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LETTER DATED 11 SEPTEMBER 1967 FROM THE DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CAMBODIA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On the instructions of my Government and further to my letter No. 5106 of 21 August 1967, I have the honour to bring the following to your attention for the information of the members of the Security Council:

On 15 July 1967, at approximately 3.30 p.m., two Khmer provincial guards named Som-San and Chea-Net, from the post of Prek Chrieu, Sangkat of Tonlounng, Srok of Mimot, province of Kompong Cham, while on patrol along national road No. 7, surprised armed foreign elements within Khmer territory about 6,000 metres from the boundary line of the above-mentioned Sangkat, Srok and province.

The foreigners, instead of responding to the challenge of the two Khmer provincial guards, opened fire on them, killing them on the spot, and then took flight.

Having been alerted, Khmer elements of the National Defence Forces pursued the foreigners throughout the night of 15-16 July 1967 and at about 7 a.m. succeeded in capturing one of them, who was a South Viet-Nameese soldier disguised as a Viet Cong, and seized the following:

1 automatic pistol, type unknown but probably of local manufacture, with two magazines and cartridges;

- 1 O.F. grenade;
- 2 smoke pots;
- 1 signal rocket;
- 1 air-ground liaison panel;
- 1 camera containing a roll of film;
- 1 knapsack containing food and medicine;
- 1 air-ground liaison radio battery B.A. 386.

The three other men succeeded in getting away.

Under interrogation by the Khmer authorities, the Viet-Nameese stated that he was Le Van Hoang, twenty-two years of age, from the province of Vinh Long (South Viet-Nam), and he disclosed the following information:

He was inducted into the Army in September 1964 and took a training course at the Thu Duc military school until early 1965. This military training planned for a group of 150 trainees, includes three periods of instruction of one month each and is based on the following programme:

FIRST MONTH

Instruction concerning reconnaissance missions;  
Marching (rapid and silent marching);  
Detection of footsteps (men, animals);  
Instruction concerning air-ground liaison by radio, smoke pots and signal rockets and panels.

SECOND MONTH

Jumping hurdles of various heights.

THIRD MONTH

General review.

He was then sent to a unit called "Lien Doan Yem Tro" (Support and Reinforcement Group) at Kontum. He served in Company No. 106 ("Tham Bao") of the unit, which was stationed at the Pham-Phu-Quoc camp approximately 2 km from Kontum under the command of Lieutenant Nguyen Van Nhan. In this unit, he was to be given further conventional military combat training together with other comrades assigned to the same unit.

Company No. 106, numbering 150 men, is a reconnaissance command which includes twelve American soldiers (including two officers) as well as six South Viet-Nameese officers.

The task of the company, which includes a command section and three reconnaissance sections of eight teams each, is to disguise its men as Viet Cong and to smuggle them into Khmer territory in teams of four in order to identify strategic points and seek evidence of the presence of Viet Cong.

For this work each man carries forged papers with a false name, similar to those issued by the National Liberation Front to its fighters. The captured Viet-Nameese, according to the papers on his person, was named Ton Xuan Vinh, whereas his real name is Le Van Hoang.

This camouflage allows the men of the command to move about with the greatest possible secrecy and the least possible risk of being recognized by the real Viet Cong.

Le Van Hoang, alias Ton Xuan Vinh, was a member of the second team (of four men), consisting of the following:

1. Sergeant Le Van Nhon (team leader)
2. Corporal Nguyen Van Nhut
3. Private 2nd Class Pham Van Loi
4. Private 2nd Class Le Van Hoang, Service No. 3430 (the prisoner).

The team had the following equipment:

a radio transmitting and receiving set for air-ground communication;  
a rubberized cloth signal panel, yellow on one side and dark pink on the other, for spotter aircraft or helicopters;  
a signal rocket;  
two smoke pots (one for yellow smoke and one for red smoke);  
two cameras (one carried by the team leader) for taking photographs which could provide evidence that the Viet Cong had a sanctuary in our territory.

