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REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE
UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN CYPRUS

(For the period 6 December 1966 to 12 June 1967)

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INTRODUCTION

1. This report on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus covers developments from 6 December 1966 to 12 June 1967 and brings up to date the record of the activities of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) pursuant to the mandate laid down in the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964 and subsequent resolutions of the Council relating to Cyprus.
2. During the period under review, the truce has been generally observed, although the situation in Larnaca District has caused considerable concern.

I. THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS

A. Composition and deployment

3. At the end of the period covered by my last report, the strength of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was 4,436 military personnel and 174 Civilian Police (S/7611, para. 3). On 7 June 1967, the composition of the Force was as follows:

<u>Military</u>		<u>Total</u>
Austria	- Field Hospital	51
Canada	- HQ UNFICYP and Military Police	64
	- Battalion and Reconnaissance Squadron	705
	- Contingent HQ and administrative support group	<u>111</u>
Denmark	- HQ UNFICYP and Military Police	29
	- Battalion	<u>616</u>
Finland	- HQ UNFICYP and Military Police	20
	- Battalion	<u>587</u>
Ireland	- HQ UNFICYP and Military Police	14
	- Battalion	<u>509</u>
Sweden	- HQ UNFICYP and Military Police	16
	- Battalion	<u>600</u>
United Kingdom	- HQ UNFICYP and Military Police	151
	- Battalion and Reconnaissance Squadron	760
	- UNFICYP logistic support units	174
	- Helicopter support	<u>42</u>
	Total military personnel:	<u>1,127</u> 4,449

<u>Civilian Police</u>		<u>Total</u>
Australia	39	
Austria	35	
Denmark	39	
New Zealand	20	
Sweden	<u>40</u>	
	<u>Total Civilian Police:</u>	<u>173</u>
	TOTAL UNFICYP:	4,622

4. The following changes took place during the period of this report:

Rotations

(a) Canada: A rotation between 3 and 13 April 1967 involved 706 all ranks. Total strength of the Contingent was increased by 5 all ranks.

(b) Denmark: A rotation between 9 and 23 May 1967 involved 525 all ranks. Total strength of the Contingent was increased by 48 all ranks.

(c) Finland: A rotation between 16 and 31 March 1967 involved 587 all ranks. Total strength of the Contingent was decreased by 1.

(d) Ireland: A rotation between 3 and 8 April 1967 involved 509 all ranks. Total strength of the Contingent was increased by 4 all ranks.

(e) Sweden: A rotation between 24 and 28 April 1967 involved 599 all ranks. Total strength of the Contingent was decreased by 3 all ranks.

(f) United Kingdom: A rotation between 2 and 6 May 1967 involved 614 all ranks. Total strength of the Contingent was increased by 1.

5. The operational situation in the Kophinou-Mari area, which is described later in the report (paras. 49-60 and 61-67), necessitated the continuous deployment of a large part of the Famagusta Zone reserve in this sensitive area. In order to relieve the manpower burden on Famagusta Zone, the Famagusta Zone/Limassol Zone border was changed on 15 May 1967 to bring the Kophinou-Mari-Menoyia triangle under the operational control of Limassol Zone. The Force is now deployed as follows (see attached map):

HQ UNFICYP, including HQ UNCIVPOL: international

Nicosia West District

Danish Contingent
Danish Civilian Police
Austrian Civilian Police

Nicosia East District

Finnish Contingent
Austrian Civilian Police

Famagusta Zone

Swedish Contingent
Swedish Civilian Police

Limassol Zone

British Contingent
Australian Civilian Police
New Zealand Civilian Police

Lefka District

Irish Contingent
Australian Civilian Police

Kyrenia District

Canadian Contingent
Danish Civilian Police

6. The Force remains under the command of Lieutenant-General A.E. Martola. On 5 January 1967, Mr. Carlos A. Bernardes, who had served with great distinction as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus since 26 September 1964, relinquished his post for pressing personal reasons, and was temporarily replaced by Mr. P.P. Spinelli, Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva, who had already served as my personal representative in Cyprus in March, 1964. Mr. Spinelli acted as my Special Representative with great effectiveness until 20 February 1967, when he was replaced by the new Special Representative, Mr. B.F. Osorio-Tafall, who comes to the post after a distinguished career as an international civil servant, first with FAO and since 1956 as Resident Representative of the United Nations Technical Assistance Board in Chile, Indonesia, the United Arab Republic, and since 1964 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

B. Function and guiding principles

7. The function of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus was defined by the Security Council, in its resolution 186 of 4 March 1964, in the following terms:

"in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions".

That resolution was reaffirmed by the Council in its subsequent resolutions of 13 March, 20 June, 9 August, 25 September and 18 December 1964; 19 March, 15 June, 10 August and 17 December 1965; 16 March and 16 June 1966, and in its resolution of 15 December 1966.

8. The guiding principles governing the operation of the Force, as summarized in my report of 10 September 1964 (S/5950, para. 7), remain in effect. The duties of the civilian police element of the Force are outlined in my report of 2 May 1964 (S/5679, para. 4).

9. The Political Liaison Committee meets regularly - usually every Thursday - to deal with the problems of implementation of the mandate and questions involving relationships between the Government and the Turkish Cypriot community. The UNFICYP Deputy Chief of Staff, the Senior Political and Legal Adviser and his staff, the Police Adviser and the UNFICYP Chief Economics Officer have continued to meet in the Committee separately with Liaison Officers representing the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership.

10. Between 6 December 1966 and 3 June 1967 the Committee held twenty meetings with the Government Political Liaison Officer and twenty-one with the Turkish Cypriot Political Liaison Officer.

Casualties and discipline

11. During the period covered by this report, UNFICYP suffered no fatal casualties as a result of inter-communal incidents. However, one soldier was killed and twenty-eight men hospitalized as a result of traffic accidents.

12. The discipline, understanding and bearing of the officers and men of the United Nations Force has continued to be of a high order. The only major breach of discipline occurred on 20 February 1967, when two soldiers of the Force were

involved in the irregular transportation of a Cypriot from Lefka District to the Turkish quarter of Nicosia in the boot of their United Nations vehicle. An immediate investigation was ordered and the two soldiers were sentenced by a court martial to nine months' imprisonment and to dismissal from the service.

C. Relations with the Government and with the Turkish Cypriot leadership

13. Throughout the period under review, as in the past, UNFICYP has continued to maintain close liaison at all levels with the Cyprus Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership.

14. While relations with the Government proper and its various ministries and departments have continued to be good, UNFICYP has experienced some difficulties in its relations with the National Guard, which has more than once addressed intemperately-worded communications amounting virtually to ultimata to it. These communications have usually threatened the use of force against Turkish Cypriots in the event of non-compliance by UNFICYP with the National Guard's wishes, but in a number of cases - in particular the Kokkina helicopter incident (para. 18) and the Ledra Palace roadblock incident (para. 19) - UNFICYP personnel were threatened, and in the Kokkina incident the National Guard's threat to use armed force against UNFICYP was actually carried out. This attitude makes UNFICYP's task even more delicate and difficult. In order to avoid possible misunderstandings, UNFICYP has proposed to the Government that while the present close liaison between the United Nations Force and the National Guard should be continued, all communications of substance emanating from National Guard Headquarters and intended for UNFICYP should be channelled through the appropriate organs of the Government of the Republic. Towards the end of May and at the beginning of June 1967, discussions took place between National Guard Headquarters and UNFICYP and a friendly atmosphere which augured well for improved co-operation in the future.

15. UNFICYP's relations with the Turkish Cypriot leadership in Nicosia have continued to be good, but difficulties have been experienced with certain local Turkish Cypriot leaders, especially in Larnaca District, where there has been little response to UNFICYP's suggestions for improving the situation and there have been such pointless and deplorable incidents as the manhandling of UNFICYP

officers, the attacks on UNFICYP units at Kophinou, and the deliberate unjustified closing of some channels of communication between UNFICYP and the local Turkish Cypriot community.

D. Freedom of movement of the United Nations Force

16. During the period covered by the present report, UNFICYP personnel have been denied freedom of movement by the National Guard or by Turkish Cypriot fighters on forty-one occasions, in eighteen of which the use of force was threatened.

17. As in the previous reporting period, most of these incidents took place in areas of confrontation (S/7611, para. 18) and involved the stopping of routine United Nations patrols. All the six incidents that occurred in Nicosia West District were accompanied by the threat of force. The most serious incidents, however, occurred in Larnaca District around the village of Kophinou, where, on 1 March 1967, UNFICYP's Chief of Staff and the Commander of Famagusta Zone were manhandled by Turkish Cypriot fighters when they attempted to inspect an alleged new Turkish Cypriot position well forward of the fighters' normal village defences. There has also been interference by the Turkish Cypriot fighters in Kophinou with the normal functions and duties of UNFICYP. On three occasions in March, Turkish Cypriots used force to gain entry into the compound where UNFICYP is based at Kophinou, injuring a number of United Nations soldiers, two of them severely. While one of these forcible entries was taking place, an UNFICYP post nearby was overrun and a large amount of United Nations stores and equipment removed. Details of these actions by the Turkish Cypriots are given later in this report (paras. 49-60).

18. On 16 April, for the first time in the history of the Force, an UNFICYP helicopter was fired on in flight. This incident followed a warning by National Guard Headquarters that "for reasons of national security" instructions were to be given to local commanders to shoot at any unidentified aircraft whose flight had not been previously notified to the National Guard. There can, of course, be no question of UNFICYP accepting any pre-notification procedure which would hamper its operational effectiveness, but for air safety reasons advance notice of flights by UNFICYP aircraft has always been given to the Air Traffic Control tower at Nicosia Airport, and in this case such notice had been given more than an hour

before the incident occurred. The helicopter in question was flying on a mercy mission and had just taken off from Kokkina with a seriously ill patient when some 100 to 150 rounds of automatic fire were directed at it from National Guard positions around the village. A strong protest was made to the Government, and subsequently agreement was reached regarding the procedure to be followed in future. Under this procedure, which differs very little from that followed before, UNFICYP emergency flights are notified to the Nicosia Air Traffic Control Centre as early as possible, but in any event not less than 20-30 minutes before take-off. This requirement does not materially affect UNFICYP's operational effectiveness, as it usually takes 20-25 minutes to prepare a helicopter for an unscheduled flight.

19. On 17 March, an incident occurred outside the Ledra Palace Hotel in the centre of Nicosia which is more fully reported elsewhere in the report (para. 117). In this incident the local National Guard commander threatened to open fire on UNFICYP soldiers of the Danish Contingent unless they immediately ceased demolishing a sandbag wall being removed at the request of the Government. This threat of force was most strongly protested both to the Government and to National Guard Headquarters, but while UNFICYP received an apology from the Government, National Guard Headquarters accused UNFICYP of not giving advance notification of its intention to remove the wall. In fact, the local National Guard commander had been informed by Headquarters DANCON, but had omitted to inform his own Headquarters.

20. A number of cases involving denial of freedom of movement to UNFICYP have occurred in areas which the National Guard has claimed to be restricted areas, but which are not so shown on UNFICYP's master map of such areas drawn up as part of the agreement of 10 November 1964 on freedom of movement of the Force (S/6102, para. 127). Since the National Guard's attitude gave grounds for believing that they were attempting to create new restricted areas unilaterally without consulting or even notifying UNFICYP Headquarters, representations were made by UNFICYP to the Government, and on 13 May, after discussions between the Government and UNFICYP, a revised master map of proposed restricted areas was submitted to UNFICYP Headquarters. This map is now being studied by UNFICYP, but the immediate impression is that, although the total number of areas has been slightly reduced, a number of individual areas have been enlarged. Moreover, the Government proposes to change the status of many areas, so that they number of areas in Category 'A',

i.e., those that can only be inspected by the Force Commander personally in company with General Grivas, would be doubled, while the number of areas which in the past have been open for inspection by Zone and District Commanders would be more than halved. It will be recalled that the full freedom of movement throughout Cyprus of the Force, its members, vehicles, aircraft, etc., is expressly provided for by article 32 of the Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Cyprus concerning the Status of the Peace-keeping Force (S/5634, annex I). Discussions on the question of restricted areas are continuing, and it is hoped that an agreement can be reached which will take full account of UNFICYP's vital need for freedom of movement.

II. ACTIVITIES TOWARDS PREVENTING A RECURRENCE OF FIGHTING
AND CONTRIBUTING TO THE RESTORATION AND MAINTENANCE OF
LAW AND ORDER

A. Military situation

(i) Armed forces in Cyprus other than UNFICYP

(a) Government armed forces

21. There has been a slight increase in the strength of the National Guard during the period under review, owing chiefly to the fact that the 1949 age group was called up in January (though students were permitted to postpone their enlistment until the summer), while the 1947 age group, part of which had been due for demobilization in February, was retained for an added six months by decision of the Council of Ministers.

22. A number of Greek military personnel of all ranks who are not members of the Greek National Contingent continue to be present in the Island. They wear the uniform of the National Guard, and no precise information as to their numbers is available to UNFICYP (S/7611, para. 24). It is believed that the small port of Boghaz, north of Famagusta, has been used on several occasions for the purpose of rotating these Greek officers and men.

23. Instruction and training, including firing exercises with heavy weapons, has followed the same pattern as in the past, but large-scale exercise, such as those which were staged during the summer months of 1966 (S/7611, para. 25), has taken place. The field exercises carried out have been of a minor nature, involving a limited number of troops, and their principal purpose seems to have been to exercise coastal defences.

24. The construction of new defence fortifications by the National Guard has continued (see para. 45). Attention has been paid to coastal defence in depth, and the road system in many sensitive areas has been improved and developed for military purposes.

25. The National Guard is maintaining its state of readiness and has mobile stand-by forces which can be sent to any part of the Island at short notice, should the situation so require (S/7611, para. 26). These stand-by forces appear normally to include armoured elements which, in addition to their mobility, also offer a high degree of fire power.

26. There have been repeated complaints by the Turkish Cypriots about arms shipments into Cyprus. According to the information given to UNFICYP by the Government and the National Guard, shipments destined for the latter have consisted mainly of various types of maintenance supplies, including large quantities of all types of ammunition. UNFICYP is not empowered to inspect military material on arrival, however, and it is not therefore possible to verify the type and quantity of such material introduced into the island (S/7611, para. 27). No advance notification of the arrival of any arms shipment has been received by UNFICYP in the period under review, although it will be recalled (S/6102, para. 129) that on 10 September 1964 the then Force Commander negotiated an agreement with the Government whereby the local authorities would inform the headquarters of UNFICYP Limassol District whenever a shipment of military stores was expected at Limassol harbour, which is where many such shipments arrive. Limassol is not the only port through which shipments of military stores pass, however, and the port of Boghaz, already mentioned in para. 22 above, is clearly also used for the introduction of substantial quantities of military stores. I can but point out again, as I have repeatedly done in the past (see, inter alia, S/7611/Add.1, para. 3), that any influx of arms and other military-type equipment into Cyprus is a cause for concern to UNFICYP with regard to the discharge of its mandate.

