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REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE  
UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN CYPRUS

(For the period 9 March to 7 June 1968)

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MAP - DEPLOYMENT OF UNFICYP IN JUNE 1968

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#### INTRODUCTION

1. This report on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus covers developments from 8 March to 7 June 1968 and brings up to date the record of the activities of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) pursuant to the mandate laid down in the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964 and subsequent resolutions of the Council relating to Cyprus.
2. The last three months in Cyprus have been marked by a further relaxation of tension and clear manifestations of a general desire to avoid incidents that might jeopardize an improving political atmosphere. This in turn has made it possible to arrange the first meaningful exchanges of views, since the beginning of the troubles in 1963, between leading personalities of the two communities.

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## I. THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS

### A. Composition and deployment

3. At the end of the period covered by my last report, the strength of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was 4,570 military personnel and 175 civilian police (S/8446, para. 3). On 7 June 1968, the composition of the Force was as follows:

<u>Military</u>		<u>Total</u>
Austria	- Field hospital	54
Canada	- HQ UNFICYP and military police	66
	- Battalion and reconnaissance squadron	710
	- Contingent HQ and administrative support group	<u>112</u>
Denmark	- HQ UNFICYP and military police	33
	- Battalion	<u>605</u>
Finland	- HQ UNFICYP and military police	19
	- Battalion	<u>559</u>
Ireland	- HQ UNFICYP and military police	15
	- Battalion	<u>509</u>
Sweden	- HQ UNFICYP and military police	25
	- Battalion	<u>593</u>
United Kingdom	- HQ UNFICYP and military police	159
	- Battalion and reconnaissance squadron	768
	- UNFICYP logistic support units	192
	- Helicopter support	<u>35</u>
	Total military personnel	<u>1,154</u>
		4,454
<u>Civilian police</u>		<u>Total</u>
Australia		50
Austria		45
Denmark		40
Sweden		<u>40</u>
	Total civilian police	<u>175</u>
	TOTAL UNFICYP	<u>4,629</u>

4. The following changes took place during the period of this report:

Rotations

(a) Austria: A partial rotation of troops was carried out at the end of which the total strength of the contingent remained unchanged.

(b) Canada: A rotation was carried out in which the 1st Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, a battery from the 3rd Regiment Canadian Horse Artillery and B Squadron of the Fort Garry Horse replaced the 1st Battalion the Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) and C Squadron of the Fort Garry Horse. The total strength of the contingent increased by three all ranks.

(c) Denmark: A rotation was carried out in which the 8th Danish Battalion was relieved by the 9th Danish Battalion. The total strength of the contingent decreased by eleven all ranks.

(d) Finland: A further partial rotation took place, reducing the total strength of the contingent by twenty-nine men. The incoming troops form part of the 9th Finnish Battalion.

(e) Ireland: A rotation was carried out in which the 9th Infantry Group was relieved by the 10th Infantry Group. The total strength of the contingent increased by two all ranks.

(f) Sweden: A rotation was carried out in which the 40th Swedish Battalion replaced the 39th Swedish Battalion. The total strength of the contingent increased by ten all ranks.

(g) United Kingdom: A partial rotation took place in which the 1st Battalion the Durham Light Infantry relieved the 1st Battalion the Royal Green Jackets, and C Squadron, 4th/7th Royal Dragoon Guards, relieved B Squadron. The total strength of the contingent decreased by ninety-one all ranks.

5. The Force is now deployed as follows (see attached map):

HQ UNFICYP, including HQ UNCIVPOL: Combined staff.

Nicosia west district

    Danish contingent

    Danish civilian police

    Austrian civilian police

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Nicosia east district

Finnish contingent

Austrian civilian police

Famagusta zone

Swedish contingent

Swedish civilian police

Limassol zone

British contingent

Australian civilian police

Lefka district

Irish contingent

Australian civilian police

Austrian civilian police

Kyrenia district

Canadian contingent

Danish civilian police

6. The Force remains under the command of Lieutenant-General A.E. Martola. My Special Representative in Cyprus continues to be Mr. B.F. Osorio-Tafall.

B. Function and guiding principles

7. The function of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus was defined by the Security Council in its resolution 186 of 4 March 1964 in the following terms:

"in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions."

8. That resolution was reaffirmed by the Council in its subsequent resolutions of 13 March, 20 June, 9 August, 25 September and 18 December 1964; 19 March, 15 June, 10 August and 17 December 1965; 16 March, 16 June and 15 December 1966; 19 June and 22 December 1967; and 18 March 1968.

9. The guiding principles governing the operation of the Force, as summarized in my report of 10 September 1964 (S/5950, para. 7), remain in effect. The duties

of the civilian police element of the Force are outlined in my report of 2 May 1964 (S/5679, para. 4).

10. The Political Liaison Committee continues to meet regularly to deal with the problems of implementation of the mandate and questions involving relationships between the Government and the Turkish Cypriot community. The UNFICYP Deputy Chief of Staff, who acts as Chairman, the Senior Political and Legal Adviser and his staff, the Police Adviser and the Force Economics Officer meet with Liaison Officers representing the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership separately. Between 9 March and 7 June 1968 the Committee held nine meetings with the Government Political Liaison Officer and eight with the Turkish Cypriot Political Liaison Officer.

#### Casualties

11. During its current mandate, UNFICYP suffered no casualties as a result of inter-communal incidents. However, two soldiers died and thirteen were hospitalized as a result of accidents, and one soldier died from a self-inflicted wound.

#### Discipline

12. The over-all discipline, understanding and bearing of the officers and men of the United Nations Force have continued to be of a high order, and reflect great credit on the Contingent Commanders, their staffs and the armed forces of the contributing countries.

#### C. Relations with the Government and with the Turkish Cypriot leadership

13. UNFICYP has continued to maintain close liaison with the Government of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot leadership. The good working relations with the Government security forces, which, in general, have adopted a defensive posture, have continued, although in one area referred to below (para. 15) the National Guard has denied freedom of movement to UNFICYP.

