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FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 13 September 1988, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Ali Shams Ardakani (Islamic Republic of Iran)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 481st plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference continues today its consideration of the reports of its ad hoc subsidiary bodies, as well as of the annual report to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representative of Finland, the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, the representatives of the German Democratic Republic, the Netherlands and Sweden, the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, as well as the representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany and Australia. I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the representative of Finland, Dr. Rautio.

Mrs. RAUTIO (Finland): Mr. President, may I begin by wishing you well in your important office? I am convinced that you will guide the Conference successfully through the final days of its present session and into the next session in 1989.

For several years, Finland has participated in the work of this important negotiating forum. I have asked for the floor today to introduce to you the second Finnish research report or "blue book" for 1988. This is the thirteenth report in the series on "Methodology and instrumentation for sampling and analysis in the verification of chemical disarmament". The first report of this year (CD/843) was introduced to the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in the middle of July, and was entitled "Standard operating procedures for the verification of chemical disarmament; D.1 a proposal for procedures supporting the reference data base". The present report (CD/873) is entitled "Computer-aided techniques for the verification of chemical disarmament; E.1 verification data base". Copies of the report will be distributed to delegations together with my statement.

The future chemical weapons convention will demand extensive declarations and detailed plans from the States parties. Verification of the implementation of the convention will require a huge amount of exact and reliable reference data to be readily available to the technical secretariat. The verification process will continue throughout the lifetime of the convention, and will produce mountains of data and an unwieldy number of reports and documents. The management of all this must be such as to ensure reliability and confidentiality. For all these reasons we feel that computer-aided techniques are the only reasonable approach to the task.

In this report we look at the possibility of applying computerized techniques to the storage and handling of verification data. The computerized data base is referred to as the verification data base. The applicability of the different techniques currently available for data management is discussed, and ways of exploiting them are outlined.

We have constructed a prototype data base based on the relational data base technique for the storage of analytical reference data, that is, data which are needed to unambiguously identify chemical compounds using different

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analytical techniques. The data base also includes tentative structures for storage of other than analytical data. These data include "static" data on the verification domain, such as organizations, targets etc., and data on operational procedures, such as inspection reports.

For the purposes of CW verification, the feasible data base techniques needed are: structural data base, text data base, chemical structures data base, picture and image data base, and reference data base. In designing the data architecture we have considered what data are to be stored, the format in which the data are stored, where the data should be physically stored, how these data would be used and by whom, data security, and how long the data should be preserved.

We illustrate how data base techniques could support the various procedures of CW verification. Some of the procedures we describe are preparatory procedures that could be introduced immediately. Others, the actual verification procedures, would be introduced only later, after the future convention enters into force.

For example, the creation of an open international verification data base would ease and speed up the exchange of information on research being done in different countries. The identification procedures for banned chemicals will have to be internationally agreed upon. By way of assistance, the data base could act as an evaluation forum for newly developed procedures. Such a forum would benefit all participants by allowing a review of research being done elsewhere, and instant feedback for one's own research.

If international co-operation between laboratories were to be arranged with a view to creating internationally accepted standard operating procedures for the analyses, the data base could be used for obtaining the preliminary working instructions, and for the storage of the results and comments on the methods. This would allow the status and progress to be continuously monitored, and facilitate statistical evaluations of the results. If the development work were to lead to scientifically sound and reproducible identification methods, the procedures could be used to produce reference data for the future international inspectorate on the compounds listed in the convention. The procedures could then be left to the preparatory commission for approval. This work would considerably diminish the work of the preparatory commission in its duty of developing procedures and instrumentation for verification, and training inspectors to use them. The data base would be an ideal tool to keep track of laboratories, timetables, statistical evaluation of the results, and distribution of the summary of results to each participating laboratory.

The main advantage of the CW verification data base will be achieved after the entry into force of the convention, when the actual verification process begins. The main activities that the data base can support are: storage of documentation, time scheduling, preparations for an inspection, registration of the inspection results, decision-making, reporting, sample tracking and acting as a reference data bank for laboratories.

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A well-organized document storage data base would facilitate the management of all the documents in the form of declarations, reports, facility attachments and so on, and reduce the personnel required for supporting administrative work, and thereby the overall cost of verification.

A time-scheduling system is a tool for work planning to ensure that all activities take place at the proper time and that personnel are available for the job. The future convention will specify a number of time-limits applying to different activities. If all agreed-upon timetables for all activities are entered into the data base, the data base can be used for planning timetables so that, for example, the inspections will not pile up in certain months. Those routine inspections that do not have a predetermined date could be planned so as to fit into slack parts of the timetable.

After entry into force of the convention, facility attachments will be prepared in accordance with model agreements for each declared facility. They will state all necessary points for verification, which instruments are to be used and where they will be installed, and so on. Each facility attachment, or relevant part of it, could be entered into the verification data base to serve as a check-list of all tasks to be performed during the inspection. A facility-specific list of all documents, equipment, spare parts, etc., needed during inspection, could be generated. The inspection report could be written on a text-processing system and stored into a text data base.

Nearly all the data collected during the verification of the implementation of the convention will have to be evaluated. This evaluation will be the most important task of inspectors, and a very laborious one too. The data will have to be checked for consistency with the earlier agreements, declarations and inspection reports. This may necessitate going through a large number of different documents. Here the capabilities of the data base for combination of data could be extensively used. Samples collected during inspection and not analysed on site will be sent to the laboratory at headquarters or to other accredited laboratories for analysis. The data base could aid in choosing the particular laboratory, using the information stored on available facilities.

Using the sample codes, the accredited laboratory could enter the results obtained by different analytical techniques directly into the sample data base. The system could compare the results obtained from control samples with the actual contents of the samples and indicate any inconsistency. The procedure would guarantee impartial analyses and protect proprietary information, since the analytical laboratories would not know the target from which the samples had been collected, nor by whom.

The accredited laboratories analysing the verification samples could use the analytical part of the data base containing the identification data and standard operating procedures. These data could also be made available to the laboratories of the national authorities to allow use of identical reference data needed, for example, to analyse duplicate samples collected during inspections. The sample and reaction data bases would be available to the personnel of the international inspectorate on a "need to know" basis only. However, the accredited laboratories should be able to enter their analytical results in the sample data base on "write only" basis through the sample codes.

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If full advantage is to be taken of computerized techniques, various supporting systems will probably be needed, in addition to the verification data base. The supporting systems could comprise the personal computer system of the inspector, a laboratory information management system for a verification laboratory, instrumental data systems for mass spectrometry and nuclear magnetic resonance spectrometry, data systems of the automatic monitors, and general-purpose international data banks.

A technical description of the prototype data base developed within the Finnish project is given in the report. The system is based on a relational data base (RDB/VMS), and runs on a MicroVax II supermicrocomputer. We have adopted an iterative data-oriented approach that relies on rapid prototyping techniques because verification procedures in the verification are not yet well defined.

The prototype system contains analytical reference data and operational data. We have focused our description on the analytical reference data since our experience lies mostly in analytical techniques and data handling. Reference-type data from organizations and targets etc. are included only to illustrate the possibilities of the data base. As operational procedures have not yet been agreed upon within the CD, or are to be agreed upon later within the preparatory commission, the description of operational data is far from complete.

Data on chemical compounds should be actively updated to be as complete as possible when the convention enters into force. New compounds may be included after the initial declarations. At the moment, our data base contains few identification data on the chemicals listed in the schedules of the convention, for we are now producing fresh data using these standard operating procedures for analyses described in our previous report (CD/843). We consider the use of identical conditions for recording the reference data and the actual verification data of samples to be essential for reliable identification. Our work in this field has been facilitated by the kind donation of listed chemicals by the United Kingdom. We are also very pleased by a detailed offer from Switzerland to provide us with listed chemicals. We also appreciate the interest shown by a number of other countries in providing us with such chemicals.

A user's manual for our prototype system is included in the report. Concurrently with the publication of this report we are offering the prototype system for international experimentation and evaluation, with the purpose of demonstrating the use of this kind of computer system for management of verification data. We encourage users to supply comments and contribute new ideas. User names and passwords will be provided on request to all the States participating in the negotiations. To encourage evaluation and ideas for further development of the system, we hope to be able to arrange a user's training course in the near future.

User names and passwords can be applied for by completing and returning to the delegation of Finland the application form attached to my circulated statement. At the moment, we have no restrictions as to the number of possible users of our prototype system, so that each delegation can decide how many users it would like to have. We would appreciate comments and

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suggestions from laboratories active in this field so as to further develop our prototype system for the day-to-day use of the future technical secretariat.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Finland for her statement and the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Ambassador Kostov, who will introduce the report of the Ad hoc Committee contained in document CD/868.

Mr. KOSTOV (Bulgaria): In my capacity as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, I have the honour to present the report of the Ad hoc Committee contained in document CD/868.

I should first of all like to express my appreciation to members of the Committee for the good will and active co-operation shown to me and my predecessor, Ambassador Tellalov, in the deliberations of the Ad hoc Committee this year, both in the hectic time before the submission of the special report and in the interesting debate held during the second part of the session.

The report before you focuses on the negotiations and discussions held during the second part, and does not duplicate the account rendered in the special report of the state of negotiations on the question. However, a summary of the exchange of views held during the first part is set out before the actual work of the second part is discussed.