27. The regular Cyprus Police is being strengthened. Up to now its ceiling had been fixed at 2,000 all ranks, including a para-military police tactical reserve of about 500 men, distributed among the principal police headquarters throughout the island (S/7191, para. 28). The exact number of additional police recruits now undergoing training is not known to UNFICYP. It has been officially stated that the 1967 ordinary budget of the Republic provides for the expansion of the police force by 200 men, but other official sources have spoken of increases of up to 500 men. A significant amount (£200,000) is appropriated in the 1967 budget for "strengthening the police force". No details were given, but it is generally believed that this sum is related to the purchase of arms for the police. It will be recalled from the Addendum to my last report (S/7611/Add.1) that following the importation by the Cyprus Government of a quantity of arms from Czechoslovakia, which caused and still causes concern to the Turkish Cypriot leadership and was also the subject of a number of representations, in particular by the Turkish Government, President Makarios agreed at UNFICYP's request to the

inspection of the crates containing the arms in question by the Force Commander. On 12 January 1967 the Cyprus Government indicated to me that the arms would not be distributed for the time being, that I would be advised in due time if the need to distribute the arms arose, and that in the meantime the UNFICYP Commander could inspect the arms from time to time to make sure that such distribution had not taken place. The Force Commander has made a number of inspections at regular intervals under these arrangements, the most recent of them on 2 May, and on that occasion, as on previous inspections, he found that all the arms recorded as having been delivered to the Cyprus Government in the specifications received by UNFICYP from the Minister of the Interior were still being kept in storage, greased and in their original wrappings, in a single guarded building.

28. General Grivas remains the Supreme Commander of the Cyprus Defence Forces. He tendered his resignation in early April, but later withdrew it. General Pantelides, who commands the Cyprus Army proper (see S/6102, para. 135), tendered his resignation to the President of Cyprus late in February, but it was not accepted.

29. Over the past few months UNFICYP has noticed increased signs of a tendency to identify the Cyprus National Guard with the Greek Army. These include the widespread use of the Greek Army cap badge by the National Guard and the use of the Greek royal crown in flags and sign boards at many National Guard camps, while the oath taken by recent National Guard recruits on enlistment now incorporates allegiance to the King of Greece.

(b) Turkish Cypriot armed elements

30. The organization and strength of the Turkish Cypriot fighters permanently under arms has remained fundamentally unchanged since my last report (S/7611, para. 28). The main concentrations are still in the Turkish Cypriot sector of Nicosia and the enclave north of the city, with significant detachments in all other major centres (S/7191, para. 31).

31. Their state of readiness does not seem to have been reduced as a result of hardships during the winter months; in several places throughout the island, their training and local leadership appear to be the responsibility of professional military personnel from Turkey who do not form part of the Turkish National Contingent.

32. No new weapons have been observed by UNFICYP in the hands of Turkish Cypriot fighters during the period under review, but there has been a general improvement in their personal equipment.

33. Mr. Kemal Coskun, known as "Bozkurt", a member of the Turkish Embassy staff, who came to the island prior to the outbreak of the troubles in 1963, left for Turkey on 24 February 1967. He is reported to have been one of the earliest organizers and latterly the over-all leader of the Turkish Cypriot fighter organization (see para. 103).

34. The departure for Turkey during May of 438 Turkish Cypriot students of fighter age (see para. 116) is considered a significant reduction in the total fighter potential, especially when taken together with the 512 who left the island from Xeros in January 1966 (S/7191, paras. 48-52).

(c) The Greek and Turkish National Contingents

35. To UNFICYP's knowledge there has been no change in the total strengths or locations of the two National Contingents since the last report (S/7611, para. 32).

36. The rotation of about half of the Greek National Contingent was carried out on 19/20 December 1966 through the port of Famagusta. UNFICYP was informed in advance.

37. In mid-January 1967, the Government of Turkey, through its Embassy in Nicosia, informed the Government of Cyprus of Turkey's intention to rotate approximately half of the officers and other ranks of its contingent towards the end of March. At the same time lists of stores to be brought in by the incoming party were forwarded to the Government for approval. UNFICYP was requested to extend its good offices and facilities for this operation as before.

38. The Government of Cyprus, while maintaining its standpoint with regard to the Treaty of Alliance, gave its consent for the rotation to take place. It objected, however, to some specific items and quantities on the list of stores and ammunition to be brought in by the incoming party. Protracted negotiations ensued, in which UNFICYP's good offices were used at their request, by the Government and the Turkish Embassy; final agreement on some items was only reached at the dockside, when the items in question had already been unloaded. Nevertheless, the rotation operation was completed as planned through the port of Famagusta on 31 March without incident.

39. The incoming party consisted of 49 officers and 303 other ranks, plus approximately 150 tons of stores and ammunition, while 49 officers and 301 other ranks departed for Turkey. UNFICYP provided a total of 39 vehicles to assist in the transportation of troops and stores.

(ii) General assessment of the situation with regard to preventing a recurrence of fighting

40. Although the general atmosphere in the island during the period under review can be said to have been calm, there have been considerable undercurrents of tension in most confrontation areas, particularly in the Kophinou area of Larnaca District and more recently in Larnaca itself. The Trypimeni, Ghaziveran and Ktima areas have been relatively quiet, but none of them can be said to have reverted entirely to normal. There was a renewed outbreak of shooting at Arsos on 9 April (see para. 97), when a relative of the Turkish Cypriot shot in the incident of 9 September 1966 (S/7611, paras. 57-61) saw his uncle drinking coffee with a Greek Cypriot and fired three rounds from his pistol in the air as a protest. This resulted in a general fustillade lasting about forty minutes. The incident did nothing to help efforts to secure the withdrawal of the Cyprus Police detachment stationed in Arsos since the shootings of 11 September 1966. During the intervening period the strength of this detachment had been progressively reduced, and had this shooting incident not taken place, police coverage of the village might well have returned to the normal procedure of mobile Cyprus Police patrols visiting the village a few times a week. At Trypimeni on 12 April 1967, the National Guard occupied an UNFICYP observation post left temporarily unoccupied during the winter months, but as soon as UNFICYP protested the National Guard withdrew and UNFICYP reoccupied the post. At Pergamos there was tension for a time when the National Guard began to construct and improve positions some 4,000 metres from the village on ground used for grazing and farming by the Turkish Cypriot villagers, who reacted by setting up roadblocks on the road leading through the village and preventing Greek Cypriots from passing that way. After patient negotiations by UNFICYP the roadblocks were removed, and some time later the National Guard completed the work on its positions and withdrew. The incidents at Kophinou and Mari are fully covered later in this report (paras. 51-63 and 61-67).

41. It is true to say that although there is a general air of calm, except in Larnaca District, where most of the actual incidents occurred, UNFICYP is faced with more potential trouble spots than ever before, and as a result has had to deploy its forces rather more extensively throughout their areas of responsibility. This has put a considerable strain on its resources, and it is quite clear that the Force at its present strength is fully committed and will continue to be so. To ease the problem for the Swedish Contingent, who have by far the largest and most troublesome Zone to cope with, the Force Commander decided in May to readjust Zone boundaries (see para. 5 above).

42. It would appear that little or no progress is being made towards solving the problem of confrontation areas. The National Guard has continued its policy of extending its fortifications throughout the island, despite UNFICYP's strong representations that this augments rather than diminishes the danger of a breakdown in the cease-fire.

43. The Turkish Cypriots, particularly in Larnaca District, have also failed on some occasions to display a spirit of co-operation and have carried out actions which obstruct rather than assist UNFICYP. This problem is covered in Sections B (ii) and (iii) of this chapter, notably paragraph 59.

44. Unless UNFICYP has the complete co-operation of both sides in its efforts to find a peaceful solution for the problems which arise, it is doubtful whether it will be able to achieve very much by way of preventing the recurrence of fighting beyond maintaining the present truce and containing incidents as they occur. So long as present attitudes and actions continue, there is likely to be little change in the general situation in Cyprus.

B. Specific developments and action taken by UNFICYP

(i) Extension and improvement of fortifications

45. It is to be regretted that UNFICYP has had little success during the present mandate in bringing to a halt the extension of military fortifications. As I explained in my last report (S/7611, paras. 47 and 48), UNFICYP's view has always been that fortification construction of any kind only tends to increase sensitivity and raise tension in areas where it takes place. The planned programme of National Guard fortification work described in the last report (S/7611, para. 46) has

continued and has also been extended into other areas of the Island. A number of these new constructions are classified by the National Guard as part of the coastal defences of the island, but lie well back from the shore, in some cases by as much as five or ten miles; in actual fact they constitute part of an island-wide system of fortifications. For their part, the Turkish Cypriots have responded by improving old positions and constructing new ones, mainly in areas of close confrontation, but their fortification work is of necessity far less sophisticated than that of the National Guard because they lack the necessary building materials such as cement.

46. A disturbing aspect of this policy of wholesale extension of fortifications by both sides is that in many cases UNFICYP has not been allowed to inspect the new positions. One major construction is at Patsalo Hill, near Larnaca, where a bunker has been constructed as part of the island's southern coastal defences. This bunker was begun in October 1966 and immediately brought protests from the Turkish Cypriots, who alleged that from some of its loopholes direct fire could be brought to bear on Scala, the Turkish Cypriot quarter of Larnaca. When the position was inspected by the Force Commander in the company of General Grivas, it was found that the bunker was designed for a heavy machine-gun and Scala was within its range.

47. Coastal defence construction has also continued in Lefka and Kyrenia Districts and in Famagusta Zone. In Lefka District the fortifications are largely coastal bunkers, but in Kyrenia District they represent an extension towards the encirclement of the Turkish Cypriot enclave south of Kyrenia. According to the National Guard, this extension is necessary to guard against an external attack by airborne troops designed to link up with the Turkish Cypriots in the enclave. Of particular concern to UNFICYP are the current defence works at Karaolos Beach, north of Famagusta, parts of which clearly encroach on the demilitarized area established under the Famagusta defortification arrangements of December 1965 (S/7191, para. 55). Strong representations are being made to the Government for the removal of those parts of the defence works which fall within the demilitarized area.

48. It will be readily appreciated that this policy of defence construction, whether by the National Guard or the Turkish Cypriots, is not altogether compatible with an attitude of mind directed at bringing about a return to normality. In UNFICYP's view the continuation of such a policy can only damage the chances of success of the efforts being made to reduce tension and tends to foster an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust, which in turn reduces the chances of a successful

solution of the Island's problems. UNFICYP cannot be satisfied with the present state of affairs in respect of fortifications, and considers that it would be a major step towards the restoration of a better atmosphere if those responsible on both sides were to halt all defence works, construct no more, and indeed, initiate the process of de-fortification with the assistance of UNFICYP.

(ii) Kophinou

49. Kophinou is a Turkish Cypriot village situated in a strategic position close to the junction of the main Nicosia-Limassol and Larnaca-Limassol highways. Though there were a number of incidents, some serious, in and around Kophinou during 1964 and the first half of 1965, there was little or no tension in the area from July 1965 until towards the end of 1966, and the freedom of movement of traffic along the two main highways was never seriously threatened. Since November 1966, however, the situation has deteriorated. In December, there were three cases of interference by Turkish Cypriot fighters with freedom of movement along the highways. Two involved the freedom of movement of the Cyprus Police and the third of a National Guard vehicle. In each of these cases petrol was demanded on the grounds that normal petrol supplies to the village had been suspended by the authorities in Larnaca.

50. In January 1967 the Turkish Cypriots removed some road signs at Kophinou bearing the customary English transliterations of Greek place-names and re-erected them after replacing the names with the Turkish versions. Eventually, after negotiations by UNFICYP, they repainted them with the original wording. All this time there was ever-increasing movement of uniformed and armed fighters along and in the vicinity of the highways. A new fighter leader had taken over control of the village in November 1966 and was prominent in all these activities. UNFICYP's efforts to have the fighters withdrawn from the area of the highways met with no success. At the end of January tension increased further when on the 25th of the month a Greek Cypriot bus was stopped by Turkish Cypriots and held with its occupants for about half an hour until UNFICYP prevailed upon them to release it and the passengers. This action by the Turkish Cypriots was stated to be in retaliation for what they considered to be the harassment of their village bus at the

Famagusta Gate checkpoint, Nicosia, by the Cyprus Police because it was displaying village name signs exclusively in Turkish. When this Turkish Cypriot bus was again stopped for the same reason on 26 January and the driver served with a summons in connexion with the signs, the Turkish Cypriots in the village repeated their action of the day before and this time stopped a number of Greek Cypriot cars passing along the main highway through Kophinou. They released them some time later, after UNFICYP intervention.

51. This second act of interference brought a strong protest from the Government, and the Force Commander pledged firm action by UNFICYP to prevent a repetition. In return, the Minister of the Interior informed the Force Commander that the Government security forces would take no action for the time being until UNFICYP had had an opportunity to correct the situation. However, at the time that this conversation was taking place, and without any warning to UNFICYP, General Givas ordered a unit of battalion strength, supported by armoured cars, to move immediately to Kophinou. This force established itself in the area of Skarinou and has remained there ever since. UNFICYP accordingly increased its own strength in the area and interposed certain observation posts and patrols between the National Guard and the Turkish Cypriot fighter positions. During the night of 26/27 January, the Chief of Staff of UNFICYP met the National Guard Commander at Skarinou and the Turkish Cypriot fighter leader at Kophinou to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the problem. He obtained a firm promise from the fighter leader not to interfere with freedom of movement along the highways in future, not to provoke any further incidents in the area, and to withdraw some of the fighters from the positions where they were deployed. Though the withdrawal of the fighters was not as complete as had been hoped, freedom of movement was re-established. UNFICYP kept a substantial force in the area to ensure that it was maintained.

52. In the light of the results of these negotiations and similar assurances received by the Force Commander from the Turkish Cypriot leadership in Nicosia, UNFICYP felt that the National Guard force should withdraw, but the National Guard were not prepared to do so. Although it was repeatedly pointed out to them that their continued presence in the area could only sustain the tension and bring about possible clashes between them and the Turkish Cypriot fighters, they were adamant that their presence was necessary for the security and the freedom of movement of Greek Cypriots. Although for a time the National Guard force was reduced, it was later reinforced and, as UNFICYP feared, a number of shooting incidents occurred.

On 28 February Turkish Cypriot fighters moved forward and dug new positions 400 yards north of their original positions around Ayios Theodoros, ostensibly to protect the freedom of movement of their shepherds, which had been restricted in some cases by the National Guard. This advance was protested against strongly by the local United Nations commander, but the Turkish Cypriots refused to withdraw, whereupon the National Guard deployed opposite them and it became necessary for United Nations forces to interpose themselves in order to prevent an outbreak of fighting.

53. The UNFICYP force had by now been considerably strengthened and comprised elements drawn from the Swedish and British contingents. This made it necessary for UNFICYP to use a larger part of the Kophinou police station and its surrounding compound. This compound, which is directly adjacent to the main Nicosia-Limassol highway, and hitherto been jointly occupied by UNFICYP and Turkish Cypriot police elements and also contained a number of married quarters used by the families not only of police elements but also of Turkish Cypriot fighters. Some of the additional tents erected in the compound by UNFICYP to house its troops were necessarily quite close to these married quarters, and some families moved out of their quarters because of this. The presence of fighters in uniform inside a compound occupied even partially by United Nations troops was obviously out of the question, and the local Turkish Cypriot fighter leader was asked to ensure that all fighters who entered the compound were in civilian dress and unarmed. This condition was at first accepted, and no uniformed or armed fighters were seen in the compound for about a week, although there continued to be considerable activity by armed fighters on or near the highway. UNFICYP considered that this was likely to cause incidents with the National Guard, and a further request was therefore made for the fighters to stay clear of the highway.

54. On 1 March, UNFICYP's Chief of Staff, accompanied by the Commander of the Swedish Contingent and the local UNFICYP commander, visited the controversial positions at Ayios Theodoros (para. 52). When they tried to approach them they were stopped by Turkish Cypriot fighters and subsequently roughly manhandled off the positions on the orders of the local fighter leader, who, although not actually on the spot, was seen in the vicinity and was known to have given the necessary instructions. The Force Commander made a strong protest to the Turkish

Cypriot leadership, who expressed regret at the incident and subsequently gave orders for the fighters to withdraw from the new positions. This withdrawal began, but was never completed because of subsequent events.