14. The number of occasions on which Turkish Cypriot fighters, who have maintained an attitude of vigilance, have obstructed UNFICYP soldiers in the execution of their responsibilities has been less than during the period of the last report

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(S/8446, para. 17). However, there has been a disturbing increase in violations of the Kyrenia Road Agreement during the current period. Armed fighters have used the road with increasing frequency in spite of strong representations by UNFICYP to the Turkish Cypriot leadership. Also, Turkish Cypriot fighters have again appeared in places where their presence could cause tension. For example, UNFICYP representations were disregarded when fighters appeared in uniform at the celebration of Turkish Youth and Sports Day in the Turkish quarter of Limassol, on 19 May.

D. Freedom of movement of the United Nations Force

15. I am pleased to report that there has been only minimal interference with UNFICYP's freedom of movement during the past three months. The only cases of significance were at Alevga (GR R 3567) and Selain t'Api (GR R 3666), where on seven separate occasions UNFICYP and UNCIVPOL patrols were prevented by the National Guard from proceeding along the main road through the two villages on the grounds that they were National Guard camps and as such were restricted areas. UNFICYP does not accept them as restricted areas since they are not among those agreed to and recorded on the official map of 10 November 1964 (S/6102, para. 127), but were placed under ~~restriction~~ unilaterally by the Cyprus Government in May 1967. The attention of the Government has been drawn to this arbitrary limitation of United Nations freedom of movement. At the same time, in the light of developments, the Government has also been asked to undertake, jointly with UNFICYP, a general re-examination of all the restricted areas with a view to reducing their number.

II. ACTIVITIES TOWARDS PREVENTING A RECURRENCE OF FIGHTING  
AND CONTRIBUTING TO THE RESTORATION AND MAINTENANCE OF  
LAW AND ORDER

A. Military situation

(i) Armed forces in Cyprus other than UNFICYP

(a) Government armed forces

16. The basic structure of the National Guard has undergone no substantial modification during the past three months and its strength under arms remains unchanged. There has been no demobilization and no further conscription of any age groups.

17. The National Guard is still deployed in many coastal areas, but there have been withdrawals from some inland outposts. This is not only consistent with the Government's normalization measures, but it has also resulted in better discipline through a higher concentration of recruits in training camps. However, the undiminished vigilance and activeness of the Turkish Cypriot fighters and their frequent appearance on their positions have led to a certain increased wariness on the part of the National Guard, which has recently been more active in patrolling those areas of confrontation from which it had previously withdrawn and has in some places temporarily reoccupied certain positions.

(b) Turkish Cypriot armed elements

18. The Turkish Cypriot fighter units do not appear to have undergone any noteworthy changes, or to have relaxed either their state of alertness or their training and instruction programmes. Although the Government's abolition of controls on the movement of goods has made it less risky to redeploy military equipment, this has not significantly affected the over-all armament of the Turkish Cypriot fighters, and UNFICYP has not seen or been furnished with any evidence that weapons or other military equipment have reached the fighter organization from outside the Island during this period.

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(c) The Greek and Turkish National Contingents

19. To UNFICYP's knowledge there has been no change in the total strengths or the locations of the two National Contingents during the period under review.

UNFICYP has been informed that part of the Greek National Contingent will soon be relieved, probably in mid-July.

20. At the end of January 1968, preparations were begun for the relief of approximately half of the Turkish National Contingent (S/8446, para. 34). The rotation subsequently took place without incident on 29 March 1968 through the port of Famagusta. The incoming party consisted of 45 officers and 306 other ranks, while 42 officers and 309 other ranks left the Island. Approximately 200 tons of stores and ammunition, which had been negotiated with the Government of Cyprus through UNFICYP's good offices, were imported with the incoming party. As in the past, UNFICYP provided inland transport, military police escorts and observers.

(d) Question of verification of other military personnel of Greece and Turkey in Cyprus

21. In my March 1968 report to the Security Council (S/8446, paras. 26 and 27), I stated that subject to certain conditions, I had agreed to a request by the Governments of Greece and Turkey to have UNFICYP verify the withdrawal from Cyprus of military personnel of Greece and Turkey in excess of their national contingents. I had asked my Special Representative and the Force Commander to initiate discussions with the Cyprus Government and the representatives of Greece and Turkey in Nicosia on detailed arrangements and procedures.

22. A number of meetings were held with officials of the Cyprus Government and of the Greek and Turkish embassies. The first two meetings took place on 9 March, when the Cyprus Government and the Greek Embassy were advised of UNFICYP's requirements in the form of the information and statistical data about Greek national forces, which would be necessary if UNFICYP was to be able to carry out the task of verification with any degree of effectiveness. In addition, the Cyprus Government was asked to approve access to all restricted areas and to all National Guard camps and detachments. These meetings were followed by one with the Turkish Embassy on 13 March at which similar information was requested as far as it related to the Turkish Cypriot fighters, the Turkish National Contingent and any other Turkish national personnel.

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23. On 6 April, the Greek Embassy informed UNFICYP that on the understanding that there would be complete reciprocity on the part of the Turkish Government, the Greek Government agreed to provide the information that had been asked for, with the proviso that in certain cases the agreement of the Cyprus Government should be obtained. The latter had already indicated its full co-operation.

24. On 24 April, a reply was received from the Turkish Government stating that the military involvement of Greece and Turkey in the Island presented significant differences, and the same criteria for inspection could not be applied to the two cases. It requested that verification be carried out in two stages, in which the checking of the presence of excess Greek national units and Greek national personnel assigned to the Cyprus National Guard would be completed before the checking of Turkish national elements.

25. Thus there appears to be no agreement on a major aspect of the inspection programme. As I have already indicated to the Council (S/8446, para. 26), verification by UNFICYP would be feasible only on the basis of full agreement and co-operation by the Governments of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey.

(e) Cyprus Police arms

26. In my report of 9 March 1968 (S/8446, para. 28), I stated that, pending further discussions with the Government, the Force Commander had refrained, for the time being, from continuing his periodic inspections of the consignment of weapons imported in December 1966 (S/7611/Add.1, and S/7969, para. 27). This decision was made in the light of the position taken by the Minister of the Interior early this year that the previously agreed inspections would no longer cover light arms, all of which were gradually to be distributed to the Cyprus Police. UNFICYP had always refused to accept any distinction between light and heavy arms, as the undertaking given to me by the Government of Cyprus covered all weapons without distinction.

