The United Nations DISARMAMENT YEARBOOK



Volume 27: 2002

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The United Nations DISARMAMENT YEARBOOK



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NOTE

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
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FOREWORD

Though the Department for Disarmament Affairs has been publishing The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook since 1976, the tradition of issuing such yearbooks can be traced back to the Armaments Yearbook, published for many years by the League of Nations. The goal of the current series has been to provide the public and Member States with a useful annual chronicle of multilateral disarmament developments, focusing especially on activities within the "UN disarmament machinery." While the approach is descriptive rather than analytical, the yearbooks serve the broader goals of promoting informed discussion of multilateral approaches to disarmament, facilitating further research in this field, and shedding some light on new and recurring challenges. The Yearbook, in short, is intended to be useful in inspiring both thought and action, with a view to strengthening multilateral disarmament norms.

Considerable thought and action will be needed to address the many issues on the multilateral disarmament agenda now and over the years to come. While conventional arms annually account for many more civilian and military casualties than weapons of mass destruction (WMD), we must never forget that the detonation of only one nuclear weapon could reverse these statistics in literally the blink of an eye.

Though it is now widely accepted that disarmament offers the "only absolute guarantee" against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, the world accomplished very little in this field in 2002 and actually took some steps away from this goal. Transparency — so tremendously important both in confidence-building, public education, and norm development — remains an extremely difficult challenge, as illustrated by the fact that the world community still does not have an authoritative figure on the aggregate numbers of nuclear weapons in the world, nor the total amounts of weapons-usable nuclear materials. Inspired efforts in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty context to improve transparency have met very little success and much resistance from the nuclear-weapon States. Meanwhile, other countries with various declared or undeclared nuclear-weapons capabilities similarly oppose greater transparency over their weapons activities.

While NPT compliance concerns have arisen in recent years with respect to nuclear activities in Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and while some States have voiced concern about other nuclear activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran, many states have also questioned the willingness of the nuclear-weapon states to fulfill their disarmament commitments under that treaty. Reports from those States in 2002 heralding the value of such weapons, threatening first use or preemptive use even

against non-nuclear-weapon States, and hinting of their further development are all inconsistent with the global nuclear disarmament norm.

Disarmament efforts in 2002 with respect to other WMD — chemical and biological — illustrate the depth of the world community's abhorrence for such weapons. With respect to the Biological Weapons Convention, the tragic failure of the States parties to conclude a verification protocol in late 2001 led to some creative multilateral diplomacy, culminating in an agreement on three consecutive annual meetings of the States parties on specific treaty-related subjects. Efforts to bring the Chemical Weapons Convention closer to universal membership also made some modest progress, as two additional States joined in 2002. Yet amid the occasional, troubling allegations of biological or chemical weapons development, the most striking conclusion with respect to the current state of CBW disarmament norms is how strong they remain: the overwhelming majority of the States parties to these conventions are fully complying with their commitments.

Missile-related developments in 2002 were mixed. On the one hand, a large group of States established a voluntary International Code of Conduct (ICOC) Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. On the other hand, it was also the final year of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The continued lack of multilateral legal norms in this field — particularly with respect to disarmament — remains a serious challenge facing the world community.

With respect to conventional arms, progress occurred in the field of small arms and light weapons in implementing the Programme of Action adopted at the 2001 United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light in All its Aspects, though much remains to be done to evolve binding legal norms in this field. More countries are reporting data using the United Nations Register on Conventional Arms and the Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures. However, many States still refuse to use these important transparency measures, as military spending continues to grow. With respect to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the States parties have made new progress in addressing the issues of Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) and mines other than anti-personnel mines.

Regional disarmament and arms control efforts continued in 2002 literally across the globe, notably including the accession of Cuba to the Tlatelolco Treaty and the new progress in reaching agreement (at the expert level) on the text of a treaty to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. I hope the 2003 Disarmament Yearbook will be able to report its formal establishment — it would be the first such zone entirely north of the Equator.


With respect to the issue of terrorism, the United Nations broke new ground when the Secretary-General submitted to the General Assembly the report of the Policy Working Group on the UN and terrorism, a report addressing, *inter alia*, the threats posed from possible terrorist acquisition and use of WMD. The Security Council's Counter-Terrorism Committee continued to gather useful data and many international organizations, including the IAEA and OPCW, remained actively engaged in confronting this challenge.

Yet the news from certain parts of the multilateral disarmament machinery was discouraging: the Conference on Disarmament was once again unable to agree on a substantive work agenda, the United Nations Disarmament Commission failed to hold a substantive meeting in its 50th year, and voting on many nuclear-related disarmament resolutions in the First Committee remained deeply divided.

This brief overview, however, hardly does justice to the numerous disarmament efforts underway in civil society. The UN has long recognized the vital importance of education in shaping public opinion in the field of disarmament. In November 2002, the General Assembly welcomed the Secretary-General's recent report on disarmament and non-proliferation education and asked him to prepare a report for its 59th session on the implementation of its recommendations. The role of civil society will be crucial to the future of multilateral disarmament efforts and international peace and security. I hope that this Yearbook might contribute to these efforts, for the benefit of all.

Sayare Ghangelo

JAYANTHA DHANAPALA Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs




NOTE

The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook is designed to be a concise reference tool. As a good amount of background information is condensed, it may be helpful to consult previous editions. Factual information, presented where possible in tabular form, is provided in the appendices. Websites of United Nations departments and specialized agencies, intergovernmental organizations, research institutes and non-governmental organizations appear as footnotes.

The Yearbook was produced under the general direction of the former Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Jayantha Dhanapala (who completed his tenure at the end of May 2003), and Under-Secretary-General Nobuyasu Abe (who assumed his functions on 1 July 2003), as well as the Director of the Department, Hannelore Hoppe. It was prepared by the following team: coordinator/editor: Xiaovu Wang: writers and contributors: Olga Sukovic, Michael Cassandra, Francesc Claret, Silvana Da Silva, Antonio Steven Feller. GaryDe Rosa. Evora. Ivor Fung. PériclesGasparini Alves, Alain Handy, João Honwana, Tsutomu Ishiguri, Marco Kalbusch, Nazir Kamal, Richard Lennane, Herbert ValèreMantels, AgnèsMarcaillou, Mika Murakami, Bantan Nugroho, Sari Nurro. Sharon O'Brien. Joanna Panepinto. Myrna EnriqueRomán-Morey, Randy Rydell, Stefano Tomat, Jerzy Zaleski; research assistance/language editing: Joanna Panepinto; programming and typesetting: ElizabethScaffidi. Natalie Goldring of the University of Maryland also contributed to the Yearbook by drafting the section on the United Nations Study on Disarmament and Non-proliferation Education.

The Department for Disarmament Affairs draws your attention to its website at: www.disarmament.un.org where up-to-date information on disarmament issues may be obtained throughout the year. Among the many electronic resources, you will find the departmental database on the status of disarmament and arms regulation agreements, which contains the texts of the treaties and States parties covered in Appendix I of *The Yearbook*.



Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation issues

"Innocent people throughout the world are still threatened by weapons of mass destruction. They face additional threats from major conventional weapons, as well as from the destabilizing accumulation and illicit sale of small arms and light weapons, and the continued production and use of landmines. Of all these challenges, however, the total elimination of nuclear weapons must remain the top priority."

KOFI ANNAN, UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL

Introduction

SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE NUCLEAR AGE, the international community has been seized with nuclear issues. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation have been addressed within and outside the United Nations and a number of bilateral, regional and multilateral agreements have been concluded. These instruments have led to the reduction of nuclear arsenals and the exclusion of deployment of nuclear weapons from certain environments and regions. International norms to prevent the proliferation and the testing of such weapons have been established.

At the bilateral level, the Russian Federation and the United States have signed a number of agreements concerning their nuclear weapons. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), signed on 31 July 1991, provided for a reduction of their strategic arsenals to no more than 6,000 nuclear warheads each, over seven years. By December 2001, the parties had completed reductions of their respective nuclear arsenals to the level required under this Treaty. The second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II), signed on 3 January 1993, would have further reduced the parties' strategic nuclear warheads to no more than 3,000 to 3,500 each. Further progress in the START process was linked to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM), which, for many years, had been widely regarded and reaffirmed as the cornerstone of international strategic stability and security. However, a new strategic relationship established between the parties in 2002 superseded START II.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) of 1968, which was extended indefinitely at the 1995 Review and Extension

Conference of the Parties to the NPT, is considered the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for nuclear disarmament. At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, States parties to the Treaty successfully adopted by consensus a Final Document which contained a number of agreements and undertakings aimed at strengthening the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty and achieving its universality. The safeguards system provided by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is an essential part of the non-proliferation regime.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was opened for signature on 24 September 1996, after more than 40 years of efforts by the international community to ban nuclear test explosions in all environments. Under its provisions, the Treaty will enter into force when the 44 States, that possess nuclear power or research reactors, listed in Annex II to the Treaty, have ratified it. In 1999 and 2001, respectively, Conferences to Facilitate the Entry into Force of the CTBT were convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in his capacity as Depositary of the Treaty. Both Conferences adopted Final Declarations which called upon the States which had not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty as soon as possible, especially those whose ratification was needed for the Treaty's entry into force.

The Conference on Disarmament (CD), the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, has been unable to commence substantive work since 1998 due to persisting divergent positions with regard to priorities for disarmament negotiation. Despite efforts by its Member States to break the stalemate, various initiatives and proposals have not led to the adoption of a substantive programme of work.

This chapter deals with a wide range of issues relating to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and developments that occurred in 2002.

Developments and trends, 2002

In 2002, the issue of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation remained a major concern for the international community in maintaining peace and security. Despite efforts on the part of its Member States, the CD was unable to agree on a substantive programme of work. The first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference was held in New York from 8 to 19 April, where the slow progress in nuclear disarmament was noted with apprehension. In June, the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty. Later that month, the Russian Federation, noting the absence of any prerequisites for the entry into force of START II,

As of 31 December 2002, 13 of the 44 States listed in Annex II to the Treaty have yet to ratify it.

declared that it was no longer bound by the obligation under the Treaty. The CTBT continued to lack the needed ratifications for its entry into force. The possibility that terrorists might gain access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including nuclear weapons, which had emerged as a source of serious disquiet after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the subsequent anthrax incidents in the United States, together with concern about clandestine acquisition by State actors of WMD and their delivery vehicles, heightened the world concern over the spread of those weapons.

Other developments, however, had positive effects on progress in the area. On 27 June, the leaders of the Group of Eight (G-8)² agreed on a Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. Under the initiative, the G-8 Governments committed to raise up to US\$20 billion over ten years to support specific cooperation projects, initially in Russia, to address non-proliferation, disarmament, counterterrorism and nuclear safety issues. In October, Cuba ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco bringing the Treaty into force for all States in Latin America and the Caribbean, thereby consolidating that region as a nuclear-weapon-freezone (NWFZ). Cuba also acceded to the NPT in November, bringing the Treaty ever closer to universality. The Panel of Governmental Experts on the issue of missiles in all its aspects concluded its work and its report was before the General Assembly at its fifty-seventh session. In November, The Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation was launched.

At the bilateral level, Russia and the United States signed the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT or Moscow Treaty) on 24 May, whereby the two parties pledged to reduce and limit their deployed strategic nuclear warheads to a level of 1,700-2,000 by 31 December 2012.

First Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference

At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the States parties to the Treaty adopted by consensus a Final Document which is considered a landmark achievement. The Final Document contains an agreement on practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", including an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament.

² The G-8 is comprised of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States.

The implementation of the agreements reached at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, however, has been considered slow and unsatisfactory.

The Final Document also contains an agreement on ways to further strengthen the review process of the Treaty. Under the section on "Improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review process for the Treaty", States parties reaffirmed the provisions in Decision 1 on "Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty" adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. The States parties also recommended that specific time be allocated at sessions of the Preparatory Committee to address specific relevant issues. Furthermore, States parties, recalling paragraph 4 of Decision 1 of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, agreed that the purpose of the first two sessions of the preparatory committee for future review conferences would be to "consider principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality". To this end, each session of the preparatory committee should consider specific matters of substance relating to the implementation of the Treaty and Decisions 1 and 2, as well as the Resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcomes of subsequent review conferences, including developments affecting the operation and purpose of the Treaty. The consideration of the issues at the first and second sessions of the preparatory committee are to be factually summarized and the results transmitted in a report to the following session for further discussion. At its third and, as appropriate, fourth session, the Preparatory Committee, taking into account the deliberations and results of its previous sessions, should make every effort to produce a consensus report containing recommendations to the review conference.

Organization of work

The Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference convened its first session from 8 to 19 April 2002 in New York. It was the first session that the Preparatory Committee held in accordance with the agreement on "Improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review process for the Treaty". The session was chaired by Henrik Salander of Sweden. His election to the post was part of an understanding reached among delegations at the outset of the session, according to which the first session would be chaired by a representative from the Western Group, the second session would be chaired by a representative from the Group of Eastern European States, and the third session by a representative from the Group of Non-Aligned (NAM) and other States parties to the NPT. Furthermore, a representative from the Group of NAM and other States parties to the Treaty would also be proposed for the presidency of the 2005 Review Conference. Of the 187 States then

parties to the Treaty, 139 participated in the first session.³ Cuba, as well as representatives of seven specialized agencies and international and regional intergovernmental organizations, and representatives of 62 non-governmental organizations attended the first session of the Preparatory Committee as observers.

Substantive work

The Committee had a general exchange of views on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory Committee. During the general debate, States parties reaffirmed that the NPT remained the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. They also renewed their commitment to promoting and implementing the Treaty, as well as to the decisions and resolution of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and the Final Document adopted at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Many voiced, however, concern over the slow progress made since 2000 in implementing the agreements reached at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, particularly the practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles

Algeria, Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Republic, Lebanon. Lesotho. Libvan Arab Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia and Zambia.

and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament". Indonesia, on behalf of the NAM and other States parties to the NPT, called for the full implementation of the unequivocal undertaking given by the nuclear-weapon States at the 2000 NPT Review Conference to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament. The nuclear-weapon States reaffirmed their commitment to the NPT and the decisions taken at the 2000 NPT Review Conference and presented, respectively, the measures they had taken to this effect.

The importance and urgency of implementing the Final Document, and thus strengthening the NPT regime, was underlined in relation to the new security challenge that had arisen from the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States. In this connection, Canada stressed that global security prospects were best served by legally-binding multilateralism and thus the global norm against nuclear weapons enshrined in the NPT must be preserved and enhanced. Spain, on behalf of the European Union (EU), stated that the terrorist attacks had given a greater sense of urgency to the common efforts required from all States in reviewing the existing international and national regimes and measures to deal with the security of nuclear installations, nuclear and radiological material.

In relation to the review process and the work of the Preparatory Committee, the agreement contained in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference to improve the effectiveness of the strengthened review process for the Treaty was reaffirmed as an important step in strengthening the NPT review process further to the Decision on "Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty" adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. A number of States parties renewed their commitment to fully utilizing the opportunity given by these agreements to take stock of progress made and developments since the 2000 NPT Review Conference and to consider further measures to be taken in implementing the NPT. The New Agenda Coalition⁴ (NAC), in its working paper⁵, proposed that the first session of the Preparatory Committee should deal with the procedural issues necessary to take its work forward, but it must also deal with matters of substance as was decided in the 1995 and 2000 outcomes. In this regard, the NAC stressed that the first session should substantively focus on nuclear disarmament so as to ensure that there was proper accounting of progress made by States parties in achieving nuclear disarmament. Spain, on behalf of the EU, considered that, as the first in a series of sessions of the Preparatory

⁴ NAC members include Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden.

NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.1.

Committee leading to the next Review Conference in 2005, it would be important for the Committee to lay a solid initial foundation for the review process. It welcomed the flexibility in the overall role and structure of the enhanced review process, allowing the Preparatory Committee to organize its sessions as it deemed best, and to allocate time to address specific relevant issues when needed. It stressed, however, that the preparatory work should be a balanced exercise, paying due consideration to all aspects of the Treaty's implementation: nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It was generally agreed that, in accordance with the agreement reached at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the Chairman should submit a factual summary at the end of the session.

The Committee devoted most of its time to a structured substantive review of the operation of the Treaty under the agenda item entitled "Preparatory work for the review of the operation of the Treaty in accordance with Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty, in particular, consideration of principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, including specific matters of substance related to the implementation of the Treaty and Decisions 1 and 2, as well as the resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcome of the 2000 Review Conference, including developments affecting the operation and purpose of the Treaty." During the substantive discussions, the Committee considered the following three clusters of issues and three specific blocs of issues:

Clusters

- (a) Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and international peace and security;
- (b) Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones; and
- (c) Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II.

Specific blocs

(a) Implementation of Article VI of the Treaty and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament", as well as the agreements, conclusions and commitments listed under the section entitled "Article VI and eighth to

twelfth preambular paragraphs", contained in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference:

- (b) Regional issues, including with respect to the Middle East and the implementation of the 1995 Middle East resolution and the commitments, conclusions and follow-up submissions to the United Nations Secretary-General, the President of the 2005 Review Conference and the Chairpersons of the Preparatory Committee meetings, in accordance with the relevant subparagraphs listed under the section entitled "Regional issues: The Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East", contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference; and
 - (c) Safety and security of peaceful nuclear programmes.
- (d) In the course of the deliberations, States parties put forward documents and proposals in which they reviewed developments since the 2000 NPT Review Conference and outlined measures for further action.

Clusters

(a) Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and international peace and security.

States parties reaffirmed that the NPT was the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament; that nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament were mutually reinforcing; and that in the current international climate, where security and stability continued to be challenged, both globally and regionally, by the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery, preserving and strengthening the NPT was vital to peace and security. A number of States parties stressed the importance of achieving universality of the Treaty and called upon the four States not parties to the NPT to accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon States⁶. Full compliance by all States parties with the provisions of the NPT was considered the best way to strengthen the nonproliferation regime. Concern was expressed about emerging new approaches to the role of nuclear weapons as part of security strategies and doctrines. In this connection, Egypt, on behalf of the NAC, stressed that any presumption of the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclearweapon States was incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and with the broader goal of maintenance of international peace and security.

⁶ Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan. Subsequently, Cuba acceded to the NPT on 4 November 2002.

It was generally felt that the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 had given an even greater sense of urgency to the common efforts of all States in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. The view was held that further strengthening and reinforcing the non-proliferation regime was imperative in order to prevent the use of nuclear materials and technologies for criminal/terrorist purposes. The United States pointed out the importance of the linkage between compliance with Articles I and II and the threat of nuclear terrorism, saying that States that violated the NPT, as well as nuclear supplier States with ineffective export policies, were vulnerable to exploitation by terrorists seeking nuclear material. The United States further noted that strengthening efforts to enforce compliance with the NPT not only helped to prevent the instability caused by the spread of nuclear weapons, but also could help to prevent nuclear terrorism.

There was emphasis on multilateralism as a core principle in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation and strong support for the enforcement of existing multilateral treaties. Egypt, on behalf of the NAC, stressed that international security was a collective concern requiring collective engagement. Internationally negotiated treaties in the field of disarmament had made a fundamental contribution to international peace and security. Unilateral and bilateral nuclear disarmament measures complemented the treaty-based multilateral approach towards nuclear disarmament. Egypt further noted that it was essential that fundamental principles, such as transparency, verification and irreversibility, be applied to all disarmament measures.

(b) Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and NWFZs.

General support was expressed for the concept of NWFZs established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States in the regions concerned. Spain, on behalf of the EU, acknowledged that such zones had enhanced global and regional peace and security. The Russian Federation stated that the establishment of NWFZs was an important measure of disarmament itself and that it had made an essential contribution to the development and consolidation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The importance of the entry into force of the existing NWFZ treaties was stressed. A number of States parties called upon the nuclear-weapon States to accept and ratify protocols to the existing NWFZ treaties. Chile, recognizing the positive contribution that NWFZs can make to the cause of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, suggested that it would be useful to convene an international conference of all States members of NWFZs. It was

⁷ NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/21, Annex II.

recalled that both the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 NPT Review Conference had underscored the importance of security assurances. Many States parties reaffirmed that non-nuclear-weapon States parties should be effectively assured by nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The IAEA's safeguards system was widely recognized as a fundamental pillar of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The work on implementing its safeguards system to verify compliance with the non-proliferation obligations of the NPT was commended. States parties that had not yet concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA were called upon to do so without delay. Also, those that had not yet signed or ratified the Additional Protocol were urged to do so as soon as possible. Japan stated that full compliance with IAEA safeguards, including the Additional Protocol, should be regarded as a prerequisite for nuclear cooperation, especially for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and would significantly contribute not only to improving transparency of nuclear activities in a State, but also to building confidence among States in a region.

The nuclear-weapon States were urged to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification, and to make arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes. In this regard, some States welcomed the work carried out by Russia, the United States and the IAEA under the Trilateral Initiative in developing technologies and methodologies for placing excess nuclear materials from dismantled weapons permanently under IAEA safeguards.

Reflecting on its nuclear-weapon-free status, Mongolia stated that it firmly believed that the establishment of NWFZs, either traditional or non-traditional, was instrumental for enhancing regional and global peace and security, thus contributing to the ultimate objective of achieving a world free of nuclear weapons.

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan reaffirmed that they remained firmly committed to the continuation of the work to implement the initiative for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia (CANWFZ) and, in this connection, intended to make every effort to bring to a successful conclusion the process of drawing up an agreed text for a treaty on the establishment of a CANWFZ. 8 A number of States Parties expressed support for the negotiations on a CANWFZ.

⁸ NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/2.

The importance of export controls was emphasized by a number of States parties, particularly with a view to preventing terrorist attacks with nuclear and radiological material. Canada noted that an effective system of export controls was a critical component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Australia stated that nuclear export controls helped States to conduct peaceful nuclear cooperation while ensuring that their NPT non-proliferation obligations were met. It also believed that export controls were crucial to preventing nuclear or radiological materials falling into terrorists' hands. The importance of transparency in export control was also widely recognized. A number of States parties stressed that nothing in the Treaty should be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all States parties to the development, research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of the NPT.

(c) Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to the development, research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II.

Strong support was expressed for Article IV of the Treaty, which provides a framework for cooperation and confidence for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In this context, the work of the IAEA in implementing Article IV, particularly through its technical cooperation activities, was commended. The importance of aligning technical cooperation programmes with development goals and the needs of the country concerned was emphasized. A representative from the IAEA briefed the Preparatory Committee on the IAEA's role in facilitating the peaceful uses of nuclear technology while, at the same time, providing assurances against the misuse of such technology for weapons purposes through its safeguards system. The IAEA representative noted the increased number of recipient countries in recent years of the Agency's Technical Cooperation Programme, which had exceeded 100. Several States parties stressed the importance of providing the Agency with adequate resources for its cooperation activities.

The United States emphasized that the benefits of peaceful nuclear cooperation could not be enjoyed without strong nuclear export controls. It stated that without national and multilateral measures beyond the application of IAEA safeguards, it would be difficult to sustain the international confidence necessary for robust cooperation in this area.

Spain, on behalf of the EU, renewed its commitment to facilitating the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful use of nuclear energy among all States parties to the Treaty. In this connection, it stressed that effective export

controls did not hamper the development of nuclear energy for peaceful uses by States parties, in conformity with Articles I, II, III and IV of the NPT, and should be regarded as an essential element for further close cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy and transfer of nuclear technology.

Specific blocs

(a) Implementation of Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament", as well as the agreements, conclusions and commitments listed under the section entitled "Article VI and eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs", contained in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

Many States parties expressed their disappointment at the progress made in implementing the practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament as agreed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. 9 In this connection, the responsibility of the nuclear-weapon-States in pursuing nuclear disarmament, in particular in relation to the unequivocal undertaking made at the 2000 NPT Review Conference to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, was underlined. Concern was expressed about existing nuclear arsenals, new approaches to the future role of nuclear weapons and the possible development of new generations of nuclear weapons. The nuclearweapon States orally presented their efforts in implementing the decisions taken at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. In this connection, France, Russia and the United States stressed that nuclear disarmament is best approached on a step-by-step incremental basis. A number of States parties, while welcoming the bilateral negotiations between Russia and the United States on strategic nuclear arms reductions, expressed the hope that such efforts would result in a legally-binding instrument with provisions ensuring irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in order to further promote international security and stability.

The United States announced that it no longer supported some of the practical steps agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, such as the strengthening of the ABM Treaty and the CTBT, while it reaffirmed its commitment to maintaining a moratorium on nuclear testing.

Many States parties concurred on the urgency of the entry into force of the CTBT and called upon the States that had not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty. Those States whose ratification was necessary for its entry into force were especially urged to do so without delay. States parties

⁹ See Disarmament Yearbook, Vol. 25; 2000, pp. 14-15.

reaffirmed their commitment to maintaining a moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending the entry into force of the Treaty. States parties regretted that the CD had been unable to start negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and to establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference was urged to agree on a substantive programme of work.

China and Russia reiterated their opposition to the militarization of outer space and deployment of nuclear weapons outside of the possessors' own territories.

The issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons was discussed extensively. Spain, on behalf of the EU, noted that for the first time in the NPT review process, the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons was included in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference and deemed it an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process. Germany submitted a working paper on non-strategic nuclear weapons 10 in which it noted that nonstrategic or tactical nuclear weapons had so far not been covered by formal arms control agreements and that there were significantly more nuclear warheads for tactical delivery systems than for strategic ones. Referring to the inclusion of the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons in the practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts for nuclear disarmament adopted at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, Germany stressed that as part of the overall nuclear disarmament process, such nuclear weapons must be reduced in a verifiable and irreversible manner. Recognizing that their elimination would not be possible in one leap, however, Germany suggested a gradual approach, which included reporting by Russia and the United States on the implementation of the 1991 and the 1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives and the formalization of those Initiatives. It also proposed that Russia and the United States start negotiations on the reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, and called on other nuclear-weapon States that had not yet done so to take particular security cautions regarding their non-strategic nuclear arsenals.

During the discussion on regular reporting on the implementation of Article VI as contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, a majority of the States parties concurred that such reporting should be made not only at review conferences, but at preparatory committee sessions as well. It was stressed that reporting would promote increased confidence in the overall non-proliferation regime through transparency.

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¹⁰ NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.5.

Many States parties considered that, while the nuclear-weapon States had a special responsibility for the implementation of Article VI, the reporting requirement contained in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference was applicable to all States parties. Some States parties stated that reporting was obligatory. While there were States parties that preferred the reporting to be made on all aspects of the Treaty rather than limiting it to the implementation of Article VI, others proposed to leave the format and frequency of reports to each State party.

Canada, in its working paper on reporting by States parties, ¹¹ noted that the reporting requirement in the practical steps for disarmament as contained in the Final Document consisted merely of undertakings to report, but lacked detail on the object, scope and framework of reporting. It stressed that the Preparatory Committee should carefully examine this issue, with a view to taking a decision at the 2005 Review Conference. In this regard, Canada suggested that it would be advantageous to develop a standard reporting format, which would permit comparisons between States parties over time. The Netherlands stated that, although it was ready to work with other States parties on a format for reporting, priority should be given to substantive and meaningful reporting by all States parties. Canada and the NAC, in its own working paper on the subject¹², expressed interest in creating an open-ended process to elaborate on reporting obligations and establishing a subsidiary body under the Preparatory Committee for this purpose.

Australia, Canada, Germany, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Poland, Sweden and Thailand presented their reports as official documents. ¹³ Other States parties reported to the Preparatory Committee orally. The nuclear-weapons States informed the Preparatory Committee of their respective measures taken in accordance with Article VI, either orally or in information notes.

(b) Regional issues, including the Middle East and the implementation of the 1995 Middle East resolution and the commitments, conclusions and follow-up submissions to the United Nations Secretary-General, the President of the 2005 Review Conference and the Chairpersons of the Preparatory Committee meetings, in accordance with the relevant subparagraphs listed under the section entitled "Regional issues: the Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East", contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference

¹¹ NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.3.

¹² NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.13.

¹³ NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/4, 5, 5/Add.1, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 18 and 20.

A majority of States parties reaffirmed the importance of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and recognized that the resolution remained valid until its goals and objectives were achieved. The Group of Arab States proposed that the 2005 NPT Review Conference must endeavour to create mechanisms for the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and to monitor the implementation of the recommendations made by the 2000 NPT Review Conference to that end, with a view to achieving all its aims and purposes. ¹⁴ Support was expressed for the long-standing proposal for establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction. Some States parties noted that all States in the Middle East were parties to the NPT except Israel and again called upon Israel to accede to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State as soon as possible and place its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.

States parties recalled and reaffirmed the request contained in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference that all States parties, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, the States of the Middle East and other interested States, report through the United Nations Secretariat to the President of the 2005 NPT Review Conference as well as to the Chairpersons of the Preparatory Committee meetings on the steps that they had taken to promote the achievement of a zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. Algeria, Australia, Canada, China, Egypt, France, Japan, Jordan, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, United Kingdom and United States submitted reports to the Preparatory Committee in accordance with the request. 15

Concern was expressed once again over the tension in South Asia and the retention of nuclear weapons programmes by India and Pakistan. States parties urged the two States to meet all the requirements set out in United Nations Security Council resolution 1172 (1998) to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States and to place all their nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. They also reiterated their call upon those States to sign and ratify the CTBT and to maintain the declared moratorium on nuclear testing pending such actions.

States parties noted with concern that the IAEA continued to be unable to verify the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration of nuclear material by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) subject to

¹⁴ NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/3/Add.5.

¹⁵ NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/3 and Add.1-6.

IAEA comprehensive safeguards. The DPRK was urged to fully implement its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

States parties also expressed concern over the fact that since the cessation of IAEA inspections in Iraq in December 1998, the IAEA had not been in a position to provide any assurance of Iraq's compliance with its obligations under Security Council resolution 687 (1991). They called for the full implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1284 (1999), and for the re-establishment of an effective disarmament, ongoing monitoring and verification regime in Iraq.

(c) Safety and security of peaceful nuclear programmes

The importance of strengthening measures to ensure the safety and security of nuclear programmes and facilities, such as the physical protection of nuclear material and export controls, was stressed, in particular in relation to preventing nuclear terrorism. In this regard, the IAEA action plan on the prevention of nuclear terrorism was widely supported. Strengthening nuclear safety, radiation protection, the safety of radioactive waste management and the safe transport of radioactive materials were also discussed. Some States parties emphasized that transportation of radioactive material, including maritime transportation, should be carried out in a safe and secure manner in strict conformity with international standards established by relevant international organizations, such as the IAEA and the International Maritime Organization. States parties that had not acceded to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material as well as the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management were encouraged to do so.

Procedural issues

A number of decisions pertaining to the organization of the Committee's own work and that of the 2005 Review Conference were taken at the first session. Specifically, the Committee elected László Molnár of Hungary, the representative from the Group of Eastern European States, as Chairman of the second session. It also decided that when not serving as Chairman, the Chairmen of the sessions of the Preparatory Committee would serve as Vice-Chairmen of the Committee.

The Committee decided on the dates and venues of further sessions of the Preparatory Committee and provisionally agreed on those of the Review Conference itself. The second session would take place from 28 April to 9 May 2003 in Geneva; the third session, from 26 April to 7 May 2004 in New York; and the Review Conference from 2 to 27 May 2005 in New York.

With regard to decision-making, the Preparatory Committee decided to make every effort to adopt its decisions by consensus. In the event that consensus could not be reached, the Committee would then take decisions in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, which would be applied mutatis mutandis.

In accordance with the Committee's decision on the participation of observers, States not parties to the NPT, specialized agencies, international and regional intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) attended the open meetings of the Committee. An agreement was reached at the 2000 NPT Review Conference that the Committee would allocate one meeting to NGOs to address each session of the Preparatory Committee. Pursuant to the decision, 14 statements were made by NGOs during the first session of the Preparatory Committee.

The first session of the Preparatory Committee concluded its work with the adoption of a report. In accordance with the agreement reached on "Improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review process for the Treaty", the Chairman presented a factual summary of the session ¹⁶ to be transmitted to the second session of the Preparatory Committee as an annex to the report of the first session.

Despite reservations by some States parties regarding the contents of the Chairman's summary, 17 the work of the first session was overall regarded as a good start of the review process leading to the 2005 NPT Review Conference. States parties took stock of developments in the area of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation since the last Review Conference. Egypt, on behalf of the NAC, while noting that the session had provided for an exchange of views and yielded a number of substantive proposals, stressed that greater interaction would be required at the second and subsequent sessions if the objectives of the strengthened review process were to be achieved. It also stated that a structured debate and interaction should lead to concrete conclusions and would lay the foundation for the development of recommendations at the third session. The necessity for interaction at future sessions was also emphasized by Indonesia, on behalf of the NAM and other States parties to the NPT, which stated that at future sessions States parties must address the issues raised at the first session so as to continue strengthening the implementation of the Treaty and the undertakings agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

¹⁶ NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/21, Annex II.

¹⁷ See NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/SR.19. The Chairman's summary is annexed to this chapter.

Ministerial Declaration by the New Agenda Coalition

The Foreign Ministers of the New Agenda Coalition (NAC)¹⁸ issued a Ministerial Declaration on 13 September 2002.¹⁹ In the Declaration, the Ministers expressed their dissatisfaction at the lack of progress in implementing the undertakings made by States parties at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). They reaffirmed their view that the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons was incompatible with the non-proliferation regime and with the broader goal of promoting international peace and security. While acknowledging that reductions in the numbers of deployed strategic nuclear warheads envisaged by the Moscow Treaty represented a positive step in the process of nuclear de-escalation between the United States and Russia, the Ministers stressed that reductions in the deployment and operational status of nuclear weapons could not be a substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, these weapons. The Ministers expressed concern at new approaches to the broader role of nuclear weapons as part of security strategies, including the development of new types of weapons. They urged the international community to intensify efforts to achieve universal adherence to the NPT.

Issues related to the CTBT

Joint Ministerial Statement

On 14 September 2002, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Australia, Japan and the Netherlands launched a Joint Ministerial Statement in support of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), at United Nations Headquarters. Ministers from 52 countries associated themselves with the Joint Statement.²⁰ In the Statement, the Ministers reaffirmed the vision, which was the basis for the adoption of the CTBT in 1996, for a treaty which would rid the world of nuclear-weapon-test explosions and would contribute to the systematic and progressive reduction of nuclear weapons and the prevention of nuclear proliferation as a major instrument in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

¹⁸ Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden.

¹⁹ A/57/425

²⁰ The Joint Ministerial Statement on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was circulated as a document of the United Nations General Assembly at its fifty-seventh session; see documents A/57/586, A/57/692 and A/57/702.

The statement called upon the States that had not signed and ratified the CTBT to do so as soon as possible, in particular those whose ratification was needed for its entry into force. They also called upon all States to continue a moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. Voluntary adherence to such a moratorium was of the highest importance but, the statement noted, could not serve as a substitute for the Treaty's entry into force. The Ministers also considered that it was vital to maintain momentum in building the verification machinery so that it was ready to guarantee compliance with the Treaty.

The Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization

On 20 November, Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO PrepCom) presented to the General Assembly, the report on its work for the year 2001²¹ and other activities in 2002.

The Executive Secretary noted that the level and pace of signatures and ratifications of the CTBT indicated the firm support of the international community for the Treaty and that the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT that had been held in 2001 had led to a significant increase in signatures and ratifications. At the date of the Executive Secretary's statement, a total of 166 States had signed the Treaty and 97 had ratified it. Of the 44 States listed in Annex II, 41 had signed the Treaty and 31 had also ratified it.

Continued progress had been made in the establishment of the International Monitoring System (IMS). The IMS consisted of 321 monitoring stations and 16 radionuclide laboratories that monitor the Earth to detect evidence of possible nuclear explosions. The International Data Centre (IDC) supported the verification responsibilities of States signatories by providing the products and services needed for effective Treaty monitoring. At the same meeting, the Executive Secretary also reported that On-Site Inspections (OSI), as provided for in the Treaty, were a final verification measure, and that the development of a draft OSI Operational Manual was a key task for the PrepCom. The Commission was also acquiring inspection equipment and building up a pool of potential inspectors.

The Executive Secretary noted that, while the primary purpose of the CTBT verification regime was to effectively verify compliance with the Treaty, the CTBT verification technologies, IMS data and IDC products had

²¹ The report on the work of the CTBTO PrepCom in 2001was transmitted to the United Nations General Assembly at its fifty-seventh session through a note by the Secretary-General (A/57/255).

the potential to offer a range of useful civil and scientific applications for sustainable development and betterment of human welfare. In this regard, the PrepCom had organized, with the support of the United Kingdom, a Senior Experts Discussion on Civil and Scientific Applications of CTBT Verification Technologies in May 2002 in London.

During the year under review, the PrepCom had organized training programmes and workshops in support of States signatories in the enhancement of national technical capability for the implementation of the Treaty. In addition, the Commission organized workshops on international cooperation in order to promote the fullest possible exchange among States signatories relating to verification technologies and the establishment and operation of national data centres. International cooperation workshops were hosted by Jamaica, Kenya and Senegal. Planning was underway for similar workshops in Azerbaijan, Fiji and Malaysia in 2003.

The Executive Secretary also reported that on 18 September 2002 the CTBTO PrepCom and the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) had concluded a relationship agreement. This was the first agreement concluded between the PrepCom and a regional nuclear-weapon-free zone organization.

The Executive Secretary also spoke on enhanced cooperation under the Relationship Agreement between the United Nations and the PrepCom. 22 Commenting on the decision by the General Assembly to consider the agenda item on cooperation between the United Nations and regional and other organizations on a biennial basis as part of the revitalization of the work of the Assembly, he noted that the CTBTO PrepCom would look for alternative ways to inform the General Assembly about the outcome of the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT to be held in 2003.