Let me say clearly from the start that the deliberations of the Ad hoc Committee during the second part did not allow for any movement forward on the question; the differences in perceptions of the security interests of the nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States are still pronounced, and a common approach or common formula still eludes us. However, it would not be fair to omit the positive aspects that arose in consideration of the question this year.

Here I refer specifically to the fact that all delegations have once again reiterated their readiness to continue the search for a common formula concerning guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States, and in particular one which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding nature. This important common ground still prevails. In addition, I would like to underline that several new ideas have been put forward recently that have stimulated some interesting discussion and debate, though they remain as yet inconclusive. These ideas and discussions are reflected in the report before you. Furthermore, I should like to comment on the tone of the meetings this summer. The palpable lack of confrontation on the issue, and the business-like discussions, lead me to believe that this issue is also benefiting from what is perceived as a generally improved international political climate. This should not be underestimated.

The results of the meetings of the Ad hoc Committee this year therefore suggest that the need to effectively assure non-nuclear-weapon States against

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the threat or use of nuclear weapons is still acute - enough so that the Ad hoc Committee recommends further work on it, one means of which is the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee next year.

In conclusion, I should like to give voice to my sincere thanks to all the secretariat services which have assisted the Ad hoc Committee this year in the accomplishment of its work.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons for his statement introducing the report appearing in document CD/868. I congratulate Ambassador Kostov for the conclusion of the work of the Ad hoc Committee. I intend to put CD/868 before the Conference for adoption at our next plenary meeting on Thursday 15 September.

I now give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Rose.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Mr. President, at the very outset, let me congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference this month. You have entered this responsible function at a moment when the opportunities for political solutions concerning a number of regional conflicts are beginning to take shape. This development strengthens our hope that increasing chances for collective measures designed to achieve genuine disarmament will arise. I would like to express my delegation's deep appreciation for the effective manner in which you are guiding the Conference during this month, in which the report to the United Nations General Assembly has to be finalized. May I also take this opportunity to express my thanks to your predecessor, Ambassador Loeis of Indonesia, for the excellent work he accomplished? At the same time, I would like to welcome whole-heartedly our new colleagues Ambassador Varga of Hungary and Ambassador Aung Thant of Burma, and wish them success in their work in Geneva. I should like to assure them of my delegation's readiness for close co-operation.

The negotiations on the CW convention have again been the focus of attention at this year's Conference. We would like to express our gratitude especially to the Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Bogumil Sujka from Poland, and also to the co-ordinators of the three working groups, Andrej Cima from Czechoslovakia, Pablo Macedo from Mexico and Sadaaki Numata from Japan, for having accomplished such comprehensive and committed work. They have created the best possible prerequisites for progressing in our negotiations. A number of positive results have been achieved to date, and conditions for solving other complex issues have improved. On the other hand, numerous delegations have justly pointed to the slackened pace in the completion of the convention text. Intensive work pursued in an atmosphere of increasing political resolve and confidence could remedy this situation.

United Nations Security Council resolution 620 (1988) has positive impact on our work. It serves to promote the elaboration of international instruments against the use of chemical weapons. At the same time, this resolution explicitly makes reference to the negotiations in our Conference on a comprehensive and effective CW ban. We have also taken note of the

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statement made to this Conference only recently by the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Mr. Burns, in which he reaffirmed his country's commitment to earnestly continue to work for a chemical weapons ban in the time to come, irrespective of the outcome of the presidential elections.

Let me now turn to some substantive issues of the draft convention. We welcome the fact that some headway has been made in the further elaboration of article II and the annex to article V. This was due to an agreement reached between the Soviet Union and the United States on the definition of production facilities for chemical weapons and the obligations to be undertaken by States in connection with their destruction. These provisions serve to ensure the security of all States in the 10-year phase after the convention enters into force. My delegation would like to reiterate the view that during this period any production of chemical weapons must be prohibited, and any exemption of CW stocks and production facilities from "international arrest" must be ruled out.

Great efforts have been made with a view to solving the outstanding problems in respect of article VI. It would certainly be of crucial importance to reach total agreement on a régime for schedule [1] chemicals. My delegation tried to promote an understanding by submitting working paper CD/CW/WP.195. A compromise solution could provide for the concentration of production of schedule [1] chemicals in a small-scale production facility. Two exceptions to this principle may be contemplated. The first concerns production for special pharmaceutical purposes. Evidence has been furnished in support citing one example, i.e. the production of nitrogen mustard. The production of this chemical in quantities corresponding to actual needs should be facilitated. The verification measures to be applied in this case would have to focus on guaranteeing the complete use of this chemical for pharmaceutical products. This régime would cease to apply once the chemical became an ingredient of the final product, i.e. medicine.

The second exceptional case could be synthesis for fundamental research or medical purposes. In this regard, we consider upper thresholds of 10 or 100 grams per year to be sufficient. Laboratories carrying out such synthesis ought to be specifically licensed by the Government concerned and should be required to submit a declaration to the technical secretariat. Furthermore, their number should be as limited as possible. Consultations on these questions should continue.

An answer also needs to be given to the question regarding the protection of confidential information in connection with article VI. As can be seen from our working paper CD/CW/WP.194, many passages in the draft convention testify to the fact that careful attention has been devoted to this matter for a long time. It has been suggested that information and data should be classified according to their degree of confidentiality. We support this proposal and are prepared to participate in the discussions on this subject. We would like to recall that the duties to be performed in this connection by the Director-General of the technical secretariat have already been set out in article VIII, which provides that a régime should be established governing the handling and protection of confidential data. The preparatory commission could work out a model for such a régime containing also a classification of information in different categories.

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There exists another problem in respect of former category [4]. In our opinion, it cannot be doubted that there are chemicals and facilities outside categories [1] to [3] which pose a risk to the convention. Attempts to identify them and to establish an appropriate régime have been in vain. But nevertheless they must be continued in future.

Considerable efforts have been undertaken to further elaborate on the problem of challenge inspection. This especially applies to the role of the executive council after the presentation of a report on such an inspection. The principles drafted last year under the chairmanship of Ambassador Ekéus from Sweden have been amended. This is a foundation to build on. Intensive work has been accomplished concerning the guidelines on the international inspectorate for the conduct of challenge inspections. My delegation made a contribution to this end by presenting working paper CD/CW/WP.198. It provides for important elements to be added to the existing guidelines contained in the addendum. What needs to be done is to finally agree on some basic issues with a view to formulating the relevant provisions in detail. We hope that our ideas regarding special procedures set forth in our outline of a manual for challenge inspections, which was submitted to the Ad hoc Committee as working paper CD/CW/WP.208, will meet with a positive response. A profound understanding of those practical matters should help resolve the questions of principle.

Regrettably, no progress has been made so far concerning the composition of the executive council, decision-making and other procedural matters. We have proposed a solution in document CD/812. Its underlying aim is to set up an effective organ whose balanced composition and democratic functioning would guarantee that decisions are taken corresponding to the security interests of all contracting parties.

Positive developments are beginning to take shape in terms of activities which are undertaken parallel to the negotiations with the aim of promoting the early conclusion of the convention, its entry into force as soon as possible as well as universal adherence to it. In the first place, mention must be made of exchanges of data and information on the possession and non-possession of chemical weapons and CW production facilities as well as activities covered by article VI. The German Democratic Republic has supported the initiative of the Soviet Union since February 1988. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of our country, Mr. Oskar Fischer, declared in his statement at SSOD-III that the German Democratic Republic does not possess or produce any chemical weapons. Today I am in a position to supplement this declaration by introducing a working paper which will appear as document CD/871.

The compilation of the data provided in our working paper was made on the basis of schedules [1] to [3] of the present draft convention in CD/831, taking into account chemicals on which preliminary agreement has been reached so far. The data have been compiled relying on information gathered with the support of the competent organs and institutions. They reflect the situation in 1988. The compilation is of a preliminary nature and is subject to further refinement following the conclusion of the convention. The ranges for production, processing or consumption mentioned in our working paper have been chosen taking into account the situation in our industry. The number of

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facilities set out in the working paper correspond to the number of locations. The presentation of the above-mentioned working paper is another practical step on the part of the German Democratic Republic to promote progress in the negotiations, increase confidence and contribute to the early conclusion of the convention. We reaffirm our resolve to be among the first to sign and ratify it.

Several countries plan to conduct national trial inspections as a first step in multilateral experiments. The German Democratic Republic also plans to carry out such a national experiment, before the end of this year. Preparations are in full swing. Our thanks are due to Ambassador Ekéus for his readiness to co-ordinate the activities of the countries participating in these activities.

Considerations have been put forward on how to ensure the broadest possible adherence to the convention upon its entry into force. An interesting idea has been aired in this regard, namely the convening of a special conference for this purpose. The forthcoming forty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly will offer a first opportunity to take up this question. I would like to make a few observations on how to take advantage of that opportunity.

When dealing with the report of the CD to the forty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly, it would be advisable to inform all United Nations Member States about the state of the negotiations and the tasks to be solved prior to the entry into force of the convention. This we deem all the more important since the "rolling text" is not easy to grasp for those States not involved in the CD negotiations. The Chairman of the CW Committee could give an account of the state of the negotiations, and comments could be added by the item co-ordinators from the various groups. All delegations would thereafter have an opportunity to enter into an exchange of opinions. Informal consultations between delegations would be an additional form of discussion. A concluding statement by the Chairman of the First Committee and/or a draft resolution, if appropriate, would be suitable for recording the results of these activities.