27. At an official parade in Nicosia on 1 April 1968, a detachment of the Cyprus Police Tactical Reserve consisting of about 180 men were observed to be carrying a quantity of automatic rocket-launchers as well as such high-powered personal arms as semi-automatic rifles and sub-machineguns. This display of weapons, which

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was widely publicized by the Greek Cypriot Press as being part of the above-mentioned consignment of imported arms, was immediately protested by the Turkish Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership as contrary to repeated assurances of the Government of Cyprus. It was emphasized that such a display could only be regarded as provocative and likely to promote suspicion at a time when tension in Cyprus was subsiding.

28. The Force Commander at once called at the Ministry of the Interior and was informed that the equipment carried by the Cyprus Police in the parade had included the following weapons from the consignment in question: 102 M-58 automatic rifles, 18 M-25 sub-machineguns and 18 rocket-launchers. It was added that all of the so-called light arms had been distributed. The Special Representative and the Force Commander drew the Government's attention to the fact that the distribution of those arms had been inconsistent with its undertaking to give the Secretary-General prior notice of such distribution (S/7969, para. 27), and with its avowed intentions, as conveyed to the Force Commander in February 1968, that only light arms would be distributed to the Cyprus Police and then only gradually, as currently used police weapons became unusable (S/8446, para. 28). Immediately thereafter, the Force Commander carried out a new inspection of the arms in store but he was shown only arms which the Government classified as heavy weapons and from which rocket-launchers were excluded. The Government was thereupon informed that its position concerning the limitation of inspection to heavy arms continued to be unacceptable to UNFICYP.

29. In the interests of furthering a climate of trust and rapprochement in the Island, UNFICYP urged the Government to return to store, and to keep available for inspection by the Force Commander all arms which had been distributed without prior notice to the Secretary-General, and especially those, such as automatic rocket-launchers, which were not normally used by a police force.

30. Following a series of consultations with Government officials, who stated that every effort would be made to comply with that request, the Force Commander carried out another inspection on 25 April, when he was shown the arms in store without any distinction being made between light and heavy weapons. This inspection showed that the situation was the same as at his inspection of

20 November 1967 (S/8286, para. 25), except for the absence of 332 semi-automatic rifles, which, it was stated, had been issued to the police and could no longer be withdrawn from them because to do so would have left them without weapons.

31. At the same time, the Government notified the Force Commander that it intended to distribute gradually, between July and December 1968, all of the light arms now in store, in order to modernize the equipment of the police force. The Government has undertaken to give me a further notice of the date on which this gradual distribution will begin and to keep UNFICYP informed of the process of distribution. The Force Commander will continue to carry out his periodic inspections of the arms remaining in store, which after 1968 are expected to consist of all of the heavy machineguns, automatic rocket-launchers and mortars in the consignment imported in December 1966.

(ii) General assessment of the situation with regard to preventing a recurrence of fighting

32. Except for a few instances in which additional National Guard units have been withdrawn from forward positions into rear camps, there has been no further military disengagement during the period under review, and it is unlikely that the Government will significantly extend its unilateral withdrawals so long as the Turkish Cypriot leadership does not take some pacifying measures of its own.

33. In Larnaca, particularly along Artemis Avenue, the situation remains unchanged since my last report (S/8446, paras. 56-58), with no withdrawals by either the National Guard or the Turkish Cypriot fighters. As a consequence, UNFICYP has found itself in the awkward position of having to continue its occupancy of a Turkish Cypriot school, badly needed for educational purposes, which is situated on the Government-held side of the Larnaca "Green Line" and which, unless more general deconfrontation in the area can be initiated, might become a new scene of conflict if UNFICYP left it. As indicated in previous reports to the Council, similar considerations apply in the case of the Kophinou police compound (S/7969, para. 58 and S/8446, para. 42). Discussion is continuing with a view to finding some arrangement whereby families would be allowed to return to the living quarters within the compound, as a first step to the solution of this long-standing problem.

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34. On 19 April Turkish Cypriots started to construct a coffee-house with adjoining recreation facilities at Karaolos Beach in Famagusta District. The Government strongly protested to UNFICYP against the new structures, pointing out that the Turkish Cypriots were violating certain building laws of the Republic, including those relating to construction on a Government-owned foreshore. The Turkish Cypriots replied that much of their property all over the Island had been illegally seized and built upon by the "Greek Cypriot Administration" and the Turkish Cypriots of Famagusta needed facilities to replace the bathing area they had had before the construction of the "New Harbour". At first, the Government was obviously also concerned about the possibility that the structures might be convertible into a small harbour of military importance, but the inspections carried out by UNFICYP indicated that this was not the case.

35. A further incident that undeniably caused alarm and, were it not for the prudence displayed by the Government and by the Turkish Cypriot leadership, might have had serious consequences occurred on 15 May, when a Turkish Cypriot lorry travelling south from Nicosia to Ktima was stopped by the Cyprus Police on the basis of information received and, upon being searched, was found to contain, hidden under sacks, two light machine-guns, five sub-machineguns, and more than 3,000 rounds of ammunition. The Turkish Cypriot leadership immediately denied all knowledge of the case and denounced it as an act of provocateurs bent on preventing further pacification and on spoiling the climate for talks between Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders. It promised to carry out a thorough investigation of the incident. This attitude had a reassuring effect on public opinion, but it is obvious that such incidents place a heavy strain on those in the Island who favour further pacification.

36. In view of such difficulties, it is gratifying to report that the last three months have passed without inter-communal troubles. This explains the brevity of the section on specific military developments in the present report and is reflected in the relatively small number of shooting incidents reported (para. 38). The situation is the more remarkable as large numbers of armed men continue to face each other in many parts of the Island. That this welcome calm has continued

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under such circumstances, despite a few serious incidents, testifies to the discipline and restraint that rank and file soldiers and their commanders can exercise when there is the will to do so.

37. Nevertheless, it is quite apparent that the opposing forces in Cyprus have entered a period of watchful waiting, pending favourable developments in the political sphere. Should these, contrary to the hopes of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots, fail to materialize, the resulting disillusionment might - if the close military confrontation in many areas is allowed to continue - give rise to increased tension and possibly new incidents.