55. On 2 March, a group of fighters, some uniformed and one armed with a pistol, attempted to force their way into the Kophinou police station compound through the gate, but were prevented from doing so by UNFICYP soldiers. They then ran to what appeared to be pre-selected points in the compound fence, where they climbed or crawled through existing holes. They next formed up in the area of the married quarters, but after a few minutes marched out of the compound in an orderly fashion. During the following week further attempts were made to enter the compound, and in one case the fighter leader himself was involved.

56. On 11 March, an open attack was made on the compound by Turkish Cypriot fighters armed with pick axe handles and machetes, under the command of the fighter leader already mentioned. Aided by the Turkish Cypriot police elements inside the compound, they forced their way in by driving a three-ton truck through the fence, and a major melee ensued in which a number of United Nations soldiers were injured, two of them having to receive hospital treatment for head wounds. This fight lasted for approximately forty minutes before the Turkish Cypriot fighters were ejected. Later that evening the fighter leader arrived at the gate with what appeared to be a home-made explosive charge, which he attempted to light and threatened to throw into the compound. He was persuaded not to do so, and subsequently left the scene.

57. It now became clear that joint occupancy of the police station and its compound was no longer possible and the Turkish Cypriot police elements were therefore requested to leave. This they did with their families at about 2330 hours on 11 March. Since the compound was now under the exclusive control of UNFICYP, the Turkish flag flying over the police station was lowered by United Nations troops shortly after midnight, carefully folded and handed to the senior Turkish Cypriot policeman. During the events of the afternoon of 11 March, a United Nations road post was also attacked by Turkish Cypriot fighters and temporarily overwhelmed, and some £100 worth of equipment and kit belonging to the United Nations was removed. Despite repeated requests, about half of this equipment and kit has still to be returned.

58. Since 11 March, UNFICYP has been engaged in negotiations with the Turkish Cypriot leadership with a view to returning conditions to normal in the Kophinou area. This must of necessity include arrangements for reducing tension in the area, preventing a recurrence of incidents by avoidance of provocative actions, maintaining freedom of movement on the adjacent highway, and ensuring unhampered use of premises occupied by UNFICYP troops, while safeguarding the legitimate rights of civilians. UNFICYP has explained to the Government, which has expressed anxiety over the situation, that it would be difficult for it to bar as a matter of principle the return of the Turkish Cypriot police elements to the compound when the situation allows.

59. It is believed that most of the difficulties encountered in Larnaca District, as the events at Kophinou have shown, stem from the obstinacy and spirit of non-co-operation of the local Turkish Cypriot leadership. Life has been made very difficult for the Commander of the Swedish Contingent, which mans the Famagusta Zone, and for his local commanders by the fact that the lower level of fighter leaders will not heed any representation made to them by UNFICYP without the authority of the Turkish Cypriot leaders in Larnaca, and more often than not this authority is refused them. So long as this is so and this spirit of non-co-operation remains, it is unlikely that UNFICYP will achieve much success in this area of the island.

60. A further underlying source of tension in the area is the continued presence of the National Guard force. UNFICYP remains convinced that had the National Guard force been withdrawn when this was suggested by UNFICYP, the United Nations Force's task of restoring tranquillity to the area and ensuring freedom of movement on the highways would have been greatly facilitated.

(iii) Mari

61. Some ten miles south-west of Kophinou, just off the main Limassol-Nicosia highway, is the Turkish Cypriot village of Mari. In the past, because of the village's strategic position, there have been minor incidents on account of Turkish Cypriot fighter movement on the highway near it. More recently, there have been reports of National Guard convoys being fired at from Turkish Cypriot positions at Mari, but these reports have not been confirmed by UNFICYP's investigations.

62. On 27 March 1967, a National Guard armoured car patrol passing by Mari along the main road reported that it had been fired at by Turkish Cypriots from positions on the high ground overlooking the road. The armoured cars returned the fire but withdrew from the area after only a few moments. Subsequent investigations by UNFICYP failed to establish who had fired first. The patrolling by armoured cars continued, although UNFICYP pointed out to the National Guard the inadvisability of such patrolling activities when tension was running so high.

63. On 8 April, a National Guard patrol consisting of two armoured cars, a land rover mounted with an 0.50 Browning heavy machine-gun, and a truck carrying infantry moved south past the village, but shortly afterwards returned northwards, and as it drew level with the village stopped and opened fire. Whether or not the Turkish Cypriot fighters opened fire first has not been established by UNFICYP, but it is clear from all observer reports that during the action that followed, which lasted for four hours, almost all the shooting was done by the National Guard and fire was only returned by the Turkish Cypriots towards the very end.

64. During the four hours of the action, at least 40 two-pounder shells and 1,000 rounds of ammunition were fired from the armoured cars; it is not known how many rounds were fired by the supporting troops. Most of the fire was directed at random. An unoccupied stone blockhouse, an unoccupied private car and a Turkish Cypriot shepherd's mud hut were severely hit. The only casualty from small arms fire during the action was a 65-year-old Turkish Cypriot woman wounded in the leg some distance away from the village of Mari. Some Mari villagers were slightly injured by splinters of masonry chipped off as a result of the National Guard fire.

65. Within a very short time of the first shots, United Nations officers reached Mari, and every effort was made to bring about a cease-fire. A senior member of UNCIVPOL managed to get right inside the village, but it is clear from his report that no fire was coming from there and the villagers had taken cover. It took time to persuade the National Guard to cease firing, but this was eventually achieved at 1245 hours. As soon as a cease-fire was obtained, United Nations troops were interposed to prevent any recurrence of fighting. They were successful in this, and no further shooting has occurred at Mari.

66. Negotiations then began to bring the situation at Mari back to normal. The immediate requirement was to ensure that there could be no further threat to freedom of movement along the main highway. To achieve this it was necessary to establish United Nations posts on the escarpment commanding the road. In discussions at the Government and Nicosia Turkish Cypriot leadership level, it was understood that once these observation posts were established, the National Guard would withdraw from the area and cease their patrolling of the main road below Mari, leaving such duties to the Cyprus Police. Before this arrangement could be put into effect, however, a National Guard force moved forward on the night of 10/11 April from positions 1,000 metres north of the village to new positions only 30 or 40 metres from the Turkish Cypriot fighter positions and 100 metres from the village. Although the National Guard force involved only numbered about 15 men, its advance naturally set up new tensions and difficulties. After 24 hours' negotiations, UNFICYP succeeded in arranging for the withdrawal of this National Guard force back to its original position. Discussions then began regarding the establishment of UNFICYP observation posts on the escarpment, and it was agreed that UNFICYP should have two such posts on the high ground in the vicinity of the Turkish Cypriot positions north and south of Mari, with a platoon headquarters and other section positions on the low ground adjacent to the main highway itself. In UNFICYP's view this was sufficient to ensure freedom of movement along the highway. No conditions were set for the withdrawal of fighters from, or the filling in of any of the positions on, the high ground. The negotiations did not go as quickly as had been hoped, but by 13 April agreement had been reached and the UNFICYP observation posts were established. After some seemingly unnecessary delay, the National Guard withdrawal began, and was finally completed on 15 April.

67. Since then there has been no interference by the Turkish Cypriots with freedom of movement along the highway. UNFICYP remains in platoon strength in the area to insure against any such interference, but local Turkish Cypriots have not helped the situation by indulging in what can only be described as ill-considered acts. To begin with, they raised near the United Nations flag a Turkish flag which was visible from a section of the main highway. Notwithstanding UNFICYP's efforts, the flag pole has so far not been moved. Moreover, work was carried out on existing Turkish Cypriot positions, some of which overlook the main road. Naturally this

aroused the concern of the Government and of the National Guard, who demanded that the positions should be destroyed by UNFICYP. The Turkish Cypriot leadership was urged to give instructions for all work on the positions at Mari to cease and for two offending newly-constructed positions to be demolished, and it was pointed out to the leadership that the present actions of the fighters at Mari were likely to endanger future peace. Work on the positions appears to have ceased, but this cannot be confirmed until UNFICYP has had the opportunity to inspect them for itself. It is regretted that, despite repeated representations, all attempts by UNFICYP to arrange for such inspection have met with the refusal of the Turkish Cypriot leadership.

(iv) Larnaca

68. In my last report (S/7611, paras. 72-74) I indicated that this was an extremely sensitive area pervaded by a constant atmosphere of tension. However, as Larnaca/Scala itself remained surprisingly quiet during the first four months of the present reporting period, despite the intense activity at other places in Larnaca District described earlier in this report, it was hoped that the danger of further clashes was diminishing. These hopes were unfortunately dashed when on 12 May 1967 National Guard headquarters complained to UNFICYP headquarters that Turkish Cypriots were blocking Artemis Avenue, an important thoroughfare at Scala, and had improved with concrete an existing bunker overlooking the road. UNFICYP was informed that unless the bunker was destroyed, the National Guard would act, and soon afterwards National Guard troops were moved into the area for this purpose.

69. The complaint was immediately investigated by the local United Nations Commander, but was not substantiated. The report that Artemis Avenue had been blocked was unfounded, and there were no indications that recent work had been done on the bunker. Despite these findings, National Guard forces were moved forward during the night of 12/13 May to positions on the west side of and immediately overlooking Artemis Avenue, while five Cyprus Police check-points were established around Scala, the Turkish quarter of Larnaca. Early on the morning of 13 May, the Commander of the Swedish Contingent personally inspected the controversial bunker and found it unmanned and showing no signs of having been worked on recently. No materials for making concrete were found, but two planks which had been propped

against the sides of the bunker could have given the impression that they were frames for receiving concrete mix. Unfortunately, the Swedish Contingent Commander's report to this effect did not convince National Guard headquarters.

70. On 15 May, the Commander of the UNFICYP Swedish Contingent informed the Larnaca District Officer that Dr. Orhan, the local Turkish Cypriot leader, had signified his willingness to remove, as demanded by the District Officer, all Turkish Cypriot positions established after April 1965 along Artemis Avenue and to give orders that no uniformed or armed Turkish Cypriots should be seen on or in front of a ridge east of the same road. Later, however, although Dr. Orhan did not dispute having spoken of his willingness to see the situation return to that which prevailed before April 1965, he made it clear that the promises he had made to the Swedish Contingent Commander were conditional upon the removal of all National Guard fortifications established since that date, and especially the coastal bunker (S/7350, paras. 32-37), the fortifications at Patsalo Hill and the positions around the Hala Sultan Tekke Mosque (S/7611, paras. 73-74). Dr. Orhan was supported in his stand by the Turkish Cypriot leadership in Nicosia.

71. In spite of strenuous efforts by UNFICYP to achieve a return to the situation existing before 12 May, a total impasse prevailed for two weeks. Eventually, after an on-the-spot visit by the Force Commander, it was arranged that the UNFICYP Chief of Staff should carry out a detailed inspection of all the Turkish Cypriot positions to the east of Artemis Avenue and that his impartial report should be accepted by the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership.

72. This inspection took place on 25 May and covered the eastern side of Artemis Avenue from the road junction at GR S 285394 to the bend in the road at GR S 298377. The Chief of Staff's findings may be summarized as follows:

(a) All but one of the twenty-two positions he found and inspected were of old construction and conformed in age with the records held by the Swedish Contingent: i.e., they were of 1965 or earlier vintage.

(b) In a number of cases, some of the old sandbags had been replaced recently, and in others additional sandbags had been added for greater protection.

(c) In four instances, prefabricated concrete blocks had been used to strengthen the forward edge of a fire trench. Among these was the controversial position which appears to have caused the deployment of National Guard and Cyprus

Police on the night of 12/13 May. This latter position was already known to the Chief of Staff, as he had had occasion to inspect it in October 1966, when UNFICYP had had to deploy forces in that area. The Chief of Staff found this position unaltered from that time and was therefore able to endorse fully the Swedish Contingent Commander's report that it had not been worked on or improved for a number of months.

(d) From the Swedish Contingent's records and from the Chief of Staff's own observations it was possible to state authoritatively that the concrete blocks referred to in paragraph (c) had been added during 1966.

(e) The Chief of Staff also inspected some houses overlooking Artemis Avenue. Although each one contained some form of defensive position, these positions were not recent, but had been in existence for a long time. In five cases it was clearly apparent that they had not been touched since 1965, while in the sixth case, that of the controversial house No. 41, the fortified windows on the ground floor had been strengthened with concrete blocks, but again not recently. In any case, the shutters on these windows were kept firmly closed and the positions were not visible from the road.

(f) The only recent new construction found by the Chief of Staff was at the bend in the road at GR S 298377. This position comprises a concrete bunker and two weapon pits, and it was admitted that it had been built in 1966. It is intended to counter the important National Guard fortifications at Patsalo Hill, which it faces at a distance of approximately 800 yards.

(g) Two sentry-boxes have been sited in view of the main road, one of them since before the troubled situation which arose in October 1966. Both are made of thin materials and cannot be described as defensive positions.

73. These facts were subsequently made known to the interested parties, and at the same time the Force Commander put forward a new plan for achieving a permanent solution of the problems which cause constant friction in the Larnaca/Scala area. This plan, which is now under consideration, calls for the immediate withdrawal of the Cyprus Police check-points and the National Guard from their positions along Artemis Avenue. As soon as this withdrawal had been achieved, UNFICYP would establish United Nations observation posts on Artemis Avenue and arrange the withdrawal of all Turkish Cypriot fighters from the positions and houses overlooking

the road from its eastern side. Thereupon, UNFICYP would seek to establish a demilitarized zone around Larnaca/Scala, from which all armed and uniformed National Guard and fighters would be excluded. Such a zone would include the controversial National Guard coastal defences such as Patsalo Hill and the National Guard positions around the Tekke Mosque, all of which would remain unmanned. The Turkish Cypriots, for their part, would be required to withdraw from all positions within the demilitarized zone, particularly those on McKenzie Hill, which have been a source of irritation to the National Guard for some time. In this way, UNFICYP feels, the all too frequently repeated confrontations at Larnaca could be brought to an end.

74. It must be remembered, as stated in my previous reports (S/7611, para. 74), that the tension at Larnaca is partly due to:

- (a) the denial to Turkish Cypriots of access to the Hala Sultan Tekke Mosque;
- (b) the construction of the Patsalo Hill position, with loopholes facing directly towards Scala; and
- (c) the continued presence of Turkish Cypriot fighters in the dominating position on McKenzie Hill.

UNFICYP believes that if all such positions, as well as some to the north of Larnaca, were kept unmanned, a state of calm could return to Larnaca/Scala.

75. On 29 May, UNFICYP was given to understand that the National Guard still insisted that the Turkish Cypriot's positions on Artemis Avenue represented a threat to freedom of movement on that road and that National Guard counter-measures were thus called for. At the same time, however, there were indications that both the Government and the National Guard felt that the check-points set up in the night of 12/13 May could be removed. This was in fact done at about midnight 30/31 May, and complete freedom of movement was re-established.

(v) Observance of the cease-fire

76. Shooting incidents during the reporting period are summarized below. The figures for previous reporting periods are also shown, for purposes of comparison.

Zone or District	6 Dec. 1966 to 6 June 1967	7 June 1966 to 5 Dec. 1966	8 Mar. 1966 to 7 June 1966	2 Dec. 1965 to 7 Mar. 1966	11 June 1965 to 1 Dec. 1965	8 Mar. 1965 to 10 June 1965	9 Dec. 1964 to 7 Mar. 1965
Nicosia Zone	Not operative during this period				17	89	97
Nicosia West District	39	8	2	0	3	Not operative during this period	
Nicosia East District	11	11	3	1	3	Not operative during this period	
Famagusta Zone	3	22	2	0	14	10	44
Limassol Zone	8	8	1	4	9	5	7
Paphos District	Not operative during this period				6	2	7
Morphou District	Not operative during this period				4	153	67
Lefka District	88	76	7	1	3	Not operative during this period	
Kyrenia District	169	164	19	11	10	Not operative during this period	
TOTAL	346	289	34	17	69	259	222

77. While the number of shooting incidents recorded during this period is substantially higher than that for the previous six months, the number of proven or suspected deliberate breaches of the cease-fire is lower. UNFICYP is of the opinion that 23 shooting incidents out of the total of 344 were deliberate breaches of the cease-fire. One occurred in Nicosia West District, 3 in Nicosia East District, 6 in Famagusta Zone, 10 in Lefka District and 3 in Kyrenia District. Fourteen were attributed to Turkish Cypriot fighters and 8 to the National Guard. In the case of the Mari incident of 8 April, which involved both sides, responsibility for firing the first shot cannot be determined.