In dealing with activities aimed at fostering the early conclusion of a global convention, I should also like to draw your attention to regional measures to this end. I have especially in mind the creation of a chemical-weapon-free zone in central Europe. We are firmly convinced that the establishment of such a zone in parallel with the preparation of a global CW ban would significantly stimulate the world-wide convention and promote universal adherence to it. The situation in which we find ourselves should impel us to combine all our efforts in the CD to conclude the convention banning all chemical weapons as soon as possible by vigorously pursuing our work on its articles and annexes. This is the only way to fulfil the task our Conference is facing.

In a few days I will leave Geneva after a stay of five years, winding up my duties as head of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic to the Conference on Disarmament. During this period I have been in a position to experience a positive breakthrough in the international situation. Moreover, I had the opportunity to participate in the demonstration of the destruction

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of SS-20 missiles as a symbolic expression of this development, which left a deep impression on me. Despite persisting complex issues, the atmosphere bears the imprint of blossoming hopes and the search for accommodation of interests. Starting-points for understanding and agreements are emerging in all fields of inter-State relations. This development should also have a stronger bearing on our Conference's work.

I am firmly convinced that this forum embodies great potentialities for fruitful co-operation with a view to reaching agreement on arms limitation and disarmament. It is truly in the interest of all States, big and small alike, nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States, to exploit this potential fully. That is why the Conference will play an even more significant part in future. In accordance with the joint peace and disarmament programme adopted by the socialist States, the German Democratic Republic has been unwaveringly committed to constructive and successful work by the Conference. It will remain so in the future. For us it is not a slogan to state that bilateral, regional and multilateral efforts should complement and reinforce each other. In our view, constructive parallelism is an urgent necessity in order to ensure peace and security for all mankind by reducing and abolishing weapons, and in the first place weapons of mass destruction.

May I take this opportunity to place on record my gratitude and thanks to all colleagues and members of delegations for their positive co-operation and friendly personal relations? I can assure you that I will preserve the best of memories of all the colleagues I worked with in the Conference, since they helped me to come to new realizations. I would also like to convey warm words of gratitude to the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Miljan Komatina, and to his Deputy, Ambassador Vicente Berasategui, as well as to their able and helpful team, including the interpreters and translators.

Bidding farewell, I should like to wish all of you good health, much happiness and success in your responsible work hereafter.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. On behalf of the Conference, I should like to bid farewell to our colleague and friend, Ambassador Rose. He distinguished himself by representing his country in this Conference for five years with remarkable competence, diplomatic tact and hard work. He presided over the Conference at the opening of this annual session and proved then once more how valuable has been his contribution to the activities of the Conference. May I also thank Ambassador Rose for the co-operation he has extended to all members of the Conference during these years? While effectively representing his country, with his warmth he gained our respect and friendship. We wish him and Mrs. Rose personal happiness and success in his new post.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador van Schaik.

Mr. van SCHAIK (Netherlands): Mr. President, please allow me first to congratulate you on taking over the presidency of our Conference. At this particular time your country is engaged in a complicated process of

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negotiations in a room which we gladly vacated for that purpose a few steps from here. We wish you and your country wisdom and success in these two endeavours, leading on the one hand to peace in the Gulf region and on the other to increased security through arms control and disarmament. We sincerely hope that the end of the terrible suffering in the Gulf area will indeed help us to make progress here, in particular on chemical weapons. I also wish to thank Ambassador Loeis of Indonesia and his staff for the exemplary way in which he has guided us in our work as President for the month of August.

We wish to welcome the newly arrived Ambassadors, Ambassador Aung Thant of Burma and Ambassador Varga of Hungary, and we hope soon to greet Ambassador Sharma of India; we look forward to close co-operation with them. Their predecessors, Ambassadors Tin Tun, Meiszter and Teja, have left their mark on the Conference and we wish them well. I wish to recall in particular the contribution made by Ambassador Dávid Meiszter, with whom my delegation co-operated very closely, a contribution also to the human face of the Conference. I have just learned with regret from Ambassador Harald Rose of the German Democratic Republic that he too will be leaving very soon, but we do hope he will keep an eye on our work in his new function, used as we are to the friendly and frank debates we have had with him.

Today I would like to address briefly a few subjects that play a role in the present work of the Conference and to which my delegation attaches particular importance. Before doing so, I wish to join all those who have expressed the hope that in the wake of the progress that is being made in disarmament negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, we in this body shall also achieve more concrete results.

We are grateful for the achievements made in the bilateral negotiations to date, and we are encouraged by the spirit in which these negotiations are being conducted. We take a strong interest in further progress by the two countries, in the first place in the START negotiations, but also in other areas, such as nuclear testing. However, we sincerely hope that the two countries will also find ways to give more substance to the multilateral negotiations in this forum. The concept of constructive interplay between bilateral and multilateral negotiations, as has been advanced by so many delegations (Ambassador Solesby, speaking for the British delegation, was I think one of the first), should gradually be materialized. I also have in mind the concept of constructive parallelism just referred to by Ambassador Rose.

This brings me to the first subject I wish to address today: nuclear testing. We are pleased that the bilateral negotiations have reached a point at which agreement on verification provisions for the two bilateral threshold treaties earlier concluded seems to be within reach. We do hope that soon conditions will be fulfilled for the ratification of these treaties. We note with appreciation the intention of the two States to enter into negotiations, immediately after ratification, on ways to implement a step-by-step programme towards a comprehensive test ban, i.e. by linking reductions in nuclear weapons to reductions in the number and yield of nuclear tests. We realize the difficulties involved in such steps. But it is on the basis of actual reductions in number and yield that progress can be demonstrated.

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This also relates to the role of the CD in this area, and to the way in which constructive interplay could be materialized between the bilateral negotiations and the work here in the CD. Very useful work is under way in the Group of Seismic Experts. But the work of that group can only be brought in to proper perspective when practical work can be undertaken in a broader context elsewhere in the CD, encompassing scope, verification and compliance. It is a great pity that such work, which of course is closely related to work being undertaken in the bilateral talks, is made impossible by continued disagreement on the mandate of the committee to be re-established.

My delegation wishes to urge other delegations finally to accept a mandate that would enable the ad hoc committee to resume its work. This could be done on the basis of the so-called Western mandate proposal. But if that is not agreeable, why not try to reach agreement on the basis of the proposal Ambassador Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia has submitted? We are, of course, aware of the wish of some delegations, in particular from within the group of non-aligned countries, to start straight away with a more ambitious negotiating mandate. But since consensus cannot be reached on that basis at this moment, we believe that at least work should be undertaken with a more modest, practical objective.

Let me also say in this context a few words on the initiative taken by six countries for a conference of parties to the partial test-ban Treaty to consider amendments to that treaty. We fully understand the spirit in which this proposal has been submitted. However, my delegation wishes to make a few observations and ask some questions on the practical value of this proposal. First, it is clear that for various reasons the time is not yet ripe for a comprehensive test ban. Therefore, we do not understand why the six countries concerned believe that the proposed amendment conference would be the proper forum to settle this deeply seated controversy and, in fact, how this conference could bring the objective of a test ban closer. Second, the amendments have only been presented in part: the most difficult part, the promised verification provisions, are still unknown to us. Delegations will be aware that verification is exactly the major issue that, so far, has not been addressed in all its aspects; its solution has eluded us so far. We wonder why the proponents of the amendment conference think that this complex issue should be addressed outside the CD rather than within.

Also in practical terms, we foresee great difficulties when such a conference would actually meet. Should we, in the meantime, stop the work here in the CD, including the preparations for an experimental exercise by the seismic experts? How much time is going to be spent on discussions about the financing of the conference, its procedures, its venue? Frankly, we really think that we must continue our difficult, painstaking efforts to place the problem on the right track here in the CD, rather than try to divert attention to another forum, which, we fear, offers less chances for success.

I will now turn to my second subject, chemical weapons. I think we all here around this table share the objective of the establishment of a comprehensive agreement effectively banning the production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons. I hope that all of us also have the same perception of the urgent need to reach agreement on such an effectively verifiable convention. Recent reports on the repeated use of chemical weapons

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speak for themselves. They underline the urgency of the matter. Chemical weapons not only present a grave potential risk, they actually represent an atrocious reality. We note with deep concern the reports on the use of chemical weapons against the Kurdish population. We do not know the extent to which these weapons have been used, but such use, if true, is abhorrent.

After the many reports on the issue, there may be a tendency in public opinion to accept the use of chemical weapons almost as a kind of routine matter; not as a man-made disaster, but as a nature-made accident. Let me state emphatically that we consider the continuous violation of the letter and spirit of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 an inadmissible offence against international law and humanity which must be strongly condemned by the world community. Such violations must be stopped for ever. The world community must stand united here and work through appropriate channels, including the Security Council, the United Nations General Assembly, the Commission on Human Rights and elsewhere, to apply the strongest pressure possible to stop this crime.

In the complex negotiations on a convention banning chemical weapons we have made progress on a number of issues this year. Many problems remain, some of a more technical character, some of much wider scope, touching on security concerns, inter alia during the 10-year transitional period. These problems need to be fully discussed. But for the Netherlands the basic scope of the treaty on which we have been working for such a long time is clear. Under the convention all production of chemical weapons by parties will be forbidden, and the destruction and complete elimination of stocks and production facilities must take effect within a 10-year period.

