
**Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

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**Working paper on reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons
submitted by Austria, Sweden and Ukraine**

At the 2000 Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the nuclear weapons states committed themselves to “further reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process.” In the preparatory committee to the 2005 Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, proposals have been made on how to take this matter forward.¹ It has been identified as one on which progress needs to and could be made.

The reasons are the following:

- Non-strategic nuclear weapons are a global concern. Due to the lack of transparency, general knowledge of these weapons is limited. The estimate numbers, depending on definitions, range between 7,000 and 20,000.
- Non-strategic nuclear weapons pose threats. Their portability and the possibility of forward deployment could increase the risk of proliferation and of use. They could be appealing to terrorists due to their relatively small size and the availability of delivery systems for such weapons.
- There are indications that non-strategic nuclear weapons increasingly are seen as a counter to conventional forces – especially if countries lack the resources to advance and modernize their conventional weapons’ systems.

There are also indications of plans to develop new types of non-strategic nuclear weapons, and to consider them useable as battle-field weapons. Thus, there is a danger that the distinction between conventional weapons and non-strategic nuclear weapons will be blurred. Such a development would go against many of the commitments made in 2000 – the unequivocal undertaking, the principle of irreversibility, and the diminishing role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines. It could also threaten the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty.

¹ For example working papers by Germany 2002; the New Agenda Coalition 2002 and 2003; Austria, Mexico and Sweden 2003; Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway 2003.

- Non-strategic nuclear weapons are an integral part of the global nuclear disarmament agenda. It is part of the unequivocal undertaking to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons which the nuclear-weapon states committed themselves to at the 2000 Review Conference.
- Non-strategic nuclear weapons have been neglected in arms control and disarmament negotiations. The only specific framework for these weapons is the 1991/92 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives between the United States and the Soviet Union/Russian Federation. We welcome the progress made so far in the implementation of these initiatives including the on-going dialogue between Russia and the United States. At the same time, these declarations are not legally-binding, but political commitments. There is no common understanding regarding the time-frame for the implementation of the initiatives. There is no mechanism for exchange of information or for the verification of compliance.

In line with the mandate from the 2000 Final Document, that the third meeting of the preparatory committee “should make every effort to produce a consensus report containing recommendations to the Review Conference”, we suggest that the following recommendations be made on the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons:

1. States Parties agree to further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process, and urge all concerned states to conduct such reductions.
2. States Parties agree to accord further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons a higher priority, as an important step towards the elimination of nuclear weapons, and to be carried out in a comprehensive manner.
3. States Parties agree that reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons should be carried out in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner.
4. States Parties agree on the importance of further confidence-building and transparency measures with regard to non-strategic nuclear weapons.
5. All concerned states are urged to develop further confidence-building and transparency measures in order to reduce the threats posed by non-strategic nuclear weapons.
6. States Parties agree to concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear-weapon systems, including non-strategic nuclear-weapon systems.
7. States Parties agree on the importance of enhancing and ensuring special security and physical protection measures for the transport and storage of non-strategic nuclear weapons, their components and related materials through, *inter alia*, the placing of such weapons in physically secure central storage sites, with a view to their removal and subsequent elimination by the nuclear-weapon States. We urge all concerned states to take measures in this regard.
8. The Russian Federation and the United States of America agree to preserve, reaffirm, and implement the 1991/1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, and to increase transparency in the implementation process thus creating greater confidence.

9. The Russian Federation and the United States of America commit themselves to codify the 1991/1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, thus facilitating verification and transparency, and to initiate negotiations on further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons. This mechanism could at a later stage be extended to all concerned states.
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