

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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Letter dated 5 June 2003 from the Permanent Representative of France to the Conference on Disarmament addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting the documents adopted at the G-8 summit held in Evian from 1 to 3 June 2003

I have the honour to forward to you the French version of the documents adopted at the recent G-8 summit, held in Evian from 1 to 3 June 2003, on the issues of security, which I reviewed during the plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament held on Thursday, 5 June 2003.

I should be grateful if you could arrange to have these documents circulated as official documents of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed): Hubert de **La Fortelle**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of France
to the Conference on Disarmament

Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: G-8 declaration

1. We recognize that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery poses a growing danger to us all. Together with the spread of international terrorism, it is the pre-eminent threat to international security.
2. This global challenge requires a multifaceted solution. We need to tackle it individually and collectively - working together and with other partners, including through relevant international institutions, in particular those of the United Nations system.
3. We have a range of tools available to tackle this threat: international treaty regimes; inspection mechanisms such as those of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW); initiatives to eliminate stocks of weapons of mass destruction such as the G-8 Global Partnership; national and internationally-coordinated export controls; international cooperation and diplomatic efforts; and if necessary other measures in accordance with international law.
4. While all of these instruments are necessary, none is sufficient by itself. Not all proliferation challenges require the same remedies. We need to deploy the tools which are most effective in each case. We remain committed to work with and strengthen all these instruments and, where appropriate, to pursue the universalization of relevant treaties and instruments.
5. Last year, at Kananaskis, we endorsed a set of principles to prevent terrorists, or those that harbour them, from gaining access to weapons or materials of mass destruction. Since then, events in the world have underscored the relevance of those principles and the urgency of implementing them.
6. We reaffirm our commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention and we urge all States which have not yet joined them to do so. We consider these three treaties to be essential instruments for the maintenance of international peace and security and cornerstones of non-proliferation and disarmament. We reaffirm our support for IAEA, which should be granted the necessary means to implement its monitoring tasks.
7. North Korea's uranium enrichment and plutonium production programmes and its failure to comply with its IAEA safeguards agreement undermine the non-proliferation regime and are a clear breach of North Korea's international obligations. We strongly urge North Korea visibly, verifiably and irreversibly to dismantle any nuclear weapons programmes, a fundamental step in facilitating a comprehensive and peaceful solution.
8. We will not ignore the proliferation implications of Iran's advanced nuclear programme. We stress the importance of Iran's full compliance with its obligations under the NPT. We urge Iran to sign and implement an IAEA additional protocol without delay or conditions. We offer our strongest support to comprehensive IAEA examination of this country's nuclear programme.

9. We call on all States to establish effective procedures and machinery to control the transfer of materials, technology and expertise which may contribute to the development, production or use of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. We likewise call on all States to establish and implement effective national standards for secure storage and handling of such materials with a view to effectively preventing proliferation and eliminating the risk that terrorists gain access to them. We agree, individually and collectively, to give support to this end where it is most needed.

Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction: G-8 Senior Officials Group annual report

Our leaders decided at the Kananaskis summit to launch a new G-8 global partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction, to prevent terrorists, or those that harbour them, from acquiring or developing weapons of mass destruction. Their statement set the scope of cooperation projects under this initiative to address non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety issues. Among the priority concerns, they identified the destruction of chemical weapons, the dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines, the disposition of fissile materials and the employment of former weapon scientists. It was agreed to review progress on the Global Partnership at the Evian summit. The Global Partnership Senior Officials Group, established to review progress of the initiative and to coordinate projects, has undertaken an active work plan to implement this initiative, under the chairmanship, first, of Canada and, in 2003, of France. In the first year of Global Partnership activities, the Senior Officials Group can report substantial progress in translating the Global Partnership initiative into actual projects. At the same time, much work remains to be done, and the Senior Officials Group has outlined a challenging action plan to be accomplished before the next summit.

The Senior Officials Group's activities over the past year have focused on four objectives: implementation and translation of the guidelines, as necessary, into specific actions and agreements; initiation and development of specific projects; financial contributions in conformity with the Kananaskis commitment to raise up to \$20 billion over the next 10 years; and outreach activities towards non-G-8 countries to expand participation in the Partnership. For each, the aim was to ensure that the Kananaskis promises were being translated into practice. In order to do so, work has been pursued with determination on resolution of outstanding implementation problems, successful negotiation of implementing agreements, development and initiation of specific projects based on allocated funds, national financial commitments to raise up to \$20 billion over 10 years, and inviting third countries to participate in the initiative and contribute to projects under the Partnership.

1. Implementation of the Kananaskis guidelines

The Kananaskis Statement defined a set of guidelines that will form the basis for the negotiation of specific agreements governing projects. Implementation of these guidelines has been a primary task of the senior officials, and was addressed at each meeting of the Senior Officials Group. In the course of their discussions, the senior officials noted the difficulties and obstacles that were hindering the initiation of projects, and have conducted an in-depth review of the outstanding issues related to the negotiation of bilateral and multilateral agreements required for projects falling under the scope of the Global Partnership.

We welcome the important progress that has been made on the issue of tax exemption on the basis of high-level political decisions. Several bilateral and multilateral agreements include such provisions. Nonetheless, these agreements have yet to be tested in practice. Full exemption from taxes, duties, levies and other charges is essential for projects to succeed; progress registered in this field is positive and has to be pursued.

Another essential issue for partners is liability protection. The effective implementation of the guideline which states: “adequate liability protection from claims related to the cooperation will be provided for donor countries, their personnel and contractors” has been discussed extensively by the senior officials. All partners agree that adequate liability protections are essential for project implementation, while recognizing that the protections differ depending on respective national requirements. Partners reinforced the need to have adequate liability provisions in all bilateral and multilateral frameworks and welcomed progress in this regard. Partners agreed that there should be uniform treatment of donors in this respect.

The guideline regarding adequate access to work sites has also been under consideration by the senior officials. The new proposal to simplify access to sites by reducing the period set for prior notification from 45 to 30 days through a procedure of annual lists has been considered as an improvement on past practice, though still judged insufficient by some partners. It should be evaluated over the coming year.

