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Yale-UN Oral History Project

Robert Gallucci
James Sutterlin, Interviewer
February 3, 1998
Washington, DC

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James Sutterlin: Mr. Gallucci, it is a pleasure to welcome you to the Yale Oral History program. The subject today is UNSCOM in Iraq, and I'd like to start by asking you how you first became associated with this operation.

Robert Gallucci: I was teaching at the National War College and on assignment from the Department of State. I was first asked to leave classes to help draft what became UN Security Council Resolution 687. I did that, I worked with a lot of other people drafting that Resolution, and then I was asked if I wouldn't...

JS: In New York?

RG: Well, the drafting was in Washington, and it was a struggle back and forth with Tom Pickering who was our ambassador at the UN acting as the US Advocate. We went back and forth with the text, we were negotiating with the French, and particularly with the British and the others, until we ended up with Resolution 687. Then, of course, it was a matter of getting it passed, and I was asked to go up to New York and work with Ambassador Pickering to help with its passage, and I did that. Then, they asked if I

would help with the establishment of the Commission. I would make a point here, which I think as people look back they may miss, that nobody knew what the Special Commission was. The Resolution had few words, so when I said “to establish a Commission” this will shock, I am afraid, Americans who assume that people in government know more than they know sometimes. I wasn’t sure what a UN Commission was, exactly. I knew there were a lot of commissions, but this one was very operational, as I looked at the text that we had all produced. It was supposed to do a bunch of things on the ground in a country that had just lost a war and been bombed. So, I didn’t have an image of a lot of people in three-piece suits as a commission.

Interestingly, nobody had an image that I could find, neither those of us that were involved with drafting, nor when I went to see the people [who were] responsible for this in the Secretariat who ran the disarmament portion of the UN under Mr. Akashi, who became well-known later on in the Bosnian context and the Cambodian context.

Anyway, we had to figure this out, whole-cloth, make it up. And when I talked to the people in the disarmament area, they had a rather, what I thought, bizarre view, which was of a geographically balanced commission. They would have the developing world and others represented, and do what the UN normally does, that is, create kind of a New York City political party ticket, a “balanced” ticket. I said, “This might work for a bunch of overseers, but not for the executive arm of this entity; to do this stuff, it would have to be something else.” So that was one issue that I ended up... I think ‘negotiating’ is the right word. And the second was who exactly would be the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission, and who would be the deputy Executive Chairman of the Special Commission.

I can't actually remember too clearly, nor probably should I, exactly what transpired at that meeting, putting myself, as the US government wished me to, forward to the UN as the Deputy Executive Chairman, and the process by which the United States worked with others to develop support for Ambassador Ekéus, who as I recall would actually be named by the Secretary-General. But that process went on in its own special little way, and Ambassador Ekéus was the first choice of the United States, and he was indeed named. I first met Ekéus at the UN Plaza hotel, across the street from the UN; we met for coffee, I think, and then walked across the street to the UN to see what there was of the offices. I strongly suspected that there would be nothing, and indeed I was quite wrong -- there was something, there was a secretary, who is still there, by the way, the secretary to the Executive Chairman, and Derek Boothby was assigned to us from the Disarmament group. That was pretty much it. However, the assignment for this Swedish diplomat, myself, one staffer, and one secretary, was to disarm Iraq. In retrospect, it is quite funny. We didn't think it was so funny when the first press call came in that day, as we were sitting around the little room with glass partitions, someone from the press asking when our first mission to Iraq would begin. Now, you might think, at this point, that the US government would simply step into the breach, since it had played such a leading role in the coalition, in forming the coalition and fighting the war, and in helping to draft and design Resolution 687 and the Commission itself.

JS: So, the Special Commission was a US idea?

RG: I can't say that right at this moment. I might be able to go back and try to find that out. But at this moment, the language I remember fighting over in the Special Commission had to do a great deal with what would be the real objectives, the standards we would have in the resolution with respect to weapons of mass destruction, what role the IAEA would play, how the Security Council would relate to the IAEA and the nuclear sub-group, all those kinds of things. And I don't remember, actually, the language creating the Special Commission. Others will, I'm sure.

In any event, the point I wanted to get to was that it was not the view of the United States government that this was now their job. It was an interesting reaction I got when I called back to Washington, saying "Well, we're here, we're ready to spearhead the US government when it comes in," which is kind of the model in my mind -- I had no idea how to put this together. The reaction of many, particularly in the Department of Defense, was, "We gave at the office. It is now the time for the international community, 'others;' we have no budget, no intention of doing any of this." So, it was a long, long way from the three of us, four of us, I guess, counting the secretary, sitting around trying to figure out how we would get teams together, where we would get assets, how we would get funded, how we would know what to do when we got there. There wasn't any US government coming in to help us out. That's how I got there.

JS: And so, how did you solve that?

RG: A lot of things happened, somewhat simultaneously. Rolf and I made the rounds within the UN. The UN's idea, interestingly, was to put the Special Commission some

five or six blocks away from the headquarters, to keep it as far away as possible. Pérez de Cuéllar was not particularly taken with having this under his wing. And, he had many more important things to do in this thirty-eight story building than a little Special Commission to disarm Iraq. We argued he had *nothing* more important to do in that building, and we were the last people who should be blocks away. So, the first thing was fighting within the UN system to get some space, to get some staff. We asked for a lawyer, a reasonable thing since we were going to have to start drafting things right away, and Legal Offices said no. Legal Offices said, “You rely on us. We are a few floors downstairs from where your office is, and you’ll just come down when you need us and we’ll put you in the queue with the other work we have to do.” So, we went off and we hired a retired legal advisor for the United Nations. We wanted to get someone out in the field right away. And [there were] the little things, like how to get to Iraq, since no one was allowed to fly in -- where would we fly from? So, we got a Romanian charter aircraft. But then nobody would go anyplace near target inspection sites, because they would have been bombed. So we needed EOD people, explosives ordinance disposal, because every place we wanted to go we had bombed, and there would be unexploded munitions. Where would we get EOD? I asked the US government for EOD, and they said, “We gave.” So, we went to private firms for EOD people. We also begged some of the other governments, first the Germans, for EOD people. Then, of course, when we went to the private firms, they said, “We aren’t going anywhere without insurance.” And we went on the private insurance market to buy insurance for the people who were going in. And then the question was “Where would we get our experts?” We were particularly interested in the nuclear issue, to get on that right away. I rapidly recognized that I

needed a few more connections, and I took -- I begged and got -- Mary Ryan, who was a wonderful Foreign Service officer in the State Department. Ultimately, she would be replaced by one of the most talented military officers I have come across, US Army Colonel Doug Englund, to be Chief of Operations. First Mary did this for a few weeks, then Doug came down. And we got the Department of Energy to get us some nuclear experts from Livermore Labs out in California.

Early on, we figured out something, which I don't think people now quite understand. These teams have to be a mix of experts who know the technical side of weapons systems and how they are put together, and people who are sort of operationally capable. Particularly in the early days, the 'operationally capable' was a big deal, because this was not a pleasant environment to work in. By 'pleasant' I first mean we were starting these inspections, the first one went off in May in Iraq, and normally in May and June temperatures are well over 100 degrees, so you need people who aren't going to fall over from heat exhaustion. On my first mission out there, which was in June, I had someone literally fall over on me, an EOD person. So it was not a pleasant place. And the Iraqis made it even more unpleasant. So you had to put these teams together. We did this through other governments and through the United States government, quite grudgingly.