B. Specific developments and action taken by UNFICYP

Observance of the cease-fire

38. Shooting incidents during the period under review are summarized below. The figures for previous periods are also shown for comparison.

Summary of Shooting Incidents

Zone or District	8 Mar 68 to 7 Jun 68	7 Dec 67 to 7 Mar 68	7 Jun 1967 to 6 Dec 1967	6 Dec 66 to 6 Jun 67	8 Jun 66 to 5 Dec 66
Nicosia West District	2	1	26	39	8
Nicosia East District	4	7	11	11	11
Famagusta Zone	3	5	25	31	22
Limassol Zone	1	6	41	8	8
Lefka District	8	23	100	88	76
Kyrenia District	21	25	81	169	164
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>284</b>	<b>346</b>	<b>289</b>

39. It is UNFICYP's opinion that there have been no deliberate breaches of the cease-fire. With the exception of the two serious cases described in paragraphs 43 and 44 below, all of the shooting incidents are believed to have been caused by random or accidental discharges of weapons in the hands of young and inexperienced personnel.

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40. There has been a reduction of 42 per cent as compared with the previous period. Of the 39 incidents reported, 8 have been attributed to Turkish Cypriot fighters and 12 to National Guard soldiers. The remainder were of unknown origin, for which responsibility could not be fixed.

41. This further substantial reduction in shooting incidents reflects the general lessening of tension all over the Island, largely resulting from measures implemented by the Government during this period.

C. Developments relating to the maintenance of law and order

42. The UNFICYP Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) has continued to carry out its duties as described in my last report (S/8446, paras. 63-64). During the period under review, nearly all of the investigations conducted by UNCIVPOL were of a fairly routine nature, such as cases of theft, damage to crops or property and inquiries concerning the origin of several fires. Several shooting incidents were investigated and found not to be of inter-communal significance. However, two serious shooting incidents occurred on 26 May and 6 June.

43. On 26 May, a Turkish Cypriot was killed by an anti-poaching patrol of the Cyprus Police at a place situated about one mile from the Turkish Cypriot village of Vrecha in the Paphos Forest. The case is being investigated by UNCIVPOL, and the local authorities have meanwhile been urged to prevent any action that might inflame the situation. On 31 May, UNFICYP informed the Government of the results of a Turkish Cypriot autopsy performed in the presence of an UNFICYP medical officer and asked for a thorough investigation of the incident. In reply, the Minister of the Interior stated that he had directed that an urgent and thorough investigation should be carried out, although the details of the autopsy report could only be accepted with certain reservations since the autopsy had not been performed by a Government pathologist and the Cyprus Police had been prevented from visiting the scene of the shooting.

44. On 6 June, a 19-year-old Turkish Cypriot was killed by National Guard soldiers on patrol who claimed that they had fired in self-defence. Investigation by UNCIVPOL showed that the youth had been hunting partridges with his father's shotgun, and that the incident had occurred at a place situated approximately

1,300 metres from the Turkish Cypriot village of Kalyvakia and 2,000 metres from a National-Guard post. He had been shot twice by rifle bullets, first in the left side of the left thigh and secondly in the middle of the back. A trail of bloodspots would indicate that, between the two shots, the victim ran for a distance of 600 metres towards his village. In this case, too, the Government, which has been informed of the results of UNCIVPOL's investigation and the report of an autopsy performed in the presence of an UNFICYP Medical Officer, has ordered a thorough investigation of its own. The Government has also advised UNFICYP that both the Cyprus Police and the National Guard are under instructions to use the greatest caution in exercising their duties.

45. Dr. Kuchuk protested with respect to the Vrecha incident (para. 43 above) by a letter dated 1 June, and again on 7 June he protested orally, in the strongest terms, with respect to the incident at Kalyvakia (para. 44 above). He contended that in each case the assertions of the Greek Cypriot security personnel that they had fired in self-defence were totally untrue. In the first case, the victim was a rural constable who was patrolling in the vicinity of his village, and in the second, it was a youth who was hunting birds, again in the vicinity of his village. In neither case had there been any threat to the armed patrols which had penetrated Turkish Cypriot areas and, in both cases, the victims had been shot from behind while running to safety. Dr. Kuchuk added that special steps were being taken by the Turkish Cypriot leadership to calm the indignation of its community and urge restraint, but declared that the mild punishment meted out in the past to Greek Cypriot security personnel who had killed Turkish Cypriots only encouraged further unjustified killings. He called for strict punishment in all such cases and for the payment of compensation to the victims' families. Dr. Kuchuk's protests have been brought to the Government's attention.

46. Two years ago, a Greek Cypriot wanted by the Cyprus Police in connexion with the murder of another Greek Cypriot took refuge in the Turkish Cypriot village of Louroujina (S/7350, para. 82) and the Turkish Cypriot leadership declined to facilitate his apprehension. On 6 May 1968, however, the local Turkish Cypriot police element handed him over to the Cyprus police through UNCIVPOL. The alleged murder weapon was similarly handed over on 22 May.

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47. A Greek Cypriot charged with the killing of a Turkish Cypriot at Koloni on 23 July 1967 and sentenced to four years' imprisonment for manslaughter on 17 January 1968 (S/8286, para. 77, and S/8446, para. 67) was released from custody on 18 April as a result of an act of executive clemency, which was also exercised with respect to four other Greek, and three Turkish Cypriots. With the release of these men, all persons arrested for offences connected with the emergency have been liberated.

48. At a trial in the Kyrenia Assize Court on 4 June, three Greek Cypriot youths charged, inter alia, with the bombing of the Aga Djafer Mosque in Kyrenia (S/8446, para 66), pleaded guilty. One, 21 years old, was sentenced to jail for nine months; another, 17 years old, was placed on probation for two years; and the third, 15 years old, was sent to a reform school. A fourth person was not prosecuted.

49. UNFICYP has learned with great satisfaction that outstanding warrants against persons accused of such offences will no longer be enforced. Two Turkish Cypriots arrested by the Cyprus Police for alleged complicity in murder cases connected with the emergency were quickly released without charges being pressed.