Other guidelines such as those relating to the monitoring, auditing and accounting for the expenditure of funds, the implementation of projects in an environmentally sound manner and the establishment of project milestones have not been raised as presenting problems. Some of these guidelines have been satisfactorily translated into bilateral agreements. The senior officials will, however, give due attention to such issues as may arise during the implementation of projects.

The senior officials have also noted in their discussions the importance of the guidelines concerning the assurance that “the material, equipment, technology, services and expertise provided will be solely for peaceful purposes” and “appropriate privileges and immunities will be provided for government donor representatives”.

After one year, the senior officials can report some progress regarding the implementation of the guidelines and welcome Russian efforts in that respect. They recognize that, given the importance of practical implementation of guidelines for engagement of new projects, sustained and broadened efforts in this field are necessary.

2. Partners’ report on progress in cooperation projects and specific projects for new cooperation

A number of specific cooperation projects are moving forward into their implementation phase. For example, in the chemical weapons field, the Gorny facility was completed and went into operation, and has already destroyed 400 tons of pyrite. After the conclusion of an agreement, construction work can start in the coming months on the chemical weapons destruction facility in Kambarka. Construction has started of the chemical weapons destruction facility for nerve agents at Shuchye and of other related infrastructure projects. These are important milestones in the task of chemical weapons destruction. It may also be reported that Italy and Russia have recently signed an additional protocol related to the Shuchye chemical destruction plant. A new stage in dismantling former nuclear submarines has been reached with the tangible results of the implementation of new projects in Saïda Bay and at Zvezda shipyard in the far east, as well as the funding of other projects for dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines. Agreement has also been reached on a programme to end Russian production of weapons-grade plutonium and on the acceleration of efforts to secure Russian

fissile material and nuclear warheads, while significant progress can be noted in the negotiations on international support for Russia's plutonium disposition programmes, including increased pledges and substantial agreement on the approach to effective programme management and oversight. We look forward to completion of these negotiations. The safety and security of biological research facilities are being improved. With respect to the employment of former weapons scientists, in addition to the continued efforts in the framework of the multilateral International Science and Technology Centre, new bilateral engagements have been initiated with former non-conventional weapons production facilities to assist in their reconversion to the development and manufacture of commercial products.

The Senior Officials Group has closely followed the development of bilateral contacts and multilateral consultations which govern the initiation of new projects. Additional efforts should be made to identify and start new projects. Partners have had an active programme of expert meetings and exchanges, including site visits and seminars to tackle specific technical issues. These included the experts seminar on environmental problems associated with the decommissioning of nuclear submarines held in Vladivostok, and the meeting of submarine experts organized by Russia in Severodvinsk, followed by an informal experts' meeting on the same subject held under the auspices of the presidency. Chemical experts also met in the margins of the meetings of the OPCW Executive Council to discuss countries' project funding plans and their outstanding needs. The conference on the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Cooperation Initiative, hosted by the European Commission in Brussels under the chairmanship of the European Union, the United States of America and Canada, also furthered the aims of the Global Partnership by facilitating information exchange, outreach to other countries and the coordination of projects.

All partners have engaged in intensive bilateral consultations with Russia to identify areas of cooperation and to select specific projects to be carried forward. The Russian Federation has identified lists of specific projects, which have been presented to individual partners. These lists have been studied in depth: some partners have already responded, while others are still in the process of discussing the projects. All partners, while keeping in mind the full scope of the Global Partnership, have addressed the priorities identified by the leaders in Kananaskis (destruction of chemical weapons, dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines, disposition of fissile materials and employment of former weapons scientists). They have also taken into account the two priorities on which Russia has placed special emphasis (destruction of chemical weapons and dismantlement of decommissioned submarines).

Notwithstanding all these efforts and active endeavours, if the practical implementation of projects is to progress as fast and as effectively as expected, sustained and broadened efforts will be needed.

3. Financial commitments

The leaders in Kananaskis gave a joint commitment to raise up to \$20 billion to support partnership projects over a 10-year period. Over the past year, this joint commitment has been translated into firm national commitments of up to: United States - \$10 billion; Germany - €1.5 billion; United Kingdom - \$750 million; France - €750 million;

Japan - \$200 million; Italy - €1 billion; Canada - Can\$1 billion. The European Union has pledged €1 billion and Russia \$2 billion. It is also to be noted that, in their budgets for the 2003 financial year, partners have appropriated adequate funds for this year's projects.

4. Outreach strategy and modalities

The leaders invited other countries which are prepared to adopt the Kananaskis documents (statement, principles and guidelines) to enter into discussions with partners on participating in and contributing to this initiative, and stated their wish to review this issue at their next summit. Intense outreach activities were launched, under the presidency of Canada, which sustained its efforts in this direction under the new presidency of France. Contacts were made with countries that expressed an interest, and information was given on the content, aims and work of the Global Partnership. Meetings with interested countries were organized in Ottawa. Following additional bilateral consultations, an information meeting, co-chaired by Canada, France and the United States, was held in Paris on 8 April in order to encourage potential donors to participate in the Global Partnership and to facilitate such participation. Russia briefed potential donors about possible cooperation projects in the area of chemical weapons destruction and the dismantlement of decommissioned submarines. They were informed of the inclusive character of the Partnership and offered the possibility, having endorsed the Kananaskis documents, to make a formal announcement of their interest and their intention to make a contribution. The Chair indicated that the G-8 would be ready to give official recognition to the new donors at the Evian summit. Potential new donors were also informed of the possibility of having back-to-back meetings of the enlarged partnership group with the G-8 Senior Officials Group meetings until future structures were decided upon. A similar information meeting with interested countries was also organized by the United States in Washington on 25 April.

Although the initial Global Partnership focus was on projects in Russia, as stated by the leaders, the Partnership may extend to other recipient countries, including in particular those of the former Soviet Union, prepared to adopt the Kananaskis documents. The leaders stated the willingness of the G-8 to enter into negotiations with such countries. In that context, an official application was submitted by Ukraine. After discussing the issue, the Senior Officials Group gave its agreement in principle, while recalling that the Partnership was still in its initial phase and therefore focused on Russian projects. The Chair has expressed its readiness to enter into preliminary discussions with interested recipients willing to adhere to the Kananaskis documents in order to prepare for their future inclusion in the Partnership. Some partners are already pursuing relevant projects in former Soviet States outside Russia.