I am leaving something very, very important out, and that is of course, how we decided where we were going to go. It did not take a rocket scientist, although it did for some of the work on the SCUDS, but it did not take a rocket scientist to figure out that we would not get very far if we stuck to the Iraqi declarations, which they knew and I knew from intelligence, were lies.

JS: You knew that from the beginning?

RG: I knew that... the chemical declaration, I didn't know, a) because at that point I wasn't particularly up on the Iraqi CW program, although trust me, eventually I was, I wasn't initially. I knew a bunch about the nuclear program and I knew that their declaration was inaccurate, and 'inaccurate' would be a nice word [for it], in that nuclear area. About BW I knew nothing, and about SCUDS I knew little.

JS: Did Ekéus have better knowledge of these things?

RG: No, Rolf had no knowledge, to my knowledge, of any of those things, except CW, which was an area he had worked in at the CD, and he knew CW pretty well, interestingly, but he knew it as a diplomat. He knew a lot of people in the CW world, and he was hooked into the disarmament world and to the Europeans extremely well. What Rolf brought to the operation was brains -- and diplomacy. I mean, he was extraordinary, I think, from the very early days of set-up right up to the moment he walked out the door. That is an incredible -- when we get to the politics of that high-wire act -- to pull off. I have nothing but respect for the way he did it.

So, the intelligence. The intelligence community in the US government was initially, I think the word for it, someplace between hostile and non-communicative on assisting the Special Commission. However, they did have the view that it is possible that the Special Commission might be of some help to them. The idea that they would

pass information to us that they regarded as at all sensitive, was hilarious. However, that if we managed to get in on the ground and walk around, then they would like to talk to us; if we got out, that's another matter. There was some interest in debriefing. We had to flip that. This was a very long, slow process, or it seemed that way to me. It probably was not more than some two or three months before the intelligence community made a 180 degree turn and set up support for the Special Commission.

JS: That is the US intelligence community?

RG: The US intelligence community. We had a lot of consultation with our colleagues in Europe, particularly the British, but not only. Now, we are... I would love to tell you all about the intelligence connection and physically what was done, but my instinct tells me I can't. But that's too bad, because some day that needs to be explained. One of the things that I would love for Americans to understand about intelligence is that once you accept the nature of the world and one particular approach to international affairs, it can be very useful, it can be very important to our security. It's important, I think, that the international community understands that the United Nations, if it is going to undertake missions like this, is going to have to figure out ways of working with intelligence communities. This is not all obvious. The whole idea, to many in the UN, that there is a link between the Special Commission, a UN entity, and the intelligence communities of France and Britain and Germany and the United States, and Russia, and to go on, is I think probably utterly unacceptable, and we never put that forward as a concept. But it would have been obvious, I think, to anyone who gave it a moment's thought, that there

was no way to know where to go on these inspection trips if we did not have intelligence. And the intelligence link, even in the field, if you could imagine -- and I am not leaving anything out -- when we arrived in Baghdad we sort of had no place to go. I mean, except the hotel. We had no transportation for the first missions. We were using Iraqi buses. I mean, it took us a while to convince, I believe, the Norwegians to give us vehicles that we could ride around in, to get communications equipment installed. We used to communicate, I don't know if people who know about these things, by book codes -- two people have the same books.

JS: Pads?



RG: You can use a dime-store novel, which is what we used, if you don't have a pad. We had no instruments of intelligence. So [we would put] one guy here, and those of us out the field, and we had the same book, that takes a long time to say "hello mom" using that system, so this was not the ideal way of communicating.

JS: So, that was all you had when you went into...?

RG: Yeah, initially that's all we had. I mean, eventually Motorola made commercially available telephones in which you can speak securely. But then, of course, the other end, where you are speaking has to be secure, and that doesn't help you. I mean, you can listen pretty good under those circumstances. So, there's all kinds of... And we had lots of reason to believe that the Iraqis were very interested in finding out where we were

going to go the next morning, and suspected that they were working on us not only when we were in Baghdad, and also when we were in New York. And by the way, I also left out a very interesting step in this: we couldn't, as the military like to say, "stage" from New York into Baghdad. We needed a place to stage, so we needed to convince, and we did, the Bahrainis to let us stage from Bahrain, and that has been, and remains, critical for the Special Commission to operate. It took a lot of courage to get on those Romanian charter planes; even the EOD people weren't happy about that. They would much rather disarm a bomb than fly in those airplanes, and I don't blame them. We eventually got the Germans to provide us with fixed-wing aircraft, and then ultimately rotary-wing craft on the ground to help us move around. I mean, by the time I left, and I left ten months after start-up, in February of 1992, we had gone from absolutely no support on the ground, that is, requiring the Iraqis to drive us around, and they would cause us all kinds of havoc, and put us in physical danger, particularly people who were vulnerable to heat, any number of times. Going from that situation to being able to sustain ourselves in the parking lot when we were held there in September, in a very few number of months we had our own vehicles. We went in with MREs and our own water, so we had food and water and we could sit in the parking lot for a week, we could have sat there longer -- I mean, not happily, but we could have if necessary. So, building up a logistical capability to support the inspections, getting the intelligence, and continuing to maintain the political support in order to overcome Iraqi resistance, which was relatively constant, was a real trial.

JS: Now, the UN has a field service. That was not available to you?

RG: We used elements of the field service. When you look at the UN, and I talk sometimes to UN people, even Kofi some, about how we can change the image of the UN, which is not altogether positive in the United States, have them look at the field service. If Americans could see what UN Field Service people do, they would be very impressed. These are folks who go to disasters and do all kinds of wonderful things and put their lives at risk, and they are professional international civil servants. We had some wonderful folks, particularly our communicators, who ran our TAC-SACs so we could communicate, these came from New Zealand; we had a doctor, some of the medical people were New Zealanders. So, the Field Service helped us in a number of ways, but they did not take us on as a mission. We kind of plugged them into what we were doing. And there was always also this funny problem of who could have access to what information. Actually whoever was leading a team would get certain information, and have to figure out with whom he could share it and how he would manage that information, which was difficult. So, this was not a Field Service operation.

JS: I wanted to ask about that, but let me first say that if there are parts or things that you want to say that you feel should not be made generally available, they can be restricted and not released for whatever amount of time you want.

RG: My hesitation, and I will tell you that there is nothing I've done in my twenty-one years of government service that is anywhere near as interesting as some of the elements of this, including the Korean negotiation. But the most interesting parts go to the most sensitive parts, and I at one point asked whether there was any interest, when I was an

Assistant Secretary, asked whether there was any interest in the US government in having this declassified or put out, even in a very positive sort of way, so that people could understand how intelligence could be used constructively against somebody who had been identified, one of the very few people on earth, as an enemy, Saddam Hussein. The answer was no. And so I have not written about this; I have not spoken about it. Those of us who were involved, particularly with that operation, UNSCOM-16 the “parking lot tour” as we liked to call it -- let me say a word about that: if you would think about those of us who spent a large portion of our careers worrying about the proliferation of nuclear weapons, actually finding the designs to make a weapon in a country that insisted it had no nuclear program, finding those boxes of documents labeled “top secret” by the Iraqis, the excitement of that and how that came to happen, is a wonderful story. And the operational character of that story, that we actually took down that building, is wonderful, and there’s virtually nothing about that that I can say that isn’t out already. When the time comes, I would talk to the people, I mean David Kay was key to that mission, a number of other people, at Los Alamos; there were people involved who could tell great stories.

