



UNITED NATIONS
 GENERAL
 ASSEMBLY



Distr.
 GENERAL

A/34/416 + add. 1 + 2 + 3
 5 October 1979
 ENGLISH
 ORIGINAL: ARABIC/ENGLISH/
 FRENCH/RUSSIAN/
 SPANISH

Thirty-fourth session
 Agenda item 45 (b)

GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

Confidence-building measures

Report of the Secretary-General

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. The General Assembly, at its thirty-third session, adopted, under the item entitled "General and complete disarmament", resolution 33/91 B, the operative part of which reads as follows:

"The General Assembly,

...

"1. Recommends that all States should consider on a regional basis arrangements for specific confidence-building measures, taking into account the specific conditions and requirements of each region;

"2. Invites all States to inform the Secretary-General of their views and experiences regarding those confidence-building measures they consider appropriate and feasible;

"3. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit the views of Member States on this question to the General Assembly during its thirty-fourth session;

"4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fourth session an item entitled 'Confidence-building measures'."

2. Pursuant to paragraph 3 of the resolution, the Secretary-General transmits herewith the views received as at 1 October 1979 from Member States concerning the question of confidence-building measures. Further replies will be issued as an addendum to the present document.

II. REPLIES RECEIVED FROM GOVERNMENTS

AUSTRALIA

/Original: English/

/6 September 1979/

1. At the thirty-third session of the General Assembly, Australia supported resolution 33/91 B on confidence-building measures, by which the Assembly invited States to inform the Secretary-General of their views and experiences of those confidence-building measures they consider appropriate and feasible.

2. In May 1979, the Federal Republic of Germany submitted a report to the Secretary-General and passed a copy of the report to the Australian Government for its information. Australia shares the views of the Federal Republic regarding the value of confidence-building measures and believes its proposals are practical and not over-ambitious and could form the basis for agreements which would contribute to the lessening of international tensions.

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3. Australia has no direct experience of the specific types of confidence-building measures outlined by the Federal Republic of Germany. They are more relevant to regions where there are formidable concentrations of military power and a wide degree of distrust between the countries concerned, such as exists in Central Europe or the Middle East. Within the framework of harmonious relations between Australia and its immediate neighbours, however, it can be said that broadly comparable objectives are served by Australian programmes of defence co-operation. These programmes, modest in scale and involving in many instances the use of military resources for developmental objectives, help to broaden international understanding and goodwill between Australia and its neighbours and mutual understanding of strategic concerns and military objectives. In the course of visits, training courses, combined exercises and other agreed projects, personal contacts are developed between defence forces and an important dimension of confidence and mutual trust is added to the totality of Australia's relations with its neighbours.

4. In addition, as the Prime Minister stated at the special session on disarmament, Australia is willing to submit its defence budget for analysis as part of a pilot project on military budgets.

AUSTRIA

/Original: English/

/9 July 1979/

1. Because of Austria's geographic position between two military alliances and in view of its relatively low level of armaments which do not threaten the military security of any other State, Austria is particularly interested in concrete results of disarmament negotiations which would guarantee a true balance of power in Europe on a lower level of armaments.

2. Considering the complexities and the resulting long duration of such arms control and disarmament negotiations, Austria has always called for measures that would complement these negotiations with an improvement of the negotiating climate and would establish confidence between the negotiating partners and between European States in general.

3. On the basis of these considerations of principle, Austria was among the co-sponsors of General Assembly resolution 33/91 B.

4. Confidence-building measures cannot replace concrete results of disarmament negotiations. If it is not possible to obtain such results over a longer period of time and should the arms race continue unabated, confidence-building measures by themselves will not be sufficient to make up for the distrust created by the continuous arms race.

5. The building of confidence, however, can have a considerable psychological-atmospheric significance in influencing, in a positive way, the subjective estimations and expectations of a negotiating partner with respect to the aims and goals of the other negotiating partner(s).

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6. Austria, therefore, advocated within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), together with other neutral and non-aligned States, the inclusion of such confidence-building measures in the Final Act of the Conference and continues to exert efforts for the full implementation and further expansion of these measures. In view of the level of its armaments, Austria in general does not hold manoeuvres of a larger category. As a sign of its goodwill, Austria has nevertheless in the past two years announced two smaller manoeuvres on a scale of 5,000 and 12,000 men respectively, although there was no commitment to do so under the Final Act of the Conference. Austria hopes that at the Madrid follow-up meeting of CSCE further relevant decisions and measures will become possible.

7. The experience gained to date by Austria concerning confidence-building measures within the framework of the Conference have shown that the regional level is particularly suited for the introduction and implementation of such measures because in such a way the confidence-building measures can best be tailored towards the special requirements of the area concerned.

8. Austria has taken note with interest of various proposals for the consideration of new confidence-building measures among the participating countries in the Conference which have been submitted since last year and which could, within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, also be considered at the Madrid follow-up meeting of the Conference. In this context, in addition to the strengthening and expansion of confidence-building measures which are already mentioned in the Final Act of the Conference (for instance through an obligation to announce also smaller manoeuvres, to improve conditions for observers at manoeuvres and to announce military movements), it could also be possible to consider new confidence-building measures. Such considerations would be greatly facilitated by a stock-taking of all feasible confidence-building measures.

9. The significant importance of confidence-building measures lies in the possibility of their substantially impeding surprise attacks or even of excluding such attacks, and in such a way as to alleviate the feeling of threat and insecurity of States with respect to the actual or presumed military capabilities and intentions of other States.

10. Austria is also prepared to continue in the future its active participation in the search for such confidence-building measures.

BELGIUM

[Original: French]

[24 April 1979]

1. The confidence-building measures which the Government of Belgium considers appropriate and feasible, so long as the specific conditions and requirements of each region are taken into account, may be listed as follows:

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- (a) Advance notice of military movements of a given magnitude;
- (b) Limitation of the magnitude of military movements;
- (c) Discontinuance of military movements of a given magnitude in certain geographical zones, for example, in the vicinity of national frontiers;
- (d) Advance notice of military manoeuvres of a given magnitude;
- (e) Limitation of the magnitude of military manoeuvres;
- (f) Discontinuance of military manoeuvres of a given magnitude in certain geographical zones, for example, in the vicinity of national frontiers;
- (g) Exchanges of observers appointed to monitor the implementation of the above measures;
- (h) Exchanges of observers for manoeuvres subject to advance notice;
- (i) Exchanges of armed forces equipment programmes;
- (j) Harmonization of equipment programmes of armed forces;
- (k) Harmonization and exchanges of component data of military budgets;
- (l) Agreements regarding the holding of intergovernmental consultations at regular intervals and/or in the event of tension or events leading to tension;
- (m) Establishment of direct privileged telecommunications circuits between political and/or military leaders.

2. This list is not exhaustive. Moreover, it refers only to confidence-building measures which might be envisaged as a complement to or, failing that, as a substitute for disarmament measures (complete or partial), non-armament measures or arms control measures, agreed on a regional basis or on a broader geographical basis.

CANADA

/Original: English/

/13 July 1979/

1. Canada has long been of the view that confidence-building measures, properly applied, can have a positive effect among States not involved actively in hostilities. Canada's role in United Nations peace-keeping efforts has been consciously undertaken with a view to the creation of conditions in which the process of peace-making can take place. This process could be furthered by the introduction of confidence-building measures as well as negotiations towards formal peace terms. For this reason alone, therefore, Canada welcomes the decision of the United Nations to examine the usefulness of confidence-building measures in detail.
2. At the same time, Canada would not wish to see confidence-building measures replace more concrete undertakings aimed at disarmament, nor become simply the vehicles for declarations of intent. But, between these two limits, Canada nevertheless considers that efforts aimed at confidence-building offer a promising avenue for future progress towards arms limitation and disarmament.
3. Canada believes it appropriate that confidence-building measures be considered within the United Nations and sees that body's role in this respect as being essentially an exploratory and co-ordinating one. While the negotiation of concrete undertakings might also be considered within the United Nations framework, it is the Canadian view that such negotiations are probably best approached on a regional basis.
4. Confidence-building measures that have already been agreed upon are a product of a lessening of tension among potentially antagonistic States. They involve agreed undertakings to demonstrate that certain specified military and militarily associated activities are, in all senses of the term, normal peacetime practices consistent with the legitimate right of self-defence. To avoid the danger of merely declaratory measures, confidence-building measures should constitute undertakings to perform a concrete political act related to the military activities of States. Such an act can be the notification of selected military activities or the voluntary disclosure of information that might otherwise be withheld, or advice as to intended future activities. Undertakings not to engage in specified activities can also build confidence, but only if the activities concerned are those that might otherwise take place in a region. These undertakings could consist of agreed upon restraints on military activities in sensitive areas, such as those near frontiers, or other limitations on activities that might otherwise be carried out. Undertakings to refrain from activities that would take place only in war or at a stage of deteriorating relations are of quite a different character. They do not in fact constitute confidence-building aimed at arms limitation because they are merely statements of intended conduct under such hostile conditions. In this category fall such notions as non-aggression pacts and non-first use of particular weapons.

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5. As mentioned above, the key to confidence-building is an undertaking by States willingly to demonstrate greater openness about their military activities. Verification is not a factor relevant to confidence-building: this function arises only when the confidence-building process evolves towards negotiated arms limitations of one sort or another.

6. Canada also considers that contacts among individuals can have a role in confidence-building, but the value of measures of this nature is to be found mainly during the initial stages of the process. As confidence develops, the role of individuals becomes of considerably less importance than that of Governments with respect to activities carried out by units of their armed forces.

7. The confidence-building concept is also relevant at the moment when a negotiated peace comes into being between previously warring States. The terms of disengagement and the act of disengagement of forces, hitherto in armed conflict constitute in fact confidence-building in that mutual withdrawal is a concrete demonstration of a governmental decision to refrain from further warfare. The dialogue that has to be held to arrange modalities is itself an establishment of contact between individuals and such contacts can and should be expanded.

8. From this departure point, formal mechanisms are needed to develop confidence-building beyond immediate practical requirements. It is the view of Canada that this should be possible in practically every region of the world to some degree, however modest. After all, members of the two major opposing military alliances have been able to agree on measures to build confidence between themselves in the very area of their confrontation.

9. Once a mechanism to negotiate confidence-building measures has been established, States should endeavour to develop parameters for agreed-upon undertakings to advise one another of selected military activities such as intended manoeuvres or budget expenditures or other appropriate measures that could be agreed. It is important to note that, at early stages of confidence-building, there may be no restraints of any kind on a State's freedom to undertake any military activity that is consistent with the Charter of the United Nations. It is for this reason that confidence-building measures should be considered as political in nature and not military.

10. The next step in the process would be to negotiate just such restraints. If need be, these could merely take the form of agreed measures of self-restraint which, over time, as confidence builds, could develop into multilaterally agreed constraints. It is at this point that confidence-building begins to evolve into more important limitations on the activities of States and hence takes on a different character.

11. All of these steps in the process need not, of course, be undertaken from first to last. Depending on the circumstances that exist in a region, States can begin at any point that offers realistic promise of reaching agreement. Thus the time-frame for confidence-building can be contracted, depending on the

circumstances. For example, voluntary disclosure of military budgets could lead directly and immediately to negotiations on how to agree on the modalities of reduction. Similarly, disclosure of chemical-weapon stockpiles would be an essential first step towards negotiating terms for their destruction. The same could also apply to the search for means to control conventional arms transfers.

12. As a participant in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and based on the experience gained to date, Canada considers the confidence-building measures established in the Final Act to have been a positive though modest step in their own right, as well as in the direction of more substantial undertakings towards arms limitation. Canada therefore believes that States in other regions of the world could benefit by beginning discussions aimed at building confidence among themselves by the development of measures that they would consider appropriate for their particular circumstances in their regions.

CHILE

/Original: Spanish/

/27 June 1979/

1. With regard to confidence-building measures, the Government of Chile considers that absolute respect for the juridical equality of States, full observance of their integrity and sovereignty, strict compliance with treaties, non-intervention in the internal affairs of States and abstention from political discrimination in respect of States have, in practice, been losing sway and should be restored to their rightful position.

2. With regard to the foregoing, the effective collaboration of all Members of the Organization is necessary, particularly on the part of the great Powers and the developed countries, which frequently violate the aforementioned principles.

3. Chile voted in favour of the resolutions designed to bring about disarmament in all its aspects and as it has shown, wishes those resolutions to be translated into realistic, concrete measures. Consequently, Chile believes it to be essential that the great Powers and the more advanced countries should also display genuine political will so that the said resolutions can be speedily implemented. That would prevent the Organization from continuing to be a forum in which rhetoric, speculation and procrastination are the common denominator giving rise to the present inaction and to disillusion on the part of those nations which believe in a more positive future in respect of an issue of such vital importance to mankind.

4. A step in this direction would contribute to restoring lost faith in States and in the United Nations and would, consequently, curb the feverish arms race in which nations engage and which is prompted by insecurity and international lack of confidence.

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5. Our country has, on numerous occasions and in various forums, expressed its firm determination to find a peaceful solution to disputes, using all legal channels to that end, and refraining absolutely from the threat of force and from the pressure which power exerts.

6. Chile is a country which loves peace and law. Consequently, it desires to maintain friendly relations with every nation in the world which observes, as we do, the legal instruments governing its international conduct, whether those instruments be the Charter of the United Nations, that of the Organization of American States, or the treaties and conventions to which it is a party. The genuine spread of this attitude and approach will be a powerful factor in favour of the restoration of mutual confidence among nations.