On 20 November 2002, the General Assembly adopted a resolution on "Cooperation between the United Nations and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization" by a vote of 128-1-3.

Conference on Disarmament, 2002

Nuclear disarmament

The 2002 session of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) started in the context of a rapidly changing security environment and widespread concern

²² The text of the Agreement was approved by the United Nations General Assembly on 15 June 2000 (see A/54/280).

²³ A/57/49.

among Member States of its potential consequences for the work of the CD. The increased concern about WMDs falling into the hands of terrorists after the events of 11 September 2001, the emergence of a new role for nuclear weapons in security and defense policies of some States as well as indications of the development of new generations of nuclear weapons affected the views expressed at plenary meetings.

The deadlock that had existed in the Conference for four consecutive years persisted throughout the 2002 session. Consultations aimed at working out a programme of work addressing the priorities of all States were conducted based on the efforts of previous Presidents, in particular, on the so-called "Amorim proposal". ²⁴ The progress made during the 2001 session on accepting the idea of establishing an ad hoc committee to deal with nuclear disarmament appeared uncontested. Efforts thus focused on drafting a mandate for an ad hoc committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS).

Since no agreement was reached on the programme of work, the Conference did not establish subsidiary bodies to deal with any items on its agenda, including nuclear disarmament. Consequently, the issue of nuclear disarmament was addressed by delegations only at plenary meetings. Many references were made to the provisions of the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, and in particular to the 13 practical steps for "systematic and progressive efforts towards nuclear disarmament". Many Western countries emphasized that negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT), together with an early entry into force of the CTBT, constituted the next essential steps in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. A number of States welcomed the signing by the United States and the Russian Federation, on 24 May 2002, of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions and the joint declaration on the new strategic relationship between the two States.

Colombia, speaking on behalf of the Group of 21, reaffirmed the Group's proposal contained in document CD/1570 on the programme of work as well as a draft decision and mandate for the establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament contained in document CD/1571.²⁵ It reiterated that nuclear disarmament remained the highest priority for the CD, and stressed the potential risk of nuclear war, and threats to humanity derived from the continued existence of nuclear weapons and their possible use or threat of use. Accordingly, the Group of 21 underscored once again the need to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons and reiterated their call

²⁴ CD/1624. See *The Yearbook*, vol. 25:2000, pp. 43-44.

²⁵ See *The Yearbook*, vol. 26:2001, pp. 10-11.

to commence negotiations without delay. The Group expressed its serious concern over the lack of anticipated progress following the declaration of the unequivocal undertaking by nuclear-weapon States to nuclear disarmament leading to the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals made during the 2000 NPT Review Conference. ²⁶

India, while preferring the proposal of the Group of 21 for "negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a nuclear weapons convention", was ready to accept the "Amorim proposal" if it enabled the Conference to adopt a programme of work.²⁷

Indonesia was concerned over the adoption of strategic defense doctrines, which entailed the use of nuclear weapons for the sake of security. In its view, efforts of the nuclear-weapon States had fallen far short of the commitments undertaken at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. It underscored that more than two years after the "unequivocal undertaking" at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, measures had still not been identified, much less acted upon. ²⁸

The Islamic Republic of Iran stressed that the emergence of the new nuclear weapons doctrine and its implications constituted a serious violation of the provisions of the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference concerning moratoria on nuclear-weapon-test explosions and the diminishing role of nuclear weapons in security policies.²⁹

Pakistan noted that some recent developments, such as the demise of the ABM Treaty and plans for development of strategic and theatre ballistic missile defenses, had damaged the prospects of global disarmament. In its view, negative trends in strategic stability and disarmament could become much worse if the policies designed to prevent the use of nuclear weapons were abandoned in favour of arbitrary and uni-dimensional approaches to security. Therefore, Pakistan advocated beginning negotiations in an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament.³⁰

China stated that the major nuclear powers should make further cuts in their nuclear arsenals, which should be verifiable, irreversible and achieved through legally binding instruments; the CTBT should be respected and should enter into force; the nuclear-weapon States should honour their

²⁶ CD/PV.891, p. 9.

²⁷ CD/PV.907, p. 11.

²⁸ CD/PV.912, pp. 16-17.

²⁹ CD/PV.900, p. 10.

³⁰ CD/PV.900, p. 3 – 4.

commitments to mutual detargeting of nuclear weapons; and nuclear deterrence strategy based on "first-use policy" should be abandoned. China also maintained that further progress in nuclear disarmament required the achievement of the CTBT and an FMCT, along with the conclusion of a legally binding agreement on negative security assurances and the withdrawal of nuclear weapons stationed on the territory of other countries. In addition, the maintenance of global strategic stability and preservation of undiminished security for all were of fundamental importance to this process. The comprehensive implementation of the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference was also regarded as essential.³¹

The Russian Federation maintained that nuclear disarmament must be sped up and strategic stability consolidated. Moreover, further reductions in strategic offensive arms must be drastic, verifiable and irreversible. It reiterated that it wanted to achieve legally binding agreements in that area, working on the premise that offensive and defensive systems were interrelated. It also intended to continue multilateral efforts and recalled, in this connection, its proposal that the Permanent Members of the Security Council set up a standing consultative process on nuclear disarmament and strategic stability. It also intended to promote measures within the NPT review process. Expressing its commitment to seek compromise on the Conference's programme of work, the Russian Federation recalled its 2001 package proposal for the establishment of an ad hoc committee to consider nuclear disarmament issues with the simultaneous establishment of an ad hoc committee on PAROS with a negotiating mandate. 32

The United States, referring to its Nuclear Posture Review, emphasized that itself and the Russian Federation were no longer adversaries and, therefore, such Cold War notions as mutual-assured destruction were no longer the defining characteristic of the strategic relationship between them. Moreover, the specter of nuclear war between the two countries was a remote possibility. In connection with its decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, the United States emphasized that its strategic relationship with the Russian Federation was much broader than the Treaty, as evidenced by the announcements by both countries of the reductions of their offensive nuclear arsenals to the lowest levels in decades. The United States also reiterated that its strategy to enhance security must include strengthening non-proliferation measures (prevention), more robust counter-proliferation capabilities (protection) and a new concept of deterrence relying more on missile defense and less on offensive nuclear forces. With regard to the CD, the United

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³¹ CD/PV.892, p. 5; CD/PV.910, p. 4.

³² CD/PV.889, pp.14 – 14; CD/PV.900, pp. 14 – 15; and CD/1644.

States' priority continued to be the conclusion of an FMCT. In that context, it was prepared to participate in good faith in the work of the other ad hoc committees that would foster serious and thoughtful discussion of topics related to nuclear disarmament and outer space.³³

Ireland, speaking on behalf of the countries of the New Agenda Coalition, stressed the importance of the CTBT's entry into force and of upholding and maintaining moratoria on nuclear-weapon-test explosions. The NAC believed that continuing to accord an important role to nuclear weapons in the security and defense policies of some States as well as the development of new generations of nuclear weapons would be inconsistent with the unequivocal undertaking by nuclear-weapon States to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. Furthermore, they were of the view that any presumption of the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States was incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the non-proliferation regime and with the goal of the preservation of international peace and security. They also believed that the CD should fulfil its responsibilities, particularly on nuclear disarmament, by agreeing on a programme of work and starting substantive negotiations with the aim of achieving a world free of nuclear weapons.³⁴

Spain and later Denmark, speaking on behalf of the European Union (EU) and associated States, stressed once again the Union's commitment to the full implementation of the decisions and resolutions adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, and to the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. In the context of the CD, this applied in particular to two practical steps agreed to by the States parties to the NPT, namely, the negotiations on an FMCT and the establishment of an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament.³⁵

Australia regarded the global application of the Additional Protocol on strengthened IAEA safeguards as an essential reinforcing step for facilitating nuclear disarmament.³⁶ It also believed that capping fissile material for weapons purpose was essential to achieving irreversible nuclear disarmament.³⁷

Canada recalled that it worked in concert with the Middle Powers Initiative and other Canadian and international non-governmental

³³ CD/PV.890, pp. 4 – 5; CD/PV.892, p. 17; and CD/PV.900, p. 17.

³⁴ CD/PV.907, pp. 7 – 8; and CD/1683.

³⁵ CD/PV.893, pp. 9-10; CD/PV.900, p. 2; and CD/PV.914, pp. 9-10.

³⁶ CD/PV.906, p. 4.

³⁷ CD/PV.891, p. 3.

organizations on issues related to disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. It believed that the menace of WMD must be eradicated and nuclear weapons should be progressively devalued, marginalized and eliminated. To that end, Canada intended to work to achieve the full implementation of the 13 practical steps agreed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. ³⁸

Sweden believed that unilateral declarations by the Russian Federation and the United States on substantial cuts in their strategic arsenals should be formalized in a legally binding agreement, which should include provisions ensuring irreversibility, verification and transparency. Furthermore, tactical nuclear weapons should be included in the next step of the disarmament process.³⁹

Finland believed that non-strategic nuclear weapons should be an integral part of arms limitation and disarmament negotiations. 40

The Netherlands advocated increasing transparency with regard to nuclear arsenals.⁴¹

Towards the end of the 2002 session, five former Presidents of the CD launched a new initiative on a programme of work. With regard to nuclear disarmament, it envisaged the establishment of an ad hoc committee to deal with nuclear disarmament. 42

Fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices

In 2002, Members of the Conference reiterated their positions on negotiations on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for weapon purposes. As in previous years, persistent difficulties over reaching an agreement on a comprehensive programme of work, which would take into account the negotiating priorities of all Member States, prevented the CD from setting up the relevant ad hoc committee. Thus, the issue of the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes was mainly addressed during plenary meetings. ⁴³

The Western as well as Eastern European countries, particularly Spain and Denmark on behalf of the EU and its associated States,⁴⁴ emphasized that the commencement of negotiations on an FMCT, together with an early

 $^{^{38}}$ CD/PV.898, pp. 6 – 7.

³⁹ CD/PV.892, p. 22.

⁴⁰ CD/PV.899, p. 8.

⁴¹ See Chapter III, section on "Transparency in armaments".

⁴² See Chapter VI.

⁴³ See chapter VI, section on the Conference on Disarmament.

⁴⁴ CD/PV.893, p. 10, and CD/PV.914, p. 10, respectively.

entry into force of the CTBT, constituted the next essential steps in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and reiterated that these steps were also endorsed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

The United States regarded negotiations to conclude an FMCT as its priority goal and, in that context, was prepared to participate in good faith in the work of other ad hoc committees that would foster serious and thoughtful discussion of topics related to nuclear disarmament and outer space. The United States considered that the CD must put aside irreconcilable differences and work on issues that were ready for negotiations, such as an FMCT. 45

The Russian Federation supported the commencement of negotiations on an FMCT and advocated the re-establishment of the relevant ad hoc committee with a negotiating mandate, without linkages to any other issues ⁴⁶

Australia believed that capping the fissile material available for use in weapons was essential to achieve irreversible nuclear disarmament. It regarded such a treaty as an indispensable element of any verification regime for a world free of nuclear weapons. Australia also considered that workshops and seminars on an FMCT could assist the CD and pave the way for more rapid progress when formal negotiations begin in the Conference.⁴⁷

Canada expressed its disappointment that, despite an agreed negotiating mandate, the Governments represented in the CD were unwilling to agree on a formula to resume negotiations for an FMCT. It regretted that such an instrument, which would simultaneously advance both disarmament and non-proliferation goals, remained within reach but was seemingly unattainable.⁴⁸

Germany stressed the importance of the commencement of negotiations on an FMCT. It shared the view that an ad hoc committee on the issue, with a negotiating mandate, should be re-established without linkages to other issues on the CD's agenda.⁴⁹

Ireland, on behalf of the NAC, reiterated their frustration at the lack of fulfillment of the 13 steps towards nuclear disarmament agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference which included the immediate commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for weapon purposes.⁵⁰

⁴⁵ CD/PV.890, p.6; CD/PV.907, p. 17.

⁴⁶ CD/PV.889, p.15; CD/PV.900, p.13.

⁴⁷ CD/PV.891, p. 3; CD/PV.906, p. 6.

⁴⁸ CD/PV.898, p. 5.

⁴⁹ CD/PV.895, p. 3.

Japan believed that the 1995 report of the special coordinator on the issue and the mandate contained therein⁵¹ was the only realistic approach to the launching of FMCT negotiations.⁵²

The Netherlands, reiterating that negotiation on an FMCT was long overdue, believed that alternative ways of promoting its cause should be found. In this connection, it recalled its initiative in 2001 for open-ended consultations on a process that could prepare ground for such negotiations within the Conference. It also welcomed seminars organized by Germany as well as by Japan and Australia, which provided an opportunity for a substantive debate on core issues of an FMCT. The Netherlands also wanted to explore the idea of an appeal to relevant members of the CD to declare moratoria on the production of fissile material and to take transparency measures related to production and stocks, pending the conclusion of an FMCT. In its view, such a step would be conducive to preparing ground for negotiations and would be a useful interim contribution to nuclear nonproliferation.⁵³ Subsequently, the Netherlands organized two more openended informal meetings on the subject, in June and September 2002, for the countries participating in the work of the Conference.⁵⁴ These meetings were welcomed by a number of delegations.

China reiterated its support for negotiating and concluding an FMCT and believed that its conclusion would be of great importance in promoting nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It expressed its intention to participate in the negotiation process as soon as agreement was reached on the Conference's programme of work. In this connection, China considered that the Conference's core issues such as PAROS, an FMCT, nuclear disarmament and negative security assurances should be accorded equal importance and be dealt with in a balanced way.⁵⁵

Colombia, on behalf of the Group of 21, reiterated the group's position on the establishment of an ad hoc committee to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for weapon purposes, as contained in document CD/1549.⁵⁶

South Africa introduced a working paper entitled "The Possible Scope and Requirements of the Fissile Material Treaty (FMT)",⁵⁷ expressing the

⁵⁰ CD/PV.907, p. 7.

⁵¹ CD/1299.

⁵² CD/PV.908, p. 8.

⁵³ CD/PV.895, pp. 6-7.

⁵⁴ CD/1676 and CD/1691, respectively.

⁵⁵ CD/PV.900, pp. 20 – 21.

⁵⁶ CD/PV.891, p. 9.

hope that it could bring more constructive focus to the long overdue issue and that it would complement other efforts to sustain and promote interest in negotiating an FMT. South Africa emphasized that, due to its unique historical experience with the destruction of a limited nuclear weapons programme and the completeness of the investigation undertaken by the IAEA, it had acquired some practical insights that might benefit Member States. This was particularly the case with regard to stocks. The paper offered a practical approach to dealing with stocks in a way fulfilling nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. A number of delegations, including Japan, the Republic of Korea and Denmark on behalf of the members of the EU and its associated States, welcomed the document. Algeria believed that the document, with certain amendments, could offer a good working basis for a treaty.

India reiterated its readiness to participate in negotiations leading to a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons use.⁵⁸

Pakistan stressed that it was committed to negotiations in the CD, on an FMT, which should be both a non-proliferation and disarmament treaty. In this context, Pakistan expressed the view that the Conference should also start negotiations in ad hoc committees on nuclear disarmament and PAROS ⁵⁹

Negative Security Assurances

During its 2002 session, the CD considered the issue of negative security assurances in the framework of discussion on its agenda and programme of work.

Colombia, on behalf of the Group of 21, reiterated that while various approaches existed, efforts should be pursued towards the conclusion of a universal and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. ⁶⁰

Algeria, emphasizing that commitments entered into by the nuclearweapon States at the 2000 NPT Review Conference were not respected, called for an explanation of the refusal to conclude a legally binding agreement on the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon

⁵⁷ CD/1671 and Add.1.

⁵⁸ CD/PV.907, p. 11.

⁵⁹ CD/PV.900, p. 4.

⁶⁰ CD/PV.891, p. 10.

States. It stated that this position left non-nuclear-weapon States or States which had renounced nuclear weapons feeling disoriented.⁶¹

Iran believed that the lack of compliance with the commitments undertaken in accordance with NPT provisions and agreed upon during the NPT review conferences, and those unilaterally pledged and reaffirmed, would make the option for a treaty on negative security assurances a viable one. In its view, the wealth of exploratory discussions within the CD on this issue provided the necessary basis for strengthening the NPT regime through an international legally binding instrument. ⁶²

China reiterated its position that the Conference's core issues, including PAROS, FMCT, nuclear disarmament and negative security assurances, should be accorded equal importance and dealt with in a balanced way. China further reiterated that as a nuclear-weapon State, it had never dodged its nuclear disarmament responsibilities and obligations and, accordingly, it had declared that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons. It also gave an unconditional undertaking not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or NWFZs. China stressed that it had always kept its nuclear weapon forces at the minimum level necessary for self-defense, and reiterated its appeal that the five nuclear-weapon States mutually undertake never, under any circumstances, to be the first to use nuclear weapons and to commit themselves unconditionally and in a legally binding manner never to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State. 63

The Russian Federation supported the idea of re-establishing in the CD an appropriate ad hoc committee with the same prior negotiating mandate and had no objection to the elaboration of a global agreement on negative security assurances in the CD provided that this takes into account its fundamental reservations with regard to cases where nuclear weapons could be used in order to repel aggression. The Russian Federation also reiterated its readiness to enlarge the range of countries covered by the existing system of security assurances, by stepping up the process of creating nuclear-weapon-free zones and by strengthening the obligations of non-nuclear-weapon States not to acquire, station or deploy nuclear weapons on their territories. ⁶⁴

Canada considered that the negative security assurances provided by nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT were

⁶¹ CD/PV.903, p. 12.

⁶² CD/PV.900, pp. 10 – 11.

⁶³ CD/PV.910, p. 3.

 $^{^{64}\} CD/PV.900,\,pp.\;16-17.$

a vital element in international security and must be preserved and respected.⁶⁵

Germany observed that the stalemate regarding nuclear disarmament, PAROS, an FMCT, and negative security assurances was deplorable. It believed that all four areas were of acute relevance, and progress, even if it had to be incremental seemed as feasible as it was desirable. 66

Towards the end of the 2002 session, five former Presidents of the Conference presented an informal proposal on the programme of work. The proposal envisaged the establishment of an ad hoc committee to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. These arrangements could take the form of an internationally binding instrument.⁶⁷

Bilateral agreements and other issues

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), signed on 31 July 1991, provided for a reduction of the strategic arsenals of the Russian Federation and the United States to no more than 6,000 nuclear warheads each, over seven years. By December 2001, the parties had completed reductions of their respective nuclear arsenals to the level required under this Treaty.

On 24 May 2002, the Presidents of the Russian Federation and the United States signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) in Moscow, also known as the Moscow Treaty. On the same occasion, they also signed a Joint Declaration on a New Strategic Relationship. Under the Treaty, the parties agreed to limit the level of their deployed strategic nuclear warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200. The Treaty allows each party to determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive forces, based on the established aggregate limit for the number of such warheads. The Treaty also establishes a Bilateral Implementation Commission that will meet at least twice a year to discuss issues related to the Treaty. The Treaty will remain in force until December 2012 and may be extended or superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement.

On 13 June, the withdrawal of the United States from the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty), previously announced in December 2001, became effective. In announcing the decision in 2001, the United States stated that the circumstances affecting its national security had changed fundamentally since the signing of that Treaty in 1972.

⁶⁵ CD/PV.898, p. 7.

⁶⁶ CD/PV.908, p. 5.

⁶⁷ See also chapter on "Institutional aspects".

It added that in order to defend its homeland, forces, friends and allies against new threats, particularly WMD and their delivery means wielded by terrorist and rogue States, it must develop the means to deter and protect against them, including through limited missile defense of its territory.

On 14 June, the Russian Federation, issued a statement on the "Legal Status of the Treaty Between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms". Noting the refusal of the United States to ratify the START II Treaty and the announcement a day earlier of its unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, the Russian Federation declared itself no longer bound by the obligation under international law to refrain from any action that would deprive the Treaty of its objective and goal. START II, which was signed by the two parties on 3 January 1993, would have reduced the parties' strategic nuclear warheads to no more than 3,000 to 3,500 each. The Russian Federation stressed that further progress in the START process was also linked to the ABM Treaty, which, for many years, had been widely regarded and reaffirmed as the cornerstone of international stability and security.

The General Assembly welcomed the signing of the Moscow Treaty by resolution 57/68 entitled "Bilateral strategic nuclear arms reductions and the new strategic framework", adopted without a vote on 22 November. The General Assembly further noted with satisfaction the Joint Declaration signed by Russia and the United States under which they would strengthen mutual confidence, expand transparency, share information and plans, and discuss strategic issues of mutual interest. The General Assembly also invited the United States and the Russian Federation to keep Member States duly informed of their strategic offensive reductions.

Missile-related issues

Missile-related issues, in particular the proliferation of long-range ballistic missiles as well as the efforts by the United States to build a missile defense, an issue that has been closely linked to the ABM Treaty, continued to attract attention and concern. Testing and development of ballistic missiles continued in many regions.

In the course of 2002, the United States conducted several flight tests of its ballistic missile interception systems. Following the withdrawal by the United States from the ABM Treaty, construction began at Fort Greely, Alaska, of silos to house ground-based missile defense interceptors. These silos are to be completed by 2004.

On 17 December, the President of the United States announced that he had directed the Secretary of Defense to proceed with the fielding of an initial set of missile defense capabilities. This initial set will include up to 20

ground-based interceptors, sea-based interceptors, additional Patriot (PAC-3) units, sea- and space-based sensors as well as the upgrading of early-warning radars in the United Kingdom and Greenland.⁶⁸

At their meeting in Prague on 21 November, NATO Heads of State and Government decided to "examine options for addressing the increasing missile threat to Alliance territory, forces and population centres in an effective and efficient way through an appropriate mix of political and defence efforts, along with deterrence." A new NATO Missile Defense feasibility study was launched to examine options for protecting Alliance territory, forces and population centres against the full range of missile threats. ⁶⁹

In 2002, the Panel of Governmental Experts, established in accordance with resolution 55/33 A of 20 November 2000, completed its study of the issue of missiles in all its aspects under the chairmanship of Antonio Vallim Guerreiro of Brazil.⁷⁰

The result contained in the report of the Secretary-General constituted a first effort by the United Nations to address the issue of missiles in all its aspects. ⁷¹ In an overview of the background and current situation in the field of missiles, it noted that there were multiple approaches currently undertaken to deal with the issue, both within and outside the United Nations. It concluded that all approaches undertaken at the national, bilateral, regional, plurilateral and multilateral levels, including the initiatives described in the report, needed to be further explored. ⁷²

Developments in the area of ballistic missile proliferation and missile defenses continued to be followed closely in the deliberations of the First Committee of the General Assembly.⁷³

⁶⁸ www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html.

⁶⁹ Prague Summit Declaration, 21 November 2002, see http://www.nato.int/docu.

The Secretary-General appointed experts from the following Member States to participate in the work of the Panel: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Egypt, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Israel, Japan, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Republic of Korea, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Ukraine, United States of America and the United Kingdom. The panel held its second and third (final) sessions from 1 to 5 April and from 1 to 9 July, respectively, in New York.

^{7Î} A/57/229.

⁷² See Chapter VII for a broader summary of the report.

⁷³ A/57/114 and Adds.1 and 2.

The Islamic Republic of Iran continued its initiative on the issue of missiles by submitting a draft resolution A/C.1/L.32 in the First Committee. By the draft resolution, the General Assembly welcomed the report of the Secretary-General⁷⁴ and requested that he seek the views of Member States on the report and to submit a report to the Assembly at its fifty-eighth session. The Assembly further requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a Panel of Governmental Experts, to explore further the issue of missiles in all its aspects and to submit a report for consideration by the General Assembly at its fifty-ninth session.

The General Assembly adopted the draft resolution, entitled "Missiles" on 22 November 2002. The European Union, as in 2000, abstained in the vote, explaining that the report of the Panel of Governmental Experts did not have enough substance to warrant the convening of a second panel of experts. The United States voted against the resolution because it raised a number of concerns with respect to its political intent and overall direction. Furthermore, the United States stated that, as the results of the previous panel showed that there was insufficient consensus on missiles, there was no justification for a further study.

The Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation

The International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC)⁷⁶ was launched on 25 November at an inaugural meeting in The Hague hosted by The Netherlands. All Member States of the United Nations, except Iraq, were invited to subscribe to the ICOC and attend the Launching Conference. Ninety-three States joined the Code on that date.

Despite the large number of participants at the Code's inauguration, a number of important countries with significant missile technology, such as Brazil, China, DPRK, Egypt, India, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mexico and Pakistan did not join. The Code remains open to States that may wish to join it in the future.

Negotiations over the final shape of the Code had continued for most of 2002, with drafting meetings held in Paris and Madrid in February and July, respectively. The result of these negotiations was the present International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, considered a political agreement rather than a binding legal obligation. It calls on subscribing States to curb and prevent the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, and to exercise maximum possible

⁷⁴ A/57/229.

⁷⁵ A/RES/57/71.

⁷⁶ See Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs website www.minbuza.nl.

restraint in the development, testing and deployment of those missiles. The Code further recognizes that States should not be excluded from utilizing the benefits of space for peaceful purposes. To increase transparency and reduce mistrust among subscribing States, the Code introduces confidence-building measures such as annual declarations on ballistic missile and space launch vehicle policies and their respective land (test-) launch sites, and the exchange of pre-launch notifications on ballistic missile and space launch vehicle launches and test flights.

On 26 November, the subscribing States held their first meeting. It appointed the Netherlands as the first Chair of the Code for a period of one year. One of the important tasks for the Chair will be to expand the number of subscribing States. Austria was appointed as administrative Central Contact of the Code. The Code was subsequently renamed as The Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.

Strategic doctrines

In February 2002, the United States Department of Defense announced the completion of the "Nuclear Posture Review" which was conducted at the direction of the Congress in order to lay out the direction for American nuclear forces over the next five to ten years. 77 Building on the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) released on 1 October 2001, 78 the Nuclear Posture Review set in motion a major change in the United States approach to the role of nuclear offensive forces in its deterrent strategy and presented the blueprint for transforming its strategic posture. The Nuclear Posture Review shifted planning for the United States strategic forces from the threat-based approach of the Cold War to a capabilities-based approach. This, according to the Review, should provide over the coming decades a credible deterrent at the lowest level of nuclear weapons consistent with the United States and allied security. The Review establishes a new triad composed of offensive strike systems (both nuclear and non-nuclear); defenses (both active and passive); and a revitalized defence infrastructure that will provide new capabilities in a timely fashion to meet emerging threats. This new triad is bound together by an enhanced command and control and intelligence system.

The Nuclear Posture Review affirmed that intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and long-

⁷⁷ The report has not been made publicly available.

⁷⁸ See special briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review by US Department of Devense, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/. Letter from Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld transmitting the Nuclear Posture Review to the Congress.

range nuclear-armed bombers would continue to play a vital role, although they would be integrated with new non-nuclear strategic capabilities. It also referred to the need for a more flexible and adaptive planning system that retained the rigor and expertise developed over the years, yet employed modern computing techniques and streamlined processes to improve the US planning capability for rapid, flexible crisis response in the face of new national security challenges.

The Nuclear Posture Review, while stressing that there was no change in the United States position on maintaining a nuclear testing moratorium, mentioned the need to accelerate nuclear test readiness. It also referred to the need to develop and field missile defense as part of building the New Triad.

The United States further issued "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America" in September 2002.⁷⁹ It laid out the security policy of the United States from both military and diplomatic aspects, as well as relating to human rights, democracy-building, economic development and regional relations. The National Security Strategy noted that new deadly challenges had emerged from rogue States and terrorists who considered WMD as weapons of choice and stated that deterrence based only upon the threat of retaliation, as had been the case in the Cold War era, was less likely to work against the new threat. In this regard, the National Security Strategy stated that, while the United States would constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, it would not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise its right to self-defense by acting pre-emptively against terrorists. The development of an effective missile defense system was included as an important component of the United States response to stop rogue States and terrorists before they were able to threaten or use WMD against the United States or its allies. It reaffirmed that the United States would enhance diplomacy, arms control and non-proliferation efforts, including multilateral export controls and threat reduction assistance, as strategies to combat the use of WMD by rogue States and terrorists.

"The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction" issued by the United States Administration in December 2002 laid out three principal pillars: counter-proliferation to combat the use of WMD; strengthened non-proliferation to combat WMD proliferation; and consequence management to respond to WMD use. The National Strategy, in order to prevent States and terrorists from acquiring WMD and missiles, stressed the need to enhance traditional measures such as diplomacy, arms control, multilateral agreements, threat reduction assistance and export

⁷⁹ The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 17 December, 2002. See http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002.

controls and to ensure compliance with relevant international agreements. It laid out four cross-cutting enabling functions to integrate the three pillars: intelligence collection and analysis on WMD, delivery systems, and related technologies; research and development to improve the United States ability to respond to evolving threats; bilateral and multilateral cooperation; and targeted strategies against hostile States and terrorists. In terms of counterproliferation, the National Strategy stated that the United States would continue to make clear that it reserved the right to respond with overwhelming force - including through resort to all of its options - to the use of WMD against it, its forces abroad and friends and allies. The importance of non-proliferation and threat reduction cooperation, particularly through the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Material of Mass Destruction, was stressed.

"The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter" was issued by the Ministry of Defence of the United Kingdom in July 2002, which was developed as a new chapter to the 1998 Strategic Defence Review to look at the United Kingdom defense posture and plans to ensure that the country had the right concepts, the right capabilities and the right forces to meet new security challenges. In terms of deterrence, the document reaffirmed that the United Kingdom's nuclear weapons had a continuing use as a means of deterring major strategic military threats, and they had a continuing role in guaranteeing the ultimate security of the United Kingdom, while it had a broad range of responses available to terrorism.

Draft Convention on Nuclear Terrorism

The Ad Hoc Committee established by General Assembly resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1996 met from 28 January to 1 February to continue its work to elaborate a draft international convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism—one aspect of the efforts to develop a comprehensive legal framework of conventions dealing with international terrorism. Due to the persistent divergence of views on the scope of the draft convention, progress was limited and the Ad Hoc Committee was unable to conclude its work. Later in the year, during the fifty-seventh session of the General Assembly, further work was conducted within the framework of the Sixth Committee. Despite a comprehensive exchange of views on the principal outstanding issues related to the scope of application of the convention no further progress was made. By resolution 57/27, the General Assembly decided that the Ad Hoc Committee should continue its efforts to resolve the outstanding issues related to the draft convention on nuclear terrorism.

IAEA safeguards

Since the approval of the Model Protocol Additional to Safeguards Agreements⁸⁰ by the IAEA's Board of Governors in May 1997, progress in signing and bringing it into force has been slow. At the end of the year, 66 States had signed the Additional Protocol, including the five nuclear-weapon States and one State with a non-comprehensive safeguards agreement, Cuba. The Additional Protocol was in force in 28 States.⁸¹

Ministers and other high-level Government representatives from 134 IAEA Member States attended the 46th General Conference of the Agency, held from 16 to 20 September in Vienna. In his statement to the General Conference, the Director General of the IAEA recalled that the Agency had been unable to draw any conclusions or provide any assurance regarding Iraq's compliance with its obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions. It would therefore be important for the Agency to resolve, upon recommencement of inspections, the key issue of whether the situation regarding Iraq's nuclear activities and capabilities had changed in any material way since December 1998. He also stressed that resumption of inspections would be a crucial step towards providing assurance to the international community that Iraq's nuclear weapons programme had been neutralized and was not being revived.⁸²

Referring to the status of the Safeguards Agreement with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), the Director General stated in the same conference that the Agency continued to be unable to verify the completeness and correctness of DPRK's initial declaration or whether DPRK had declared all the nuclear material that was subject to IAEA safeguards under its NPT safeguards agreement. He also noted that the work required to verify the

Additional protocol is a protocol additional to a safeguards agreement (or agreements) concluded between the IAEA and a State, or group of States, following the provisions of the Model Additional Protocol [540]. A comprehensive safeguards agreement, together with an additional protocol, contains all of the measures included in the Model Additional Protocol. In the case of an INFCIRC/66-type safeguards agreement or of a voluntary offer agreement, an additional protocol includes only those measures from [540] that have been agreed to by the State concerned. Under Article 1 of [540], the provisions of the additional protocol prevail in the case of conflict between the provisions of the safeguards agreement and those of the additional protocol.

Strengthened Safeguards System: Status of Additional Protocols (table), http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Programmes/Safeguards/sg_protocol.shtml.

⁸² See the statement of the IAEA Director General to the 46th regular session of the IAEA General Conference 2002, Vienna, 16 September.

correctness and completeness of DPRK's declaration could take three or four years, assuming its full cooperation.

With regard to verification issues, the Director General stressed that the Agency continued to play a critical role in ensuring the health and vitality of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. He stated that an immediate priority for the Agency would be the conclusion of comprehensive safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols with all States that had made non-proliferation commitments through the NPT and other relevant agreements, and urged all States that had not yet done so to conclude and bring into force the required safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol at an early date. The Director General also reported on the lack of progress in his consultations with the States of the Middle East region on the application of full scope safeguards to all nuclear activities in the region and on the development of model agreements that would contribute to the establishment of a NWFZ in that region.

Referring to challenges posed by the threat of nuclear terrorism, the Director General called on all States to continue to contribute resources needed for the full implementation of the Agency plan to upgrade nuclear security worldwide. Enhanced efforts were needed, including threat assessments, to protect nuclear facilities against attack, sabotage or theft and the focus of these efforts should be expanded to cover research installations as well. The Director General also highlighted the Agency's work to bring radioactive sources under appropriate control, whether in use, storage, orphaned or in transport.

In the context of progress in nuclear arms control measures, in particular the Moscow Treaty, as well as the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction established by the G-8, the Director General noted that preparatory work under the initiative of the Russian Federation and the United States to submit nuclear material released from their military programmes to Agency verification was almost concluded. Experts from the two States and the Agency had examined the technical, financial and legal issues associated with a future role for the IAEA in the verification of weapon-origin fissile material. The Director General would report to the Agency's Board of Governors on this matter once they had indicated the types of material they would submit for Agency verification 83 as well as the timing and modalities for doing so.

In a statement to the General Conference, Cuba reaffirmed its decision to accede to the NPT and to ratify the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco). The

⁸³ Ibid.

Director General of the IAEA welcomed this as a step to complete the weapon-free zone ⁸⁴ and expressed the hope that Cuba would soon conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency as required under Article III of the NPT.

At the General Conference, Member States stressed the need for effective safeguards to prevent the use of nuclear material for prohibited purposes in contravention of safeguards agreements and underlined the vital importance of effective safeguards for facilitating cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Conference also affirmed the importance of measures to strengthen and improve the efficiency of the safeguards system in detecting undeclared nuclear material. Members urged Iraq to provide immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to enable Agency inspectors to carry out their mandate in that country. In addition, the Conference adopted a resolution backing the full implementation of IAEA verification responsibilities in the DPRK and urged the DPRK to take all steps that the Agency deemed necessary to verify the correctness and completeness of its declared nuclear programme.

The Russian Federation, the United States and the IAEA, during the General Conference, concluded that the task entrusted to them under the Trilateral Initiative ⁸⁸ in 1996 had been fulfilled. Moreover, the three parties agreed to direct their technical experts to begin discussions without delay on future cooperation within the trilateral format and to meet again in September 2003 to review progress in that regard. ⁸⁹

In the area of Agency's efforts to combat nuclear terrorism, the IAEA Board of Governors, on 19 March, approved in principle the action plan

⁸⁴ IAEA Press Release 2002/14.

⁸⁵ GC(46)/RES/12.

⁸⁶ GC(46)/RES/15 and GC-46 Daily Wrap: Friday, 20 September 2002, at http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/About/Policy/GC/GC46.

⁸⁷ GC(46)/RES/14 and GC-46 Daily Wrap: Friday, 20 September 2002, at http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/About/Policy/GC/GC46.

⁸⁸ The Trilateral Initiative was launched in 1996 following independent statements by the President of the United States in 1993 and by the President of the Russian Federation in 1996. It is an Initiative between the IAEA, the Russian Federation and the United States in the context of Article VI of the NPT. The purpose of the Initiative is to examine the technical, legal and financial issues associated with IAEA verification of weapon origin and other fissile material released from defence programmes in the two countries. See also www.IAEA.org/worldatom/periodicals/bulletin/bull434.

⁸⁹ IAEA Press Release 2002/13.

designed to upgrade worldwide protection against acts of terrorism involving nuclear and other radioactive materials. ⁹⁰ The Board of Governors also called upon IAEA member States to contribute to the Nuclear Security Fund to support the plan. ⁹¹ The 46th General Conference adopted a resolution on measures to improve nuclear security and protection against nuclear terrorism. The resolution emphasized the importance of physical protection, measures against illicit trafficking of nuclear materials, as well as national control systems for ensuring protection against nuclear terrorism. ⁹²

Verification activities in Iraq

Upon resumption of verification activities in Iraq on 27 November. 93 the initial priority of the IAEA was the re-establishment of its knowledge of Iraq's nuclear capabilities, including conformation of the locations of major equipment, of nuclear material and significant non-nuclear materials, and of key technical personnel. Since the commencement of inspections till the end of the year, the IAEA had conducted 109 inspections at some 88 locations in Iraq. A majority of these inspections took place at industrial facilities. research centres and universities where most of Iraq's significant technical capabilities were known to have existed in the past. The inspections also included facilities identified through commercial satellite imagery as having been modified or constructed since 1998, in addition to some new locations. All of the inspections were carried out without prior notification to Iraq. except where notification was necessary to ensure that specific support were available. The Iraqi authorities consistently provided access without conditions and without delay, as well as made available additional original documentation in response to requests by IAEA inspectors. 94

Upon the resumption of activities in Iraq, the Agency also started the process of interviewing key Iraqi personnel. While the determination of the modalities for interviews, including location, was vested by Security Council resolution 1441 in the IAEA, the willingness of the interviewees to accept the IAEA preferred modalities remained a limiting factor. Moreover, analysis of all information available to the Agency was continuing in parallel with, and

⁹⁰ See *The Yearbook*, vol. 26: 2001, p. 26-28.