While stressing the importance of the universal adoption of non-proliferation principles, senior officials have been keen to promote the importance of the Global Partnership and to publicize its objectives and activities to third countries as well as the United Nations, the European Union, the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference and others. In this context, the senior officials welcome the European Union plan to organize an inter-parliamentary conference on the Global Partnership in November 2003. This conference, to be held in Strasbourg on 21 November 2003, is fully supported by the G-8 partners and the Chair, and also by the future European Union presidency, who view the event as an important opportunity to provide information on the Global Partnership to parliamentarians, whose support for funding the initiative will be essential over the coming 10 years.

Reviewing their activities over the year since Kananaskis, the senior officials note the progress achieved in implementing guidelines, the advancement of new projects, financial commitments and outreach activities, while recognizing that, in all these fields, further work has to be done. All the Kananaskis documents thus remain under consideration and review by the Senior Officials Group, as part of a continuing and comprehensive process with the aim of yielding substantive results.

Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction: G-8 action plan

The Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, which we launched last year at the Kananaskis summit, has made significant progress over the past year toward realizing the objective of preventing terrorists, or those who harbour them, from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological, and biological weapons; missiles; and related materials, equipment, and technology.

With our determined commitment, significant progress has been made:

- Substantial sums have already been pledged by partners towards their Kananaskis commitment to raise up to \$20 billion over 10 years;
- The Russian Government has made welcome decisions to ensure the implementation of guidelines, in particular full exemption of assistance from taxation, duties and other charges. Other guidelines have also been intensively addressed;
- The recent conclusion of the multilateral nuclear environment programme for the Russian Federation has demonstrated substantial progress in translating the Global Partnership initiative into specific actions;
- All partners have actively embarked on the process of determining cooperation projects to be undertaken, and some significant projects have already been launched or expanded, in accordance with our priorities identified in Kananaskis;
- Outreach activities have been undertaken with the non-G-8 countries, with a view to raising awareness among them, enlisting their participation and enabling them to contribute, as a result of which Finland, Norway, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland have indicated their interest in joining the Global Partnership as donors.

We commit ourselves to an active programme to continue the implementation of the initiative and to achieve substantial progress by the next summit. Our goals are:

- To pursue the universal adoption of the non-proliferation principles;
- To reach our Kananaskis commitment of raising up to \$20 billion over 10 years through contributions from new donors or additional pledges from partners;
- To expand project activities to a significant extent, building upon preparatory work to establish implementing frameworks and to develop plans for project activities, as well as to sustain steady progress in projects already under way. We will continue to review progress in initiating and implementing projects over the coming year and to oversee the coordination of projects, in order to review priorities, avoid gaps and overlaps and assess the consistency of projects with international security objectives, in accordance with our priorities;

- To resolve all outstanding implementation challenges and to review the implementation in practice of all guidelines, keeping in mind the need for uniform treatment of partners, reflecting our cooperative approach;
- To expand participation in the Global Partnership to interested non-G-8 donor countries that are willing to adopt the Kananaskis documents. While still focusing on projects in Russia, we mandate the Chair to enter into preliminary discussions with new or current recipient countries, including those of the former Soviet Union, that are prepared to adopt the Kananaskis documents, as Ukraine has already done;
- To inform other organizations, parliamentary representatives and public sectors of the importance of the Global Partnership.

**Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction - securing
radioactive sources: G-8 statement**

At Kananaskis, we, the heads of State and Government of the eight major industrialized democracies and the representatives of the European Union, endorsed six principles and launched the Global Partnership to prevent terrorists or those that harbour them from gaining access to weapons and materials of mass destruction. Today, at Evian, in another tangible demonstration of our commitment to these principles, we have agreed to improve the security of radioactive materials. Radioactive sources are found in everyday life and have beneficial applications in medicine, agriculture, research, and industry. Certain poorly protected sources pose a real threat because they could be manipulated by terrorists to construct a radiological dispersion device or a “dirty bomb”. We commit ourselves to employing high standards that reduce the vulnerability of radioactive sources to acquisition by terrorists. We urge all countries to take measures to strengthen regulatory control of high-risk sources within their territories. In that context, we welcome the initiatives taken by G-8 countries and the European Union aimed at developing an appropriate legal framework to this end.

We welcome the findings of the 2003 International Conference on Security of Radioactive Sources. We also recognise the essential role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in combating radiological terrorism and endorse its efforts to establish international standards that ensure the long-term security and control of high-risk radioactive sources. We have decided to undertake the following actions to reinforce and complement IAEA activities, as well as to ensure the unavailability of radioactive sources to terrorists. The G-8 will:

1. Identify elements of the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources that are of the greatest relevance to preventing terrorists or those that harbour them from gaining access to high-risk radioactive sources;
2. Consider developing recommendations on how those elements could be applied at the national level. Those elements may include, as necessary:
 - 2.1. National registers for tracking sources;
 - 2.2. Programmes for recovering orphan sources;
 - 2.3. National regulations limiting export of high-risk sources to States that have effective controls;
 - 2.4. Notification requirements to recipient States of exports;
 - 2.5. National measures to penalize theft or misuse of radioactive sources;
 - 2.6. National physical protection measures and access controls; and
 - 2.7. National laws to ensure the safe and secure disposal of high-risk spent sealed sources;

3. Work towards agreement on and implementation of these recommendations by the time of our next meeting in 2004;
4. Encourage all countries to strengthen controls on radioactive sources and observe the Code of Conduct when the revisions to it have been completed and approved;
5. Enhance international cooperation on locating, recovering, and securing high-risk radioactive sources;
6. Support and carry forward the IAEA programmes to improve the security of radioactive sources, including considering the provision of additional resources as necessary to the Nuclear Security Fund in order to promote the implementation of the Code of Conduct and the recommendations for its application;
7. In conjunction with IAEA, convene an international conference in 2005, in France, to discuss further and raise awareness of the radioactive source problem, and to assess progress in implementing the findings of the 2003 International Conference on Security of Radioactive Sources;
8. Continue to work on this issue and will review the implementation of the plan of action, as set out in the technical annex to this statement, at the 2004 G-8 summit.

Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction - securing radioactive sources: G-8 action plan

1. Background

The risks associated with radioactive sources have been the subject of increasing attention for several years now, particularly by IAEA, with respect to safety and possible radiological accidents. But 11 September 2001 highlighted the risk posed by the use of certain highly radioactive sources for malevolent or terrorist purposes, i.e., the exposure of populations to radiation, or the use of one or more sources in a radiological dispersion device.

In either case, this could have a major psychological impact on the population, going well beyond the actual radiological or chemical consequences produced - which would themselves be limited. Consequently, the international community must imperatively concern itself with the question of the security of these sources.

2. G-8 approach

The G-8, recognizing the vital need to strengthen arrangements for the prevention of acts of radiological terrorism, desires to give a strong political impetus to the consideration of this issue. The Evian summit provides an opportunity for the G-8 to express international awareness of this issue at the highest level, to reaffirm its support for the IAEA work in this domain, to call on States to mobilize efforts to improve the safety and security of the sources they produce, possess, use, import or export, and to develop a medium and long-term approach aimed at reinforcing the security of sources and the mechanisms for cooperation between States.

The G-8 welcomes the initiatives taken by G-8 countries and the European Union aimed at developing a legal framework for the registration, administration and control of radioactive sources. This work, performed in close cooperation with IAEA, can provide a valuable input to wider international efforts in this area.

The utilization of radioactive sources yields important benefits in many peaceful applications (including medicine, agriculture, the environment, industry, and so forth). Conscious of the vulnerability of many States with regard to the control and monitoring of sources used in these applications, the G-8 agreed on the following approach to strengthen the safety and security of radioactive sources.

2.1 Support of the IAEA work

The Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources represents an essential feature of the IAEA work. The G-8 encourages as many States as possible to observe the principles contained in the Code when the revisions to it have been completed and approved, with a view to improving national systems for the control of sources. The G-8 lends its political support to the Agency for the implementation of its action in this field. It undertakes to promote the application of the Code of Conduct, collectively or individually, when the revisions to the Code have been completed and approved, and to encourage States to request the assistance of the Agency in this sphere (see document 1, "Support of the IAEA work").

2.2 Support for the most vulnerable States

The G-8 States are mobilizing individually or in partnership, notably with the IAEA, to assist the most vulnerable States in taking steps to account and securely manage all high-level radioactive sources in their territory, including the search for and securing of sources no longer under regulatory control. They call on the other producers or exporters of highly radioactive sources to do likewise. They will exchange information and hold consultations to review progress achieved in this sphere.

2.3 Mechanisms for the control of radioactive sources

The G-8 undertakes to carry out a long-term review of the means to strengthen control over radioactive sources and international cooperation in this sphere. The following avenues in particular are being explored:

2.3.1 Political commitments by States producing, possessing, using, importing or exporting radioactive sources to uphold the “principles of safe and secure management of radioactive sources”, inspired by the relevant sections of the IAEA Code of Conduct (see document 2, “Political commitment by States producing, exporting and holding radioactive sources”);

2.3.2 Identification of the elements of the completed Code of Conduct that are of the greatest relevance in preventing terrorism and encouragement to implement them worldwide. These may include national registers for radioactive sources, national measures to penalize the theft or misuse of such sources and national physical protection and access control measures (see document 3, “Recommendations to States on the security of radioactive sources”).

2.4 International conference on radioactive sources

The G-8 welcomes the success of the International Conference on Security of Radioactive Sources, held in Vienna from 11 to 13 March of this year, which emphasized in its findings the necessity of improving the control and security of radioactive sources at the national level and called for international initiatives in this sphere.

It supports the proposal by France to hold in France, in the first half of 2005, the fourth international conference on this topic and to include both the safety and the security aspects of radioactive sources, in order to review the actions undertaken and to map out perspectives for the future (see document 4, “International Conference on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources”). This conference will also serve to support the actions already in progress (e.g., IAEA programmes and bilateral and multilateral cooperation), encouraging all national and international players in their chosen course.

Document 1: Support of the IAEA work

The G-8 reaffirms its support for the actions undertaken by IAEA in favour of the safety and security of radioactive sources, and declares its readiness to cooperate with the Agency on this issue.

More specifically,

1. The G-8 contributes financially to the Agency's Nuclear Security Fund and is cooperating with the Agency through contributions in kind, within the framework of the programme for protection against nuclear and radiological terrorism, via, among other measures, the secondment of experts, training programmes, evaluation on request of national systems for the control of sources, participation in campaigns for the detection and securing of uncontrolled sources, and in technical cooperation projects for the supply of equipment for the detection of illegal movements of radioactive sources (as part of the fight against the illicit trafficking in radioactive materials).
2. The G-8 members will promote - individually and collectively - the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources when the revisions to it have been completed and approved, and invite States to work through the Agency for its application.
3. The G-8 will consider requests for assistance from the Agency in response to a radiological accident or malevolent act, to secure the incriminated source or sources and, where necessary, to treat persons who have been radiated by these sources. It will also consider requests for assistance, as needed, for preventive actions (e.g., the search for and securing of sources).
4. The G-8 will consider supplying to IAEA the information at its disposal concerning particular emergency situations involving a radioactive source, or information likely to assist the Agency in dealing with such emergency situations where so requested. It will also consider similar requests from non-IAEA members.

Document 2: Political commitments by States producing, exporting and holding radioactive sources

1. Radioactive sources are used in a wide range of applications, including agriculture, the environment, industry, medicine, research and others. There are estimated to be several million radioactive sources of all kinds and sizes disseminated around the world. The great majority of these sources present no serious threat, even if they should be handled with the customary caution: this notably applies to smoke detectors or instrument calibration sources. Certain sources, on the other hand, call for strict safety and security measures owing to their highly radioactive nature. The main objectives are to prevent malevolent acts (theft, sabotage or transformation into a radiological dispersion device) and avoid radiological accidents. IAEA considers that roughly 100 countries lack the legislative and regulatory framework needed to control radioactive sources adequately.
2. The G-8 heads of State and Government appeal to the international community of States, calling upon them:
 - 2.1. To account for the sources in their possession on their territory;
 - 2.2. To take steps (where necessary with the assistance of IAEA) to secure all high-level radioactive sources;

- 2.3. To search for, locate and secure sources believed missing (“orphan” sources).