50. Three Greek and five Turkish Cypriots reported missing during the period under review were located by UNCIVPOL. Three Greek Cypriots and two Turkish Cypriots reported missing during the past month are still being sought.

### III. ACTIVITIES TOWARDS A RETURN TO NORMAL CONDITIONS

#### A. General assessment

51. The appeal contained in my last report calling on the parties to exercise the greatest prudence and avoid any disturbing incidents has by and large been heeded, and it is to be hoped that the new atmosphere created will be allowed to evolve into one of greater trust and confidence, which are essential to the growth of a spirit of conciliation and understanding. The Government's pacification measures, particularly the lifting of all restrictions previously imposed on the movement of Turkish Cypriots and certain goods (S/8446, paras. 71-75), have contributed greatly to the present situation. These measures also include the withdrawal on 19 March of the Government's request that diplomats should have no official contacts with Turkish Cypriot leaders (S/8446, para. 80) and the authorization of the return to Cyprus of Mr. Rauf Denktash, the President of the Turkish Communal Chamber, after he had been designated by his community as a participant in informal talks with Greek Cypriot leaders. Other Government measures which have been welcomed by the Turkish Cypriot community were its decisions to facilitate the re-registration of unlicensed Turkish Cypriot vehicles (para. 43) and to take no action on outstanding warrants relating to offences connected with the emergency (para. 47).

52. The new atmosphere has also been furthered by some conciliatory public statements of Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders. For example, on 19 May, Archbishop Makarios declared that despite the misgivings caused among Greek Cypriots by the way in which the Turkish Cypriots had so far responded to the pacification measures, the Government wished to believe that the Turkish Cypriot leadership would eventually decide "to move in our direction to meet us". He added that the roads leading to a meeting and talks would be kept open by the Greek Cypriot side. Speaking on the same day, Mr. Denktash publicly stated that the Turkish Cypriot community wanted an honourable peace, one that would safeguard its rights and interests, and it was prepared to show all possible flexibility in order to attain such a peace.

53. After the Government restrictions were lifted in March, my Special Representative often discussed with the Turkish Cypriot leadership the question

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of their contributions to pacification, especially in the field of freedom of movement. On 14 March, Vice-President Kuchuk, and subsequently other Turkish Cypriot leaders, indicated that if the removal of restrictions proved to be lasting and inspired by goodwill, the Turkish Cypriot leadership might consider taking "such reciprocal measures as would not prejudice its defence requirements". No measures were taken for two months. It was argued, for example, that the restrictions had been illegal, so that their removal had not constituted any concession, or that the Government's actions in Omorphita (paras. 78-79) and the display of police arms at the Eoka Day parade (para. 27) proved that the Greek Cypriots had not really changed their attitude towards the Turkish Cypriot community. In May, however, the Turkish Cypriot leadership ordered the dismantling of some road barriers set up within the Turkish sector of Nicosia during the crisis of last November (para. 66), and promised to take further steps if warranted by the political atmosphere.

54. It is gratifying to note that while there were some matters during the period under review on which one side or the other felt very strongly, both responded to UNFICYP's appeals to avoid their aggravation. Any one of such problems as Omorphita (paras. 76-79), the Karaolos Beach structures (para. 34), the display of new Cyprus Police arms (paras. 26-31), the clandestine transport of Turkish Cypriot arms (para. 35) and the killing of two Turkish Cypriots (paras. 43-44) might in the past have had serious consequences.

55. There are several other questions which are troubling inter-communal understanding. For example, the Turkish Cypriot leadership is demanding that the Hala Sultan Tekke, a famous Moslem shrine, should be returned to religious use under the administration of EVKAF, the Moslem religious trust. At the present time, the vicinity of the Tekke is controlled by a unit of the National Guard, while the building itself is being looked after by an official of the Department of Antiquities. The Government insists that the Tekke must remain accessible to all who wish to visit it and that the question of withdrawal of the National Guard from strategic positions in the vicinity of the Tekke is linked to that of military deconfrontation in the Larnaca area generally (S/8446, para. 59). In this respect as already indicated (para. 33 above) UNFICYP has been unable to make any progress but, pending such deconfrontation, it is trying to arrange, as regards the Tekke

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itself, for the restoration of the situation that existed prior to the inter-communal fighting, with adequate guarantees against the entry of armed elements.

56. It will be recalled that on 5 January 1968 the Turkish Cypriot leadership had raised the question of compensation for losses of life and personal property sustained by the inhabitants of Kophinou and Ayios Theodhoros during the military operation of 15-16 November 1967 and that the matter was taken up by UNFICYP with the Government (S/8446, paras. 49-51). The Government, in its reply, stated that it had promptly provided, through the good offices of UNFICYP, the necessary building materials for the immediate repair of all damaged immovable property in the two villages, but as to other losses it pointed out that since the commencement of the emergency in December 1963 hundreds of Cypriots - most of them Greek Cypriots - had lost their lives and many more their property. In the Government's view it would be unfair to isolate the case of Kophinou and Ayios Theodhoros and independently make any payment for loss of life or personal property in those villages.

57. This position is not accepted by the Turkish Cypriot leadership, which contends that the losses sustained at Kophinou and Ayios Theodhoros are in a different category from those suffered elsewhere, which involve Turkish Cypriot claims of millions of pounds against the Greek Cypriot community. It has requested UNFICYP to continue to press the case of the two villages as a separate matter. Similarly, the Turkish Government insists that the looting done by the National Guard in these villages should be made good without delay, and above all that indemnity, as provided in the relevant Cyprus regulations, should be paid to the families of villagers killed in the fighting. UNFICYP is continuing to make available its good offices in seeking a solution to this problem.

58. It is my earnest hope that leaders on both sides will continue along their present course of not permitting the process of pacification and normalization to be at the mercy of particular problems, however justified their positions might appear to be, or of fortuitous events springing from the unhappy past, and that they will pursue a policy of positive responses to measures of relaxation so as to encourage even further détente.

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59. With respect to the functioning of the law courts and the administration of justice, no new issues have arisen and the situation as described in my last report (S/8446, paras. 134-138) remains unchanged.

60. In connexion with the "Immovable Property (Forced Sales) (Special Cases) Laws, 1968" (S/8446, paras. 116-117), no forced sales of Turkish Cypriot property have been held.