⁹¹ IAEA Press Release 2002/04.

⁹² GC(46)/RES/13 "Nuclear Security – Progress on Measures to Protect Against Nuclear Terrorism".

⁹³ See Chapter II, p. 89

⁹⁴ Status of the Agency's Verification Activities in Iraq as of 8 January 2003, Informal Briefing of the United Nations Security Council by IAEA Director-General, Dr. Mohamed El Baradei, 9 January 2003.

in support of, inspections activities. In this context, the IAEA integrated the new declarations submitted by Iraq, including the updated backlog of semi-annual declarations provided in September 2002 and the currently accurate, full and complete declaration submitted in December 2002, with the information accumulated between 1991 and 1998 and information acquired after 1998.

The Director-General of the IAEA, in his briefing to the Security Council in early January 2003, concluded that by that time no new information of significance had emerged regarding Iraq's past nuclear programme (pre-1991) or with regard to Iraq's activities during the period between 1991 and 1998. Moreover, no evidence of ongoing prohibited nuclear or nuclear-related activities had been detected, although not all of the laboratory results of sample analysis had yet been available.⁹⁶

DPRK issues

On 16 October, the international press reported an announcement by the United States Department of State that during bilateral meetings the DPRK had acknowledged that it had a programme to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. Following the announcement, the IAEA Director General and the United Nations Secretary-General expressed concern at the reported existence of the programme. The IAEA requested the DPRK to provide information about the reports and confirmed the Agency's readiness to discuss the matter and general question of implementation of IAEA safeguards in the country.

On 29 November, IAEA Board of Governors adopted by consensus a resolution on the implementation of the IAEA safeguards in the DPRK reiterating its previous calls to the DPRK to comply fully and promptly with its safeguards agreement and to cooperate fully with the Agency to that end. The Board of Governors further urged the DPRK to give up any nuclear weapons programme expeditiously and in a verifiable manner. ¹⁰⁰

On 13 December, the Secretary-General of the United Nations urged the DPRK to comply with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. ¹⁰¹ In a further statement on 27 December, the Secretary-General expressed concern

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ US State Department Press Statement, www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/.

⁹⁸ For statement see http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=119.

⁹⁹ IAEA Press Release 2002/17.

¹⁰⁰ IAEA Media Advisory 2002/33

¹⁰¹ For statement see http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=209.

over the increasing tensions on the Korean Peninsula and urged DRPRK to fully cooperate with the IAEA. ¹⁰² On 24 December, the IAEA Director General reported that the DPRK had disrupted safeguards equipment at three facilities at Nyongbyong, including the reprocessing facility. ¹⁰³ Four days later, IAEA inspectors left the country at the request of the DPRK. ¹⁰⁴ In a statement on 29 December, the Director General said that the IAEA would submit a report to its Board of Governors for consideration at an emergency meeting scheduled for 6 January in Vienna. He added that he would urge the Board to demand that the DPRK immediately allow the inspectors to resume surveillance at the reactor complex and, barring that, that the IAEA would "have an obligation to refer the matter to the Security Council". ¹⁰⁵

On 11 November, the Director General of the IAEA presented the Agency's annual report to the UN General Assembly under the agenda item entitled "Report of the IAEA". In his accompanying statement, the Director General reported on the progress made with regard to the Agency's comprehensive plan 106 to upgrade nuclear security worldwide and elaborated on a peer review process underway to assess the physical protection of nuclear facilities. He also noted that a partnership had been established in June between the Russian Federation, the United States and the Agency to secure the radioactive sources lost or abandoned during the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In the field of verification of nuclear non-proliferation, the Director General reported on the preparations underway for resumption of inspections in Iraq. In his view, success of the inspections depended on meeting the following criteria: 1) full authority for inspections with unfettered access to any location; 2) access to all sources of information; 3) unified support of the Security Council throughout the inspection process: 4) preservation of integrity and impartiality in the inspection process; and 5) cooperation from Iraq, with willingness to be transparent and assist in carrying out inspections. 107

The Director General also noted the slow progress on the part of States in fulfilling their obligations under the NPT to bring safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols into force. He stressed that without those agreements in force the Agency could not perform verification activities or provide

¹⁰² See http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=220.

¹⁰³ IAEA Press Release 2002/24.

¹⁰⁴ IAEA Press Release 2002/26.

¹⁰⁵ IAEA Media Advisory 2002/73.

¹⁰⁶ See The Yearbook, vol. 26: 2001, p. 27-28.

¹⁰⁷ See the statement by IAEA Director General to the Fifty-seventh regular session of the UN General Assembly, New York, 11 November.

assurance of non-proliferation. Referring to reports suggesting that the DPRK had been working on an undeclared programme to produce highly enriched uranium, he noted that the Agency had asked the DPRK to confirm the accuracy of the reports and expressed readiness to discuss this and other issues relevant to its compliance with its obligations under the safeguards agreement.

Several delegations stressed the need for Iraq and the DPRK to comply with their international obligations in relation to their nuclear activities. Member States, in particular developing States, reiterated the importance of nuclear energy in satisfying their growing energy needs and in contributing to their economic growth. In this regard, they commended the Agency's work in the field of technical cooperation and assistance. Moreover, many delegations in acknowledging the threat of terrorists accessing nuclear or radioactive materials, stressed the importance of the Agency's efforts to prevent this.

By resolution 57/9 of 11 December, the General Assembly called upon Iraq to implement in full and without further delay all relevant Security Council resolutions and to cooperate fully with the Agency to that end. On the issue of the DPRK, the Assembly noted with growing concern that the Agency continued to be unable to verify the accuracy and completeness of DPRK's initial declaration of nuclear material and that the Agency was therefore unable to conclude that there had been no diversion of nuclear material. The Assembly called upon the DPRK to begin promptly full cooperation with the Agency for the verification and completeness of its initial declaration. The Assembly further called upon all Member States to provide to the Nuclear Security Fund the political and financial support it needed, and urged States to strengthen their national efforts to secure all radioactive sources within their borders. The Assembly also called on States in the Middle East to fully apply IAEA safeguards, to adhere to international non-proliferation regimes and to establish a NWFZ in the region. ¹⁰⁸

The resolution, introduced by Kuwait, was adopted by a recorded vote of 138 in favour, 1 against (DPRK) and 2 abstentions (Angola and Vietnam). As in previous years, separate votes were taken on several paragraphs, including the paragraphs on the safeguards system, the application of safeguards in the Middle East and on Iraq's cooperation with the Agency. Furthermore, Iraq introduced an amendment ¹⁰⁹ to the draft resolution. In the amendment, the Secretary-General's letter to the President of the Security Council ¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁸ A/RES/57/9.

¹⁰⁹ A/57/L.17.

¹¹⁰ S/2002/1034

informing the Council of Iraq's decision to allow the return of the weapons inspectors was extensively quoted, a development which the General Assembly welcomed. The Assembly adopted a motion not to take any action on the Iraq amendment with a recorded vote of 86 in favour, 11 against 111 and 26 abstentions.

Nuclear safety and radioactive waste, including physical protection

The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management entered into force on 18 June 2001. The Convention is the first international instrument that addresses the safety of management and storage of radioactive wastes and spent fuel in countries with and without nuclear programmes. By the end of 2002, the Convention had 29 Contracting Parties and 42 Signatory States. In 2002, preparations were underway for the Organizational Meeting of Contracting Parties, to be held from 7 to 9 April 2003 in Vienna, (7 to 9 April 2003), as well as for the first Review Meeting (3 to 14 November 2003).

The Convention on Nuclear Safety entered into force in October 1996. By the end of 2002, the Convention had 54 Contracting Parties and 65 Signatory States, covering 428 of the 448 nuclear power reactors worldwide. The Second Review Meeting of Contracting Parties to the Convention was held in Vienna, from 15 to 26 April. Parties to the Convention concluded that significant progress had taken place in a number of key areas, such as strengthened legislation, regulatory independence, availability of financial resources, enhanced emergency preparedness, as well as safety improvements at nuclear power plants. Moreover, commitment of States to all aspects of nuclear safety was regarded higher than ever. Over 400 representatives from forty-six Contracting Parties attended the Review Meeting. 113

The 46th General Conference of the IAEA adopted a resolution on measures to strengthen international cooperation in nuclear, radiation, transport and waste safety. The resolution appealed to all Member States to become parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. Moreover, it welcomed the progress being made towards implementing the Revised Action Plan for the Safety and

¹¹¹ Algeria, Belarus, Cuba, DPRK, Jordan, Libya, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Vietnam and Yemen.

¹¹² IAEA Fact Sheet "Convention on Nuclear Safety", Registration No: 1676.

¹¹³ IAEA Press Release 2002/07.

Security of Radiation Sources, and, in light of increased international concern about the potential misuse of radioactive sources, welcomed the work done in 2002 to strengthen the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. In addition, the resolution called for continued efforts, at the appropriate international and regional levels, to examine and optimize measures and international regulations relevant to the international maritime transport of radioactive materials. ¹¹⁴

The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which entered into force on 8 February 1987, requires Contracting Parties to ensure during international nuclear transport the protection of nuclear material within their territory or on board their ships or aircraft. By the end of 2002, the Convention was in force for 81 States. 115

The 46th General Conference of the IAEA reaffirmed the importance of the Convention as the only multilateral instrument dealing with the physical protection of nuclear material. The Conference also noted with concern the lack of progress in the work of the open-ended group of legal and technical experts to prepare a draft of a well-defined amendment aimed at strengthening the Convention, and called for the early finalization of the negotiations on such an amendment. From 4 to 8 November, the open-ended group of legal and technical experts met in Vienna to continue its work to prepare a draft amendment to the Convention. The Group agreed that there would be one further, final meeting to be held from 3 to 14 March 2003 in Vienna.

The IAEA further convened a number of other conferences in 2002, focusing on verification, safety and security of nuclear materials, and radioactive waste. A "Seminar for African States on the Nuclear Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: The Role of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols" was organized in cooperation with the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, (Johannesburg, 24 to 27 June); an international conference on "Safe Decommissioning for Nuclear Activities: Assuring the Safe Termination of Practices Involving Radioactive Materials" (Berlin, 14 to 18 October); an international conference on "Safety Culture in Nuclear Installations", (Rio de Janeiro, 2 to 6 December); and a conference on "Issues and Trends in Radioactive Waste Management", (Vienna, 9 to 13 December). 117

¹¹⁴ GC(46)/RES/9.

¹¹⁵ IAEA information sheet "Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material", Registration No: 1533.

¹¹⁶ GC(46)/RES/13.

Radiological weapons

While the issue of radiological weapons has become one of urgent concern after 11 September, over the years it has been addressed at various disarmament fora. In 1948, the United Nations Commission for Conventional Arms defined radiological weapon as one type of weapon of mass destruction. The 1978 Final Document of SSOD I affirmed that "a convention should be concluded prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons".

The issue of radiological weapons had been on the agenda of the CD for many years. 120 From 1980 to 1992, the CD established annually an ad hoc working group, later an ad hoc committee, to consider a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. In 1981, Sweden proposed to include the issue of attacks on nuclear plants into the negotiation. In 1987, the ad hoc committee decided to establish two contact groups dealing with the prohibition of radiological weapons in the "traditional" sense, and issues relevant to the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities, respectively. At the CD's 1992 session, the ad hoc committee reported its work to the Conference, stating that although the draft convention prohibiting radiological weapons was at an advanced stage, the basic provisions governing the scope and definition of radiological

¹¹⁷ IAEA fact sheet "Major IAEA Meetings for 2002", www.iaea.org/worldatom.

¹¹⁸ The Commission defined WMD "to include atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of atomic bombs or other weapons mentioned above." See The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970 (United Nations publication, sale No. 70.IX.1), Chap. II, page 28.

¹¹⁹ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4), sect. III, para. 77. (http://disarmament.un.org).

¹²⁰ In 1975, the Soviet Union proposed a new agenda item entitled "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons" to be considered by the General Assembly, with a draft international agreement on the subject attached. At that time, "radioactive material weapons", now known as radiological weapons (devices containing radioactive substances which are dispersed by conventional explosives), did not exist, and they are still not known to be produced. See The Yearbook, vol. 1: 1976, Chap. XV. After bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the US, they submitted in 1979 to the CD a joint proposal on major elements of such a convention. See documents CD/31 and CD/32.

weapons remained unresolved. With regard to a draft convention banning attacks against nuclear facilities, the fundamental question of what facilities would fall under the protection of the convention remained open. ¹²¹ In 1993, the CD decided to focus its energies on negotiating the CTBT and thus did not establish an ad hoc committee on radiological weapons. The issue was shelved until after the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001, when the threats of possible use by terrorists of a radiological dispersal device, or so-called "dirty bomb", led to renewed interest in the issue among Member States.

During the 2002 session of the CD, several delegations addressed the issue of radiological weapons in plenary meetings. On 31 July, Germany lightlighting the importance of considering anew the issue of radiological weapons in the light of the threat of terrorist use of such weapons, submitted a discussion paper proposing that the Conference consider the issue. In addition, Germany, during its Presidency, conducted open-ended informal consultations on the basis of its paper and suggested that a special coordinator be appointed. Denmark, speaking on behalf of the EU and a number of States which associated themselves with its statement, welcomed the proposal put forward by Germany for the CD to revisit the issue of radiological weapons. Efforts to create an ad hoc committee on the item in the CD, however, did not materialize due to lack of agreement on its overall programme of work.

During the debate in the First Committee of the General Assembly, a number of Member States expressed concern about the possible development of new types of WMD that had characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those WMD identified in 1948 by the Security Council, including radiological weapons. The General Assembly adopted resolution 57/50 requesting the CD to keep the matter under review, with a view to making recommendations on undertaking specific negotiations on identified new types of WMD.

In addressing the question of WMD and terrorism, the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, during its two sessions in 2002, identified a form of nuclear terrorism "matching highly radioactive materials with conventional explosives to create radiological dispersal devices". It recommended that the

¹²¹ See Report of the Conference on Disarmament, Official Records of the Forty-Seventh Session of the General Assembly, Supplement No. 27 (A/47/27), pp. 74-83.

¹²² CD PV. 908, p. 15.

¹²³ CD/1681.

¹²⁴ CD PV. 914, p. 11.

CD resume negotiations on a convention for a prohibition of radiological weapons. 125

The related question of adequate security of radioactive materials has been on the agenda of the IAEA for many years and several sets of regulations have been adopted, the latest being "Basic Safety Standards for Protection Against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources (1996) and "Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources" (2001).

IAEA held a Conference on Radiation Security (Vienna, 11-13 March 2002) which called for stronger national and international security over radioactive sources, especially those that could be used to produce a terrorist "dirty bomb", warning that the current control of radioactive sources was inadequate and that urgent measures were needed to stop terrorists from accessing such a weapon. ¹²⁶

Export Controls

Nuclear Suppliers Group

The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) held its 2002 Plenary Meeting on 16-17 May in Prague under the chairmanship of the Czech Republic. The membership of the Group rose to 40 with the admission of Kazakhstan as the newest member. ¹²⁷ The Group recognized the challenge of terrorism as manifested in September 2001 and agreed that it would continue to develop its contribution to preventing and countering nuclear terrorism. The Group also agreed to continue to seek ways to enhance information-sharing capabilities within the regime.

In that context, the NSG acknowledged the need for effective export controls, including closer cooperation between law enforcement authorities, and expressed strong support for the anti-terrorism measures being

¹²⁵ A/57/335, pp. 5-6.

¹²⁶ IAEA Press Release PR 2003/03 of 13 March 2002; In his opening statement, the Director General said that stricter measures were urgently needed to keep radioactive material out of the hands of terrorists, who could use it to spread havoc with "dirty bombs".

¹²⁷ The membership of the NSG is as follows: Argentina, Australia, Australia, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States.

undertaken by the IAEA. The Group also reiterated the importance of the requirement of IAEA full-scope safeguards as a condition for supply, of strengthening the physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities, and of prevention of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials. The Group renewed its encouragement to all those that had not yet done so to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA, as well as the Additional Protocol, and stressed the need for States to follow the NSG Guidelines.

The Group mandated the Chair to continue the dialogue with the non-NSG countries that have developed nuclear programmes and are potential nuclear suppliers (China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Israel, Malaysia, Mexico and Pakistan) for the purpose of strengthening the global non-proliferation regime, in particular through the enhanced application of export controls.

The NSG convened an Extraordinary Plenary Meeting in Vienna on 13 December, also under the chairmanship of the Czech Republic. The Meeting was held to respond to the new proliferation and security challenges that had emerged and threatened to strike at the foundations of the global non-proliferation regime. In response to the threat of nuclear terrorism, the NSG agreed to several comprehensive amendments to strengthen its guidelines. These amendments were intended to prevent and counter the threat of diversion of nuclear exports to nuclear terrorism. The Plenary emphasized that effective export controls were an important tool to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism.

The NSG recalled resolution GOV/2002/60 adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors, which recognized that a covert enrichment programme or any other covert nuclear activities would constitute a violation of the DPRK's international agreements, including their safeguards agreement pursuant to the NPT. The Plenary also took note of other concerns by participating Governments that the recent activities of the DPRK were a clear violation of its commitments under the Agreed Framework and the Joint North-South Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The NSG called on all States to exercise extreme vigilance that their exports and any goods or nuclear technologies that transit their territorial jurisdiction do not contribute to any aspect of DPRK's nuclear weapons efforts.

Missile Technology Control Regime

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) held its 17th Plenary Meeting in Warsaw from 24 to 27 September, under the chairmanship of Poland, in order to review its activities and further strengthen its efforts to prevent missile proliferation. 128

The Plenary reiterated that the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery posed a serious threat to international and regional peace and security.

The Plenary also stressed the need for further efforts to limit the risk of controlled items and their technologies falling into the hands of terrorist groups and individuals. They adopted a Joint Action stating that "the Partner countries of the MTCR stress the need to give the necessary impetus to actions to combat terrorism. The MTCR will continue to contribute to the fight against terrorism by limiting the risk of controlled items and their technology falling into the hands of terrorist groups and individuals and calls upon all States to take similar action. Partner countries will further study how possible changes to the MTCR guidelines may contribute to this objective."

The Plenary recognized that further action against missile proliferation was essential at the national, regional and international level. In this context, it re-emphasized the important role played by export controls, the need for their strict implementation and enforcement, and the need for continued adaptation and strengthening of such controls to respond to technological development and the evolving security environment. To this end, the Plenary agreed to a number of changes to the Regime's Annex, i.e., Control List.

Details of the MTCR's objectives, membership and control list are now available on the Regime's new website, ¹²⁹ endorsed by the Warsaw Plenary as an important contribution to transparency.

The Chair was mandated to pursue a range of contacts with non-partners, including MTCR-sponsored workshops and seminars, and intensified dialogue concerning MTCR goals and activities, with the focus on such topics as export controls, related legislation, trans-shipment and enforcement.

The Plenary welcomed the offer of Argentina to host the next Plenary Meeting in Buenos Aires in September 2003 and to serve as Chair of the MTCR for the subsequent year. Partners also noted the Republic of Korea's willingness to host the 2004 Plenary.

¹²⁸ The membership of the MTCR comprises the following countries: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States.

¹²⁹ See www.mtcr.info.

Other export controls

On 25 August, the Government of China promulgated Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Export Control of Missiles and Missile-Related Items and Technologies, and an attached Missiles and Missile-related Items and Technologies Export Control List, which set forth in clear terms further measures for the export control of sensitive missile-related items and technologies. The Regulations and the Control List took effect on the date of their promulgation. ¹³⁰

General Assembly, 2002

The General Assembly took action on 14 draft resolutions and one decision dealing with the subjects discussed in this chapter.

Issues related to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation

57/56. Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure nonnuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons The draft resolution was introduced by Pakistan, on behalf of the sponsors, (see page 429 for the sponsors) on 14 October, adopted by the First Committee on 21 October (98-0-54) and by the General Assembly on 22 November (106-0-55). For the text of the resolution and the voting pattern, see pages 354 and 452.

First Committee. The Republic of Korea, which abstained on the vote, believed that the key to nuclear non-proliferation and reduction of the nuclear threat was universal adherence to the NPT and full compliance with its obligations. It stressed that all non-nuclear-weapon States that had renounced the nuclear option and were fully compliant with the NPT had a legitimate right to negative security assurances from the nuclear-weapon States. In its view, the absence of such a legal instrument did not justify the pursuit of nuclear weapons. It maintained that establishing internationally binding arrangements without giving due consideration to States parties that were non-compliant was premature.

57/97. The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East The draft resolution was introduced by Egypt, on behalf of States Members of the United Nations that are members of the League of Arab States, on 17 October. It was adopted by the First Committee (as a whole: (150-4-9); and preambular paragraph 6: (153-2-5)) on 25 October and by the General Assembly (as a whole: (158-3-8); and preambular paragraph 6: (163-2-2)) on

¹³⁰ See www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/33980.html.

22 November. For the text of the resolution and the voting pattern, see pages 419 and 468.

First Committee. Prior to the vote, Israel stated that it would cast negative votes on both the draft resolution as a whole and preambular paragraph 6 (on the 2000 NPT Final Document and its call for universal adherence). In its view, the draft was biased, undermined confidence among the States of the Middle East and cited the 2000 NPT Final document selectively. It declared that the draft resolution chose to ignore the profound hostility towards Israel on the part of those countries which continued to reject any form of peaceful reconciliation and coexistence in the region. Moreover, adopting a draft resolution that did not reflect that reality would not serve the greater objective of curbing proliferation in the region. It held that the real risk of proliferation emanated from States parties that were not compliant with their obligations under international treaties. Pakistan, voting in favour of the whole draft, but abstaining on preambular paragraph 6, also had reservations about references to the NPT in preambular paragraph 5 and operative paragraph 3. As a non-party to that Treaty and as a State that possessed nuclear weapons, it could not accept the provisions called for in those paragraphs.

Speaking after the vote, India, which abstained on the draft as a whole and cast a negative vote on preambular paragraph 6, stressed that the draft resolution should be limited to the region it intended to address. Canada supported preambular paragraph 6 and abstained on the draft as a whole on the grounds that the draft's operative paragraphs had failed to deal appropriately with issues of adherence to, and full compliance with, the NPT.

57/515. United Nations conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers in the context of nuclear disarmament. The draft decision was introduced by Mexico on 15 October, adopted by the First Committee on 21 October (111-7-37) and by the General Assembly on 22 November (121-6-37). For the text of the resolution and the voting pattern, see pages 425 and 470.

First Committee. After the vote, France, which spoke on behalf of the United Kingdom and the United States, explained their negative vote, maintaining that the establishment of a parallel process, like a United Nations conference, would conflict with the NPT approach and would not advance nuclear disarmament. Germany abstained on the vote believing that it was inopportune to convene such a conference. Instead, it stressed full implementation of the 13 practical steps in the 2000 NPT Final Document and the start of negotiations in the CD on a fissile material cut-off treaty.

57/58. Reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons On 14 October, Ireland introduced a draft resolution on behalf of the sponsors (see page 429 for sponsors). On 23 October, a revised text was presented with changes to some of the preambular and operative paragraphs. Preambular paragraph 2 (on the advisory opinion of the ICJ) was reworded and became preambular paragraph 5; operative paragraphs 5 and 8 were combined (calling upon the Russian Federation and the United States to legally formalize their Presidential Nuclear Initiatives and to initiate negotiations on further verifiable reductions of these weapons); and the request for the Secretary-General to submit a report containing views of Member States to the 58th General Assembly session was deleted. On 28 October the draft resolution was adopted by the First Committee (115-3-38) and by the General Assembly (120-3-42) on 22 November. For the text of the resolution and the voting pattern, see pages 358 and 453.

First Committee. The United States, which spoke on behalf of France and the United Kingdom, explained their negative vote, pointing out that: the draft selectively quoted the 2000 NPT Final Document; took a flawed approach to dealing with reductions in that category of weapons; failed to take into account the progress and present efforts such as the NATO-Russia Council discussions on nuclear confidence-building measures, and recent dialogue on transparency in the United States-Russia Consultative Group for Strategic Security (CGSS). It felt that one concept missing from the draft resolution was the idea that steps by the nuclear-weapon States led to nuclear disarmament that promoted international stability and that they should be based on the principle of undiminished security for all. It felt that a formal arms-control approach to non-strategic nuclear weapons as called for in the draft would present major problems, including definition and verification. China, which did not participate in the vote, maintained that neither the concept nor the definition of non-strategic nuclear weapons was clear and cautioned that this ambiguity would lead to difficulties in implementing the reductions. It also questioned whether this issue warranted priority treatment in nuclear disarmament discussions as called for in the draft.

The Russian Federation, Canada, Lithuania and Australia, explained their abstentions. The Russian Federation believed that a number of issues in the draft were still unresolved, such as: prospects for regulating and reducing non-strategic nuclear weapons through international treaties and agreements; significant differences among the nuclear-weapon States about the role of this category of weapons in national security and in promoting stability; lack of a unified or clear criteria for defining these weapons; and problems relating to the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of non-nuclear-weapon States. Canada believed that it was more productive to focus

on the detailed technical aspects of the issue in the appropriate fora and to leave discussions on the current security and fate of existing non-strategic nuclear weapons to a more appropriate time in either the First Committee or in other multilateral fora. Lithuania and Australia spoke about reducing non-strategic nuclear weapons in the framework of the 2000 NPT Final Document. In that spirit, Lithuania favored a gradual approach that would build on the consensus of all concerned States. It did, however, support other elements of the draft: the special security and physical protection efforts, the call for confidence-building and transparency measures, and reducing the operational status of non-strategic nuclear weapons systems. Australia had a number of substantive difficulties with the draft resolution, notably it failed to recognize the substantial reductions in non-strategic weapons. It also had concerns about the preambular reference to the advisory opinion of the ICJ on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.

Finland, which voted in favour, attached great importance to the substantive deliberations on non-strategic nuclear weapons within the NPT framework and saw the 2005 NPT Review Conference as an opportunity for further action on the subject.

57/59. Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda The draft resolution was introduced by Ireland on behalf of the sponsors (see page 430 for the sponsors), on 14 October. A revised text was submitted on 18 October with a number of changes. The revised draft was adopted by the First Committee on 25 October (118-7-38) and by the General Assembly on 22 November (125-6-36). For the text of the resolution and the voting pattern, see pages 360 and 454.

First Committee. Prior to the vote, Germany, explained its decision to abstain. It held that nuclear disarmament could only be achieved by a gradual, step-by-step approach, a fundamental point that the draft disregarded.

In their statement after the vote, the United Kingdom, speaking on behalf of the United States and France, emphasized that their commitments to non-proliferation remained rooted in the NPT. They voted against the draft because many of its new elements were not part of the 2000 NPT Final Document, in particular: the presumption in preambular paragraph 16 that all five nuclear-weapon States should be involved in negotiations on nuclear weapons' reductions; the implications in preambular paragraph 9 that nuclear disarmament was the only imperative of the NPT; and operative paragraph 5 which singled out security assurances for priority treatment at the 2005 NPT Review Conference. India and Pakistan, saw the draft resolution cast in the NPT framework and therefore voted against it. They could not agree with the

special status conferred upon only the so-called nuclear-weapon States in preambular paragraph 20 and operative paragraph 18. India, for its part, rejected the draft's prescriptive approaches to security issues also contained in preambular paragraph 20 and operative paragraphs 18, 19 and 20 because they did not reflect the realities in the region, especially the reference to a NWFZ in South Asia. It also argued that the resolution ignored the sources of proliferation that the NPT had failed to stem, and that nuclear disarmament efforts were limited by the Treaty's discriminatory framework of obligation. It referred to the programme of action in the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (SSOD I) as the source of any future nuclear disarmament agenda and added that the goal of nuclear disarmament had still remained unaccomplished.

The Russian Federation, Switzerland and Australia abstained on the vote. The Russian Federation had difficulties with the draft's critical evaluations and recommendations, particularly the prematurity of some of the proposed measures, including those pertaining to non-strategic nuclear weapons. In its view, the process of nuclear disarmament required a balanced and comprehensive approach. To that end, it expressed its willingness to pursue dialogue with all interested States on enhancing the NPT regime and on further disarmament measures in the CD. Switzerland attached importance to the complete and full implementation of the 13 steps in the 2000 NPT Final Document and regretted that the draft did not highlight the gradual, realistic and balanced approach to nuclear disarmament as called for in that package of measures. It also favored a multilateral, universal and verifiable agreement on the total prohibition of non-strategic nuclear weapons. Australia felt that the draft resolution lacked sufficient balance and did not accurately reflect commitments in the 2000 NPT Final Document, particularly in relation to non-strategic nuclear weapons. It added that the draft's references to missile defense and national security strategies did little to advance the goal of nuclear disarmament.

China cast an affirmative vote, because it supported the thrust of the draft resolution. It reiterated its stance that "no first use" and transparency were critical to nuclear disarmament. However, it had reservations on parts of the draft resolution that dealt with non-strategic nuclear weapons, noting that neither the concept nor the definition were clear. Colombia also supported the draft resolution and, with regard to the drafts call for the CTBT's entry into force, reiterated its willingness to ratify the Treaty in line with international law and its own constitutional process.

57/78. A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons The draft resolution was introduced by Japan, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 439 for the sponsors), on 14 October, adopted by the First Committee on 23

October (136-2-13) and by the General Assembly on 22 November (156-2-13). For the text of the resolution and the voting pattern, see pages 388 and 463.

First Committee. Prior to the voting, Ireland, which spoke on behalf of the countries of the New Agenda Coalition, said that they would abstain because the draft resolution had misinterpreted the 2000 NPT Review Conference outcome. In their view, the placement of the unequivocal undertaking of the nuclear-weapon States in operative paragraph 3 (e) created two problems: it suggested that this undertaking was a step that had not been taken and created a contextual linkage with general and complete disarmament that they could not accept.

After the vote, the United States and India explained their negative votes. The United States had concerns primarily with the language in the draft resolution on the CTBT. In its view, nuclear disarmament would not be achievable without stronger non-proliferation controls to preclude the transfer of WMD and related technologies. India was unable to support many elements in the draft resolution which it felt were cast in the NPT framework which made it a flawed vehicle for achieving nuclear disarmament; also the call in operative paragraph 3(b) for a moratorium on the production of fissile material indicated a lack of responsiveness to reality.

China and Pakistan abstained on the vote. China found several weaknesses in the draft: some basic nuclear disarmament principles and measures conducive to international peace and security were missing; it failed to call for the abandonment of nuclear-deterrence doctrines characterized by the first use of nuclear weapons and a strategy of preemptive nuclear strike; and some of the specific measures called for in the draft were premature. Pakistan found parts of the draft resolution questionable. It felt that an inordinate emphasis was placed on non-proliferation to the detriment of nuclear disarmament; it could not endorse the premise of preambular paragraphs 7 (on the NPT) and 8 (on IAEA safeguards); had reservations about operative paragraph 1 (universality of the NPT); and explained that being a non-Party to that Treaty, it was under no obligation to implement the provisions of operative paragraph 3 and some of its sub-paragraphs, nor was it bound by any provisions of the 2000 NPT Final Document.

Austria and Germany subscribed to many elements related to the NPT contained in the draft resolution and voted affirmatively, with some reservations. Austria held that the conclusion of additional protocols with the IAEA and early implementation of its integrated safeguards system were key elements for enhancing nuclear proliferation and regretted that the language in operative paragraph 11 did not reflect the importance and urgency of those

measures. For its part, Germany felt that the draft did not reflect the 13 practical steps in the 2000 NPT Final Document in their entirety.

57/79. Nuclear disarmament The draft resolution was introduced by Myanmar, on behalf of the sponsors, (see page 439 for the sponsors) on 18 October adopted by the First Committee on 23 October (as a whole: (91-40-19); and operative paragraph 10: (139-2-8)) and by the General Assembly on 22 November (as a whole: (107-41-21); and operative paragraph 10: (160-2-5)). For the text of the resolution and the voting pattern, see pages 391 and 464.

First Committee. Speaking before the vote, Cuba stated that it would vote for the draft resolution as it appropriately reflected the highest priority of nuclear disarmament; it also fully supported the draft's appeal to the CD to establish, on a priority basis, an ad hoc committee to deal with nuclear disarmament in 2003 and to commence negotiations leading to total nuclear disarmament.

Japan abstained on the draft as a whole and voted for operative paragraph 10, which welcomed the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States, in the 2000 NPT Final Document, to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament. Speaking in the context of the NPT, it called for full compliance by all States parties. Regarding its abstention on the draft as a whole, it could not endorse a specified time frame for nuclear disarmament as called for in the draft, but believed that such steps should be realistic and progressive, with the engagement of the nuclear-weapon States from the beginning.

China voted in favour of the draft as a whole and operative paragraph 10. It supported many NAM positions, such as: commitment to total nuclear disarmament; opposition to nuclear deterrence doctrines characterized by a first use policy or pre-emptive nuclear strike strategy; the call for an unconditional commitment by nuclear-weapon States to "no first use"; and early negotiations on an international legal instrument on no use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or NWFZs. China also pointed out that some specific nuclear disarmament measures in the draft resolution were still premature.

India and Pakistan, fully committed to comprehensive nuclear disarmament, had problems with certain elements of the draft resolution. India, which abstained on the draft as a whole and voted against operative paragraph 10, felt that the draft resolution had diluted a number of traditional NAM and Group of 21 positions on nuclear disarmament which it supported. In addition, the draft included elements of the NPT in its operative paragraphs 9 and 10 that India was unable to support. Pakistan abstained on

both the draft as a whole and operative paragraph 10. It believed that preambular paragraphs 6 (on the NPT) and 20 (on terrorism and WMD) and operative paragraphs 6 (no first use), 9 and 10 (on the NPT) were inconsistent with its position.

57/80. The Conference on Disarmament decision (CD/1574) of 11 August 1998 to establish, under item 1 of its agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", an ad hoc committee to negotiate, on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299), and the mandate contained therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The draft resolution was introduced by Canada, on behalf of the sponsors, (see page 442 for the sponsors) on 14 October, adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 21 October and by the General Assembly on 22 November. For the text of the resolution, see pages 395 and 465.

57/84. Reducing nuclear danger The draft resolution was introduced by India, on behalf of the sponsors, (see page 442 for the sponsors) on 17 October, adopted by the First Committee on 21 October (96-45-15) and by the General Assembly on 22 November (107-46-17]. For the text of the resolution and the voting pattern, see pages 400 and 465.

First Committee. Israel stated that it joined the consensus because it believed that the objective of a fissile material cut-off treaty as called for in the draft resolution was subsumed in the Middle East NWFZ concept. It therefore stressed that an assessment of the modalities of this draft resolution had to include the Middle East peace process in all its aspects and the overall effort to reduce tension, curb proliferation and limit armaments in that region.

57/94. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons The draft resolution was introduced by India, on behalf of the sponsors, (see page 447 for the sponsors) on 14 October, adopted by the First Committee on 21 October (98-45-9) and by the General Assembly on 22 November (110-45-12]. For the text of the resolution and the voting pattern, see pages 416 and 467.

First Committee. China voted in favour of the draft resolution reaffirming its established position on "no first use" by, and unconditional negative security assurances from, the nuclear-weapon States. It also held that the negotiation and conclusion of a convention banning the use of nuclear weapons as called for in the draft would forcefully advance the realization of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

International Court of Justice

57/85. Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons¹³¹ The draft resolution was introduced by Malaysia, on behalf of the sponsors, (see page 443 for the sponsors) on 15 October, adopted by the First Committee on 21 October (as a whole: (106-30-22; and operative paragraph 1 (underlining once again the advisory opinion of the ICJ): (146-5-5)) and by the General Assembly on 22 November (as a whole: (117-30-24); and op. paragraph 1: (161-4-1)). For the text of the resolution and the voting pattern, see pages 401 and 466.

First Committee. Belgium, speaking on behalf of a number of countries¹³², and Japan voted for operative paragraph 1, but abstained on the draft as a whole. While they supported the unanimous opinion of the ICJ on the existing obligation under international law to pursue nuclear disarmament and to conclude negotiations on the matter, they could not support the draft in its entirety. Japan said that it was firmly committed to concrete measures to achieve an incremental approach to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. In that context, it believed that such practical steps should be intensely pursued before all States embarked upon the commencement of multilateral negotiations as called for in the draft resolution. Belgium that the draft resolution reflected only one aspect of the advisory opinion of the ICJ. It held that the advisory opinion was indivisible and had to be considered in its entirety. In addition, Belgium was firmly convinced that nuclear disarmament could only be achieved through a gradual process and that the international community should focus on implementing the 13 practical steps agreed to at the sixth NPT Review Conference.

Issues related to the CTBT

57/100. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty The draft resolution was introduced by Mexico, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 449 for the sponsors), on 15 October. On 16 October the sponsors submitted a revised text, which was adopted by the First Committee on 21 October (125-1-4) and by the General Assembly on 22 November (164-1-5). For the text of the resolution and the voting pattern, see pages 424 and 469.

¹³¹ A/57/95 and Adds, 1 and 2.

¹³² Belgium spoke on behalf of Luxembourg and the Netherlands, as well as Germany, Bulgaria, Spain, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Norway, Poland and Portugal, which associated themselves with this explanation of vote on the draft resolution.

First Committee. Several States explained their positions after the vote. The United States, which voted against the draft resolution, argued that while it did not support the CTBT, it intended to maintain its 1992 moratorium on nuclear testing and urged all States with existing moratoria to do the same. It emphasized its commitments under the arms control agreements to which it was a part, particularly the NPT and its special responsibility as a nuclear-weapon State under article VI of that Treaty.

