
**Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

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I. Overview

1. As a cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and a foundation for the promotion of nuclear disarmament, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has made immense contributions to maintaining and strengthening international peace and security since its entry into force in 1970 and particularly after the end of the Cold War. Its role in this respect is indispensable.
2. The review process for the 2005 Review Conference was launched smoothly at the first Preparatory Committee in 2002. Japan considers it crucial for the States Parties to the NPT to unite and take actions to deal with emerging challenges to the NPT regime, and make efforts to effectively maintain and strengthen the NPT regime toward the 2005 NPT Review Conference.
3. Japan, as the only nation to have suffered atomic bombing, continues to adhere to its “Three Non-Nuclear Principles,” of “not possessing, not producing and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan”. The successive Cabinets of Japan, including the present Koizumi cabinet, have repeatedly articulated the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles”, and there is no change in the position of the Government of Japan in that it continues to uphold these principles.
4. Japan, since its accession to the NPT, has concluded IAEA safeguards agreements as well as the IAEA additional protocol in an effort to ensure transparency of its nuclear related activities. Furthermore, in 1955, Japan promulgated “the Atomic Energy Basic Law” that requires that the utilization of Japan’s atomic energy shall be limited to peaceful purposes. These points also testify that Japan has no intent to possess nuclear weapons.

II. Nuclear disarmament

5. The NPT pursues both nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. The fact that an overwhelming majority of countries have renounced the possession of nuclear weapons is epoch-making in international efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. This achievement should be taken seriously by nuclear-weapon States. In this regard, it should be recalled that the decision in 1995 to extend the NPT indefinitely was an integral part of a package with “Principles and Objectives”, which includes the promotion of nuclear

disarmament. Nuclear-weapon States must respond to such resolute determination on the part of non-nuclear-weapon States by demonstrating tangible progress towards nuclear disarmament.

6. The international community should realize a peaceful and safe world free of nuclear weapons at the earliest date possible. It is imperative that nuclear-weapon States strengthen and continue to take disarmament measures. In recent years, concern over the increasing possibility of the use of nuclear weapons has been expressed more frequently. As the only nation which suffered atomic bombing, Japan has strongly urged that nuclear devastation never be repeated. The threshold for the use of nuclear weapons must be kept as high as possible. In this vein, Japan believes that the international community should be well informed and ever conscious of the horrendous and long-lasting consequences of the use of nuclear weapons.

7. It is necessary for States Parties, especially nuclear-weapon States, to faithfully strive to make progress in implementing the nuclear disarmament measures agreed at the 2000 Review Conference. At the General Assembly of the United Nations since 2000, Japan has been submitting a resolution entitled "A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons," which identified concrete steps that should be taken to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons, based on the agreements made at the 2000 Review Conference. It also reflected the present situation of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and strongly appealed to the international community for progress in nuclear disarmament.

A. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

8. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is an historic milestone in the promotion of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation by restricting the spread and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons. The CTBT, together with the IAEA safeguards, has a significant role as one of the major pillars of the NPT regime and is a practical and concrete measure towards realizing a nuclear-weapon-free world. Although, despite more than six years having passed since its adoption in 1996, the CTBT has not yet come into force. This lack of progress is making the future of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation less certain and it is feared the NPT regime may be negatively affected.

9. In response to the Final Declaration of the Second Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT in 2001, the countries that have not yet signed or ratified the CTBT, especially those whose ratification is a requirement for its entry into force, are strongly urged to do so at the earliest possible date. It is also important that efforts to establish a nuclear-test-ban verification regime undertaken by CTBTO will continuously be made, including the International Monitoring System (IMS), and that necessary budget will be ensured to establish such a regime.

10. Japan considers the early entry into force of the CTBT extremely important, and has worked actively to this aim. As a part of the establishment of the International Monitoring System (IMS), Japan launched the construction of domestic monitoring facilities last year and has established the CTBT National Operation System of Japan.

11. On September 14, 2002, Ms. Yoriko Kawaguchi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, together with the Foreign Ministers of Australia and of the Netherlands, co-chaired the Friends of the CTBT Foreign Ministers' Meeting, in which the Ministers of States that had ratified the CTBT met in New York and issued the Joint Ministerial Statement. This statement included a call for signing and ratifying the CTBT as early as possible. To date, Foreign Ministers from

over 50 countries have associated themselves with the Joint Statement. Japan strongly hopes that many more States will sign and ratify the CTBT in view of the third Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT, which will take place in September 2003.

