Background data to Sanctions Brief)

Gross National Product (estimated) . . . . .	R25 million
G.N.P. <u>per capita</u> . . . . .	R 42
Population (estimated), 1966 . . . . .	600,000
1965 Total exports . . . . .	R10,238,700
Cattle (live) . . . . .	R 838,000
Cattle (carcasses) . . . . .	R 5,802,000
Sheep, goats, etc. . . . .	R 54,000
Hides and skins . . . . .	R 658,000
Canned meat . . . . .	R 753,000
Meat extract . . . . .	R 432,000
<u>Abattoir by-products</u> . . . . .	R 369,000
Bone meal . . . . .	R 184,000
Total meat and meat by-products . . . . .	R 9,090,000
Per cent of exports which are associated with the cattle industry . . . . .	87.5%

Imports

1965 imports from South Africa . . . . .	R12,815,000
1965 imports from Rhodesia . . . . .	R 3,880,200
1965 imports from others . . . . .	R 124,200
Total imports . . . . .	R16,819,400
Per cent of imports from Rhodesia . . . . .	23.4%
1966 imports from Rhodesia (estimated) . . . . .	R 4,365,136
Per cent increase in 1966 Rhodesia imports figure . . . . .	20%

Sugar imports

1965 imports of sugar from South Africa; 5,000 short tons . . . . .	R 500,000
1965 imports of sugar from Rhodesia; 5,475 short tons . . . . .	R 516,954
1966 estimated imports of sugar from Rhodesia . . . . .	R 875,586

Tobacco imports

1965 cigarettes and tobacco from South Africa . . . . .	R 139,000
1965 cigarettes and tobacco from Rhodesia . . . . .	R 59,542
1966 cigarettes and tobacco from Rhodesia . . . . .	R 281,598

7. <u>Imports from Rhodesia, 1966</u>	<u>Value</u>
Asbestos . . . . .	nil
Iron ore . . . . .	nil
Chrome . . . . .	nil
Pig iron . . . . .	nil
Copper . . . . .	nil
Meat and meat products . . . . .	R 21,094
Dairy produce . . . . .	R 25,604
Hides and skins . . . . .	nil

8. <u>Total employment of Botswana by Rhodesia Railways 1965</u>	
African . . . . .	766
Non-African . . . . .	98
Total wage bill . . . . .	R 600,000

9. Total mail transit fees, 1966 . . . . . R 175,000

10. Live cattle railed to B.M.C. from Gaborones North  
 in 1966 . . . . . 103,000  
 (75% of total)

11. <u>Meat exports 1965</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>%</u>
Rhodesia . . . . .	R 595,308	6.95
South Africa . . . . .	R2,051,458	23.50
Others . . . . .	R5,927,634	69.55
	<u>R8,574,400</u>	<u>100.00</u>

12. Fuel shipments to Rhodesia via Botswana during 1966

	Quantity (gals)	Assumed price per gal.	Value
Petrol . . . . .	383,743	R.0.50	R 191,872
Diesel . . . . .	3,200	R.0.50	R 1,600
Lubricating oil . . . . .	237,638	R.3.0	R 718,089
Paraffin . . . . .	79,109	R.0.50	R 39,555
Aviation gas . . . . .	40,060	R.1.0	R 40,060
Industrial oil . . . . .	-	-	-
Grease . . . . .	-	-	-
Petroleum liquid gas . . . . .	167,189	R.1.0	R 167,189
Chemicals . . . . .	9,800	R.1.0	R 9,800
TOTAL . . . . .	<u>920,748</u>		<u>R1,168,174</u>

Most of the above was consigned to Zambia.

13. Passengers carried by Rhodesia Railways in Botswana per month in 1966

<u>Month</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Passenger revenue</u>
January	40,137	R.54,320
February	26,688	R.40,850
March	30,880	R.36,288
April	37,561	R.40,900
May	31,324	R.32,590
June	20,197	R.30,582
July	25,501	R.29,616
August	32,540	R.43,012
September	28,176	R.44,274
October	23,903	R.42,212
November	28,743	R.45,309
December		

14. Freight handled in Botswana by Rhodesia Railways, 1966

<u>Month</u>	<u>No. of tons</u>
January . . . . .	3,696
February . . . . .	1,814
March . . . . .	6,353
April . . . . .	1,999
May . . . . .	1,092
June . . . . .	3,912
July . . . . .	4,892
August . . . . .	4,156
September . . . . .	1,720
October . . . . .	3,170
November . . . . .	4,864
December	

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