Syria which abstained on the vote had concerns over critical omissions in the Treaty: no commitment by the nuclear- weapon States to eliminate their nuclear arsenals within a reasonable time frame; no explicit reference to the illegality of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by the nuclearweapon States; no emphasis on the need to attain the treaty's universality; overlooking laboratory experiments or qualitative development/production of new nuclear weapons; concerns about the Treaty's verification system; discrimination by States parties against non-parties, including significant measures that the Security Council might adopt in conformity with Chapter VII of the Charter (threats to and breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression) which it saw as a violation of the sovereign right of States to accede or not to the Treaty. In addition, Syria refused the inclusion of Israel in the list of Middle East and South Asian States (MESA), and saw Israel's refusal to adhere to the NPT and to subject its nuclear facilities to the IAEA's verification and safeguards regime as an impediment to a NWFZ in the Middle East

Colombia, felt obliged to abstain on the vote due to its constitutional difficulties with the Treaty's ratification, which it hoped to accomplish at the earliest opportunity.

Egypt did not vote, but reiterated its commitment to the CTBT's entry into force within its country's national constitutional process.

Israel, Jordan and Pakistan supported the draft resolution because they attached importance to the objectives of the CTBT. Israel had some reservations with the wording in operative paragraph 1 (the signature and ratification of the CTBT). It also regretted that only moderate progress had been made on several important issues, such as: the development and readiness of the verification regime; unresolved political issues related to the geographical region of the Middle East and South Asia; the lack of acceptance of the CTBT by several Middle East and South Asian States; the tolerance shown by other States signatories towards attempts to block or to bypass the functioning of the Middle East and South Asian Group; the negative dynamics evolving in the Middle East where certain States signatories were not fully cooperative with the efforts to complete and test the international monitoring system, which, it felt impeded the pace of

development of that part of the verification regime. Jordan, for its part, joined in the call for all countries that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty. Pakistan explained that it was obliged by the imperative of self-defense and the restoration of the strategic balance in South Asia to demonstrate its nuclear capability. It declared that had the application of restraint and responsibility prevented the nuclearization of its region, the CTBT might have enjoyed a different status today. With respect to operative paragraph 3 (moratoria on nuclear-weapons test explosions), Pakistan recalled its unilateral moratorium on further testing and its commitment to maintain that moratorium until the Treaty came into force.

Moscow Treaty, ABM Treaty and other bilateral agreements

57/68. Bilateral strategic nuclear arms reductions and the new strategic framework. The draft resolution was introduced by the United States, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 431 for the sponsors), on 14 October. A revised text was submitted on 21 October in which the words "Calls upon all countries" in operative paragraph 5 were replaced by the words "Invites all countries, as appropriate". It was adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 23 October and by the General Assembly on 22 November. For the text of the resolution and the voting pattern, see pages 374 and 459.

First Committee. Prior to the vote, several States that intended to join the consensus explained their positions or vote. Cuba, Malaysia, Ireland and Pakistan welcomed the signing of the Moscow Treaty as a positive step in reducing the immediate threat from the deployed nuclear weapons of the United States and the Russian Federation. Cuba and Pakistan supported multilateral negotiations as the vehicle for irreversible nuclear disarmament. In that regard, Cuba cautioned that the bilateral commitments on strategic nuclear arms reductions must not replace multilateral negotiations among the five nuclear-weapon States leading to an irreversible and definitive reduction in nuclear weapons and was concerned over the deadlock in such negotiations. It also was apprehensive about the growing role assigned to nuclear weapons within security strategies as well as the development of new kinds of nuclear weapons and arguments in favour of their use. While Pakistan supported the thrust of the draft resolution and the new strategic relationship between the two nuclear-weapon States, it further emphasized that a mere change in the deployment status of nuclear warheads would not materially contribute towards general and complete disarmament, unless the nuclear-weapon States forswore the use and possession of nuclear weapons under international control. It therefore believed that negotiations on nuclear disarmament should commence in the CD at the earliest and hoped that the principle sponsors of the draft would help galvanize global efforts to

terminate the threat of WMD. Malaysia saw the strategic reductions as an endeavour by the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their obligations under article VI of the NPT and in that spirit decided to join the consensus vote. However, it noted that the principle of irreversibility was not incorporated in the Moscow Treaty and felt that principle along with effective verification and transparency would have further advanced the sponsors' commitment to article VI. Ireland speaking on behalf of the countries of the New Agenda Coalition stressed that reductions in deployment and in operational status could not be a substitute for irreversible cuts and complete nuclear disarmament. It also referred to the 2000 NPT Final Document as the blueprint for the disarmament process and saw this bilateral commitment as a sign that progress in disarmament could be achieved.

After the vote, China stated that it joined the consensus only because it agreed to give positive appreciation to the Moscow Treaty and document on the reduction of nuclear weapons reached between the Russian Federation and the United States.

Missiles

57/71. Missiles The draft resolution was introduced by the Islamic Republic of Iran, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 432 for the sponsors), on 18 October. It was adopted by the First Committee on 23 October (90-2-57) and by the General Assembly on 22 November (104-3-60). For the text of the resolution and the voting, see pages 379 and 459.

First Committee. In their explanations of vote, the Russian Federation and Cuba acknowledged that both the work and the report of the Panel of Governmental Experts represented the first substantive effort by the United Nations to deal with missiles in all its aspects.

Before voting, the Russian Federation reiterated its support for the draft resolution noting that its objectives corresponded with the Russian approach to resolving missile proliferation issues. Overall, it valued the work and outcome of the Panel of Governmental Experts; welcomed the new substantive role for the United Nations; and hoped that future work would continue within the UN framework for consensus on all missile issues. In addition, it referred to its own initiative for a global monitoring system on missile non-proliferation and related technology based on legally binding agreements that included drafting a treaty on a global missile non-proliferation regime, preferably under United Nations auspices in the CD. It believed that all interested States should participate equally and on a non-discriminatory basis in the development of such an agreement which would also not infringe on their lawful right to the peaceful uses of outer space and access to its socio-economic benefits.

The United States, Denmark, Australia, the Republic of Korea and Japan, while maintaining their commitment to and participation in support of ballistic missile non-proliferation efforts, nevertheless, did not support the draft resolution.

The United States cast a negative vote because the draft resolution's overall direction and political intent were problematic. It raised concerns that the net effect of the draft resolution, particularly the call for a second governmental expert panel, could divert attention and resources from successful ongoing missile non-proliferation efforts. The United States advocated a regional-based strategy that included the active participation of those States that were directly interested and affected, along with other cooperative efforts that sought to prevent the proliferation of missiles and missile technology. This approach seemed more productive than the broad and vague approach embodied in the draft resolution.

Denmark, Australia, the Republic of Korea and Japan explained their reasons for abstaining on the vote. Denmark¹³³, speaking on behalf of the European Union (EU) and other countries that aligned themselves with its explanation of vote, reiterated that the draft text did not reflect the central issue of the proliferation of ballistic missiles and related technologies. Moreover, Denmark and Australia regretted that the draft did not sufficiently refer to the international code of conduct, which they felt was a significant multilateral and concrete initiative to curb the spread of ballistic missiles. Denmark added that a first step towards curbing the spread of ballistic missiles had been taken with the launching of the code of conduct and in that spirit urged all States to adhere to the code at its upcoming launching conference in The Hague. For its part, Australia also held that ballistic missile proliferation issues were destabilizing to regional and global security and that those issues demanded appropriate attention and a concerted response from the international community, including the United Nations. It had a number of substantive difficulties with the draft resolution, notably its failure to highlight the importance of ballistic missile proliferation with relation to international security. On another aspect, Denmark, Australia and the Republic of Korea questioned the proposal to convene another panel of governmental experts (as requested in operative paragraph 3), since the

¹³³ Denmark spoke on behalf of the European Union, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe associated with the European Union - Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia - and the associated countries of Cyprus, Malta and Turkey, as well as the European Free Trade Association countries of the European Economic Area, Iceland and Norway.

current report failed to reach agreement on specific follow-up recommendations. Japan abstained on the vote because the draft resolution did not explicitly address missile proliferation as delivery vehicles of WMD, nor did it recognize the efforts in which its country was currently involved.

Cuba supported the draft resolution because it represented a major achievement towards a broad-ranging, transparent, non-discriminatory and balanced consideration of the issue in the General Assembly. In that connection, Cuba emphasized that the United Nations had a central role to play, as reflected in operative paragraphs 2 and 3 of the draft. Regarding the expert group, it felt that the report was limited, but hoped that a second panel of experts would submit more specific recommendations to the General Assembly.

57/50. Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament The draft resolution was introduced by Belarus, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 427 for the sponsors), on 15 October, adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 22 October and by the General Assembly on 22 November. For the text of the resolution, see pages 344.

Conclusion

In 2002, developments in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation were mixed.

States parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty reaffirmed that the Treaty was the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for nuclear disarmament. Yet, compliance issues, concern about the asymmetry in the implementation of disarmament commitments on the one hand and the non-proliferation provisions on the other, as well as reports about changes in security policies on the use of nuclear weapons, contributed to undermine confidence in the Treaty.

Apprehension over the dangers of weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of non-State actors underscored the urgent need for concerted efforts and multilateral cooperation to promote disarmament, non-proliferation and the safety and security of nuclear materials and facilities. Interest by the international community on the issue of radiological weapons was renewed.

The IAEA continued its efforts, particularly in the areas of strengthening safeguards, nuclear safety, radiation protection, safety of radioactive waste management and the safe transport of radioactive materials.

While there was a notable increase in ratifications of the CTBT, still 13 out of the 44 States listed in Annex II to the Treaty, whose ratifications are needed for its entry-into-force, have not yet ratified it.

The CD remained immobilized by lack of agreement on a substantive programme of work. The stalemate raised serious concern about its ability to fulfil its mandated role as the sole multilateral negotiating body of the international community on disarmament.

The withdrawal by the United States from the ABM Treaty became effective. The Russian Federation and the United States signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) and a Joint Declaration on a New Strategic Relationship. The Treaty commits the parties to limit the level of their deployed strategic nuclear warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200.

The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, though voluntary and non-legally binding, is a positive step towards promoting international peace and security. The international community has yet to codify a universally accepted norm governing the development, testing, production, acquisition, transfer, deployment or use of missiles.

ANNEX I

Chairman's Factual Statement for the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference, first session

- 1. States parties reaffirmed that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. In the current international climate, where security and stability continued to be challenged, both globally and regionally, by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of their means of delivery, preserving and strengthening the Non- Proliferation Treaty was vital to peace and security.
- 2. States parties stressed their commitment to the effective implementation of the objectives of the Treaty, the decisions and the resolution of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, adopted by consensus.
- 3. States parties further stressed that continued support to achieve universality of the Treaty was essential. They called upon the four States remaining outside the Treaty ó Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan ó to accede unconditionally to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States, particularly those three States that operated unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. Concern was expressed about the ongoing development of nuclear weapons and missile programmes in different regions, including those of States not parties to the Treaty.

- 4. It was stressed that the best way to strengthen the non-proliferation regime was through full compliance by all States parties with the provisions of the Treaty.
- 5. It was generally felt that the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 had given an even greater sense of urgency to the common efforts of all States in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. The view was held that further strengthening and reinforcing the nonproliferation regime was imperative to prevent the use of nuclear materials and technologies for criminal/terrorist purposes. The enhancement of the non-proliferation regimes covering all weapons of mass destruction, including efforts by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), was considered to be the most important integral part of combating terrorism.
- 6. There was emphasis on multilateralism as a core principle in the area of disarmament and nonproliferation with a view to maintaining and strengthening universal norms and enlarging their scope. Strong support was expressed for the enforcement of existing multilateral treaties. The need to seek treaties and other international agreements that meet today's threats to peace and stability was underlined.
- 7. The view was expressed that the Treaty should be seen in its larger context of coherent commitments and credible progress towards nuclear disarmament. Without the fulfilment of article VI over time, the Treaty, in which non-proliferation and disarmament were mutually interdependent and reinforcing, would lose its true value.
- 8. The importance of increased transparency with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament was stressed. It was emphasized that accountability and transparency of nuclear disarmament measures by all States parties remained the main criteria with which to evaluate the Treaty's operation.
- 9. States parties remained committed to implementing article VI of the Treaty and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. Disappointment was expressed in the progress made in implementing the practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Treaty and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament", as agreed at the 2000 Review Conference. It was also noted that the goal of nuclear disarmament could best be achieved through a series of balanced, incremental and reinforcing steps.

- 10. The nuclear-weapon States informed the States parties of their respective measures taken in accordance with article VI of the Treaty, for example, reductions of nuclear weapons arsenals, reduced 13 NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/21 reliance on nuclear weapons, and that new nuclear weapons were not being developed.
- 11. Concern and uncertainty were expressed about existing nuclear arsenals, new approaches to the future role of nuclear weapons, and the possible development of new generations of nuclear weapons.
- 12. Strong support was expressed for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, as reflected in the Final Declaration adopted at the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty held from 11 to 13 November 2001. The importance and urgency of the early entry into force of the Treaty was underscored. States which had not ratified the Treaty, especially those remaining 13 States whose ratification was necessary, and in particular those two remaining nuclear-weapon States whose ratification was a prerequisite, for its entry into force, were urged to do so without delay. States reaffirmed the importance of maintaining a moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. States parties noted the progress made by the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in establishing the international monitoring system.
- 13. Concern was expressed that the decision by the United States of America to withdraw from the Anti- Ballistic Missile Treaty, and the development of missile defence systems, could lead to a new arms race, including in outer space, and negatively affect strategic stability and international security. Hope was expressed that the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Russian Federation to create a new strategic framework would further promote international stability.
- 14. States parties welcomed the announcement in December 2001 that the United States and the Russian Federation had completed reductions in their nuclear arsenals required under START I. They further welcomed the continuing bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Russian Federation on strategic nuclear arms reductions, and many expressed the hope that such efforts would result in a legally binding instrument with provisions ensuring irreversibility, verification and transparency.
- 15. The importance of further reductions in nonstrategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process, was emphasized. There were calls for the formalization of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991 and 1992 on reducing non-strategic nuclear weapons. It was stressed that non-strategic weapons must be further reduced in a verifiable and irreversible manner.

Negotiations should begin on further reductions of those weapons as soon as possible.

- 16. States parties expressed regret at the inability of the Conference on Disarmament to start negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and to establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference was urged to agree on a programme of work. States that had not yet done so were called upon to declare a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
- 17. The importance of arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes, under IAEA or other relevant international verification, and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes was stressed.
- 18. Several States parties endorsed the work being carried out under the Trilateral Initiative involving IAEA, the Russian Federation and the United States in developing techniques and methodologies for placing excess nuclear materials from dismantled weapons permanently under IAEA safeguards. States parties were informed that the United States had already placed some of its fissile material under IAEA safeguards and that both the United States and the Russian Federation were working to develop practical measures for the monitoring and inspection of fissile material, including verification by IAEA. Some States parties also noted the safeguards experience of IAEA in verifying nuclear materials and expressed the view that the Agency could play an important role in verifying nuclear disarmament agreements.
- 19. The view was held that the attainment of a nuclear-weapon-free world should be accompanied by the pursuit of other effective arms control agreements at the global and also particularly at the regional level.
- 20. States parties recalled that regular reports should be submitted by all States parties on the 14 NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/21 implementation of article VI as outlined in paragraph 15, subparagraph 12, of the 2000 Final Document. It was stressed that such reporting would promote increased confidence in the overall non-proliferation regime through transparency. Views with regard to the scope and format of such reporting differed. Some States parties suggested that such reports should be submitted, particularly by the nuclear-weapon States, at each session of the Preparatory Committee, and should include detailed and comprehensive information, e.g., in a standardized format. Several States parties expressed interest in open-ended informal consultations on reporting to prepare proposals for consideration for

subsequent sessions of the Preparatory Committee. Other States parties advocated that the specifics of reporting, the format and frequency of reports, should be left to the determination of individual States parties.

- 21. States parties recalled the 2000 Final Document and the request that all States parties, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, the States of the Middle East and other interested States, should report through the United Nations Secretariat to the President of the 2005 Review Conference, as well as to the Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in advance of that Conference, on the steps that they had taken to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.
- 22. Support was expressed for the concept of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States in the regions concerned. The contribution of such zones to enhancing global and regional peace and security, including the cause of global nuclear non-proliferation, was emphasized. It was noted that the number of States covered by the nuclear-weapon-free zones had now exceeded 100. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba was considered as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament. The importance of the entry into force of the existing nuclearweapon-free zone treaties was stressed. Efforts aimed at establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in different regions of the world were welcomed. It was also stressed that assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all States of the zones should be provided by the nuclear-weapon States. Support was expressed for the efforts among the Central Asian countries to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in their region. States parties noted that no progress had been achieved in the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East, South Asia and other regions.
- 23. On the issue of universality, States parties reaffirmed the importance of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and recognized that the resolution remained valid until its goals and objectives were achieved. The resolution was an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Conference and of the basis on which the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had been indefinitely extended without a vote in 1995. States parties reiterated their support for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction. States parties noted that all States of the region of the Middle East, with the exception of Israel, were States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. States parties called upon Israel to accede to the

Treaty as soon as possible and to place its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. Some States parties affirmed the importance of establishing a mechanism within the Non-Proliferation Treaty review process to promote the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.


- 24. States parties expressed concern at the increased tension in South Asia and the continuing retention of nuclear weapons programmes and options by India and Pakistan. States parties urged both States to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States and to place all their nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. States parties noted that both States had declared moratoriums on further testing and their willingness to enter into legal commitments not to conduct any further nuclear testing by signing and ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear- Test-Ban Treaty. States parties called upon both States to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. States parties noted the willingness expressed by both States to participate in negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. Pending the conclusion of a legal instrument, States parties urged both States to commit to a moratorium on the production of such fissile material. The importance of 15 NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/21 the full implementation by both States of Security Council resolution 1172 (1998) was emphasized.
- 25. The importance of full compliance by all States parties with the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty was stressed. States parties remained concerned that IAEA continued to be unable to verify the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration of nuclear material made by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea was urged to come into full compliance with its Safeguards Agreement with IAEA. States parties expressed concern over the lack of implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework.
- 26. States parties noted that since the cessation of the IAEA inspections in Iraq in December 1998, the Agency had not been in a position to provide any assurance of Iraq's compliance with its obligations under Security Council resolution 687 (1991). Many States parties expressed grave concern and called for the full implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1284 (1999), and for the re-establishment of an effective disarmament, ongoing monitoring and verification regime in Iraq, and hoped that United Nations inspectors would be able as soon as possible to resume their work in Iraq. Iraq reiterated that it was in full compliance with its Treaty obligations and maintained that IAEA had successfully carried out inspections in 2000, 2001 and 2002 pursuant to Iraq's Safeguards Agreement with the Agency.

- 27. It was recalled that both the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference had underscored the importance of security assurances. It was emphasized that negative security assurances, a key basis of the 1995 extension decision, remained essential and should be reaffirmed. Many States parties reaffirmed that non-nuclear-weapon States parties should be effectively assured by nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Reaffirmations were expressed of commitments under Security Council resolution 984 (1995). Many States parties stressed that efforts to conclude a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States should be pursued as a matter of priority. Some States parties were of the view that this could take the form of an additional protocol to the Treaty, without prejudice to the legally binding security assurances already given by the five nuclearweapon States in the framework of the treaties regarding nuclear-weaponfree zones. Pending the conclusion of such negotiations, the nuclear-weapon States were called upon to honour their commitments under the respective Security Council resolutions. Concern was expressed that recent developments might undermine commitments taken under the respective Security Council resolutions. A view was held that the issue of security assurances was linked with fulfilment of the Treaty obligations. Several States parties, including one nuclear-weapon State, emphasized the importance of a no-first-use policy.
- 28. Education on disarmament and non-proliferation was considered important to strengthening disarmament and non-proliferation for future generations. In that connection, the ongoing work of the group of governmental experts which was expected to submit its report for consideration by the General Assembly at its fifty-seventh session during autumn 2002 was commended.
- 29. States parties recognized IAEA safeguards were a fundamental pillar of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and commended the important work of IAEA in implementing the safeguards system to verify compliance with the non-proliferation obligations of the Treaty.
- 30. States parties welcomed the efforts of IAEA in strengthening safeguards and the Agency's completion of the conceptual framework for integrated safeguards. The importance of the Model Additional Protocol was underlined. Some drew attention to the fact that States parties must have both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in place for IAEA to be able to provide an assurance of both non-diversion of declared material and the absence of undeclared activities or material. The goal of universality was stressed. States that had not yet concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA were called upon to do so

without delay. Many States parties called upon those that had not yet signed or ratified the Additional Protocol to do so as soon as possible.

- 31. It was reiterated that export controls were a key element of the non-proliferation regime under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The important work of the existing export control regimes was noted, in particular their function in guiding States parties in setting up their national export control policies. The importance of 16 NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/21 transparency in export controls was widely recognized. It was reaffirmed that nothing in the Treaty should be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
- 32. Many States parties noted both the importance of combating nuclear terrorism and the many instruments available for doing this, including the physical protection of nuclear material and export controls. The IAEA action plan on the prevention of nuclear terrorism was widely noted and supported. The Agency's work in support of States' efforts to prevent the illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material was also commended.
- 33. States parties called for the strengthening of the physical protection of nuclear material, inter alia, through a well-defined amendment of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Many States parties called upon States that have not yet done so to accede to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Support was expressed for the IAEA International Physical Protection Advisory Service.
- 34. The importance of strengthening nuclear safety, radiation protection, the safety of radioactive waste management and the safe transport of radioactive materials was stressed. The efforts of IAEA in the promotion of safety in all its aspects were welcomed. States parties that had not yet acceded to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, as well as the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, were encouraged to do so.
- 35. States parties emphasized that transportation of radioactive material, including maritime transportation, should be carried out in a safe and secure manner in strict conformity with international standards established by the relevant international organizations, such as IAEA and the International Maritime Organization. Some States parties called for effective liability arrangements, prior notification and consultation. Some States parties noted the conclusions on safety in IAEA General Conference resolution GC(45)RES/10. The holding of an IAEA conference on safe transport of radioactive materials in July 2003 was welcomed by many

36. States parties reiterated their strong support for article IV of the Treaty, which provided a framework for cooperation and confidence for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In that context, States parties expressed wide support for the technical cooperation activities of IAEA. It was underlined that technical cooperation played an important role in further developing the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including human health, pest eradication, food and agriculture, and the environment. The importance of aligning technical cooperation programmes with development goals and the needs of the country concerned was emphasized. Several States parties stressed the importance of providing the Agency with adequate resources for those activities.



Biological and chemical weapons

Introduction

Two categories of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), namely chemical and biological weapons, have long been considered to pose a serious threat to international peace and security. The determination of the international community to remove such a threat has resulted in the conclusion of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the first multilateral disarmament treaty banning an entire category of WMD, and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the first such treaty to be completely negotiated within a multilateral disarmament forum, the Conference on Disarmament (CD). Since the two Conventions were opened for signature in 1972 and 1993 respectively, the United Nations has sought to promote the universality of the two instruments, as well as compliance with their provisions. In addition, States have continuously reaffirmed the necessity of upholding the principles and objectives of the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare¹.

The CWC not only contains provisions to prohibit chemical weapons and to provide for their destruction, but it also establishes a comprehensive verification system. Since the entry-into-force of the Convention in 1997, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), with its headquarters in The Hague, has been actively implementing the Convention.²

The BWC does not set out a verification mechanism to monitor compliance with the provisions of the Convention. In order to strengthen the BWC regime, States parties, between 1986 and 1991, agreed upon and elaborated confidence-building measures involving data exchanges in an effort to prevent and reduce the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts and suspicions and to improve international cooperation in peaceful biotechnological activities. At the Third Review Conference in 1991, States parties decided to establish an open-ended ad hoc group of governmental experts (subsequently known as the VEREX Group) to identify and examine

¹ The texts and status of the BWC, CWC and Geneva Protocol are available on the DDA website at: www.disarmament.un.org.

For further information, see the OPCW website: www.opcw.org.

potential verification measures, and a Special Conference of States parties held in September 1994 considered the VEREX report³.

At the Special Conference, the parties agreed to establish an ad hoc group, open to all States parties, "to consider appropriate measures, including possible verification measures, and draft proposals to strengthen the Convention, to be included, as appropriate, in a legally binding instrument". The Ad Hoc Group first met in 1995, and from 1997 negotiations were conducted on the basis of a rolling text of a protocol on compliance submitted by the Chairman of the Group. The Group continued its work until 2001 when its work came to a halt due to rejection by the United States of the composite text proposed by the Chairman, as well as of further negotiations on the draft protocol. In the same year, the Fifth Review Conference of the States Parties to the BWC was held from 19 November to 7 December. Due to divergent views and positions among States parties on certain key issues, particularly the work of the Ad Hoc Group, the Conference suspended its work and agreed to resume its session in November 2002.

This chapter covers developments with respect to the implementation of the BWC and CWC, including efforts by the international community to strengthen and universalize the two instruments. It also gives a brief account of the work of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission in Iraq (UNMOVIC). UNMOVIC was established in December 1999 pursuant to Security Council resolution 1284 as the successor to the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM).⁴

Developments and trends, 2002

The year 2002 witnessed the successful conclusion of the Fifth Review Conference of the States Parties to the BWC. The Conference, which had been suspended on 7 December 2001 due to divergent views and positions among States parties on certain key issues, particularly the Ad Hoc Group's work, met from 11 to 15 November in Geneva. The conference adopted a Final Report setting out a fresh approach to combat the deliberate use of disease as a weapon. Under the agreement, States parties to the BWC are to meet annually in the lead up to the Sixth Review Conference in 2006. Each annual meeting is to be prepared by a two-week meeting of BWC experts.

The threat of bio-terrorism continued to be a source of concern to the international community. To contribute to a better understanding of the

³ The VEREX report is contained in document BWC/CONF.III/VEREX/9.

⁴ See *The Yearbook*, vol. 24: 1999, Chapter II, pp. 68-71 and vol. 25: 2000, Chapter III, pp. 86-91.

issues involved, the Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA) organized a symposium on "The Biological Weapons Convention and Bio-terrorism" on 30 January. Three experts⁵ were invited to discuss the issue of the threat of bio-terrorism and the role of the BWC in preventing such threat.

In May 2002, the World Health Assembly adopted resolution WHA55.16, entitled "Global public health response to natural occurrence, accidental release or deliberate use of biological and chemical agents or radionuclear material that affect health". The resolution, *inter alia*, mandates the WHO to strengthen global surveillance of infectious diseases, water quality, and food safety by coordinating relevant information gathering and by providing support to laboratory networks, and by making a strong contribution to any international humanitarian response, as required. The strategy developed by WHO to respond to this resolution includes four main areas: international preparedness; global alert and response; national preparedness; and preparedness for selected diseases/intoxication.

On 29 April, the United Kingdom issued a Green (consultative) Paper on "Strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: Countering the Threat from Biological Weapons". The Paper outlined the nature of the threat posed to international security by biological weapons, discussed the priorities of the United Kingdom and the steps to be taken ahead of the reconvened Fifth BWC Review Conference. It contained an invitation for comments on the proposals outlined therein and on any other ideas for strengthening the Convention. Besides the measures taken by the United Kingdom to combat the threat of biological weapons, a wide range of issues was discussed in the Paper, including the threat posed by the possible terrorist use of biological agents, the advance of technology and the dual use problem, export controls, deterrence and defense capabilities at the national level, as well as the work of the BWC Ad Hoc Group. The Paper further identified eleven measures for consideration in order to strengthen the BWC.

The fifth anniversary of the entry into force of the CWC was observed on 29 April 2002. The Convention continued to be implemented and efforts to make it universal progressed. By the end of the year, three additional States had deposited their instruments of ratification or accession, bringing the total number of States parties to 148. The Seventh Session of the Conference of the States Parties was held from 7 to 11 October in The Hague and

⁵ Tibor Toth (President of the Fifth BWC Review Conference), Alfredo Labbe Villa (Deputy Permanent Representative of Chile in Geneva); and Decio Ripandelli (Director, Administration and External Relations of the International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology). See Chapter VI.

preparations continued for the First Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Convention to be held in 2003. Throughout most of the year, UNMOVIC continued preparations to be operationally ready to carry out a full range of monitoring and verification activities in Iraq as mandated by the Security Council. The second half of the year, in particular, was a period of intense activity requiring a rapid build-up of inspection and support staff, as well as the resolution of operational and logistic issues, and eventually leading to the commencement of its work in Iraq in November.

Biological Weapons

"Every effort must be made by the international community to ensure that advancements made in biotechnology are applied towards the improvement of life on our planet and never for purposes that run counter to the provisions of the Biological Weapons Convention."

KOFI ANNAN, UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL

Fifth Review Conference of the States Parties to the BWC

The Fifth Review Conference was originally convened in Geneva from 19 November to 7 December 2001. Following persistent difficulties in reaching agreement on a final declaration, on 7 December 2001 the Conference decided, by consensus, to adjourn its proceedings and to reconvene in Geneva from 11 to 22 November 2002. This decision, and the work of the Conference during its 2001 session, were recorded in the Interim Report of the Conference. 8

The Conference duly resumed in Geneva on 11 November 2002, under the continuing presidency of Tibor Tóth (Hungary). A total of 94 out of 146 States parties to the Convention participated⁹ in the resumed session of the

These measures consist of investigations into non-compliance with the Convention; assistance in the event, or threat, of use of biological weapons; national criminal legislation and extradition procedures; Scientific Advisory Panel; revised confidence-building measures; a new Convention on Physical Protection of Dangerous Pathogens; a new Convention on Criminalization of chemical and biological weapons; increased efforts on disease surveillance; codes of conduct; promotion of universal membership of the BWC; and withdrawal of reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. See also, website: http://files.fco.gov.uk/npd/btwc290402.pdf.

⁷ See *The Yearbook*, vol. 26: 2001, Chapter. II, pp. 53-56 for details of the 2001 session of the Conference.

⁸ See BWC/CONF.V/12.

Conference. Four signatory States, one other State, five United Nations and other interested organizations, and 16 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) attended as observers. ¹⁰

At the opening plenary meeting of the resumed session (the seventh plenary of the Conference), the President circulated a draft decision ¹¹ which he recommended as the sole outcome of the Conference, given the continuing difficulties in agreeing on a final declaration. According to this draft, the Conference would decide:

- (a) To hold three annual meetings of the States parties of one week duration each year commencing in 2003 until the Sixth Review Conference, to be held not later than the end of 2006, to discuss, and promote common understanding and effective action on:
 - (i) the adoption of necessary national measures to implement the prohibitions set forth in the Convention, including the enactment of penal legislation;
 - (ii) national mechanisms to establish and maintain security and oversight of pathogenic micro-organisms and toxins;
 - (iii) enhancing international capabilities for responding to, investigating and mitigating the effects of cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease;
 - (iv) strengthening and broadening national and international institutional efforts and existing mechanisms for the surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating of infectious diseases affecting humans, animals, and plants;

⁹ For States parties see Final Report of the Conference, in BWC/CONF.V/17, para. 7. Also Appendix II.

¹⁰ The signatory States were Egypt, Madagascar, Myanmar and Nepal. In accordance with the relevant rules of procedure, one State, Israel, neither party nor signatory to the Convention, also attended the resumed session as an observer. The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) attended the resumed session in accordance with the relevant rules of procedure. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the World Health Organization (WHO), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (ICGEB) attended the resumed session as observers. Sixteen non-governmental organizations and research institutes also attended the resumed session of the Conference in accordance with the rules of procedure.

¹¹ See BWC/CONF.V/CRP.3.

- (v) the content, promulgation, and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists.
- (b) All meetings, of both experts and of States parties, will reach any conclusions or results by consensus.
- (c) Each meeting of the States parties will be prepared by a two-week meeting of experts. The topics for consideration at each annual meeting of States parties will be as follows: items (i) and (ii) will be considered in 2003; items (iii) and (iv) in 2004; item (v) in 2005. The first meeting will be chaired by a representative of the Eastern European Group, the second by a representative of the Group of Non-Aligned and Other States, and the third by a representative of the Group of Western European and other States.
- (d) The meetings of experts will prepare factual reports describing their work.
- (e) The Sixth Review Conference will consider the work of these meetings and decide on any further action.

The President recommended that delegations take time to study the draft, and he undertook to consult informally before reconvening the plenary to consider action on the draft decision. Following a series of intensive consultations with individual delegations and regional groups, the eighth plenary meeting was convened on 14 November 2002. At this meeting, the Conference adopted the draft decision unchanged, along with its draft report 12, into which the decision was incorporated. At the same meeting, the Conference approved the nomination by the Eastern Group of Tibor Tóth (Hungary) as Chairman of the 2003 meetings, and decided that the Sixth Review Conference would be held in Geneva in 2006 to be preceded by a Preparatory Committee. The Conference then adopted by consensus its Final Document 13, which included the above-mentioned report.

Following the adoption of the Final Document, South Africa, on behalf of the Group of the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) and Other States said that the Group was disappointed with the limited nature of the decision. States parties had foregone the opportunity to strengthen the Convention, with the limited work at best only having the potential to enhance the implementation of the Convention. Nevertheless, the Group was satisfied that the option of more meaningful work in the future had not been foreclosed, and that multilateralism had been preserved as the only vehicle for preventing the use of disease as an instrument of terror. The Group considered, however,

¹² See BWC/CONF.V/L.1.

¹³ See BWC/CONF.V/17.

that the language of the decision had many ambiguities, and these would need to be clarified in the course of the work.¹⁴

Australia, on behalf of the Group of Western European and other States, welcomed the decision and said that it established a framework for an ongoing multilateral process in the lead-up to the Sixth Review Conference that would enable States parties to work together to enhance and strengthen effective implementation of the Convention. The Group believed that the decision was clear and self-explanatory.¹⁵

The ninth and final plenary meeting was convened on 15 November 2002 and it approved the cost estimates for the meetings to be held in 2003, 2004 and 2005¹⁶; requested the depositaries of the Convention to consult with a view to establishing suitable dates for the 2003 meetings; and approved the consequent amendments to the Final Document.

Chemical Weapons: the Chemical Weapons Convention and the OPCW

"We must continue to work towards the universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention, towards the total destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles, and for a world in which cooperation in the peaceful uses of chemistry is fostered."

KOFI ANNAN, UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL

The year 2002 saw continuous and concrete progress towards the elimination of chemical weapons, especially in efforts to accelerate their destruction. Since the CWC entered into force five years ago, States parties have destroyed approximately 7,140 metric tonnes of chemical agents, including binary components, or more than 10 per cent of the total declared global stockpile under OPCW verification. In addition, of approximately 8,624,000 munitions and containers declared to the Organization, over 1,896,000, or more than 20 per cent of the total global stockpile, had been verifiably destroyed. The United States and India met their obligations to destroy 20 per cent of their declared chemical stockpiles within five years after the entry into force of the Convention. The Russian Federation made significant progress towards this goal, in particular through the commencement of operations at the new destruction facility in the village of Gorny. Another State Party completed the destruction of 20 per cent of its declared stockpile. Two-thirds of more than 60 former chemical weapons

¹⁴ See BWC/CONF.V/15.

¹⁵ See BWC/CONF.V/16.

¹⁶ See BWC/CONF.V/14.

production facilities were either destroyed or converted to peaceful purposes. Since the entry into force of the CWC on 29 April 1997 until 31 December 2002, almost 75,000 inspector days had been devoted to verifying compliance with the Convention on the territory of 51 States Parties. A total of 1,327 inspections had been conducted by the OPCW out of which 825 were at chemical weapons-related facilities and a further 502 were at industrial sites.

On 29 April the OPCW marked the fifth anniversary of the entry into force of the CWC. ¹⁸ Throughout the year, activities aimed at increasing the universality of the Convention continued. By the end of 2002, three additional States ¹⁹ had deposited their instruments of ratification or accession, bringing the total number of States Parties to 148. During the year, a large number of thematic workshops, seminars, conferences, symposia and other gatherings of National Authorities, governmental representatives, experts, representatives of non-governmental organizations and industry were held. These events were devoted primarily to: (a) promoting the universality of the Convention, (b) providing support to States parties in their efforts to implement the Convention, (c) fostering international cooperation, and (d) seeking solutions to outstanding problems.

The First Special Session of the Conference of States Parties to the CWC, convened in The Hague from 21 to 24 April, decided to end the tenure of the then Director-General. On 25 July, the Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties reconvened and appointed, by acclamation, Rogelio Pfirter as Director-General, whose term of office commenced immediately upon his appointment.²⁰

The Seventh Session of the Conference of States Parties was held from 7 to 11 October in The Hague. A total of 109 States Parties, three non-signatory States — Andorra, Iraq and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, representatives of five international organizations, as well as six NGOs and some industry representatives, attended the Conference. The Conference had before it a number of reports concerning the activities of the OPCW as well as the status of the implementation of the Convention. The Conference considered and approved the Report of the Organization for the year 2002²⁴

¹⁷ Statement by the Director-General of the OPCW, Rogelio Pfirter to the First Committee, 23 October 2002.

¹⁸ OPCW Press Release, 37/2002.

¹⁹ Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa and Thailand.

²⁰ OPCW Press Releases 50/2002 and 51/2002.