12. Japan firmly believes that, pending the entry into force of the CTBT, all countries should maintain their political will to continue their moratoriums on nuclear-test explosions. Also, it must be recalled again that in paragraph 3 of its resolution 1172 (1998), the Security Council called on all countries to refrain from carrying out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion in accordance with the provisions of the CTBT.

B. Fissile material cut-off treaty

13. It is truly regrettable that, despite the conclusion of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) has not yet commenced negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT). Such negotiations must be commenced without delay. All states, including nuclear-weapon States, should maintain their political will to continue their moratoriums on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, pending the entry into force of the FMCT. The fact remains valid that the FMCT is an important measure for promoting nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Furthermore, the delay in entry into force of the CTBT should not justify the delay in commencement of the negotiations on FMCT.

14. Japan, which considers reaching agreement on a programme of work at the CD and the early commencement of negotiations of FMCT as primal tasks, has been making its utmost efforts to break the current stalemate of the CD. Dr. Kuniko Inoguchi, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Japan to the Conference of Disarmament, also reiterated the importance of early commencement of the negotiations on FMCT in her speech delivered at the CD. As a part of Japan's effort to promote early commencement of negotiations on FMCT, Japan hosted a workshop titled "Promoting Verification in Multilateral Arms Control Treaties" in March 2003 in Geneva.

C. Reduction of nuclear weapons in the United States and Russia

15. Japan welcomes the progress achieved by the nuclear-weapon States on reduction of their nuclear weapons, including the completion of the reductions of strategic offensive weapons according to the START I Treaty, the measures for unilateral reduction and the recent signing of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions between Russia and the United States, which should serve as a step for further nuclear disarmament.

16. Japan highly values the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions signed by the United States and the Russian Federation as guaranteeing, in a legally binding form, the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons which the U.S. and Russia had already respectively declared, and hopes that ratification by the U.S. will soon be followed by that of Russia and that the two Parties will soon put it into effect. Japan hopes that the other nuclear-weapon States will undertake, unilaterally or through negotiations, further reductions of their nuclear arsenals, without waiting for the implementation of reductions to be undertaken by the United States and Russia.

D. Non-strategic nuclear weapons

17. It is imperative for all states that possess non-strategic nuclear weapons to undertake measures to reduce them, while maintaining transparency, in accordance with the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Reducing non-strategic nuclear weapons is crucially important in terms of regional and international security, as well as non-proliferation and counter-terrorism. Furthermore, Japan hopes that the U.S. and the Russian Federation implement their initiatives on the reduction of their non-strategic nuclear forces completely and on a voluntary basis, as declared in 1991-1992, and provide data on the status of implementation of these initiatives.

E. Assistance for denuclearization in Former Soviet States

18. Japan considers that making one practical and concrete step after another is the only way to realize a peaceful and safe world free of nuclear weapons at the earliest possible date. Thus, Japan has been actively taking the following practical measures.

19. In June 2002, Japan announced it would make a contribution amounting to a little more than 200 million US dollars for the time being, 100 million of which would be allocated to the disposition program of Russian surplus weapon-grade plutonium, and the rest to other projects such as the dismantlement of nuclear submarines. Japan has already extended assistance to Russia by providing a floating facility for liquid radioactive waste treatment. Japan and Russia are currently engaged in a project for dismantling a Victor III class decommissioned nuclear submarine. A joint research program between Japanese and Russian research institutes also brought success in disposing of approximately 20 kg of weapon-grade plutonium.

(International Science and Technology Center (ISTC))

20. Japan signed the “Agreement for the Establishment of the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC)” in 1992, and has been actively supporting the project since the inauguration of the ISTC head office in Moscow in March 1994.

F. Reporting

21. The submission by all States Parties of reports on the implementation of article VI of the NPT, one of the thirteen practical disarmament steps agreed in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, is an important step in nuclear disarmament. Japan believes that specific methods of reporting should continuously be discussed. In particular, it is necessary to ensure that nuclear-weapon States report on their progress in implementing nuclear disarmament and on their future policies.

III. Non-proliferation

A. Strengthening of the commitment to the NPT and the IAEA safeguards

22. Japan attaches great importance to maintaining the reliability and effectiveness of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and strengthening the capability of the IAEA to detect non-compliance with its safeguards agreements under the NPT. In this respect, the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference recommends, among others, a possible plan of action to promote and facilitate the conclusion and entry into force of the IAEA safeguards

agreements and additional protocols. Japan strongly supports this recommendation and believes that it is an urgent task to promote the universalization of the Additional Protocol.