Some remarks have been made recently about the amount of detail which has to be worked out before the convention is ready for signature. There is no doubt that the provisions of the convention must be crystal clear before we enter into far-reaching commitments, which, by the way, also have to be translated into national legislation. But every time we dig into the details, we must ask ourselves whether the common sense of the Director-General of the future secretariat, where necessary under the guidance of the executive council or the conference of States parties, would not enable him to cross bridges when these are reached. We cannot foresee all situations that may occur.

Notwithstanding the many points that still have to be worked out, the "rolling text" of the draft treaty is shaping up. There is growing consensus on the main orientations of its provisions. However, this is not yet the case with article VI, on the régime necessary to verify that permitted capabilities are not used for forbidden purposes. We trust that the national trial inspections to be conducted by a number of countries will help to solve some problems, in particular concerning schedule [2] facilities. You may be aware that the Netherlands held such a trial inspection two years ago. We are at present looking into the possibility of additional activities in this field.

Some major conceptual problems remain, however, in the context of article VI. I note the very interesting idea of so-called ad hoc checks, which may present a solution to deter illegal production in facilities capable of producing chemicals relevant to the convention but not falling under

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routine verification procedures. Much work remains to be done to understand all the consequences of the system of ad hoc checks, such as the types of chemical facilities or sites to be listed, the kind of checks inspectors may perform and the selection of the facilities or sites to be checked. In view of the potential importance of ad hoc checks within the overall system of verification of non-production, we consider serious in-depth discussion of this concept essential.

The convention will be a very complex agreement. We have already long since passed the point at which we can explain it to our children. Yet the need for logical consistency remains. In this connection, I would like to raise the issue of the need for schedule [4], or schedule [...] as it is now called, on super-toxic lethal chemicals. For my delegation the three dots are, for the time being, three question marks.

Three major reasons have been given for including schedule [4] in the convention. First, schedule [1] only lists STLCs that have actually been used to fill chemical munitions. According to the proponents, schedule [4] would have to cover other STLCs. It seems to us, however, that most chemicals liable for introduction in schedule [4] are unsuitable for chemical warfare. And if they are, they would be much better put into one of the other three schedules.

Second, it is argued that some of the facilities producing super-toxic materials may at present not be relevant for chemical warfare, but could none the less be used for producing chemical warfare agents. According to the proponents, such CW-capable facilities would be covered if a schedule [4] were introduced. However, this would only be a very partial solution, as most of the facilities with a capability for producing chemicals relevant to the convention would not fall under schedule [4]. In other words, facilities producing STLCs constitute only one amongst various categories with such a potential capability. An adequate system of ad hoc checks would in our view be much better to address these problems, as this would cover all relevant chemical facilities.

Third, proponents of schedule [4] apparently also consider such a scheme appropriate because it could offer the opportunity for verification of the non-development of chemical weapon agents. But in our view non-development is another issue that cannot be covered by a régime which is meant to check the non-production of known chemical weapon agents and their precursors in militarily relevant quantities. Development almost by definition implies that the agent is still unknown and that the quantities produced are irrelevant. If a verification régime for non-development is at all possible, it would be better taken up separately. In that case, we must address the question of what development exactly is - which stages must be passed before development becomes relevant with respect to the purposes of the convention. We may be able to elaborate some confidence-building measures, comparable to those agreed during the last review conference of the biological weapons Convention, which would suit the purpose.

All in all, it will require much time to resolve the complex issues of verifying non-production and related matters, taking also into account the

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discussions with industry that are needed to find optimum solutions. We therefore hope that delegations will focus their attention on these questions, so as to find adequate solutions within a reasonable time span.

Verification may prove to be the most time-consuming and most intricate problem to be solved before the convention can be drafted in its final shape. But the greatest political challenge may well be to ensure maximum participation by countries in the convention. The question is not only that those countries that at present participate in our work - the 40 member countries of the Conference and the 15 or so others that have joined us and make their contribution - should sign and ratify the convention. The question is also how to encourage other countries to take an interest in the enterprise. We think it is too early yet to foresee what procedures are most suitable to ensure that the convention becomes a truly global convention. One element could be the holding of a final conference open to all States once the details of the convention have been worked out.

At this stage we wish to limit ourselves to one observation valid for the short term. In the Netherlands' view, all countries that are interested in joining the work at present are welcome as observers. We fully understand that various countries, perhaps for practical reasons, do not have the opportunity yet to be represented in the daily affairs of the negotiations. But we do hope that representatives of those countries at least find an opportunity to get acquainted with the reports we have produced, and, if they so wish, put questions on an informal and individual basis to those of us here who are more closely associated with the work. This could be of use to us, and it may eventually also facilitate the ratification process once the convention is established.

Allow me to touch briefly on the issue of outer space. My country attaches particular importance to appropriate measures regarding arms control in outer space, a complex subject which defies simple solutions. The negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on these matters, in particular around the ABM Treaty, clearly show how difficult, how arduous the task is to achieve tangible results in this area. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Hans van den Broek, indicated at SSOD-III how important agreement on a period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty would be. It is therefore encouraging to hear that the United States and the Soviet Union are very slowly edging forward towards agreement on a period of non-withdrawal. Agreement on this period would add to stability because it would create a more predictable strategic environment.

Predictability has also been enhanced by the recently concluded agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on the prior notification of launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. I wonder whether it might not be possible to further study the implications of this agreement for other countries. Perhaps the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space may wish to consider the question of whether this agreement could serve as an example to other relevant countries. Since the bilateral agreement on prior notification of launches of intercontinental missiles clearly serves the cause of stability, and thus the security of us all, similar commitments by other relevant States would be important.

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I would not like to prescribe or predict what other relevant countries could do in this respect. But they may wish to consider acting as if they were parties to the bilateral agreement. They may also wish to consider formally adhering to the bilateral agreement. Or they may consider creating a multilateral mechanism of their own. I strongly believe that arrangements of this kind should ultimately have a firm foundation in international law with the purpose of securing binding commitments by all relevant States.

During the past session of the CD a lot has been said about the existing legal régime. The views of my Government on this subject are known to you: we believe that there is scope for improvement, to fill gaps, and we are of the opinion that the Conference on Disarmament should examine the subject in depth. One aspect concerns the strengthening of the registration Convention, which in our view should be given serious consideration. Pending agreement on the strengthening of its provisions, I wish to stress the importance of adequate implementation of the existing Convention. Proper application of the provisions of the Convention could lead, for example, to more and better information on the nature and function of objects in space. If the registration Convention were applied more fully, this could well increase transparency and strengthen confidence on the part of all countries concerned. States may also be prepared to improve on the notification provisions under the registration Convention. Notification could, for instance, be done before instead of after the launching of objects into space. Useful suggestions have been presented in a recent working document by Australia and Canada. The Netherlands fully supports these suggestions.

Before I conclude, I would like to use this opportunity to thank the delegation and the Government of the Soviet Union for their invitation to attend the first operation for the destruction of a number of SS-20 missiles, and for the hospitality rendered to us on that occasion. It was a significant experience to be a witness of the beginning of the destruction of a whole category of sophisticated weapons that for so long has blocked the road towards disarmament. It was with a big bang that those missiles were destroyed. My question is: when will we hear the first "bang" that is the product of this Conference? Not a bang on the table, but a bang marking the destruction of weapons. Or, if you wish, when will we see the fumes of destruction under agenda item 6? Or, for that matter, hear just silence as the fruit of our work under agenda item 1? We hope next year will bring us closer to that moment.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Netherlands for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair, and I pray to the Almighty that his wishes for my country at the peace talks in the Persian Gulf region will be materialized soon. I now give the floor to the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Ekéus.

Mr. EKEUS (Sweden): Let me first express the great satisfaction of the Swedish delegation that you have assumed the presidency of the Conference for the month of September and the inter-sessional period. We interpret the decision of your Government to send such a distinguished, high-level official to preside over our work as an expression of the importance attached by your Government to the work of the Conference. May I also, through you, express our gratitude to Ambassador Loeis of Indonesia for his skilful leadership of

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the Conference during the month of August, which kept the Conference on a steady course and also brought some progress in our work? I would also like to address our warm welcome to Ambassador Varga of Hungary, Ambassador Aung Thant of Burma and Ambassador Sharma of India, who have recently joined us.

I will devote my statement today to the question of chemical weapons mostly, but before that I will make some short reflections on item 1. That item of our agenda, "Nuclear test ban", has the highest priority in the CD. This is an issue to which my Government attaches the utmost importance. Given the widely recognized urgent need to initiate negotiations on this item, it is a source of great concern that this negotiating body has not succeeded in starting substantial treatment of the nuclear test ban issue.

We have all welcomed the measures undertaken by the major Powers to carry out quantitative reductions in their nuclear weapon arsenals. The INF Treaty constitutes an important initial undertaking which must soon be followed by reductions in strategic nuclear arsenals. The Treaty is significant also as a means of building confidence and promoting dialogue, and is of great practical interest as to its verification methods. The demonstration of the destruction of intermediate-range missiles in the Soviet Union was a concrete event of great symbolic and political importance. We thank the Soviet delegation and the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union for this initiative.