²¹ Report of the Seventh Session of the Conference of the States Parties, C-7/5, 11 October 2002.

and took note of the Report of the Executive Council on the performance of its activities for the period from 24 February 2001 to 16 July 2002. It also considered and adopted the programme and budget of the Organization for 2003 and decided on the scale of assessment for States parties for 2003. The budget was established at EUR 68.6 million, resulting in an increase, for the first time in four years, of approximately 10 per cent. 26

Furthermore, the Conference considered and adopted: (a) a decision on the recommendation on ensuring the universality of the Convention;²⁷ (b), in principle, a decision on a request from the Russian Federation for an extension of its obligation to meet the intermediate and final deadlines for the destruction of its Category 1 chemical weapons; (c) a decision on a request by another State party to grant an extension of its obligation to meet the intermediate Phase 2 deadline for the destruction of its Category 1 chemical weapons; (d) a decision on nine requests by the Russian Federation for conversion of chemical weapons production facilities for purposes not prohibited under the Convention.²⁸ The Conference elected 21 States parties as new members of the Executive Council for a two-year term of office, to commence on 12 May 2003.²⁹ The Conference decided, in accordance with the recommendation of the Executive Council, to hold the first special

²² Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Oatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav, Macedonia, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, and Zimbabwe.

²³ The International Court of Justice, the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, United Nations, and the Secretariat of the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (UNEP).

²⁴ C-7/DEC.3, 10 October 2002.

²⁵ C-7/DEC.2, 3 October 2002.

session to review the operation of the Convention from 28 April to 9 May 2003.³⁰

In his opening statement,³¹ the Director-General announced that, five years after the OPCW had been established, the Organization would undergo an overall assessment of its establishment in order to enhance its performance and efficiency. The Director-General referred to the positive developments that had taken place with respect to the destruction of chemical weapons, with more than 10 per cent of the total stockpiles declared by four State parties destroyed under OPCW verification. He noted that verification had thus far concentrated on monitoring the destruction of existing chemical weapons stockpiles, rather than on detecting illegal new production. In that regard, he stressed the need for additional resources to be devoted to monitoring the global chemical industry, in full consultation with interested parties and in line with the provisions of the Convention. As regards international cooperation, the Director-General stated that the process of regional consultations among National Authorities was consolidating and expanding. In relation to the efforts aimed at increasing the membership of the Organization in all regions, the Director-General indicated that Africa was a priority region in the efforts of the OPCW. Moreover, South East Asia, as well as Latin America and the Caribbean, would continue to be a focus of attention in the near future as the Organization implemented its programme in the year 2003.

In the course of the year, the Executive Council of the OPCW held four sessions, ³² during which it dealt with a wide range of issues, some of which are discussed below.

²⁶ OPCW Press Release, 65/2002.

²⁷ C-7/DEC.15, 10 October 2002.

²⁸ C-7/DEC.5-13, 10 October 2002.

²⁹ Africa: Cameroon, Nigeria, Tunisia, Sudan, Zambia; Asia: China, India, Japan, Kuwait, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia; Eastern Europe: Czech Republic, Slovakia; Latin America and the Caribbean: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico; Western Europe and Other States: France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, and United States.

³⁰ C-7/5, P. 10.

³¹ Opening Statement by the Director-General to the Conference of the States Parties at its Seventh Session, The Hague, 7 October 2002, C-7/DG.4.

³² The twenty-eighth session was held from 19 to 22 March; the twenty-ninth, from 25 to 28 June; the thirtieth, from 10 to 13 September; and the thirty-first, from 10 to 13 December. For a review of the work of the Executive Council, see website: www.opcw.org.

In accordance with the provisions of the Convention, the preparations for the First Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Convention in 2003 were ongoing throughout the year. The Conference was to review the operation of the CWC and provide strategic direction to the OPCW. This would include a comprehensive evaluation of the implementation of the CWC, its role in the current security environment, as well as an assessment of the impact of developments in science and technology on the CWC. A task specific to the First CWC Review Conference would be the review of the verification regime for the chemical industry and, in this context, a re-examination of the verification provisions applicable to facilities producing discrete organic chemicals. The Conference was expected to develop recommendations and adopt a political declaration by the States parties to the Convention.

From 9 to 11 March, the OPCW, in cooperation with the Government of Sudan, organized a regional workshop on the Chemical Weapons Convention in Khartoum. The workshop was aimed at increasing the membership of the Organization in Africa, as well as at providing technical support to the OPCW Member States in the region in the implementation of the Convention. More than sixty participants from 29 countries attended the workshop, including seven States not Party to the Convention, namely Angola, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Rwanda and Sierra Leone. The Minister of Justice of Sudan, Ali Mohamed Osman Yasin, echoed those sentiments in his opening address and called for the establishment of a chemical-weapon-free zone in Africa. 33

From 10 to 14 September, the OPCW conducted, in cooperation with the Government of Croatia, the first exercise on the delivery of assistance (ASSISTEX I) in Zadar. A chemical attack by terrorists at an international airport was the basis for the exercise scenario. The objective of the exercise was to evaluate the level of preparedness of the OPCW in responding to a request for assistance by a State party, which had suffered a chemical weapons attack. Approximately 15 States parties, 900 personnel and 100 tonnes of equipment were involved in the exercise.³⁴

Within the framework of its mandate on international cooperation, the Organization convened its third Associate Programme from 29 July to 3 October. Representatives from 12 countries in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Eastern Europe and the Middle East participated.³⁵ The programme focused

³³ OPCW Press Releases 15Rev.1/2002 and 17/2002.

³⁴ OPCW Press Release, 56/2002.

³⁵ Burundi, Croatia, Eritrea, Fiji, Jordan, Georgia, Moldova, Mozambique, Nepal, Philippines, Sri Lanka and Sudan.

on facilitating industry-related national implementation of the Convention, enhancing the national capacities of the States parties, facilitating trade in chemistry through the adoption of best practices in the chemical industry and on expanding the pool of qualified professionals in the implementation of the CWC. The programme also included exposure to modern chemical practices and a three-week internship at chemical plants in Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and Switzerland.³⁶

Other specific programmes aimed at fostering international cooperation, which were implemented during the year, included the Conference Support Programme, the Internship Support Programme, the Laboratory Assistance Programme, the Programme for Support of Research Projects, the Equipment Exchange Programme, and the Information Service. A thematic workshop on "Financial Resource Mobilisation for the Sound Management of Chemicals" was held jointly with the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) on 19-22 November 2002 in Geneva. This was the seventh in the series of workshops on issues relating to national chemicals management which resulted from the recommendations of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro.

The Secretariat continued to provide support to the National Authorities of States parties in the implementation of the Convention. implementation support activities were undertaken, including the Fourth Annual Meeting of National Authorities, convened from 4 to 6 October at OPCW Headquarters. At that meeting, the discussion focused on possible new measures designed to ensure effective national enforcement of the Convention in all States parties. The right to request and receive assistance and protection by all States parties against the use or threat of use of chemical weapons was also discussed. Participants underlined the need to strengthen the process of regional consultations. Over 80 National Authorities attended the annual session, ³⁷ using the opportunity to also conduct over 100 bilateral consultations between the Secretariat and National Authority representatives on matters relating to implementation. Regional meetings of National Authorities were held in Latin America and Eastern Europe. In view of the value of these opportunities to exchange experiences and ideas, it was decided to hold similar regional encounters in Asia and Africa in 2003.

Also as part of the implementation support programmes of the Organization, two National Authority Basic Courses were convened in 2002, in September and November, with the objective of providing continuity in

³⁶ OPCW Press Release, 62/2002.

³⁷ OPCW Press Release, 63/2002.

the process of the implementation of the Convention and enhancing the reliability of the compliance mechanism.³⁸

On 23 October, the Director-General of the OPCW addressed the First Committee, reiterating the importance of the CWC as the single multilateral instrument in the field of WMD providing simultaneously for disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as cooperation and assistance on a nondiscriminatory basis. The Director-General recalled the decisions taken at the Seventh Session of the Conference of the States Parties, particularly with regard to facilitating the process for the Russian Federation to meet its obligations to destroy chemical weapons stockpiles. The Director-General reported that the OPCW Member States, recognizing the growing importance of international cooperation and assistance, had decided to increase provisions in the budget of the Organization to ensure that its membership had access to the relevant benefits stipulated in the Convention. In this connection, he pointed out that international cooperation and assistance programmes ranged from concrete assistance in emergency situations to activities to support the National Authorities in the implementation of the Convention, such as guidance in the preparation of national declarations, as well as legislation as required by the CWC.³⁹ He further elaborated on the ongoing efforts to improve the level of preparedness of the OPCW to assist Member States in cases of attack or threat of attack with chemical weapons.

The Director-General also stressed the continuous efforts of the OPCW to reach out to the international community and civil society to achieve universality of the Convention. He cited as an example the OPCW's cooperation with the Secretariat of the African Union. In view of the decision adopted by the African Union on the implementation and universality of the Convention in the region, the two organizations were in the process of drafting a programme that would meet the requirements and priorities of the States concerned⁴⁰ in Africa. He also referred to OPCW's ongoing efforts to enhance its cooperation with the United Nations through DDA.

On 20 November, under the agenda item entitled "Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and other organizations", the Director-General reported to the plenary of the fifty-seventh session of the General Assembly on matters relevant to the implementation of the Convention and

³⁸ OPCW Press Releases 55/2002 and 66/2002.

³⁹ Statement by the Director-General of the OPCW, 23 October 2002.

⁴⁰ C-7/NAT.2, Annex The decision of the African Union on the Implementation and Universality of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, AHG/Dec. 182 (XXXVIII).

the work carried out by the OPCW. In his statement, he stressed the importance of a close cooperation between the United Nations and the OPCW in areas where the United Nations Charter and the OPCW mandate could converge for the benefit of disarmament and non-proliferation of WMD. He highlighted the substantive progress being made by the Member States of the CWC in achieving the goals set out by the Convention particularly the destruction of chemical weapons, a process in which the OPCW continued its vigorous efforts in verification. He pointed out that the anticipated steep rise in verification activities was a clear indication of the challenges ahead for the Organization: the number of inspections would increase, and their nature would change due to new technologies, evolving industrial methods and lessons learned from the past few years of OPCW inspections. He also noted that the OPCW would widen the scope of its monitoring activities in the industry.

Referring to the Organization's preparedness to provide assistance in the case of use or threat of use of chemical weapons, the Director-General stated that the OPCW had been actively working to improve its readiness in this regard, not only in actual emergencies but also in the area of capacity building. The Director-General expressed the hope that other international organizations, including the United Nations, would lend their support and contribute to those efforts. Continuing on the issue of terrorism, the Director-General stated that an active implementation of the provisions of the CWC could help to counter this menace. He also pointed out that, in December 2001, CWC States parties and the Technical Secretariat had jointly identified a number of areas where a useful contribution to the struggle against international terrorism could be made, such as the promotion of universal adherence to the Convention, the enactment of adequate national implementation legislation, as well as the full and effective implementation of the provisions related both to the destruction of CW capabilities and to inspections in the chemical industry. On the question of universality of the CWC, he acknowledged that some States outside the purview of the CWC were a clear proliferation concern. Furthermore, for some other States, the overall security situation prevailing in their respective regions was a factor impacting on their decision to adhere to the Convention. The Director-General concluded by stating that the First Review Conference of the CWC would provide an ideal occasion to reaffirm the validity and importance of the Convention.41

⁴¹ Statement by the Director-General of the OPCW to the 57th session of the General Assembly, 20 November.

After the report of the Director-General, several States made statements in the plenary under the same item. Denmark, speaking on behalf of the European Union and associated States, attached the greatest importance to the activities of the OPCW, particularly given the risk that such arms might fall into the hands of terrorists. Furthermore, Denmark encouraged the further development of coordination and collaboration in this field between the OPCW and the United Nations Secretariat.⁴²

Argentina stressed the importance of the continued political will of the international community to achieve the vital objective of making the CWC universal. It also highlighted the importance of another goal of the Convention - non-proliferation - at a time when the international community was threatened by the phenomenon of terrorism. Argentina also reiterated the importance of international cooperation to make available to developing countries the human and technological resources in the field of chemistry for purposes not prohibited by the Convention.⁴³

The Republic of Korea expressed its continued support for the OPCW and noted the increased relevance of the Organization in the light of the current climate of threats to international security, including potential acts of chemical terrorism. It noted with satisfaction the readiness of the OPCW to cooperate with the Counter-Terrorism Committee of the Security Council by providing information and assistance in line with Security Council resolution 1373 (2001). Moreover, the Republic of Korea pointed out that the OPCW deserved unreserved support of its member States and the international community at large to strengthen its verification regime. 44

As host country to the OPCW, the Netherlands introduced a procedural resolution on the cooperation between the United Nations and the OPCW. ⁴⁵ The General Assembly, by its resolution 57/45, which was adopted without a vote on 21 November, took note of the annual report of the OPCW for 2001 provided by its Director-General on behalf of the Organization. ⁴⁶

UNMOVIC

The United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) was established in December 1999 pursuant to Security Council resolution 1284, as a subsidiary body of the Security Council, to assume responsibilities originally mandated to the United Nations Special

⁴² A/57/PV.54, p. 7.

⁴³ A/57/PV.55, p. 4.

⁴⁴ A/57/PV.55, p. 5.

⁴⁵ A/57/PV.53, p. 23.

⁴⁶ A/57/PV.56, p. 28.

Commission (UNSCOM).⁴⁷ In 2002, several rounds of senior-level discussions between UN officials and representatives of the Government of Iraq were convened to discuss the practical implementation of Security Council resolutions 1284 (1999), 1441 (2002) and other relevant resolutions, ⁴⁸ and the resumption of inspections in Iraq. The Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, Hans Blix, participated in the dialogue between the Secretary-General and the Foreign Minister of Iraq on 7 March, 1-3 May and 4-5 July.⁴⁹ The second half of the year required the Commission to rapidly build up its inspection and support staff, and to resolve operational and logistic issues in order to resume inspections and monitoring in Iraq in November.

In his letter of 16 September to the Secretary-General, the Foreign Minister of Iraq stated that his Government had decided to allow the return of United Nations weapons inspectors without conditions and that the Iraqi side was ready to discuss the practical arrangements necessary for the resumption of inspections. On 17 September, the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC held a preliminary meeting with the Iraqi authorities on the arrangements related to the resumption of inspections. The meeting was followed by discussions on 30 September and 1 October in Vienna, chaired by the Executive Chairman and the Director General of the IAEA, Mohamed El Baradei, with Iraqi counterparts. At the conclusion of the talks, Iraq provided UNMOVIC and the IAEA with the backlog of semi-annual declarations of its holdings of dual-use equipment and related materials required of it under the terms of Security Council resolution 715 (1991).

Following the unanimous adoption of resolution 1441 in the Security Council on 8 November, ⁵² the Foreign Minister of Iraq wrote to the Secretary-General that Iraq would respond to the resolution and that it welcomed the return of United Nations inspectors. ⁵³ From 18 to 19 November, the Executive Chairman and the Director General of IAEA held discussions with representatives of Iraq in Baghdad on the practical implementation of inspections, in particular, the implementation of resolution 1441 (2001). In parallel, technical and logistic personnel began to restore the premises of the former UNSCOM and IAEA in Baghdad to create an effective and secure operational centre for inspection activities in Iraq.

⁴⁷ See *The Yearbook*, vol. 25: 2000, p. 86-91.

⁴⁸ Resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991), 715 (1991).

⁴⁹ S/2002/606, S/2002/981, S/2002/1303.

⁵⁰ S/2002/1034, Annex.

⁵¹ S/2002/1303.

The first team of UNMOVIC inspectors arrived in Iraq on 25 November, comprising 11 experts from the staff at Headquarters and covering the three areas (biological, chemical and missile) for which UNMOVIC was responsible.⁵⁴ The first inspection took place on 27 November. This team was followed by additional groups of inspectors drawn from the roster of trained experts of the Commission. By year end, the Commission had around 100 inspectors plus support staff in Iraq.

On 7 December, responding to the requirement in paragraph 3 of Security Council Resolution 1441 (2002), Iraq submitted to UNMOVIC, the IAEA, and the Security Council "a currently accurate, full and complete declaration of all aspects of its programmes to develop chemical, biological, nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and other delivery systems". declaration, including supporting documents, comprised more than 12,000 pages. The Executive Chairman, in his informal briefing to the Council on 19 December, presented an assessment of the information contained in the declaration. The Chairman concluded that UNMOVIC experts had found little new significant information in the part of the declaration relating to proscribed weapons programmes, nor much new supporting documentation or other evidence. New material was provided concerning non-weaponsrelated activities during the period from the end of 1998 onwards, especially in the biological field and on missile development. In the assessment of UNMOVIC, as there was little new substantive information in the part of the declaration dealing with weapons, or new supporting documentation, the issues that had been identified as unresolved in the Amorim report⁵⁵ and in the report of UNSCOM (S/1999/94) issued in 1999, remained.⁵⁶

⁵² Resolution 1441 (2002) provided for a strengthened inspection regime by conferring revised and additional authorities on UNMOVIC inspectors. It also set out time lines for the resumption of inspections in Iraq and the requirement that Iraq make, within 30 days of the date of the resolution, a current, accurate, full and complete declaration of all aspects of its programmes for weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, as well as of programmes claimed to be for non-weapon purposes in the chemical, biological and nuclear fields. The resolution directed that inspections be resumed in Iraq not later than 45 days following the adoption of the resolution and that UNMOVIC update the Council 60 days thereafter. The resolution further provided for UNMOVIC to report promptly to the Council if at any time Iraq failed to comply with its obligations.

⁵³ S/2002/1242, Annex.

⁵⁴ S/2002/1303.

⁵⁵ S/1999/356

⁵⁶ S/2003/232

From the arrival of the first inspectors in Iraq in November to the early part of 2003, UNMOVIC conducted more than 550 inspections covering approximately 350 sites. All inspections were performed without notice, and access was provided promptly in virtually all cases. The inspections took place throughout Iraq at industrial sites, ammunition depots, research centres, universities, presidential sites, mobile laboratories, private houses, missile production facilities, military camps and agricultural sites. Inspections effectively helped to bridge the gap in knowledge that had existed due to the absence of inspections between December 1998 and November 2002. Several hundred chemical and biological samples were collected at different sites, a majority of which were screened using the analytical laboratory capabilities of UNMOVIC in Baghdad. In his twelfth quarterly report to the Security Council of 28 February 2003, the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC concluded that the results from the inspections and monitoring activities had been consistent with Iraq's declarations. ⁵⁷

The College of Commissioners of UNMOVIC held four plenary sessions and one special session during 2002⁵⁸ to review the implementation of resolutions 1284 (1999), 1441 (2002) and other relevant resolutions, ⁵⁹ as well as to provide advice and guidance to the Executive Chairman. Guidance was provided on significant policy decisions and on the quarterly reports that the Chairman submitted to the Security Council through the Secretary-General. In 2002, four quarterly reports, submitted in accordance with paragraph 12 of resolution 1284 (1991), were transmitted to the Security Council. ⁶⁰ In addition to the members of the College, representatives of the IAEA and the OPCW continued to attend the meetings of the College as observers.

At the meetings of the College, the Executive Chairman reported on his participation in the United Nations-Iraq dialogue, as well as the technical talks on the resumption of inspections that he had had with Iraqi experts. The College expressed its appreciation of the Chairman's comprehensive reports⁶¹ on the rounds of discussions and welcomed the participation of the Chairman in those talks.

J' Ibid.

⁵⁸ The plenary sessions took place on 18-19 February, 29 May, 29-30 August, and 26 November. The special session was convened on 18 October.

⁵⁹ Resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991), 715 (1991).

⁶⁰ The first report covered the period 1 December 2001-28 February 2002 (S/2002/195); the second, 1 March-31 May (S/200/606); the third, 1 June-31 August (S/2002/981); and the fourth, 1 September-30 November (S/2002/1303).

⁶¹ S/2002/606, S/2002/981, S/2002/1303.

In the meeting it held after the approval of resolution 1441, the College welcomed the unanimous adoption of the resolution by the Security Council and considered that the continued and united support of the Council for the inspection activities in Iraq would be vital for the effective implementation of this and earlier resolutions concerning the disarmament of Iraq. The College also discussed how the strengthened powers of inspections that had been conferred on UNMOVIC and the IAEA by that resolution could be used.

Throughout the year, the Executive Chairman continued his practice of providing monthly briefings to the respective Presidents of the Security Council. He also kept the Secretary-General and his senior staff informed of the activities of UNMOVIC. In addition, the Executive Chairman undertook numerous consultations with representatives of several governments, the Director General of the IAEA and the Director-General of the OPCW. He further provided briefings to visiting ministers, parliamentarians and government officials and gave interviews to the media. 62

The College noted the resumption of inspections on 27 November, well in advance of the 45-day deadline set in resolution 1441, and discussed the analysis of the declaration of Iraq. 63 Moreover, the College continued to discuss the clustering of unresolved disarmament issues, as required by resolution 1284, and the status of implementation of the revised Goods Review List adopted in resolution 1409 and the associated procedures for its application. The College noted that the implementation of the Goods Review List and the new procedures would require additional human resources and premises for UNMOVIC, and noted the efforts by the Chairman to deal with those matters.

At the end of the year, the UNMOVIC core staff, in the professional grades at Headquarters, included 73 individuals of 29 nationalities, 10 of whom were women. In addition, there were 267 experts on the roster of trained experts. Whenever a particular expertise was not required on an ongoing basis, UNMOVIC continued to engage the services of short-term consultants. Such consultants assisted, for example, in the consolidation of background information on sites previously inspected and subject to monitoring; the further analysis of Iraq's declarations on its biological weapons activities; the preparation of an Iraqi chemical and biological weapons munitions identification guide; and the refinement of the formats for Iraq's monitoring declarations required under resolution 715 (1991). They

⁶² S/2002/195, S/2002/606, S/2002/981, S/2002/1303.

⁶³ S/2002/606, S/2002/981.

⁶⁴ S/2002/1303.

also provided various forms of support for the training activities of the Commission.⁶⁵

Pursuant to resolution 1284 (1999), the Commission continued to attach high priority to the training of its staff and the experts on the roster, as part of its overall programme of readiness. The fifth basic training course was held from 18 February to 22 March in Geneva, involving 54 participants from 28 nationalities. The sixth basic training course took place from 7 October to 8 November in Vienna, including the participation of 54 individuals. Towards the end of the year, preparations were underway for the seventh basic training course to start in January 2003. 66

UNMOVIC also continued a series of more advanced training courses for roster personnel, as well as for prospective chief inspectors and team leaders drawn from its headquarters staff. Moreover, both existing staff and a number of persons from the roster of trained experts undertook detailed practical training in the area of biological dual-use items, skills and technology of conduct of on-site inspections in biological and chemical fields, as well as in the operation and management of remote monitoring. Furthermore, UNMOVIC conducted specialized training courses on missile, as well as on other issues related to biological and chemical weapons.⁶⁷

In the field of export/import of goods by Iraq, the UNMOVIC/IAEA joint unit continued to receive notifications from Member States of supplies to Iraq of dual-use items. The unit also continued to review all contracts concluded with the Government of Iraq under the provisions of resolution 986 (1995) and to provide technical assistance to the Office of the Iraq Programme and to Member States. With the adoption of resolution 1409 (2002) in May, which approved the revised Goods Review List ⁶⁸ and revised procedures for its application, the role of UNMOVIC was widened. accordance with the procedures, UNMOVIC and the IAEA started to evaluate applications to be financed from the escrow account established pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolution 986 (1995). The evaluations were meant to determine whether an application contained any item referred to in paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1991) relating to military commodities and products, or military-related commodities or products covered by the Goods Review List. Given the wider scope of the list beyond dual-use items and materials related to weapons of mass destruction, UNMOVIC recruited a number of additional analysts to carry out that work.⁶⁹

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⁶⁵ S/2002/606.

⁶⁶ S/2002/195, S/2002/1303.

⁶⁷ S/2002/195, S/2002/606, S/2002/981, S/2002/1303.

⁶⁸ S/2002/515.

Australia Group

The Australia Group ⁷⁰ held an annual meeting from 3 to 6 June 2002 in Paris and reiterated its commitment to fair and transparent trade in chemical and biological materials for peaceful purposes. Participants also agreed that the non-discriminatory application of national export licensing measures allowed legitimate trade to expand unhampered by proliferation fears.

The Group also agreed to adopt tougher export controls to prevent the spread of chemical and biological weapons, including to terrorist groups, as well as formal guidelines to govern the licensing of sensitive chemical and biological items. The participants encouraged all countries to adhere to these guidelines in the interest of international peace and security. Moreover, the Group agreed to include a "catch-all" provision in its guidelines, this being the first time that an export control regime agreed on the inclusion of such a clause in its public guidelines. In an effort to decrease the possibility of terrorists accessing equipment for biological or chemical weapon attacks, the participants also agreed to apply more rigorous controls to the export of fermenters, lowering the volume threshold from 100 litres to 20 litres. In addition, the Group agreed to improve controls of dual-use biological equipment which could be used to manufacture biological weapons, as well as to control, for the first time, the intangible transfer of information and knowledge related to biological and chemical weapons. The Group agreed to additional measures to promote awareness related to risks of biological and chemical weapons proliferation through publication of the Australia Group booklet - "Fighting the spread of chemical and biological weapons: Strengthening global security". 71

⁶⁹ S/2002/606.

The Australia Group continued to consult on and harmonize their national export licensing measures on chemical and biological weapons related items, aimed at preventing any inadvertent contribution to chemical or biological weapons programmes. Participants include: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, European Commission, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Republic of Korea, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States.

⁷¹ Press Release: 7 June 2002, Australia Group: New measures to fight the spread of chemical and biological weapons. See www.australiagroup.net.

General Assembly, 2002

The General Assembly, pursuant to recommendations of the First Committee, took action on two draft resolutions and one draft decision dealing with subjects discussed in this chapter.

57/62. Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The draft resolution was introduced by South Africa, on behalf of the Members States of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, on 18 October [PV 16]. It was adopted by the First Committee on 22 October (140-0-2) [PV 18/pp.11-14] and by the General Assembly on 22 November (164-0-3). For the text of the resolution and the voting pattern, see pages 366 and 455.

First Committee. The Republic of Korea stated that it voted in favour of the draft resolution because it had withdrawn its reservations with respect to biological weapons in the Protocol. However, it still had reservations regarding chemical weapons owing to the security situation on the Korean peninsula.

57/516. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. The draft decision was introduced by Hungary on 17 October, adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 22 October and by the General Assembly on 22 November. For the text of the resolution see pages 426 and 471.

First Committee. Cuba stated that though it joined the consensus, it preferred a substantive decision in the First Committee that would reaffirm the commitment of all States to strengthen the BWC and to a successful outcome of the BWC Review Conference later in the year. It advised that the adoption of only a procedural decision must not be interpreted as a lessening of the basic importance of a strengthened BWC and urged all States to display clear political will to achieve that goal set out by the Review Conference.

57/82. Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. The draft resolution was introduced by Poland, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 442 for the sponsors), on 17 October, adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 22 October and by the General Assembly on 22 November. For the text of the resolution see page 398.


First Committee. Israel, [PV18/p.16] having joined the consensus, reaffirmed its view that positive changes in the security climate in the Middle East would be the major consideration for its decision to ratify the CWC.

Conclusion

The year 2002 witnessed continued international concern over the potential threat of biological terrorism that had been brought about by the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States. Nevertheless, some progress was made in multilateral efforts to address that threat with the conclusion on 15 November 2002 of the Fifth Review Conference of the States Parties to the BWC, which had been suspended on 7 December 2001. States parties to the BWC agreed to meet annually in the lead up to the Sixth Review Conference in 2006 to consider ways of combating the deliberate use of disease as a weapon. The first such annual meeting, to be held in 2003, will discuss and promote understanding and action on the adoption of national measures to implement the prohibitions set forth in the Convention, and on the establishment of national mechanisms to establish and maintain the security and oversight of biological agents and toxins.

In 2002, further progress was achieved in the implementation of the CWC and the destruction of chemical weapons, as well as the destruction or conversion of chemical-weapons production facilities to peaceful purposes. The fifth anniversary of the entry into force of the CWC was observed on 29 April. Some progress was made in achieving universalization of the CWC. By the end of 2002, three additional States had joined the Convention bringing the total of States parties up to 148.

UNMOVIC continued to prepare for the initiation of verification and monitoring activities in Iraq under relevant Security Council resolutions. The second half of the year, in particular, saw a period of intense activity requiring a rapid build-up of inspection and support staff, as well as the resolution of operational and logistic issues. In November, UNMOVIC commenced its work in Iraq.



Conventional Weapons Issues

Introduction

ISSUES RELATED TO THE REGULATION AND REDUCTION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND ARMED FORCES have been on the disarmament agenda of the United Nations since its creation. In the 1950s, the General Assembly dealt with the subject of disarmament in the context of ways and means to achieve the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments and to achieve general and complete disarmament. In 1999, the Disarmament Commission (UNDC) adopted guidelines on conventional arms control with an emphasis on practical disarmament measures. ²

In the 1980s the need to address conventional disarmament in a systematic way, led to negotiations that resulted in the conclusion, in 1981, of the first global agreement on conventional weapons, the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW).³ The CCW was concluded as an "umbrella" treaty to which additional specific agreements could be attached in the form of protocols. Three such protocols were concluded at that time. ⁴ The First Review Conference of the States parties to the CCW, held in 1995-1996, adopted Amended Protocol II.⁵ and a new Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV). ⁶

¹ See *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970* (United Nations publications, Sales No. 70.IX.1), Chap. II. See, in particular, resolution 41(I) of 14 December 1946.

² A/54/42, Annex III.

³ See document CCW/CONF.1/GE/5 for a summary of the negotiations leading to its conclusion. The text of the Convention is reproduced in Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements, 4th edition: 1992 hereafter referred to as Status: 1992, vol. 1 (United Nations publications, Sales No. E.93.IX.11). See also DDA website: http://disarmament/un.org/TreatyStatus.nsf.

⁴ Protocol I on non-detectable fragments; Protocol II and a technical Annex on mines and booby traps; and Protocol III on incendiary weapons.

Following the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, the international community was confronted with the eruption of intra-State conflicts in many parts of the world in which small arms and light weapons (SALW) were the weapons of choice. This led Member States and the United Nations system to initiate efforts to curb the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and the uncontrolled transfers of these weapons. Thus, in the late 1990s, the General Assembly mandated three expert studies on the matter⁷. In 1998, on the recommendation of one such study, the General Assembly decided to convene an international conference on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects. In July 2001, the United Nations Conference took place, adopting by consensus the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA). 8 The PoA recommends actions to be undertaken at the national, regional and global levels, as well as a follow-up process to the 2001 United Nations Conference. In 1998, the Secretary-General designated the Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA) as the Organization's focal point for small arms. Subsequently, the Department established the Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA) mechanism, a consultative body with a wide-ranging membership from within the United Nations system⁹, aimed at ensuring that the United Nations system as a whole addressed the challenges posed by SALW in a comprehensive, coordinated and coherent fashion. Parallel to global efforts, a number of important initiatives were taken at regional and subregional levels to combat the illicit circulation and excessive accumulation of SALW¹⁰. Civil society, including non-governmental organizations, also contributed significantly to the global efforts to address the small arms scourge. The International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), a network, established in 1998, comprising over 500 organizations from nearly 100 countries, has played a key role in raising awareness, coordinating NGO activities and campaigning in this field.

For the text of Amended Protocol II, see DDA website: http://disarmament.un.org/TreatyStatus.nsf. It entered into force on 3 December 1998. The First Annual Conference of States Parties to the CCW took place in December 1999 in Geneva; for the text of the Declaration, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 24: 1999, pp. 110-111. The Second Annual Conference of States parties to the CCW took place from 11 to 13 December 2000 in Geneva; for the text of the Declaration, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 25: 2000, pp. 135-136.

⁶ For the text of Protocol IV, see DDA website: http://disarmament.un.org/Treaty Status. It entered into force on 30 July 1988.

⁷ See documents A/52/298 (1997), A/54/258 (1999) and A/54/155 (1999).

⁸ See document A/CONF.192/15, pp 7-17 for the full text of the Programme of Action.

In addressing the question of transparency in military matters, the General Assembly established two mechanisms: the standardized instrument for international reporting of military expenditures (1980)¹¹ and the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (1992)¹² to serve as confidence-building measures. With regard to transparency in armaments, the United Nations Register continued to be the most important instrument in the field of conventional weapons at the global level.

To address the dramatically high number of civilian casualties caused by anti-personnel mines (APMs), in the early 1990s, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and other humanitarian organizations alerted the international community to this unfolding crisis. In 1996, Protocol II of the CCW was amended to extend its scope and application to cover both international and internal armed conflicts and to prohibit the use of non-detectable APMs and their transfer as well as the use of non-self-destructing and non-self-deactivating mines outside the marked areas. As the civilian impact of land-mines grew more apparent, a number of governments, international agencies and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL)¹³ made efforts to move beyond the amended Protocol II towards a total ban and as a result of these efforts, in December 1997, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-

⁹ The following departments and agencies are current members of CASA: the Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA), the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the Department of Public Information (DPI), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict (OSRSG/CAAC), the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), the World Bank, the World Health Organization (WHO), and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).

¹⁰ See The Yearbook, vol. 26: 2001, p.73.

¹¹ The instrument covers three categories of expenditure (operating costs, procurement and construction, and research and development) relating to strategic, land, naval, air and other combat forces, central support administration and command, paramilitary forces, and military assistance.

¹² The Register covers transfers in seven categories of weapons: battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles and missile launchers.

Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (the Mine-Ban Convention)¹⁴ was adopted and entered into force on 1 March 1999.

This chapter deals with the issue of conventional arms at the global level: small arms and light weapons, prohibition or restriction of the use of certain conventional weapons, anti-personnel mines, transparency measures, and export control.

Developments and trends, 2002

The implementation of the PoA generated a renewed momentum in the efforts by the international community to address the problem of SALW, which was characterized by increased initiatives at the global, regional, and national levels, involving both governmental and non-governmental actors. Many such activities were undertaken within the framework of the Group of Interested States in Practical Disarmament Measures, ¹⁵ while others, particularly in Africa, were aimed at assisting States in curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them. ¹⁶ One of the important steps to implement the PoA was the establishment of a Group of Governmental Experts to assist the Secretary-General in examining the feasibility of developing an international instrument to enable States to identify and trace, in a timely and reliable manner, illicit small arms and light weapons, taking into account the views of States on the issue.

Pursuant to the decision by the Second Review Conference of the States Parties to the CCW, an open-ended Group of Governmental Experts was established to address the issue of explosive remnants of war (ERW) and to explore the issue of mines other than anti-personnel mines. (See Appendix V, Report of the meeting of States parties to the CCW). The meeting of States Parties to the CCW held from 12-13 December 2002, in Geneva, endorsed the outcome of the meetings of the Group of Governmental Experts. Notably, the mandate of the working group on ERW was changed from one of deliberation in 2002 to one of negotiation in 2003, in order to negotiate an

¹³ The ICBL, created in 1991, is a coalition of over 1,000 NGOs in over 60 countries working to ban landmines. On 10 October 1997, in recognition of the crucial role played by the ICBL, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to it and its coordinator, Jody Williams.

¹⁴ The text of the Mine-Ban Convention is reproduced in the Yearbook, vol.22 1997, Appendix II, pp. 227-241.

¹⁵ See General Assembly resolution 56/24 P of 29 November 2001on "Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures".

¹⁶ See General Assembly resolution 56/24 U of 29 November 2001 on "Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them"

instrument on post-conflict remedial measures of a generic nature which would reduce the risks of ERW. The meeting of States parties also decided that the working group on mines other than anti-personnel mines would continue its work in 2003 to further explore the issue.

The year 2002 witnessed several developments in the field of antipersonnel landmines. The Fourth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine-Ban Convention, held from 16 to 20 September, in Geneva, reviewed the general status and operation of the Convention, including article 7, reporting on transparency measures concerning the implementation of the Convention and the 2002-2003 intersessional work programme. The meeting also considered preparatory work for the first Review Conference of the Convention in 2004. The Fourth Annual Conference of the States Parties to the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices (Amended Protocol II) to the CCW met in Geneva on 11 December 2002. The Conference reviewed the operation and status of Amended Protocol II and called for its universalization. During the year, eight countries¹⁷ ratified or acceded to the Mine Ban Convention and five more countries¹⁸ consented to be bound by Amended Protocol II to the CCW. By 31 December 2002, the Mine Ban Convention had 130 States parties, ¹⁹ and 68 countries had consented to be bound by Amended Protocol II to the CCW.

Intensive efforts by DDA, including activities carried out in cooperation with interested States during the year, contributed to a wider acceptance of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms resulting in a record number of replies for 2001. However, differences among Member States continued, especially on expanding the scope of the Register to include data on military holdings and procurement through national production on the same basis as data on transfers. The question of inclusion of weapons of mass destruction continued to be controversial.

Military expenditures continued to rise. While figures for 2002 are not yet available, world military expenditures are expected to approach one trillion in the coming years. This is due largely to the projected increase in expenditures by the United States. Moreover, the war on terrorism initiated after the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September will continue to impact future trends in military expenditures in other countries as well.²⁰

¹⁷ Angola, Afghanistan, Cameroon, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gambia, Central African Republic and Suriname.

¹⁸ Albania, Croatia, Latvia, Morocco, and Slovenia.

¹⁹ At the date of publication, there are 132 States Parties to the Mine Ban Convention. Cyprus deposited its instrument of ratification on 17 January 2003 and Sao Tome and Principe on 31 March 2003.

The United Nations continued to gather official data from Member States through its standardized reporting instrument for military expenditure. Although the level of participation remained low, the number of replies submitted by Member States more than doubled over the past two years, recording a 33 percent increase over the previous year.

Small arms and light weapons

Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects

During the year, efforts at the global, regional and national levels were made to implement the PoA. The United Nations, working closely with Member States, other international and regional organizations as well as civil society, including non-governmental organizations, played an important role.

The Security Council continued to take measures to strengthen enforcement of arms embargoes aimed at preventing the sale and supply of arms and related materials to targeted States and entities under its sanctions, as an integral part of the global fight against the illicit trade in SALW. All current United Nations sanctions regimes imposed by the Security Council have an arms embargo component. The sanctions committees dealing with Angola, Somalia, Liberia and Afghanistan have been supported by expert monitoring bodies focusing in particular on tracing sanctions violations, including violations of arms embargoes²¹.