23. In view of the importance of the universalization of the Additional Protocol, Japan took part in formulating the "Plan of Action", hosted the *International Symposium for Further Reinforcement of IAEA Safeguards in the Asia-Pacific Region* in June 2001 and the *International Conference on Wider Adherence to Strengthened IAEA Safeguards* in December 2002 in cooperation with the IAEA, and contributed financial and human resources to a series of regional seminars.

24. The latest *International Conference* aimed at consolidating the outcomes of the regional seminars from a global perspective and succeeded in providing participants with the opportunity to recognize the importance of the IAEA safeguards and consider concrete steps toward the universalization of the Additional Protocol. At this Conference, the participating governments agreed that impartial and critical inspections are a cornerstone of the NPT regime and that the IAEA should be given the authority to provide the international community with credible assurances, not only on the non-diversion of declared nuclear material, but also on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. The participants also expressed their hope that all States that had signed, but not yet ratified, additional protocols - notably, the remaining nuclear-weapon States and EU member states - redouble their efforts to finalize their national ratification procedures promptly in order to maintain political momentum.

25. The Additional Protocol can play a pivotal role in strengthening international non-proliferation regime and increase the transparency of States' nuclear related activities, by providing the IAEA with the enhanced ability to, *inter alia*, verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Japan hopes that the States Parties will identify the need that the Additional Protocol be universalized as soon as possible.

26. In addition, Japan firmly believes that the more advanced nuclear technology a State has, the more responsibility and transparency it should have in its peaceful use of nuclear energy. In the light of this belief, Japan calls upon all countries with advanced nuclear technologies, such as fuel cycle technology, to discharge their responsibility by, among others, concluding the Additional Protocol.

27. In this regard, Japan has closely followed with concern the development of Iranian nuclear programmes and, in particular, its new nuclear facilities recently made public. Japan views that, since uranium enrichment and heavy water production could easily be diverted to the manufacture of nuclear weapons, a country which possesses plants or technologies related to uranium enrichment and heavy water production should bear a heavy responsibility for achieving a high level of transparency in its nuclear activities. In this respect, Japan calls on Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA, conclude the Additional Protocol as a matter of priority, and ensure high transparency commensurate with the level of its nuclear activities, while appreciating as a positive step its recent revision of the Subsidiary Arrangement to the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA.

B. Management and Disposition of Russian surplus weapon-grade plutonium

28. A significant amount of nuclear material including weapon-grade plutonium has been withdrawn from dismantled nuclear weapons as a result of ongoing nuclear disarmament

efforts by the U.S. and Russia. It is an urgent task to prevent such material from being reused for military purposes or proliferated to a third country or terrorist group in view of counter-terrorism. In this regard, Japan announced in June last year that it would contribute 100 million US dollars to the disposition program of Russian surplus weapon-grade plutonium.

C. Export control

29. International export control frameworks for nuclear related materials and technologies, i.e., the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Zangger Committee (ZC), play a pivotal role in ensuring the implementation of paragraph 2 of Article III of the NPT by the States Parties. The coordinated export control policy, in line with common guidelines of the NSG and the ZC, and their outreach activities are of great significance for the effective deterrence and prevention of proliferation from the supply side. In this respect, Japan urges that the roles of the NSG and the ZC be explicitly endorsed in the NPT review process towards the 2005 Review Conference as important mechanisms to help ensure the strict and compliance with the NPT.

30. Japan, considering such significance of both regimes in connection with the NPT, has been actively taking part in their endeavors, by acting as the Point of Contact of the NSG, for instance. Japan calls for a redoubling of efforts of the international community towards the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction through the strengthening and reaffirming of strict export regulations to control related items that may contribute to the development of nuclear weapons.

31. Furthermore, so as to complement nuclear non-proliferation efforts, it is necessary for the international community, as a whole, to prevent proliferation of the means of delivery of nuclear materials. In this regard, Japan highly values the successful launch in November 2002 of the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC) as an important step, and is determined to take part in the universalization process of the ICOC by promoting dialogues with non-participating states.

D. Measures against nuclear terrorism

32. Through a series of terrorist events since 11 September 2001, the international community has renewed its awareness of the real and imminent threat of the acquisition by terrorists of nuclear material and nuclear weapons. In order to prevent nuclear terrorism, the international community must cooperate at national, regional and international levels, and exert individual and collective efforts in relation to exchanges of information, border control and physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities. In this respect, Japan welcomes the current efforts to strengthen the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM).