I wish, however, to reiterate our view that if the nuclear arms race is to be effectively checked quantitative reductions are not enough. By means of qualitative improvements the nuclear arms race can in fact continue. It is in this perspective that a nuclear test ban should be viewed. A test ban would provide an effective means of preventing the qualitative arms race and support efforts towards real disarmament. The Six-nation Initiative has - in Delhi, Mexico and Stockholm - called for an immediate halt to all nuclear testing. Broad political support for this goal has been manifested in this Conference, as well as in other international forums. A determination to seek to achieve a complete test ban is expressed in the partial test-ban Treaty as well as the non-proliferation Treaty and was repeated at the third review conference of the NPT. This is a commitment made by nuclear-weapon Powers too. Unless these commitments are pursued there is a strong risk of not only continued vertical proliferation but also horizontal proliferation.

The United States and the Soviet Union have decided to conduct joint verification experiments, one at the United States test site in Nevada and the other at the Semipalatinsk test site in the USSR. On 17 August one of these nuclear tests was carried out, and the second is scheduled to take place tomorrow, 14 September. In this context I must state that Sweden's view is that continued nuclear testing will help fuel the nuclear arms race. We cannot subscribe to a legitimization of nuclear tests. Neither can we endorse in principle testing in any form. We consider that confidence-building experiments in this area should take place within the context of a precisely defined plan to achieve a comprehensive test ban at an early and specified date. The aim is not controlled tests, but no tests at all.

While welcoming the increased transparency in this field, which should help to promote the elaboration of an effective verification system, it would

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be helpful if the international community could become involved in the data exchange. This is a modest idea considering that as much as 25 years ago the two major Powers proclaimed that agreement on general and complete disarmament should be subject to strict international control. Important international efforts are under way with the purpose of finding effective means of verifying a nuclear test ban. Sweden for its part is prepared to supply all relevant data from the Hagfors observatory.

During this summer session of the CD, the Group of Scientific Experts has held its 26th meeting. The Group conducted a thorough review of its report on the design of a modern global network for exchange of seismological data, including level II (wave-form) data. The separate parts of the system - a world-wide network of seismological stations, international data centres as well as national ones and appropriate means of communication - will provide us with adequate methods to verify a nuclear test ban. The Group has initiated a large-scale experiment on the exchange and analysis of level II data with the aim of arriving at further refined principles for the operation of a global seismological network. The different parts of the experimental system will be tested continuously and, later on, fully integrated testing of the whole system will take place.

As a result of the work of the scientific experts, we can now see that it will become feasible to create an effective global verification system which can be used to help observe compliance with obligations under a comprehensive test-ban treaty, even if a considerable amount of work still has to be carried out. Verification is thus now a political rather than a technical issue. Allegedly inadequate verification methods can no longer be used as an argument for deferring negotiations on a nuclear test ban. Why then is it that the CD is not taking decisive steps towards in-depth deliberations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty? There is a de facto convergence of views on the question of a mandate. Continued detailed elaboration of the wording of a mandate will most probably not help the matter, but rather prevent us from tackling the substance of the issue. There is a risk that the inability to define a mandate may be considered as a sign of lack of interest in moving forward on this issue.

Regarding the proposed mandates, my delegation finds the differences between them more artificial than real. For our part we support the proposed text contained in document CD/829, which in our view shows considerable flexibility on the part of the Group of 21. My delegation has also noted the proposal contained in document CD/863. When this proposal was first introduced informally Sweden expressed its interest in working on the basis of this text, and we still consider it as a possible approach for negotiating a compromise formula with regard to a mandate for the ad hoc committee. My delegation considers it imperative that multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty should be accorded the highest priority. The Conference on Disarmament is the one and only forum for such negotiations.

We have here a forum attended by all five nuclear-weapon Powers. We have easy access to advanced reference work on verification. We are thus well prepared and should be ready to give more substance to our work on the test ban issue. The CD provides us with an important forum for negotiations on a future agreement that should be acceptable to all. Bearing in mind the work

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of the forthcoming General Assembly and its First Committee, my delegation deems it important that efforts to further narrow the gap between differing views on the test ban issue should continue. If these efforts bear fruit, the prospects of having an ad hoc committee on item 1 of our agenda with an effective mandate during the spring session of the Conference on Disarmament next year will certainly look much brighter.

I would now like to turn to the question of chemical weapons. Work in the Conference on Disarmament on a chemical weapons convention has continued in 1988 against a backdrop of intensified and escalated use of these weapons of mass destruction. The situation is serious. We are faced with a threat of further proliferation of chemical weapons and further development of chemical warfare agents and methods for their dissemination. Recent United Nations reports on the continued use of these weapons in the conflict between Iran and Iraq, as well as other reports in its aftermath, demonstrate in a tragic way the importance of concluding our work without further delay. A comprehensive ban on chemical weapons would, by its effectiveness and globality, insure us all against the resurgence of chemical warfare, from the very date of its entry into force. This is what is expected by the Conference on Disarmament. Our work must be inspired by a new sense of urgency to address and solve all outstanding issues. For Sweden, the completion of a chemical weapons convention is a major priority of the Conference. That goal is within reach. Our success would also imbue the multilateral disarmament process with new confidence, with a new sense of purpose.

However, and much to our regret, we must note that our work in 1988 has fallen short of the repeated calls for renewed or even continuing urgency. Some important issues have hardly been addressed; solving others has taken unnecessary time and effort. We are conscious that substantive progress has taken place in bilateral work between the two major possessors of chemical weapons. We welcome this progress and are acutely aware of its importance, as an illustration of how bilateral and multilateral efforts can support and reinforce each other. We would however urge the two major possessors of chemical weapons to intensify their efforts and to present their results and agreements in a form which would facilitate their transfer to the multilateral context, i.e. into the "rolling text".

Yet if we feel frustrated by the slow pace of our negotiations, it would not be fair to paint too gloomy a picture. During the present session the Committee, under the steady and patient chairmanship of Ambassador Sujka of Poland, has made some substantive progress. The efforts and the dedication of the three working group chairmen, Mr. Cima of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Macedo of Mexico and Mr. Numata of Japan, have not been in vain. The report which the Conference is presenting to the General Assembly contains valuable new elements.

I will mention some of them, if I may. The Chairman of Group A was able to bring to the report a well-balanced, carefully drafted text on article XI, "Economic and technological development". His success in this endeavour was in part made possible by the flexibility shown by members of the Group of 21, for which this article is of special importance. We regret, however, that the present text of article XI has not been included in appendix I of the report. The arguments that the text is at an early stage of elaboration and that no

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common understanding exists as to the terms and definitions employed in it are hardly convincing. The text of the article has been thoroughly discussed with inputs from delegations of all groups. Its terms and definitions have to a large extent been borrowed from the biological weapons Convention, which has been signed and ratified by most members of the Conference.

The major breakthrough in Working Group B has been the integration into the "rolling text" of a definition of chemical weapons production facilities and of clear language with regard to the undertaking that these facilities should be destroyed, as well as principles and methods for their destruction.

In Working Group C, the Chairman has managed to make considerable progress on the issue of challenge inspections and on procedures following the submission of inspection reports.

As a result of consultations on the final clauses, conducted by the Chairman of the Committee, well-structured elements presented as alternatives are included in appendix II. They form the necessary basis for completion of this important part of the draft convention. Furthermore, the meeting with industrial experts in July highlighted a number of points regarding confidentiality of commercial and industrial information, and also served to illustrate that the chemical industry in major industrialized countries is committed to facilitating the implementation of the convention.

Finally, substantial and results-oriented work has been made in the open-ended consultations on trial inspections. Having chaired those meetings, I will revert to the issue of trial inspections and report to the Conference on the results of our constructive deliberations at the end of my intervention.

Thus, the results which the Conference is able to present this year are tangible even if they are far from sufficient. I will briefly make some observations with regard to the problems that still remain unsolved and indicate areas where, in the view of my delegation, we will have to concentrate our efforts during the inter-sessional work and during the coming session.

Article I remains the very backbone of the draft convention and the basis for all our work. As a result of this summer session it has been further strengthened through the unambiguous undertaking by all States in paragraph 6 to destroy their chemical weapons production facilities. Remaining brackets seem less difficult to deal with. Consultations will have to be undertaken regarding preparation for use, a problem which is also linked to the issue of development of chemical weapons. The question of "jurisdiction or control" could be solved in relation to other articles.

The clarity and comprehensiveness of our scope provisions provide the practical and moral rationale for the whole draft convention and, in the view of Sweden, remaining issues can and must be solved without any major modifications of article I, which has acquired a definitive and timeless character.

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The same cannot be said about article II, another basic provision of our draft convention. Certainly, the inclusion of an agreed definition of chemical weapons production facilities this summer is a significant step forward. Other parts of the article, however, have not been addressed in substance for too long a period. The present text reflects an early stage of our negotiations and does not fully correspond to the present stage of chemical weapons technology. Definitions under article II must be basic and applicable to the future. However, the present language in article II has a provisional character; it has, on that basis, served us well up to a point, but it has not been of much help in the latest negotiations on article VI and its various régimes. Progress in those negotiations on activities not prohibited by the convention can bring us closer to a new set of definitions and methods of handling them. As a first step in dealing with the problem of definitions the Committee should, in our view, address article II and the schedules under article VI comprehensively in order to transfer relevant lists of chemicals together with some definitions, criteria and guidelines to a special annex on chemicals. Mechanisms for revision should ensure that this annex could be kept up to date. Article II itself should contain only fundamental and permanent definitions and criteria.

Article III, on declarations, does not seem to require any further work at this stage of the negotiations. The only outstanding issue is to fix a date as of which declarations should be made. In view of the comprehensiveness of the definitions of chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities, it would seem practical to choose the later date indicated in the text, i.e. 26 March 1975. This would help us to avoid unnecessary ambiguities in implementation, which could lead to irrelevant and potentially harmful challenge situations.