78. A study of the above table will show that the number of shooting incidents in Lefka and Kyrenia Districts is comparable to that in the previous reporting period, whereas there was an appreciable increase in Nicosia West District, which largely accounted for the over-all increase. Although the number of shooting incidents in Famagusta Zone did not increase much, this does not actually represent the true state of affairs, for the two most serious of the shooting incidents - those at Mari and Arsos - took place in that zone.

Famagusta Zone

79. The first serious incident here took place on 27 March (para. 62), when a total of 35 to 45 rounds of small arms fire were exchanged between Turkish Cypriot fighters at Mari and a National Guard convoy on the Nicosia-Limassol main road. On 8 April, a more serious incident occurred when a National Guard convoy which included two armoured cars and a truckload of infantry opened fire on Turkish Cypriot fighter positions at Mari and on the village itself, allegedly in reply to shots fired at the convoy by the fighters (para. 63).

80. The third incident in this Zone took place in Arsos on 9 April, when an estimated 1,500 rounds were fired by both sides. UNFICYP's investigations revealed that the first shots were fired into the air by an over-excited Turkish Cypriot and quickly sparked off general firing by both sides. There were no casualties.

Kyrenia District

81. The firing in this district has been evenly spread over the full period of six months. Rarely were more than one or two shots fired at any one time, and the one or two instances where there was a fair volume of fire did not escalate into anything really serious.

Lefka District

82. Shooting took place mainly in the areas of Peristeronari, Ambelikou and Limnitis. The most serious incident was on 16 April, when the National Guard fired approximately 150 rounds at an UNFICYP helicopter which was carrying out aero-medical evacuation.

83. There were a total of six incidents involving booby traps in the Lefka District. Four of the incidents occurred during the month of April in the area of Ambelikou. In one of them a Turkish Cypriot was killed, in another a Turkish Cypriot was injured, and in a third two British tourists received minor injuries. Four of the booby traps employed a locally manufactured fragmentation grenade similar to the British No. 36 grenade.

C. Developments relating to the maintenance of law and order

(i) The work of the UNFICYP Civilian Police

84. The work of the UNFICYP Civilian Police has continued in the period under review to follow the broad pattern described in the last report to the Security Council (S/7611, para. 84). UNCIVPOL's relations and liaison with the Cyprus Police and Turkish Cypriot police elements have continued to be close, particularly at the vital local level, and this fact, allied with the confidence enjoyed by UNCIVPOL among both Greek and Turkish Cypriots, has frequently proved of great value in the early settlement, with a minimum of publicity, of potentially serious problems. UNCIVPOL's strength and composition during the present reporting period have remained the same as in recent previous periods, except that the Austrian element has been increased by one man and the Australian element decreased by one man. At the end of the present mandate the New Zealand UNCIVPOL element is to be withdrawn and its twenty members will be replaced by ten more Australian and ten more Austrian policemen.

(ii) Investigation of crime and inter-communal strife

85. The investigation of matters of a criminal nature having aspects of inter-communal strife continues to be one of the main fields of activity of UNCIVPOL. In all, about three hundred crimes suspected of having inter-communal aspects were investigated in the period under review, among them a number of cases of murder or wounding, shooting at villagers, assault, larceny, damage to property and explosions of bombs and booby traps. Observations were also made to the appropriate authorities in connexion with the arrest or temporary detention of many Turkish Cypriots by the Cyprus Police and confiscations of goods by the Cyprus Police at check-points.

86. A very disturbing aspect of the crime situation in Cyprus during the past six months, especially in April, has been the relatively large number of booby trap explosions in Lefka District which have caused death or bodily injury, to say nothing of a number of booby traps which failed to explode because of defects. In the present reporting period one Turkish Cypriot was killed and two tourists and one Turkish Cypriot fighter were injured by booby traps within a month in places close to Turkish Cypriot areas and not usually frequented by Greek Cypriots. In addition, two unexploded booby traps were found in the same general area.

87. UNCIVPOL was unable to establish who had been responsible for setting any of these booby traps, but the Turkish Cypriots had no hesitation in attributing them to Greek Cypriots, who, they pointed out, had access to all the places where they had been set. The local Greek Cypriots stoutly denied these allegations, however, and suggested that the booby traps had been set by Turkish Cypriots for reasons of their own.

88. In addition to the booby trap explosions referred to above, UNCIVPOL has investigated a number of bomb explosions in Government-controlled areas of the island in order to determine whether they had any inter-communal aspects. In all cases it was concluded that the bombings had a political or personal, but not an inter-communal motive. Michel Weiss, the French national who was sentenced last year to twelve years' imprisonment on charges of sabotage (S/7350, para. 83) was released by the Cypriot authorities on 8 May 1967 after having served only one year of his sentence. Three bomb explosions which occurred in the small hours of the morning of 19 May in the Turkish quarter of Nicosia are referred to elsewhere in this report (para. 103).

89. There have been a number of serious thefts of livestock from Greek Cypriots in recent months which have been alleged, and in two cases confirmed, to have been committed by Turkish Cypriots. One such theft during November last involved 128 sheep and one goat, which have not been recovered. Several others have occurred as well and UNCIVPOL is co-operating with the Cyprus Police in an endeavour to obtain the return of at least some of the stolen animals. It is certain that if this wage of thefts continues, serious tension could develop. UNFICYP understands that the Turkish Cypriot leadership is considerably disturbed by these thefts and the possibility of retaliatory action, and has used its best endeavours to put a

stop to such activities. That the Government's and the Turkish Cypriot leadership's fears of retaliation are not groundless is borne out by the fact that on 21 May, when five Turkish Cypriot shepherds were grazing their flocks totalling 229 sheep east of Malounda, six Greek Cypriots, one of whom later proved to be the owner of 177 sheep stolen in March, forced the Turkish Cypriot shepherds at gun-point to leave their flocks. The Greek Cypriots then began to drive the flocks away, but about one hour later they were arrested by the Cyprus Police. The flocks were handed back to their Turkish Cypriot owners, and the shepherds concerned, after making statements to the Cyprus Police at Lefkoniko, were taken back to their village by UNCIVPOL. In this instance, as there no longer seems to be any hope of the Greek Cypriots' stolen sheep being recovered, UNFICYP gave the Turkish Cypriot leadership to understand that the payment of a certain amount of compensation or some other gesture of goodwill to the Greek Cypriot owners of the stolen sheep would do much to dispel the atmosphere of bad feeling which has sprung up over such thefts, but so far the Turkish Cypriot leadership has not reacted to this suggestion.

90. Among the homicide cases investigated or followed with special attention by UNCIVPOL during the reporting period, several are of special interest. It will be recalled that last September (S/7611, para. 96) three Greek Cypriots were arrested by the Cyprus Police in connexion with the murder of two Turkish Cypriots in the commission of robbery. These three accused were brought to trial in the spring of 1967, but on 1 March the Nicosia Assize Court discharged all of them without calling upon them to defend themselves, on the grounds that no prima facie case had been established against them by the prosecution. Although two of the accused had made confessions to the Cyprus Police, these confessions were ruled inadmissible by the Court because they had not been taken in accordance with the relevant regulations. The Court's decision to discharge the accused was received rather bitterly by Turkish Cypriots, who accused the Government of dispensing one kind of justice to Greek Cypriots and another to Turkish Cypriots.

91. On 15 January 1967, a Greek Cypriot hunter from Sysklipos was found shot dead between the National Guard forward defence lines near his village and those of the Turkish Cypriot fighters at Pileri. On-the-spot investigations were made by the Cyprus Police, under UNCIVPOL escort, but as far as UNFICYP knows no evidence as to the identity of the man's killer or killers has so far been obtained. In another homicide case, on 23 January, UNFICYP personnel near Scala, the Turkish

Cypriot quarter of Larnaca, heard shots and found a uniformed Turkish Cypriot lying riddled with bullets in a roadway. UNCIVPOL was not allowed by the local Turkish Cypriots to investigate the killing, but there can be little doubt that this was not an inter-communal murder.

92. During the period under review, UNCIVPOL investigated two cases where persons were wounded by gunfire after approaching military positions. In the first case, on 18 March, a Turkish Cypriot from Mandres Hamid was wounded in the thigh by a bullet when he approached the National Guard forward defence line. In the second case, on the evening of 26 March, two United States Embassy personnel out for a drive with two ladies were fired on and wounded by a young Turkish Cypriot fighter while turning their car round near Kourou Monastir, a Turkish Cypriot village a short distance off the main Nicosia-Famagusta highway. When UNCIVPOL investigated the incident on the spot, a Turkish Cypriot fighter who appeared to be about 18 years old admitted firing on the car. The Turkish Cypriots issued conflicting reports after the shooting, alleging, inter alia, that two cars, one without lights, had approached Turkish Cypriot fighter positions at the village in a suspicious manner.

93. Several of the cases followed with particular attention by UNCIVPOL involved Turkish Cypriots charged with offences alleged to have been committed several years ago. In a number of criminal cases involving Turkish Cypriots, the court authorities of the Republic have on several occasions informed UNFICYP in advance when Turkish Cypriots are due to appear in court and have invited the Senior Legal Adviser of the Force or a representative of his to watch the proceedings.

94. Sometimes false allegations of inter-communal violence or crime are made by individuals in order to get themselves out of embarrassing situations. On 11 January a 19 year old Turkish Cypriot fighter of Nicosia was wounded in the neck by a bullet on the Green Line. He said that he had been shot by a Greek Cypriot who had approached his position and fired at him from a distance of some yards. UNCIVPOL came to the conclusion, however, that the young fighter had accidentally shot himself when he dropped his weapon, and was trying to place the blame elsewhere in order to escape punishment for his carelessness. In another case of the same kind, an 85 year old Turkish Cypriot of Pano Arodhes complained to UNCIVPOL that on 13 February his house was burned down by Greek Cypriots. UNCIVPOL's opinion, however, is that the unfortunate old man left his cooking fire unattended and that the fault was his own.

95. Two cases of assault by members of the Cyprus Police on Turkish Cypriots at the Famagusta Gate check-point were witnessed by UNCIVPOL in March 1967 (see para. 115). They were reported to the Government, and the Commander, Nicosia Police District, appointed an investigator to enquire into them. There have been many Turkish Cypriot complaints of assault by the Cyprus Police in various Government-controlled areas, but these reports were denied by the police and could not usually be proved.

96. The investigation of the whereabouts of missing persons continues to be an important part of UNCIVPOL's work, and enquiries regarding missing persons come not only from the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership but also from individual citizens. The list of Turkish Cypriot missing persons referred to in my last report (S/7611, para. 88) was reduced to 198 persons when an 11 year old boy listed as missing since December 1963 was found by UNCIVPOL on 30 May 1967 to be safe and well in the Turkish quarter of Nicosia. Many new cases of missing Turkish Cypriots have been investigated by UNCIVPOL and the persons traced in every instance. Four Greek Cypriot males have been added to the list of missing Greek Cypriots, bringing the total to forty-five. Two of them, a 16 year old carpenter and a 21 year old National Guardsman, are alleged to be prisoners in a Turkish Cypriot-controlled area, but this is denied by the Turkish Cypriot leadership. Eight Turkish Cypriots are alleged to have "defected" to Government-controlled areas, one of them for the fourth time, and four of them subsequently returned to Turkish Cypriot areas. Several Greek Cypriots who strayed into the Turkish Cypriot sector of Nicosia were returned.

97. Although UNCIVPOL's work is primarily the investigation of crime and the carrying out of other tasks usually associated with the police, sometimes UNCIVPOL finds itself directly involved in preventing a resumption of fighting, and its local knowledge and the confidence UNCIVPOL members enjoy among Greek and Turkish Cypriots can in certain circumstances enable it to play a valuable role in this connexion. Thus, UNCIVPOL was instrumental in April in preventing a dangerous situation from developing in the troubled mixed village of Arsos. On 9 April 1967 wild shooting broke out in Arsos after a Turkish Cypriot, whose brother was shot dead there on 9 September 1966 (S/7611, para. 97) saw his uncle fraternizing with a Greek Cypriot in a Turkish Cypriot tavern. UNCIVPOL arranged a cease-fire and ensured that tension was not allowed to build up by persuading the Inspector-in-

charge of the Cyprus Police detachment stationed in Arsos since 9 September 1966 not to increase the strength of the Cyprus Police in the village, which remains at one sergeant and four constables.

III. ACTIVITIES TOWARDS A RETURN TO NORMAL CONDITIONS

A. General assessment

98. Over the period covered by this report, the climate for a return to normality in Cyprus has differed little, if at all, from that of previous reporting periods. The Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership are as reluctant as ever to take any effective steps towards a full return to normal conditions until the political future of the Island has been settled, and their attitude towards normalization remains, as I stated in my last report (S/7611, para. 188), one of pervasive caution and of apprehension lest even small concessions might, in their view, erode their political position and disadvantageously affect the terms of the ultimate settlement. Despite the obvious advantages to both sides of a return to normality, the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership stick to their entrenched positions and continue to attach great importance to the preservation of their monolithic fronts and set attitudes on all important matters. The Government maintains that it is the only legal authority in the Island, that its sovereignty extends in law if not in fact over every aspect of life in every part of Cyprus, and that the Turkish Cypriots have forfeited the right to exercise the degree of authority in certain spheres originally granted to them under the 1960 Constitution because of their "rebellion" against the established order. The Turkish Cypriots, for their part, insist that far from being rebels they were the victims, in December 1963, of premeditated armed aggression and that the "Greek Cypriot administration" - as they call the Government - has forfeited its authority and no longer has any legal standing because of its violations of the 1960 Constitution.

99. UNFICYP's task of promoting a return to normal conditions in Cyprus is greatly complicated by the fact that there is no common denominator between the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership as to what "normal conditions" are. In essence, the Government understands "normal conditions" to mean a state of affairs in which its authority is recognized by all Cypriots, it has access to all areas of the country, and it has the ability in fact as well as in law to exercise its sovereign authority throughout the land. The Turkish Cypriot

community of Cyprus, on the other hand, takes the position that a return to normal conditions means the restoration of the situation in Cyprus as it was before the disturbances of December 1963, including the restoration of the constitutional situation.

100. In the face of such seemingly uncompromising attitudes, little progress can be made towards the achievement of the main ingredients of a return to normality: the restoration of freedom of movement, the resettlement of refugees, the abolition of economic restrictions and the resumption of common public services. Nevertheless, UNFICYP has persevered with its efforts to achieve some progress - no matter how slight - towards normality, and my Special Representative approached both the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership in April 1967 with a number of suggestions for greater freedom of movement, the relaxation of economic restrictions, and the reactivation of closed factories and channels of commerce. These suggestions covered, on the Government side, the abolition of the ban on access to or exit from Kokkina, the reduction or complete abolition of Government checkpoints throughout the Island, and the removal from the restricted list of such items as building materials. On the Turkish Cypriot side, they called for authorization of Greek Cypriot transit traffic through Kokkina and along the Kythrea-Lefkoniko road, the facilitation of transit traffic along the Kyrenia Road, and the conclusion of arrangements for the reopening of Greek Cypriot-owned factories in Turkish Cypriot areas. There had been some indications that the Government had in mind an over-all plan covering all the main factors concerning the restoration of normal conditions, and that UNFICYP would be asked to help in the implementation of such a plan. For example, in the event of the Government's removal of all remaining checkpoints, roadblocks and fortifications, UNFICYP would have undertaken to see that the Turkish Cypriots did not build new positions or advance to more forward ones. If the Government lifted its ban on certain strategic materials being allowed into Turkish Cypriot areas, UNFICYP would have arranged to verify that such materials were used in the general effort to return to normality, and not to strengthen the Turkish Cypriots' fortifications or to further their plans for living physically apart.