This short and medium-term approach being conducted by States at the national level may be accompanied by international cooperation geared towards the most vulnerable States. The work performed by G-8 countries and the European Union aimed at developing, in close cooperation with IAEA, a legal framework for the registration, administration and control of radioactive sources can provide a valuable input to wider international efforts in this area.

3. International assistance is being intensified under the auspices of IAEA. This may, among other things, take the following forms:

- 3.1. Campaigns to search for and locate orphan sources, based on information gathered locally or from the initial producer and/or exporter of these sources;
- 3.2. Securing these sources on site and, in extreme circumstances, evacuating them to specialized facilities;
- 3.3. Installing appropriate instruments at border crossings and strategic points which aim to detect illegal movements of radioactive materials.

4. These assistance missions, which are liable to take place over an extended period of time, may be implemented with the aid of international financing (via the G-8 Global Partnership, the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund, European or national funding, etc).

5. The States that produce and distribute radioactive sources have a special responsibility with regard to the safety and security of these sources. The G-8 initially, and subsequently the other producer and exporting States as well, will give consideration to the type and nature of commitment into which the radioactive source producer and/or exporting States might enter.

This commitment could take the form of an individual declaration by these States to IAEA, in which they affirm their determination to uphold the “principles of safe and secure management of radioactive sources”.

Document 3: Recommendations to States on the security of radioactive sources

1. The IAEA Code of Conduct contains points contributing to the safety or the security of radioactive sources, or both. In its findings, the International Conference in Vienna, in March 2003, also identified points that ought to help strengthen the security of radioactive sources and render terrorist access to these sources more difficult.

The G-8 proposes that these points be considered by States in implementing control and monitoring systems within their territory.

2. The G-8 will direct a working group to identify those elements of the IAEA Code of Conduct that are of greatest relevance to preventing terrorists from gaining access to radioactive sources and to develop recommendations for national consideration on the implementation of

those elements, in close consultation with IAEA. These recommendations will take into account the findings of the 2003 International Conference on Security of Radioactive Sources and could consider addressing, in particular, the following:

- 2.1. Establishing a national register to track sources throughout their life cycle;
- 2.2. Setting up an outline for creating a national mechanism for the recovery and securing of “orphan” or poorly controlled sources within their national territory;
- 2.3. Establishing a series of guidelines with respect to the control of exports of sources, conditions attaching to them, and mechanisms (e.g., notifications) for monitoring these exports;
- 2.4. Developing national measures as necessary to combat malevolent acts involving radioactive sources;
- 2.5. Identifying possible measures to be taken by the State in order to safeguard and restrict access to sources;
- 2.6. Identifying measures that the State could take regarding the conditioning and/or encouraging the recycling of sources at the end of their life;
- 2.7. Putting in place a system which aims to detect the passage of radioactive sources at strategic points such as border crossings.

Document 4: International conference on the safety and the security of radioactive sources

1. The international Conference on Security of Radioactive Sources held in Vienna in March 2003, co-chaired by Russia and the United States, set in motion a process for reinforcing and accelerating international cooperation in the field of safety and security of radioactive sources, and more especially from the standpoint of security. This also follows on from the previous international conferences on safety and security, held in Dijon (France) in 1998 and in Buenos Aires (Argentina) in 2001.

2. Over the next two years, it would be desirable to consolidate the political impetus given to this issue in 2003 (through the Vienna conference in March and the Evian summit in June). A progress report should be drawn up on action taken to secure radioactive sources by:

- 2.1. The competent international organizations, e.g., IAEA, the World Customs Organization (WCO), the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the European Commission, etc.;
- 2.2. States, at both national as well as bilateral and multilateral levels: safety and/or security authorities, export control bodies, customs administration, public or private agencies or enterprises with expertise in the field of radioactive sources (management, detection, search and location, securing, etc).

3. Consultations should be conducted, after the Evian summit, with the main States concerned in order to give substance to the initiatives launched. In particular, the proposals aimed at making sources more secure need to be refined: these could include, among other things, recommendations made on the basis of measures contained in the IAEA Code of Conduct and of the findings of the March 2003 International Conference. Consideration will also be given to the need to launch campaigns to secure poorly controlled radioactive sources, and to search for, locate and secure “orphan” radioactive sources, with international funding (mainly via the G-8 Global Partnership and the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund). National expert groups could meet to discuss these themes at IAEA in the second half of 2003 and in 2004.

4. France will organize a fourth conference in the first half of 2005, which will draw up a progress report on the process begun in 2003. This conference could work according to the following guidelines:

- 4.1. Consolidating international efforts by IAEA with regard to radioactive sources (via its action plan, Code of Conduct, assistance in the detection of illicit trafficking in radioactive materials, campaigns to locate orphan sources, and so on), and States in their national initiatives, as well as supporting bilateral and multilateral cooperative ventures;
- 4.2. Evaluating the main projects in progress;
- 4.3. Preparing a provisional assessment of the campaigns to secure poorly controlled sources (covering safety and security aspects), and campaigns to search for, locate and secure orphan sources;
- 4.4. This conference would be attended by all of the aforementioned operational actors concerned by this issue.

Building international political will and the capacity to combat terrorism: G-8 action plan

1. Overview: critical need for capacity-building

The international community has been united in fighting against international terrorism since the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001. The threat of terrorism still, however, remains serious, as has been seen in a series of terrorist incidents, including in Indonesia, Kenya, Morocco, Pakistan, the Philippines, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and Yemen over the past year.