The main task remaining in articles IV and V is to agree on the order of destruction of chemical weapons stocks and chemical weapons production facilities. These articles and their annexes are of pivotal importance for the implementation of article I so as to ensure the undiminished security of all States, including minor possessors of chemical weapons. This problem has been under consideration for a number of years. Useful material with regard to the principles and order of destruction of chemical weapons is now included in appendix II and reflects a rather advanced stage of elaboration. It is, however, clear that differences on the subject remain.

Most States have never seen the need for chemical weapons in their arsenals and others, like the United Kingdom, have unilaterally decided to destroy their chemical weapons and production facilities, obviously without experiencing profound feelings of diminished security. Still, States evidently have concerns regarding the destruction period. The proposal by France in CD/CW/WP.199 and the difficult discussion on the Committee's report these last few weeks convey the message that there exists a problem which has to be solved. Sweden therefore welcomes the consensus that the issue must be addressed in full. In doing so, however, we maintain that any solution to the problem of undiminished security must be found through a balanced and asymmetrical levelling out of chemical weapons stocks and a balanced phasing out of chemical weapons production facilities.

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Sweden, and indeed the whole of the Group of 21, does however reject the possibility of continued production or use of chemical weapons during the destruction period. This would constitute an open invitation to the legalized proliferation of chemical weapons, and would discriminate against all States which have refrained from such production. The draft convention is designed to prohibit the production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and not to regulate how to produce, how to stockpile and when to use them.

Activities not prohibited by the convention, covered by article VI and its annex, constitute an area where we have not been able to make any major progress during this session. We hope that the industrial experts' discussion on confidentiality, the convincing demonstration of non-intrusive verification equipment like the "sample now, analyse later" (SNAL) concept introduced by the Federal Republic of Germany, and not least the planned process of trial inspections will provide us with fresh material and new insights so that rapid progress can be made. We must provide for effective inspection régimes but at the same time not allow ourselves to get bogged down in technical details which could usefully be left to the preparatory commission and the technical secretariat to solve.

The main goal of article VI must be to provide for measures that would give States parties to the convention confidence that the basic undertaking not to produce chemical weapons is fulfilled by all States parties. The article provides for methods and principles to control relevant production of chemicals in order to verify either that certain chemicals are not produced or that production of toxic chemicals and their precursors is for purposes not prohibited by the convention.

Our choice of approach must take account of several interests. First, we must provide for a high degree of probability that violations of the convention are detected and reported. This means a stringent régime of verification of declared facilities. In addition to the provisions for challenge inspections, there also seems to be a need to extend the possibility for inspections on a politically less visible level to facilities not declared under the respective schedules. Second, the hampering of research, development and production for peaceful purposes must be avoided. Especially at the most sensitive stage, research and development, legitimate concerns regarding commercial and industrial secrets must be respected. Third, the régime must be easily adaptable to future technological developments. To achieve such adaptability the principles and objectives of verification must be clearly and unambiguously stated, while on the other side the technical verification methods and procedures, as well as the lists of relevant chemicals subject to control, could be smoothly changed and updated in consonance with new technical achievements. Fourth, the régime must be designed in such a way that it can be implemented without incurring unacceptable costs and an unmanageable administration. It should thus be not only effective, but also efficient.

If we decide in the negotiations to widen the scope of routine inspections to undeclared facilities, as is proposed with the concept of ad hoc checks, we must be able to establish, first, that such a régime really would increase our confidence in the convention, secondly that it is made sufficiently effective in order not to create ambiguities which might decrease

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our confidence, and thirdly that the costs are commensurate with the objective. We must establish what the objective of ad hoc checks is supposed to be. Are we looking for undeclared production of listed chemicals? Do we want to control unlisted chemicals that could have military uses? Do we want to check that production capacity is not misused? A purely random, almost accidental, selection for inspection from an enormous number of facilities, most of which could not even be transformed for CW-related production, would be neither efficient nor effective.

Trying to verify what is not verifiable does not create confidence. Verification must be applied to what is relevant and significant. Verification cannot be an aim in itself. A case in point is the area of early research and development of chemical weapons, an issue which has been intensively discussed this summer. My delegation is not convinced that certain proposals advanced during the discussion on this specific issue lead us in the right direction.

The first stages of research and development of chemicals for weapons use in laboratories are undistinguishable from legitimate research for protection purposes. As far as chemicals not included in schedule [1] are concerned, such research is undistinguishable from legitimate research regarding environmental protection, industrial safety, medical or agricultural purposes. We must choose a stage in the development process where verification becomes meaningful, that is a stage where it could conceivably be possible to demonstrate a violation of the convention, or at least a serious inexplicable anomaly. This would hardly be possible before research and development have left the laboratories and entered a pilot plant or weapons testing phase.

A very brief outline of the Swedish position on article VI would be the following. Production of schedule [1] chemicals must be confined to single small-scale production facilities, with the exception of laboratory-scale synthesis and production for medical purposes of up to 10 kg a year. As far as schedule [2] chemicals are concerned, the régime as it now stands seems practicable on paper. The trial inspections will hopefully give us enough experience to finalize that régime. The régime for schedule [3] will need further elaboration. A system of spot checks could usefully be explored. As regards the last, unnumbered schedule, which was also touched upon by Ambassador van Schaik in his speech today, it seems to my delegation that it is the capacity of a given facility that would justify its being subject to control arrangements, rather than the actual chemicals it may be producing. The schedule might even be deleted if we were able to devise another method for identifying and controlling potential (from the technical point of view) facilities for production of chemical warfare agents.

As I have already mentioned, all the lists should be revised and updated and transferred together with relevant criteria and guidelines to a separate annex on chemicals.

In article VII there still remains a heading regarding national technical means without any text. My delegation would consider any language that may be proposed under the heading with great interest. If no such text is forthcoming we would suggest that the heading should simply be dropped next session.

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In article VIII the basic structure of the Organization has acquired almost final form. The core issue that remains to be solved is the composition, procedure and decision-making of the executive council. We maintain a flexible attitude on the relevant provisions. Our main concern is to make the executive council both representative and efficient. This leads us to favour a comparatively small body, certainly not bigger than the Board of Governors of IAEA. The composition of the executive council should reflect political balance and equitable geographical distribution. We fully understand the concerns of some States which, because of their level of industrial development, would carry a higher burden of routine inspections, and their wish for special representation. Those concerns could however be met within the framework of political and geographical criteria.

As to decision-making, rules that would be conducive to consensus should be striven for. Efficient and effective powers of decision-making, however, call for the possibility of voting, and the application of qualified majorities would seem appropriate. With respect to the required majority it is difficult to decide whether it should be two thirds or three quarters, as long as the composition and the full extent and nature of the decisions to be taken by the council are not known. Composition and decision-making must be addressed in parallel. It is also doubtful whether a solution can be found until articles VI, IX, X, XIII and XIV have been fully elaborated. At a later stage it might be useful to consider a differentiated approach to decision-making, implying that different kinds of decisions will be taken with different majorities.

The complex and difficult issue of how to initiate a challenge inspection under article IX, and the principles for the conduct of such inspections within the parameter of no right of refusal, has not yet been finally worked out. The material to be found in appendix II constitutes a sound basis for treaty language that would reflect a balanced approach to the interests of reassurance and security on the one hand and national integrity on the other.

Otherwise, it is the view of my delegation that progress in Working Group C under the skilful and energetic chairmanship of Mr. Numata has been a major achievement this summer. The general rules governing inspections under article IX, now included in the addendum to appendix I, constitute a comprehensive outline. It is our hope that the efforts will continue in such a way that the relevant part of the draft convention can be completed early next session.

Another issue addressed in Working Group C is reflected in a new text in appendix II on the procedure to be followed after the submission of the report. Some problems still remain in that text. Basically the question concerns the extent to which the executive council must, or should, or can express itself on the inspection report and what special importance, if any, should be given to the assessment of the requesting State.

For Sweden it seems obvious that the executive council must be given a high degree of freedom of action. We must therefore rule out a provision which would impose on the council the obligation to determine whether or not a violation of the convention has taken place. Sometimes this would simply not

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be feasible. On the other hand, we cannot deny the council the right to state that a violation has taken place if this has been substantiated by the inspection.

Article X, on assistance, has been thoroughly debated, especially during the summer session. The result, however, is disappointing. The text that now appears in appendix II is heavily bracketed and contains clearly contradictory elements. It seems necessary to reconsider the whole article. The main assurance against the use of chemical weapons lies in a convention of comprehensive scope, effectively verified and universally adhered to. This is the convention we are elaborating. If we conclude such a convention, the issues addressed in article X acquire a rather academic and theoretical character. Nevertheless, such a provision serves a purpose during the transitional period, and can therefore be viewed as yet another way of tackling the issue of undiminished security. But to serve a purpose it must be realistic in scope and possible to implement. Basically it must contain provisions for assistance in cases of chemical weapons use. Such provisions ought to be easy to elaborate. We have, regrettably, growing experience of extending such assistance to victims of chemical warfare. Furthermore, it can contain provisions for facilitating co-operation in the development by member States of programmes in the field of protection against chemical weapons use. Such co-operation must, however, be carried out on a voluntary basis. For many non-possessors of chemical weapons, undiminished security during the transitional period depends on a high degree of confidentiality regarding their own national programmes and equipment for protection against the use of chemical weapons. That national security interest is incompatible with the concept of model agreements.