101. On 10 and 19 April, my Special Representative and the UNFICYP Force Commander had meetings on the general question of normalization measures, first with the

President of the Republic and then with the Turkish Cypriot leadership. At a meeting on 11 May, the Turkish Cypriot leadership presented my Special Representative with a memorandum dated 9 May on practical measures for easing the conditions of life of the Turkish Cypriot community, in which, after stressing the hardships and privations caused to that community by the abnormal relations prevailing in the Island, as a result of which Turkish Cypriots were deprived of essential goods, subjected to arbitrary arrest and indignities and prevented from going back to their homes in certain areas, the Turkish Cypriot leadership listed the liberalization measures which it felt that the Government should take and enumerated certain comparable measures which it would be willing to take itself, while stressing that the number of concessions it could make was of necessity very limited and that the Turkish Cypriot community could not be expected to give up its security and inherent rights in return for a mere easing of restrictions by the Government. When the Special Representative and the Force Commander again met the President of the Republic on 16 May, the President expressed disappointment at the fact that the Turkish Cypriot leadership had deemed it appropriate to give its confidential memorandum of 9 May to the Special Representative such wide publication (it is understood that a number of diplomatic missions in Cyprus had received a copy of it) as to make it an open statement of the Turkish Cypriot stand on normalization. Such publication, he said, could only hinder the Government's exploration, with UNFICYP, of the complex question of a return to normality in Cyprus. My Special Representative urged the President to give continued consideration to the question of normalization, but it is UNFICYP's view that the Special Representative's and the Force Commander's task of seeking a gradual relaxation of restrictions in an atmosphere of trust and confidence would have been facilitated if the views of the Turkish Cypriots had been kept wholly confidential.

102. It can be said that the period under review has been one of consolidation of existing positions and lines of approach. Thus, the Turkish Cypriots have pursued their policy of non-recognition of and non-cooperation with the Government, particularly in Larnaca District, where the deliberate segregation of all-Turkish Cypriot villages like Kophinou and Mari has been intensified and determined attempts have been made in mixed villages such as Tokhni to bring about the

division along communal lines of public services such as the distribution of mail and the reading of electricity metres. In addition, there have been a number of incidents in the same district which point to a desire on the part of the local Turkish Cypriot leaders to discourage fraternization and friendship between members of their community and Greek Cypriots. In the face of the Turkish Cypriot policies described above, the Government has persisted with the measures already initiated by it to deal with what it considers as a Turkish Cypriot insurrection. UNFICYP, for its part, has continued to participate in and develop the implementation of the widely-appreciated land records arrangement (S/7611, paras. 149-155), to keep a watchful eye on the working of the postal arrangement (S/7611, paras. 145-148), and to play an active part in efforts to reach agreement on the resumption of Turkish Cypriot participation in the national social insurance scheme (para. 156) and on arrangements for the payment in 1967, as in the past, of the Government-subsidized price for grain produced by Turkish Cypriot farmers (para. 131). In addition, UNFICYP has proceeded with what has become its routine work of smoothing out the day to day problems which arise, usually between Turkish Cypriots and the Government, but sometimes simply owing to the forces of nature, in such matters as the movement of goods and individuals, the welfare of refugees and persons rendered homeless by bad weather, and the many aspects of agriculture.

103. During the period under review, the Ministers and leading personalities of the Government remained unchanged, as on the whole did the main figures in the Turkish Cypriot leadership. The Government Public Information Office and the Greek Cypriot Press published frequent reports of dissension among the leaders of the Turkish Cypriots, however, particularly at the end of 1966, and these reports appeared to be borne out to some extent when, on 29 December 1966, Dr. Kuchuk printed in the Turkish Cypriot newspaper "Halkin Sesi" an open letter from himself to the Turkish Cypriot fighters in which he pointed with pride to his past record as a champion of his community and vigorously attacked those among the Turkish Cypriot ranks who were, he said, trying to dishonour him so that he would withdraw from his position as leader and leave them a free hand to do whatever they liked to promote their own selfish interests. Moreover, when the Cyprus Government granted in February 1967, after several weeks' delay, the

Turkish Government's request for permission for the departure from the Island of Mr. Kemal Coşkun, the Turkish diplomat declared persona non grata by the Cyprus Government almost a year before (S/7350, paras. 86-87), some Turkish Cypriot newspapers expressed disappointment at Mr. Coşkun's departure, praising him as a popular leader who deserved much of the credit for building up the Turkish Cypriot fighter organization. On 19 May 1967, three explosive charges which went off within minutes of each other damaged the house and car of a close associate of Dr. Kuchuk, a house occupied by another adviser of Dr. Kuchuk, and a house only recently vacated by another prominent member of the Turkish Cypriot leadership.

B. Freedom of movement of the population

104. As stated in all my reports on the United Nations operation in Cyprus since 1964, freedom of movement of the civilian population is one of the main prerequisites for a return to normality in Cyprus. The extent to which it is restricted has always been a reliable indication of the degree of tension reigning at any given time or in any given area in the Island, and the intensification of checks and controls on freedom of movement has become the almost automatic reaction to any disturbing incident. This was the case, for example, in the Scala area of Larnaca, where four roadblocks were set up in the night of 12/13 May 1967 by the Cyprus Police and the National Guard following the latter's discovery of what they believed to be new Turkish Cypriot positions there.

105. Even in the periods of greatest calm, however, freedom of movement is far from complete for both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriot leadership denies Greek Cypriots access to the Turkish Cypriot enclaves and to most Turkish Cypriot villages at all times, even if accompanied by UNFICYP personnel, while it keeps to a minimum the number of Turkish Cypriots allowed to leave those enclaves to visit Government-controlled areas. Its asserted purpose in so doing is to protect unsuspecting Turkish Cypriots from indignities, insults, ill-treatment and even possible arbitrary arrest at the hands of the Cyprus Police manning the Government checkpoints. The Government, for its part, maintains that there is complete freedom of movement for all in the areas under its control, but it has been unable so far to agree to do away with the identity checks and searches which the Cyprus Police apply systematically at points of entry into or

exit from Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas and which it claims to be essential security measures. The Turkish Cypriot leadership rejects the Government's claim that there is full freedom of movement, and it points to a long list of alleged abusive searches, unjustified seizures of goods, arbitrary arrests and unprovoked assaults of which it claims Turkish Cypriots have been the victims at Cyprus Police checkpoints. These allegations are frequently incapable of being substantiated when investigated by the UNFICYP Civilian Police.

106. Despite the leadership's complaints, however, substantial numbers of Turkish Cypriots do pass through the various Cyprus Police checkpoints every day. Thus, hundreds of Turkish Cypriots (most of them visitors from other parts of the Island) enter and leave the Turkish quarter of Nicosia on an average day through the Famagusta Gate checkpoint, while a number of Turkish Cypriots who live in the Turkish quarter and the main enclave enter and leave the Government-controlled area every day to work at British military bases, foreign embassies and so forth. Since 1964, a number of Turkish Cypriots, such as doctors, advocates, and administrators, have been allowed to use the Ledra Palace checkpoint in Nicosia, where no goods traffic is allowed and delays are usually minimal. In April 1967, however, the number of Turkish Cypriots permitted to use that checkpoint was reduced, and a number of Turkish Cypriots who had been using it were told that they must pass through the Famagusta Gate in future. The Government claimed that the restriction on use of the Ledra Palace checkpoint was necessary because the police there could only cope with a limited number of persons, and it stated that Turkish Cypriots with a valid reason for needing to pass through checkpoints with a minimum of delay could be given priority over their fellows at the Famagusta Gate, but the Turkish Cypriots maintained that the granting of such priority was not an adequate substitute for the possibility of using the Ledra Palace checkpoint. Freedom of movement for Turkish Cypriots is not the same problem in the other main towns of Cyprus, such as Famagusta and Limassol, as there are no checkpoints comparable to the Famagusta Gate, and Turkish Cypriots are not usually searched when entering or leaving their areas, although the Cyprus Police keep a close watch on their points of entry and exit and carry out frequent identity checks.

107. Greek Cypriots generally avoid entering Turkish Cypriot areas, but there is substantial Greek Cypriot transit traffic through the main enclave and the Limnitis enclave under UNFICYP escort and UNFICYP supervision, respectively. It

has not proved possible, however, to arrange for transit traffic through the Kokkina enclave, and many persons in the western part of the Island are obliged to make very long detours because of this.

108. No obstacles are placed by the Government in the way of Turkish Cypriots wishing to leave the Island, but there is a standing ban on the return of Turkish Cypriot students from Turkey because the Government is convinced, despite repeated denials by the Turkish Cypriot leadership and Turkish authorities, that such students receive special military training in Turkey. Any young Turkish Cypriots who go to Turkey must therefore resign themselves to an indefinite period of separation from their homeland.

109. The ban on the return from Turkey of Turkish Cypriot students may also be applied to other persons. Thus, on 13 January 1967 Mr. Nedjat Konuk, Director-General of the Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber in Nicosia, who had been born in Cyprus but later became a Turkish national (without, the Turkish Cypriot leadership claims, relinquishing his Cypriot nationality), was refused re-entry to Cyprus at Nicosia Airport after a three-week visit to Turkey although he had obtained a Cyprus re-entry visa valid for three months when he left the Island just before Christmas, 1966. The Turkish Cypriots claimed that the Government had only granted Mr. Konuk a re-entry visa in order to induce him to leave Cyprus, so that he could be kept out of the country when he tried to return. The Government, for its part, stated that Mr. Konuk was an alien and could therefore legally be refused entry to Cyprus even if in possession of a visa, and it maintained that the reason for this refusal was that it had been discovered after Mr. Konuk's departure that he had been engaging in unspecified subversive activities.

110. In January 1967, the Turkish Cypriot leadership complained that Government officials at the airport and elsewhere were trying to dissuade foreign tourists from entering or staying in the Turkish quarter of Nicosia. In particular, they alleged that foreign tourists booked in at a luxury hotel in the Turkish quarter had been warned at the airport not to go there and had therefore cancelled their reservations and stayed at hotels in the Government-controlled sector of Nicosia. The Government denied that it was its policy or practice to try to influence the lawful activities or movements of tourists and pointed out that the 1967 edition

of the Government-sponsored "Cyprus Hotel Guide" contained advertisements not only for the luxury hotel in respect of which the Turkish Cypriot complaint had been made, but also several other Turkish Cypriot hotels. UNFICYP investigations revealed that at least some of the tourists who had cancelled their reservations at the hotel in question had done so because they had not previously appreciated the nature of the Nicosia "Green Line" and had been reluctant, on seeing the fortifications along it, even to try to cross it. There have, however, been a number of cases in the period under review, as in other periods, where foreign tourists wishing to cross into the Turkish quarter of Nicosia have been prevented from doing so by the Cyprus Police, especially when the tourists were trying to cross the Green Line at places other than the main checkpoints.

111. During the period under review, there have been relatively few substantiated complaints by the Turkish Cypriots about their treatment at police checkpoints such as the Famagusta Gate in Nicosia. Except on a few days, delays to vehicles and passengers passing through the Famagusta Gate checkpoint have not been excessive, although the checks now made of the amount of fuel in Turkish Cypriot vehicles' tanks have caused some additional delay. The Famagusta Gate checkpoint remains closed to all vehicles carrying goods on Saturday afternoons and Sundays, however, despite UNFICYP's suggestions that the Government should tackle the by no means insuperable problem of arranging for its manning on those days, and it is also closed on Greek Cypriot public holidays.

112. In the autumn of 1966, the Turkish Cypriot leadership complained frequently of assaults on Turkish Cypriots by the Cyprus Police in a small hut at the Famagusta Gate checkpoint. These complaints almost entirely ceased after the UNCIVPOL observers at the checkpoint were ordered to pay special attention to whatever took place in the area of the hut. However, in March 1967 UNFICYP was once more obliged to draw the Government's attention to two cases in which Turkish Cypriots were manhandled by members of the Cyprus Police whilst being questioned in the hut.

113. While there were fewer substantiated complaints by Turkish Cypriots about conditions and practices at the Famagusta Gate checkpoint than for some time past, there were several complaints, particularly in the early part of 1967, that sick Turkish Cypriot women and children attempting to enter the Turkish quarter of

Nicosia for medical treatment had been told by the police at the Famagusta Gate that they must go to the Nicosia General Hospital in the Government-controlled sector of the city to have their condition verified before they could be allowed into the Turkish quarter. Some of the complaints were substantiated by UNCIVPOL's inquiries, but the Government denied that it was its policy or practice to insist that sick Turkish Cypriots be examined by official Greek Cypriot doctors before admission to the Turkish quarter, except in the case of males suffering from injuries reasonably suspected of having been sustained in the course of some illegal activity. At all events, since UNFICYP raised the matter with the Government, the Turkish Cypriot complaints in respect of women and children have eased, although Turkish Cypriot males are still sometimes sent for preliminary examination to the Nicosia General Hospital.

114. Because of the reluctance of some Turkish Cypriot doctors and patients to pass through police checkpoints, the inhabitants of some Turkish Cypriot villages had come to rely on UNFICYP medical personnel for emergency medical attention, particularly after dark. As the increasing popularity of this practice was seriously interfering with the efficiency and availability of UNFICYP's medical personnel, however, the Turkish Cypriots were warned in December 1966 that while UNFICYP would continue to do all it could to assist in genuine emergencies, it could not provide what was becoming in effect a routine health service for Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriots then attempted to arrange, through UNFICYP, for their doctors to be exempted from search or delay at checkpoints when answering emergency calls after dark if transported in UNFICYP vehicles, which UNFICYP was willing to make available, with drivers, for the purpose. The Government refused to agree to this procedure, pointing out that as there was full freedom of movement in Government-controlled areas there was no need for any such arrangements.

115. In February 1967, the Turkish Cypriot leadership agreed to allow a Government official to enter the main enclave. The official's visits, which were made by UNFICYP helicopter, were in connexion with the release by the Government of building materials for emergency repairs to the Kanli Keuy dam, some seven miles north-west of Nicosia (see paras. 134-137). Without wishing to overstress the significance of this development, it is UNFICYP's hope that it may mark the

beginning of a more flexible approach by both sides to the questions of freedom of movement and restrictions on the movement of goods. It is also worth noting that on several recent Turkish Cypriot festival days Greek Cypriot journalists have been allowed into the Turkish quarter of Nicosia to witness parades and displays.

116. Another welcome step forward was the resumption, at the beginning of May 1967, of air links between Turkey and Cyprus, which had been severed since 1965.

Agreement has been reached between the Cyprus and Turkish Governments and their national airlines for a thrice-weekly service between Turkey and Nicosia, two of the round-trip flights to be by Turkish Airlines and the other by Cyprus Airways. Among the first passengers on this service were 438 Turkish Cypriot high school graduates whose departure for Turkey to continue their education had been organized through the good offices of UNFICYP.