JS: Well, I’ll come back to probe you to see what you can say on that, because I have seen the film. I’ve read the descriptions, and I was fascinated by the question of how you knew which boxes to look at, and did you have enough Arabic speaking people to identify things?

RG: You should have questions about that kind of stuff; I can answer those questions explicitly. That's not a problem

JS: Let me go, first though, go back to what you're saying about the organization, because there are some things there that are especially UN, in a way. Normally there's a tremendous problem about money, about paying for things when you start up something. You got started pretty quickly. How did you do that? Where did you find the money?

RG: I hope Rolf remembers. We were given... we had a budget of some kind, and we kept begging to get more, and I think the US government, particularly, put money into that pot. But exactly, and I remember the kind of \$10 or 11 million figure -- it was around there -- and we would just spend and then, and we had this sequence, even in those first ten months, and then afterwards and going and saying "in another six weeks we'll have to stop operations, we can't fund a mission."

JS: But that actually did not hold you up. The lack of money did not hold you up?

RG: No. I'd say no. We kept getting... see, one thing that happened, and you always have to be sensitive to the politics here [or] the story doesn't make any sense. I think if the Commission hadn't been, immediately had resistance from the Iraqis, and pressed... this image is very clear in mind, of the nuclear mission where we were physically pushed around a bit by the Iraqis, when we were looking for the EMIS program, and we had very good intelligence on where to look and they blocked us from going to the site. We went

up to some high ground, took some pictures, and when they blocked us I said, "I'm going to go back," and David was with Mauricio Zifferero, who was the agency person, David was on a trip, Mauricio was his superior, and I said "I'm going to go back and make the political case that they are obstructing the inspections." While I was off, going back, David led, it was principally David, a sort of very cowboy-like activity, which was essential to funding. I mean, they went and they had trucks chasing trucks, and the Iraqis fired in the air, and this all made wonderful newspaper stories. Wholly apart from all that, that was all, in my view, essential to everybody recognizing, to keeping this issue before the public so that we could not be let down. And, as soon as that kind of thing happened, it was clear the Iraqis were doing, actually, sort of obstructing this small group of unarmed people from the UN who were supposed to go in and inspect. That, I think, provided the basis for the political support that gave the financial support to the Special Commission, so that it was easier to get the assets. And I think, also, for the intelligence community, that was one thing that opened them up. "Hey, these guys are actually going to push! We tell them where to go and they don't walk away." So the intelligence community came forward and so did the funding.

JS: Now, this question of intelligence from US sources has consistently been a problem at the UN because they don't trust the UN. You said you were able to overcome that within a certain amount of time. Was that by giving assurances on, for instance, the restrictive measures in the distribution of the intelligence?

RG: I can't say that I overcame, or that at any point we overcame, the mistrust within the intelligence community of the ability of the UN to keep secrets, because I don't trust the UN to keep secrets, so I wouldn't try to convince them! What we wanted to convince the community of, was that we could play by whatever rules they needed so long as some of us got the information and we could guide the missions, that we would, you know, put in place whatever control mechanisms they needed. I pointed out that I maintained all my clearances and I worked for the US government; I wasn't even seconded to the UN, I was *assigned* to the UN. The US government was paying my salary. So I said, you know, "I should be able to have this intelligence. You should be able to tell me where the teams have to go, and you should be able to trust the Chairman, the Executive Chairman." And so we had Doug Englund, an active duty US colonel, as Chief of Operations, so we put enough Americans and people who were from NATO countries and that sort of thing, to make them feel OK about this. They still, with very good cause, were nervous about exactly what was provided, because this was very current intelligence. It wasn't going to help us a lot to know what happened last year. If they were moving something while we were on the ground, and we had a team out there, and they were going to tell us about it, they put an asset at risk if we seemed to be responding to that and the Iraqis figure out, you know, that that is happening. So, I don't know that we ever overcame this; I think that we worked with it, and we got sufficient confidence from them that they would provide the help we needed.

JS: One other question on the organizational side -- the Commission had twenty-one members, and you just mentioned the selection. How were they selected?

RG: Ah! Well, a little arrangement that I worked out with Mr. Akashi was that he could have, not complete, but virtually complete freedom to use his “UN sense” to shape a Commission that would garner support within the United Nations, provided that the executive element, that which was under the Executive Chairman, Rolf Ekéus, and he could shape the instrument of the inspections himself. Then the Commission would oversee what we were about. The Commission would be composed of the people from these countries. We did ask that we not be silly about this. In other words, since we were dealing with weapons of mass destruction in this Commission, countries that had no knowledge of any of these things sending us people as Commissioners might not make much sense. So it was good, for example, that if Japan is paying and Japan has a self-defense force and there are people there who understand about chemical weapons if not missiles, that’s fine. But there would be some countries that would be able to contribute nothing, in terms of a knowledgeable Commissioner, so we asked, as he sought balance, that he be sensitive to that. And he was.

Rolf used the Commission, I think, in a very savvy political way. We had the Commission come and meet, and we briefed them on everything we were doing. We tried to make sure they felt informed and supportive so that they would do what we hoped they would do in the UN and back in their own governments. He would keep them in town for a couple of days, at my recollection...

JS: “In town” meaning New York?

RG: In New York. And sometimes if a government had nominated a Commissioner who was really savvy, and I think the Brits did this and the Aussies did that, he would ask them to stay for six months, instead of two days, and say, "Could you kind of join the executive portion of our operation for a while?" So we got additional free expertise. Now, these were generally many more senior people who would not go on a mission, but they provided some weight to what we were doing.

JS: Yes -- that was the next question. None of the Commission members actually participated in the missions?

RG: I don't think so, but Rolf might... I don't recollect that during my ten months that that happened, but I couldn't say for certain.

JS: I'd like to go on to the operational part. Your first contacts with the Iraqis, tell me about that.

RG: Well, the initial approach of the Iraqis was, I thought, well, I was surprised, frankly. I was surprised that they were so clearly in an adversarial mode.

JS: From the beginning?

RG: From the beginning. The second mission was the mission that I went on. The first mission I stayed by the phone and I talked to them constantly, and I remember that

first mission very clearly because I sat in our little office. The second mission, I was on it, Mauricio was on it, and David was on it. I remember sitting, I don't think David went to the meeting, it was with a deputy foreign minister, I can't remember his name, and I've told this story before, but it really was striking, and it doesn't fit into anything else I've done, either before or since. We were talking about scheduling inspections the next morning, and we didn't have much of a record of inspections -- we'd only done one mission, for a week or so, about three or four days, and I said, "We are going to start tomorrow morning, and etc." And the Deputy Foreign Minister said, "You are not starting tomorrow morning, because tomorrow is an Islamic holiday." And I said, "Actually, there is nothing, if you look at UNSC Resolution 68, there is nothing about excepting Islamic holidays." I said, "We've got a schedule; we're going tomorrow." And he said, "It would be really unfortunate if something happened to you or your team tomorrow." And that was a very clear threat, in that you have that in the context of sitting in his office and looking at this guy and the people around him. I thought this was odd. I mean, you would have imagined that if he wished to threaten us, physically, he would have found another way to do it than that way. So, this set a tone, which I don't... I still maintain that people do not understand how intimidating that environment can be, either because the Iraqi authorities allow a hostile population that has been whipped up to get close, and they know they can't actually control it entirely and you get a sense that something bad could happen, or because there's a physical shoving, or they... just *things* about this and that. That set a tone. That was my first meeting with a senior Iraqi Deputy Foreign Minister [*sic*], which I took to be a threat. And I said, "We'll be starting tomorrow morning."