7. It must be repeated that renewed confidence will also result from the removal of world political instability, which is a consequence of ideological struggles, the expansionist aspirations of certain States and an unjust international economic order.

8. It must be explicitly stated that policies designed to relieve critical situations in certain regions of the world, particularly those where the interests of the great Powers are involved - essentially those of the United States and the Soviet Union - must not be applied only partially; it is vital that they be made universal, and be duly supplemented by respect for the principles ensuring a just, lasting and universal peace.

9. Chile emphatically supports the activation of any international disarmament-monitoring machinery and the implementation of supplementary practical measures geared towards such an urgent and noble end, in which initiatives, decisions and implementation would not be subject to the discretion of the great Powers alone.

10. With regard to regional arrangements, Chile has demonstrated its confidence in all types of such arrangements, which it made clear, in the Latin American context, by subscribing to exemplary initiatives in the fields of disarmament and peace-keeping and by participating sincerely and committedly in the events to which it was invited, the purpose of which was to put disarmament measures into practice.

11. If the proposed initiative is to be reinforced, a new attitude on the part of the nuclear Powers is essential, in that they must not employ discrimination, neither from the security standpoint nor in respect of peaceful development, against those nations which join the nuclear-weapon-free zones.

12. Any confidence-building measure is closely linked to the various issues involved in disarmament, such as the relationship between disarmament and development, the reduction of military budgets, the strengthening of international security and of States' security guarantees, nuclear-weapon-free zones, etc. Confidence, therefore, is both the nub of all activities involved in disarmament and the necessary stimulus for the measures that will make disarmament possible.

13. The reinforcement of this initiative is a moral imperative for all States Members of the United Nations and for the Organization itself. It would be stronger and more fruitful if the Soviet Union and the United States, for example attained substantive goals in the protracted negotiations on strategic arms limitation. The multiplier effect of vital decisions taken in that respect would be particularly felt by the other countries of the international community.

DENMARK

/Original: English/

/19 July 1979/

I

1. According to the generally accepted view, up to now the scope of confidence-building measures conceptually differs from that of arms control and disarmament measures. The latter concentrate on quantities of weapons, equipment and troops and their qualitative aspects, and thereby directly affect the military capability of the States concerned. In contrast, the confidence-building measures do not affect the capability, but focus on the parties' perception of each others' intentions. By providing greater openness in military matters and greater predictability about military activities, confidence-building measures aim at eliminating mistrust and enhancing confidence in each others' non-aggressive intention, thereby contributing to a strengthening of security.
2. The concept of confidence-building measures has developed to encompass a wide spectrum of different kinds of measures, notably advance notification of specified categories of military activities, exchange of observers and other military personnel and disclosure and exchange of information on military matters.
3. Some measures, such as exchange of information, are designed with a view to allowing other States insight into internal matters in the security field, thereby giving assurance of the defensive intentions and providing for a reliable assessment of the military potential of the party concerned. Other measures, typically of the notification type, establish the transparency of the party's military behaviour which, inter alia, by assuring the necessary warning time, should lessen the feeling of military vulnerability by the other parties. When implemented simultaneously, the different kinds of measures could contribute to a clearer picture of the military capabilities, provide greater possibility of foreseeing and calculating the military activities of the other party and thus strengthen stability and security.
4. Which modalities of confidence-building measures are most appropriate for a certain region, that is, for application by a number of States, depend on the special conditions prevailing in the particular region. Confidence-building régimes, therefore, must be established on a regional basis, and a specific confidence-building régime could normally not be transferred immediately to other regions.

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II

5. As for Europe, the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe contains a special document on confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament. The principal provisions for confidence-building measures concern notification of military manoeuvres and the invitation to observers to attend military manoeuvres.

6. Since the signing of the Final Act, 25 notifications have been sent of major military manoeuvres with more than 25,000 troops, which have taken place. Twenty-four manoeuvres with less than 25,000 troops were also notified. Observers have been invited to attend 25 manoeuvres.

7. No manoeuvres involving more than 25,000 troops have taken place on Danish territory since the signing of the Final Act. However, Denmark has sent notification of the participation of a contingent of Danish troops in one such major manoeuvre, which partly took place in Denmark. Further, Denmark has sent notification of the Danish participation in two smaller-scale manoeuvres with a total of 11,000 and 16,000 troops respectively. To one of these, Denmark, under the provision in the Final Act on the exchange of observers, issued invitations to nine States of the Conference including members of the Warsaw Pact and neutral and non-aligned States. Danish observers have likewise attended manoeuvres in States of the Conference which are members of the Atlantic Alliance of the Warsaw Pact and in neutral and non-aligned countries of the Conference.

III

8. It is difficult to register precisely to what extent the confidence-building measures fulfil their purpose of strengthening security and stability. It should, however, be realized that the confidence-building measures mentioned in the Final Act are of an initial character and of a limited scope. There should thus be scope for progress not only in future implementation, but also in the strengthening and enlarging of the confidence-building measures provisions in the Final Act.

9. It is the Danish view that the experience gained so far has proved that it is worth while to continue the efforts to strengthen and enlarge the confidence-building measures. The mutual application of an adequate confidence-building régime among States should favour the creation of a political climate in which the parties would find reductions in military potentials feasible without any negative consequences for their security. Confidence-building measures thus is a means of smoothing the path for disarmament and arms control steps.

FINLAND

/Original: English/
/22 August 1979/

1. Finland, as one of the signatories of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, has had experiences of certain confidence-building measures stipulated in the provisions of the said Final Act. In addition to these confidence-building measures, some others have also been proposed and discussed in the European context.

I. Prior notification of major military manoeuvres

2. The States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe send notification of their major military manoeuvres to all other participating States through the usual diplomatic channels, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Final Act. Notification is given 21 days or more in advance of the start of the manoeuvre when the total number of troops exceeds 25,000, and it will contain appropriate information concerning the manoeuvre. In the case of a participating State whose territory extends beyond Europe, prior notification need be given only of manoeuvres which take place in an area within 250 kilometres from its frontier facing or shared with any other European participating State; the participating State need not, however, give notification in cases in which that area is also contiguous to the participating State's frontier facing or shared with a non-European non-participating State.

3. The experience gained from the prior notification has been entirely positive and can be said to have increased confidence among the participating States and thus contributed to increasing stability and security in Europe. In the view of the Finnish Government, these positive experiences could be used in other areas by creating, on a regional basis, arrangements for specific confidence-building measures taking into account the specific conditions and requirements of each region.

II. Prior notification of other military manoeuvres

4. The provisions of the Final Act of Helsinki foresee also the possibility of sending notifications of smaller-scale military manoeuvres to other participating States, with special regard for those near the area of such manoeuvres. Some participating States have adopted the practice of sending notifications of such military manoeuvres either to all participating States or only to those near the area.

5. The experience gained from this confidence-building measure can also be considered entirely positive; the total number of notifications need not exceed reasonable limits.

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III. Exchange of observers

6. The participating States have invited other participating States, voluntarily and on a bilateral basis, as observers to attend military manoeuvres. The practice of inviting military observers has varied. In the view of the Finnish Government this confidence-building measure has further strengthened confidence and reduced risks of misunderstanding and miscalculation of military activities. It has also increased mutual understanding among military personnel and various participating States.

IV. Prior notification of major military movements

7. This confidence-building measure, the importance of which is widely recognized, was not agreed upon in the Final Act of Helsinki. In accordance with the Final Act, further consideration would be later given to this question in the light of the experience gained by the implementation of the measures which are set forth in it.

8. In the view of the Finnish Government, prior notification of major military movements is an important measure which should be fully considered, on a regional basis, when introducing arrangements for specific confidence-building measures.

V. Other confidence-building measures

9. In addition to the confidence-building measures mentioned above, there are other confidence-building measures which might fruitfully be introduced in certain areas. For instance, promoting the exchanges of invitations among military personnel, including visits of military delegations, can have and, in the case of countries of the Conference has had, a positive impact on their mutual relations. Furthermore, a greater openness regarding military expenditures of different countries could help to dispel misunderstanding and miscalculation. Similar positive effects could follow from agreed limitations on military exercises and movements in designated areas.

10. The experiences Finland has had of confidence-building measures are convincingly positive. It is therefore strongly recommended that all States consider, on a regional basis, arrangements for specific confidence-building measures as first steps to diminish the danger of armed conflicts resulting from misunderstandings or misinterpretations of military activities. Naturally, the feasibility of each measure depends on existing conditions and requirements and is to be determined by the States of the region concerned.

FRANCE

/Original: French/

/29 June 1979/

I. The scope of confidence-building measures

A

1. The French Government welcomes the adoption by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session of resolution 33/91 B concerning confidence-building measures, submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany. The reception given to this proposal by the international community attests to the importance attached to the role of confidence-building in relations among States and the contribution which it can make to détente and disarmament.

2. It would appear to be both feasible and desirable to develop the concept of confidence-building in order to give it new breadth so that appropriate measures may not only improve the political climate of relations among States, but also diminish the danger of armed conflicts resulting from misunderstandings or misinterpretations of military activities.

3. As emphasized in resolution 31/91 B, efforts in this area must be continued, taking into account the situations peculiar to specific regions which have a bearing on the nature of the measures that are feasible. A regional approach of this kind is very much in keeping with the concern with respect to disarmament expressed by France on several occasions.

B

4. The French Government for its part, wishes to make a contribution to the thinking on this subject, in particular about measures conducive to the building of confidence in Europe.

5. The French Government believes that the building of confidence is a precondition to the cessation of the arms race. In its view, the situation on the European continent, where the unbalanced build-up of conventional weapons has continued in recent years, justified such action as a matter of priority.

II. Possibilities

A

6. In general, France shares the views expressed by the Federal Republic of Germany concerning the confidence-building measures which might be adopted by States. As has been stated, such measures should be in keeping with regional conditions. Provision should also be made for the progressive building of confidence by the adoption of a series of measures, the cumulative effect of which

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would be to make an effective contribution to détente and help States to gain a better understanding of each other's intentions through a genuine exchange of information.

B

7. More specifically, confidence-building measures can be divided into three main categories.

8. The first comprises measures whereby States endeavour to demonstrate that their attitude is not aggressive and that they are primarily concerned with defence. Such measures, which are usually general in nature and require implementation on a continuing basis, comprise primarily bilateral or multilateral exchanges of information (exchanges of visits and military lecturers, exchanges of information on the level and deployment of forces, and so on).

9. The second category of measures enables States to feel less vulnerable to the threat of a surprise attack. These more specific measures are of a sporadic nature and are concerned mainly with the notification of military activities (notification of exercises, movements, manoeuvres and so on).

10. The third category of measures contributes to the effective strengthening of the security of States either by limiting the scope of certain military activities or by prohibiting activities deemed to be particularly threatening (limitation of the scope and number of military activities, prohibition of military activities in certain circumstances).

III. The European experience with regard to confidence-building measures

A

11. France is of the view that the situation with regard to the implementation of the Final Act in the field of confidence-building measures is, on the whole, positive. The implementation of the relevant provisions of the Final Act has enabled States to give evidence of their spirit of co-operation and goodwill. Moreover, further efforts can be made in this field to improve the climate of confidence in Europe both by deepening the general discussion on security and by adopting new measures.

B

12. The French Government believes, however, that the Final Act has inherent limitations because, whatever its scope might be and whatever possibilities it might offer, it does not envisage confidence-building within the framework of disarmament. For that reason, France has proposed that, parallel to efforts within the context of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, discussions should be initiated in a new forum with a view to the adoption of tangible and legally binding measures which will effectively help to open the way for disarmament.

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GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

/Original: English/

/26 June 1979/

1. The German Democratic Republic considers the implementation of effective steps towards curbing the arms race and towards disarmament to be among the most pressing tasks of our time. It believes that, in efforts to this end, measures for military détente at a regional level are essential to the strengthening of confidence among States. This goes in particular for regions showing a high concentration of military potentials and a high level of military confrontation.
2. Fundamental to any progress also in this area is, in the view of the German Democratic Republic, that all measures must be based on the principle of undiminished security.
3. Being situated in the centre of Europe and at the dividing line between the world's two biggest military organizations, the German Democratic Republic regards it as a principal task of its foreign policy to co-operate in achieving progress in military détente in this particular region. It holds that the time has come to agree on practical measures designed to promote confidence among States, to lessen military confrontation and finally to cut down the high levels of forces and armaments. If no progress can be reached in this field and if the arms race is allowed to go on in Europe, negative effects on security and co-operation in Europe will, in the end, be inevitable.
4. For this reason, the German Democratic Republic and the allied socialist States in the Moscow Declaration of 23 November 1978 of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (A/33/392-S/12939, annex) presented a comprehensive programme of specific measures to promote confidence among States. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs Committee of the same organization met on 14 and 15 May 1979 and made proposals on how to carry out that programme in Europe (A/34/275-S/13344).
5. A significant contribution to promoting confidence and to military détente in Europe would be contractual arrangements among the European States, the United States of America and Canada not to be the first to use nuclear and conventional weapons against one another. Such renunciation is founded on key elements of the Declaration of Principles contained in the Helsinki Final Act; it would strengthen existing, and create new, reliable guarantees for the States concerned to live together in peace. Realization of this proposal would be a real breakthrough in the effort to establish relations that are free of military competition and threats and where mutual respect and trust prevail.
6. The German Democratic Republic considers that the confidence-building measures provided for in the Final Act of Helsinki are apt to strengthen confidence. For its part, the German Democratic Republic has strictly adhered to these provisions. It holds that the confidence-building measures agreed upon in Helsinki should be extended. Such further steps could include:

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(a) The notification of major military movements and of major air and naval manoeuvres;

(b) The renunciation of manoeuvres exceeding a total of 50,000 to 60,000 troops;

(c) The extension to the Mediterranean region of the provisions of the Final Act relating to confidence-building measures.