117. UNFICYP has continued to devote great efforts, unfortunately without much result, to trying to induce both sides to do away with roadblocks and checkpoints throughout the Island. Success seemed near in one case, when the Government concurred with an UNFICYP suggestion that an UNFICYP sandbag wall in the immediate vicinity of one of Nicosia's main hotels should be removed as it served no strategic purpose and was a traffic hazard, as well as being an eyesore and a cause of concern to tourists. The Government invited UNFICYP to remove the wall, but apparently did not contact the National Guard about the matter, as when the UNFICYP troops began to demolish the already crumbling structure the local National Guard ordered them to stop and threatened to open fire if they did not do so, making it clear that this was no idle threat. A tense situation ensued, and it was decided, at the Government's request, not to proceed with the dismantling of the wall, but to leave it, pending further discussions, in a half-demolished state. Shortly afterwards the sandbag wall was knocked down in a traffic accident. The National Guard insisted on its re-erection, and the Government finally asked UNFICYP to rebuild it. Despite UNFICYP's representations that in its view the wall had no real military significance and that only good could come of its removal, the Government maintained its stand, and the wall was eventually re-erected on 24 May 1967 by local civilian labour under UNFICYP supervision. UNFICYP's task in arguing against the re-erection of the wall had

unfortunately been rendered more difficult by the Turkish Cypriots' unwillingness to remove a nearby sandbagged position of their own manned by uniformed Turkish Cypriot fighters.

118. In concluding this section on freedom of movement, I can but stress once again, as I have done in my previous reports, my undiminished conviction that the significant liberalization of freedom of personal movement in Cyprus could have only the most beneficial effects, and my regret that the contending sides have not yet found it possible to agree to such a course, in the pursuit of which they can count on the full assistance and co-operation of UNFICYP.

C. Efforts to restore normal economic activities

Introduction

119. Over the period covered by this report, the contrast between the economic stagnation of the Turkish Cypriot community and the continuing prosperity of the residents of Government-controlled areas grew more striking than ever. The restrictions on the movement of persons and goods make it practically impossible for the Turkish Cypriots to emerge from their economic isolation and to share in the general prosperity prevailing outside their areas. A high proportion of the 20,000 or more Turkish Cypriot refugees and displaced persons are unemployed and depend on Turkish Government aid for their livelihood, as do the Turkish Cypriot civil servants and public employees.

120. The Greek Cypriots and other residents of Government-controlled areas, in contrast, continue to enjoy considerable prosperity which promises to increase still further as a result of the very good harvests which should ensue from the exceptionally wet winter, the growing number of new industrial enterprises, and the ever-increasing numbers of tourists flocking to the Island.

Economic restrictions and movement of goods

121. The restrictions imposed by the Government on the movement into Turkish Cypriot areas of a wide range of items considered to be of actual or potential strategic value remain one of the major grievances of the Turkish Cypriots. A revised list of restricted materials and materials which may, subject to certain

conditions, be obtained under permit from the District Officer was made public by the Government in December 1966, but it differed very little in substance from the previous list (S/7001, paras. 123-125) which had been in effect since October 1965. The main reason for its publication was simply to remove certain misunderstandings to which the Turkish Cypriots had complained that the 1965 list gave rise. As the aim of the restrictions is not only to keep the military capability of the Turkish Cypriot fighters to a minimum but also to discourage the permanent settlement of refugees in Turkish Cypriot enclaves, the prohibited goods include not only military equipment but also all types of building materials and many items of primarily civilian application, such as plastic piping, black tar, all kinds of electric cable and wire, tape recorders and external television aerials. In addition, many items such as firewood, all types of wet and dry batteries, water pipes and their accessories and automobile spare parts and tyres can only be obtained by permission of the local District Officer, and such permission is difficult to obtain. There have therefore been unceasing Turkish Cypriot complaints throughout the period under review, as in the past, that the economic restrictions imposed by the Government cause them serious loss and hardship and cannot be justified on moral or constitutional grounds.

122. Although there have been relatively few substantiated complaints by Turkish Cypriots during the period under review of seizures at checkpoints of goods not on the restricted list, Government policy on the movement of restricted items has not been relaxed, and two items not on the list - petrol in excess of two gallons per vehicle and all types of electrical fittings, such as plugs, sockets, etc., are now consistently denied entry to the Turkish quarter of Nicosia. The Government has stated that the restrictions on the amount of petrol each vehicle is allowed to take into the Turkish quarter of Nicosia were made necessary by the discovery that Turkish Cypriots in the main enclave north of Nicosia were stockpiling petrol for military purposes, while the restrictions on the importation of electrical fittings were necessary because the Government had reason to believe that the fittings were to be used for new installations which it could not condone in view of the Turkish Cypriots' refusal to comply with the established regulations requiring that all new electrical installations be inspected by an authorized official of the Electricity Authority of Cyprus. The

Government's refusal to allow the fittings into the Turkish quarter also appears to represent an attempt to reduce, or at any rate prevent any increase in, the consumption of electricity in the Turkish quarter of Nicosia and the main enclave, where the Turkish Cypriots have not paid their electricity bills since the outbreak of the disturbances in 1963. When the matter of the restrictions on the movement of electrical fittings was raised in the Political Liaison Committee on 20 January 1967, the Government representative stated that as at 31 December 1966 Turkish Cypriots owed the Electricity Authority of Cyprus a total of £275,882 (£225,683 of that figure being for the Nicosia area alone) and that that amount was certainly far below the real total of Turkish Cypriot arrears, since it was based on bills issued in 1963 and took no account of illicit electrical connexions, of which, he said, there were known to be many. The Turkish Cypriots justify their refusal to pay electricity bills for the Turkish quarter of Nicosia and the main enclave by pointing to the vast sums which they claim the Government owes them (para. 155). Despite the introduction of the ban on the movement of electrical fittings into the Turkish quarter, high-consumption electrical appliances such as electric fires, electric cookers, water heaters, and so forth are still allowed in in substantial numbers.

123. The Government's ban on the movement of all types of building materials into Turkish Cypriot areas has continued to be applied with undiminished strictness in the period under review. As stated above, the object of this ban is said to be twofold: to prevent the Turkish Cypriot fighters from constructing strong fortifications incorporating timber and cement, and to prevent the construction of dwellings for Turkish Cypriot refugees, whom the Government wishes to return to their former villages, where in some cases houses built or repaired at government expense are available for them. The Turkish Cypriots have applied through UNFICYP on a number of occasions for the release of building materials for such purposes as mending streets and repairing schools and public buildings, but all their requests have been refused, except in the case of that regarding emergency repairs to the Kanli Keuy dam (para. 136), where building materials were made available subject to inspection of the dam and the repair work by a government official and supervision of the use of the materials by UNFICYP. The Government has occasionally stated that it is willing to make building materials

available for certain specific projects if the work is inspected and supervised by one or more of its officials, but except in a few rare cases, such as that of the Kanli Keuy dam above, this condition is rejected as unacceptable by the Turkish Cypriot leadership.

Industry

124. A number of industrial enterprises have been idle since the disturbances either because the restrictions on freedom of movement prevent their Greek Cypriot owners and staff from gaining access to them or because the restrictions on the movement of goods do not allow the entry into Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas of the raw materials needed for their operation. Three valuable Greek Cypriot-owned enterprises - a limekiln and quarry, a flour mill and a textile plant - are idle because they are in Turkish Cypriot areas, while, for example, two Turkish Cypriot-owned firms respectively producing steel wool and retreaded tyres cannot operate because the Government does not allow raw materials for them into the Turkish Cypriot enclave. A number of smaller firms belonging to Greek or Turkish Cypriots are also paralysed by the political situation.

125. It must obviously be a matter of the greatest regret that enterprises which could play such a useful part in the Cyprus economy and which represent so much invested capital are kept idle and are allowed to deteriorate because of the present political climate. In 1966 UNFICYP made a determined and lengthy attempt to secure the reactivation of idle factories on both sides (S/7350, paras. 115-117), but the initiative came to nothing. It is UNFICYP's view that there can be no real hope of success in the reactivation of idle factories until there have been significant changes in the policies of both sides regarding freedom of movement and the free flow of goods.

Agriculture

126. Despite the growing importance of industry and commerce in Cyprus, agriculture and ancillary occupations still provide the livelihood of the majority of Greek Cypriots and almost all Turkish Cypriots. Agriculture is therefore far too important a part of national life for it to be allowed to be seriously disturbed by the political conflict, and co-operation between Greek and Turkish

Cypriots on agricultural matters, although it has occasionally broken down over certain details, has been relatively good.

127. The main source of disputes and conflict in agriculture remains the fact that a large area of Greek Cypriot-owned agricultural land is in Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas, while an even larger portion of Turkish Cypriot-owned land is in Government-controlled areas. Generally speaking, no Greek Cypriot farmers venture, or would be allowed even if they tried, into Turkish Cypriot areas to cultivate their land. Although some Turkish Cypriots enter Government-controlled areas to tend their fields, much of their land is abandoned because it is considered to be dangerous to till on account of the proximity of National Guard units or because the owners have fled to some area too far away to permit them to continue working it. Where land is close to the border of a Turkish Cypriot- or Government-controlled area, UNFICYP often helps the owners to continue to cultivate their own fields by providing observers to watch over cultivation and harvesting operations if requested, while in cases where it is not practicable for the owner to continue to cultivate his own land UNFICYP makes every effort to ensure, by promoting the conclusion of leasing or share-cropping arrangements, that any use of the land by other persons is on a legal basis. Nevertheless, there is a good deal of friction between Greek and Turkish Cypriots over unauthorized cultivation of abandoned land, particularly in connexion with Greek Cypriot-owned land within the main Turkish Cypriot enclave, for which it has not yet been possible to negotiate leasing arrangements. UNFICYP has of course continued its efforts to solve the problem, but little progress has been made. There are, however, some indications that it may be possible to divorce the question of unauthorized cultivation from political considerations and thus secure a further reduction in the number of cases where land is used without paying compensation to the owner.

128. In 1966 the difficulties over the unauthorized cultivation of land in the main enclave were carried over into the matter of the disposal of the Turkish Cypriot cereal crop by the Government's attempts to impose an additional 30 per cent levy, as well as the regular 20 per cent loan repayment levy, on payments by the Cyprus Grain Commission to cereal producers in the enclave, in order to set up a compensation fund for Greek Cypriots prevented by the political

situation from cultivating or harvesting their land. The Turkish Cypriots opposed this levy on the grounds that it amounted to a form of collective punishment (S/7611, para. 134), and none of the Turkish Cypriot grain crop from the main enclave was sold to the Grain Commission in 1966. This year, however, after relatively brief and harmonious negotiations arranged through the good offices of UNFICYP between Turkish Cypriot representatives and the members of the Cyprus Grain Commission, it was announced by the latter at a meeting on 6 June 1967 that the Government had decided that all Turkish Cypriot grain, no matter where it had been grown, would be purchased by the Grain Commission at the Government-subsidized price, less a deduction of 20 per cent (as in the past) to cover outstanding government loans to Turkish Cypriot agricultural co-operatives, etc. Both the Grain Commission and the Turkish Cypriot representatives expressed satisfaction with these arrangements.

129. As far as the use of agricultural machinery by Turkish Cypriots is concerned, the position during the period under review has been little different from the past. Fuel is released by District Officers to Turkish Cypriot owners of licensed tractors, in some cases in adequate amounts and with a minimum of formalities. In other cases, the Turkish Cypriots complain that niggardly quantities are released and then only after time-wasting individual application by each owner to the local District Officer. Moreover, the Turkish Cypriots complain that supplies of tractor fuel are sometimes denied for political reasons, as for example in the Pergamos area, where tractor fuel supplies to Turkish Cypriot farmers were cut off for a time in April 1967 in retaliation for the Turkish Cypriots' action in erecting barricades to protest National Guard fortification work in the area. No new tractors are allowed into Turkish Cypriot areas, and spare parts, which can only be obtained with the local District Officer's permission, are released only for licensed tractors. As the Turkish Cypriots refuse to allow them to be inspected on the spot by a government official, most of the tractors used in the main enclave are not licensed and are granted neither allocations of fuel nor clearance for spare parts by the Government. Spare parts for combine harvesters in the same area are released by the Government on the recommendation of UNFICYP Economics Officers.

130. In the winter of 1966/1967 Turkish Cypriot livestock owners in the main enclave found themselves short of straw to feed their animals and wished to make

arrangements to bring in straw from other areas to make good the deficiency. Straw is not on the Government's list of restricted goods, but loads of it which Turkish Cypriots attempted to bring into the enclave were turned back at the Famagusta Gate checkpoint. When approached by UNFICYP on the matter, the Government stated that if the Turkish Cypriots in the enclave were short of straw it must be because they had used all their surplus straw to make mud bricks, as according to government figures they should have a large surplus of straw every year. The Government finally agreed to allow 150 tons of straw to be brought into the enclave, after a list of the persons requiring it and the numbers of livestock they owned had been submitted through UNFICYP.

131. UNFICYP has continued to provide valuable liaison between the Government and the Turkish Cypriot farmers in the period under review in such matters as the distribution of animal vaccines, provided in some cases free of charge by the Government, among Turkish Cypriot livestock owners.

Water supplies

132. In a country like Cyprus, where agriculture is the main source of livelihood and rainfall is usually low, water supplies are of vital importance, and the tackling of problems connected with them is one of UNFICYP's regular tasks throughout the year.

133. In the period under review, UNFICYP's main concern in the field of water supplies was with two dams: the Apliki dam, near Lefka, and the Kanli Keuy dam, near Nicosia. The Apliki dam, it will be recalled, was damaged by an explosion in September 1966 (S/7611, para. 115), and one of its sluice-gates was destroyed. In accordance with its promise, the Government repaired the dam without delay, but it was not possible to secure a replacement sluice-gate at short notice and Turkish Cypriot farmers in the area irrigated by the dam were worried that the sluice-gate, which had been ordered from England, might not be delivered until after the end of the rainy season, thus making it impossible to store water in the dam and depriving them of vital irrigation water in the summer of 1967. When it became clear that the replacement sluice-gate could not be delivered in time to ensure that the dam was filled by the rains, UNFICYP arranged for a temporary plug to be installed in place of the sluice-gate, thus solving the problem for the time being to the satisfaction of all concerned.

134. The case of the Kanli Keuy dam was interesting because it marked the first time since the outbreak of the disturbances that the Turkish Cypriots agreed to allow a government official into the main Turkish Cypriot enclave north of Nicosia to supervise work done with building materials specially released by the Government. When the disturbances began in December 1963, the Kanli Keuy dam - a 240 million gallon capacity earth dam - had been completed at a cost of some £23,000, with the participation of United Nations technical assistance experts, except for the spillway and associated works, which were left in a provisional state. The Turkish Cypriots asked for clearance for the building materials needed to complete the spillway as long ago as 27 July 1965, but allowed the matter to lapse when the Government made it clear that the materials could only be released subject to inspection and supervision of the work on the spillway by a government official.

135. The winter of 1966/1967 in Cyprus was marked by unprecedentedly heavy rainfall, especially in the area of the dam, which by early February 1967 was overflowing at such a rate as to give serious grounds for fearing that it would burst and flood a large area, including part of the Kyrenia Road, with possible danger to human life. In order to overcome the deadlock which had arisen over the question of the work needed to save the dam, UNFICYP invited the Resident Representative of the United Nations Development Programme in Cyprus and his technical advisers to inspect the dam and make recommendations regarding both the emergency measures needed to prevent it from bursting and the work needed to make it permanently safe.

136. The Resident Representative's recommendations, involving clearance for 3,000 sandbags and 200 bags of cement, were transmitted to the Government on 13 February. Clearance for the materials in question was given on condition that a government official was allowed to inspect the dam and supervise their use. The Turkish Cypriot leadership agreed to this stipulation, and on 16 February an official of the Government Water Department visited the dam by UNFICYP helicopter. Clearance for the cement and sandbags required was granted within forty-eight hours of the government official's visit to the dam, and by 20 February the emergency repair work had been completed by Turkish Cypriot workers and the dam was saved, at least for the time being.