61. UNFICYP continues to extend its good offices for the normalization of the public services. However, only limited progress has been made in working out practical arrangements, owing mainly to a general tendency not to accept commitments that are thought to have lasting political implications.

B. Freedom of movement of the population

62. As previously reported, on 7 March 1968 the Government decided to lift all remaining restrictions on the movement of Turkish Cypriot persons and goods (S/8446, paras. 71-75). Since then, close observation by UNFICYP's Civilian Police has shown that the Government's decision has been fully implemented. Apart from the search of a lorry that resulted in the discovery of a quantity of arms (para. 35), there has been no evidence of interference by Cyprus Police in the peaceful movement of Turkish Cypriots along the roads - no stopping of vehicles or questioning of travellers except for traffic control, and no searches of persons or vehicles.

63. In April, the Government adopted two additional measures which further promoted freedom of movement. Owing to the former restrictions, most Turkish Cypriot motor-vehicle owners living in the enclaves had not paid the annual circulation tax since 1964. The Government decided to waive the regulation requiring the payment of a substantial registration fee for such vehicles - roughly three or four times the annual circulation tax - and to re-register the vehicles free of charge on payment of the tax as from 1 January 1968. Subsequently, just before Easter, UNFICYP was informed that warrants outstanding in respect of offences connected with the emergency would no longer be executed (para. 49).

64. All of these measures seem to have been well received by the Turkish Cypriot community. The manner in which they have been implemented and the absence of any incidents between travelling Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriot officials and

civilians have helped to overcome much of the fear resulting from the inter-communal fighting and more than four years of hostility and isolation. Although among Turkish Cypriots living in the villages there is still some reluctance to travel, those residing in the main enclave seem to have no such hesitation. For example, on one Sunday in May, more than 3,000 of them were observed leaving or entering the main enclave by the Famagusta Gate road, in addition to many others who passed through other exit points. The travellers were headed for family reunions, picnics, recreation at the seaside or in the mountains, or were simply motoring through familiar places they had not seen for several years.

65. At the present time, the only restrictions on the freedom of movement of the population in Cyprus are those which continue to be applied in the areas under Turkish Cypriot control. Except for UNFICYP-controlled transit through the Limnitis enclave (S/7611, para. 118) and the UNFICYP convoys on the Kyrenia Road (S/6102, annex I), no Greek Cypriot is allowed to enter Turkish-Cypriot-held areas unless authorized to do so. Such authorization has been given, for example, to journalists for reporting specific events, or to technicians to carry out repairs. As to Turkish Cypriots, they are still required to observe certain formalities when passing through the Turkish Cypriot barriers.

66. In mid-May, the Turkish Cypriot leadership ordered the removal of some secondary barriers erected within the Turkish sector of Nicosia during the crisis of last November, and it has promised to consider taking additional measures if the political atmosphere continues to improve. In general, the Turkish Cypriot leadership's view appears to be that freedom of movement is a matter which is too closely linked to other aspects of the Cyprus problem, such as the safety of its community, to allow of completely independent treatment and solution.

#### C. Efforts to restore normal economic conditions

67. In my last report further reference was made under this heading (S/8446, paras. 108-118) to the Government normalization measures lifting all the long-standing restrictions on the entry of certain types of goods into Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas. Since March, hardly a day has passed without numerous lorries laden with petrol, building materials, imported products, and industrial

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raw materials entering these areas without any interference by the Cyprus Police. This has resulted in the revival of a number of small industries within the Turkish Cypriot enclaves, and in a considerable amount of building activity, including extensive work on dilapidated, damaged and unfinished houses, and increasing construction of new housing. Nevertheless, owing to the absence or inadequacy of certain prerequisites, economic conditions in the Turkish Cypriot areas have as yet not significantly improved, in contrast to the continuing boom in the rest of the Island.

68. On 8 April 1968, the Government submitted to the House of Representatives its Second Five-Year Development Plan (1967-1971), which deals with prospective development "in all sectors of the Island's economic and social activity". Substantial funds are to be earmarked for technical education and vocational training and for the expansion of certain industries, especially tourism. Fixed investment is estimated at 186 million Cyprus pounds and the annual rate of growth at approximately 7 per cent. In his introductory address presenting the Plan, the Minister of Finance stated that it envisaged a unitary Cyprus and would benefit both communities.

69. However, a great deal of criticism and mistrust has been voiced in the Turkish Cypriot Press with respect to the Plan and to the international assistance it anticipates. In spite of the urgency and importance of the problem of the Island's economic future, there has been no progress in developing any form of contacts regarding the subject between the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership. There can be no doubt that the question of the place of Turkish Cypriots in the economic development of the Island would be a useful subject of discussion and, if clarified, might do much to heal the rift between the two communities. Unless some progress on this matter is made very soon, however, hard decisions may be taken which will render even more difficult the solution of political questions and perhaps even widen the gap between the standard of living in the Turkish Cypriot enclaves and that in the rest of the country.

70. As expected, the Government's normalization measures of 7 March have disposed of part of the problem of reactivating the closed factories in the main Turkish Cypriot enclave (S/8446, para. 112). Apart from financial considerations, there is now nothing to prevent Turkish Cypriot owners of such factories from resuming operations.

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71. None the less, the reactivation of a few large Greek Cypriot enterprises in the main enclave, whose return to full production would provide many jobs to Turkish Cypriots and help to relieve economic stagnation, has not been facilitated. It is UNFICYP's hope that the Turkish Cypriot leadership will soon authorize the reopening of these plants since the demands put forward in the past with respect to Turkish Cypriot-owned factories in the enclave have been met (S/8286, para. 116) and their reopening would unquestionably have a beneficial effect on inter-communal relations. At a recent meeting with the Turkish Cypriot leadership, my Special Representative was given to understand that the matter was again under active consideration.