7. At the same time the German Democratic Republic wishes to point out that the main question should not be the notification of manoeuvres, but their reduction. The fact that the number of military manoeuvres held by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization along the German Democratic Republic's western frontier has tripled since the signing of the Final Act cannot possibly enhance confidence between States.

8. The proposed treaty banning the first use of nuclear and conventional weapons, the measures proposed and others to strengthen confidence and lessen military confrontation should be on the agenda of a conference of the European States, the United States of America and Canada to be convened at the political level as soon as possible. The fact that other European States have made similar proposals reflects the growing awareness that specific steps of military détente appear now practicable and should be taken. Such a conference on military détente in Europe would be a new body to continue the multilateral process of détente initiated with the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, placing special emphasis on the promotion of confidence and on military détente. Sound results of the conference would stimulate the parallel process of implementation of the Final Act of Helsinki. The German Democratic Republic is convinced that the early convocation of such a conference and its constructive and successful work would be extremely beneficial to Europe and beyond. The German Democratic Republic would welcome United Nations resolutions to promote a European conference on military détente.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF

/Original: English/

/18 June 1979/

I. Views on confidence-building measures

A. Concept

1. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany welcomes the fact that the thirty-third session of the General Assembly, by an overwhelming majority and without objection, adopted resolution 33/91 B on confidence-building measures. The significance which confidence-building measures can have for strengthening peace and the security of States has been recognized by this resolution.

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2. The Federal Government hopes that the recommendation, addressed to all States, to consider on a regional basis the conclusion of arrangements on specific confidence-building measures taking into account the particular conditions and requirements of the respective regions, will meet with a favourable response.

3. The Federal Government is willing to co-operate actively in the further elaboration of confidence-building measures and, in doing this, to pass on its own experiences.

4. In answer to the Secretary-General's inquiry, made in accordance with operative article 2 of resolution 33/91 B, to communicate to him its views and suggestions on confidence-building measures, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany expresses its views as follows:

5. The concept of confidence-building measures pursues the aim of arriving at a step-by-step reduction of mistrust and fear in order to contribute to the development of confidence and better understanding between nations. The concept proceeds from the realization that States need to be reassured that certain military activities of other States do not constitute threats to their own security. Initially, therefore, agreements on confidence-building measures aimed at a relatively modest objective: the observance of rules of military behaviour of the participating States. It was expected that the regular implementation of such agreed rules in a specific region would strengthen confidence and thereby create the precondition for successful arms control negotiations.

6. Over the years, however, the notion of confidence-building measures assumed a wider and more comprehensive dimension. It encompasses manifold measures designed to create and strengthen confidence in both the political and military fields. The growing interest for such measures points to the fact that, in a world of growing complexities of political and military issues, a better understanding of each other is needed to contribute to the elimination of mistrust, fear and hostility in international relations.

7. A higher degree of confidence, however, can only be achieved when the amount of information which Governments command enables them to foresee satisfactorily and to calculate actions and reactions of other Governments within their political environment. In other words, the degree of confidence primarily depends on the degree of openness and transparency with which States are prepared to conduct their political and military affairs.

8. Openness, predictability and reliability of national policies are necessary preconditions for the building and strengthening of confidence, but they ought to be supplemented by efforts for an enhanced international dialogue leading to agreements on specific confidence-building measures. Such agreements will help to allay suspicion and engender trust by creating the framework for a wide range of contracts and exchanges. In the final analysis, it is only by way of intensified personal contacts at all levels of political and military decision-making that prejudices and misconceptions, which form the basis of mistrust and fear, can be overcome.

9. It is evident that the specific conditions prevailing in various regions are bound to affect both the nature as well as the implementation of appropriate confidence-building measures. Meaningful arrangements therefore must be sought in the regional or subregional framework where it is possible to make allowance for the special political and military over-all conditions which determine the respective area.

10. In Europe, a first agreement on confidence-building measures emerged from the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in August 1975. Since then, the measures provided for in the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference have proved their usefulness. In view of the differences in the geographical, political and military situation in the various parts of the world, the measures adopted in the European context can, however, be considered as examples which have proved useful under specific circumstances.

B. Possibilities

11. The following are a few examples of measures which may be suitable for building confidence in various regions of the world. It should of course be left to the Governments of the countries concerned in each case to decide on which measures and which parameters they agree. As a start, it would be sufficient if the countries of a region commit themselves to take only a few measures selected by them which are appropriate to the prevailing political and military situation. As soon as positive experience has been gained, the arrangements could be developed further step by step.

1. "Hot wires"

12. The establishment of "hot wires" (jamproof communication links) between various capitals of a region for the purpose of allowing direct contacts between participating Governments in case of alarming developments in the region or in its neighbourhood. This measure does not affect the security of those concerned in any way. On the contrary it contributes to the strengthening of confidence. It enables the early prevention of misunderstandings and miscalculations, especially when normal communication facilities should not be operational.

2. Notification of military manoeuvres

13. The adoption of rules of information on the prior notification of military exercises can be a first important step towards reducing tension and creating confidence. The early notification of the time, place, scope (participating units), duration and purpose of military manoeuvres pursues the objective of informing the other States in greater detail of the intention of the State carrying out the manoeuvre, thereby reducing the danger of misinterpretation. Such a military manoeuvre, which has been notified in accordance with the agreement, should no longer be regarded as a potential threat but as an exercise justified to maintain the country's defence capability. In view of the fact that very different forms of military exercises take place in the various regions, this paper cannot make any suggestions as to the required parameters. As a matter of principle, prior notification should extend to those exercises which exceed the framework of a geographically limited garrison exercise. In the interest of confidence-building, notification should be issued at least some weeks before the manoeuvre begins.

3. Invitation of observers to manoeuvres

14. The invitation of observers to manoeuvres supplements prior notification. To an even greater extent than the transmission of manoeuvre data, the invitation of observers from the countries parties to the arrangement serves to build confidence. Personal contacts between hosts and observers can lead to a revision of prejudices and thus to a sober over-all assessment of the other side. The observation of the manoeuvre itself also offers an opportunity of correcting possible erroneous views of the strategy, training, posture and equipment of the forces of the Government of the host country.

15. In order to ensure that the observers are treated in an equally generous manner, the arrangement should also include rules for their treatment. (They should be briefed on the course of the manoeuvre, be able to watch it through binoculars, have a chance for discussion, be assigned transport, etc.).

4. Notification of military movements

16. The prior notification of major military movements taking place into or within an applicable area would serve the same purpose as the other rules of information, namely, of reducing tensions and increasing confidence in the area. The participating States would have to agree on the amount of information (for example, on time, place and scope) to be communicated.

5. Exchange of military delegations

17. Agreement on the exchange of visits, for example of the chiefs of staff, the generals commanding the various services, delegations from military academies and warships, can lead to a better understanding of the problems and concerns of the countries participating in these exchanges and, above all, to better personal contacts. However, real confidence-building will only take place if, as a result of the exchanges, both sides have received a realistic impression of the military thinking of their partners. In the field of personal contacts, there are many possibilities not only for military personnel, of which only a few are mentioned below by way of example.

6. Offers for help (personnel and equipment) from the forces in the case of natural disasters

7. Admission of correspondents of the partner countries to certain military events

18. All prior examples which illustrate ways and means of building confidence aim at military contacts. In view of the great public interest in progress in the field of confidence-building, one could, in addition, imagine arrangements to invite foreign press representatives to form their own impression of the implementation of confidence-building measures agreed to in the military field.

8. Observation posts

19. Establishment of observation posts at geographically important points. This measure, because of its longer duration, could make a more substantive contribution to confidence-building than the measures mentioned before and, moreover, serve the purpose of verification of further arrangements, for example in the arms control field. By showing their willingness to accept stationary observation posts of the other partners at agreed important points in their territory (such as ports, airports, railway stations), the participating States could make a convincing contribution to openness and could considerably reduce the fear of possible surprise attacks.

9. Information on defence budgets

20. An important measure of confidence-building could be a regional agreement in which the countries of the area commit themselves to publish their defence budgets in such a manner that the amounts spent by them on defence can be compared with those of other countries. In some parts of the world, such agreements may be possible already today because budgets are not kept secret. In order to rule out misunderstandings, such agreements should lay down clearly that indirect defence expenditures should be included in the total budget. Positive experience with such arrangements could form the basis of future agreements on verifiable reductions of defence budgets.

10. Review of agreements

21. When concluding agreements on confidence-building measures, the participating States should, from the beginning, provide for the possibility of further development of such measures. Already the first agreement might provide for a review after three or five years.

C. Conclusions

22. In view of the examples given above, it becomes clear that confidence-building measures alone do not suffice to maintain international peace and security. By adding to the transparency, predictability and consistency of political and military behaviour they can make, however, an important contribution to greater rationality and stability in international relations. By intensifying the international dialogue they assist in improving the existing instruments of international crisis management. At the same time, they help to establish the necessary foundation on which more far-reaching arrangements in the field of international security, such as agreements on arms control and disarmament, can be built.

23. Even though confidence-building measures are thus limited in scope, States can only be expected to introduce specific measures gradually. It is evident that the success of every single measure created new confidence as to the possibility of further steps in the process of détente.

24. In the final analysis agreements on confidence-building measures could contribute to a political climate in which the importance of the military element in international relations (that is the possibility of making political use of military power) would increasingly be restricted.

II. Experience to date with confidence-building measures in Europe

25. An important result of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in 1975 was the document on confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament, in which the complementary nature of the political and military aspects of security was emphasized. The preamble:

(a) Notes the relation between increasing confidence and increasing stability and security in Europe;

(b) Recognizes the need to contribute to reducing "the dangers of armed conflict and of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities ... 'through' clear and timely information".

The document contains a relatively comprehensive list of confidence-building measures. The core of these accords in the Final Act is supplemented by general considerations of security and arms control policy.

26. The two principal confidence-building measures with a high degree of binding force are:

(a) The prior notification of major military manoeuvres exceeding a total of 25,000 troops with the fullest possible information on, for example, the purpose of the manoeuvre and the participants involved, the type and strength of the forces engaged, the area and time-frame etc.;

(b) Exchange of observers at manoeuvres.

27. Measures with a lesser degree of binding force are:

(a) Prior notification of smaller-scale military manoeuvres involving less than 25,000 troops;

(b) Prior notification of major military movements;

(c) Other confidence-building measures such as exchanges among military personnel, visits by military delegations etc. This builds on the existing military tradition of military exchange visits which have also in the past served to strengthen confidence (for example, visits by defence ministers, chiefs of general staff, chiefs of the three services, military attachés, ships and fleets, squadrons and flying groups).

The development and enlargement of the above confidence-building measures is also envisaged in the Final Act.

28. The Final Act of the Conference established the framework for the arrangements and their implementation. The arrangement not to make confidence-building measures legally binding, on the one hand, leaves the participating States their sovereign right to decide for themselves on the method and scope of their implementation. On the other hand, it is in the nature of confidence-building measures that they can only then fulfil their purpose if they are implemented as comprehensively and regularly as possible by all participants.

29. Experiences made so far in the implementation of confidence-building measures in Europe since the autumn of 1975 has been encouraging. The two principal measures, namely, prior notification of major military manoeuvres exceeding 25,000 troops and exchange of manoeuvre observers, were implemented in 49 cases, prior notification of smaller-scale military manoeuvres involving less than 25,000 troops took place in 24 cases; notification thus took place in a total of 73 cases. There were also a large number of exchange visits by military delegations of a traditional kind. A break-down of the figures gives the following picture:

(a) The member States of the Atlantic Alliance gave prior notification of 12 manoeuvres involving over 25,000 troops and 15 smaller-scale manoeuvres and invited observers to 16 manoeuvres;

(b) The countries of the Warsaw Pact gave prior notification of 10 manoeuvres involving over 25,000 troops and also invited selected observers to attend five manoeuvres;

(c) In the case of the neutral and non-aligned countries, prior notification was given of two major and seven smaller-scale manoeuvres, and four invitations to send observers were issued.

30. The Federal Republic of Germany has from the start endeavoured to be generous in its implementation of confidence-building measures. It gave timely notification of major manoeuvres taking place on its territory and issued invitations to all States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe to send two observers each to almost all major manoeuvres. The notification contained comprehensive and detailed military information on the forces engaged, the purpose of the manoeuvre, the time-frame, area etc. In our arrangements for observers invited to attend manoeuvres, we endeavoured to establish a practice serving the purpose of confidence-building so that the observers received comprehensive and in-depth insights into the manoeuvres (frequent briefings with written documents, map materials, visits to command posts, talks with all ranks, fulfilment of special wishes as regards unscheduled visits to units, access to equipment and use of cameras and field glasses).

31. For some States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, it was at first not easy to become accustomed to the idea and the implementation of confidence-building measures. After an occasionally hesitant and cautious start, the initial reluctance of a number of participating States had to be overcome, in order to progress from a selective and restrictive fulfilment of the minimal provisions to the goal of full implementation.

32. Although a certain amount still remains to be done, good progress is being made. Even on a sober estimate, it can be said that the confidence-building measures provided for in the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference have proved their value by helping to achieve a favourable climate for the ongoing process of détente and for further efforts in the field of arms control.