137. The UNDP experts were of the opinion that these emergency repairs were only of a temporary nature, and that as long as the spillway remained uncompleted there would be a danger that prolonged heavy rain might once again lead to a critical situation. UNFICYP is therefore trying to negotiate the release of the building materials needed to complete the spillway, so as to remove all cause for future anxiety about the safety of the dam.

138. Another water supply problem dealt with by UNFICYP during the period under review concerned the Turkish Cypriot village of Epikho and the Greek Cypriot village of Exometokhi, north-east of Nicosia. Irrigation in Cyprus is handled at the local level by village area irrigation boards. In this case the Exometokhi irrigation board claimed a certain amount of money from the Epikho board, which, however, counter-claimed a considerably larger amount from Exometokhi. The situation became potentially dangerous in January 1967, after the Exometokhi board had padlocked sluices serving fields in its district tilled by inhabitants of Epikho who had not paid the irrigation dues claimed by it from them. The villagers of Epikho retaliated by cutting off the drinking water to Exometokhi, which was supplied by a pipe running through Epikho. The Government had to transport drinking water to Exometokhi in tankers for a short time, and tension rose quite seriously in the area. Fortunately, UNFICYP soon managed to secure promises from both the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots in the area that they would not interfere with drinking water supplies again on any pretext, whereupon tension over the water dispute fell and permitted a calm examination of the claims and counter-claims over irrigation dues which is still in progress.

139. Throughout the period under review the inhabitants of Scala, the Turkish Cypriot quarter of Larnaca, complained at intervals of interruptions in their domestic water supply. It will be recalled that the Turkish Cypriots in Scala refuse to pay any water or electricity bills because they claim that the Government owes them a large sum of money for the Bekir Pasha water system, which serves the Scala quarter and which, they assert, was unlawfully appropriated by the Larnaca municipal authorities (S/7350, paras. 147-148). The inhabitants of Scala have on occasions complained that their water supply has been deliberately cut off by the Larnaca municipal authorities as a form of harassment, but the municipal authorities deny this. UNFICYP has offered to make a full investigation

of the Scala water supply situation in order to prevent this possible source of tension from developing further, but the Larnaca municipal authorities stated that they saw no reason for such an investigation to include the central pumping and distribution installations in Larnaca proper, which serve the Scala quarter.

140. Early in December 1966, the inhabitants of the Greek Cypriot village of Palekythro, north-east of Nicosia, increased the height of a weir controlling the flow of the Pedieos River. In a year of normal rainfall this action would have reduced the amount of irrigation water available to several Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot villages downstream, and the inhabitants of those villages complained to the Nicosia District Water Board and UNFICYP, respectively. The Water Board seemed reluctant to order the removal of the unauthorized addition to the weir, but the problem was solved by the unprecedentedly heavy rainfall of the winter of 1966/1967, which kept the Pedieos River at such high level that ample water passed over the weir for the irrigation of the land downstream.

141. This unusually high rainfall also solved, at any rate for the period under review, the dispute over the Kyrenia Pass borehole (S/7611, paras. 163-164), since the Turkish Cypriots in the area had ample supplies of water from other sources and did not need to draw significant amounts of water from the borehole in question.

D. Measures to assist refugees and other distressed persons

142. The Turkish Cypriot refugees and displaced persons, who fled from their homes during the disturbances of 1963 and 1964, still number some 20,000, and there can be little hope of reducing their number as long as the political situation in the Island keeps them away from their homes and fields. Many of the areas of greatest concentration of refugees, such as Kokkina, Ktima and Polis, offer little scope for their resettlement because of the shortage of cultivable land, and the Government does everything it can to prevent the construction of permanent housing for refugees in the areas where they are at present sheltering. Despite the discomfort and disadvantages of their existence in refugee areas, however, they still seem to display little willingness to return to their old homes, and most of the abandoned Turkish Cypriot houses repaired and rebuilt at government expense in villages like Skylloura and Potamia with the aim of inducing Turkish Cypriot refugees to return to Government-controlled areas remain empty.

143. Although the living conditions of many refugees are still hard and uncomfortable, none are now living in conditions comparable to those which prevailed for some time after the initial influx of refugees into Kokkina in 1964, when a number of families were obliged to live in bare caves. Life in the tents which still house most of the 1,200 residents of that village has been made more comfortable by the installation of wooden floors, for which UNFICYP obtained clearance. The Government prohibits the entry of any form of building materials into Turkish Cypriot refugee areas, and it may take weeks to secure permission to take to Kokkina such items as wooden planks to repair a damaged bakery roof or a small quantity of building materials to construct new latrines, even though the work is to be carried out under UNFICYP supervision. In some Turkish Cypriot refugee areas a few dwellings can be built with mud bricks and branches of trees, but in Kokkina there are no suitable trees and little clay for making bricks. This is why so many families there are still living in tents several years after their arrival.

144. Despite housing difficulties, the most serious problem in refugee areas is probably that of employment. Even in a large and fertile area like the main Turkish Cypriot enclave north of Nicosia there are many unemployed or under-employed, and in really overcrowded areas like Kokkina there is almost nothing for the men to do. To a lesser extent this is also true of all the other Turkish Cypriot villages and areas that received substantial numbers of refugees. The explosive nature of the atmosphere thus created has been seen in the period under review at Kophinou and Mari, to give only two illustrations.

145. In addition to its aid to Turkish Cypriot refugees, UNFICYP has provided assistance on a number of occasions to Turkish Cypriots who have been victims of the forces of nature. Many houses in the Island, particularly in Turkish Cypriot areas, are not very solidly built of mud bricks, and the very heavy rainfall and widespread local flooding of the winter of 1966/1967 brought many appeals for UNFICYP help in providing tents to accommodate families rendered homeless by bad weather. Among the Turkish Cypriot villages most seriously affected by the heavy rains were those of Epikho, north-east of Nicosia; Kambyli, west of Kyrenia, and Marona in Paphos District. Although UNFICYP was unable to provide material aid itself, except for four small tents which it lent to the

villagers of Epikho, it extended its good offices by, inter alia, once more approaching, at the request of the Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber, the British High Commission in Nicosia regarding the possible provision of additional tents. The British and United States Governments provided many tents for Turkish Cypriot refugees in the past. The Turkish Cypriot leadership itself provided ten tents for the village of Kambyli and promised to consider providing funds to assist the resettlement of homeless villagers in Epikho. The inhabitants of the flood-damaged Greek Cypriot village of Theletra, near Marona, also approached UNFICYP regarding the provision of tents, but were subsequently looked after by the Ministry of the Interior.

146. The twelfth shipment of Turkish Red Crescent relief supplies for needy Turkish Cypriots arrived at Famagusta on 20 December 1966 after arrangements for the entry of the vessel carrying the supplies and for their customs and security clearance had been made through the good offices of UNFICYP. The shipment consisted of about 1,290 tons of foodstuffs and some 10 tons of clothing and medical supplies. A large number of Turkish school and library books were sent to Cyprus on the same ship. As in the past, the distribution of these supplies to the various district storage points in the Island was carried out by UNFICYP trucks, and was completed on 26 January 1967 without a single untoward incident. In addition to the Red Crescent supplies and books already mentioned, the ship in question brought 326 bags of mail from Turkey, some of it posted as long ago as the beginning of the disturbances. These bags were handed over to the Postmaster at Famagusta for forwarding to the General Post Office in Nicosia, and the mail was subsequently delivered to the addressees.

147. On 28 March 1967, the Turkish Embassy in Nicosia informed the Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs that a new shipment of Red Crescent relief material, consisting mostly of clothes, footwear and medical supplies, would be sent to Cyprus soon. On 10 May, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied to the Turkish Embassy that it had no objection to the importation of the relief material, subject to certain conditions and to payment of customs duty on certain items, and added that UNFICYP had been requested to extend its good offices.

E. Normalization of the public services

Postal services

148. The ad hoc postal arrangement concluded in October 1966 (S/7611, paras. 145-148) has continued to operate smoothly, but it has not so far been possible to broaden its scope to cover additional Turkish Cypriot areas of the Island and to provide parcel post, postal draft, and Post Office box services.

149. In February 1967, the Turkish Cypriot leadership complained that copies of an anti-Government circular letter sent by them by registered mail to the delegates to the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization Conference in Nicosia had not been delivered by the Post Office, but UNFICYP enquiries revealed that the letters had in fact been delivered as addressed, against a receipt, to the hotel which was serving as a base for the delegates. If, as was claimed, the letters had not reached their addressees, this could not be blamed on the Post Office, whose responsibility was only to deliver mail as addressed. Apart from this, no complaints have been made about the operation of the postal arrangement, and the two Turkish Cypriot postal agents in Nicosia have enjoyed full freedom of movement except on one or two occasions which appear to have been due to misunderstandings on the part of the Cyprus Police personnel at the checkpoint through which the postal agents pass.

150. The situation regarding the ad hoc postal arrangement has thus been one of consolidation without much further progress, but in the troubled Larnaca District the postal services situation, which was previously considered satisfactory, has suffered serious setbacks, particularly in several mixed villages in the general area of Kophinou. Thus, in the mixed village of Tokhni, where thoroughly satisfactory postal services were previously provided for both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot inhabitants by a Greek Cypriot postal agent, the leaders of the Turkish Cypriot villagers have since the beginning of 1967 refused to allow any members of their community to go to the Greek Cypriot part of the village to collect their mail as they had done in the past, insisting instead that all the mail for Turkish Cypriot villagers be handed over by the Greek Cypriot agent to a Turkish Cypriot "postal agent". The Greek Cypriot postal agent and the district postal authorities refused to agree to this procedure, pointing out that it was

illegal to deliver mail to unauthorized persons, and the result has been that the Turkish Cypriots of Tokhni have, at least officially, not collected any mail for several months. This new policy of rejection of certain integrated public services by Turkish Cypriots is a serious hindrance to UNFICYP's normalization efforts in the public service field, and although it is at present confined to Larnaca District, there is a risk that it may spread as the Turkish Cypriots seek ways of asserting the separate nature of their community.

Land records

151. The land records arrangement (S/7611, paras. 149-155) has operated efficiently under UNFICYP supervision, and the hand-over and photocopying of records and files has continued with relatively few disagreements or difficulties. Of the hundreds of operations connected with sales, gifts, mortgages, etc. of immovable property performed for Turkish Cypriots during the period under review by the various District Offices of the Department of Lands and Surveys of the Cyprus Government, a great many were in Nicosia District, where transactions involving Turkish Cypriots are carried out on UNFICYP premises with the aid of technical services provided by UNFICYP to facilitate the processing of such transactions. The Department of Lands and Surveys is considering opening an official sub-office in these premises. This would not affect the nature of the services being provided at present, which are considered satisfactory by all parties, but would improve their speed and efficiency.

Payment of social insurance benefits

152. As in so many other public services, full Turkish Cypriot participation in the national social insurance scheme ceased abruptly with the outbreak of the disturbances in December 1963, and no residents of Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas who have become eligible for social insurance benefits since then have been able to obtain their benefits. Over the past three years many Turkish Cypriots who had established their entitlement to old age or widows' pensions before the disturbances have succeeded in securing the payment or resumption of payment of their pensions, but the Government has refused to pay any arrears of pensions due.

153. Discussions regarding resumed Turkish Cypriot participation in the national social insurance scheme have been held for some time with both the Turkish Cypriot leadership and the Government. On 14 April 1967, the chief Turkish Cypriot specialist in social insurance matters discussed the question of renewed Turkish Cypriot participation directly with officials of the Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance for the first time at a meeting arranged through the good offices of UNFICYP. Further meetings are scheduled. The problems involved are complex and are becoming still more so as time goes on, since for actuarial reasons it becomes more costly for the Turkish Cypriot community to re-enter the social insurance scheme with every year that passes.

154. On the whole, there have been few difficulties over the issue of social insurance cheques to those Turkish Cypriots who have established their entitlement, but the Government has claimed on a number of occasions that local Turkish Cypriot leaders levy a form of taxation on social insurance benefits and on other income paid to Turkish Cypriots in their areas. In what he stated was an attempt to prevent this "taxation", the Government District Officer in Limassol had social insurance cheques for residents of the Turkish quarter of Limassol delivered by the Cyprus Police for a time. Following discussions by UNFICYP with the District Officer, the monthly cheques are now delivered to their addressees in the Turkish quarter by a civilian local government official: an arrangement which appears to satisfy all parties.

Problems of public revenue

155. Like many other problems in Cyprus, the problems of public revenue become increasingly difficult to solve with the passage of time because of the steady hardening of attitudes on both sides and the steady increase in the amount of money involved. Basically, the position is that the Turkish Cypriots refuse to make any payments they can possibly avoid to a Government which they consider to be unlawful, unconstitutional, and responsible for all their past losses and present hardships. The Government, for its part, maintains that the Turkish Cypriot community is in rebellion against it and it therefore refuses to disburse to the Turkish Cypriot leadership any of the money claimed by the latter as its due, such as the £400,000 annual grant to the Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber (S/7191, para. 124), the various sums claimed to be due to Evkaf, and the money for the

salaries of Turkish Cypriot civil servants. Moreover, it makes only a minimum of payments of pensions, etc., to individual Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriot leadership has complained with particular force on a number of occasions about the Government's refusal to honour its responsibility to pay pensions to many Turkish Cypriot retired teachers and civil servants, pointing out that some of these persons completed most of their pensionable service under the British administration before Cyprus became independent, and that the Government has no legal or moral right to refuse to pay pensions in respect of which the British Government left a large sum of money in trust with it at Independence. In reply, the Government has stated that it would find it difficult to justify paying pensions to Turkish Cypriots while many of them are in rebellion against it and do not recognize its authority. Moreover, it said, money paid to Turkish Cypriot pensioners might be seized by the Turkish Cypriot leadership and used to further the activities of the Turkish Cypriot fighters. In view of the Government's attitude to the problems of public revenue, the Turkish Cypriots refuse to pay taxes, licence fees, water and electricity bills, social insurance contributions and other dues to the Government and quasi-Government bodies such as the Electricity Authority of Cyprus. They follow this policy whenever payment can be avoided without too much inconvenience and justify their attitude by pointing to vast sums, amounting to many millions of pounds, which they claim the Government owes the Turkish Cypriot community. Thus, many Turkish Cypriot motor vehicles have not been licensed since January 1964, although they are in regular use inside Turkish Cypriot areas, while, as already stated, Turkish Cypriots in a number of areas, notably the main Turkish Cypriot enclave, have not paid any electricity or water bills since the disturbances. Both the Turkish Cypriots and the Government have complained publicly on a number of occasions about the unsatisfactory nature of the inter-communal public revenue situation, but neither side has shown any willingness to start meaningful discussions on the matter, holding the view that such discussions could only have any significance when a broad political solution of the whole Cyprus problem had been reached.

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Payment of rent to Turkish Cypriot owners of property occupied by UNFICYP

156. The implementation of the arrangements made in October 1965 (S/7191, para. 123) for the payment of rent by the Government to Turkish Cypriot owners of UNFICYP-occupied property has continued throughout the period under review. In spite of efforts by UNFICYP to speed up the rate at which owners have been called to the Ministry of Communications and Works to sign rental agreements, the Turkish Cypriots have complained with some force, inside and outside the Political Liaison Committee, that the Ministry has been slow in dealing with their rent applications.

157. A problem which continues to create bad feeling among Turkish Cypriot owners of UNFICYP-occupied property is that of the assessment of the rental value of property in so-called "sensitive" areas. The Government is not willing to delegate responsibility for such assessment to UNFICYP, but refuses to order its own officials to do the work on account of the danger involved in a visit by a valuation officer to a sensitive area, although UNFICYP has offered to do everything possible to ensure the officials' safety.