33. The IAEA also has an essential role in this area. At the IAEA Board of Governors meeting in March 2002, Japan announced that it would contribute half a million US dollars to the Agency's Nuclear Security Fund and called upon other Member States of the Agency to make their contributions as well. In the context of nuclear terrorism, Japan acknowledges that the *International Conference on the Security of Radioactive Sources*, held in Vienna in March this year, successfully drew international attention, as the safe and secure management of radioactive sources is also of extreme importance. Japan hopes that the international community will devote its available resources to efforts to tighten the management of

radiation sources in line with the Major Findings issued by the said International Conference and the *Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources* endorsed by IAEA Member States. Furthermore, Japan encourages the IAEA to continue its efforts in line with the *Action Plan for the Safety and Security of Radiation Sources* and its revision.

34. Japan is certain that the Additional Protocol can play a substantial role in preventing such sensitive materials from falling into the hands of terrorists because it provides a reporting mechanism on the export and import of nuclear materials and equipment. The conclusion of the Additional Protocol should therefore be promoted in order to contribute to anti-terrorism efforts.

IV. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

35. The steady use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is vital, not only to securing a stable energy supply, but also to preventing global warming. Japan, as a State Party to the NPT, has enjoyed and promoted the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Japan aims at implementing the use of plutonium for light water reactors and establishing a nuclear fuel cycle through the utilization of fast breeder reactor technology. Japan is also pursuing the research and development of innovative reactor technologies that would be safer, more efficient, as well as more diversion and proliferation resistant, and that it would help to extend the scope of the use of nuclear energy to new areas such as hydrogen production.

36. In promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy, Japan fully complies with the IAEA safeguards agreement, including its Additional Protocol, and ensures transparency in its nuclear activities, including in the use of plutonium. At the same time, Japan gives the highest priority to the safety of its nuclear activities and facilities. In this connection, Japan believes the convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management are of great importance and urges those countries that have not yet concluded these Conventions to do so as soon as possible. The Japanese Government has submitted the Joint Convention to the Diet for ratification, and hopes that the First Review Meeting on the Joint Convention, which is scheduled to take place in November in Vienna, will enhance the safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste management globally. Furthermore, Japan recognizes the important role of the IAEA in strengthening the global "safety culture" through the foundation of guidelines for safety and training, and will continue to make contributions to the Agency's activities.

37. Japan is making positive contributions towards promoting international cooperation in the area of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, considering Article IV of the NPT. Japan acknowledges the remarkable role of the IAEA not only in the area of power generation, but also in fields of medicine, agriculture, food, sanitary and water resources and will continue to make contributions to the Agency's activities in these fields, in the hope that such activities would help promote better public understanding of the peaceful use of nuclear technology.

38. The safe and smooth transport of radioactive materials is a prerequisite for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Radioactive material transport has been conducted in line with the right of navigation established in international law with the most prudent precautionary measures taken to ensure safety in conformity with the international standards set by credible international organizations such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the IAEA. In addition, information on radioactive transport has been, and will be, made available to relevant states to the maximum possible extent on the basis of the full consideration of the

physical protection and safety and smooth implementation of such transport. Japan notes with satisfaction last year's IAEA General Assembly resolution GC (46)/RES/9 that welcomes such practice of shipping states in this area. In this regard, Japan also hopes that the International Conference on the Safety of Transport of Radioactive Material, to be organized by the IAEA in July, will facilitate mutual understanding among states concerned about transport safety, fulfilling its objectives from a technical view-point within the IAEA mandate.

V. Universality and non-compliance

A. Universality

39. Japan welcomes the fact that, in November 2002, Cuba deposited its instrument of accession to the NPT, thereby becoming the 188th Party. Japan believes that Cuba's recent accession should lead to further strengthening of the NPT regime. NPT has attained almost worldwide universality. In 1998, the NPT regime was challenged from outside in the form of nuclear weapon test explosions conducted by India and Pakistan, but at the 2000 Review Conference, the States Parties made clear that these two countries would not receive new nuclear-weapon State status or any special status whatsoever. Japan continues to urge these two countries to join the NPT as non-nuclear weapon States, to sign and ratify the CTBT, and to give their utmost consideration to the problem of nuclear proliferation. Lack of progress in the establishment of a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone in the Middle East poses a serious problem for the credibility of the NPT. Strenuous efforts should be maintained to urge early accession to the NPT by the remaining Non-Party States such as India, Israel and Pakistan.