For the prevention and eradication of terrorism, since 11 September 2001 the G-8 and other countries have successfully strengthened their own counter-terrorism measures. The Coalition operation in Afghanistan has also accomplished certain results by arresting those related to al-Qa'idah and destroying most of its training camps. The remnants of al-Qa'idah are scattered all over the world, however, and still maintain a global network. In order to disrupt the network and to secure safety in the international community, it is important categorically to deny terrorists a safe haven anywhere. For this purpose it is essential for the G-8 to build stronger international will and to engage in outreach activities towards other countries in the area of counter-terrorism cooperation, and at the same time to provide capacity-building assistance to those countries with insufficient capacity to fight terrorism.

Each G-8 member has so far encouraged, based on its own priorities, countries to enhance counter-terrorism measures and has provided capacity-building assistance. Now it is necessary for the G-8 to have a common plan for counter-terrorism outreach activities and capacity-building assistance with a view to ensuring that assistance by the G-8 be selectively and effectively provided to those areas in which countries need assistance most and in order to avoid, as far as possible, the duplication of assistance by the G-8.

2. G-8 strategy for capacity-building

Developing a successful capacity to tackle terrorism requires a focus on three main areas of counter-terrorist activity: first, denying terrorists the means to commit terrorist acts (for example, preventing the financing of terrorism, and denial of false documents and weapons); second, to deny terrorists a safe haven and ensure that terrorists are prosecuted and/or extradited (for example to accelerate the conclusion of counter-terrorism conventions and protocols, to deny terrorists entry into a country and to reinforce law-enforcement agencies); and third, to overcome vulnerability to terrorism (for example, to enhance domestic security measures and capability for crisis management and consequence management). For the peace and security of the world, it is essential for all countries, including developing countries, to enhance such capability. Such activity should be seen as complementary to initiatives to strengthen good governance, the rule of law, human rights and judicial reform, and to the analysis of factors which contribute to the emergence of terrorism.

As a means of delivering capacity-building assistance, we may receive trainees, dispatch specialists, or provide equipment as requested by recipient countries. From this viewpoint, the following are broad areas for potential capacity-building assistance, and it is important for each G-8 member to make a contribution according to its own ability by making the most of its own know-how. In each area, efforts to ensure training and assistance to implement laws, procedures and regulations will be pursued. The areas for capacity-building assistance as outlined by the United Nations Security Council's Counter-Terrorism Committee include:

- Counter-terrorism legislation - assistance in developing legislation for the domestic implementation of conventions, protocols and resolutions relating to terrorist activity;
- Financial law and practice - assistance in drafting and enforcing legislation, regulations and codes of practice criminalizing the financing of terrorism and the seizure and freezing of assets;
- Customs law and practice - assistance in drafting and enforcing legislation on the establishment of border controls;
- Immigration law and practice - assistance in drafting and enforcing legislation on immigration controls including standards for travel documentation and the granting of asylum or refugee status;
- Extradition law and practice - assistance in drafting legislation to implement bilateral and multilateral cooperation on extradition;
- Police and law enforcement - development of procedures for counter-terrorism law enforcement and the provision of assistance to national police forces to counter terrorism as well as illicit drug trafficking and organized crime as they relate to counter-terrorism;
- Export controls and illegal arms trafficking - assistance in the drafting of legislation and development of procedures preventing the access by terrorists to weapons;
- Domestic security measures - assistance in the development and implementation of adequate crisis and consequence management techniques, aviation and transportation security measures and protection of critical infrastructure.

3. G-8 action plan: building international political will and the capacity to combat terrorism

3.1. The G-8 will support the United Nations Security Council's Counter-Terrorism Committee by:

- Ensuring that the Counter-Terrorism Committee is sufficiently staffed;

- Prioritizing countries, regions and fields in order to coordinate the assistance necessary to meet the obligations entered into under resolution 1373 (2001) (2001) of the United Nations Security Council;
- Outlining specific ways in which G-8 members can support and encourage countries to fulfil their obligations under resolution 1373 (2001) of the United Nations Security Council;
- Working with the Counter-Terrorism Committee to identify relevant international best practices, codes and standards;
- Supporting steps by our finance ministers to coordinate counter-terrorism financing measures and to work with the Financial Action Task Force on Money-Laundering and the international financial institutions to tackle terrorist financing, to build institutional capacity and to pursue other counter-terrorism objectives in their assessment and assistance initiatives.

3.2. To this end, the G-8 will create a counter-terrorism action group:

- The G-8 will create a counter-terrorism action group, to focus on building political will and coordinating capacity-building assistance where necessary. Other States, mainly donors, will be invited to join the group. A representative of the Counter-Terrorism Committee will be invited to meetings of the action group. Representatives from relevant United Nations bodies, the international financial institutions and other regional and functional organizations will be invited to relevant meetings (the first meeting to be held by 15 July);
- Members of the action group will provide funding, expertise or training facilities. They will focus their activities on areas and countries where they have expertise.

3.3. The counter-terrorism action group will analyse and prioritize needs, and expand counter-terrorism capacity-building assistance by:

- Reviewing requests, analysing the requirements and prioritizing needs for capacity-building assistance (by the second meeting of the action group, to be held by 15 October);
- Exchanging information as far as possible on the needs assessment missions that action group members have carried out;
- Holding coordination meetings between the diplomatic missions of action group members in priority recipient countries, involving host government and local officials responsible for capacity-building assistance;

- Seeking to increase counter-terrorism capacity-building assistance and coordination (by the 2004 summit);
- Providing reports biannually of current and planned capacity-building assistance which will then be shared with the Counter-Terrorism Committee;
- Identifying cases of successful implementation of counter-terrorism capacity-building efforts to share best practices and lessons learned (by the second meeting of the action group, to be held by 15 October);
- Facilitating joint initiatives by members in certain countries.

3.4. The counter-terrorism action group will expand regional assistance by:

- Encouraging regional assistance programmes, including the delivery of assistance, through regional and donor-sponsored training centres (by the 2004 summit);
- Sharing available information on counter-terrorism curricula and best training practices (by the first action group meeting, no later than 15 July) and developing key areas of focus that various regional training centres could address (by the second meeting of the action group, to be held by 15 October);
- Seeking to address unmet regional assistance needs (by the 2004 summit).