The minders we had, the people who -- and remember in the beginning we were in their bus -- and they would say, "Where do you want to go?" and we would say, "Well I want to go *here*." I remember the first site we were going to go visit, and I can't remember the name, Al-Goreed maybe, just west of Baghdad. I was in a car with Mauricio sitting next to me and Abigail Freedman, my special assistant that I took from the State Department, a female Foreign Service officer and a lawyer, sitting in the front. Abigail had been looking at the maps and compass and she said, "Whoa! We're going right by it." And he said, "No we're not!" and he kept going. And it took a while before we convinced him he needed to stop the car. They were going to drive all day, just keep us in the car. We had to insist, so we got out of the car, we insisted we were going to go back, turn all the cars around, the caravan and the bus, and go back. We got there, and yes, it was the right place, the guy said we couldn't come in. Everything was a trial. [Eventually] "Yes, you can come in," and then in the middle of the day, they had us out and they rolled the windows up, and there was no air conditioning, it was 110 degrees outside, 120 in the car. They really, really did a lot of things to make it unhappy for us, to make us want to go home.

It seemed to me that this was going to be a really long haul. When we met resistance, though, it encouraged us because we interpreted that as meaning we were close. This was a hiders-finders game. And so, we kept finding. I mean, one of the things that was wonderful about the early days was that we kept getting rewarded by, and I don't mean to be cruel here, but by Iraqi incompetence. We were rewarded on that first mission, and through that first ten months I was there, we were rewarded repeatedly, by them saying, "Something wasn't there. Something wasn't there. You can't go here." and

then finding just what we wanted to find. So, the contacts with the Iraqis were quite hostile in the beginning, and they certainly hadn't gotten any better, or much better, when I left.

I'll tell another contact story which will give you a little context. Much later in another inspection when I was going on a CW inspection, but also I was interested in still -- they had by this time come clean on a lot of the stuff having to do with the centrifuge program in the nuclear area, but there was still some questions we had, that hadn't fit together. Particularly I was going for the chemical weapons inspection but also to talk to some ballistic missile people. I would stop by in Bonn to talk to the export people, and the Germans put on a wonderful presentation to us of what they had discovered in terms of German companies' exports to Iraq before the war. They said a lot of this was in the process of litigation, because they had -- there was another word they used because they were bringing some companies up on some sort of legal procedures and charges, so they could not be made public. But they gave me data, which would be useful in Baghdad. I went from Bonn then, through Bahrain to Baghdad, and I sat down, and I had Mauricio, who was with me I think on that one too. I thought I was holding a pretty good hand, sitting across the table and the fellow, who I think now is the Foreign Minister, was their opposite number. I said essentially, "Have you shown us everything that you have to show us in the centrifuge area?" And he said, "Absolutely." I said, "There's no other materials or equipment?" He said, "Absolutely not." I said, "Would you look at these, which the Germans have told us they shipped to you, and I have here everything you have so far declared and destroyed -- none of this material that they shipped to you have you shown us." And there was a huddle, and they huddled for a few minutes, and then he

said, "We'll take you there tomorrow." I said, "Let's stop a minute. I asked you did you have it, and you said no. I show you the evidence and you say yes? Why don't we stop the games that have gone on, and we could be finished with this. You know the light at the end of the tunnel, how long can the inspections drag on. Show us the stuff -- we're going to destroy it." And he put up his hands and said, "Stop. This is not a cooperative endeavor we are engaged in." He explained to me, "You have this information, we'll show you the things...". Now, that was pretty clear, I think. And that's how it was: if you find it, you get to destroy it; if you don't find it, we get to keep it.

JS: And a lot of the keys lay outside of Iraq, in factory inventories and things like that, invoices...?



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RG: It depends on the area. Obviously some of their programs were very dependent on imports, and a lot of what they did was indigenous. You may recall that there one of the many issues that arose was, to what extent was the Special Commission, as it went about its work, going to expose other governments or companies in other countries that had cooperated in one way or another with Iraqi efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction. This is one of the four thousand cases of Rolf Ekéus' exquisite good judgment, in saying that when we found things like this he would notify the governments. On certain points they may be part of the publications that we put out about the sources of the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, but he wasn't in a "Gotcha!" mode, trying to catch a German company or to try to expose these kinds [of things]. His job was not that. The press was good after that; there were a lot of people trying to write about that. His job

was to find stuff in Iraq, and alienating governments wasn't going to be the way to do it. So, he kept his eye on the ball I think very well.

JS: I think in a way you answered this, but how skillful were the Iraqis in camouflaging what they had?

RG: Well, I laugh, but let me first give the disclaimer: it's like when people ask after we froze the program in Korea, they say, "Have you gotten everything?" You don't know what you don't know, and in the Korean case I say, "Koreans dig tunnels when they're hiding stuff." And then I refer to the Iraqi case and I say, "Look, before the Gulf War, we focused our intelligence capability on Iraq. So did a number of other countries, including Israel. Everybody pretty much knew that the Iraqis seemed to be interested in centrifuge technology to enrich uranium to high levels. The Israelis have bombed the Osirak reaction in the early 1980s." However, having said that, and spent all this energy on this, nobody had picked up the principal Iraqi technology being pursued to produce highly enriched uranium, meaning the electromagnetic isotope separation technology which we had used fifty years earlier. So, the Iraqis were clearly good at hiding a program. They also obviously fooled the IAEA. Some would call that not a terrific accomplishment, but it was interesting. They went so far as to tell us at one point that while the Agency would be going around in Tuwatha, they would be driving around in a truck ahead of them, with stuff they didn't want the IAEA to see. In one building in Tuwatha that we walked in was where they had the reactor, which was inspected, it was the very next building, the building next door, where they had a test stand for the EMIS program. So, they were

good at hiding things. Were they good when a Special Commission comes in, armed as we were? No. Hans Blix said it really quite clearly in the summer of 1991, when he was subject to all that criticism because of what UNSCOM had found and the IAEA had not. The IAEA did not conduct inspections like that, it did it according to a book that essentially said, "You go where the host government lets you go." "Well," he said, "if we had intelligence like that and we had this kind of operational capability, and we had the political support to overcome resistance when we met it, we could find it too!" And he's right. You could argue that the request for special inspections that brought us the crisis in North Korea was a direct result of his experience in Iraq -- he wasn't going to have that happen again. Good move, I say, on Hans Blix's part. So, I'd say the Iraqis were good up to a point, but you let people in with intelligence, let them roam, give them the freedom... I mean, right now, we are in the crisis we are in, not because these inspectors know for sure that there is stuff being hidden, which is one of the problems with a bombing campaign to solve this problem, but because they know for sure where they are not allowed to go. I'd say, no, they were not terribly good.