I have already at the outset mentioned our progress regarding article XI. Suffice it to repeat briefly that in the view of my delegation the remaining brackets could be removed and the text transferred to appendix I.

As far as the final clauses are concerned, article XII has become a stumbling-block. For Sweden, as for many other delegations, our whole work would be undone if unilaterally declared "rights" under the Geneva Protocol of 1925 were to be transferred and thereby somehow eternalized in a comprehensive chemical weapons convention. This convention, as of its entry into force, unambiguously rules out the use of chemical weapons, and that means any use of chemical weapons. This does not mean that those "rights" fully cease. They will have a residual character, but only as a result of withdrawal from the convention. To solve the issue the proposal put forward by Canada that article XII should simply be deleted merits full consideration. It goes without saying that the convention would not limit the obligations under the Geneva Protocol.

The Swedish view on the issue of use leads us to the conclusion that States parties, in exercising their national sovereignty, will have the right to withdraw from the convention if extraordinary events related to the subject-matter of the convention have jeopardized their supreme interests. This right should only take effect if scope for remedying the situation under the convention has been exhausted.

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

Openness and transparency are indeed important for our work. Sweden welcomes the declarations that have been made during this session regarding the possession or non-possession of chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities. In this context, I am instructed to declare that Sweden does not possess chemical weapons.

This concludes my intervention in my capacity as the leader of the Swedish delegation. With your permission, however, I wish in my capacity as Chairman of the open-ended informal consultations on trial inspections to present a report on the work undertaken on that subject.

In the draft chemical weapons convention, a number of provisions relate to on-site inspections within the chemical industry. In order to expedite work on the convention, and to assess whether the proposed text has adequate and practical provisions to provide the necessary assurance to States that civil facilities are used only for purposes not prohibited by the convention, it has been suggested that trial inspections could be undertaken.

In a first stage, such trial inspections should be carried out on a national basis. In the second stage, the experience in the national trial inspections should be pooled and evaluated together, in the light of the relevant provisions of the draft convention. This process could be devoted to discussion of what might be involved in, and elaboration of, modalities for the third stage: trial inspections with multilateral participation.

Under the auspices of the Ad hoc Committee, and at the request of the Ad hoc Committee Chairman, I held informal, open-ended consultations to prepare the ground for such multilateral trial inspections in the chemical industry. As a result of these consultations a paper was elaborated. This paper has now been distributed to you. The paper is primarily intended to assist interested States in their preparations for the national trial inspections. The suggestions contained in the paper are not in any way binding or mandatory, but can be regarded as a list of issues of relevance to the trial inspections. The paper will be issued as a working paper of the Ad hoc Committee by the Chairman of the consultations.

As was agreed during the preparations for this round of consultations, delegations are free to add their comments to the paper before the end of this session. The present document, as I said, is issued under the responsibility of the Chairman of the consultations. The paper is divided into three parts. The first part (part A - General approach) could be used for the development of scenarios for the trial inspections. The second part (part B - Detailed approach) provides a kind of check-list for the elaboration of procedures for the conduct of the trial inspections. The third part (part C - Specific aspects) provides a list of issues which might be addressed by the trial inspections. Parts of the paper could also be used by States as a reference in preparing reports of the results of their national trial inspections.

Information available regarding the national trial inspections could be discussed during the inter-sessional work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. The detailed elaboration of modalities for the multilateral trial inspections could commence in the 1989 spring session with a view to beginning the actual inspections as soon as possible after these modalities have been worked out.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Sweden for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the distinguished Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, Ambassador García Robles, who will introduce the report of that Ad hoc Committee contained in document CD/867.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, my delegation congratulates you and welcomes the fact that it has fallen to a person of your experience and qualities to preside over our deliberations in the last month of this year, which is always the most important. Likewise, we would like to reiterate our congratulations to your predecessor, Ambassador Loeis, the distinguished representative of Indonesia, who presided over our deliberations last month.

As you have just stated, Sir, I am going to speak today in my capacity as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament in order to introduce the Committee's report to the Conference on its work to date during 1988. The report starts with a brief summary of the work of the Committee and the documentation the Committee had before it. It goes on to refer to some progress that has been made towards harmonizing positions and reducing areas of disagreement indicating, however, that in the short time available it was not possible to reach agreement on all outstanding issues, for which reason the Committee agreed that it should resume work at the outset of the 1989 session with the firm intention of completing the elaboration of the Programme for its submission to the General Assembly at the latest, and I quote, "at its forty-fourth session".

The brief introduction is accompanied by a lengthy annex of 31 pages setting forth the provisions that the Programme might contain. These provisions are grouped together in six chapters with the following titles: Introduction, Objectives, Principles, Priorities, Disarmament measures, Machinery and procedures. With regard to the first four chapters as well as the sixth and last, the Ad hoc Committee has made very considerable progress. There are but a few items that are still outstanding in the introduction, Objectives, Principles and Priorities, and it may be said that it would suffice to abide firmly by the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament to settle any problem concerning these chapters. Turning to the fifth chapter, dealing with disarmament measures, it should be borne in mind that the United States and the Soviet Union have succeeded in reaching positive agreements, among which the joint statement of 8 January 1985 provides an eloquent example of co-operative efforts to halt and reverse the arms race and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Concerning the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, it has been possible to reach consensus on most of the basic elements for that objective. It has also been possible to indicate the obligations and responsibilities of both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, with regard to preventing an increase in the numbers of the former and reducing and eventually eliminating nuclear weapons. With regard to other weapons of mass destruction, it has been agreed that all States should accede to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, which is known by the name

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of the Geneva Protocol because it was signed in this city on 17 June 1925. There is agreement that it is necessary to make all possible efforts to secure the positive conclusion of the negotiations that are being carried out in the Conference on Disarmament on an international convention that will bring about the elimination of all chemical weapons; there is also agreement that a treaty should be concluded on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons, bearing in mind the negotiations under way in the Conference on Disarmament and all proposals made in connection therewith.

It was possible to reach a common position on the need to pursue resolutely, together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament. In this connection there is also agreement that the States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of reducing these arsenals. It has also been possible to adopt the conclusion that the gradual reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis, particularly by nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, would be a measure that would contribute to the curbing of the arms race and would increase the possibilities of allocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly in developing countries. There is consensus with regard to the need for further steps to prohibit military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques, as well as further steps to prevent an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, and to prevent an arms race in outer space.

In order to facilitate the process of disarmament it has been agreed that it is necessary to take measures and pursue policies to strengthen international peace and security and to build confidence among States. There was also agreement on strict adherence and full commitment by all States Members of the United Nations to the purposes of the Charter of the Organization, and their obligation strictly to observe its principles. Likewise, there is general acceptance of the need for Member States to make all efforts to ensure a better flow of information with regard to the various aspects of disarmament, to avoid dissemination of false and tendentious information concerning armaments, and to concentrate on the widest possible dissemination to all sectors of the public of reliable information on the danger of the escalation of the armaments race and on the need for general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Consensus has also been reached on the fact that disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all, without this implying any undue intrusion in the internal affairs of other States.

The sixth and final chapter of the Comprehensive Programme, entitled "Machinery and Procedures", with the exception of five words related to the Charter of the United Nations, is totally free of square brackets. In it, reference is made to the three stages - the first stage, the intermediate stage and the final stage - that will comprise the programme; it is envisaged that the implementation of the measures included in the various stages of the

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

Comprehensive Programme will be periodically reviewed - including at special sessions of the General Assembly; it is stipulated that, in addition to the periodic reviews to be carried out at special sessions, there should be an annual review of the implementation of the Programme, and to facilitate this the Secretary-General would annually submit a report to the Assembly on progress in the implementation of the Programme. The chapter and the draft Comprehensive Programme end with the statement that "at the earliest appropriate time, a world disarmament conference should be convened with universal participation and with adequate preparation".

The undoubted importance of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament - and there is conclusive proof of this in the sections already adopted by consensus, of which I have only given an illustrative example in those I have outlined in this statement - highlights the good grounds for the "firm intention" of the Ad hoc Committee that I referred to today, quoting from the conclusion appearing in the last paragraph of its report for this year, in which it emphasized its decision to "resume work at the outset of the 1989 session", in order to complete the elaboration of the Programme for submission to the General Assembly, as I have already said at the beginning, at the latest at its forty-fourth session.

My statement would be incomplete if I were not to conclude by expressing my gratitude, and, I am sure, that of all the members of the Conference on Disarmament, to those whose efforts have made it possible for us to make progress, although perhaps not to the extent we would have wished, on various of the items with which we have been dealing. I would therefore like to place on record the names of those who acted as co-ordinators of the contact groups to whom I will refer in order which we followed every week in reviewing our subjects: Mr. Renié, representative of France, who dealt with Objectives; Mr. Paliakkara of Sri Lanka, who dealt with Principles; Mr. Fagundes of Brazil, Priorities; Mr. Sood of India, who dealt with the bilateral and multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament and measures to avoid the use of nuclear weapons and prevent nuclear war; Mrs. González, of Mexico, who was responsible for everything pertaining to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones; Miss Letts of Australia, co-ordinator of the contact group on zones of peace, and Messrs. Dejanov, Bulgaria, and Lundbo, Norway, who in their personal capacity and as "friends of the Chairman" lent their valuable co-operation in the consultations designed to produce a text that would receive the approval of all on disarmament and international security. I should also mention Miss Wilma Gibson, who helped the Committee in its work, replaced when she was away by Miss Anne Dolan and Miss Audrey Williamson, as well as Mrs. Beatrice Malinverni.