72. A special problem is presented by closed factories and businesses situated in areas of military confrontation, such as the Green Line in Nicosia. Obviously, the problem would be greatly eased by a mutual military withdrawal, but in the meantime UNFICYP is extending its good offices in assisting one Turkish Cypriot owner who wishes to reopen his tyre-retreading shop on the Nicosia Green Line and intends to employ eleven Turkish Cypriot workers and one Greek Cypriot foreman. In view of the present conditions of calm, UNFICYP feels that a revival of economic activity in certain sensitive areas with adequate guarantees that the premises concerned could not be entered by armed personnel would further strengthen confidence and might hasten military deconfrontation.

73. Owing to insufficient rain, cereal crops mainly in the north and east of Cyprus are drought-stricken. On 2 May, the Council of Ministers decided to implement the drought relief scheme provided for by Government legislation. At the request of the Turkish Cypriot leadership, UNFICYP has arranged with the Government for the scheme to be extended to affected villages in the Turkish Cypriot areas. It has also been instrumental in arranging for inspection of the damaged crops by the competent Government commission, which is functioning in close co-operation with Turkish Cypriot specialists and UNFICYP economic officers.

74. UNFICYP is also lending its good offices in the negotiation of an arrangement, along the lines of last year's arrangement (S/7969, para. 128), for the sale of this year's Turkish Cypriot cereal crop to the Government's Grain Commission. The question of deductions from the Government's subsidized prices in respect of past debts is under discussion.

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D. Measures to assist refugees and other distressed persons

75. There has at last been some noticeable improvement in the living conditions of the refugees. In the Turkish Cypriot areas, there is expanding activity in the renovation and construction of housing, much of it designed to provide Turkish Cypriot refugees with better accommodation. Greek Cypriot and Armenian refugees, who are unable to return to their houses in Turkish Cypriot areas - which in any case are usually occupied by Turkish Cypriot refugees - have recently benefited from Government legislation, although there have been complaints that the benefits are inadequate.

76. In my last report, I referred to the objections raised by the Turkish Cypriot leadership to the incorporation of the suburb of Omorphita into the municipality of Nicosia (S/8446, para. 115). In December 1963, Omorphita was the scene of bitter fighting and most of its inhabitants, who were Turkish Cypriots, took refuge in what later became the main Turkish Cypriot enclave. At the time of the cease-fire, Omorphita was in Government hands and since then it has been strongly held by the National Guard. During and immediately after the fighting, nearly all of the Turkish Cypriot houses were damaged and in the last four years have become seriously dilapidated. Since it is situated on the Green Line, most of Omorphita is constantly patrolled by UNFICYP troops.

77. The Government has repeatedly stated that the Turkish Cypriot residents are free to return to Omorphita and that if they did so their damaged houses would be repaired. However, it is determined not to renounce its authority in the area and has repeatedly rejected a proposal of the Turkish Cypriot leadership that Omorphita should be placed under the exclusive control of UNFICYP troops. The Government feels that the withdrawal of its security forces would result in the eventual annexation of the area to the adjoining Turkish Cypriot enclave.

78. The Government has explained that the incorporation of Omorphita into the municipality of Nicosia had become necessary in order to finance the improvement of public services, but the Turkish Cypriot leadership has pointed out that one of the effects of the incorporation is to transfer civil control of the area from its own Development Board - an organ mainly responsible to local inhabitants - to a Greek Cypriot municipality. It rejects the transfer as having taken place under what is regarded as unconstitutional legislation adopted since 1964.

79. Since my last report, the issue of Omorphita has been further complicated by the desire of the municipal authorities to demolish parts of thirty-eight houses - belonging to twenty Greek Cypriots and eighteen Turkish Cypriots - whose condition had become a threat to the safety of the public. The Turkish Cypriot leadership has denounced the proposed demolitions as further proof of an intention to eliminate Turkish Cypriots from the area and of a lack of good faith that justified its delay in responding to the Government's measures restoring freedom of movement to Turkish Cypriots (S/8446, paras. 71-75). It has renewed its proposal that the Turkish Cypriot houses should be repaired and that their owners should reoccupy them under exclusive UNFICYP control. For its part, the Government, while stopping the demolitions, has reiterated its previous position, and has denied that there is any connexion between the extension of the municipal boundaries and the demolitions, which would have been necessary in any case.

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#### IV. GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

80. The good offices exercised on my behalf by my Special Representative in Cyprus have, during the period covered by this report, remained available to the parties directly concerned.

81. His main effort has been directed to promoting and consolidating a general atmosphere of restraint and tranquillity and to making arrangements for informal meetings between prominent personalities of the two communities. Both the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership expressed strong support for the idea of such meetings, and had designated as participants Mr. Glafcos Clerides, President of the House of Representatives, and Mr. Rauf Denktash, President of the Turkish Communal Chamber. Nevertheless, my Special Representative found it necessary to engage in intensive consultations in order to overcome a number of procedural difficulties.

82. Happily, a formula proposed by him was finally accepted by the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, which announced on 2 June in identical communiqués that, after having met in private in Nicosia, Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash had agreed to exchange views at meetings in Beirut and to resume talks in Cyprus in the near future. My Special Representative would be present at the first meeting in Cyprus, after which he would be kept informed of the progress of the talks and remain at the disposal of the participants.

83. Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash began their consultations in Beirut on 2 June, and on 5 June they issued a joint communiqué stating that they had had a "useful exchange of views". The communiqué added that their contacts would continue in Nicosia and that the first meeting would be held at the Ledra Palace Hotel on 24 June, subsequent contacts to take place in the two participants' houses, in rotation. It also confirmed that Mr. Osorio-Tafall would be present at their first meeting in Nicosia.

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V. MEDIATION EFFORT

84. The situation regarding a resumption of the mediation function under paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 186 of 4 March 1964 has remained unchanged since my last report, owing primarily to the widely differing and firmly held views on the matter of the three Governments most directly concerned.

## VI. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

85. The costs to be borne by the Organization for the operation of UNFICYP for the fifty-one-month period from its inception on 27 March 1964 to 26 June 1968 are estimated at \$89,590,000. This total does not include an estimate of \$610,000 which would be required for the final repatriation of contingents and liquidation costs.

86. As at 7 June 1968, payments and pledges of voluntary contributions received from forty-seven Member States and four non-member Governments to cover these costs total the equivalent of \$80,417,845. To the above amount may be added \$450,000 which had been received as at 31 May 1968 from interest earned on investment of temporarily surplus funds, public contributions, gains on exchange and other miscellaneous income.