33. There are good prospects that the participants in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe will take a favourable view of the future implementation and further development of the existing agreements. This positive development in a region which was in the past the scene of intractable conflicts and confrontation, of which it is still not entirely free today, gives grounds for hope regarding possible developments in other regions of the world.

GREECE

/Original: English/
/18 May 1979/

I. Regional disarmament

1. Greece believes that regional disarmament constitutes a useful step towards a general and complete disarmament. The convening of regional conferences for regional disarmament should be left to the initiative of the States in the region. The countries concerned shall determine by themselves and on a regional basis the level of disarmament.

II. Confidence-building measures

2. Confidence-building measures include the following:

- (a) Advance notification of military manoeuvres and movements;
- (b) Designation of the area of application;
- (c) Exchange of observers;
- (d) Information concerning military budgets and level of armed forces.

ISRAEL

/Original: English/
/9 July 1979/

1. It is the view of the Government of Israel that no truly comprehensive programme for confidence-building measures can be entertained without a concomitant process of reduction of political tension. At the same time, the employment of purely military confidence-building measures, as recommended in General Assembly resolution 33/91 B, can greatly contribute to a reduction of tension, thereby leading ultimately to peace and security.

2. Israel voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 33/91 B, having expressed its support for it in the First Committee, by describing it as "a most valuable guideline for parties to international disputes who wish to defuse tension without sacrificing the demands of national security" (A/C.1/33/PV.49, p. 32, of 24 November 1978).

3. The resolution draws inspiration from the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, a regional agreement applicable to the States of Europe. This serves to illustrate that agreements on confidence-building measures in the military field are feasible first and foremost among States with a common border or belonging to the same region.

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4. The regional aspect of the resolution is brought out in the working paper submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany to the Ad Hoc Committee of the tenth special session, concerning zones of confidence-building measures as a first step towards the preparation of a world-wide convention on confidence-building measures (A/S-10/AC.1/20 of 8 June 1978). The first paragraph of the working paper states:

"Agreement on clearly delimited regions in which, if possible, all States in a particular geographical zone voluntarily conclude agreements on specific confidence-building measures could be a major contribution to stability and, hence, to further progress in the direction of disarmament and arms control."

5. Such an agreement can be arrived at only by direct negotiations between States of a region. Moreover, adherence to it can be brought about only by way of voluntary association and on a basis of non-discriminatory participation.

6. To be effective, confidence-building measures need to be gradual and reciprocal, to allow all sides to a dispute to test the intentions and sincerity of one another.

7. Israel, for its part, has already sought to provide a propitious setting for arms control in the Middle East region in a variety of ways, such as the unilateral reduction of its military budget in 1978 by 23 per cent. A reciprocal reduction of military budgets of certain Arab States would have served to reduce tension in the Middle East.

8. Israel will continue to support suitable initiatives in the United Nations and elsewhere, aimed at the reduction of international tension through confidence-building measures.

9. Finally, it should be noted that the Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt, of 26 March 1979, incorporated the principle that agreed security arrangements will be established in order to provide maximum security for both parties on the basis of reciprocity. The Peace Treaty is therefore a significant contribution to confidence-building in the Middle East.

ITALY

/Original: English/

/25 July 1979/

1. In the view of the Government of Italy, "confidence-building measures" are intended to provide the basis, in relations among States, for the gradual elimination of those circumstances and attitudes which might engender doubt, suspicion or concern in regard to certain activities and which, through misinterpretation or erroneous assessment of the latter - inter alia, because of a lack of reciprocal communication - might generate tensions or even conflicts.

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2. The confidence-building measures elaborated so far, while often varying in both nature and terms, in so far as some have a purely political character, while others are legally binding, are mostly related, either directly or indirectly, to military activities, as those most likely to provoke the effects mentioned above.

3. Also within this category, however, must be distinguished actions classifiable as "routine" from those which, owing to their more specifically "offensive" connotation, are likely to generate those very suspicions which are one of the main causes of mutual distrust among States. In such a context, confidence-building measures play a crucial political role in promoting openness and exchanges of information in sectors which, up to now, have been jealously considered restricted, and therefore contribute to a better mutual understanding and hence a closer relationship among States.

4. Such traits confer upon confidence-building measures a particular interest as an instrument in the preparation and implementation of future agreements for arms reduction on a regional basis; furthermore, some of these measures - in the field of verifications, for example - might be considered for application at the global level.

5. As far as Europe is concerned, confidence-building measures certainly constituted one of the most significant results of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe held in 1973, and may be included in other future agreements such as the one on the mutual and balanced reduction of military forces in Central Europe, currently being negotiated in Vienna.

6. Among the confidence-building measures envisaged in the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference, whose area of jurisdiction includes the European countries and those territories of the Soviet Union lying within 250 kilometres of its borders with the States signatories of the Act, the notification is worth recalling. Although the notification is to be made on a voluntary basis, it is connected with the commitment and responsibilities residing with the States parties. It concerns military manoeuvres involving ground forces, eventually in co-operation with air and naval divisions, in excess of 25,000 men and the information to be provided regards such manoeuvres and the exchange of observers. Among other measures envisaged, although a large margin of discretion is allowed to States parties in this respect, are the notification of military manoeuvres involving fewer than 25,000 men, the notification of major troop transfers, exchanges of military personnel, visits and so forth.

7. The importance of confidence-building measures should certainly not be underestimated, and their reinforcement is most desirable, but, in the opinion of the Italian Government, these measures should none the less not be regarded as ends in themselves. Rather, they should be accompanied by substantive initiatives in the area of real and effective arms limitation, to be incorporated in due time into a programme of general and complete disarmament.

8. Finally, it should be recalled that confidence-building measures serve an important political function also at the bilateral level, as shown by the agreements existing on this subject between the United States and the Soviet Union.

NETHERLANDS

/Original: English/

/12 July 1979/

1. The Netherlands Government attaches great value to confidence-building measures and deems it highly important that views of Governments be collected with a view to applying such measures in different parts of the world.
2. The Netherlands has to some degree practical experience with confidence-building measures as they have been applied within the framework of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.
3. In the preamble to the document on confidence-building measures in the Helsinki Final Act of the Helsinki Conference, some considerations have been included which, in the opinion of the Government of the Netherlands, have relevance in underlining the importance of the concept of confidence-building measures elsewhere.
4. First and foremost, confidence-building measures are aimed at eliminating the causes of tension that may exist among States, and thus contribute to the strengthening of peace and security. In that way, confidence among States will be enhanced, and mistrust and fear reduced.
5. More particularly, confidence-building measures will enable States to avoid misunderstandings or miscalculations concerning military activities which could give rise to apprehension, particularly in a situation where States lack clear and timely information about the nature of such activities.
6. Confidence-building measures are thus primarily of a political and psychological nature and cannot be considered as arms control in the sense of limiting or reducing armed forces. None the less, confidence-building measures concern military activities of States, although measures in other spheres are conceivable as well. Through confidence-building measures, military activities of States will be made subject to a degree of openness and predictability that will build trust and allay suspicion. Furthermore, the intensification of contacts and exchanges between military and political representatives of countries will help to bring about a better understanding for each other's preoccupations and possibly discard misconceptions and prejudices.
7. Having outlined the general benefits of confidence-building measures, some examples of concrete measures follow, which are mainly based on the experience of the above-mentioned Final Act. Other measures, however, have been included, and still other ones could of course be conceived of. The list is therefore non-exhaustive. In describing these measures, one has to keep in mind, of course, that regional differences have to be taken into account in adopting confidence-building measures, so that measures will have to be tailored for the specific region in view of the existing political, military and geographical circumstances.

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8. There follow some examples of concrete measures:

(a) Prior notification of military manoeuvres. Prior notification aims at giving pre-information in military activities, in order to avoid misunderstandings about possible intentions of States or to reduce tension. Notifications of military manoeuvres can be an important confidence-building measure, especially when timely and extensive information is provided.

(b) Exchange of observers. This measure is an important addition to the one just mentioned in complementing the prior knowledge of a state of a manoeuvre being held, with on the spot opportunity to observe the manoeuvre. It is of great importance that adequate facilities are granted to the observers so as to ensure that they are really able to observe the manoeuvre properly.

(c) Notification of military movements. The prior notification of military movements into or within a certain area is also intended to reduce tension and building confidence.

(d) Exchange of information on military structure. This measure would require States to provide, e.g., neighbouring States with information on the structure of their military forces and thereby contribute to a greater openness in military affairs.

(e) Observation posts. The establishment of stationary observation posts at geographically relevant points would help the process of confidence-building, as well as make a contribution to verification of arms control or other arrangements (for example a separation of forces).

(f) Disclosure of defence budgets. A decision of States to make public their defence budgets in such a way that it is comparable with other budgets would be an important measure of confidence-building. In this connexion attention is called to the fact that the Netherlands has stated its preparedness to participate in a pilot test to develop a satisfactory instrument for standardized reporting of the military expenditures of Member States of the United Nations.

9. Other measures are of course conceivable, possibly specified for a certain region. Parameters will have to be worked out in detail, while decisions have to be taken in some cases on the degree of voluntariness in implementing the measures.

10. The experience so far with confidence-building measures in Europe is encouraging, and could perhaps serve as a model for other regions of the world. It is of course difficult to assess any real, practical results so far in terms of greater openness and trust, but it can be stated on the basis of past experience that they have in an important way contributed to an improvement of relations between the countries participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

NORWAY

/Original: English/

/9 July 1979/

I. Purpose of confidence-building measures

1. In the view of the Norwegian Government, the particular purpose of confidence-building measures is to prevent or reduce tensions and arms competition among States caused by misapprehension on the part of one or more of them about the military postures, activities, planning etc. of other States, and to prevent armed conflict between them owing to such misapprehension, to miscalculation or accident. The over-all aim of confidence-building measures is thus to contribute to increased stability and security.
2. Confidence-building measures may serve these purposes among States which fear each other's military capabilities and do not exclude the possibility of armed conflict between them, but have a common desire to avoid unintended tension among themselves arising out of misapprehension about their military postures, activities, planning etc.
3. Confidence-building measures do not replace arms control and disarmament measures, but may play a useful role before or after the conclusion of arms control and disarmament agreements or in conjunction with such agreements.

II. Gradual approach

4. At the beginning, only modest confidence-building measures may be possible, and even unilateral measures should not be excluded. If the first measures are successful in creating mutual confidence or if no negative experience is gathered, they may be gradually developed and enlarged either by more complete or frequent implementation or by adding other measures to those already practised. They may also be made gradually more binding, starting with voluntary or discretionary commitments and may progressively be made legally binding.

III. Types of confidence-building measures

5. There are various types of confidence-building measures:
 - (a) Establishing special means of communication;
 - (b) Increasing personal contacts among military personnel;
 - (c) Providing for greater openness about military postures, activities, planning etc.;
 - (d) Avoiding certain types of military postures, activities and planning etc., generally or in certain geographic areas.

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IV. General views on confidence-building measures in the European and the East/West context

6. It is the Norwegian view that confidence-building measures can play a positive role in the European and the greater East/West context.

7. Norway itself has for many years unilaterally practised various confidence-building measures where this is relevant. These include no foreign military bases on Norwegian territory in times of peace, no stockpiling of nuclear weapons in Norway, geographic limits on allied manoeuvres in Norway etc. These measures are publicly announced but, as they are unilateral, Norway of course remains free to interpret them or to discontinue them at her own discretion if circumstances change.

8. In the context of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Norway has tried to play an active part in elaborating, implementing and further developing and enlarging confidence-building measures.

9. The Norwegian Government also takes a positive view of the various confidence-building measures, both independent of and in conjunction with arms control agreements, which have been adopted by the Soviet Union and the United States of America.

V. Implementation of and experience with confidence-building measures agreed on at the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe

10. As is known, at the final stage of the Conference in 1975, agreement was reached on various confidence-building measures, which have been implemented since then, albeit to varying degrees by the participating States.

11. Norway has since then given prior notification to the other participating States of six military manoeuvres taking place on its territory. All of them have involved fewer than 25,000 troops, which is the level at which the participating States have agreed that they will notify each other of military manoeuvres taking place on their territory.

12. No military manoeuvres involving more than 25,000 troops have been held.

13. Norway has wished, however, to implement also the discretionary provision of the Final Act, which stipulates that the participating States recognize that they may also notify other participating States of smaller-scale manoeuvres, with special regard for those near the area of such manoeuvres.

14. Furthermore, Norway has given ample information about the manoeuvres notified and has in two instances invited observers from other participating States to the manoeuvres. Norway has also participated in exchanges of military personnel with other participating States.

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15. Norway considers that the experience gained from the implementation of the confidence-building measures agreed on at the Conference is generally positive, although it may be too early to pass final judgement on their effect.

VI. The developing and enlarging of confidence-building measures agreed on at the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe

16. In the opinion of the Norwegian Government, however, the experience gained so far with the confidence-building measures agreed upon at the Conference is such that the participating States of the Conference should make renewed efforts within the follow-up framework of the Conference to strengthen their implementation and to extend and develop them further, thus enlarging their scope and effectiveness.

17. The Norwegian Government believes that this would apply also to confidence-building measures between the Soviet Union and the United States of America.

VII. The question of confidence-building measures in other regions

18. In general, and particularly in view of the experience gained from the implementation of confidence-building measures in the European and the East/West context, the Norwegian Government believes that such measures can serve a useful purpose also in other regions and contexts.

19. If States which experience fear and tension among themselves have a desire to avoid unpremeditated and accidental confrontation and armed conflict, the opportunity should be seized to seek agreement on confidence-building measures.