3.5. The G-8 will increase outreach efforts to third countries and regional and functional organizations by:

- Continuing to make G-8 approaches to countries that are not parties to all international counter-terrorism conventions and protocols, to urge them to become parties and to accelerate the domestic implementation of required measures;
- Conducting outreach bilaterally and jointly through expert meetings and seminars, to share the benefits of concluding conventions and to impart technical knowledge for implementation (plan to be presented by the first meeting of the action group);
- Building upon the 6 March 2003 meeting between the Counter-Terrorism Committee and regional organizations, to identify specific roles and responsibilities for regional and functional organizations that emphasize their strengths while avoiding the duplication of effort;
- Requesting regional and functional organizations to become more active in encouraging implementation by their members of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001);

- Encouraging regional and functional organizations to develop best practices, codes or standards conducive to implementation of the requirements of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001);
- Implementing G-8 outreach to the international financial institutions and functional organizations, such as the World Customs Organization (WCO), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO), to discuss areas of mutual interest in the funding and provision of counter-terrorism capacity-building assistance.

4. Follow-up

The G-8 Presidency will produce a report for the 2004 summit.

Chair's summary, Evian, 3 June 2003

We met in Evian for our annual summit, confident that, through our joint efforts, we can address the challenges of promoting growth, enhancing sustainable development and improving security. Our discussions with the leaders of emerging and developing countries (Algeria, Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Africa) and with the President of the Swiss Confederation and the representatives of the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) provided an opportunity for an exchange of views on growth and international cooperation. New proposals have been put forward which could underpin our future work. The following is a summary of our decisions.

1. Strengthening growth worldwide

Macroeconomics, structural reforms, trade and responsible market economy. Our economies face many challenges. Major downside risks have receded, however, and the conditions for a recovery are in place. We are confident in the growth potential of our economies. We reaffirm our commitment to multilateral cooperation, to achieve the objectives and overall timetable set out in the Doha Development Agenda as reflected in our action plan on trade, and to implement sound macroeconomic policies supportive of growth, while ensuring domestic and external sustainability. Our common responsibility is to raise growth in our own economies, and thus contribute to a stronger global economy.

As this contribution should rely more strongly on structural reforms and flexibility, we therefore reaffirm our commitment:

- To implement structural reforms of labour, product and capital markets;
- To implement pension and health care reforms, as we face a common challenge of ageing populations;
- To raise productivity through education and lifelong learning and by creating an environment where entrepreneurship can thrive, fostering competition and promoting public and private investment in knowledge and innovation;
- To strengthen investor confidence by improving corporate governance, enhancing market discipline and increasing transparency;
- To the principles of our Declaration on Fostering Growth and Promoting a Responsible Market Economy, accompanied with specific actions to improve transparency and to fight corruption more effectively, including a specific initiative on extractive industries.

Prevention and resolution of financial crises: We welcomed the progress achieved over the last year on strengthening the international framework for financial crisis prevention and resolution so as to improve conditions for sustained private investment in emerging markets.

IMF should continue to enhance its surveillance by making it more comprehensive, independent, accountable and transparent. It should also pursue work on issues of general relevance to the restructuring of sovereign debt. We will exercise improved discipline in the provision of official finance.

We remain committed to promoting an early and widespread adoption of collective action clauses, building on the specific steps already taken by several countries. We welcome initiatives being taken by issuers, the private sector and our officials on the development of a code of conduct. We look forward to their progress.

We welcomed the agreement reached by our finance ministers on a new tailored Paris Club approach for responding to the debt problems of countries not eligible for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt initiative. We expect this “Evian approach” to address debt sustainability problems more conclusively, while ensuring that debt restructuring remains the last resort.

We look forward to the results of efforts under way to strengthen the international framework for financial crisis prevention and resolution.

2. Enhancing sustainable development

We focused on the implementation of the internationally agreed Millennium and Johannesburg development goals in the following areas:

Africa: Our discussions with the presidents of Algeria, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa, the leaders of countries represented on the Steering Committee of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), demonstrated our common will to contribute to the development of Africa. We endorsed the report prepared by our Africa personal representatives. We agreed to extend our dialogue to other African leaders on NEPAD and the G-8 Africa action plan. We invite interested countries and relevant international institutions to appoint senior representatives to join this partnership. We will review progress on our action plan no later than 2005 on the basis of a report.

Famine: To alleviate the threat facing millions of people, especially in Africa, we committed ourselves to responding to the emergency food aid needs and agreed on ways to improve famine prevention mechanisms and long-term food security.

Water: Following on from the Kyoto World Water Forum, we adopted an action plan to help meet the Millennium and Johannesburg goals of halving the number of people without access to clean water and sanitation by 2015.

Health: We agreed on measures:

- To strengthen the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, and other bilateral and multilateral efforts, notably through our active participation in the donors’ and supporters’ conference to be hosted in Paris this July;

- To improve access to health care, including to drugs and treatments at affordable prices, in poor countries;
- To encourage research on diseases mostly affecting developing countries;
- To mobilize the extra funding needed to eradicate polio by 2005;
- To improve international cooperation against new epidemics, such as severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS).

Financing for development: We reaffirmed our commitment to addressing the challenge of global poverty and our support for the Millennium development goals and the Monterrey consensus. We noted that achieving these ambitious goals would require considerable efforts from both developed and developing countries, including increased resources. We welcomed the report of our finance ministers' discussions on our increased resources and on financing instruments. We invite them to report back to us in September on the issues raised by the financing instruments, including the proposal for a new international finance facility.