87. Accordingly, unless additional pledges are received, there will be a deficit on 26 June 1968 in the amount of approximately \$8,722,000 which is \$1,037,000 above the estimated deficit of \$7,685,000 as at 26 March 1968.

88. If the Security Council should decide to extend beyond 26 June 1968 the period during which the Force is to be stationed in Cyprus, it is estimated that the additional cost to the Organization, including the amount of \$610,000 as the cost of final repatriation of contingents and liquidation costs, assuming continuance of reimbursement commitments, would be as follows:

UNFICYP cost estimates by major categories of expense  
(in thousands of US dollars)

<u>I. Operating costs incurred by the United Nations</u>	<u>For a three-month extention</u>	<u>For a six-month extention</u>
Movement of contingents	635	795
Operational expenses	542	1,065
Rental of premises	50	100
Rations	276	551
Non-Military personnel, salaries, travel, etc.	323	606
Miscellaneous and contingencies	104	108
Total, Part I	1,930	3,225

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<u>II. Reimbursement of extra costs to Governments providing contingents</u>	<u>For a three-month extension</u>	<u>For a six-month extension</u>
Pay and allowances	3,335	6,670
Contingent-owned equipment	385	770
Death and disability awards	50	100
	<u>Total, Part II</u>	<u>7,540</u>
	<u>Grand total, Parts I and II</u>	<u>10,765</u>

89. The above estimates do not reflect the full cost of UNFICYP to Member and non-member States since they exclude the extra costs which Members providing contingents or police units to the Force have agreed to absorb at their own expense rather than to seek as reimbursement from the United Nations. Based on reports received from certain of the Governments providing contingents or police units to the Force, the estimated amount of such extra costs which the Governments would absorb at their own expense in respect of an extended period, in the event the mandate of UNFICYP were extended and the Governments concerned agreed to continue the present arrangements, are as follows:

	<u>For a three-month extension</u>	<u>For a six-month extension</u>
	\$	\$
Australia	93,075	186,150
Austria	55,169	110,337
Canada <sup>1/</sup>	550,745	878,984
Denmark	120,000	240,000
Ireland	260,500	521,000
United Kingdom	325,000	650,000

Finland and Sweden are also absorbing certain UNFICYP costs at their own expense. 90. In order to finance the costs to the Organization of maintaining the Force for an extended period after 26 June 1968 and to meet all costs and outstanding claims up to 26 June 1968, it will be necessary for the Secretary-General to receive pledges totalling \$14,422,000 for a three-month extension and \$19,487,000 for a six-month extension.

1/ Exclusive of the cost of normal pay and allowances.

## VII. OBSERVATIONS

91. As the preceding chapters show, the relaxation of tension in Cyprus which set in at the beginning of the year has continued during the period under review. There have been increasing contacts between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots with but few incidents having inter-communal implications. What is more, there have been no military clashes and the number of shooting incidents is low considering that there are still thousands of men under arms in Cyprus.

92. There are recent indications that both Greek and Turkish Cypriots have at last begun to realize that they cannot solve their dispute by force and that any further attempt to do so not only would be costly in terms of human life and property but also might unleash and unpredictable chain of events. On the other hand, the basic issues dividing the two communities have remained unresolved.

93. In my last report to the Security Council (S/8446, para. 155) I gave an outline of the initiatives which in my view should be taken without delay in the search for a solution to the Cyprus problem. Some of these initiatives have yet to materialize.

94. Little progress has been made during the last three months in the matter of military disengagement. Although the opposing armed forces have shown commendable discipline and restraint, their proximity to one another continues to constitute a latent danger both to the present improved atmosphere in Cyprus and to future progress towards a solution.

95. Moreover, despite the Government's normalization measures and their beneficial effects on the Turkish Cypriot population, their leadership has not yet found it possible to respond with measures of its own so as to further a steady movement towards normality. However, my Special Representative has been given to understand by the Turkish Cypriot leadership that the matter is under active consideration and I am hopeful that positive developments in this regard will be forthcoming shortly.

96. On the other hand, the efforts of my Special Representative in arranging for inter-communal talks have been successful. Two prominent leaders of the two communities, Mr. Glafkos Clerides and Mr. Rauf Denktash, after preliminary talks in Nicosia, met in Beirut from 2 to 5 June. They have agreed to resume their talks in Nicosia as from 24 June and their first meeting there will be opened by

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my Special Representative. This establishment of a direct channel of communication between the two communities for the first time in four and a half years is most encouraging. I attach very great importance to these inter-communal talks. Apart from the basic issues that must be solved if a lasting settlement is to be achieved, there are many current internal problems which have to be overcome. I am deeply conscious of the difficulty and complexity of the task that lies ahead and it is my earnest hope that, in the interest of the country as a whole, both communities will find it possible to make those concessions and accommodations without which no agreement can be attained. The will to compromise and adjust their differences would be a historic demonstration of statesmanship which the leaders in Cyprus could offer towards a just and lasting peace in their country. I hope that the talks will be fruitful and will constitute an important step towards a settlement of the Cyprus problem.

97. It is obvious that continued peace is an essential condition for the success of the inter-communal talks which have just begun and that, despite the relaxation of tension and the improved relations between the two communities, the situation remains unstable in the Island. Therefore, I consider it unavoidable that the mandate of UNFICYP should be extended for another period. Because the inter-communal talks have to deal with very complex problems and are likely to be protracted, I feel that the period of extension should be of six months. Consequently, I recommend that the Security Council extend the stationing of UNFICYP for a further period of six months until 26 December 1968.

98. In this connexion, I must draw the Security Council's attention to the growing deficit of the UNFICYP budget. This deficit, due to inadequate and now decreasing contributions, has reached alarming proportions and if this is allowed to continue it could make unavoidable a premature withdrawal of the Force. I therefore appeal to the members of the Security Council to give most serious and urgent attention to this matter.

99. In concluding this report, I wish once again to express my deep appreciation to the Governments of those countries providing contingents to UNFICYP and to those which have made financial contributions to its budget. Without their generous support it would not be possible to maintain this important peace-keeping operation of the United Nations.

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