I'll tell one little anecdote which has always struck me as funny. I was getting a briefing before an inspection, and it was the summer of 1991, I think it was the summer of 1991. The briefing was in the US mission, and it was from members of our intelligence community giving us some thoughts on where we might find things the Iraqis were hiding, and they weren't sure but they had ideas. And I remember one young woman who said, "It's not on our list, but if you have some time, free time, could you check this building out?" And I said, "OK -- why?" She said, "I just have a hunch. It's just funny, this building, where it is." And so I took those coordinates down. By the way, we were

by that point on GPS, which was not like it is now that everybody had it. The Iraqis were stunned at what GPS could do, and so if you went in with the coordinates which you got from satellites, and you had a GPS with you, you could go... I mean, I have a terrible sense of direction, I used to get lost running cross-country, so this was...

JS: What is a GPS?

RG: I'm sorry: Global Positioning Satellite. Right now, all the sailors, everybody on Chesapeake Bay have GPS. It tells you where you are exactly, or how to get to where you want to go. A compass and GPS and you are set. So, we were at Tuwatha, it was an afternoon and I remember the teams had split and I think George Ansalon from Livermore was taking a team up one place, and I think we were pretty much done. We had gone and looked at the place that we had wanted to, and then I remembered that this woman said that, "You ought to go and check this out." So, I told the Iraqis that I wanted to go someplace and they said, "Where?" And I said, "Actually, I don't know, trust me. We'll guide the car. Just go down here, make a left." So, we are doing this this way, and I said, "That's it." And then I looked at the building that looked like where it would be, configured to the river and up the road and so far from the berm at Tuwatha, there is a berm around there; so we were walking down the road, and the Iraqi said, "Why do you want to go there?" And I said, "I just do." And the Iraqi minder said, "Well, you know what that was?" And I said, "No, I'd be interested." "Well, that was an automotive maintenance facility for the army and it's now abandoned." And I said, "Then there should be no problem." He said, "Right." So we walked in, and indeed, it was a big open

warehouse, and there was nothing inside. I walked in, and one of my guys -- I'm not technical in any way whatsoever; I mean, I know the technology of the nuclear weapons stuff, but I don't know equipment -- and so I looked up and I saw a big overhead crane, and it meant nothing to me...

End of Tape, Side 1

RG: [There was an] EOD guy, who walked on the other side of another, a smaller overhead crane, and he called me over. He said, "Look up there and read what it says." On my side of the crane, it was in Arabic, and said, "I don't read Arabic," and he said, "Well, it's in English on this side." So, on the other side, it said, I swear, it said "Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission" on the crane. So I called over my minder and I said, "Automotive repair?" And he gave me a face, and we called the guys from the other inspection team, the technical people around. George, who is technical, who is a centrifuge expert as well as nuclear weapons expert generally, over, and George came over and looked at it, and this was another building, it turned out, which had the test stands for the EMIS [electromagnetic isotope separation] program. What we were doing, and wanted to do, and which the Commission is still trying to do, and trying to explain to everybody, is to have a full picture of each one of the programs, so that if something doesn't fit then you know something's missing. What they wanted, they wanted to see the whole EMIS program, where magnets were, where the calutrons were, how you tested them, and in each of the areas. They wanted to do that in the chemical area, in the bio area, and in the missile area. This was another piece in that program. I would say that that wasn't too smart.

JS: Now, there were always Iraqi minders with you, no matter where you went?

RG: Absolutely.

JS: Even though you had your own drivers?

RG: Ah! When we got our own vehicles and we drove them, the deal, by the time we got to UNSCOM 16 and the only way that UNSCOM 16 worked was by us surprising them. In other words, instead of the night before a friendly little inspection, where we would get together at 6:00 o'clock and say, "OK, tomorrow we're going to begin around 8:00 or 9:00, and we're going to go here, here, and here, please tell the people we are coming, so that we can get into the gate" -- that kind of thing then we can do an inspection. For UNSCOM 16, we said be at the hotel at 05:30, they said, "It's dark." We said, "We know. We'll ...?" Actually, we started somewhat earlier than that, interestingly. Even though that's when we told them to be there, and we had our vehicles and they said, "Where are you going?" and we said, "We'll tell you tomorrow." When they got there, and they said, "Where are we going?" we said, "Follow us." And then we went to the building we knew we wanted to go to. We had already had people there to make sure nothing happened in advance, and then we worked to seal it off -- when I say seal it off, I don't mean physically prevent, but be able to film anything that was going in or coming out. We were all armed with Sony Mini-cams, so we could shoot anything we needed to shoot and try to capture.

We, by that time, by September, of the first year of 1991, we were in our own vehicles and able to move around, but never anywhere without them. That would have not been wise. It still wouldn't be wise.

JS: But you didn't have to announce it in advance?

RG: No.

JS: And how important were the U2 overflights there; were you still there or not?

RG: The U2 flights started while I was there. This was an interesting... I think I should have brought that up in the context of the intelligence, because the U2 photography could actually be shown to the staff of the Special Commission.

JS: They could?

RG: Yeah.

JS: But not the satellite photos?

RG: The satellite photography, to my knowledge, was not.

JS: I remember at one point Ambassador Ekéus said that there were very useful pictures but they could only keep them for a little while and could not show them.

RG: Yes -- that's... What Rolf saw, Rolf saw a great deal, virtually everything. And Rolf was taken into the confidence of the US government, but I'm talking about what could be actually used, kept, manipulated, by the UN staff. The U2 photography was briefed, you know, people would come down and then explain what the photography was. The Special Commission went and got from governments people who were PIs, photograph interpreters -- the military always has them because everybody does BDA -- bomb damage assessment, after the ...bomb ... to re-photograph to understand the things you're looking at. So they all have these kinds of folks, and the U2 photography the Commission could keep on file and compare over time. The satellite photography is another matter entirely. That you don't pass out.

JS: But the U2 photography was useful then, in identifying?

RG: It was useful in, I think, establishing a baseline, and very useful for establishing a monitoring program, but for the kind of activity that we were engaged in initially, during the first year of operations, we needed something a little different. I don't think that it's a great secret that U2 photography isn't quite as precise as satellite photography. That's clear.

JS: Which brings me to the question of 'live' sources. How important were they?
Could you talk about that? Internally or externally.

RG: All I would say is that we, you know, you talk about photo intelligence, photo-int., or communications intelligence, is called comm-int., human intelligence is called hum-int., in the trade, right. Now, hum-int. was, well, there was an awful lot of bad hum-int. around, because everybody who wanted to cause trouble would tell you that if you wanted to find Iraqi nuclear weapons or biological weapons, all you have to do is dig up that grave site, for example, or go to this mosque and take it apart, or go to that minister's home. So, a lot of stuff was just not useful, and that would come from essentially what we would call 'walk-ins.' And that's maybe all I can say about hum-int. I would say there was an awful lot of noise out there.

JS: But it was not crucial while you were there, no?

RG: I don't think I can speak to hum-int.

JS: Right, right. Well, I know that it was much later that Ekéus actually interviewed the son-in-law, and...

RG: Yes, that was [later].

JS: ...and apparently that was quite revealing.

RG: Uh-hum.

JS: I don't think anybody knows quite how revealing yet.

RG: I still want to know why he went back.

JS: We talked about the selection of the Commission, but what about the missions?

Was any effort made to select, I know that a special effort was made to have real experts, right?