20. The type and degree of commitment will have to be adapted to the circumstances prevailing in the particular region, context or situation. It will constitute a first positive step to agree on certain practices involving communication, contact, openness in military matters, avoidance of certain types of postures, activities and planning. It is important, however, that in due course the confidence-building measures affect those aspects of military matters which cause the greatest concern on the part of other States.

POLAND

/Original: English/

/30 July 1979/

I

1. The Government of the Polish People's Republic offers its views on the question of confidence-building measures, particularly on the basis of the experiences it has gained while implementing the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. The importance of activities of States in that field was strongly emphasized in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, which recognized measures to strengthen security and confidence as a substantial part of its Programme of Action.

II

2. Poland's involvement in the implementation of confidence-building measures arises from its deep conviction that they contribute to creating a more favourable political climate, to reducing suspicion and deepening mutual trust. Parallel to disarmament and arms limitation measures, action to strengthen confidence is an integral part of efforts in the entirety of measures to promote military détente.

III

3. Poland, for obvious reasons, focuses its attention on matters of military détente in Europe, and especially in Central Europe. Against the backdrop of the situation which has evolved in international relations, particularly on the European continent, ever more urgent has become the necessity of intensifying efforts in the area of military détente. Progress in that field, at the present moment, is an important prerequisite of the consolidation and expansion of the process of political détente.

IV

4. The Government of the Polish People's Republic believes that intensifying action to enhance confidence and eliminate the sources of mistrust is a particularly pressing task at this time, as various negative phenomena continue to occur on the international plane, also in Europe. They first of all include attempts at strengthening the military factor in the foreign policies of many States and at violating the established principle of equal security of States, on which the security of the European continent as a whole is also based. Therefore, Poland has been constantly advocating that every agreement or any other action on the international forum concerning specific undertakings in the sphere of strengthening confidence should ensure the undiminished security of all parties, reciprocity of commitments and respect for the principle of sovereign equality of States. However, equal security of all participating States can be assured only if none of them will seek to achieve unilateral military advantages.

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V

5. In striving to reduce the level of military confrontation in Europe, especially in its central part, replete as it is with modern instruments of warfare, Poland deems it both desirable and necessary to simultaneously continue actions with a view to limiting armaments and reducing armed forces, as well as effecting broadly conceived confidence-building measures. Today, rapid and meaningful progress in both those areas in the first place depends on the political will of all States concerned to act consistently towards those ends.

6. In the opinion of the Government of the Polish People's Republic, a considerable role in the area in question is attributed to the full implementation of the provisions of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe on confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament. Taking as they do equal account of the security interests of all States, the provisions thus represent an important instrument of military détente. They are bound to prevent misinterpretation or erroneous evaluation of military activities of States, which is particularly important to small and medium-sized countries. The period of time since the Conference in Helsinki has confirmed convincingly the positive impact that the provisions of its Final Act had upon the course of improving mutual relations among States, furthering development of the process of détente and strengthening security.

VI

7. In the view of the Polish Government, in principle the implementation of the foregoing provisions of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe has so far been satisfactory; it offers a promising point of departure for moving still further, in the spirit of the Final Act, towards fostering mutual trust.

8. Poland, like other socialist States, has repeatedly pronounced itself in favour of the consolidation of international security, notably in Europe, through new measures of a political and military nature, as well as those in the field of international jurisprudence. Such measures would add to the development of confidence-building measures, now being implemented on the basis of the specific provisions of the Final Act of the Conference. The current position of Poland, as well as of other socialist States, on the matters in question has been expressed in the Declaration of the Political Consultative Committee of States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty (A/33/392), adopted in Moscow in November 1978, and subsequently developed in the communiqué of the meeting of the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of States Members of the Warsaw Treaty of 15 May 1979 (A/34/275).

9. The documents contain numerous proposals aimed at strengthening mutual trust, limiting the military activities of States and lowering the level of military confrontation in Europe.

10. Along with other States members of the Warsaw Treaty, Poland stands ready to sign, with the participating States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, a treaty on the non-first use of either nuclear or conventional weapons

against each other. In the opinion of the Government of the Polish People's Republic, the conclusion of such a treaty would substantially strengthen the political and legal base of the observance in Europe of the principle of the non-use of force or threat of force and would increase the effectiveness of the principle of the territorial integrity of States. A document like this would play an important role in lowering the risk of conflict in Europe. In Poland's view, the conclusion of an agreement by European States on prior notification of major military movements, limitation of the quantitative levels of military manoeuvres, as well as on the non-enlargement of military-political groupings, would represent a meaningful addition to confidence-building measures set out in the Final Act of the Conference.

11. All such questions, as well as other matters to be eventually raised by States, might be discussed at a conference on a political level with the participation of all European States, the United States of America and Canada. The basic task of the conference would be to reach agreement on practical measures in the military field to serve the strengthening of international security.

VII

12. Apart from measures in the military field, such forms of activities by States as expanding political consultations, co-operation in various areas and contacts among the societies are also becoming particularly important for the strengthening of mutual trust. In the opinion of the Polish Government, the broad concept of confidence-building measures they represent more adequately conforms to the requirements of the existing reality and reflects the nations' desire to live in mutual security.

13. Poland contributes its own share to the realization of the thus conceived broad concept of confidence-building measures. This is evidenced by its bilateral relations with States having different socio-political systems, notably by the development of political consultations at various levels and all-round co-operation in different fields. It is also reflected in the broad dialogue which Poland carries on with Governments, political parties, civic movements and religious organizations which declare themselves in favour of ending the arms race and the consolidation of détente and peace.

VIII

14. The Government of the Polish People's Republic thereby wishes to express its readiness to take joint action with other States, both on a regional and a global scale, with a view to promoting confidence-building measures which would serve the consolidation of peace and security and the furthering of understanding among nations.

QATAR

/Original: Arabic/

1. The building of confidence among States is a fundamental part of the process of strengthening international security. Confidence-building measures will help to alleviate international tension in sensitive regions and will also avert new outbreaks of tension in other parts of the world. Measures to build confidence among States are particularly important for the achievement of further progress in disarmament. In our opinion, the following measures would help to build confidence:
2. A commitment by all States to the principles of international law, respect for international covenants and agreements and the strengthening of the role played by international organizations, primarily by the United Nations.
3. Reaffirmation of the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force, under which Israel is obligated to withdraw completely and unconditionally from all occupied Arab territories, including Arab Jerusalem. This is especially necessary, since Israeli actions and practices in the occupied Arab territories constitute a violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, article 47 of which forbids the annexation by the occupying Power of territories placed under military occupation, and article 49 of which forbids the transfer of nationals of the occupying Power to the occupied territories.
4. The settlement of international disputes by peaceful means, the substitution of dialogue for confrontation and constant endeavours to conclude voluntary and equitable agreements between all the parties to a dispute.
5. Reaffirmation of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of States, rejection on principle of the threat of military intervention by any great Power under any pretext, even if such intervention should take place under the pretext of protecting world energy resources or any other resources in any part of the world.
6. Efforts to remove tension and dissipate the atmosphere of apprehension which is hanging over the peoples of the developing countries as a result of the military confrontation between the great Powers and their allies in the Middle East, southern Africa, Asia and Latin America.
7. There is an inverse relationship between military build-up and the building of confidence in so far as a loss of confidence among States leads to an escalation of the arms race and the stockpiling of weapons by certain States gives rise to a lack of confidence in other States. In this connexion, we would refer to the implications of the continual military build-up, stockpiling of conventional weapons and acquisition of nuclear weapons by Israel and the nuclear blackmail that is being practised by that country against the States and peoples of the region. Under such conditions, the building of confidence among the States and peoples of the region is a difficult if not impossible task.

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8. The speeding up of the establishment of the new international economic order aimed at narrowing the wide gap between the developing and the developed countries and efforts to curb monetary inflation, remedy the deficit in the balance of payments of the poorer developing countries and put an end to the plundering by the developed countries of the resources of the developing peoples.

9. The drafting of an international agreement under which confidence-building measures would be put into effect on a world-wide basis for the purpose of disarmament and arms control.

ROMANIA

/Original: French/

/10 July 1979/

1. In its policy regarding the strengthening of international security, peace and co-operation among all States, Romania assigns an important role to measures aimed at increasing confidence and international détente, creating a political climate conducive to peace of mind among peoples and mobilizing their efforts for the purpose of development and the building of a better and more equitable world.

2. One of the fundamental problems relative to contemporary international life, peace and the progress of all peoples is the cessation of the arms race and the implementation of real disarmament measures. The unprecedented stockpiling of weapons, especially of nuclear weapons, contains within itself the seeds of the aggravation of international conflicts and the triggering of a global holocaust, and thus poses a serious threat to human civilization as a whole. Huge military expenditures are helping to perpetuate and widen the economic disparities between States, are obstructing the implementation of programmes designed to increase the well-being of the population and are also engulfing the developing countries so that these countries are deprived of substantial material and human resources needed to eliminate under-development.

3. In spite of repeated appeals in United Nations resolutions for the prompt initiation of disarmament measures, the results achieved thus far are not likely to curb the arms race and national stockpiles of weapons have, in fact, considerably increased, thus magnifying their potential for destruction. Taking the realistic view that the complex problem of disarmament and of relieving the people of the tremendous burden of military expenditures cannot be solved overnight, the Romanian Government considers it necessary to agree on a series of transitional measures to facilitate the process of bringing about a substantial reduction in armaments and achieving the ultimate objective, namely, disarmament and, primarily, nuclear disarmament. In this respect, an important role is to be played by the negotiation and implementation of certain urgent measures to build confidence among States, to consolidate political détente by moves towards military détente, and to secure a radical improvement in the international political climate.

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4. In the opinion of the Romanian Government, confidence-building measures should constitute an objective to be pursued consistently throughout the disarmament process, bolster and be bolstered by a gradual reduction in armaments, cover both the military and the political spheres and be approached from a regional as well as from a broader international angle.

I. Political and military measures at the international level

5. Contemporary international relations provide convincing proof of the fact that the use of force in relations between States has caused, and continues to cause, incalculable harm to the progress and development of peoples. Recourse to force, violence and aggression against the independence of States perpetuates conditions of instability and tension and promotes an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust, thus impeding the process of development and expansion of multilateral co-operation among all members of the international community.

6. The Romanian Government believes that international détente and the building of confidence among States call for the initiation of real negotiations for the formulation and adoption of an international treaty on the renunciation of the use of force in relations between all States. In the opinion of the Romanian Government such a treaty should stipulate that States have an obligation not to use armed force to intervene in the internal affairs of other States and not, to support for any reason whatsoever, the actions of various groups opposing the legal Governments of sovereign and independent States. In view of the fact that the accumulation and increasing sophistication of nuclear weapons constitutes the most dynamic element in the arms race, and that these arms pose a permanent threat to global peace and security, an essential step towards the elimination of force in international relations would be a commitment by States possessing nuclear weapons not to resort, in any way and under any circumstance or pretext whatsoever, to the use or threat of use of nuclear or any other type of weapons against States which do not possess nuclear weapons and have refrained from the production, acquisition and stationing of such weapons in their territory.

7. Concurrently with the negotiations aimed at the abolition of force in relations between States, persistent action must be taken to resolve all conflict situations at the negotiating table in order to put an end, by political means, to sources of potential confrontation throughout the world. The Government of Romania has already submitted a set of proposals to this end, including a proposal for the negotiation of an international agreement whereby States would undertake to resolve any contentious issue exclusively by peaceful means through negotiations between the parties concerned. As a first step in this direction, a declaration by the United Nations General Assembly on the peaceful settlement of disputes between States might be envisaged.

8. The United Nations must also intensify its efforts and improve its machinery and working methods in order to make a greater contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the development of broad co-operation between States in all spheres. In the opinion of the Romanian Government, the appointment of a Committee or of some other standing body of the United Nations

General Assembly, responsible for using its good offices and exercising conciliation functions could serve to increase the role of the United Nations in the prevention and peaceful solution of disputes between States and in furthering the purposes and principles laid down in the Charter.

9. In view of the interrelationship between the major problems of the present-day world and of the fact that international peace and security cannot be maintained without eliminating the phenomenon of underdevelopment and the economic disparities between the developing and the developed countries, the Romanian Government believes that confidence-building measures at the political and military levels must also be accompanied by positive results in the field of economic development.

10. In this connexion, we believe that the freezing of military budgets, with a view to their gradual reduction, would lead not only to an improvement in the international political climate and an increase in confidence, but also the accelerated economic and social advancement of States. The funds thus released could be used for national development programmes in those countries which freeze or reduce their military budgets and also for the purpose of helping the developing countries in their efforts to accelerate their economic and social development.

11. The Romanian Government is convinced that the initiation of negotiations on such measures within the United Nations, with the active participation of all States, would have a powerful and positive effect in building up confidence among States, in easing tensions and improving the general political climate, and also in creating conditions favourable to the continued implementation of a comprehensive disarmament programme which would lead to general disarmament and primarily nuclear disarmament, and would strengthen international peace and security.

II. Political and military measures at the regional level

12. As a European country, Romania is concerned with the implementation of measures to build confidence between all European States with a view to facilitating the process of establishing a durable system of security and co-operation on this continent.

13. Europe is still the scene of the most complex situation in international life. The pursuit of the arms race on a hitherto unprecedented scale and the stockpiling of increasingly sophisticated weapons, including nuclear weapons, which place a heavy burden on the people and increasingly endanger their security, are an aggravating factor in both the economic crisis and international instability.