On 11 October, the Security Council held a high-level open meeting to discuss "The role of the Council in preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons". The Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs addressed the opening meeting and introduced the Report of the Secretary-General on Small Arms. ²² The report presented an overview of the Council's latest initiatives regarding SALW in situations under its purview and presented twelve recommendations relevant to the expansion and consolidation of the Council's work in this area. The recommendations of the Secretary-General covered the following topics: implementation of the PoA adopted by the 2001 United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons; actions and arms embargoes mandated by the Security Council; conflict prevention, peace-

²⁰ See SIPRI Yearbook 2002, Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford University Press, 2002.

²¹ http://www.un.org/Docs/sc.

²² S/2002/1053 (20 September).

building and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR); and confidence-building measures.

In continuing its consideration of the small arms item, the President of the Security Council, at its 4639th meeting, on 31 October 2002, spoke on behalf of the Council, ²³ taking note with appreciation of the Report of the Secretary- General and requesting him to report, no later than December 2003, on the implementation of all the recommendations contained in that report. The Presidential statement focused principally on the question of arms embargoes, their establishment, monitoring and effective implementation. It also touched on the question of the illicit trade in SALW: the reinforcement of existing legislation, procedures for and control over the export, import, transit and stockpile of SALW, and DDR in post-conflict situations.

The General Assembly adopted two resolutions on SALW, entitled "The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects" (57/72) and "Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them" (57/70). By resolution 57/72, of 22 November, the General Assembly decided to convene the first of the biennial meetings of States in New York in July 2003. As stipulated in the PoA, the meeting would consider the implementation of the PoA at the national, regional and global levels. The resolution encouraged all initiatives to mobilize resources and expertise to promote the implementation of the PoA and to provide assistance to States in its implementation. It also requested the Secretary-General to continue to collate and circulate data and information provided by States on a voluntary basis, including national reports, on their implementation of the PoA.

Resolution 57/70 of 22 November encouraged the establishment in the countries of the Sahelo-Saharan subregion of national commissions to combat the illicit proliferation of small arms, and invited the international community to lend its support wherever possible to ensure the smooth functioning of the commissions. The resolution welcomed the decision to renew the Declaration of a Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa, adopted by the heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of West African States in Abuja on 31 October 1998, and encouraged the international community to support the implementation of the moratorium. It encouraged the involvement of organizations and associations of civil society in the efforts of the national commissions to combat the illicit traffic in small arms and their participation in the implementation of the moratorium on the importation, exportation and manufacture of small arms and light weapons in

²³ S/PRST/2002/30, (31 October).

West Africa as well as in the implementation of the PoA. It also called upon the international community to provide technical and financial support to strengthen the capacity of civil organizations to take action to combat the illicit trade in small arms; and invited the Secretary-General, and those States and organizations that are in a position to do so to provide assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them.

A Follow-up Meeting of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects was held in Tokyo, from 23 to 25 January, at the invitation of the Government of Japan. Forty-seven representatives from 32 Governments as well as 32 individuals representing the United Nations and various other organizations and research institutes participated. The objective of the Follow-up Meeting was to sustain the momentum of the United Nations 2001 Conference; to assess its outcome; and to consider ways to vigorously implement the PoA. Participants agreed that the PoA was a valuable first step and a common basis from which different States and regions could move forward at a speed appropriate to their desires, needs and capacities.

Parallel to global efforts, many regional and subregional initiatives were undertaken to address the SALW problem, especially in the area of implementing the PoA (see Chapter IV).

Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 56/24 V of 24 December 2001 on "The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects", DDA collated and circulated data and information provided by States, on a voluntary basis, including national reports, on the implementation of the PoA. The Department also invited Member States to communicate the details of their respective national points of contact so that the Secretariat could facilitate coordination among States and between them and the United Nations and other relevant stakeholders. In addition, as requested by the General Assembly, in paragraph 13 of that resolution, the Secretary-General submitted a report to the General Assembly at its 57th session on the activities undertaken by states from June 2001 to June 2002 to implement the PoA²⁴.

DDA and its regional centres in Africa, Asia and the Pacific and Latin America and the Caribbean, actively promoted the implementation of the PoA and provided technical and substantive support to interested States. In so doing, the DDA conducted fact-finding, assessment and advisory missions on the small arms situation in Argentina, Brazil, Cambodia, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Niger, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Sri Lanka and Togo. DDA also carried out other activities such as training programmes related to SALW for

²⁴ A/57/160.

experts from the States signatories to the Nairobi Declaration;²⁵ subregional workshops on the follow-up to the 2001 United Nations conference in Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean.

Furthermore, in partnership with the Hague Appeal for Peace, supported by the United Nations Foundation, DDA conducted a six-month project (6 December 2001 - 5 June 2002) for a two-year programme entitled "Peace and Disarmament Education: Sustaining Weapons Collection and Preventing Violence". The programme will support small arms collection programmes by providing long-term training and awareness of peaceful alternatives to guns and violence to the youth and the community at large, as a contribution to preventing the recurrence of conflict.

Activities undertaken by the regional centres in this area are reflected in Chapter IV.

The Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA) mechanism 26

In 2002, CASA members undertook a number of activities related to the implementation of the PoA, some of these are highlighted in the table below.

The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) played a leading role in the development of the Reference Group on Small Arms (RGSA) under the Inter-Agency Standing Committee of a Humanitarian Programme of Action on small arms established after the 2001 United Nations Conference.

The Department of Political Affairs (DPA) promoted arms limitation as an essential element in conflict prevention and peace-building. It included arms control in the mandates of special representatives or envoys dispatched to areas in or emerging from conflict, and involved United Nations peace-building support offices in specific activities to combat the illicit traffic in SALW. DPA also supported programmes to collect and destroy SALW in Africa and the Pacific region, such as ensuring the effective implementation of the weapons disposal provisions of the Bougainville Peace Agreement.

The United Nation Children's Fund (UNICEF) together with its partners, organized panels on "Children and Small Arms" during the twenty-seventh Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Children (8 to

²⁵ The States signatories of the Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa (15 March 2000) are Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda and United Republic of Tanzania.

²⁶ See footnote 9 to this Chapter.

10 May 2002). It was involved in small arms pilot projects in Kosovo, Albania, Croatia, Sri Lanka, Egypt, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia, Somalia and Tajikistan to raise awareness among children of SALW. UNICEF also provided assistance to a project on disarmament education conducted by DDA in Albania, Cambodia, Niger and Peru.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), through the Trust Fund to Support the Prevention and Reduction of the Proliferation of Small Arms, supported programmes for the recovery and destruction of small arms; built national and regional capacity for the removal of small arms, including training law enforcement and customs officers. UNDP also undertook several community development and weapons collection and destruction projects and DDR programmes.

The Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict promoted the incorporation of children affected by armed conflict in the international peace and security agenda resulting in the adoption of Security Council resolutions 1379 (2001) and 1460 (2003) which included provisions to address the linkages between SALW and children and urged Member States to take action. It supported the development of a two-year research project on the impact of SALW on children affected by armed conflict undertaken by an International Research network hosted at the Social Science Research Council (SSRC).

The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) initiated a research project on lessons learned from weapons collection programmes on Albania, Cambodia, Congo, Mali and Papua New Guinea. The Geneva Forum, a joint initiative of UNIDIR, the Quaker United Nations Office, Geneva, and the Programme for Strategic and International Security Studies of the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, developed a support programme to the implementation of the PoA.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in Vienna held a series of meetings to inform Governments and officials and experts from relevant regional and intergovernmental organizations about the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, to discuss ratification requirements and identify specific requirements for technical assistance.

The United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) contributed to the success of the weapons collection programme in Elbasan and Diber in Albania through public awareness campaign materials targeting women and youth, capacity-building workshops and a conference attended

by over two hundred women called "Women of Diber Say No to Guns, Yes to Life, Yes to Development". In Somalia, UNIFEM provided technical assistance to the Women's Development Organization in Southern Somalia (International Development Association) for a weapons collection project that culminated in a public weapons destruction ceremony.

Group of Governmental Experts on identifying and tracing illicit small arms and light weapons

Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 56/24 V of 24 December 2001, entitled "The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects", the Secretary-General convened, in 2002, a Group of Governmental Experts to examine the feasibility of developing an international instrument to enable States to identify and trace, in a timely and reliable manner, illicit small arms and light weapons, taking into account the views of States.²⁷

The Group held its first session in Geneva, from 1 to 5 July, at which it considered the views of Member States pursuant to resolution 56/24 V and heard presentations on relevant topics. It examined a number of United Nations documents related to SALW as well as national legislation and other documentation submitted to DDA by States, on a voluntary basis, including national reports on the implementation of the PoA on SALW. The Group also took note of documentation on SALW from various regional organizations and reports of follow-up meetings to the 2001 UN Conference. In carrying out the study, the Group considered the definition of SALW as defined in the 1997 Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, excluding ammunitions and explosives. ²⁸

The Group agreed that tracing comprised three key elements: marking, record keeping and cooperation, all of which had different legal, technical, political and institutional dimensions. The Group will hold two more sessions in March and in June 2003, with a view to making recommendations to the General Assembly on developing an international legal instrument to identify and trace illicit SALW.

Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures

General Assembly resolution 56/24 P of 29 November 2001, on "Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures" further

²⁷ The Group was composed of the representatives of: Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, France India, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Mali, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russian Federation, South Africa, Switzerland, Thailand, United Kingdom and United States.

²⁸ A/52/298.

encouraged Member States, including the Group of Interested States in Practical Disarmament Measures, to lend their support to the Secretary-General in responding to requests by Member States to collect and destroy small arms and light weapons in post-conflict situations.

The Group provided financial assistance to the United Nations for fact-finding and assessment missions to the following countries in 2002: Sri Lanka (11-18 February), Sierra Leone (14-28 April), Papua New Guinea (1-10 May), and Cambodia (13-20 June). The Group held five meetings and was briefed on: implementation of the weapons collection project in N'guigmi, Niger (ongoing since October 2001); the United Nations fact-finding missions to Kenya (August 2001), Sri Lanka (February 2002) and Papua New Guinea (May 2002); and the disarmament assessment mission to Sierra Leone (April 2002). The Group also considered the establishment of an electronic database on bilateral and multilateral practical disarmament projects and the peace and disarmament education initiative undertaken by DDA in collaboration with the NGO Hague Appeal for Peace.

Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them

Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 56/24 U of 29 November 2001, on "Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them", national authorities, international organizations and civil society were encouraged to combat the illicit traffic in SALW and support operations to collect such arms in Africa and provide technical and financial support to such endeavours. Pursuant to paragraph 20 of the twelfth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission to Sierra Leone (S/2001/1195), an inter-agency disarmament assessment mission to Sierra Leone and neighbouring Liberia and Guinea took place from 14 to 28 April 2002. The principal objective of the mission was to evaluate the effectiveness of the disarmament exercises that were conducted in Sierra Leone from May 2001 to January 2002.

Transparency in conventional arms transfers and military expenditures

United Nations Register of Conventional Arms

Pursuant to the recommendations contained in the 2000 Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development,²⁹ the Secretariat was engaged in a number of activities to enhance Member States' familiarity with and encourage their greater

²⁹ A/55/281.

participation in that instrument. DDA cooperated with the governments of Canada, Germany, Japan and the Netherlands and held of three workshops on transparency in armaments, including the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. The first workshop took place in Accra, Ghana, (26-27) March) for Member States of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); the second in Windhoek, Namibia, (19-20 June) for Member States of the Southern African Development Community (SADC); and the third in Lima, Peru, (26-27 November) devoted to Latin America and DDA facilitated and participated in a meeting of the the Caribbean. Hemispheric Security of the Organization of American States (OAS), held at its headquarters in Washington, D.C. on 26 April. The meeting was devoted to arms transparency at the regional level, including the Register of Conventional Arms. During the First Committee, on 15 October, DDA also organized a symposium to mark the tenth anniversary of the Register, (United Nations Headquarters). In addition, the Department published a special booklet in honour of the Register's tenth anniversary.

Annual report on the Register for the calendar year 2001

The tenth consolidated report of the Secretary-General³⁰ and the two addenda for the calendar year 2001 contained data and information provided by 125 governments on imports and exports in the seven categories of conventional arms covered by the Register. A composite table for 2001, listing all the replies received by the Secretary-General and indicating whether each reply contained data on imports and exports or both, and whether relevant explanations and background information were included, is annexed to this chapter (see page 134). The report for 2001 indicated a

³⁰ See A/57/221 and Add.1 and 2. An electronic copy of the report is available on the United Nations website: http://disarmament.un.org. Information for the calendar year 2001 submitted after the 31 May deadline will be issued as further addenda to document A/57/221.

further increase in the number of submissions over the previous year. Regional participation is reflected in the following table:

Member States participating in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms: 1996-2001

(by region)
(excluding Cook Island and Niue submissions)

1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
African States					
9 of 53	11 of 53	3 of 53	6 of 53	11 of 53	17 of 53
Asian States					
22 of 53	26 of 53	21 of 53	21 of 53	32 of 53	30 of 54
Eastern European States					
18 of 22	16 of 22	15 of 22	18 of 22	21 of 22	21 of 22
Latin American and Caribbean State					
16 of 33	14 of 33	12 of 33	20 of 33	23 of 33	26 of 33
Western European and Other States					
27 of 28	28 of 28	28 of 28	28 of 28	27 of 28	29 of 29

^{*} Updated to include submissions to the Register as of 10 July 2003.

In addition, on the basis of operative paragraph 4(a) of resolution 56/24 Q, the Secretary-General received views from Cuba, the European Union, Kazakhstan and the League of Arab States.³¹

Objective information on military matters, including transparency of military expenditures

On 15 January, the Secretary-General sent a note verbale, to Member States requesting them to submit their annual reports, not later than 30 April, on their military expenditures for the latest fiscal year for which data were available preferably using to the extent possible the reporting instrument

³¹ See A/57/221 and Add.1 and 2. An electronic copy of the report is available on the United Nations website: http://disarmament.un.org.

recommended in resolution 35/42 of 12 December 1980, or as appropriate, any other format developed in conjunction with similar reporting on military expenditures to other international or regional organizations. Replies received from 81 Governments, most of which used the reporting instrument, have been reproduced in a report of the Secretary-General.³²

By operative paragraph 5(f) of its resolution 56/14, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to promote international and regional symposia and training seminars to explain the purpose of the United Nations system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures and to give relevant technical instructions. Pursuant to this request, DDA cooperated with the governments of Canada, Germany, Japan and the Netherlands and held three workshops on transparency in armaments (see section above on the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms). At those workshops, issues related to the United Nations standardized instrument for reporting military expenditures were also addressed. At a meeting of the Hemispheric Security of the OAS, held at OAS headquarters in Washington, D.C. on 26 April, which DDA facilitated and participated in, the United Nations standardized instrument for reporting military expenditures was discussed, (see section above on the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms).

Conference on Disarmament, 2002

Transparency in armaments

During its 2002 session, while seeking agreement on its programme of work, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) considered the possibility of appointing a special coordinator to seek the views of its members on the most appropriate way to deal with the question of transparency in armaments.

³² A/57/263. Replies were received from: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Palau, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Yugoslavia and Zimbabwe.

Since the programme of work had not been agreed upon, the issue was addressed at the plenary meetings of the Conference.

The Netherlands recalled that transparency in armaments was one of the major confidence-building principles among States that enabled the international community to be better informed about military matters and developments. With regard to conventional arms, there were two instruments: the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and the system for standardized reporting on military matters, including transparency in military expenditures. During its ten years of operation, the United Nations Register has established a norm of transparency; has prompted many Governments to improve their national systems for monitoring and controlling transfers of conventional arms; and has set an example for regional activities such as the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions. The Netherlands also attached importance to transparency in the field of weapons of mass destruction and advocated increasing transparency with regard to nuclear arsenals. It recalled its proposals at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, together with Belgium, Germany, Italy and Norway for the nuclear-weapon States to provide information periodically on the aggregate numbers of their nuclear weapons and on their nuclear policies, as well as to increase transparency with regard to tactical nuclear weapons. The Netherlands was of the view that transparency in nuclear issues applied also to non-nuclear-weapon States, and that concluding additional safeguards with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was another way of being transparent. Finally, recalling that transparency in armaments was one of the non-contested items on the CD's agenda it believed that the Conference could deal with the issue 33

Romania advocated the resumption of the debate on transparency in armaments in the CD as a way of preparing the ground for future international instruments intended to ensure the restraint and responsibility of both producers and end-users, while providing equal and undiminished security at the lowest level of armaments. It also appealed to all States to participate in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and in the standardized reporting on military matters and transparency on military expenditures.³⁴

The Russian Federation recognized the positive role that transparency in armaments plays in creating a climate of confidence among States. In its view, transparency in armaments could serve as leverage to prevent the

³³ CD/PV.895, pp. 7 - 8.

 $^{^{34}}$ CD/PV.896, pp. 5 - 6.

destabilizing accumulation of arms and averting arms conflicts, particularly if transparency measures were implemented by importers.³⁵

The Group of Governmental Experts of the States Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW)

The Second Review Conference of the States Parties to the CCW decided to establish an open-ended Group of Governmental Experts to discuss ways and means to address the issue of explosive remnants of war (ERW) and further explore the issue of mines other than anti-personnel mines. The Group was requested to report to the meeting of States Parties to the CCW in December 2002. The Group convened three sessions during 2002, chaired by Rakesh Sood of India, who also chaired the meeting of States Parties to the CCW in December. ³⁶

The first session

The first session of the Group of Governmental Experts took place in Geneva from 21 to 24 May 2002.³⁷ The Group adopted its agenda, ³⁸ confirmed its rules of procedure³⁹ and adopted arrangements for meeting the costs of its activities. It further agreed to prepare a report at the conclusion of each session so that decisions or recommendations on both substantive and organizational matters could be properly recorded.

The meetings were chaired by two coordinators who addressed the issues of explosive remnants of war (ERW) and mines other than anti-personnel mines (MOTAPM)⁴⁰ respectively. The Group considered 12 working papers,⁴¹ and heard presentations by Hungary on the unexploded ordnance

³⁶ The first session was held from 21 to 24 May, the second from 8 to 19 July, and the third from 2 to 10 December 2002.

³⁸ CCW/GGE/I/1, which was applied to all the three sessions of the Group of Governmental Experts.

³⁵ CD/PV.900, p. 17.

³⁷ Out of 88 States Parties to the Convention, 58 participated in the work of the Group, along with three signatory States. In accordance with the relevant rules of procedure, seven States not parties to the Convention participated as observers. The representatives of UNMAS and the ICRC as well as a number of non-governmental organizations also participated in the meeting.

³⁹ As recommended and used by the Second Review Conference (CCW/CONF.II/PC.1/1 with oral amendments)

⁴⁰ Chris Sanders (Netherlands) on explosive remnants of war and Peter Kolarov (Bulgaria) on mines other than anti-personnel mines.

(UXO) problem in that country, and by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)⁴² and ICRC based on their joint working paper. ⁴³ An exposition on ERW was organized by Switzerland on 21-22 May. Presentations entitled "Afghanistan Battle Damage Assessment Mission" and "Global Overview of Explosive Submunitions" by Human Rights Watch, and "Explosive Remnants of War" by Landmine Action also took place during the session. On 24 May, the Group of Governmental Experts adopted a procedural report of the first session. ⁴⁴

The second session

At its second session, held from 8 to 19 July 2002, the Group discussed ERW; MOTAPM; and in accordance with a decision of the Second Review Conference, one meeting was devoted to discussing options to promote compliance with the Convention and its protocols.

On ERW, the Group considered the scope, adequacy of existing international humanitarian law, technical improvements and other measures, warning to civilian populations, clearance, rapid provision of information to facilitate clearance, clearance associated issues and responsibilities, and post-conflict assistance and cooperation. With regard to MOTAPM, the Group considered the humanitarian aspects; legal aspects; technical and other measures; definitions and future work.

During the second session, the Group considered 22 working papers, ⁴⁵ held two meetings of military experts under the chairmanship of Col. Erwin Dahinden of Switzerland to deal with the ERW, and two meetings of military experts to deal with MOTAPM under the chairmanship of Paul Ellis of the GICHD. The Group also heard several presentations by governments, international organizations, as well as NGOs and academia. ⁴⁶ The Group of Governmental Experts adopted a procedural report of the second session. ⁴⁷

The third session

The third session of the Group of Governmental Experts took place on 2-10 December. 48 The Working Group on ERW held seven meetings and

⁴¹ CCW/GGE/I/WP.1 to CCW/GGE/I/WP.12

⁴² The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining supports Humanitarian Mine Action through operational assistance, research, and support to the implementation of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. It is an independent Foundation supported by 18 governments.

⁴³ CCW/GGE/I/WP.5.

⁴⁴ CCW/GGE/I/2.

⁴⁵ CCW/GGE/II/WP.1 to CCW/GGE/II/WP.22.

discussed: (i) Munitions: generic, preventive; (ii) Munitions Design: specific, preventive; (iii) Restrictions during a conflict, additional Geneva Protocols, etc.; (iv) Post conflict remedial action: what should be done, and when should it start? (v) Post conflict remedial action: by whom? (vi) How to deal with existing ERW; (vii) Assistance and cooperation in areas (i), (ii), (iv), including victim assistance, and (v) above; and (viii) the Draft mandate for 2003. The Working Group on MOTAPM held three meetings and discussed new papers and the draft mandate for 2003. The Group considered eight working papers submitted on both subjects.⁴⁹

During the third session, one meeting of military experts was held under the chairmanship of Col. Erwin Dahinden of Switzerland on the issue of ERW. ⁵⁰ The Group heard presentations on "Measures to Prevent ERW: Good Practices in Munition Management" (United Kingdom), ⁵¹ "Measures that Can Be Taken During Conflict" (Netherlands), "U.S. Submunition Reliability Policy" (United States) and "International Humanitarian Law and Targeting: Australian Approach" (Australia). Presentations were also made by Human Rights Watch on "Cluster Bomb Use in Afghanistan" and by Landmine Action on "The Impact of ERW on Civilian Communities in Sri Lanka" and "ERW: The Global Problem – Preliminary Finding".

In accordance with the decisions of the States Parties at the Second Review Conference, one meeting was devoted to the consideration of options to promote compliance with the Convention and its annexed Protocols. In this regard, the Group recommended that the Chairman-designate of the Meeting of States Parties to the Convention should undertake consultations

^{46 &}quot;Ways to Resolve the Problem of Mines Other Than Anti-personnel Mines" by the Russian Federation; "Information on Technical Measures Related to AV Mines: Detectability and SD/SN/SDA" by the United States; "Anti-Vehicle Mines – Experience from Field Operations" by UNMAS; "Explosive Ordnance Disposal from a Field and Donor Perspective" and "Information Needs from a Field Perspective" by Landmine Action; "Background Brief on Anti-Handling Devices" by GICHD; and "Legal Issues Regarding Explosive Remnants of War" by Professor Christopher John Greenwood.

⁴⁷ CCW/GGE/II/1.

⁴⁸ 60 States Parties to the Convention participated in the work of the Group, along with three signatory states. In accordance with the relevant rules of procedure, eight States not parties to the Convention participated as observers. The representatives of UNIDIR, UNMAS and the ICRC, as well as a number of non-governmental organizations also participated in the meeting.

⁴⁹ CCW/GGE/III/WP.1 to CCW/GGE/III/WP.8

⁵⁰ CCW/GGE/III/WP.8

⁵¹ CCW/GGE/III/WP.3.

during the intersessional period on possible options to promote compliance with the Convention and its annexed Protocols, taking into account proposals put forward, and should submit a consensus report to all the States parties.

The Second Review Conference also decided to invite experts from interested States parties to consider possible issues related to small calibre weapons and ammunition and report to the States parties on their work. Accordingly, the representative of Switzerland reported that a meeting was held in that country in 2002 with the participation of experts from interested States parties.

On 10 December, the Group reviewed and endorsed the recommendations by the two Working Groups and adopted a procedural report of the third session. ⁵² On the issue of ERW, the Group recommended that an instrument on ERW be negotiated. On the issue of MOTAPM, the Group recommended that it continue to explore the issue next year. Both proposals were included in a report to the Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on 12 and 13 December 2002.

The Group also recommended that follow-up work of the Meeting of States Parties should be held under the oversight of the Chairman-designate of the Meeting of States Parties in Geneva, in 2003, in conjunction with the Fifth Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II.

The Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW)

The Second Review Conference of the States Parties to the CCW, held in Geneva from 11-21 December 2001, decided, in its Final Declaration, to convene a meeting of the States Parties on 12-13 December 2002 in Geneva, as follow-up on decisions by the Review Conference. The Conference also decided that the chairman-designate of the Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention should undertake consultations on possible options to promote compliance with the Convention and its annexed Protocols and to invite interested States Parties to consider possible issues related to small calibre weapons and ammunitions.

Main task, participation and organizational matters

The Meeting of the States Parties was held on 12-13 December in Geneva.⁵³ Its main task was to consider the Report of the Group of Governmental Experts of the States Parties to the Convention.

⁵² CCW/GGE/III/1.

At the first plenary meeting on 12 December, Rakesh Sood of India was elected Chairman of the Meeting of the States Parties and a number of organizational matters were addressed.⁵⁴ The Meeting also received a message from the Secretary-General of the United Nations.⁵⁵

During the general exchange of views, a total of 31 delegations (including Denmark, on behalf of the European Union and associated States) made statements. ⁵⁶ The representative of the ICRC also participated in the general exchange of views, and some NGOs were invited to address the Meeting. ⁵⁷

Most delegations welcomed the Report of the Group of Governmental Experts and expressed their support for the draft mandates of the two Working Groups on explosive remnants of war and mines other than antipersonnel mines, respectively, for the continuation of their work in 2003.

The Meeting of the States Parties concluded its work on 13 December and adopted a report by consensus ⁵⁸ (for the text of the report, see Appendix V, p.338). On the issue of ERW, the meeting endorsed the recommendations by the Group of Governmental Experts of States Parties to CCW on the Group's 2003 mandate. The mandate contained, in one part, a negotiating mandate on post-conflict remedial measures, and, in another part, a mandate on further exploration of preventive measures. Meanwhile, on the issue of MOTAPM, States Parties decided that the Group of Governmental Experts of States Parties should continue to explore the issue in 2003. In addition, the Meeting decided to continue the examination of the issue of compliance with the Convention and its Protocols. Agreement was also achieved on the consideration of small-calibre weapons and ammunition. The Meeting

⁵³ Out of 89 States Parties, 66 participated in the work of the Meeting, along with three signatory States. In accordance with the relevant rules of procedure, 11 States not parties to the Convention participated as observers. The representatives of UNIDIR, UNMAS and the ICRC, as well as a number of non-governmental organizations also participated in the Meeting. See Appendix V, para. 12 for full list of participants.

⁵⁴ Adopted its agenda; rules of procedure, as adopted and used by the Second Review Conference (CCW/CONF.II/PC.1/1 with oral amendments); financial arrangements for the Meeting as contained in the Final Document of the Second Review Conference (CCW/CONF.II/2) pp. 46-47.

⁵⁵ UN Press Release: SG/SM/8560, 2002.

⁵⁶ Refer to Appendix V, para. 20, for the participants in the general exchange of views.

⁵⁷ Human Rights Watch, International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and Landmine Action.

⁵⁸ CCW/MSP/2002/2.

invited interested States Parties to continue informal meetings at the expert level on this issue.

The Meeting decided to re-designate Rakesh Sood of India as Chairman of the Meeting of the States Parties in 2003, and reappointed Chris Sanders of the Netherlands as Coordinator on ERW and Peter Kolarov of Bulgaria as Coordinator on MOTAPM. The Group of Governmental Experts will hold its first session in 2003 from 10–12 March, its second session from 16–27 June, and its third session from 17–24 November. The Fifth Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II of the Convention is scheduled for 26 November 2003 and will be followed by the Meeting of the States Parties from 27–28 November 2003.

Anti-Personnel Mines

Fourth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine-Ban Convention

Pursuant to the decision of the Third Meeting of the States Parties to the Mine-Ban Convention, the Fourth Meeting took place in Geneva from 16 to 20 September. Between the Third and Fourth Meetings, intersessional work was conducted through the Standing Committees (SCs)⁵⁹, which held two meetings in 2002, from 28 January to 1 February and from 27 to 31 May. These intersessional meetings of the SCs were supported by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and benefited from the active participation of relevant non-governmental, regional and international organizations.

The official opening of the Fourth Meeting was preceded by a ceremony at which statements were delivered by the President of the Swiss Confederation and Her Royal Highness, Princess Astrid of Belgium, and which featured testimonies provided by landmine survivors from Angola and Chad. The Meeting was then officially opened by the Vice-President of the Republic of Nicaragua, José Rizo Castellón, on behalf of the President of the Third Meeting of the States Parties. The Meeting was attended by a large number of States Parties and observer States ⁶⁰, as well as representatives of international organizations and NGOs ⁶¹.

The Meeting elected by acclamation Jean Lint of Belgium as President and unanimously confirmed the nomination of Christian Faessler of Switzerland as the Secretary-General of the Meeting. A message from the

⁵⁹ The Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Awareness and Mine Action Technologies, the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socioeconomic Reintegration, the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, and the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention.

Secretary-General of the United Nations was delivered by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Sergio Vieira de Mello. Jody Williams, Ambassador for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), addressed the Meeting. The President of the International Committee of the Red Cross sent a message to the meeting.

After a general exchange of views⁶², the Meeting reviewed the general status and operation of the Convention, noting that 126 States had ratified or acceded to the Convention. The Meeting also expressed satisfaction that the new international norm established by the Convention was taking hold as demonstrated by the behaviour of many States not parties to the Convention. In addition, the Meeting expressed satisfaction that efforts to implement the Convention were making a difference, that 88 States Parties no longer possessed stockpiled anti-personnel mines, that considerable areas of mined land had been cleared over the past year, that casualty rates had been reduced in several of the world's most mine-affected States, and that more and better efforts were being undertaken to assist landmine victims. On-going efforts to achieve universalization of the Convention were also highlighted.

⁶⁰ The proceedings of the Meeting are contained in its Final Report (APLC/ MSP.4/2002/1). Eighty-nine parties participated: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, ElSalvador, Equatorial Guinea, France, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Luxembourg, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Republic of Moldova, Monaco, Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Uganda, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Five States that had ratified or acceded to the Convention, but for which it had not yet entered into force: Afghanistan, Angola, Cameroon, Comoros and Democratic Republic of Congo; eleven signatory States: Brunei Darussalam, Burundi, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Gambia, Greece, Haiti, Lithuania, Poland, Sudan and Ukraine; and 27 States not parties: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Central African Republic, Cuba, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Iraq, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, and Yugoslavia participated as observers.

The President of the Meeting stated that he had not been informed that any State wished to make a request for an extension of the deadline for completing destruction of anti-personnel mines, as provided for in article 5, nor a request for clarification of compliance, as provided for in article 8.

The Meeting considered matters concerning transparency reports to be submitted under article 7, and the States parties expressed their continued satisfaction with the technical ways and means of circulating reports as adopted at the First Meeting and as amended at the Second Meeting. On the basis of suggestions contained in the President's Paper on article7 reporting 63, the Meeting encouraged States parties to maximize the potential of the reporting format as an important tool to measure progress and communicate needs, and agreed to act upon the suggestions as appropriate, including by submitting reports electronically and using the suggested cover page.

The Meeting recognized the continuing importance of the Intersessional Work Programme. It expressed the view that on the basis of the President's Paper⁶⁴, in the lead-up to the Convention's First Review Conference, the Programme should focus with even greater clarity on those areas most

⁶¹ In accordance with the rules of procedure, the following international organizations and institutions, regional organizations, entities and nongovernmental organizations attended the Meeting as observers: European European Parliament, Geneva International Commission. Humanitarian Demining, International Campaign to Ban Landmines, International Committee of the Red Cross, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Order of Malta, Organization of American States, International Labour Office, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA), United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), and the World Health Organization (WHO). In accordance with rule 1.4, the following organizations attended the Meeting as observers at the invitation of the Meeting: Canadian International Demining Corps (Canada), Emergency Life Support for Civilian War Victims (Italy), HAMAP Demineurs - Halte aux Mines Antipersonnel (Switzerland), International Committee for the Respect and Application of the African Charter on Human and People's Rights (Switzerland), International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance (Slovenia), Mine Action Information Centre, James Madison University (United States), NAMSA - the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (Luxembourg), PRIO - International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (Norway), Solidest (Switzerland), South African Institute of International Affairs (South Africa), VERTIC - the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (United Kingdom).

directly related to the core humanitarian objectives of the Convention. States parties also expressed the view that the Intersessional Work Programme should proceed in a manner consistent with the principles that had served it well to date, particularly the informal, inclusive and cooperative nature of the process.

States parties endorsed the work of the four Standing Committees and welcomed their respective reports⁶⁵. The Meeting was in general agreement with the recommendations made by the Standing Committees and urged States parties and all other relevant parties, where appropriate, to act with urgency on these recommendations. States parties agreed to change the name of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Awareness and Mine Action Technologies to the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies. States parties also identified the Committee co-chairs and co-rapporteurs who would serve until the end of the Fifth Meeting of the States Parties⁶⁶, and agreed to set the dates of the 2003 meetings of the Standing Committees from 3 to 7 February and from 12 to 16 May.

The Meeting recognized the value and importance of the Coordinating Committee and requested that the Committee, in a manner consistent with its mandate, continue to make available summary reports of its meetings on the GICHD web site, and requested the President, as Chair of the Coordinating Committee, to continue to report on the functioning of the Committee. The Meeting noted the report of the Director of the GICHD on the activities of the Implementation Support Unit (ISU)⁶⁷. The Meeting also noted the work undertaken by interested States parties through the establishment of a sponsorship programme, which had helped to ensure more widespread

⁶² Fifty States parties, 14 observer States and 5 observer organizations made statements during the general exchange of views, including rights of reply.

⁶³ APLC/MSP.4/2002/1, Annex III.

⁶⁴ APLC/MSP.4/2002/1, Annex II.

⁶⁵ APLC/MSP.4/2002/1, Annex V.

⁶⁶ SC on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies: Belgium and Kenya (co-chairs); Cambodia and Japan (co-rapporteurs); SC on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration: Colombia and France (co-chairs); Australia and Croatia (co-rapporteurs); SC on Stockpile Destruction: Romania and Switzerland (co-chairs); Guatemala and Italy (co-rapporteurs); SC on the General Status and Operation of the Convention: Austria and Peru (co-chairs); Mexico and the Netherlands (co-rapporteurs).

⁶⁷ APLC/MSP.4/2002/1, Annex VII.

representation at meetings of the Convention and of the intersessional meetings.

On the basis of the President's Paper on Developing a Process to Prepare for the Convention's First Review Conference⁶⁸, the Meeting agreed to mandate the President to facilitate consultations leading to the consideration of a variety of matters at the Fifth Meeting on preparations for the Convention's First Review Conference. Austria, Canada, Germany and Norway expressed their interest in hosting the Review Conference in 2004.

At its final plenary meeting, on 20 September, the Meeting agreed that the Fifth Meeting of the States Parties would be held from 15 to 19 September 2003 in Bangkok. The Meeting then adopted a declaration, which is reproduced in Appendix IV, p.338). In addition, the Meeting welcomed the President's Action Programme ⁶⁹ as a practical means of facilitating implementation of the Convention in accordance with the recommendations made by the Standing Committees.

The Fourth Annual Conference of the States Parties to the Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW)

As decided by the Third Annual Conference (Geneva, 10 December 2001), the Fourth Annual Conference was convened on 11 December 2002 in Geneva. To Christian Faessler of Switzerland was re-elected by acclamation as President. At its first plenary meeting, the Conference adopted its agenda, rules of procedure and cost estimates. The Conference agreed to change the Rules of Procedure by extending the number of Vice-Presidents from two to three to secure a balanced representation of regional groups in the General Committee. In addition, the Conference decided to designate the future President and Vice-Presidents by the end of the current meeting to assure continuity in preparatory work carried out by the President. The Conference nominated Dimiter Tzantchev of Bulgaria as President-designate for the Fifth Annual Conference in 2003 as well as representatives of China, South Africa and Switzerland as Vice-President-designates.

The Conference conducted its work in plenary meetings and reviewed the operation and status of Amended Protocol II. Twenty States, including Denmark on behalf of the European Union and associated States, took part in the general exchange of views. ⁷¹ The issue of the universality of the Protocol

⁶⁸ APLC/MSP.4/2002/1, Annex IV.

⁶⁹ APLC/MSP.4/2002/1, Annex VI.

⁷⁰ Refer to Appendix III, paras. 7-9, for a list of participants.

prevailed in almost every statement, and many speakers called for full compliance with the Protocol by States parties, including submitting national annual reports.

The Conference received national annual reports from 42 States parties containing material on the dissemination of information on Amended Protocol II to armed forces and civilian populations in several areas. 72 During the session, Switzerland introduced a proposal on the improvement of the reporting format to simplify and facilitate the submission of the national annual reports.

The Conference concluded its work by adopting its final document,⁷³ as well as an appeal⁷⁴ (for the text of the report and the Appeal, see Appendix III, p. 330 and Annex III) to all States that had not yet done so to take all measures to accede to Amended Protocol II as soon as possible. In its report, the Conference recommended that the Secretary-General, as depositary, and the President of the Fourth Annual Conference, exercise their authority to achieve the goal of its universality, and called upon the States parties to promote wider adherence in their respective regions. In accordance with GA resolution 57/98, the Conference decided that the Meeting of the States Parties to the CCW (12-13 December 2002) would address the dates and duration of the Fifth Annual Conference in 2003. On 13 December, the Meeting of the States Parties to the CCW agreed to convene the Fifth Annual Conference on 26 November 2003 in Geneva.