RG: Oh yes. But real experts, first, planning. I mean, we needed a strategy, we needed to plan, and then we needed tactics, we needed the strategy of how you go about, and I don't mean just the logistics part, but I mean the search, and what we were looking for and how we were going to proceed, and then the tactics of how you put missions together, and then the real logistics of who would be on them, and which governments would contribute. So, it was a layered process, starting with I think Rolf, and myself, and the Chief of Operations Doug Englund, and others who were trying to have an over-sight, and bring in some senior people from other governments. Make sure at the Commission we had somebody we could count on who knew chemical weapons, somebody we could count on who knew nuclear weapons stuff, and each of these we broke down to individual weapons areas. Initially the teams were very, very separate, and I think they are now somewhat mixed -- I mean, there would be a BW team, and then there would be a CW

team that would be different, and then the missile team would have missile people on it, and sometimes we would have two or three teams in the field at the same time, controlling all three of them separately.

JS: Was the search for [the right people] done primarily from New York or from Bahrain, or what?

RG: That was all New York, all New York. Yes, Rolf had very good contacts with people so we got good diplomats to help us work with other governments and the missions in New York. Then we could also go back and, if we wanted to increase the ask, we could ask Washington to support a request that we'd made for some assets.

JS: And the first criterion was expertise? Did you ever get to the UN criterion: regionally representative?

RG: Not in my recollection. We wanted to have... we made sure this was not an American operation. I think the most sensitive thing, and the thing Rolf constantly contributed, much to his credit, was that this was not going to be an American operation. When he went up to talk to Washington, I never went with him. When he made the rounds inside the UN, I never went with him. This was not going to be American, because that really undermined the operation. That it be *international*, was important. That it be balanced was, in my recollection, not even a thought, not in terms of operations.

JS: Now, the other question in this connection [is] the Iraqis, of course, claim that there are spies in the midst. Do you know if any precautions were taken to ensure that in fact there were not agents among those that you chose?

RG: I think I've been on the record on this already. The process by which we went and got people is, we did not go to the US Army and say, "Give me an Army guy -- a chemical guy." We didn't call up Livermore and say, "I need a Livermorian to come out." We went to capitals, we went to ministries, and said, "We need expertise in this area," and that includes Washington. When the Brits came up and they said, "This guy knows nuclear stuff," great. When the Swedes said, "This is a chemical man," we said, "Great." When the Americans said whatever, we said, "Great." We didn't say, "And where has he worked?" And, it wouldn't make any sense for us to do that. That's the process, so if someone has intelligence experience, and is on this trip, we might not even know about it -- we probably wouldn't know about it. Something else that is true of the US government and other governments is that people sometimes have tours with segments of the intelligence community; they might work in defense intelligence, they might work in army intelligence. Are they spies, because they had some experience? I just think that that charge should have been deflated a long time ago. What we did not do is ever go and say, "Send us some spies." And I don't remember, and this is an incredible statement to make, but I don't remember a single case in which we got someone when we went after an expert and we did not get expertise. In other words, when someone came and he was supposed to be the bio expert and he didn't know what an Erlenmeyer flask

was. It never happened. So, that if governments were sending us people who had intelligence experience, they were sending us experts. We didn't say, "Make sure that no one knows anything about intelligence, that you send us." We said, "Send us an expert in this area." We did that with the US government, et cetera.

Now, when you go and you ask for an EOD expert, this guy has to be an expert in explosives ordnance disposal, so he's going to come out of a certain kind of community in the military.

JS: Switching to the Iraqi side, could you judge anything about the Iraqi method of operations? I mean, what communication channels did they have? It's been said that nothing is decided in Iraq without Saddam Hussein's personal agreement. Did you find that they were afraid to make any decisions without going up at least one step?

RG: [For] anything important, the answer to that is 'absolutely true.' Absolutely true. We were always looking for the man who was the wizard behind the nuclear program, for example, and I think we probably met him. He showed up in some of those tapes. During the UNSCOM 16 mission he came to the first day, where we got the most sensitive stuff, which was not the place where we were held in the parking lot, it was the night before, which probably was I think... Jabar was his name. I think, whenever we got to something important, it was clear that higher agreement was necessary. How far Saddam himself was tracking us in those early days, I had no way of knowing.

JS: And you had no contact with Tariq Aziz?

RG: I had one meeting, Rolf and I did, or I had one meeting, which I remember meeting with Rolf, with Aziz, during that summer. I think it was after the hostage or whatever you want to call the parking lot tour, situation. I went back, I stayed in Bahrain, waited for Rolf, after we came out, and went back in and was treated to a complaint by the Iraqis over our behavior, which led to one of the more colorful exchanges.

JS: He's quite a talker. You were in the parking lot? And from the film I noticed that you had lots of boxes of files, which you were trying to get out of there. On what basis, you had lawyers by that time, what basis do you seize files from a government office?

RG: Resolution 687.

JS: Under Chapter VII?

RG: Yes.

JS: And that was the basis?

RG: Yup.

JS: Another legal question, I think that Iraq has never ratified the bacteriological convention. Did that make any difference in the operation?

RG: We were looking at... Resolution 687, as you know, is much more far reaching in all these areas than any other regime, and essentially the capability to produce as well as the items themselves, and that's what we referred to constantly.

JS: So we went on the assumption that the Resolution really supersedes any other...

RG: Supersedes? It is more demanding on the Iraqis than anything else, any other commitments they have, and it is the Resolution that is directly tied to the Security Council and the legal basis for the use of force. That's why it was so germane to us.



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JS: That's why it was... yes. Right. Now, in your task, which was somewhat different, but were you able to reach any assessment of the effect of Desert Storm bombing?

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RG: Sure. I mean, a couple of things: First, I was in Baghdad in May, for the first time, ever, which was only a couple of months after the end of the war. One was struck by limited damage in Baghdad, not that there weren't buildings that were hit, but I used the phrase, it was sort of "building-ectomy." This was not leveling, this was not like the pictures I have seen of cities that were bombed. Baghdad wasn't bombed; I mean, maybe along the line of confrontation, Saudi Arabia or Kuwait, maybe that, the B-52 bombing, but Baghdad itself was not in any way leveled. So the first thing was we were able to see the impact of the bombing on the ground, in terms at least of what the level of destruction

was, and there wasn't massive destruction in Baghdad. However, when you drove by a building that was hit it was clear that this looked like a sort of modern art twisted structure, so that if they went after a particular building... It seems to me that some of those, assuming that the buildings that I saw that had been struck were the ones that were being aimed at, then I would say that the precision guided munitions were pretty impressive as compared to other types of bombing. And we, by the way, we went through buildings that had been hit. The building where we found the designs for the nuclear weapon was a building that had been hit, and there was a whole wall that wasn't there. So that when you went up to, I think, the eighth floor, if you walked to the edge, there was nothing there -- the whole wall had been taken out. The place had been hit, so you could not take the elevators in that building, for example. This was [the case] with many buildings that had been bombed. We'd been to many sites that had been bombed.

However, if you look at the impact on weapons of mass destruction... take the nuclear program: We bombed sites that were related to their nuclear program. They moved their fuel, spent fuel and fresh fuel, into the fields, and we didn't know where they were, where it was, [and] couldn't have hit them. They had an enormous amount of equipment and stuff that we didn't know about, technology we didn't know about, and it was not destroyed. They, after the war, went about burying it, but we didn't hit it because we didn't know about it. Certainly all those facilities like bunkers used to develop the implosion system for the device weren't hit. Outside of the nuclear area, [in] the chemical area, well, we now know, since the Special Commission did the destruction, hundreds and hundreds of tons of mustard and nerve agents, were there. During the Iraqi war, the Gulf War, I don't think now that the judgment is that a single SCUD or SCUD-

variant was destroyed by the SCUD hunters on the ground, during the Gulf War. We certainly crushed up a whole lot of them, the Special Commission did.