In addition to this set of communication and signalling equipment, each man carries:

generally, a crudely manufactured firearm, undoubtedly one of those made by the local arsenal of the National Liberation Front and customarily used by NLF fighters, picked up by United States forces during combat;

a hand-grenade;  
food (cooked rice, various condiments - dried peppers, sauce concentrate, tomato concentrate, salt) well packed in plastic or cellophane packets and bags;  
medicine: anti-malaria pills, insect repellants, a preparation for soothing coughs, water sterilization tablets.

His team had already completed two missions. The present mission, which was the last for his team, was to last a week, from 11 to 18 July 1967. On 11 July, a helicopter, piloted by two United States soldiers, picked up his team from the command post at Kontum and dropped them at about 4 p.m. on the same day in a rice paddy somewhere in our territory. The team was accompanied in the helicopter up to this point by Lieutenant Nguyen Van Khang, Deputy Commander of

Company No. 106 ("Tham Bao"). On board the helicopter itself, this officer handed him the weapons, the equipment and the forged papers and at the same time gave him the following instructions:

to show the forged papers if Viet Cong were encountered;  
in case of arrest by the Khmer authorities, to say that he wanted to surrender as a soldier of the Saigon Government sent to Cambodia to look for Viet Cong.

He, however, was tired of this way of life and wished to surrender in order to live in peace in Cambodia.

He and the three others were then to continue on foot and try to pass into Khmer territory for the purpose of gathering information on:

- the presence of Viet Cong in Khmer territory;
- the relations between the Cambodian people and authorities and the Viet Cong;
- the location of strategic points (bridges, roads, etc.).

From 11 to 13 July, they proceeded through the forest towards a pre-assigned destination - a metal bridge on national road 7 (approximately 6,000 metres within our territory). The team leader, Sergeant Len Van Nhon, who was in possession of the map and the compass, must have known the name of the bridge.

The prisoner recalls having met two members of the Viet Cong in the woods at a point he cannot specify.

From 13 to 15 July, the four men remained hidden not far from the bridge to take photographs and watch for the Viet Cong they thought might pass through.

On the afternoon of 15 July, the team was surprised by two Cambodian guards, who ordered them to lay down their arms. The team leader thereupon fired a burst with his gun, killing the two guards outright. The prisoner and the others also fired, while at the same time all four made quickly for the woods.

Le Van Hoang, alias Ton Xuan Vinh, failed to keep up with the other three and lost his way. The following morning, he was captured by our Provincial Guards, who had been sent out after the men as soon as the previous evening's incident had become known.

Le Van Hoang has stated that he found nothing to confirm the existence of Viet Cong bases in Khmer territory and that from the afternoon of 11 July until the

morning of 15 July his team leader made radio contact eight times - twice each day - with an L-19 aircraft.

This statement attests to the fact that Company No. 106 is a special unit maintained and controlled by the United States Highlands Command for the purpose of:

1. Conducting espionage in Khmer territory by sending in its agents primarily to spy on the activities of the Khmer Royal Armed Forces. Their being posted for several days close to a bridge on the Khmer national highway had no other object than observation of the activities of Khmer forces.
2. Carrying out sabotage at strategic Cambodian points - with reconnaissance as the first step - the agents being disguised in Viet Cong uniforms. The negative taken from the captured camera shows that pictures were in fact made of Cambodian bridges and roads.
3. Sowing terror among the Khmer frontier inhabitants and forces under the Viet Cong cloak.

It is perfectly obvious to all that the sole aim of these acts of agitation and espionage perpetrated by the United States-South Viet-Nameese armed forces in Cambodian territory is to find pretexts (encampments of NLF fighters, NLF supply routes, etc.) for extending the war to Cambodia.

The Royal Government has protested most strongly against these criminal manoeuvres of agitation and these acts of espionage and has demanded that the Governments of the United States of America and the Republic of Viet-Nam put an end to them at once.

I should be grateful if you would arrange for this letter to be circulated as a Security Council document.

Accept, Sir, etc.

(Signed) OR KOSALAK  
Deputy Permanent Representative of Cambodia  
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

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