In order to avoid any involuntary omissions, I will say that our thanks go to all the members of the Secretariat who have been working with the Committee, both visible as well as invisible, among whom the interpreters deserve special mention. Finally - and a better use could hardly be found for the expression "last but not least" - Miss Aída Levin, Secretary of the Ad hoc Committee for seven years now, that is to say since just a year after it commenced its activities as a working group, who, as I have already said in the past and I am very happy to repeat today, has played her important role with a competence and objectivity which are exemplary in every way.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament for his statement introducing the report of the Ad hoc Committee. I also wish to thank His Excellency for the kind words addressed to me. I also extend congratulations to Ambassador García Robles on the completion of the work of the Ad hoc Committee. As in the case of the other report introduced today, we shall take action on document CD/867 at our plenary meeting next Thursday.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador von Stülpnagel.

Mr. von STULPNAGEL (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. President, as I am taking the floor for the first time under your Presidency, I would like to wish you every success in the discharge of your important responsibilities during these crucial last days of this year's session. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Loeis, for the efficient manner in which he steered the work of the Conference during the month of August. I am pleased to welcome Ambassador Aung Thant from Burma, whom I wish all the best for his future work in the Conference.

Next Thursday the Conference on Disarmament will be presented with the report of its Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. I would like to express my appreciation and thanks to the Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Sujka, and the chairmen of the working groups, Mr. Cima, Mr. Macedo and Mr. Numata, for the committed efforts and the hard work they have undertaken during the past session to move the negotiations forward.

On 16 August I promised a further contribution on ad hoc checks in the light of comments made since my delegation presented the case for ad hoc checks in working document CD/791 of 25 January this year. The purpose of the proposed ad hoc checks is to come to terms with the existing verification gap and provide an additional and easily manageable possibility for monitoring also those chemical industry facilities which would not be covered by on-site inspections under the provisions so far contained in the "rolling text".

Encouraged by the interest which was shown in our basic idea, we proceeded to elaborate on our concept of ad hoc checks. Today I would like to introduce document CD/869, which, taking account of the interesting discussions we have had on the issue in recent months, tries to develop the concept further, and I hope it will provide a useful basis for future work aimed at strengthening the verification régime for non-production.

In submitting this paper we do not claim to provide all the answers; rather, it is our intention to stimulate further thinking. The following points mark the basic framework from which we propose to proceed. Ad hoc checks are of a complementary nature; they are to be seen solely in the context of article VI, and represent an additional, unintrusive measure for verifying non-production, their main purpose being to verify the absence of substances listed in schedules [1], [2] and [3]; ad hoc checks are of a strictly routine character, with the technical secretariat initiating them on a random basis without any outside interference; and they are to cover the whole chemical industry on the basis of national registers listing all chemical industry facilities in accordance with an agreed definition.

(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

We hope that our paper will contribute to finalizing expeditiously the provisions on non-production in the "rolling text". In our view it should help to resolve some of the problems which have arisen in the context of article VI, for which we have so far not been able to work out solutions acceptable to all. In this regard I am thinking particularly of the STLC problem which has been debated for a considerable time and on which differences persist. Today's remarks in the Conference seem, in part, to confirm this view. Ad hoc checks could offer a solution to this problem, and thus help to overcome the deadlock on it in the negotiations. Admittedly ad hoc checks, due to their very nature, may not be the answer to all questions which have been raised with regard to the verification requirements of an effective convention. Therefore, I believe that all concerns in this connection warrant our close attention.

In conclusion I would like to express my satisfaction at the prospect of inter-sessional work starting on 29 November this year. We should make the best possible use of the time available during the agreed inter-sessional period. Indeed, I believe that we should not use the inter-sessionals merely to continue our work along the familiar lines. Rather, we might think of focusing our attention on the few specific items we have agreed to deal with during that period. It should be possible as a result of intensive work to make considerable headway on these issues. The Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Sujka, will be able to count on the full and active co-operation and support of my delegation.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Australia.

Mr. MORRIS (Australia): The following statement is made on behalf of a group of Western delegations. It addresses item 1 of the Conference agenda - Nuclear test ban.

The group of States for which I am speaking deeply regrets that once again it has not proved possible for agreement to be reached on the establishment of an ad hoc committee on item 1 of our agenda. The group has stated repeatedly its belief that such an ad hoc committee should be established in order to carry out the practical work that would be required before a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty could be brought into existence. It was for this reason that on 20 July 1984, the group placed before the Conference a mandate for such an ad hoc committee, the text of which is given in document CD/521. As was made clear then, the terms of CD/521 represented a compromise proposal by our group.

That draft mandate was then supplemented by a suggested programme of work for an ad hoc committee, the terms of which were given in document CD/621, and by numerous working papers submitted by members of the group both to the Conference and to the Group of Scientific Experts.

We have indicated repeatedly that we would welcome discussion of our draft mandate and our draft programme of work in order to determine where they may be misunderstood or where other difficulties with their terms might lie. This offer has never been accepted. It remains open today.

(Mr. Morris, Australia)

In the face of these disappointing realities, but because we continue to attach very great importance to the establishment of an ad hoc committee under item 1, we indicated a year ago that we would be prepared to discuss with others, as a possible basis for developing a consensus, the draft mandate which had been drawn up by Ambassador Vejvoda in his capacity of President of the Conference for the month of April 1987. That offer was met by the claim, made by some member States of the Conference, that it would not be possible to consider Ambassador Vejvoda's draft unless it were first tabled in the Conference. That action has now been taken by Ambassador Vejvoda, who tabled his draft proposal on 25 August 1988 - document CD/863.

Accordingly, the group of Western States for which I am speaking wishes to record, again, that while its preferred approach would be for an ad hoc committee to be established on the basis of the mandate given in document CD/521, if this proposal cannot find consensus then it is prepared to enter into discussions of the Vejvoda proposal with other groups and delegations as a possible basis for reaching agreement on the establishment of an ad hoc committee under item 1 of the agenda.

The group for which I am speaking, notes that the same willingness has been expressed by the Group of Socialist States and by China and regrets that, to date, a similar indication has not been given by the Group of 21. Indeed, no reply has been given by the Group of 21 to requests that it agree simply to begin discussions of the Vejvoda proposal.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Australia for his statement, and I now give the floor to the representative of Mexico.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): What the distinguished representative of Australia has just said impels me to take the floor very briefly since I think that would be sufficient. It is not a matter here - at least that is the interpretation of my delegation - of our referring to proposals that have been made by a group of delegations or a delegation several years ago and proposals that are being made this year. It is a matter of comparing them, and seeing whether there have been any substantive changes in these proposals. The distinguished representative of Australia has referred to the proposal that was distributed in document CD/521 of 20 July 1984. Prior to that, on 28 March 1984, the Group of 21 had submitted proposal CD/492. What we would like is a comparison between the 1984 proposals and the 1988 proposals.

What did we say in 1984? In 1984 we said, and I quote:

"The Conference on Disarmament decides to re-establish for the duration of its 1984 session the ad hoc subsidiary body on a nuclear test ban to initiate immediately the multilateral negotiation of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests and to exert its best endeavours in order that the Conference may transmit to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session the complete draft of such a treaty."

I think that what the Group of 21 was asking for in 1984 was quite clear. Since then we have said that we were ready to display flexibility, to try to

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understand the point of view of other delegations, and in a proposal that was ultimately reproduced in document CD/829 of 15 April this year - What does the Group of 21 say? The Group of 21 says:

"The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish an ad hoc committee on item 1 of its agenda with the objective of carrying out the multilateral negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty."

"The ad hoc committee will set up two working groups which will deal, respectively, with the following interrelated questions:

"(a) Working group I - Contents and scope of the treaty;

"Working group II - Compliance and verification."

I think that this text is clear, but if there were a need for an explanation, then I would venture to recall what I said when I introduced this text to the Conference on Disarmament. I said that the words "with the objective" are open to many interpretations, but that each participant could, at the time the mandate was adopted, place on record his interpretation of these words "with the objective".

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico. I see no other speaker.

I am sure that all members are aware by now that we are well behind schedule in the preparation of the annual report to the General Assembly of the United Nations, so much so that we will not be able to close the annual session on Thursday, as originally planned. In principle, it might be possible to conclude the session with a plenary meeting on Friday at 5 p.m., if consideration of the draft substantive paragraphs is completed at midday today or immediately after the open-ended consultations on the substantive paragraphs of item 1 to take place at 3.15 p.m. in room 302. Unfortunately, there is a large amount of documentation to be processed during the last stages of our work, as some subsidiary bodies were not able to conclude their work as originally planned. Accordingly, the technical processing of the revision of the technical parts of the report, plus the substantive paragraphs for certain agenda items, will take a bit longer than on previous occasions. I do hope that we can finish on Friday, but I would prefer to formalize any decision concerning the closing date at our next plenary meeting, when we will have a better idea of where we stand concerning documentation. Of course it is understood that, if we are able to conclude on Friday at 5 p.m., the plenary meeting will be devoted only to adoption of the report. Any statement on substance should therefore be made at the plenary meeting next Thursday.

I have no other business to consider today. I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday 15 September at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.