The United Nations continued to implement its five-year Mine Action Strategy, 75 endorsed by the Inter-agency Coordination Group on Mine Action on 26 September 2001 and submitted by the Secretary-General to the 56th General Assembly. 76 Progress was made in all aspects of the Mine Action Strategy. The United Nations produced information related to mineaction problems, conducted several assessment missions to mine-affected countries, developed reporting templates for field programmes, and enhanced

⁷¹ See CCW/AP.II/CONF.4/SR.1, pp. 6-15.

⁷² (a) dissemination of information on the Protocol to armed forces and civilian populations; (b) mine clearance and rehabilitation programmes; (c) steps taken to meet technical requirements of the Protocol and any other relevant information pertaining thereto; (d) legislation related to the Protocol; (e) measures taken on international technical information exchange, on international cooperation on mine clearance, and on technical cooperation and assistance; (f) other relevant matters; and (g) information to the United Nations database on mine clearance.

⁷³ CCW/AP.II/CONF.4/3 (Part I).

⁷⁴ See CCW/AP.II/CONF.4/3 (Part I), Annex III.

the web-based information network E-Mine. A rapid response plan for emergency situations and United Nations-mandated operations was developed and the plan was implemented in response to requests from national governments, aimed at, among others, building local mine-action capacities. The United Nations further developed and applied the International Mine Action Standards, including standards for operations with Mine Detection Dogs, and worked on the final version of Mine Action Guidelines for a ceasefire and peace agreement.⁷⁷

Coordination in Mine action took place at several levels through the Mine Action Support Group (Member States and United Nations), the Inter-Agency Coordination Group (IACG) (United Nations) and the revitalization of the Steering Committee on Mine Action (United Nations, other intergovernmental organizations, and NGOs).

Representatives of UNMAS, DDA, UNICEF and UNDP made presentations at several meetings designed to promote a better understanding of the Mine Ban Convention and at meetings addressed the complex issue of Humanitarian Emergencies. A CD-Rom entitled "Landmines: The World Takes Action", containing information about the role and contribution of the United Nations in mine action was launched during the 4th annual meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Convention and is accessible online. ⁷⁸

Wassenaar Arrangement

The eighth plenary meeting of the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies⁷⁹ (WA) was held in Vienna from 11-12 December 2002. Several initiatives to combat terrorism were adopted at the meeting. Participating States of the WA agreed on the need to intensify ongoing co-operation to prevent the acquisition of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies by terrorist groups and organizations, as well as by individual terrorists. They

⁷⁵ The Mine Action Strategy has six Strategic Goals: Information production and availability to all to understand and address mine-action problems (goal one); rapid response capability to meet mine-action requirements in emergency response (goal two); national and local capacities to plan, coordinate and implement mine-action programmes (goal three); implementation of mine-action operations in a safe and cost-effective manner (goal four); mobilization of adequate resources for mine-action and effective coordination of their use (goal five); universalization of international instruments addressing the mine/unexploded ordnance problem (goal six).

⁷⁶ See A/56/448/Add.1 (16 October 2001).

⁷⁷ Endorsed by the IACG at principals' level in March 2003.

⁷⁸ http://www.mineaction.org.

decided to review the adequacy of existing WA guidelines regarding Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MAN PADS) in preventing terrorist use of such systems.

Participating States adopted in December "Best Practice Guidelines for Exports of Small Arms and Light Weapons". The objectives of the guidelines included: promoting greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms; the prevention of destabilizing accumulations of such arms; and preventing the acquisition of conventional arms by terrorist groups and organizations, as well as by individual terrorists. According to the guidelines, SALW exports would be evaluated carefully against the Wassenaar Arrangement Initial Elements and each participating State should avoid issuing licences for SALW exports where it deemed that there was a clear risk that the small arms were questionable. Participating States would take special care when considering SALW exports other than to governments or their authorized agents.

Recognizing the importance of controlling arms brokering, Participating States also adopted a Statement of Understanding on Arms Brokerage. In the statement, they agreed to continue refining the criteria for effective legislation on arms brokering and to continue the elaboration of its enforcement measures. Additionally, they considered measures on possible implementation of a denial consultation mechanism and a catch-all provision under which licensing/authorization for transfers of non-listed items to certain destinations would be required when the items were intended for a military end use. An additional sub-category of military items was included in mandatory reporting of transfers/licenses granted under Appendix III of the Initial Elements. 80

Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies was established in 1996. Its meetings are normally held in Vienna, Austria, where the Arrangement is based. The current Participating States of the Wassenaar Arrangement are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States.

⁸⁰ The Initial Elements were adopted at the Plenary of 11 to 12 July 1996 and were amended at the Plenary of 6-7 December 2001. In addition to the objectives of the WA, the elements also contain its scope, exchange of information, and five appendices specifying the items subject to specific information exchange, such as dual-use goods and technologies, arms, and control lists.

More information is available on WA's website. 81

General Assembly, 2002

The General Assembly took action on seven draft resolutions dealing with the subjects discussed in this chapter.

Small arms and light weapons

57/70. Assistance to States for curbing the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. The draft resolution was introduced by Mali, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 432 for the sponsors), on 18 October, adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 22 October and by the General Assembly on 22 November. For the text of the resolution, see page 376.

57/72. The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects. The draft resolution was introduced by Japan, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 433 for the sponsors), on 16 October, adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 22 October and by the General Assembly on 22 November. For the text of the resolution, see page 380.

Practical disarmament measures

57/81. Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures. The draft resolution was introduced by Germany, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 441 for the sponsors), on 18 October, adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 23 October and by the General Assembly on 22 November. For the text of the resolution, see page 396.

Transparency in conventional arms transfers and military expenditures

57/75. Transparency in armaments. The draft resolution was introduced by the Netherlands, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 438 for the sponsors), on 17 October, adopted by the First Committee on 23 October (as a whole: 132-0-23; operative paragraph 4 (b): 134-2-17 (requesting the convening of a Group of Governmental Experts in 2003 on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development); and operative paragraph 6: 134-0-20 (inviting the CD to consider continuing its work in the field of transparency in armaments) and by the General Assembly on 22 November (as a whole: 143-0-23; operative paragraph 4 (b): 140-2-20; and operative paragraph 6: 139-0-23). For the text of the resolution and the voting patterns see page 384.

First Committee. A number of States explained their votes on the draft resolution as a whole as well as on the two operative paragraphs. In its

⁸¹ www.wassenaar.org/index.html.

statement prior and after the vote, Kuwait, speaking on behalf of States members of the United Nations that are members of the League of Arab States, reaffirmed the position that the Arab League had maintained since 2 October 2000 with regard to transparency in armaments. Although the League supported transparency in armaments as a measure for consolidating peace and security worldwide, they believed that the United Nations Register should be expanded to include advanced conventional weapons and WMD, in particular nuclear weapons and related advanced military technology. They regretted that the groups of governmental experts that had studied the Register over the past 10 years had not included the question of national possession and manufacturing of WMD, and reiterated their view that the unbalanced and incomplete approach, especially in the Middle East, could not attain the desired results. Algeria, Jordan, and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya which abstained on the draft as a whole and the two operative paragraphs, and Syria which abstained on the draft as a whole and operative paragraph 6 but cast a negative vote on operative paragraph 4(b) associated themselves with Kuwait's statement. Jordan noted that, despite its reservations, it reported regularly to the Register and would continue to do so. Egypt, which abstained on the draft as a whole and operative paragraph 6 and voted negatively on operative paragraph 4(b), and Iran and Morocco which abstained on all three votes, expressed similar concerns regarding the need to broaden the scope of the Register to address the concerns of the region.

Pakistan, which abstained on the draft resolution as a whole and on operative paragraph 4(b), but voted affirmatively on operative paragraph 6, noted that countries should be given time to analyze the report of the 2000 Expert Group before convening another group of governmental experts, as well as the need to universalize participation in the Register before it could be expanded.

China explained that it had abstained since 1998 because, although the Register was a record of legitimate arms transfers between sovereign States, the United States included arms sales to Taiwan in its report. China stressed that it would not be in a position to submit its reports to the Register until and unless that practice was discontinued.

Although Cuba voted in favour of the draft as a whole, it abstained from the vote on paragraph 6, being of the view that the Conference on Disarmament had already completed its work on transparency.

Myanmar which abstained on the three votes pointed out the need for transparency on WMD, including nuclear weapons. Regarding paragraphs 4(b) and 6, it stated that a group of governmental experts was premature and

ambitious and that it saw no reason to include the CD, which was not able to agree on a programme of work in 2002.

Israel, exercising its right of reply, stated that participating in the UN Register was an important step in confidence-building, and called on its neighbours in the region to adopt that measure.

Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons

57/98. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. The draft resolution was introduced by Sweden, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 448 for the sponsors), on 16 October, adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 28 October and by the General Assembly on 22 November. For the text of the resolution, see page 420.

First Committee. After the vote, Malaysia explained that although it was not a State party to the CCW, it had decided to join the consensus.

Anti-personnel mines

57/74. Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction The draft resolution was introduced by Belgium, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 435 for the sponsors), on 16 October, adopted by the First Committee on 23 October as follows: (128-0-20) and by the General Assembly on 22 November (143-0-23). For the text of the resolution and the voting pattern, see pages 382 and 461.

First Committee. Explaining their abstentions after the vote, the Republic of Korea, Myanmar, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Cuba, India, Pakistan, and Egypt asserted that the draft resolution did not address their self-defence rights and legitimate security concerns and they could not agree to the complete prohibition of APMs. The Republic of Korea supported the humanitarian objectives of the Ottawa Convention and reiterated its commitment to amended Protocol II of the CCW. It also announced that South and North Korea had begun mine-clearing operations in the demilitarized zone. Myanmar felt that a total ban on APMs was not a practical and effective preventive measure, and that the right approach was to address illicit trafficking and indiscriminate use of APMs by non-State actors. Egypt and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya noted that the Mine Ban Convention fell short on the issue of legitimate self-defence rights and the principle of international cooperation and mine clearance assistance to affected countries. Cuba attributed the absence of recognition of legitimate

security concerns in the draft resolution as the main reason for its abstention. India remained committed to a non-discriminatory, universal and global ban on anti-personnel landmines through a phased process that enabled States especially with long borders to meet their legitimate security needs. It also held that the ban on landmines could be facilitated by the availability of more cost-effective non-lethal alternative technologies that performed the defensive role of APMs. Pakistan stated that until viable alternatives were available, it could not agree with the total ban on APMs as called for in the draft resolution. It supported a truly universal standard set within the framework of the United Nations that would address both humanitarian and security concerns. Lebanon explained its abstention on the grounds that Israel, which had left a large number of landmines on its territory following its occupation, had not yet acceded to the Convention.

Three States that were not Parties to the Convention voted in favour of the draft resolution. Singapore pledged its continued support for all initiatives to ban the indiscriminate use of APMs and announced that its national moratoria on APMs was still in effect. Armenia announced that its full participation in the Convention was contingent on a similar level of political commitment by other parties in the region to adhere to the Convention and comply with its regime. While Nepal explained that its own security concerns kept it from joining the Convention.

Export controls

57/66. National legislation on transfer of arms, military equipment and dual use goods and technology. The draft resolution was introduced by the Netherlands on 18 October and on 22 October the sponsor submitted a revised text. Major revisions included the addition of two preambular paragraphs - paragraph 2 that recalled commitments by States parties' under international disarmament and non-proliferation treaties to control transfers that could contribute to proliferation activities and to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of dual-use equipment and technology - and paragraph 5 which reaffirmed the inherent right to individual or collective self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter. Minor revisions were also made to operative paragraphs 1 and 2. The revised draft was adopted by the First Committee (as a whole: 160-0-0 and preambular paragraph 2, the words "inter alia, both to control transfers that could contribute to proliferation activities and": 117-0-31) on 25 October and by the General Assembly on 22 November (as a whole: 166-0-0 and preambular paragraph 2: 131-0-27). For the text of the resolution and the voting pattern, see pages 372 and 458.

First Committee. Speaking prior to the vote, Kuwait, on behalf of States Members of the United Nations that are members of the League of Arab

States, Jordan, Algeria, Iran, and Malaysia explained that they would vote in favour of the draft as a whole, because its message upheld efforts towards the non-proliferation of WMD consistent with States parties' commitments under relevant international instruments. On the other hand, they would abstain on the words in preambular paragraph 2, "inter alia, both to control transfers that could contribute to proliferation activities and" for a number of reasons. In their view, those words created an imbalance in the draft since the concept of controls had already been covered in its other preambular and operative parts; the procedures for export controls on items that "could contribute to proliferation activities" were discriminatory contravention of international agreements; and the words were vague and could hamper States parties to international treaties from the benefits of peaceful uses of technology. Algeria further stated that there was a need to balance proliferation of WMD concerns with the requirements of technology and dual-use equipment transfers for peaceful use. It further advised that WMD proliferation concerns should not be a rationale for preventing the developing countries from the benefits of peaceful uses of technology and called for the elimination of impediments to that end. Iran added that agreement within the international community on the enactment of such export controls already existed in disarmament agreements, but that a comprehensive and unified approach to the mechanism of applying and implementing such controls was lacking. Moreover, guidelines for regulating the transfer of materials, equipment and technology should be established in a multilaterally agreed framework with the participation of all concerned States to ensure that those guidelines were effective and non-discriminatory in character. It believed that the language in preambular paragraph 2 distorted the balance between proliferation and peaceful uses of goods and technology and did not come from any disarmament agreement or document adopted by international disarmament fora or treaty review conferences.

Denmark, on behalf of the European Union, Canada and Australia, also speaking before the vote, supported the entire draft because it enhanced effective control over the transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods and technology through effective enforcement of treaty obligations and implementation of national legislation.

Of those countries that spoke after the vote, Cuba and Indonesia supported the revised draft as a whole, but abstained in the separate vote on preambular paragraph 2. Cuba believed that the revised draft was more comprehensive and balanced, particularly its references to the fullest possible exchange of materials and technological information for peaceful purposes; the voluntary nature of information exchanges; and the inherent right of self-defence set out in Article 51 of the UN Charter. However, the ambiguous

language in preambular paragraph 2 forced it to abstain on preambular paragraph 2. Indonesia added that a comprehensive, non-discriminatory and multilaterally negotiated international treaty would be an important step to addressing the proliferation concerns in the draft.

Conclusion

Spurred by the adoption of the PoA on SALW in July 2001, the year 2002 witnessed a surge in activities in the field of SALW. These activities engaged the efforts of States, United Nations bodies, regional and subregional organizations, and a host of civil society entities, often working in partnership arrangements. Actions were undertaken in a wide range of areas, such as capacity-building, development of national legal instruments and institutional frameworks, strengthening of cooperation and coordination arrangements at the international, regional and subregional levels, advocacy and awareness raising, networking and information exchange, as well as practical disarmament measures, including the collection and destruction of SALW. A group of UN governmental experts began work on studying the feasibility of developing an international instrument to enable States to identify and trace illicit SALW in a timely and reliable manner.

Despite the efforts made at all levels, the problems arising from the illicit trade in SALW have not diminished and continue to threaten peace and security and to hinder development efforts in many parts of the world. The accelerated pace of globalization, resulting in the easing of cross-border movement of goods, people and information has facilitated legal and illegal transfers of SALW, much of which is destined to satisfy the high demand stemming from the upsurge of intra-State conflicts in recent years. Even in situations where such conflicts have subsided, large quantities of SALW continued to be available and used for the perpetration of acts of armed violence and crime. This underscores the need to emphasize the role of disarmament in post-conflict situations, for effective programmes for the demobilization and reintegration of former combatants as well as the need for enhanced commitment to sustainable solutions for the eradication of the root causes of conflicts and the illicit trade in SALW.

The increased interest of the Security Council in SALW issues constitutes a significant development, which bears further witness to the prominent place that these issues now occupy on the international peace and security agenda. The General Assembly agreed to hold the first biennial meeting of States in New York in July 2003 to review the progress achieved on the implementation of the PoA.

The international community moved forward in its efforts to prohibit or restrict the use of weapons with indiscriminative effects or causing

superfluous injuries and suffering. The Meeting of States Parties to CCW decided to begin in 2003 negotiations on a legally binding instrument on post-conflict remedial measures and to further explore preventive measures. It also decided to continue to explore the issue of mines other than anti-personnel mines in 2003. The consideration of small-calibre weapons and ammunition will also continue.

Global efforts continued, aimed at widening adherence to and full implementation of the two legal instruments on anti-personnel mines: Mine-Ban Convention and Amended Protocol II of the CCW. States Parties to the Mine-Ban Convention, at their fourth annual gathering, confirmed their commitment to take strong action to fulfil the humanitarian aims of the treaty in the areas of mine clearance, stockpile destruction, victim assistance, and universalizing a total ban on anti-personnel mines. States Parties to Amended Protocol II of the CCW, at their fourth annual meeting, encouraged each other to promote wider adherence to that instrument in their respective regions and called on all States that had not yet done so to accede to the Protocol.

The two UN instruments on transparency in armaments – the Register of Conventional Arms and the standardized instrument for reporting of military expenditures – continued to contribute to the general trend in the direction of greater transparency in military matters, thus increasing confidence among States. Although both instruments witnessed a major increase in the number of reporting States, differences among Member States continued, especially regarding the scope of the Register. The General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to convene a group of governmental experts in 2003 to review the Register's continuing operation and further development.

ANNEX I

Composite table of replies of Governments for the Register of Conventional Arms: Calendar Year 2001*

(including a "nil" report submitted by Cook Islands and Niue)

Government	Data on exports	Data on imports	Explanation submitted in note verbale	Background Information
Andorra	nil	nil		no
Antigua and Barbuda	nil	nil		no

Composite table of replies of Governments for the Register of Conventional Arms: Calendar Year 2001* (including a "nil" report submitted by Cook Islands and Niue)

Government	Data on exports	Data on imports	Explanation submitted in note verbale	Background Information
Argentina	nil	nil		no
Armenia	nil	nil		yes
Australia		yes		yes
Austria	yes	nil		yes
Azerbaijan	nil	nil		no
Bahamas	nil	nil		no
Bangladesh		yes		no
Barbados	nil	nil		no
Belarus	yes	yes		no
Belgium	yes	yes		no
Belize	nil	nil		no
Bhutan	nil	nil		no
Bolivia	nil	nil		no
Bosnia and Herzegovina	nil	nil		no
Brazil	nil	yes		yes
Bulgaria	yes	yes		yes
Burkina Faso	nil	nil		no
Cambodia	nil	nil		no
Canada	yes	yes		yes
Chile	yes			no

Composite table of replies of Governments for the Register of Conventional Arms: Calendar Year 2001* (including a "nil" report submitted by Cook Islands and Niue)

Government	Data on exports	Data on imports	Explanation submitted in note verbale	Background Information
Comoros	nil	nil		no
Costa Rica	nil	nil		no
Croatia	nil	nil		yes
Cuba	nil	nil		no
Cyprus	no	yes		no
Czech Republic	yes	yes		no
Denmark	nil	yes		yes
Djibouti	nil	nil		no
Dominica	nil	nil		no
Ecuador	nil	nil		no
Estonia	nil	yes		yes
Fiji	nil	nil		no
Finland	yes	nil		yes
France	yes	nil		yes
Gambia	nil	nil		no
Georgia	nil	nil		yes
Germany	yes	yes		yes
Greece	yes	yes		yes
Grenada	nil	nil		no
Guatemala	nil	nil		no

Composite table of replies of Governments for the Register of Conventional Arms: Calendar Year 2001* (including a "nil" report submitted by Cook Islands and Niue)

Government	Data on exports	Data on imports	Explanation submitted in note verbale	Background Information
Guyana	nil	nil		no
Haiti	nil	nil		no
Honduras	nil	nil		no
Hungary	nil	nil		no
Iceland	nil	nil		no
India	nil	yes		no
Indonesia	nil	nil		no
Ireland	yes	yes		yes
Israel	yes	yes		no
Italy	yes	yes		yes
Jamaica	nil	nil		no
Japan	nil	nil		yes
Jordan	nil	yes		no
Kazakhstan	nil	yes	yes	yes
Kenya	nil	nil		no
Kiribati	nil	nil		no
Latvia	nil	yes		no
Lebanon	nil	nil		no
Lesotho	nil	nil		no
Liechtenstein	nil	nil		no

Composite table of replies of Governments for the Register of Conventional Arms: Calendar Year 2001* (including a "nil" report submitted by Cook Islands and Niue)

Government	Data on exports	Data on imports	Explanation submitted in note verbale	Background Information
Lithuania	nil	nil		no
Luxembourg	nil	yes		no
Malawi	nil	nil		no
Malaysia		yes		no
Maldives	nil	nil		no
Malta	nil	nil		no
Marshall Islands	nil	nil		no
Mauritius	nil	nil		no
Mexico	nil	yes		no
Monaco	nil	nil		no
Mongolia	nil	nil		no
Nauru	nil	nil		no
Nepal	nil	nil		no
Netherlands	yes	yes		yes
New Zealand	yes	yes		yes
Niger	nil	nil		no
Norway	nil	yes		no
Pakistan	nil	yes		no
Palau	nil	nil		no
Panama	nil	nil		no

Composite table of replies of Governments for the Register of Conventional Arms: Calendar Year 2001* (including a "nil" report submitted by Cook Islands and Niue)


Government	Data on exports	Data on imports	Explanation submitted in note verbale	Background Information
Paraguay	nil	nil		no
Peru	nil	nil		no
Philippines	nil	nil		no
Poland	yes	nil		yes
Portugal	nil	yes		yes
Republic of Korea	yes	yes		no
Republic of Moldova	nil	nil		no
Romania	nil	yes		yes
Russian Federation	yes	nil		no
Rwanda	nil	nil		no
Saint Kitts and Nevis	nil	nil		no
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	nil	nil		no
Samoa	nil	nil		no
San Marino	nil	nil		no
Sao Tome and Principe	nil	nil		no
Senegal	nil	nil		no

Composite table of replies of Governments for the Register of Conventional Arms: Calendar Year 2001* (including a "nil" report submitted by Cook Islands and Niue)

Government	Data on exports	Data on imports	Explanation submitted in note verbale	Background Information
Seychelles	nil	nil		no
Sierra Leone	nil	nil		no
Singapore	nil	yes		no
Slovakia	yes	yes		yes
Slovenia	nil	nil		no
Solomon Islands	nil	nil		no
South Africa	yes	nil		no
Spain	nil	yes		yes
Suriname	nil	nil		no
Sweden	yes	nil		yes
Switzerland	yes	yes		yes
Tajikistan	nil	nil		no
Thailand	nil	yes		no
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	nìl	yes		yes
Turkey	yes	yes		no
Tuvalu	nil	nil		no
Ukraine	yes	nil		no

Composite table of replies of Governments for the Register of Conventional Arms: Calendar Year 2001* (including a "nil" report submitted by Cook Islands and Niue)

Government	Data on exports	Data on imports	Explanation submitted in note verbale	Background Information
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	yes	yes		yes
United Republic of Tanzania	nil	nil		no
United States of America	yes	yes		yes
Uruguay	nil	nil		no
Uzbekistan	nil	nil		no
Vanuatu	nil	nil		no
Viet Nam	nil	nil		no
Yugoslavia	yes			yes
Zambia	nil	nil		no



Regional disarmament

"The United Nations and the regional organizations need to move towards creating a network of effective mutually reinforcing mechanisms -regional and global- that are flexible and responsive to the reality we live in today. The United Nations stands ready to work together with the regional organizations in that cardinal mission."

KOFI ANNAN, UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL

Introduction

REGIONAL APPROACHES TO DISARMAMENT and confidencebuilding measures continued to be applied by States to enhance their security and to address issues specific to their region or subregion. Although the United Nations Charter has envisaged a substantive role for regional organizations in promoting international peace and security, it was not until the end of the cold war that they assumed a more active role. The need for a regional approach to disarmament was stressed in two 1992 reports of the Secretary-General,² and the United Nations has facilitated regional and subregional efforts aimed at preventing or resolving conflicts, easing tension and building confidence among States of a given region or subregion. The Disarmament Commission (UNDC) adopted, by consensus, guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament in 1993 and for nuclear-weapon-free zones in 1999.³ During recent years, the United Nations has intensified its cooperation with regional and subregional organizations to promote disarmament as the benefits of such interaction have become more apparent. The three regional centres of the Department for Disarmament

¹ See: Study on All Aspects of Regional Disarmament (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.81.IX.2).

New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and Disarmament in the Post-Cold War Era (A/C.1/47/7) and A New Agenda for Peace (A/47/277-S/24111).

³ "Guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security", document A/48/42, Annex II; and "Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned", document A/54/42, Annex I.

Affairs (DDA), established in the 1980s, provide practical support for these approaches in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, and Latin America and the Caribbean.⁴

The regional approach was first applied to the nuclear field in the late 1950s with the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Antarctica⁵ and was subsequently expanded with the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) in other parts of the world, thus promoting nuclear nonproliferation. NWFZs have been established in the following regions: Latin America and the Caribbean, through the Treaty of Tlatelolco (concluded in 1967); the South Pacific, through the Treaty of Rarotonga (concluded in 1985); Southeast Asia, through the Bangkok Treaty (concluded in 1995); and Africa, through the Pelindaba Treaty (concluded in 1995). For the status of these treaties, see Appendix I. Proposals to establish NWFZs in other parts of the world, such as the Middle East, South Asia and Central and Eastern Europe have been put forward for many years by the interested States, but none has been realized so far. Since 1997, negotiations on a draft treaty for a Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (CANWFZ) have been underway among the five Central Asian countries. The General Assembly welcomed, in 1998, Mongolia's declaration of its nuclear-weapon-free status, ⁶ and the five nuclear-weapon States issued a joint statement on security assurances in connection with Mongolia on 5 October 2000.⁷

The most significant reductions in conventional arms and armed forces, as well as confidence-building and confidence- and security-building measures (CBMs/CSBMs) were undertaken in Europe in 1990 through the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and the related document on CSBMs. Other regions have also adopted agreements and initiatives in this field. The Organization of American States (OAS) adopted two instruments: the 1997 Inter-American Convention against the Illicit

⁴ The Secretary-General issued a report on each of the regional centres: Africa (A/57/162), Asia and the Pacific (A/57/260) and Latin America and the Caribbean (A/57/116).

⁵ During the consideration of the question of Antarctica, the First Committee had before it the report of the Secretary-General on the subject (A/57/346), and on recommendation of the First Committee, the General Assembly adopted, without a vote, resolution A/RES/57/51.

⁶ Resolution 53/77 D.

⁷ A/55/530-S/2000/1052.

⁸ For the texts of the CFE Treaty and Vienna Documents on CSBMs, which were updated at the Istanbul Summit meeting in 1999, see documents CFE.DOC/2/99 and FSC.DOC/1/99.

Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials, and the 1999 Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions. A number of CBMs have been undertaken in Asia through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF)¹¹, and through bilateral and multilateral agreements among States. In June 2001, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)¹² was established as a further extension of the "Shanghai Five" to promote mutual confidence and trust and consolidate multilateral cooperation in the maintenance and strengthening of peace, security and stability in the region.

The growing number of conflicts in Africa during the last decade led the United Nations and several regional and subregional organizations on the continent to focus their attention on resolving those conflicts and preventing future ones through various means including curbing proliferation of conventional arms, especially the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW) on the continent. under the umbrella of regional organizations, other important initiatives were undertaken by the States in the region, such as the 1998 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation, and Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons. ¹³

The increased global concerns over the proliferation and illicit trade in SALW and its devastating consequences led to the convening of the 2001 United Nations Conference on the issue. Efforts at the regional and subregional levels played a key role in the process leading to the Conference and in the subsequent implementation of the Programme of Action adopted at the Conference.

⁹ A/53/78, Annex. The text is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 22: 1997, Appendix III.

¹⁰ AG/RES. 1607 (XXIX-O/99). The text is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 24: 1999, Appendix II.

¹¹ Non-mandatory CBMs discussed and implemented within the ARF include: exchange of information on observation and prior notification of military exercises, exchange of visits to military establishments and naval vessels, holding seminars and workshops with defence and military officials, visits to defence facilities and dialogue on defence policy and conversion.

¹² Member States of SCO are: China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

¹³ A/53/763-S/1998/1194, Annex.

This chapter deals with issues concerning developments in specific regions related to NWFZs, confidence-building, and conventional disarmament.

Developments and trends, 2002

During the year, efforts to consolidate the existing NWFZs and to establish new ones continued. With the assistance of DDA, the five Central Asian States (C5) reached agreement on the draft treaty to establish a CANWFZ. Several United Nations bodies, especially the Security Council, continued to be actively involved in resolving a number of inter-State or inter-State conflicts, and in restoring peace, security and stability in conflict or post-conflict situations, particularly in Africa and the Middle East. The issue of terrorism was at the top of the agenda of many regional and subregional organizations, which made substantial efforts in this regard. Most of the regional and subregional efforts in conventional weapons were devoted to limiting the proliferation of illicit small arms under the PoA.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

Efforts continued to be made by States, within United Nations bodies and in other multilateral and regional fora to establish new or strengthen the existing nuclear-weapon-free zones. The year 2002 marked the 35th anniversary of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The General Assembly of the OAS adopted, in June, a resolution on the consolidation of the regime established in the Treaty, urging the States that had not done so to deposit their instruments of ratification at the earliest date. The resolution also reaffirmed the importance of strengthening the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) as the appropriate legal and political forum for ensuring unqualified observance of the Treaty and of its commitment to continue striving for a non-proliferation regime that was universal, genuine, and non-discriminatory in every respect.¹⁴ The most significant development was Cuba's ratification of the Treaty and its amendments. With the deposit of its instrument of ratification on 23 October, 15 the Treaty entered into force for all countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. The General Conference of OPANAL, at its XVI special session, on 26 November, adopted a resolution on the reservations of some nuclear-weapon States related to Protocols I and II of the Treaty 16 and

¹⁴ See AG/RES.1903 (XXXII-0/02) on consolidating the regime of the Treaty of Tlatelolco adopted at its XXXII session, held in Bridgetown, Barbados, 2 June 2002.

¹⁵ See OPANAL document S/Inf. 867 of 1 November 2002 and document A/57/596.

requested its Secretary-General to invite those nuclear-weapon States to review their reservations with a view to withdrawing them. ¹⁷

The States parties to the Bangkok Treaty, formally known as the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ), continued to focus on setting up an institutional framework to implement the treaty and on negotiating with the nuclear-weapon States on the Protocol to the Treaty in order to ensure their early accession to it.

The C5¹⁸ reached agreement on the text of a treaty for a CANWFZ in September, at a United Nations-sponsored meeting of experts in Samarkand (Uzbekistan). Afterwards, the C5 and the five nuclear-weapon States held a series of informal consultations in New York aimed at securing agreement of the nuclear-weapon States on the protocol to the treaty. While expressing general support for the draft treaty, some nuclear-weapon States stressed that several points in the treaty and its protocol needed clarification.

The Heads of State or Government of members States of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), ¹⁹ at a meeting on 4 June, in Almaty, Kazakhstan, expressed their support for the establishment of zones free from nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the Middle East and Central Asia. ²⁰

The Heads of State of members of the SCO, in a declaration adopted on 7 June at their meeting in St. Petersburg, Russian Federation, also supported the establishment of a NWFZ in Central Asia, as well as Mongolia's non-nuclear status. ²¹

The issue of a NWFZ in the Middle East was addressed by the member States of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), at a ministerial meeting in April, in Durban, South Africa. They called for the speedy establishment of a NWFZ and a zone free of all WMD in the Middle East.²² At its eighty-fourth session, held in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, from 2 to September, the Ministerial

¹⁶ For the text of the reservations see United Nations website: www.disarmament.un.org/TreatyStatus.nsf.

¹⁷ See CG/E/Res. 430 "Reservations of the Nuclear Powers to Protocols I and II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco".

¹⁸ Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

¹⁹ Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China, Egypt, India, Iran (the Islamic Republic of), Israel, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Palestine National Administration, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkey and Uzbekistan. In June 2001, Mongolia joined the CICA. The United Nations, OSCE, as well as ten countries including the United States, have observer status in the Conference.

²⁰ A/57/423 – S/2002/1065.

²¹ A/57/88-S/2002/672.

Council of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), adopted a communique urging the international community to take action to transform the Middle East region, including the Gulf, into a zone free of WMD.²³ The General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) adopted, at its 46th session, a resolution calling for the application of its safeguards in the Middle East and called on all parties directly concerned to consider seriously taking the practical and appropriate steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a mutually and effectively verifiable NWFZ in the region.²⁴

A large number of States, especially the States parties to the treaties of Tlalelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba continued to promote the nuclear-weapon-free status of the southern hemisphere and adjacent areas. In General Assembly resolution 57/73 of 2 May 2002, they supported the proposal to convene an international conference of States parties and signatories to the NWFZ treaties to promote the common goals envisioned in those treaties. Once again, the resolution proved unacceptable to the three Western nuclear-weapon States and five other States (among them the Russian Federation) abstained because they considered that the creation of such a zone would be contrary to existing international law, particularly the Convention on the Law of the Sea. As on previous occasions, a reference in the resolution to the establishment of a NWFZ in South Asia was opposed by India and Pakistan.

Conventional disarmament at regional levels

The Secretary-General, in his report on the Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration, ²⁵ noted that one of the vital areas for action in the field of disarmament was the control and disposal of surplus and illicit SALW and the need for enhanced institutional cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations. Significant efforts were made not only at the global level, but also at the regional and subregional levels to implement the Programme of Action adopted at the 2001 United Nations Conference on the issue. Other aspects of conventional

²² See communiqué of the Ministerial meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement, held in Durban, South Africa, on 29 April, document CD/1669, para. 73.

²³ See communiqué issued at the eighty-fourth session of the Ministerial Council of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, 3 September (A/57/417-S/2002/1042, Annex, pp. 2-5).

²⁴ See GC (46)/RES/16 of 20 September 2002.

²⁵ A/57/270.

disarmament, particularly security issues in areas of conflict continued to be addressed by regional and subregional organizations, in cooperation with the United Nations and other international bodies. The following sections give an overview of the most significant regional developments for the year 2002, while the global aspects of conventional arms are dealt with in Chapter III.

Africa

The Security Council continued to be actively involved in resolving conflicts, promoting durable peace, security and sustainable development on the African continent. It adopted a number of resolutions and issued several presidential statements, ²⁶ vis-à-vis the situations in Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia and the Eritrea-Ethiopian conflict.

Pursuant to resolution 56/37 of 4 December 2001, the Secretary-General submitted a progress report on the implementation of the recommendations contained in his earlier report on the causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa. A special reference was made to the implementation of his recommendations on curbing the proliferation of arms and reducing resources used for arms and munitions purchases to below 1.5 per cent of gross domestic product while attaining a zero-growth budget for military expenditure. Despite some progress, he concluded that defence spending in many African countries remained well above the target of 1.5 per cent of their GDP.²⁷

During the year, the OAU made a transition to the African Union. The African Union was officially launched²⁸ at the First Ordinary Session of its Assembly, held in Durban, from 9 to 10 July. The new organization continued to play the primary role in addressing the various disputes and armed conflicts which continued to threaten peace and security on the continent. The Council of Ministers, at its sessions held in March and June/July, adopted a number of decisions on the situation in Angola,

See Security Council resolutions: 1397(2002), 1402 (2002), 1403 (2002), 1405(2002) and 1435 (2002) on the Middle East; and 1399 (2002) on Democratic Republic of Congo; and presidential statements: S/PRST/2002/1 on the Ethiopia-Eritrea situation; S/PRST/2002/5 and S/PRST/2002/27on Democratic Republic of Congo; S/PRST/2003/9 and S/PRST/2002/20 on the Middle East; S/PRST/2002/35 on Somalia; S/PRST/2002/40 on Burundi; S/PRST/2002/6 on the objectives for protecting civilians in armed conflict; S/PRST/2002/12 on children in armed conflict; S/PRST/2002/32 on the role of women in peacekeeping and post-conflict situations; and S/PRST/2002/41 on condemnation of violence against civilians.

Comoros, DRC and Liberia aimed at solving disputes and restoring peace in those countries.²⁹

From 18 to 21 March, the African Conference on the Implementation of the Programme of Action on Small Arms (PoA on SALW): Needs and Partnerships was held in Pretoria, South Africa, Participants included representatives from 41 African countries, 29 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, three observer countries. eight international and regional organizations, and 33 non-governmental organizations. Co-sponsored by the governments of Austria, Canada, Kenya, Mali, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, South Africa, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, the Conference aimed to recap on the commitments in the PoA on SALW and in the Bamako 2000 Declaration and to examine how national, sub-regional and international implementation processes could be supported by OECD and African countries. Several broad areas under review included implementation of commitments to: stockpile management and record-keeping; collection, destruction and legislation; information exchange; subregional priorities for implementation; the role of civil society and the development of guidelines and partnerships to support sustainable action to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in SALW in all its aspects in Africa. Participants emphasized that the PoA on SALW represented an important international achievement and provided a flexible framework for action to prevent, combat and eradicate this problem. They

²⁷ A/57/172, paras. 9-10. The Security Council held a debate on the "Situation in Africa" on 29 January, and issued a presidential statement "Conflict prevention, peacekeeping cooperation in Africa", document S/PRST/2002/2, which called on the United Nations system to intensify its cooperation, including assistance within the existing resources, to the OAU and subregional organizations in Africa in the field of capacity-building, particularly in early warning conflict prevention and peacekeeping. The statement reiterated the Council's call on all States to implement the Programme of Action on SALW.