14. The confidence-building measures provided for in the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference only represent an initial phase in the establishment of a climate of peace and security, détente and co-operation in Europe. Their implementation has, however, proved that they are insufficient to bring about real progress with regard to the strengthening of European security.

15. In the present circumstances, Romania is focusing its European policy on consistent action for the implementation of effective confidence-building measures and military disengagement measures without which real security, in Europe or elsewhere in the world, would be inconceivable.

16. The Romanian Government believes, therefore, that negotiations should be initiated without delay on proposals such as:

(a) The freezing of military expenditures, military establishments and armaments with a view to their eventual gradual reduction;

(b) An undertaking by States to refrain from stationing further troops and weapons in the territory of other States, the gradual reduction and withdrawal of all foreign troops within national frontiers, the dismantling of military bases, and primarily nuclear bases, in the territory of other States and a commitment by States no longer to accept the installation of foreign military bases in their territory;

(c) The establishment between the two military blocs - the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty blocs - of a zone, on both sides, in which no foreign armies or weapons of any kind may be stationed, where no military manoeuvre or show of force may take place and which should only contain limited forces belonging to the countries in whose territory the demilitarized zone would be established;

(d) A continuous reduction in the activities of the military blocs on the continent, an undertaking on the part of States parties to the military pacts not to admit any new States to these organizations and the creation of conditions for their simultaneous liquidation;

(e) An undertaking on the part of all States possessing nuclear weapons not to use these weapons against States which do not possess nuclear weapons and, in general, not to use any type of weapon against States which do not possess nuclear weapons and which have resolved not to produce or acquire such weapons;

(f) The reduction and discontinuance of military manoeuvres and, in general, of any show of force in the proximity of the national frontiers of other countries;

(g) The notification of troop movements and of naval and air manoeuvres;

(h) The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free-zones of mutual understanding and peaceful co-operation in various parts of Europe. In this respect, Romania, in association with the other States of the Balkan region, is working for the transformation of this zone into a zone of peace, good neighbourly relations, confidence and mutually advantageous co-operation for the benefit of all the people and for the furtherance of security in Europe and the rest of the world;

(i) The conclusion of a general European treaty whereby all the signatories of the Final Act of Helsinki would undertake to renounce the use or the threat of the use of force and not to be the first to use either nuclear or conventional weapons against the others.

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17. The Romanian Government is of the opinion that, for the consideration and adoption of the above measures, it is necessary to proceed to urgent negotiations within an appropriate framework, with the participation of all the States signatories of the Final Act of Helsinki, on the basis of the democratic rules of procedure of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

III. Principles for the identification and negotiation
of confidence-building measures

18. The measures designed to build up confidence should be part of a broader approach, and an integral part of the entire process of strengthening international peace and security and achieving general disarmament and, primarily, nuclear disarmament.

19. The basic premise for the identification of such measures must be the necessity of guaranteeing maximum effectiveness, given the complex circumstances and specific conditions in which the problems of peace and disarmament present themselves at each stage.

20. The adoption and implementation of confidence-building measures should take into account the need for suitable guarantee of equal security for all States and to avoid creating military advantages for any State.

21. Bilateral and multilateral negotiations for the adoption of confidence-building measures should be conducted on a democratic basis and under conditions of perfect equality between the parties, whose interests and points of view should be taken into consideration.

22. The United Nations must have a more active role in promoting and encouraging the negotiation and implementation of confidence-building measures, making its specialized assistance available to the various States.

23. The experience accumulated in Europe in this field could also be examined with a view to identifying the confidence-building measures that could be applied and might also be useful for other geographical regions.

24. Similar advantages could also be derived from the preparation, by a group of United Nations experts, of a study on confidence-building among States, which would facilitate a more thorough study of all the political and military aspects of this question, provide States with a practical instrument to which they could resort in certain specific situations and encourage States in general to take an interest in confidence-building measures.

25. The Romanian Government believes that it should be a greater concern of the United Nations to examine and reach agreement on confidence-building measures, as this would represent a specific means whereby the Organization could make a greater contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the furtherance of the cause of disarmament and, primarily, of nuclear disarmament.

SPAIN

/Original: Spanish/

/30 July 1979/

1. The question of confidence-building measures in the context of efforts aimed at strengthening international peace and security is of the utmost importance, for everything that helps to create a climate of understanding and mutual comprehension among States necessarily has a favourable effect on international relations, and thus makes it difficult for military conflicts to arise. It was in the light of these considerations that the Spanish delegation supported General Assembly resolution 33/91 B. However, it feels that, in order to attain the resolution's objectives, it would be advisable to go beyond the measures set forth in paragraph 93 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2) devoted to disarmament. To this end, the Spanish delegation would be in favour of action at the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly to develop those principles and to define concrete measures that could promote progress in this field.
2. The participants in the tenth special session of the General Assembly submitted very interesting proposals which were not reflected in the definitive text of the Final Document. The implications of some of those proposals, however, went beyond the scope of confidence-building measures. It is essential to recognize that confidence-building measures cannot be substantive in nature and must be purely supplementary to other measures, since they cannot relate either to control or to the limitation of armaments or military forces.
3. In the opinion of the Spanish delegation, the observations contained in the document presented by the Federal Republic of Germany at the tenth special session of the General Assembly (A/S-10/AC.1/20) should be studied carefully, since they contain valuable elements that could be very useful in connexion with this matter.
4. The relevant chapter of the Final Act of 1 August 1975 of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe should also be borne in mind. That chapter contains a series of provisions which have subsequently been implemented by a number of signatory countries of the Final Act and which constitute a valuable precedent for measures of this kind. These provisions include exchanges by invitation among military personnel, as well as reciprocal visits by military delegations.
5. The delegation of Spain regards as most interesting the recommendation contained in resolution 33/91 B that States should consider regional arrangements for confidence-building measures. With a view to the meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation, which is to be held at Madrid starting on 11 November 1980, the Government of Spain is studying the possibilities offered in this field.

SWEDEN

/Original: English/

/18 July 1979/

1. The importance attached by the Swedish Government to the notion of confidence-building measures has been expressed on several occasions and in various international fora, in the form of both general declarations and concrete proposals, notably in the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

2. The Swedish Government sees confidence-building measures as measures designed to reduce military and political tension in interstate relations and to enhance a negotiating climate conducive to concrete disarmament and arms control agreements. The Swedish view is based both upon experience on such confidence-building measures, which have been in operation in Europe since the signing of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in 1975 and on a belief that a further development of existing confidence-building measures in Europe could serve the purpose of détente and disarmament.

3. It is abundantly clear that a critical factor underlying the global and regional arms race, and the subsequent threats to over-all détente, is the state of mutual fear and distrust that exists between States and blocs of States. By contrast, with a comprehensive system of confidence-building measures applied in a region, it might, in the longer prospective, be possible for the States of that region to redefine the requirements of national security, emphasizing trust rather than distrust, military restraint rather than military capability and readiness. No doubt, such a development would be in accordance with the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

4. Needless to say, confidence-building measures do not constitute an alternative to genuine disarmament. In the final analysis, only a process of practical disarmament measures can build lasting military confidence. And without military confidence, any state of political détente is likely to remain fragile. The need for establishing political détente based upon progressively lower levels of armaments cannot be over-emphasized. Nevertheless, in order to deepen détente and prepare the road for concrete disarmament, it is essential that the relevant States agree on a formula whereby their non-aggressive and non-offensive military intention are communicated across common borders in such a way as to reduce tension without any jeopardy to the national security of each State.

5. The application of confidence-building measures presupposes the existence of a regionally delimited area where the component States, particularly the militarily significant ones, are genuinely willing to show restraint and co-operate in order to reduce tension. It certainly is the hope of the Swedish Government that countries in other regions of the world will initiate conferences on security and co-operation, similar to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, conferences within the framework of which it may prove possible and worthwhile to agree on confidence-building measures adapted to the specific characteristics, conditions and problems of the relevant region.

6. The confidence-building measures agreed upon in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe have now been in operation for about four years. On the whole, the provisions of the Final Act have been duly applied. As a result, valuable experience has been gained. However, as pointed out by the Swedish delegation at the Conference follow up meeting in Belgrade, it is of crucial importance that these measures be improved and expanded.

7. Such expansion is clearly foreseen in the Final Act of the Conference. Nevertheless, it was regrettably not possible in Belgrade to reach consensus even on those further measures specifically mentioned in the Final Act.

8. In the view of the Swedish Government, an expansion of existing confidence-building measures is of great importance to the dynamics and viability of the whole Conference process. It could be undertaken in various ways. One road, set by the Final Act of the Conference would be to expand the procedure of compulsory notification to smaller manoeuvres and major military movements and to improve on the working conditions of military observers, etc. In addition, it is conceivable that confidence-building measures in connexion with different types of military forces (naval, amphibious, air-borne) and with different weapon categories, such as chemical weapons, could make fruitful contributions.

9. The concept of confidence-building measures, as established in an increasing number of international negotiating fora, such as the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Reduction of Forces in Central Europe and, most recently, the United Nations, reflects a growing awareness of the undeniable fact that, unless military secrecy and mutual distrust gradually give way to openness and confidence, any hope for a genuine regional and global process of disarmament runs the risk of ending in frustration.

SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC

/Original: English/

/30 April 1979/

1. As a small developing country, the Syrian Arab Republic is extremely interested in the achievement of all aspirations of the group of non-aligned countries so that its people and the rest of the peoples of the world can enjoy peace, security and prosperity. Without the determined will of all peoples and all States, nothing of that kind will take place. If peace and justice prevail, if injustice is eradicated and if all peoples enjoy their rights and freedoms and exercise their sovereignty, they will not hesitate to contribute constructively in building a prosperous future.

2. The Syrian delegation put the question on how can peoples victims of injustice, exploitation, oppression and racial discrimination, peoples deprived of their land and their basic right to build independent States, abandon the struggle and throw down their arms so long as they remain threatened with extermination and subjugation by fierce enemies possessing destructive weapons?

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3. The General Assembly, at its thirtieth session, commended the idea of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East. To strengthen that objective, it recommended that the Member States concerned in the region should:

"Proclaim solemnly and immediately their intention to refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons", and urged "all parties directly concerned to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" 1/ (resolution 3474 (XXX)).

Again, at its thirty-second session, the General Assembly urged "all parties directly concerned to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" 1/ (resolution 32/82) with the objective of promoting the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, and repeated its recommendation that the Member States directly concerned, pending the establishment of such a zone, under an effective system of safeguards, should:

"refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory or the territory under their control by any third party";

and that they should also

"refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from any other action that would facilitate the acquisition, testing or use of such weapons, or would be in any other way detrimental to the objective of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region under an effective system of safeguards"; and

"Agree to place all their nuclear activities under the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards".

4. The General Assembly also went on to refer to other items in resolution 32/82.

5. So long as the question of an occupied territory and peoples who have been expelled and unjustly treated and are threatened by a military presence armed with the most sophisticated weapons - in particular nuclear weapons - remains, then hostility will continue and the competition to acquire more powerful arms will accelerate. The establishment of the Middle East as a nuclear-weapon-free zone is closely - in fact, inevitably - linked to Africa, the Indian Ocean and South-East Asia. In order that peace may prevail in that Ocean and in that part of Asia, every reason for the violation of peace and security should be removed, that is, strategic, political and economic rivalry and the establishment of military bases and their equipment with the most sophisticated weapons and equipment.

1/ General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex.

6. As stated in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly:

"The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned constitutes an important disarmament measure", (General Assembly resolution S-10/2, para. 60)

until such time as we achieve our ultimate target of general and complete disarmament.

7. The Final Document states:

"The vast stockpiles and tremendous build-up of arms and armed forces and the competition for qualitative refinement of weapons of all kinds, to which scientific resources and technological advances are diverted, pose incalculable threats to peace. This situation both reflects and aggravates international tensions, sharpens conflicts in various regions of the world, hinders the process of détente, exacerbates the differences between opposing military alliances, jeopardizes the security of all States, heightens the sense of insecurity among all States, including the non-nuclear-weapon States, and increases the threat of nuclear war.

...

"The arms race ... adversely affects the right of peoples freely to determine their systems of social and economic development, and hinders the struggle for self-determination and the elimination of colonial rule, racial or foreign domination or occupation. Indeed, the massive accumulation of armaments and the acquisition of armaments technology by racist régimes, as well as their possible acquisition of nuclear weapons, present a challenging and increasingly dangerous obstacle to a world community faced with the urgent need to disarm." (resolution S-10/2, paras. 11 and 12).

8. Current treaties and conventions, as well as negotiations, both bilateral and multilateral, can with difficulty be described as steps towards total disarmament. As far as we are concerned, they are only a codification or regulation of the arms race amid each party's terror and fear of the other. Within these negotiations compromising different trends and ideas, the time has come for the international community to discuss disarmament and the dialogue concerning it at an international conference to be held for that purpose, in order to allow all the developing and small States to play a greater role in that field and in application of the principle of world-wide participation. We expressed the hope that the international community would assume the responsibility which has been placed upon it for eliminating and eradicating the conditions which have made the Middle East, Africa and other areas pockets of tension and the scene for the presentation and consumption of the production by arms merchants of different types of weapons, disregarding mankind and its values.

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9. It is obvious from the Syrian delegation's declaration that the Syrian Arab Republic cannot go along with bilateral regional agreements if they are not based on the respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political and economic independence of States. The Government opposes any attempt by a Member State to impose its conditions through bilateral agreements and "confidence-building measures", especially when one party is well-known for a discriminatory policy and practices and for his contempt for all principles of international law and for the United Nations Charter. The "confidence-building measures" cannot be conceived to be achieved and asked for between an aggressor and a victim of the aggression.