What's left -- BW? I really don't have any reason to believe that there was much success by the air war on BW. I mean, I don't know, maybe one factory was, that was in fact a site. So, in the areas of WMD, the bombing campaign was not overly successful.

JS: Now, I saw those pictures of some of the chemical weapons that were leaking. What about the Iraqi maintenance procedure that you found?

RG: Awful. If you go to Aniston Arms, the Army detail, and you go through some of their igloos, you could eat off the floor. I mean, its really very nice and the nerve agents in the artillery shell have a certain kind of stripe around, and the mustard agents have a different colored stripe, and a white phosphorus round has another kind of stripe around it. You don't have to worry about opening up a chemical munitions, or in the disposal mode, and finding that you're not dealing with a chemical agent but you're dealing with a white phosphorus. The Iraqi situation was awful. I mean, they said, "These rockets are a HE, they're not a chemical." And as you probably heard this morning, at least one incident [where] one of the vehicles crushed a rocket and it was a sarin rocket, but their nerve gas, the potency doesn't stay very long so while one of their guys was exposed to it, he was not... he lost consciousness.

JS: One of *their* guys or...

RG: Their guys. Our guy was not exposed to it; their guy went down, our guy picked him up, threw him in the back seat of the car, and drove him to a medical area, and they hit him with an injection and the next day he was pretty much OK. There's all kinds of problems with their munitions which were leaking, which were just in bad shape. It was a mess. It was a real mess. There was an area, an airbase, I went to where just below the surface they had thousands of artillery rounds, probably bombs for aircraft but I can't remember. I remember the artillery rounds in particular and then they had mustard rounds just out there, so that you could actually walk out there and get a whiff of that in the air. I don't know how many places on earth you can do that. I would say it was not up to standard.

JS: Now, when you were there, I think, you found the so-called big guns, which seemed to be very obvious, but they had not been destroyed in the war, right?

RG: Yes. The big guns were... I found this otherworldly. I never saw them on the ground myself, but I saw pictures. Doug Englund went out, he led some of the ballistic missile teams. These were, they looked like sewer pipes to me, anyway, but they were for launching, I guess, Volkswagen-sized shells. Very impressive.

JS: But they had not been destroyed in the war?

RG: I guess not. No. Certainly in the pictures I saw they were not destroyed. There was a lot of talk, I remember, about what was the best way to make them non-useable for the purpose they were intended for.

JS: In your judgment, I realize that you were not there more recently, but would it be possible ever to detect everything that the Iraqis had if they don't want you to?

RG: Well, it depends what we mean by that exactly. I mean, that's kind of the current situation, because this blends into that, I think, rather nicely. If the Iraqis can keep large areas off limits to inspection, they can hide things in that area. As soon as you put things in a garage you can't see them from satellite. Could they have fifty Al-Hussein rockets, some of them with warheads with binary chemicals in those? Yes. Would that be significant? Yeah -- it would be. Could they have a biological weapons factory that would be significant in terms of what it would produce, anthrax, or something? Absolutely, they could, because there are large areas where they could do that. Could they have a serious chemical weapons production facility? [It's] very hard, I think, to hide that; [it's] possible, depending on the area we're talking about, but that gets harder. Could they have a nuclear weapons development program in one of those areas that we wouldn't know about? I don't think so. I don't think they could sneak a reactor in there and secretly build one, nor have a centrifuge hall running and all that that would require. No. Now, there are a couple of tricks to what I'm saying. I'm saying that in some of the areas you could do stuff in a relatively small place and hide it from the inspectors, if you could prevent them from going there. If the inspectors could really go everywhere, it's

going to be hard for them to do anything outside of the BW area, or just, you know, if they've got missiles stashed somewhere and they don't move them, and they could stash them -- anything they've got stashed they can stash. There is nothing here that you could be sure you're going to find with inspecting the country. If you're talking about a program, though, to build them, I'm saying that if you really have full access, then BW is the only one I see as safe from discovery. I don't think they can secretly build missiles, secretly have a chemical program, and secretly have a nuclear program, not if you have full access.

JS: And this leads to the next question. The resolution provides for more-or-less permanent monitoring, and I think you from the beginning began to think about how that should be developed. How far did you get on that, and how practical do you think it is?

RG: Well, we got to the early stage of figuring out, I think it was Resolution 715, I'm not sure, that we would need to go into a different mode for continuous monitoring in terms of the teams and the composition and the size and how they'd operate. I mean, there would not be a lot of surprise inspection. This would be a more routine kind of thing, checking on areas, unless you got some special information somehow to go someplace else. The monitoring process would be establishing a baseline, getting a whole, complete understanding of the program that existed before, and getting a real grip on things. So that then, I think the theory we had was that at some point if they started, once the embargo was lifted, and they started importing in numbers, that you could sort of

go where I think you might expect them to be able to regenerate one of these programs.

We were thinking along those lines.

How reasonable is it? I think as long as you see this regime in power, or to put it more precisely, Saddam there, it is very difficult for me, anyway, to conceptualize situations where one is not worried anymore about them in these weapons areas. Now, it's clear they pumped in billions and billions of dollars into WMD. I mean, the nuclear estimate I've seen, seven to eight, nine to ten, billion dollars on nuclear alone. That's serious money. So, they are pretty committed to this. He is pretty committed to this. So long term monitoring seems like the only way to go, to me, under that scenario, if your objective really is to have some assurance that those programs are not regenerated.

JS: And long term monitoring would mean persons, from your observation, actually stationed in Iraq?

RG: Well, it just makes a lot more sense. And in fact, that's what we have now. We've worked out of that building that we had occupied then. We did set up a base in the former UN building in Baghdad. We were working out of that during the first year, when I was there. It is not a secure place, in the same way that your base area is in Bahrain, but it allows you to run teams and stay at a hotel, and you can run teams in and out pretty easily. And the more routine you make it, I think the better off you are.

JS: A technical question there, going back to communication. You do have the office in Baghdad, with scrambler phones, to a certain extent, but is there a possibility, and this

may seem naive, but the diplomatic pouch procedure -- can you send sealed messages to Baghdad, and if so what would you do with it when they get there?

RG: Well, certainly when people come in, and they come in knowing what they want to do, and they can carry things with them, and you don't have to give up anything sealed at the airport...

JS: You do not?

RG: No. I wouldn't think about putting them in the mail, but I think you carrying stuff in and out [is OK]. I mean, you can't carry weapons in and out, but you can carry sealed envelopes. I think that you remind yourself you are in Iraq.

JS: I want to go back to the very beginning in a way, and ask if you have anything else to say about UNSCOM's relations with headquarters in New York, any relationship with the Secretary General, with Akashi, Derek Boothby, the old disarmament hands. Did your contact with headquarters remain centered in the Disarmament Department?

RG: Disarmament has probably reorganized, but we, no. Once we got set up and Derek was given to us, he was marvelous, by the way...

JS: He may be coming to Yale.