F. The functioning of the law courts and the administration of justice

158. It will be recalled that the administration of justice in Cyprus suffered a heavy blow in June 1966, when the Turkish Cypriot judges discontinued attending their offices, and in September 1966, when three Turkish Cypriot judges, who had resumed their duties in the District Court of Limassol some time previously, ceased to do so (S/7611, paras. 166-173). Subsequent attempts to bring about the resumption of attendance by Turkish Cypriot judges at the Courts of the Republic failed, and since September 1966 no such Courts have been attended by Turkish Cypriot judges, while Turkish Cypriots continue to be reluctant to make use of the Courts or take part in litigation.

159. On 23 December 1966, the Government announced the appointment of a Greek Cypriot member of the Supreme Court as President of the Court with effect from 1 January 1967, while the two Greek Cypriot justices designated as acting Supreme Court judges in September 1966 (S/7611, para. 171) were appointed to permanent Supreme Court judgeships, also with effect from 1 January 1967. A number of appointments were also made at the District Court level.

160. There have recently been persistent reports emanating from Government sources to the effect that the Turkish Cypriots have set up what amounts to a regular court system of their own. Enquiries made in this connexion seem to indicate that there continue to be ad hoc judicial proceedings in the Turkish Cypriot enclaves outside the normal system of courts (S/7350, para. 151), and that Turkish Cypriot judges of the Republic who were appointed and took the oath before the 1963 disturbances continue to hear cases, reportedly basing their action on the provisions of the 1960 Constitution and other relevant legislation, but not on the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Law of 1964, which is considered by the Turkish Cypriot leadership to be unconstitutional (S/7611, para. 167; S/7350, para. 153).

161. In view of the lack of improvement in the judicial situation, it was to be expected that no progress has proved possible on the question of the handing-over to the Government of the pre-disturbance court records (including wills and administrative files and records), law reports and law books held in the Turkish quarter of Nicosia, the non-availability of which continues to hamper the work of the Courts of the Republic.

162. The deterioration in the functioning of the law courts and the administration of justice which must ensue from the withdrawal from the Courts of the Turkish Cypriot judges is one of the most deplorable features of the public services situation in Cyprus, and I can but repeat my appeal to all concerned to do everything they can to enable the Courts of Cyprus to resume normal functioning in the interests of the whole population: an aim in which they can count, as in the past, on the assistance and good offices of UNFICYP.

IV. GOOD OFFICES OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN CYPRUS

163. During the period under review the good offices of my Special Representative in Cyprus continued to be available to the directly interested parties for the purpose of promoting and assisting in any negotiations aimed at easing local problems, exploring issues of a broader nature, and contributing to the creation of a more favourable atmosphere for further consultations.

164. The discussions between the Governments of Greece and Turkey on the question of Cyprus and on Greco-Turkish relations as a whole, which began last summer and were referred to in my last two reports (S/7350, para. 179, and S/7611, paras. 177 and 178), continued until the middle of December 1966, when they were reportedly suspended. The results of these discussions have not been divulged, and neither party has given me information about them. Since early 1967 several attempts are believed to have been made by the Governments of Greece and Turkey to resume the dialogue, but at the end of the reporting period there was still no official information regarding its resumption or otherwise.

165. As was the case during the preceding six months, it was generally felt that no useful initiative could be taken by my Special Representative pending clarification of the intentions of the interested parties, especially as regards the Greco-Turkish dialogue, although, as I said in my last report (S/7611, para.189), United Nations efforts towards a solution of the outstanding problems in Cyprus should not be suspended for too long.

166. My Special Representative and his staff have devoted a good deal of their attention to a number of problems, mostly of a technical nature, either through the machinery of the Political Liaison Committee or by direct approaches to the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, and the Special Representative has, in particular, engaged in a series of discussions with the Cyprus Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership with the aim of making some headway towards a return to normality. The question of whether, on certain particular issues, there could be simultaneous attendance by the Government and Turkish Cypriot Political Liaison Officers at meetings of the Political Liaison Committee under UNFICYP chairmanship continues to be explored, but agreement on such joint meetings has not yet been reached.

167. Conversations were held by my Special Representative with the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, at which he recommended the adoption by both sides of a number of measures designed to improve the conditions of life of Turkish Cypriots and ensure complete freedom of movement throughout the Island. As already stated in this report (para. 101), these renewed efforts towards normalization have not yet come to fruition, but it is felt that with goodwill, and provided these efforts are not hampered by unnecessary publicity, some further progress in this direction is not beyond the realms of possibility.

V. MEDIATION EFFORT

168. The situation regarding a resumption of the mediation function under paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 186 of 4 March 1964 has remained unchanged since my last report, owing primarily to the widely differing and firmly held views on the matter of the three Governments most directly concerned.

VI. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

169. My present estimate of the operating costs of the Force to be paid by the United Nations and the estimated amounts to be claimed by Governments providing contingents to the Force as reimbursement of part of their extra costs from the United Nations, for the thirty-nine month period from the inception of the Force on 27 March 1964 through 26 June 1967, totals \$69,105,000. This estimate makes no provision for the costs of the final repatriation of contingents and liquidation costs which together may total \$610,000.

170. The amount of voluntary contributions pledged by forty-three member and four non-member Governments for the same period totals \$63,715,630 as at 8 June 1967. To the above amount may be added approximately \$320,000 which has been received from public contributions, income earned on investment of temporary surplus funds, and net gains on exchange. Accordingly, unless additional pledges are received, there will be a deficit on 26 June 1967 in the amount of \$5,069,370.

171. If the Security Council should decide to extend the period during which the Force is to be stationed in Cyprus for an additional six months from 27 June 1967 to 26 December 1967, it is estimated that the additional cost to the Organization, including an amount of \$610,000 as the cost for final repatriation of contingents and liquidation costs, assuming continuance of reimbursement commitments, would be approximately \$10,800,000, as follows:

UNFICYP Cost Estimates by Major Categories of Expense
for the period 27 June 1967 to 26 December 1967
 (in thousands of U.S. Dollars)

I. <u>Operating Costs incurred by the United Nations</u>		
A. Movement of Contingents		952
B. Operational Expenses		1,152
C. Rental of Premises		166
D. Rations		660
E. Non-Military Personnel Salaries, Travel, etc.		618
F. Miscellaneous and Contingencies		112
	Total, Part I	<u>3,660</u>
II. <u>Reimbursement of Extra Costs to Governments Providing Contingents</u>		
A. Pay and Allowances		6,080
B. Contingent-Owned Equipment		960
C. Death and Disability Wards		100
	Total, Part II	<u>7,140</u>
	Grand Total, Part I and Part II	<u>10,800</u>

172. The above estimates do not reflect the full cost of UNFICYP to Member and non-Member States since they exclude the extra costs which Members providing contingents or police units to the Force have agreed to absorb at their own expense rather than to seek as reimbursement from the United Nations. Based on reports received from certain of the Governments providing contingents or police units to the Force, the estimated amount of such extra costs which the Governments would absorb at their own expense in respect of the period 27 June 1967 through 26 December 1967, in the event the mandate of UNFICYP were extended and the Governments concerned agreed to extend their participation to the latter date under currently prevailing arrangements, are as follows: Austria: \$101,500; Australia: \$152,400; Canada: \$744,444 (exclusive of the cost of normal pay and allowances); Denmark: \$223,575; Ireland: \$595,700; Sweden: \$360,000; United Kingdom: \$1,000,000. Finland is also absorbing certain UNFICYP costs at its own expense. Accordingly, the total costs to the Organization and to the Governments providing contingents or police units would exceed \$13,977,000 for the six-month period ending 26 December 1967.

173. In order to finance the costs to the Organization of maintaining the Force for an extended period of six months after 26 June 1967, and to meet all costs and outstanding claims up to 26 June 1967, it will be necessary for the Secretary-General to receive pledges totalling \$15,869,370.

VII. OBSERVATIONS

174. Very little further progress, if any, was made by UNFICYP during the period under review in achieving a "return to normality", let alone in overcoming the stalemate over broader issues, but the Force has had no small measure of success in preventing a recurrence of fighting and helping to maintain law and order. UNFICYP's patient and unremitting efforts could lead to more progress were they matched by a genuine desire by the parties to move towards a solution to the conflict. Although there have been no meaningful indications of such willingness to solve the underlying basic issues, it is nevertheless felt that the day-to-day situation in the Island has improved since the dark days of 1964. However, as I stated earlier in this report (paras 98-99), both sides seem grimly determined to stick to their entrenched positions and set attitudes, the Government treating the Turkish Cypriots as rebels and the Turkish Cypriots regarding the Government as unconstitutional and devoid of legal standing. As a result, for example, hardships in daily life caused by various kinds of restrictions continue to be suffered by the Turkish Cypriot population, while Greek Cypriots continue to be denied access to many areas controlled by the Turkish Cypriots and the authority of the Government is not allowed to be exercised in those areas.

175. The situation in the Island during the period under review has continued to be one of uneasy quiet disturbed from time to time by incidents, some of them serious, arising out of the persistent armed confrontation which is a matter of particular concern in a number of sensitive areas; by frequent breaches of the cease-fire, often deliberate; by bomb explosions and other terrorist acts directed particularly against civilian victims; and by the construction of new and provocative fortified positions, as well as the reinforcement of old ones. In spite of the apparent relative calm which prevails, the ever present possibility of large-scale fighting is illustrated by such cases as that of Mari (paras. 61-67), and there is general agreement that if it were not for the interposition of UNFICYP forces as a buffer in areas of direct confrontation, the renewal of armed strife would appear to be practically inevitable.

176. The deadlock over the final settlement of the Cyprus question remains as described in my last report (S/7611) of 8 December 1966. There should be no misunderstanding concerning the fact that the basic issues which are at the root of the Cyprus problem continue to be unresolved and that there is only danger in ignoring this situation. I wish most earnestly to appeal to the parties directly concerned to make every effort to break the deadlock and to cast away the dangerous attitude of complacency with a status quo which I can still describe as one of an uneasy truce. The United Nations stands ready to assist in every possible way, but it is clear that little can be done unless the parties themselves show a genuine willingness to put an end to a state of affairs which, after more than three and a half years, remains stubbornly deadlocked.

177. Although I have received no official information on the subject, I understand that the dialogue between the Governments of Greece and Turkey on Greco-Turkish relations and the Cyprus question, which came to a halt in the middle of December 1966, has remained in abeyance ever since, and there is no official indication as to when or if it will be resumed. As stated in para. 178 of my report of 8 December 1966 to the Security Council (S/7611), it had not been considered desirable for my Special Representative to initiate any new approaches under his broadened mandate while the dialogue was in progress. However, it is obvious that the situation cannot be left indefinitely in abeyance and that new efforts are called for at the political level to actively seek a solution to the Cyprus question. It was clearly the intention of the Security Council in its resolution of 4 March 1964 that, parallel with the duties entrusted to UNFICYP concerning peace and quiet in the island, a continuing search should be made for the purpose of solving peacefully the problems besetting Cyprus.

178. I have been disheartened by reports received from my Special Representative and from the Force Commander to the effect that during the period covered by this report some elements of the National Guard and some local Turkish Cypriot leaders have not shown all the necessary measure of co-operation towards UNFICYP, thus rendering more difficult the already complex task of the Force. There have been manifest signs of distrust on the part of the National Guard in not giving


consideration to recommendations by the Force Commander designed to ease tension and in disregarding UNFICYP's advice on many occasions, especially in connexion with the erection of fortifications in sensitive areas. Equally, some Turkish Cypriot leaders, particularly in the Larnaca area (see para. 59), have shown a lack of co-operation and, in some instances, have displayed signs of antagonism towards UNFICYP. I very much hope that these attitudes will be changed and that all parties in Cyprus will give to UNFICYP full co-operation and assistance in the discharge of its responsibilities.

179. There were, during the period under review, some occasions when sections of the Press in Cyprus undertook what seemed to be a campaign against UNFICYP, based on a misunderstanding of the Force's attitude in regard to certain incidents which occurred in the Island, especially in Mari, and one involving National Guard firing at an UNFICYP helicopter (para. 18). It is very much hoped that these instances will not recur and that UNFICYP will continue to enjoy, without exception, the goodwill and understanding which the Press of the Island has shown since the beginning of the operation.

180. As we come to the end of another period of UNFICYP's operation, I wish to reiterate my deep appreciation to the Governments providing contingents to the Force, for their unstinting support to this important peace-keeping activity of the United Nations. My gratitude extends, as well, to the Governments which, by their voluntary financial contributions, have made it possible to maintain UNFICYP in Cyprus. I cannot pass in silence, however, the unsatisfactory method of financing UNFICYP, for the insufficiency of funds and the uncertainty of future contributions place the operation in jeopardy and hamper the orderly planning of its activities.

181. As I stated in one of my earlier reports (S/7001, para. 207), it is necessary to balance against the undoubted need for the continued presence of UNFICYP in Cyprus the danger that excessive confidence in the indefinite continuation of that presence may be a factor in reducing the sense of urgency of the contending parties about seeking solutions for the underlying differences which originally caused violence to erupt in the Island in 1963 and 1964. I trust that all the interested parties will bear in mind the inexorable fact that

UNFICYP cannot remain in Cyprus indefinitely, if only for financial reasons. For the moment, however, I see no alternative but to recommend to the Security Council the extension of the mandate of UNFICYP for a further period of six months, up to 26 December 1967. The Government of Cyprus as well as the Governments of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom have given their agreement to this proposal.



Recce Sqn RCD (CDA)
 One SP Coy 2 QOR of C (CDA)
 HQ UNFICYP
 DET 72 Sqn RAF (UK)
 UN Flt AAC (UK)
 1 Sqn RCT (UK)

One Coy 2 QOR of C (CDA)
 DISTRICT HQ
 HQ Coy 2 QOR of C (CDA)
 One Coy 2 QOR of C (CDA)
 One Sup Coy YKSP 6 (Finland)

1 Sect UNFICYP Police (Denmar)
 One Coy 2 QOR of C (CD)
 DISTRICT HQ
 Dancon 7 (Denmark)
 HQ Coy
 Three Coys
 HQ UNFICYP POLIC
 1 Sect (Austria)
 1 Sect (Denmark)

Field Hospital (Austria)
 DISTRICT HQ
 HQ Coy 8 Inf Gp (Ireland)

Armd Car Gp 8 Inf Gp (Ireland)

One Coy 8 Inf Gp (Ireland)

One Coy 8 Inf Gp (Ireland)

1 Sect UNFICYP Police (Australia)

One Coy 1 DWR (UK)
 One PI 1 DWR (UK)

35° 00'

1 Sect UNFICYP' Police (Australia)

One PI 1 DWR (UK)

Coy HQ 1 DWR (UK)
 Two PI 1 DWR (UK)

DISTRICT HQ
 1 DWR (UK)

1 Sect UNFICYP Police (N.Z.)

One PI 1 DWR (UK)

ZONE HQ
 HQ Coy 1 DWR (UK)
 One Coy 1 DWR (UK)

One PI 1 DWR (UK)

1 Sect UNFICYP Police (N.Z.)

One Coy 1 I
 One Tp 5 IN

1 Sect UNFICYP

Sqn HQ 5 INNIS C

The boundaries shown on this map are not official endorsement or acceptance of the UNFICYP.

33°30'

34°00'

34°30'

35°30'


35°00'

34°00'

34°30'







34°30'

33°30'



S E A The boundaries shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

**CYPRUS
DEPLOYMENT OF UNFICYP
JUNE 1967**

-  UNFICYP operational boundaries
-  District boundary
-  Road
-  Airfield, airstrip
-  Sovereign Base Area
-  Contour line (in feet)