10. The Syrian non-participation in the vote on resolution 33/91 B, adopted by the General Assembly on 16 December 1978, was caused by the lack of distinction between measures to be built on the basis of mutual respect and others asked for, in order to perpetuate occupation, aggression, racial discrimination and apartheid. What kind of measures could be built between the apartheid régime in South Africa and the neighbouring sovereign countries, victims of daily aggression perpetrated by that régime? Could the Namibian people trust the régime of illegal occupation of his territory? Could the world ask the Palestinian people to trust the Zionist régime while it continued to occupy all of Palestine and parts of Arab territories and persisted in practising the policy of expansionism and racial discrimination?

11. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic considers that the first step to be made towards confidence-building measures is the renouncement by certain countries and régimes of their policies and practices which obstruct the international community's efforts towards détente, settlement of conflicts, disarmament and a better life.

TURKEY

Original: English

20 July 1979

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1. The concept of confidence-building measures is relatively new in international relations. They could be defined, in the broader sense, as measures designed to reduce misunderstanding and tension between States and to build confidence whether by dispelling misapprehension by greater openness about armed forces or about the purposes of military activities or by placing constraints on such activities. It is evident that strengthening confidence among States would contribute to increasing stability and security in the world and would enhance the development of the process of détente.

2. The adoption and adequate implementation of confidence-building measures on a bilateral or multilateral basis would contribute to the creation of the political and psychological atmosphere which is necessary for engaging in serious arms control measures.

3. As the scope and the nature of the confidence-building measures would depend to a large extent on the political, military and geographic conditions

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prevailing in a given part of the world, such measures could be usefully developed on a regional basis. As a start, they could be agreed selectively and they could be further developed and enlarged when the experience gained by their implementation showed that these measures did in fact contribute to a strengthening of confidence among the States concerned, and thus to increasing stability and security in the region. The term of region may apply to two or more States.

4. Confidence-building measures could rest on a voluntary basis, as has been the case with those measures adopted at the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, or they could entail legally binding obligations and restrictions on military activities. In both cases, it would be essential that they be consistent with the principle of undiminished security for all concerned.

5. The measures set forth below are deemed appropriate and feasible for building confidence and reducing tensions among States by dispelling misunderstanding and apprehension. The parameters for each measure would be decided by the participating States, taking into consideration the peculiarities of the region involved.

A. Prior notification of major military manoeuvres

6. This notification, providing detailed information relating to the time and duration, area, numerical strength and type or types of the participating units and the general purpose of the exercise in advance of its start, can contribute to eliminating the causes of tension that may arise from misinterpretation of military activities by helping the States concerned to determine whether the activities in question are normal peace-time exercises and not a prelude to aggression or acts of political pressure.

7. Notification could be given at least three weeks in advance of the start of the manoeuvre. The definition of the term "major" and other relevant parameters would have to be agreed upon by the parties concerned in the light of existing conditions.

B. The establishment of direct communication lines ("hot lines")

8. These "hot lines" between the capitals of two or more States, particularly in areas of tension, can reduce the risk of conflict and contribute to the prevention of attacks which may take place by miscalculation, error, accident or failure of communication.

C. The invitation of observers to manoeuvres

9. This is also an important confidence-building measure. The presence at the site of the manoeuvre of foreign military representatives would certainly add to the openness of the military activity and would help create a positive psychological atmosphere necessary to build and develop mutual confidence.

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Providing adequate observation opportunities and granting necessary facilities to the invitees would render the measure more meaningful. Foreign observers must be treated in conditions of equality and their ability to follow the course of the manoeuvre must not be impeded.

D. Exchange of military delegations

10. Exchange of visits among military personnel at the commanding level and visits by military delegations, warships and squadrons of aircraft can provide to participating States the opportunity of better understanding each others thinking and concerns related to the military field.

E. Disclosure of defence budgets

11. Disclosure of defence budgets and supply of information on future defence expenditure projections on the basis of standardized and comparable reporting systems so as to render possible a realistic comparison between the defence efforts of the countries concerned, could be considered as another important measure designed to build confidence. The establishment of such a practice could lead to multilateral agreements aiming at reducing the growth of military budgets. Satisfactory experience with such arrangements and agreement on budgetary technics and methods would then pave the way for reasonable reduction in military expenditures.

F. Prior notification of military movements

12. Prior notification of major military movements into or within a defined area can be given with the aim of contributing to confidence-building and thus to increased stability and security in the region. The same parameters as those envisaged for the prior notification of major military manoeuvres should apply to this measure with the additional information on the directions of the movement and the place of destination.

II

A. Experience with the confidence-building measures in Europe

13. The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (1975) includes a document on confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament. With this document, the participating States have recognized that the strengthening of confidence among them would contribute to increased stability and security in Europe. They have also recognized the need to contribute to the reduction of the danger of armed conflict arising from some misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities by providing clear and timely information about the nature of such activities, and they have adopted a number of confidence-

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building measures, to be implemented on a voluntary basis which implies a political commitment.

B. Confidence-building measures adopted by the Conference

14. The following principal confidence-building measures were adopted by 35 participants of the Conference:

(a) The prior notification of major military manoeuvres exceeding a total of 25,000 troops, independently or combined with any possible air or naval components. Notification will contain information on the general purpose of and the States involved in the manoeuvre, the type or types and numerical strength of the forces engaged, the area and estimated time-frame of its conduct with any other relevant information;

(b) Exchange of observers at military manoeuvres;

15. The following confidence-building measures also adopted at the Conference represent a lesser degree of commitment, compared to the above-mentioned two measures:

(c) Prior notification of manoeuvres not exceeding the level of 25,000 troops;

(d) Discretionary notification of major military movements;

(e) Other confidence-building measures, such as the exchange of military personnel, including visits by military delegations.

16. The participating States recognized in the same document that the experience gained by the implementation of the measures adopted, together with further efforts, could lead to developing and enlarging measures aimed at strengthening confidence.

C. Implementation

17. The implementation so far of the measures adopted at the Conference has been quite satisfactory. Notification has been sent by the participating States regarding all major military manoeuvres exceeding the total level of 25,000 troops.

18. In the period that followed the signing of the Final Act of the Conference, a noticeable increase in the number of bilateral military exchanges of various participating countries has been observed. This involved visits by military personnel of all ranks, including the most senior, as well as exchanges of military units, such as naval ships and aircraft squadrons.

19. There has been no notification so far of any major military movement. In addition to notification of major military manoeuvres, the participating States have sent notification of no less than 24 smaller-scale manoeuvres involving between 5,000 and 25,000 troops.

20. During the four years since the signing of the Final Act, Turkey has given prior notification of two military manoeuvres, both not exceeding the level of 18,000 troops. No major military manoeuvre has been held in Turkey during the period. Notification in advance of 30 days was made for the second of these two manoeuvres, which exceeds the minimum time-frame provided for in the Final Act.

21. In conformity with the provisions of the Final Act related to exchange among military personnel, including visits by military delegations, Rear-Admiral Orhan Karabulut, Chief of Staff of the fleet, visited Romania in August 1975. In May-June 1976, General Kenan Evren, Deputy Chief of General Staff, accompanied by a military delegation visited the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The following year, Deputy Chief of General Staff, General Vecihi Akin, paid a visit to Romania and in April 1978, Marshal A. V. Ogarkov, Chief of General Staff of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, visited Turkey. In April 1978, Lt-Gen. Bedrettin Demirel participated in the symposium held in Romania on the occasion of the one hundredth anniversary of its independence.

22. In August 1975, the naval training ship Savarona visited Constanta, Romania. Two Turkish destroyers visited Odessa in December 1978 and the Soviet cruiser Dzerzinsky and destroyer Reshitelny reciprocated by visiting Istanbul in December 1978.

III. Outlook

23. The experience so far gained in the implementation of confidence-building measures in Europe is positive and encouraging. There are good prospects for further developing and enlarging the scope of existing measures as to continue to build and strengthen the confidence among the 35 participating States of the Conference. It is hoped that the experience acquired in Europe with regard to confidence-building measures will set examples for other regions of the world and will thus contribute to stability and security in the world.

UKRAINIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

/Original: Russian/

/5 September 1979/

1. In its foreign-policy activities, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic steadfastly and consistently pursues a policy of peace and advocates strengthening the security of peoples and developing co-operation among States. Since the earliest days of the United Nations, it has unswervingly supported all proposals aimed at reducing the threat of a new war, ending the arms race and promoting disarmament. Accordingly, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic fully endorses the provisions contained in the Final Document of the special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament and in General Assembly resolution 33/91 B to the effect that in order to facilitate the process of disarmament, measures must be taken to strengthen international peace and security and to establish a climate of confidence among States.

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2. As a European State Member of the United Nations, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic considers it extremely important to work for the implementation of the provisions of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe relating to the need for effective measures to reduce military confrontation, in order to supplement political détente with military détente and to strengthen security on the European continent. The socialist States have repeatedly put forward specific proposals aimed at establishing and strengthening a climate of confidence in relations among States. In particular, they have proposed that all the States Parties to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe should conclude a treaty in which each undertook not to be the first to use nuclear or conventional weapons against any other. The conclusion of such a treaty would be in keeping with the spirit of the understanding achieved at Helsinki, strengthen the political and legal basis for strict compliance with the obligation not to use force or the threat of force in their relations with one another and thereby create further guarantees against the outbreak of military conflicts on the European continent. An effective step towards military détente in Europe would be the implementation of the socialist countries' proposal that prior notice should be given of any significant troop movements in the area, as well as of any major air-force manoeuvres or any major naval manoeuvres close to the territorial waters of other States participating in the all-European conference. The countries of the socialist community are also prepared to conclude an agreement not to expand military and political blocs in Europe, to restrict the level of military exercises and to extend confidence-building measures to the Mediterranean area.

3. Under present conditions, it is important to proceed to consider all these proposals, as well as possible proposals by other States which would lead to the lessening of military confrontation, the reduction of military build-ups, the curtailment of armed forces and armaments and the strengthening of peace and security in Europe. To that end, the States Parties to the Warsaw Pact have proposed convening a conference at the political level in which all the European States, the United States and Canada would participate. The convening of such a conference would provide opportunities for further strengthening confidence among European States and would facilitate the relaxation of international tension not only in Europe but in other continents as well.

4. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, consistently emphasizing the need for action in the interests of peace, détente and international co-operation, will continue to welcome any steps aimed at building a climate of confidence and friendship in relations among States.

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

/Original: Russian/

/22 August 1979/

1. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics consistently advocates the strengthening of peace and international security. It regards practical steps to halt the arms race and achieve disarmament as radical measures for the attainment of that goal. It also favours measures which, though themselves not genuine disarmament measures, nevertheless serve to ensure progress in that direction. These include, inter alia, measures to promote the strengthening of confidence between States and the deepening of military détente. The need to adopt such measures is also noted in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which stresses that their implementation could significantly promote further progress in the field of disarmament.
2. The Soviet Union, mindful of the importance of confidence-building measures in promoting military détente and reducing international tension, has in recent years concluded a series of bilateral agreements designed to attain those goals. These are bilateral agreements between the Soviet Union and a number of major States designed to lessen the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war, to provide warnings in case of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and to create and improve lines of direct communication. These agreements have made a significant contribution to the cause of lessening the danger of an outbreak of armed conflict involving the use of nuclear weapons and have helped to improve the political atmosphere in the world.
3. The measures which were agreed upon at the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe regarding the European continent represented major progress towards the creation of an atmosphere of confidence. As is well known, the Final Act of the European Conference provided that the participating States would notify each other not less than 21 days in advance of planned military manoeuvres by land forces exceeding a total of 25,000 troops within a specified area of Europe. It also provided that the participating States would invite observers voluntarily and on a bilateral basis to attend military manoeuvres and would also promote exchanges by invitation among their military personnel, including visits by military delegations. In complete conformity with the provisions of the Final Act, the Soviet Union provides notification of its military manoeuvres and receives observers from other States at those manoeuvres.
4. The implementation of these measures shows that to a certain extent they do in fact promote the strengthening of confidence and military détente. Acting in accordance with the Final Act of the European Conference which proclaims the possibility of enlarging measures to strengthen confidence on the basis of the acquired experience gained, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have in recent years put forward a set of proposals designed to further the process of military détente in Europe.

5. The Soviet Union and the other States parties to the Warsaw Treaty propose that agreement should be reached on the avoidance of first use of either nuclear or conventional weapons through the conclusion of a treaty to that effect among the participants in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. They are convinced that the conclusion of such a treaty would greatly strengthen the political and legal basis for the observance in Europe of the principle of non-use of force or the threat of force, enhancing its effectiveness and thus creating new guarantees against the unleashing of military conflicts on the European continent. They have also proposed that there should be agreement to refrain from expanding the military and political blocs in Europe.

6. The socialist countries have declared their readiness to reach agreement on limiting military manoeuvres to the level of 50,000 to 60,000 troops, on prior notification regarding major troop movements and large-scale aerial manoeuvres in the area of notification defined by the Final Act of the European Conference as well as large-scale naval manoeuvres conducted near the territorial waters of another country and on extending confidence-building measures to the Mediterranean area.

7. Expressing their willingness to undertake immediate consultations with interested parties on preparations for convening a conference at the political level with the participation of all European States, the United States and Canada, the countries of the Warsaw Treaty have proposed convening such a conference for the purpose of discussing and resolving the questions of implementing additional confidence-building measures, reducing military confrontation in Europe and then curtailing troop concentrations and reducing armed forces and armaments on that continent.