RG: Really? I really quite liked him. Once we got Derek, we had a lot less to do with Disarmament and Akashi. We worked with the Secretary General's office, Ron Spiers, Mitch Werner, Mitch is back there by the way, and a lot through the Security Council, a lot of briefing with the Security Council, it was very important to us. There was a lively tension over our presence that continued, and it is still there. I mean, some of the things you're seeing now. I was just talking to, I ran into Charlie Duelfer in the park a couple of mornings ago, and Charlie was telling me about the attempt to increase the influence of the Commission because that allowed greater access by the Commissioners to the operation of the Commission, something Rolf always resisted, as a way of kind of dialing it back a bit, I mean, he was worried about that. That tension was always there the first year, and still is.

JS: And what about the relations with the IAEA?

RG: Very, very difficult period. Some of my worst periods in my twenty-one years in government came over some things that happened with the IAEA. I remember distinctly David and I -- David was very much of the activist in the Agency; I think he drove Hans crazy and Mauricio and everybody else over there with his enthusiasm for this mission, and we loved it -- David and I agreed to communicate when he was out in the field. He was out in Baghdad and I was in New York and he was faxing me some stuff which he was also faxing to Vienna. He faxed it to me at the same time in New York. And you understand, let me back up here, 687, in the Resolution, the nuclear stuff is given to the IAEA, but not exclusively. The Special Commission still has a purview over it, so it's a

funny [situation]. Any mission had to be technically run by the IAEA if it was in the nuclear area. UNSCOM-16 was technically, sort of, David was the mission person, but all the planning for the mission I had done back here, and we had staged that mission initially out of London, before going to Bahrain, and I brought David and a few people to London, in order to explain how we were going to do this mission. It had to have someone from the official IAEA, or it couldn't be a nuclear mission. Earlier on, I think, the tension was clearly manifest when David sent me this stuff which indicated that the Iraqis had, earlier on, irradiated some fuel elements in a safeguarded reactor, which they had manufactured secretly. They had irradiated elements secretly in the reactor, pulled them out, and separated gram quantities of plutonium, all without telling the IAEA. Now, you may say, "compared to everything else they did, why is that important?" That's important because this was a safeguarded reactor. It's one thing for Hans Blix and the Agency to say "Calutrons, EMIS, all this, we don't know from that. It wasn't what we were inspecting. We were inspecting a declared program." OK -- that reactor was declared, you inspected it. They snuck in fuel elements, they irradiated them, they pulled them out, and the separated plutonium. That's on your watch. Now, I saw that as explosive. The Iraqis had admitted all that to David and his team, David faxed that back, so I called the Agency in Vienna from New York, and I said, "What are you going to do with this? This is dynamite." And he [Zifferero] said, "Neahhh -- I don't know, we don't... probably nothing." And I said, "Look," this was on Friday, "on Monday, the Secretary General Pérez de Cuéllar is going to go to the Security Council and report on stuff. I got this report in my hand, Rolf isn't here, I can't sit on this. You're supposed to report this. On Monday I'm going to call you, you're six hours ahead of me. By the time

we get to ten o'clock in the morning, you had better tell me you're going to go ahead with this, or I'm going to go ahead with this. I'm not going to be the one holding this bag."

That's Friday. Nothing happens over the weekend; on Monday, they haven't moved. I go and I'm sitting with this information, I wrote up a little report on why this was significant, and I still remember this, it was an informal of the Security Council, and I'm sitting and I've got in front of me Undersecretary General Ron Spiers. Ron Spiers had been a lot of places, including Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, and I'd worked with him in the Department -- he would get this picture, I don't have to explain a lot about this [with] my little note. So, Ron is sitting in front of me, as an Undersecretary, and there's Pérez de Cuéllar, and there's the Security Council! So, I give this to Ron, let him hold the bag. Ron turns around, tells me to give it to the Secretary-General. I give it to the Secretary-General, the Secretary-General reports it. [The] Agency goes crazy:

"How did you get this?" "Well, I don't particularly want to burn a member of the IAEA who is cooperating with the Special Commission, but I got it from a team in the field."

"Well, that is never going to happen again." So, now we know everything is going to go through Vienna. That's one case, and by the way, they thought this was grandstanding.

To me, this was incredibly important -- this was another case of the Iraqis having been found cheating the IAEA, violating their undertakings under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, very significant in political terms of what was going on. That was the kind of thing that the Agency would have managed. A big mistake, in my view.

There were lots of these things. Even Hans when he went over to Baghdad in early July, the team that had been out there that had been shoved around and pushed around and, you know, shots fired in the air, he showed a great sympathy for the Iraqi

position and people going everywhere and looking where they weren't invited. That was not the right posture to strike. I've never really seen a case like this. I think that within a matter of a month to six weeks, Hans re-calibrated, and re-calibrated the Agency, and we were dealing with something entirely different six months later. By the time we got to North Korea, which was only really, if you think about this, not that much later, a few years later, he had brought that Agency, I mean *he* brought the Agency, to where it should have been before. But he really adjusted. As an international civil servant interested in organizational learning, I think he did an extraordinary job. But initially, it was a very rough patch. And by the way, if you think, as I did, that this is going to be great, the two Swedes will talk to one another in Swedish, and all will be wonderful -- there's a naiveté in that that I can't begin to describe to you, the depth there, which I had. That was wrong. I don't mean that they were mortal enemies, but to assume that because they were both Swedes and came out of the Swedish foreign ministry, this was going to grease the skids when there was so much of a difference in orientation of their organizations was crazy. They did work it out, and they did work together very effectively, but initially there was a very, very big difference over posture and attitude of how to approach the inspections.

JS: You've got time for two more questions? One is I think you established in Bahrain, an assessment staff to assess the information that was coming in, because apparently initially you didn't have that capacity. Was that successful? How did that work?

RG: I'm caught here. I can tell you about what we had at the headquarters in New York, but I can't tell you about what we had in Bahrain.

JS: OK. All right -- we'll cut that question out.

RG: Clearly, it's a good question. It's an excellent question

JS: We'll come back to that in a couple of years. Final question is, how would you compare the Iraqis to the North Koreans?

RG: Really, entirely different. I'm no expert on culture and politics. We have a major here at this School in Culture and Politics, but that is, even though its been twenty-one years at State, I don't consider myself, as some people in the Foreign Service are, as really sensitive to the way culture impacts upon negotiations, etc. Though I certainly observed it. The Iraqis were... let me give you an example. I could say to an Iraqi, "You are lying," and I could get a smile in response. I can't tell you what the response would have been had I been so stupid as to say to a North Korean across the table, "You are lying." There's a sense of, even if the North Koreans were lying, that's not something you could say and then continue the conversation. They would not smile back. This would be an insult that would need to be responded to. They have a much greater sense of -- I don't know if 'propriety' is the right thing -- but things you cannot do, and a sensitivity that I did not find in, I won't say the Iraqi people, but I would say the Iraqi government people that I dealt with. These people were nasty, physically, they were very difficult to deal

with in every sort of way, and not in terms of... you might say the North Koreans have this crazy ideology that they still are holding to, even as it causes them to starve to death, I could capture no Iraqi ideology. This was not dealing with Islam. This was dealing with nasty, largely military, folks, who would use the crudest type of advantage any time they could find it. And this is again not a comment about Iraqi people, but about the people who they put to deal with us, the inspectors.

JS: Who were the loyalists?

RG: Well, when you're in a country in which failure to show loyalty can lead to the death of you, your family, and your neighbors, you can end up with a lot of loyalists.

JS: Thank you very, very much.

Yale-UN Oral History Project

Robert Gallucci

James Sutterlin, Interviewer

February 3, 1998

Washington, DC

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