40. Japan wishes to inform all NPT Members, with great pleasure, that, in response to Japan's request for their early accession to the NPT, His Excellency Dr. Ramos Horta, Senior Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Timor-Leste, advised us on 23 April, on the occasion of his official visit to Japan, that preparation is well under way and that it will join the NPT in due time.

B. Non-compliance

41. With regard to problems associated with compliance of the NPT, Japan is deeply concerned about the steps taken by North Korea. Japan is firmly convinced that the erosion of the credibility of multilateral disarmament treaties such as the NPT is not in the interest of any Member States.

42. As the international community today is confronted with multiple uncertainties and difficulties in security matters, Japan strongly calls upon North Korea to show its political will to co-operate with the international community in reducing the uncertainties and in increasing mutual confidence by taking concrete actions. Japan cannot accept, by any means, any development, transfer, acquisition or possession of nuclear weapons by North Korea. Japan strongly urges North Korea to comply with all its obligations under the NPT and, consequently, obligations under the safeguards agreement with the IAEA, to refreeze its nuclear related facilities and to take prompt actions to dismantle its whole nuclear weapons program in a verifiable and irreversible manner.

43. Japan welcomes efforts made by all countries concerned, including the pivotal role played by China for the trilateral meeting held from 23rd to 25th April 2003 in Beijing. Japan is now carefully studying the result of this meeting. Japan believes that this issue should continue to

be dealt with multilaterally, with the early participation of the concerned countries, including Japan and the Republic of Korea. Japan believes that there exists a strong common interest among all those concerned in urging North Korea to take necessary actions to de-escalate and improve the situation, and to engage in talks with countries concerned in a responsible, forthcoming and constructive manner. The international community should endeavour to resolve this problem peacefully so that we are able to tell future generations that our political will and concerted efforts can make a profound difference in the security environments of mankind in the 21st century.

44. Japan believes it is of utmost importance that the issue of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq should definitely be resolved with proper international involvement. Japan also considers it crucial that the future Government of Iraq adheres to all relevant non-proliferation agreements in order to prove its willingness to behave as a responsible member of the international community.

VI. Nuclear-weapon-free-zones and negative security assurance

A. Nuclear-weapon-free zones

45. Japan supports the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the regions concerned and on the condition that the establishment of such zones would contribute to regional stability and security. In particular, Japan appreciates the efforts made by the countries of Central Asia to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region as contributing to the prevention of nuclear terrorism.

46. Japan hopes that satisfying conclusions for all concerned states will be reached at the consultation between five nuclear-weapon States and five countries of Central Asia and that such an outcome will be recognized as a new achievement in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. In this view, Japan has been supporting the work of the Department of Disarmament Affairs of the Secretariat of the U.N. in establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia.

B. Negative security assurances

47. It is important to consider and discuss security assurances for non-nuclear weapon States of the NPT, based on Security Council resolution 984 (1995) as well as the relevant declarations of nuclear-weapon States. From this viewpoint, Japan supports the idea that a programme of work, containing the establishment of an ad hoc committee on negative security assurances, will be agreed upon at the Conference on Disarmament.

VII. Strengthening dialogue with civil society and future generations

48. In order to advance disarmament and non-proliferation, it is essential to gain the understanding and support of young people who will lead future generations, as well as civil society as a whole.

49. Stressing the importance of education on disarmament and non-proliferation for future generations, Japan welcomes the report of the Secretary General associated with the Group of Governmental Experts to the General Assembly, which includes recommendations requesting member states to promote disarmament and non-proliferation education. In an effort to realize

the recommendations in the report Japan has been making efforts, including inviting a disarmament educator from overseas.

50. In this regard, over the past 20 years, Japan has invited about 450 United Nations disarmament fellows to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, providing these young people who will be responsible for future disarmament diplomacy with the opportunity to understand the tragic devastation and long-lasting consequences caused by atomic bombs. Japan intends to continue to make such efforts.

51. A regional disarmament conference is also an effective means to enhance awareness of the issue of disarmament in regions concerned. Every year, Japan sponsors a United Nations conference on disarmament in a local city, providing a valuable opportunity for distinguished disarmament experts, not only from the Asia and Pacific region, but also from around the world, to engage in useful discussions. Japan welcomes that the UN Disarmament Conference sponsored by the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs will be held in Osaka in August this year.

52. Japan attaches importance to the constructive role played by civil society in promoting nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. In view of importance of dialogues with non-governmental organizations, which play a significant role in civil society, Japan appreciates that, on the basis of the agreement at the 2000 Review Conference, a non-governmental organization session is being held during this session of the Preparatory Committee.