8. The Soviet Union believes that Europe, which initiated the process of political détente, can promote further progress in military détente and set an example for other regions in that regard.

9. The experience acquired on the European continent in implementing confidence-building measures in the opinion of the Soviet Union, could be used in regional consideration of the question of reaching agreement on such measures, taking into account, of course, the specific conditions and requirements of each region.

UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

/Original: English/

/26 July 1979/

1. The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland sees the building of confidence between nations as an important element of the arms control and disarmament process and supports the introduction of confidence-building measures wherever these can contribute to the strengthening of stability in international relations. The United Kingdom therefore, together with other

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Western States, advocated a number of confidence-building measures in the Western draft programme of action for the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1973 and welcomed the adoption by the Assembly later that year of resolution 33/91 B. We hope that these actions will lead to the introduction of appropriate confidence-building measures after agreement among the States concerned, on a bilateral, regional and world-wide level.

2. The purpose of such measures is to reduce the risk of armed conflicts by preventing the misunderstandings and miscalculations which can arise when States lack clear and timely information about the military activities of their neighbours. Confidence can be enhanced by States being more open, on a reciprocal basis, about their peaceful intentions, and in the conduct of their military activities. As experience of confidence-building measures is gained and their scope widens, consideration should be given to those measures which increase a State's ability to predict and understand the military behaviour of its neighbours, including measures which specifically place limits on the type of agreed military activity which States can undertake. It is likely that the verification of arms control agreements will form an increasingly important element in the confidence-building process.

3. The term itself was coined during the negotiation of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, although the concept existed in a number of arms control agreements before 1975. However, it is within the Conference that European confidence-building measures have been pursued, and this is where the main emphasis of the United Kingdom's approach lies.

4. At the Helsinki Conference, during July and August 1975, the States participating agreed: that they would notify each other 21 or more days in advance of military manoeuvres involving over 25,000 men; that such notifications would contain information on the purpose of the manoeuvre, the type and number of forces engaged and the area and duration of its conduct; and that observers would be invited to attend the manoeuvres. The participatory States also agreed that they would give consideration to the notification of troop manoeuvres under 25,000 men, the prior notification of military movements and the promotion of exchanges of military personnel.

5. Since the signing of the Final Act, States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe have given prior notification of all exercises involving 25,000 men in the Conference area. Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance have given prior notification of 12 such manoeuvres. Warsaw Pact member States similarly notified 10 such manoeuvres and two such manoeuvres have been notified by the neutral and non-aligned countries. In addition, manoeuvres involving under 25,000 men have been notified on 15 occasions by NATO member States, on seven occasions by neutral and non-aligned countries and on three occasions by Warsaw Pact States. The United Kingdom has sent notification of one such exercise, to which we invited observers. The United Kingdom has seen those confidence-

building measures so far agreed in the Conference as primarily political in their effect and as inseparable from other parts of the Conference and the détente process.

6. Bearing in mind the recommendations contained in paragraph 93 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2) and in the light of experience gained from the Conference process, the United Kingdom would recommend that appropriate confidence-building measures might be considered by States in other regions of the world. Examples of such measures might include:

(a) Twenty-one or more days' notification of major military manoeuvres or movements, the thresholds of which might be determined on the basis of regional requirements;

(b) Invitations to observers to attend manoeuvres and the exchange of military personnel on a reciprocal basis;

(c) Improving communications between Governments, particularly in areas of tension, by the establishment of "hot lines";

(d) The publication of full and detailed information on military budgets.

7. Other measures might be appropriate for application in different regions of the world. The United Kingdom would urge individual States, which are in the best position to judge their own needs, to give serious consideration, perhaps on a regional basis, to what types of confidence-building measures might be useful in their territory. The United Kingdom would also suggest that the Secretary-General of the United Nations could keep a voluntary register of types of confidence-building measures applied throughout the world, as an aid to the further development of this important concept.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

/Original: English/

/10 July 1979/

1. The United States of America welcomes this opportunity to share its views regarding confidence-building measures with States Members of the United Nations. The United States has actively supported the advancement of such measures, and co-sponsored General Assembly resolution 33/91. Vice-President Mondale, in his statement to the Assembly at its tenth special session in May 1978, emphasized our support for regional arms control, including "confidence-building measures which increase predictability and lessen the fear of sudden attack". In addition, the United States and its NATO allies view measures of the confidence-building type as an important part of the negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe. The United States views confidence-building measures as valuable for their psychological and political effect, for the openness they

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encourage among nations about their military practices, and for their potential to prevent or defuse situations that could lead to hostilities. On almost every continent, peace and security are threatened by potential regional conflict. So long as nations see their individual security interests imperiled by the policies and military postures of their regional neighbours, they will feel compelled to strive for higher levels of armaments and forces to secure their continued independence. As perceptions of insecurity deepen, the risk of regional conflict grows.

2. But confidence-building measures can provide ways to minimize uncertainty and misperception concerning potentially hostile military forces. Confidence-building measures offer a promising device for the reduction of tension and for reassuring potential adversaries that certain routine military activities are not intended as threatening. They can be useful as an accompaniment to arms control measures, perhaps for setting the stage for more extensive limitations or reductions in arms for forces or as an alternative means of achieving certain arms-control-related objectives where reductions are not feasible. They can also be useful in providing consultative mechanisms in conjunction with specific arms control agreements.

3. History confirms that nations are understandably cautious in their approach to arms control in general. They are particularly cautious with regard to comprehensive regional arms control régimes. Therefore, confidence-building measures provide attractive and practical initial steps towards more ambitious arms-control approaches: no nation risks weakening its security by participating in a set of modest measures designed to improve the dissemination of certain agreed types of information relating to military matters.

4. Confidence-building measures may take the form of notifications or restrictions on military activities, invitations to observe military activities, exchanges of data, communications agreements or arrangements for greater contact among military personnel of States in a region, and arrangements intended to minimize misunderstandings, especially during periods of tension.

5. The experience of the United States with regard to confidence-building measures might prove useful to other nations considering the proposal or implementation of such measures in their regions. Its experience with bilateral and multilateral confidence-building measures has been generally quite positive.

6. Bilaterally, the United States and the Soviet Union have entered into several agreements which can be considered confidence-building measures: the "Hotline" Agreement and the accidents measures agreement are examples.

7. The "Hotline" Agreement, signed on 20 June 1963, with a modernization agreement in 1971, provides for a prompt, direct communications link between the two countries and reduces the danger that accident or miscalculation might trigger a nuclear war. The United States used the "hot line" to prevent misunderstandings during the 1967 war in the Middle East. The existence of such a communication channel may be reassuring in times of tension.

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8. The Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War between the United States and the Soviet Union, signed on 30 September 1971, was an outgrowth of the SALT process. It is a pledge by both sides to take measures to improve organizational and technical safeguards and to notify each other immediately of any incident involving the possible detonation of a nuclear weapon.
9. The confidence-building measures included in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe are directed mainly at promoting openness about routine military activities by providing information on certain of them and in some cases allowing States to observe them. The confidence-building measures of the Conference seek to accomplish these objectives without impeding the ability of States to conduct routine training activities.
10. Of these confidence-building measures, only one, notification of major manoeuvres (those involving more than 25,000), is required of participating States under the provisions of the Final Act of the Conference. Other provisions, such as the invitation of observers, notification of smaller manoeuvres and major troop movements, and military exchanges, are discretionary.
11. The record of implementation for the confidence-building measures of the Conference, though it has varied from State to State, has been generally good. Since the Final Act was signed, it appears that all signatory States have complied with the requirement for prior notification of major military manoeuvres; 24 have been notified. In addition, there has been progress towards implementation of discretionary provisions. Twenty-five smaller-scale manoeuvres (those involving less than 25,000 troops) have been notified. Observers have been invited to a total of 23 major or smaller-scale manoeuvres.
12. The United States views confidence-building measures as an important part of the CSCE process. The measures have achieved some progress towards developing greater openness about military activities. The United States shares the interest of other participants in further development of confidence-building measures, both regarding their scope and effectiveness.

YUGOSLAVIA

/Original: English/

/9 July 1979/

1. Pursuant to the appeal launched by the General Assembly in resolution 33/91 B, the Government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia wishes to express its views on confidence-building and on some experiences with respect to efforts exerted in this field.
2. Yugoslavia has repeatedly explained its approach to confidence-building measures. In particular, the Yugoslav delegation to the thirty-third session of the General Assembly presented a broader view on this matter. On this occasion, Yugoslavia intends to emphasize some elements which it deems relevant to a successful completion of efforts aimed at defining concrete confidence-building measures and their implementation.

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3. The realization of the goal of general and complete disarmament and, particularly, the consistent implementation of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2) make it imperative to pursue policies and to take concrete measures for strengthening peace, international security and confidence among States, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. Confidence-building measures are an indispensable element of the global trend towards disarmament. They can be a significant means to eliminate sources of tension in the world and to favour effective disarmament.
4. Confidence-building measures are one of the elements of the political aspect of disarmament. They cover a wide range of relations that build or promote confidence and better understanding among States by acquainting one another with the character and content of activities and intentions or by refraining from the activities likely to arouse suspicion and misunderstanding. The ultimate goal is to improve the political climate at the bilateral, regional and global levels under conditions in which measures of genuine disarmament are easier to implement.
5. The Government of Yugoslavia wishes to point out again that these measures can by no means be a substitute for effective disarmament. Moreover, they should not be an excuse for the absence of genuine disarmament measures and, above all, a cover for the continuation of the arms race and intensification of military activities. Confidence-building measures are rendered possible in the context of effective efforts in the field of disarmament and elimination of other sources of mistrust between States, such as the elimination of focal points of crisis.
6. Confidence-building measures within the framework of disarmament should rest on the broadest possible foundation, while the manner of their implementation should be adapted to the realities and needs of particular regions. They will serve their purpose all the more if they encompass the field of behaviour and state of the military factor and other fields of relations and measures that favour the overcoming of conflicting situations, the solving of conflicts by peaceful means, the elimination of the focal points of crisis, the banning of war propaganda and the development of good neighbourly relations and co-operation.
7. Bearing always in mind the need for the broadest approach to the question of the building of confidence among States and peoples, the Government of Yugoslavia wishes to underline some of the concrete measures to which it attaches particular importance.

A. Information on military activities

8. Within the framework of the implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, countries participating in this Conference have developed a wide practice of notifying larger military manoeuvres and inviting foreign military observers to such manoeuvres. The Belgrade Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe assessed this practice as an effective contribution to the building of confidence and elimination of possible erroneous appraisals concerning the purpose and character of given military activities in territories of various European countries.

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9. In implementing the Helsinki document, consistently, Yugoslavia also sends notification of its larger military manoeuvres and invites foreign military observers to them. But it has gone one step further regarding the provisions of the document and it sends notification of even its smaller manoeuvres. With some of its neighbours, Yugoslavia has developed a practice of mutual notification of military manoeuvres and other activities, particularly in border regions. Such practice, as applied by a large number of countries participants in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, points to the need to extend the measures provided for under the Final Act. With a view to ensuring the continuity of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Yugoslavia will urge the amending of these measures by establishing the obligation of sending notification of larger military movements as well as naval and air force manoeuvres.

B. Restraint from military activities that can cause suspicion

10. Contemporary international relations are burdened with focal points of crisis and frequent occurrence of strained relations, which are, as a rule, followed by activities that often carry the risk of exacerbating distrust and further degrading relations. This is primarily caused by military build-ups which, in the case of large-scale military manoeuvres, have the character of a threat of force. Foreign interference in certain regions results, as a rule, in a variety of forms of military assistance and military presence. Experience has shown that such activities directed at focal points of crisis have never contributed to their appeasement, let alone to the establishment of confidence in a region. Therefore, recommendations of the international community with respect to confidence-building measures should also contain appropriate provisions on refraining from activities, particularly military activities, in areas of crisis or directed at them, activities liable to cause and deepen distrust of any party concerned, alongside with respect for the legitimate rights of every country and every people to take measures designed to defend its independence and its rights.

C. Limitation of military activities

11. Present-day military activities have assumed such intensity and such dimensions that they pose a direct threat to world peace and the security of individual regions and States, particularly of non-bloc States. Consequently, it is indispensable for the international community to limit the scope of military activities and to lessen their intensity. In that context, it is possible to envisage a series of concrete measures ranging from the setting of ceilings to military manoeuvres and movement to the prohibition of their staging, for instance, in border and other areas.

D. Thwarting of terrorist activities

12. One of the current sources of distrust and a factor of conflicting relations are the activities pursued from the territories of particular States and aimed against the integrity and internal stability of other States. Such activities assume a variety of forms, of which the most drastic is terrorist activity,

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which is prepared in the territories of certain countries and tolerated and supported by the authorities of those countries. It is conceivable that such an activity cannot but cause a deep distrust of the countries against which it is aimed. It also constitutes a flagrant violation of the fundamental principles of the Charter.

13. In this connexion, the Yugoslav Government deems that the list of confidence-building measures should contain the obligation of every country to refrain from and prevent activities, particularly terrorist activities, pursued from its territory and directed against the independence and territorial integrity of other countries, without prejudice to the rights of peoples fighting against colonialism, racist régimes, apartheid and all other forms of domination.

14. The Government of Yugoslavia feels that the adoption and implementation of these and other confidence-building measures, whether at the international or regional level, can be essential for an over-all movement towards disarmament.