Debt: We reaffirmed our commitment to the HIPC initiative, launched at our Cologne summit. Since Kananaskis, where we pledged to provide our share of the shortfall of up to \$1 billion, progress has continued in the implementation of the HIPC initiative. Twenty-six of the world's poorest countries are now benefiting from debt relief, totalling more than \$60 billion committed in nominal terms. In the light of continued implementation challenges, however, and the slow pace of country progress in the initiative, we have identified the following priority areas:

- To encourage and assist eligible countries in taking the steps necessary to complete the HIPC process, our finance ministers asked IMF and the World Bank to identify, by their next annual meetings, the specific impediments in each country and the steps that need to be taken to tackle them;
- Not all official and commercial creditors have yet agreed to participate in the initiative. We urged IMF and the World Bank to intensify their efforts to secure the full participation of all creditors. Further options to deal with the issues of litigation should also be explored;
- We welcomed the progress made towards completing our commitment in Kananaskis to fill the estimated financing gap in the HIPC trust fund, through the pledges of \$850 million made in Paris in October 2002. We will continue to monitor the financing needs of the trust fund;
- We reaffirmed the objective of ensuring lasting debt sustainability in HIPC countries and noted that these countries will remain vulnerable to exogenous shocks, even after reaching completion point. In this context, we have asked our finance ministers to

review by September mechanisms to encourage good governance and the methodology for calculating the amount of “topping-up” debt relief available to countries at completion point based on updated cost estimates. Market-based mechanisms and other effective instruments to address the impact of commodity price fluctuations on low-income countries should also be explored;

- E-government: We welcomed work on the e-government model promoting efficiency and transparency in developing countries and will work towards enlarging the number of beneficiary countries.

Human security: We took note of the report of the International Commission on Human Security submitted to the United Nations Secretary-General.

Science and technology for sustainable development: We adopted an action plan on how best to use science and technology for sustainable development, focused on three areas:

- Global observation;
- Cleaner, more efficient energy and the fight against air pollution and climate change;
- Agriculture and biodiversity.

Those of us who have ratified the Kyoto Protocol reaffirm their determination to see it enter into force.

Illegal logging: From the perspective of sustainable forest management, we confirmed our determination to strengthen international efforts to tackle the problem of illegal logging.

Marine environment and tanker safety: We endorsed an action plan to reduce the threat posed by the excessive exploitation of marine resources and to enhance maritime security.

Nuclear safety: In accordance with our statement at Kananaskis, we established the G-8 Nuclear Safety and Security Group, and adopted its mandate and the core principles shared by each of us, to promote the safe and secure use of civil nuclear technology.

3. Improving security

Commendable progress has been achieved against terrorism worldwide. We note with concern, however, the remaining threats of terrorist networks, the challenges of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in several countries and the risks to peace and security that unresolved conflicts pose to the world.

Non-proliferation: We adopted a statement on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and endorsed an action plan on the prevention of radiological terrorism and the securing of radioactive sources.

Terrorism: We adopted an action plan on capacity-building against terrorism and created a counter-terrorism action group, in support of the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee, in order to combat terrorist groups worldwide. One of the best ways to do this is to staunch the flow of financing that supports terrorism. We direct finance ministers to assess progress and identify next steps. To develop strengthened cooperation, we also ask ministers to initiate a dialogue with counterparts in other countries, including those whose financial institutions, both formal and informal, may serve as conduits for such financing, at their forthcoming meeting in Dubai next September.

Transport security and control of man-portable air defence systems: In order to reduce further the risks of terrorist action against mass transportation, we reviewed the implementation of the measures agreed upon at Kananaskis and decided to take new initiatives concerning sea and air transport security. We agreed on actions to prevent the use of man-portable air defence systems (Manpads) against civil aviation.

Global Partnership: We reaffirmed our Kananaskis commitments to prevent terrorists, or those that harbour them, from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. To that end, we reviewed the implementation of the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction launched last year. We welcomed the progress achieved so far. We are determined to sustain and broaden our efforts towards:

- Reaching our Kananaskis commitment of raising up to \$20 billion over 10 years;
- Developing and initiating specific and worthwhile projects;
- Fully implementing the guidelines;
- Opening this initiative to new countries. To this end, we endorsed an action plan on the Global Partnership.

Small arms: We welcomed the upcoming meeting of States on the illicit traffic in small arms, to be held at the United Nations in New York in July 2003.

4. Regional issues

Iraq: We welcomed the unanimous adoption of United Nations Security Council resolution 1483 (2003) and share the conviction that the time has now come to build peace and reconstruct Iraq. Our shared objective is a fully sovereign, stable and democratic Iraq, at peace with its neighbours and firmly on the road to progress. We welcomed the announcement made by the United Nations regarding a preparatory meeting for an international conference on the reconstruction of Iraq.

Israel and Palestine: We welcomed the approval by the Palestinians and by Israel of the Quartet road map and emphasized our determination jointly to support its implementation. We discussed the desirability of reaching a comprehensive peace settlement that includes Syria and

Lebanon. We tasked our relevant ministers with examining as soon as possible the measures necessary to support a plan for the revitalization and reconstruction of the Palestinian economy, including the leveraging of private investment, within the framework of the Middle East peace process.

North Korea: We addressed the North Korean nuclear issue in our statement on non-proliferation. We support the efforts made by the different parties to seek by peaceful means a comprehensive solution to the North Korean nuclear issue and to other matters, including unresolved humanitarian problems such as the abductions. We also support the peace and prosperity policy pursued by the Republic of Korea.

Afghanistan: We confirmed our support for President Karzai's transitional administration. We reaffirmed that the Bonn process needs to be fully implemented, in both spirit and substance. We expressed our remaining concern on the security situation. In order to combat drug trafficking from Afghanistan, we support full implementation of the Afghan national drug strategy and the "Paris Pact" proposed on 22 May 2003 by the United Nations during the Ministerial Conference on Drug Routes from Central Asia to Europe.

Iran: We addressed the proliferation implications of Iran's advanced nuclear programme in our statement on non-proliferation.

Algeria: We expressed our deepest sympathy for the Algerian people after the recent devastating earthquakes. We are providing urgent humanitarian aid and, to address the financial consequences of this situation, we are instructing our relevant ministers to report within one month on how best to help Algeria recover.

Zimbabwe: We are concerned about reports of further violence by the authorities in Zimbabwe against their own people. We called on the Government of Zimbabwe to respect the right to peaceful demonstration. Consistent with the fundamental principles of the NEPAD partnership, we welcomed the contribution of other African States to promoting a peaceful resolution of the crisis and a prosperous and democratic future for the people of Zimbabwe.

We welcomed the offer of the President of the United States to host our next summit in 2004.