The decision to replace the OAU with the African Union was taken at the 5th Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, (Sirte, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 1-2 March 2001), and at the 37th Summit of the OAU, (Lusaka, Zambia, 9-11 July 2001). They adopted the New African Initiative and reaffirmed their commitment to the provisions of the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community and the Constitutive Act of the African Union adopted in 2000. See Declaration on the New Common Initiative (MAP and OMEGA), document AHG/Decl. 1 (XXXVII) and decision AHG/Dec. 160 (XXXVII) on the implementation of its previous decision on the African Union. See also document A/56/457, Annex I.

agreed to concentrate their implementation efforts on each subregion taking into account the immediate and longer-term needs characteristic of each subregion, and to focus short-term action on capacity-building, training and technical assistance. The discussions also involved the different roles that civil society could play in support of the PoA on SALW, effective partnership between the OECD and African countries in all aspects of the implementation process. Participants agreed on core guidelines for partnership arrangements between African and OECD countries, as well as their sub-regional structures in this area.

At the subregional level, the ECOWAS³⁰ continued to address peace and security issues in the region. At its Fifth Extraordinary Session of the Council of Ministers held in Abuja, Nigeria, from 22 to 23 April, Member States reviewed the political and security situation in the subregion, especially the situation in Cote d'Ivoire and the Mano River Union countries,³¹ and the activities of its Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. ECOWAS also continued to coordinate the implementation of its Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa and urged Member States to comply fully with the provisions of the Moratorium and the Code of Conduct.³² Eight countries in the subregion have already established national commissions to tackle the issue of small arms proliferation. The Programme for Coordination and Assistance on Security and Development (PCASED) continued to address security and development problems associated with the proliferation of light weapons and assisted ECOWAS States in taking practical steps to

²⁹ The OAU Council of Ministers met in Addis Ababa (13 to 15 March) and in Durban (28 June to 6 July), and adopted a number of decisions; see Reports of the 75th and 76th Ordinary Sessions of the Council of Ministers, documents CM/RPT (LXXV) and CM/RPT (LXXVI). See decisions: CM/Dec. 662 (LXXVI) on the situation in Liberia; CM/Dec. 663 (LXXVI) on the situation in Democratic Republic of Congo; CM/Dec. 664 (LXXVI) on the situation in the Comoros; CM/Dec. 665 (LXXIV) on the situation in Angola; and CM/Dec. 679 LXXVI) on the situation in Burundi. During the Durban Summit, a Special Session of the Council of Ministers of the African Union took place (1-2 July) and the First Ordinary Session of the Executive Council of the African Union (9 to 10 July). The reader may consult the African Union website: www.africa-union.org.

³⁰ The reader may consult the ECOWAS website: www.ecowas.int.

³¹ Members of the Mano Rover Union are: Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone.

³² ECOWAS extended its moratorium in July 2001 for a period of 3 years. See ECOWAS Press Release, No. 63/2001, Lusaka, 6 July 2001.

ensure that weapons had not crossed their borders, to help diminish the demand for weapons and to develop legal and regulatory measures relating to weapons possession and transfers. In addition, it organized arms destruction programmes in Sierra Leone and Mali.³³ In an effort to strengthen its cooperation with African regional and sub-regional organizations in the areas of peacemaking and peace-building, the United Nations established an Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa in support of ECOWAS efforts to promote peace and stability, including addressing the issues of small arms in the subregion.³⁴

The First Ministerial Review Conference of the Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa took place in Nairobi, Kenya, from 7 to 8 August. A Ministerial Declaration for Continued Concerted Action in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa was issued. Countries in the region reaffirmed their the commitments to support the PoA on SALW, to improve the coordinating mechanisms that would guide and facilitate the Implementation Plan of the Coordinated Agenda for Action on the Problem of the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa, to improve the national and regional coordinated capacity to prevent, control and reduce the SALW problem in the region, and to ensure a sustainable solution to the problem through the pursuit of long-term national coordinated and concerted efforts.

Heads of State and Government of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), at their summit meeting in Luanda, from 1 to 3 October, applauded the ceasefire agreement signed in Angola, in April, as the beginning of a new era of peace and stability in the region. They expressed their full support for the ongoing efforts to demobilize ex-combatants, with a view to ensuring their social reintegration and rehabilitation. The Summit also commended the work of the DRC Government's towards building peace and pledged its support for its efforts to rebuild the country. SADC undertook efforts to seek the early ratification by its member States of the SADC Protocol on Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials adopted in August 2001.

Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa³⁶
The Advisory Committee held two ministerial meetings during 2002.³⁷ The Committee reviewed the geopolitical and security situation in both the

³³ See PCASED website: www.pcased.org.

³⁴ A/57/172, p.5.

³⁵ See the Final Communique of the 2002 SADC Summit.

Central African region and within the individual countries of Committee members, examined cooperation on security matters among Central African States, and evaluated the implementation of its previous decisions and recommendations. At its seventeenth ministerial meeting, the Committee adopted the Kinshasa Declaration which marked the tenth anniversary of its creation. The Declaration reaffirmed the Committee's objectives, as well as its commitment to revitalize and strengthen the capacity of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in the areas of peace and security in their region. At its eighteenth ministerial meeting, the Committee adopted its programme of work for the period 2002-2003. It also requested ECCAS to organize, with the assistance of the Committee's Secretariat, a seminar on the implementation of the PoA on SALW in the Central African region, and also invited DDA to organize a workshop on the participation of the Central African States in the United Nations Register on Conventional Arms and the United Nations standardized instrument for reporting military expenditures.

In addition, under the auspices of the Advisory Committee, a meeting of chiefs of staff of the armed forces of the member States was held in Libreville, from 18 to 20 March, to review the organization costs of joint military exercises "Biyongho-98", originally planned for 1998. Reaffirming the need for these exercises, the participants formulated the budget and adopted a time-table for their preparations. Under a new title, "Biyongho 2003" the exercises will be held in Gabon in June 2003.

During the year, the Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa³⁸ continued to provide substantive and technical support to African States and regional and subregional organizations in the field of peace, security and disarmament.

The Centre undertook a number of peace-building activities in conflict-affected countries. It helped to organize an international conference on the Armed Conflict in Democratic Republic of Congo (Sun City, South Africa, February); undertook a mission to Niger (March) with the objective of training the United Nations Volunteers of the "Consolidation of peace" project in the Diffa region for micro-projects involving monitoring and

³⁶ Members of the Standing Advisory Committee are: Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda and Sao Tome and Principe.

³⁷ The Seventeenth Meeting was held in Kinshasa (22 to 26 April); and the Eighteenth Meeting was held in Bangui (26 to 30 August); see A/57/79 – S/2002/551 and A/57/380 – S/2002/988 respectively.

³⁸ A/57/162 Report of the Secretary-General on the Regional Centre.

evaluation. The Centre, together with the ECOWAS Secretariat, the Centre for Democratic Development (Ghana) and the Government of Ghana organized consultations on "Training for Peace Operations in West Africa" (Accra, October). Representatives of ECOWAS Member States, NGOs and relief agencies, including local police, military and security officers participated in the event.

The Centre also convened an international workshop on the elaboration of a code of conduct for armed and security forces in Africa (Lomé, May), and it conducted missions to Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire and Mali (August) to discuss with authorities the process of adopting the code of conduct for the armed and security forces in their countries.

In the area of WMD, the Centre continued to work with the PrepCom for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) in promoting the signing and ratification of the CTBT (Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty) by African States, and, in cooperation with the PrepCom for the CTBTO, held consultations on the Treaty in Lomé, in March. It also collaborated with the CTBTO PrepCom and the Government of Kenya in organizing a workshop for East Africa on the Treaty (Nairobi, June) and provided substantive support to the "Seminar for African States on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: the Role of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols" organized by IAEA (Johannesburg, June).

The Centre carried out several activities related to the implementation of the PoA on SALW and the ECOWAS Moratorium. These activities involved: a data-collection mission to the Mano River Union countries to assess the magnitude and scope of SALW proliferation and illicit trafficking in those countries; a fact-finding mission in Sao Tome and Principe to discuss ways of collecting small arms illegally held by the civilian population; consultations arranged by civil society organizations from West Africa (Dakar, April/May; Accra, May) seeking to develop a training manual on small arms and to set up an Action Network of West African civil society groups on small arms (WAANSA).

Problems related to land-mines continued on the African continent. At the request of the Government of the DRC, the Centre undertook a fact-finding mission to that country, in June, to explore the possibility of conducting an extensive mine-awareness campaign.

The Centre also led a joint mission by the United Nations and the Hague Appeal for Peace (March- April) to gather information and data in order to facilitate work on the formulation of a project entitled, "Developing peace and disarmament – education initiatives to disarm children and youth". A two-year funding for the project was officially approved by the United

Nations Foundation and is scheduled to be launched on 1 January 2003. It also assisted in a preparatory meeting on the project, "Micro-disarmament and Human Security in Central Africa", held in Yaoundé, Cameroon in November.

For the Centre's other activities and its publications see Chapters VI and VII.

Americas

The Organization of American States (OAS)³⁹ continued its peace, security and disarmament activities in the hemisphere. The General Assembly of the OAS, meeting in Bridgetown, in June, expressed its support for the work of the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE) and reaffirmed its commitment to implement specific measures to prevent, combat and eliminate international terrorism.⁴⁰ It adopted a number of disarmament-related resolutions, such as on the CTBT, limitation of military spending, transparency in arms acquisitions, and proliferation of and illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons.⁴¹ The Member States also reaffirmed their goals on the global elimination of antipersonnel landmines and the conversion of the Western Hemisphere into an anti-personnel-landmine-free zone.⁴²

The Presidents of South American countries, ⁴³ meeting in Guayaquil, Ecuador, from 26 to 27 July, adopted a Declaration on the South American

³⁹ See the OAS website: www.oas.org.

⁴⁰ See resolution AG/RES. 1877 (XXXII-0/02).

⁴¹ See, for example, resolutions: "Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials (CIFTA) (AG/RES. 1874 (XXXII-0/02); "Inter-American Support for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty" AG/RES. 1876 (XXXII-0)/02); "Support for the Program of Integral Action Against Antipersonnel Mines in Central America (AG/RES. 1878 (XXXII-0/02); "Confidence – and Security-Building in the Americas" (AG/RES. 1879 (XXXII-0/02); "Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions" (AG/RES. 1881 (XXXII-0/02); and "Proliferation of and illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons" (AG/RES. 1888 (XXXII-0/02). See also resolution on "Limitation of military spending" (AG/RES. 1887 (XXXII-0/02).

⁴² See resolutions AG/RES. 1889 (XXXII-0/02) and AG/RES. 1875 (XXXII-0/02).

⁴³ Presidents of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela, and the representatives of the heads of States of Guyana, Suriname and Uruguay.

Zone of Peace.⁴⁴ The Ministers for Foreign Affairs and of Defence of the Andean Community countries,⁴⁵ meeting in Lima, on 17 June, signed the Lima Commitment, establishing the Andean Charter for Peace and Security and for the Limitation and Control of Defence Spending, through which they undertook, *inter alia*, the following commitments: to consolidate the ban on nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, to eradicate the illicit traffic in firearms, ammunition, explosives and other related materials, to eradicate anti-personnel landmines and to expand and strengthen confidence-building measures.⁴⁶

On 5 October, the Parliaments of the Central American States, with the support of the Parliaments of Spain and Sweden, set up a Permanent Forum in Madrid to combat the illicit trafficking in SALW. Parliamentarians from Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama, as well as Spain and Sweden adopted a draft white book containing legal norms and instruments on firearms, ammunition and explosives, intended for use by parliamentarians as a reference tool to encourage the use of uniform technologies in national firearms legislation. The Madrid Declaration, adopted at the Forum, called for expanding the Forum to include parliamentarians from all countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as European Union member States.

The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLiREC)⁴⁷ continued to serve the countries in the region in the following capacity: (a) a means of promoting subregional, regional and cross-regional activities; b) a tool to identify synergies between security and development issues; and c) an instrument for the United Nations to play a proactive role in the establishment of a more secure environment for social and economic development in the region. Its activities covered a wide range of disarmament issues, such as firearms, ammunition and explosives, anti-personnel landmines, nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and raising public awareness of disarmament through education, information dissemination and public events.

As far as firearms, ammunition and explosives were concerned, the Centre consolidated its Regional Clearing-house Programme on Firearms,

⁴⁴ CD/1684.

⁴⁵ Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela.

⁴⁶ CD/1678.

⁴⁷ See the report of the Secretary-General on the Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (A/57/116).

Ammunition and Explosives. The Programme was designed to serve as a tool for nurturing national and regional expertise in the field of practical disarmament measures.

As a part of its UN-LiREC's "2006 Lima Challenge", initiated by the United Nations, CICAD/OAS⁴⁸ and UNDP, the Centre encouraged and assisted countries in the region to collect and destroy illicit or surplus firearms, as well as to improve the security of firearms and ammunition storage facilities. The Centre undertook planning missions to a number of countries to assess the feasibility of destroying firearms and ammunition, and assisted governments in the organization and implementation of the actual destruction of those arms and ammunition. The destruction included 10,000 firearms in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, (28 August), 5,004 firearms and 8,262 rounds of ammunition in Mendoza, Argentina (10 August and 22-23 November), and 2,573 firearms in Lima, Peru (5 December). Preparations were also undertaken to destroy 12,639 firearms, 71,070 rounds of ammunition, and 12,924 grenades in Asuncion, Paraguay.

From 3 to 5 May, UN-LiREC and the Swedish Fellowship of Reconciliation (SWEFOR) organized a seminar for Central American Parliaments within the framework of a larger joint project entitled "Parliamentary Information Exchange Initiative in Latin America and the Caribbean", with the participation of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the Central American countries. The Centre and SWEFOR also supported the III Inter-Parliamentary Meeting on Illicit Traffic of SALW in Central America (Madrid, 3-5 October), where the First Permanent Forum of Parliamentarians was created to implement the PoA on SALW.

The Centre and CICAD/OAS initiated the development of a "Parliamentary Exchange Initiative White Book on Legal Norms and Instruments on Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives in Latin America and the Caribbean". The initiative was intended for the creation of a regional comparative legislation document to help parliamentarians in the region to improve their national legislation.

Together with CICAD, the Centre jointly organized two subregional events to build awareness among police officers and customs officials of the 1997 CICAD Model Regulations for the Control of the International Movement of Firearms and their Parts and Components and Ammunition (Brasilia, 26 to 28 February) and a workshop (16 to 17 May) on "Commercial Trade of and Illicit Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Ammunition: Training the Trainers in Investigative Techniques". Work has also been undertaken to develop the training manual, syllabus and database

⁴⁸ Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission.

management tools, as well as practical issues related to the implementation of the training courses.

From 14 to 15 May, the first Coordination Meeting of the project "Latin America and Caribbean NGOs Capacity-building, Networking and Strengthening of their Advocacy Means" took place at UN-LiREC's facilities in Lima. 49 Since then, work has been undertaken to plan training courses and develop a training manual.

On 14 March, at United Nations Headquarters in New York, the Centre organized a seminar on "Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Issues: Towards the 2005 NPT Review Conference" for members of the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States. In cooperation with the Government of Panama and sponsored by Switzerland, it also organized a regional seminar on "Firearms, their Parts and Ammunition: Partnership with the Industry and Commercial Sector to Implement the United Nations 2001 Programme of Action" (Panama City, Panama, from 13-15 November).

The Centre provided substantive support to a planning mission to Lima (28 February to 8 March) with a view to gathering information for the drafting of a proposal on "Peace and Disarmament Education Initiatives to disarm children and youth", as a part of the DDA/Hague Appeal for Peace project in the area of disarmament education. The two-year project received funding from the United Nations Foundation and will be formally launched on 1 January 2003.

For further details on the work of the Regional Centre and its publications, see Chapter VI and Annex (pp. 226 and 232).

Asia and the Pacific

Activities related to conventional arms and confidence-building in Asia and the Pacific were undertaken by States at the national level, as well as within the framework of subregional organizations or multilateral fora, such as ASEAN and its Regional Forum (ARF) and the newly formed Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

The 8th ASEAN Summit of Heads of State and Government, held in Phnom Penh, from 2 to 3 November, adopted a Declaration on Terrorism⁵⁰ condemning the terrorist attacks in Bali⁵¹ and expressing its members' determination to implement the specific measures outlined in the ASEAN

⁴⁹ Representatives of the following NGOs participated: the Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress, International Alert, Save the Children Sweden, Small Arms Survey, Swedish Fellowship of Reconciliation and Viva Rio.

⁵⁰ See the ASEAN website: www.aseansec.org.

Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism adopted in November 2001. The 35th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting was held in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, from 29 to 30 July, followed by the 9th meeting of the ARF on 31 July.⁵² The foreign ministers who took part in both meetings expressed satisfaction at the ARF's continued progress in addressing regional security concerns and in exploring preventive diplomacy. They were also satisfied with the successful implementation of the confidence and securitybuilding measures⁵³ recommended by the ARF Inter-sessional Support Group on Confidence-building Measures⁵⁴ work and appreciated the Group's work in advancing the AFR process. In addition, the ministers noted on-going consultations between ASEAN countries and the five nuclearweapon States regarding their agreement to the Protocol to the Treaty on the South East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ). They further discussed issues related to nuclear weapons and other WMD, and their means of delivery, as well as the implications of the deployment of missile defence systems, and reiterated their support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Moreover, they expressed hope that the resumed session of the 5th Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Review Conference would make progress strengthening that Convention. They also called on members States to continue to implement the PoA on SALW.

In the Work Programme on Terrorism to Implement the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime issued in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on 17 May, the ASEAN countries decided to strengthen cooperation, both within the subregion and with outside partners in combating the illicit trafficking in arms and explosives. The adopted action plan included the following elements: (a) establishment of a database on illicit trafficking of arms and explosives with a view to addressing the current lack of information/database and research indicating the volume of trade; (b) types of cases pursued; (c) the trends, routes and manner of smuggling; (d) the establishment of procedures for countries to declare surplus arms that were

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⁵¹ On 12 October 2002, terrorist attacks were carried out by bombs against civilians in Bali, Indonesia, resulting in a number of deaths and injuries.

⁵² See the ASEAN website: www.aseansec.org.

⁵³ Non-mandatory CSBMs discussed and implemented within the ARF include: exchange of information on observation and prior notification of military exercises, exchange of visits of military establishments and of naval vessels, holding seminars and workshops of defence and military officials, visits to defence facilities and dialogue on defence policy and conversion.

⁵⁴ The Inter-sessional Support Group met in Hanoi, from 21 to 23 April.

destroyed, missing and lost from government stockpiles to be reported and compiled to facilitate tracking measures in line with the development of international procedures and the exchange of information; (e) enhancing information exchange with ASEAN Dialogue Partners, regional organizations, relevant United Nations specialized agencies and other international organizations, particularly the sharing of critical information on the identities, movements and activities of known transnational criminal organizations involved in arms smuggling.

The "Seminar on Implementing the Programme of Action on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons", hosted by the Philippine Government and co-sponsored by Canada, was held in Manila, from 9 to 10 July, and was attended by delegates from ASEAN member countries, as well as Australia, Canada, China, Finland, Germany, Japan, Republic of Korea, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States of America, the United Nations, International Committee of the Red Cross, civil society and representatives of the arms industry. The seminar highlighted ways to strengthen international and regional cooperation through efforts to curb the illicit trade in small arms. The meeting discussed suggested principles and strategies for implementing the PoA on SALW in Southeast Asia. The participants also put forward 28 concrete recommendations and proposals to be taken into consideration by ASEAN countries in their fight against the illicit trade in small arms.

The Heads of Member States of the SCO, meeting in Saint Petersburg, on 7 June, signed the Charter – the basic constituent document of the Organization. The SCO, a successor of the "Shanghai Five", was established on the basis of two agreements, which were innovative for the Asian continent, on confidence-building measures in the military sphere and on arms reductions. It was established to further consolidate multilateral cooperation in the maintenance and strengthening of peace, security and stability in the region, to jointly counteract new challenges and threats, and to encourage effective and mutually advantageous cooperation in various spheres. ⁵⁵

The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific⁵⁶ organized the Fifth United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues entitled, "The challenge of terrorism for international security and disarmament: global and regional impact" (Kyoto, 7-9 August). The conference addressed several issues, including the impact of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the field of security and disarmament, the

⁵⁵ For the text of the Declaration, see document A/57/88 - S/2002/672.

⁵⁶ See the report of the Secretary-General (A/57/260).

relationship between terrorism and WMD, Asia-Pacific regional cooperation in combating terrorism, and responses to terrorism by the United Nations and regional organizations. The Centre organized a United Nations/Republic of Korea Joint Conference entitled, "Changing security dynamics and the implications for disarmament and non-proliferation" (Jeju Island, Republic of Korea, 3-5 December). Discussions highlighted four main themes: (a) security assessment and review of the disarmament process; (b) disarmament and non-proliferation on the Korean Peninsula; (c) issues of WMD and missiles; and (d) disarmament and non-proliferation efforts for combating terrorism.

The Centre continued to provide assistance to Mongolia in taking necessary measures to consolidate and strengthen its international security and nuclear-weapon-free status (NWFS). It served as a focal point of an informal consultative group of United Nations bodies and agencies to address non-nuclear aspects of Mongolia's international security.⁵⁷

The Centre again assisted the United Nations Association of Japan in organizing the eighth Kanazawa Symposium on North-East Asia, from 4 to 6 June. The symposium discussed several issues of the subregion, including the security outlook on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia; the 11 September terrorist attacks and their implications for Northeast Asia; and a new agenda for the "Kanazawa process".

For other aspects of the work of the Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific and its publications, see Chapter I, VI and VII.

Europe

Security and disarmament issues continued to be addressed within the regional institutional framework: the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU) the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and other regional and subregional organizations. The security situation in the Balkans, especially in Kosovo and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYRM), remained high on their agenda.

The Security Council continued to deal with disarmament related issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. While reaffirming its commitment

⁵⁷ The "Sapporo document" elaborated by a United Nations-sponsored non-governmental experts group in 2001 contained elements of a legally binding instrument regarding Mongolia's non-nuclear-free status (NWFS) and some recommendations on how to achieve an internationally recognized or legally binding NWFS. See document A/57/59.

to the implementation of the Dayton Agreement⁵⁸ and the relevant decisions of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) established on the basis of that Agreement, the Council decided to bring to conclusion the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), including the International Police Task Force, the mandate of which expired on 31 December. It welcomed the EU's decision to send a Police Mission (EUPM) to Bosnia and Herzegovina starting on 1 January 2003.⁵⁹ The United Nations Observer Mission in Prevlaka (UNMOP) also completed its mandate⁶⁰ after the Governments of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia established a provisional cross-border regime on the Prevlaka Peninsula on 10 December. 61 The Council reaffirmed its continued commitment to the full and effective implementation of its resolution 1244 (1999) under which a civil presence, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), and a security presence (KFOR) were established in Kosovo. In this connection, the Council issued four presidential statements on the situation in Kosovo.62

The Concluding Document adopted in 2001 under article V of Annex 1-B of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina entered into force on 1 January 2002. The States parties held a Conference on Implementation of the Concluding Document in Tirana, Albania, from 22 to 24 May. A Commission established on the basis of that Document held its first meeting in Tirana on 9 October. The States parties to the Agreement on Subregional Arms Control, also known as the Florence Agreement⁶³ continued to implement the Agreement. Inspections on arms limitation and disarmament were conducted in accordance with the Agreement and efforts were undertaken to further improve the quality of the annual information exchange. The States parties held three meetings and the

⁵⁸ The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (known as the Dayton Peace Agreement) was signed, on 14 December 1995, in Paris, between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the basis of which the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was ended.

⁵⁹ See resolution S/RES/1396 and a Presidential Statement, S/PRST/2002/33 of 12 December.

⁶⁰ See a Presidential Statement, S/PRST/2002/34.

⁶¹ S/2002/1348.

⁶² See presidential statements S/PRST/2002/4, S/PRST/2002/11, S/PRST/2002/16and S/PRST/2002/29.

⁶³ The Agreement was signed in Florence on 14 June 1996 between Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Srpska.

third conference to review the implementation of the Agreement. The members of the Sub-regional Consultative Commission resolved a number of issues, while two remained outstanding — armaments in internal security forces and those held for research and development.

The OSCE continued activities to combat terrorism and to promote conflict prevention and confidence building, gradually expanding its activities in the security field through monitoring the implementation of the Dayton Agreement and addressing issues related to small arms.

The OSCE intensified its efforts to implement the Plan of Action for Combating Terrorism adopted in 2001. It held a Conference on Conflict Prevention and Combating Terrorism in Lisbon on 12 June, at which participating States emphasized their strong commitment to reinforce and develop bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the United Nations and with other international and regional organizations in tackling those problems. The fight against terrorism was also prominent on the agenda of the OSCE's Ministerial Troika in Vienna on 5 November. At the 10th Ministerial Council in Porto, from 6 to 7 December, the OSCE foreign ministers agreed on new measures to combat terrorism and to deal with new threats to security by adopting the OSCE Charter on Preventing and Combating Terrorism.⁶⁴ It organized an Expert Meeting on Combating Terrorism within the Politico-Military Dimension of the OSCE on 14-15 May.

The OSCE built on its OSCE 2000 Document on Controlling the Proliferation of Small Arms and continued its activities in this area. Its Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) continued to follow closely and enhance the implementation of the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security and the OSCE Document on SALW. On 10 July, FSC established new standards for SALW data exchange. The purpose was to establish a common format and to accomplish uniformity both in structure and contents in sharing information regarding SALW in OSCE participating states. It organized a workshop on implementation of the OSCE Document on SALW in Vienna, from 4 to 5 February. The workshop discussed several issues, including review of the first information exchange, questions related to developing "best practices", coordination and cooperation with other institutions and future course of action. ⁶⁵ FSC also took steps to address the risks arising from stockpiles of surplus ammunition and explosives.

⁶⁴ See OSCE document MC(10).JOUR/2.

⁶⁵ See OSCE document FSC.GAL/21/02, 20 February 2002.

⁶⁶ Porto Ministerial Declaration, OSCE document MC(10).JOUR/2.

In an effort to enhance its cooperation with NATO, OSCE convened a Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council/ Partnership for Peace Alliance (EAPC/PFP) Workshop on the implementation of the OSCE-Document on SALW in Zagreb, Croatia on 24-25 October 2002. OSCE was also active on weapons collection and destruction programmes. It conducted a weapons collection programme in Georgia, which resulted in handing over 1,320 units of arms and rounds ammunition and 210 kg of explosives from civilians to the government. OSCE and NATO jointly carried out destruction of arms stocks in partner countries, such as Albania (landmines, SALW and ammunition), Ukraine (landmines), and Moldova (landmines, rocket fuel and ammunition).

A number of initiatives were undertaken on the issues of SALW and landmines within the framework of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe⁶⁷ and within the South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECP).⁶⁸ To tackle the uncontrolled proliferation and illicit trafficking of SALW in South Eastern Europe, the Stability Pact, in partnership with the UN Development Program (UNDP), opened, in Belgrade, on May 8, the South East Europe Regional Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons. It represented the most visible element of the Stability Pact's comprehensive effort to address the proliferation of SALW throughout SE Europe. The task of the Clearinghouse was to help SEE governments and non-governmental organizations develop targeted projects aimed strengthening capabilities to stem the illicit flow of SALW throughout the region. The Clearinghouse would also seek out opportunities to develop a regional identity in countering the proliferation of SALW through the promotion of cross-border activities and projects. In order to address the impact of landmines in the region of South East Europe, the Stability Pact created the Reay Group (previously the Forum for Cooperation on Mine Action in South East Europe) to promote a coordinated approach to mine action through the provision of a strong regional framework for funding mine action projects.

The EU continued to emphasize the importance of strengthening multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation instruments as a means to enhance security. While the EU continued to participate in all discussions on arms control and disarmament at the global level, preparations for EU

⁶⁷ The Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe was initiated by the EU and adopted in Cologne on 10 June 1999 and endorsed at the Sarajevo Summit on 30 July 1999.

⁶⁸ See the Joint Statement by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of SEECP issues at their meeting in Belgrade, on 19 June (A/57/98-S/2002/705, Annex).

enlargement, combined with the unfolding debate on the constitutional future of Europe dominated its institutional and security agenda during 2002. Its biggest enlargement ever in terms of scope and diversity was conducted at its Copenhagen Summit held on 12 to 13 December. Ten more countries - Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia – joined the European Union. This unprecedented expansion was followed by the November Prague Summit of NATO that extended invitations to seven countries - Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia - to begin accession talks to join the Alliance. Once these dual enlargements are completed in 2004, 19 of the 26 NATO countries will be members of the EU, and 18 of the 25 EU countries will be NATO members.

In addition to the dual enlargements, efforts toward policy coordination of the two institutions were made in several ways. Most significantly, the Brussels European Council continued to involve the non-EU members of NATO in consultations on the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in peacetime.

On 22 July, the EU Council's meeting approved its priorities in the field of disarmament. These included: non-proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery; strengthening the NPT and its review process; further strengthening of the regimes established by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC); early entry into force of the CTBT; supporting efforts to draft an International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC); pursuing a successful outcome of the Fourth Meeting of the States parties to the Mine-Ban Convention and providing assistance in mine action; and in the framework of the CD, supporting the launch of negotiations on an FMCT, as well as dealing with both nuclear disarmament and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The EU continued to take steps towards creating its own capability for independent military action. Following the adoption of the Military Capability Commitment Declaration (2000), and the establishment of the Military Staff of the European Union (2001),⁶⁹ the European Council (EC), in its conclusions of May 13, reviewed the progress achieved towards the development of EU military capability in the light of the guidelines laid down at its Laeken meeting.⁷⁰ During the Brussels EC meeting (24-25 October), the modalities were agreed for the implementation of the Nice provisions on the involvement of the non-EU European members of NATO in peacetime European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) consultations,

⁶⁹ See Council decision 2001/80/CFSP.

and at its meeting in Copenhagen (12-13 December) welcomed the efforts which had enabled a comprehensive agreement to be reached with NATO on all outstanding permanent arrangements between itself and NATO. It also confirmed the Union's readiness to take over the military operation in the FYRM as soon as possible, and indicated the Union's willingness to lead a military operation in Bosnia following SFOR. In addition, the Council adopted declarations on the Middle East and Iraq.

The EU continued to implement its Joint Action to combat the destabilizing accumulation and spread of SALW. On 12 July, it adopted a Joint Action on small arms and light weapons. The Joint Action sought to build consensus in the relevant international fora and in a regional context for the realization of principles and measures to prevent the further destabilizing accumulation of small arms, including in the areas of export control, such as a commitment by exporting countries to supply small arms only to governments, promoting increased transparency and openness, through regional registers on small arms and regular exchanges of available information, on exports, imports, production and holdings of small arms, and on national weapons legislation, combating illicit trafficking of small arms through the implementation of effective national controls, such as effective border and customs mechanisms, regional and international cooperation and enhanced information exchange.⁷¹

Efforts were made by the EU to consolidate and improve the application of its arms export control regime – the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. The dialogue with third countries, particularly the Associated Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as Cyprus, Malta and Turkey, was stepped up and aimed at improving the application of the Code in these countries. Ad hoc expert meetings between all Member States and Associated Countries were held on a regular basis. A meeting of the Presidency and the Commission with the United States, attended by a number of EU Member States, was held in June on the subject of export control assistance, including arms exports. Member States have been conscious of the increased need to prevent arms from falling into the hands of terrorists and have supported the inclusion of a terrorist clause in the "Initial Elements" of the Wassenaar Arrangement, of which all EU Member States are members.

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⁷⁰ At that meeting, the EC adopted a Declaration on the operational capability of the common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in which it reaffirmed its objective of making it operational at the earliest opportunity. See document SN 300/1/01.REV.1.

⁷¹ See document 2002/589/CFSP of 12 July 2002.

At their Summit, held in Washington, on 2 May, the EU and the United States discussed and agreed on the urgent need to fight terrorism, on issues related to non-proliferation and disarmament, including export control regimes, as well as regional issues, such as the Middle East, reconstruction in Afghanistan and operations in the Balkans related to their efforts to promote a political solution to the crises in the FYRM, and reaffirmed their support for the Stability Pact for South East Europe. 73

At their Summit, held in Moscow, on 29 May, the EU and Russia issued a Joint Statement ⁷⁴ and after underlining the importance of a strategic partnership between Russia and the EU, expressed their intent to increase joint efforts to successfully meet common challenges, especially international terrorism, including access to WMD. The parties exchanged views on the situation in the Balkans and agreed that it was essential to implement the UN Security Council resolutions pertaining to the region. They also adopted a Joint Declaration on further practical steps in developing political dialogue and cooperation on crisis management and security matters, especially conflict prevention and mine clearance. They also issued joint statements on Middle East and Indo-Pakistani relations, expressing a deep concern for the evolving situation in the Middle East region, and the increasing tension in Indo-Pakistani relations.

NATO carried out its activities mainly through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC),⁷⁵ Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the NATO-Russian Permanent Joint Council. The year 2002 marked the opening of a new chapter in NATO-Russia relations. At the Summit Meeting between NATO and the Russian Federation, (Rome, 28 May), the NATO-Russian Council was established (replacing the previous Permanent Joint Council). The new council will provide a mechanism for consultation, consensus building, cooperation, and joint decisions. The NATO-Russian Council, will meet at the level of foreign ministers and defense ministers twice annually.

⁷² For details on the Wassenaar Arrangement see Chapter III in this volume, page 126.

⁷³ See the EU website: www.eu.int

⁷⁴ Ibid

The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council organized a number of meetings. Thus, the Government of Canada and the Council organized a seminar on arms embargoes and sanctions, (Ottawa, 26-27 April),; and the Governments of Canada and Poland co-hosted and co-chaired a Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council seminar on disarmament and peace-keeping, (20-21 September), see document A/CONF.192/15, Annex.

NATO continued to address issues related to its enlargement and intensified its consultations with Partners, culminating at the Summit meeting of States and Government, held in Prague, from 21 to 22 November, at which seven States were invited to join the Alliance. 76 NATO's forces continued to be present in a number of peacekeeping missions, such as NATO-led peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR) and in Kosovo (KFOR) as a part of the UN efforts to stabilize the region. In addition, it was involved actively in efforts to solve problems in Macedonia after the outbreak of violence in March 2001, NATO agreed to maintain its presence after 15 December for a limited period to contribute to continuing stability after the successfully concluded weapons collection mission, known as "Operation Amber Fox", by which the Albanian rebels in the FYRM voluntarily handed over weapons. It also noted the EU's expressed readiness to take over the military operation under appropriate conditions. 77 It also remained committed to the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, reaffirmed its attachment to the early entry into force of the Adapted Treaty, and welcomed the significant results of Russia's effort to reduce forces in the Treaty's Article V area to agreed levels.

The meetings of the North Atlantic Council in Foreign and in Defence sessions⁷⁸ reviewed the implementation of the Defence Capabilities Initiative, launched at the 1999 Summit in Washington, and noted with satisfaction the contribution made by NATO's Southeast Europe Initiative to regional dialogue and cooperation with a view to enhancing and long-term security stability in the Balkans. Disarmament. Demobilization and Reintegration (DD&R) programmes were also the focus of NATO. It provided advice and expertise to Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia in setting up programmes aimed at facilitating a smooth transition of demobilized military personnel from military service to civilian jobs. The effort has now expanded to include advice to Bulgaria and Romania on military base closure and conversion to civilian use.

Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
 See Prague Summit Declaration, NATO Press Release (202) 127 - 21 Nov.
 2002.

⁷⁷ NATO, Press Release: Press Release Guidelines – 25 September 2002.

⁷⁸ The North Atlantic Council Meetings in Foreign Ministers' Sessions took place in Reykjavik, from 14 to 15 May; and Council Meetings in Defence Ministers' Sessions took place in Brussels 6-7 June, and, in addition, an Informal Defence Ministers Meeting were held in Warsaw, from 24 to 25 September. See final communiqués posted on the NATO website: www.nato.int/docu.

The implementation of the CFE Treaty continued during the year. Since its establishment, the Verification Coordinating Committee (VCC) has provided the means to coordinate or exchange information on verification and monitoring activities associated with CFE and Open Skies treaties. Since the entry into force of the CFE Treaty, the VCC has coordinated the conduct of over 2,500 on-site inspections of which 112 took place in 2002. The VCC sponsored four meetings of the Alliance's Data Management Experts to review CFE data in 2002.

The work of the Joint Consultative Group (JCG) of the CFE Treaty focused on the issue of entry into force of the Agreement on Adaptation that would open the way for accession of new states to the Adapted CFE Treaty. It remained concerned about the presence of Treaty-limited equipment unaccounted for and uncontrolled within the Treaty areas of application, that adversely affected the operation of the Treaty. The JCG and its working groups and sub-groups dealt with existing problems of implementation of the Treaty operation, discussed technical issues, and had successfully completed negotiations on the adoption of new Format for Inspection and Observation Visit Reports and updating of the Protocol on Existing Types. ⁷⁹

The Open Skies Treaty (1992), negotiated between 27 NATO and former Warsaw Pact members to enhance military stability and transparency, and some elements of which have been applied provisionally since 1992, entered into force on 1 January 2002. The Open Sky Consultative Commission (OSCC) focused its activities on resolving questions necessary for the effective implementation of the Treaty and adopted a number of decisions to ensure smooth conduct of observation missions. 81

Pursuant to resolution 56/29 of 31 October 2001, the Secretary-General submitted a report⁸² on strengthening of security and cooperation in the

⁷⁹ See OSCE document MC(10).Jour/2, Annex 6.

⁸⁰ The following States have signed and ratified the Open Skies Treaty: Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States; Kyrgyzstan has signed but not ratified; see document CD/1661. The applications of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Finland, Latvia and Lithuania have been approved by the OSCE.

⁸¹ In the period August - December 2002, 12 States parties conducted a total of 24 observation flights. See OSCE document MC(10).JOUR/2.

⁸² See document A/57/91; replies were received by Algeria, Qatar and Tunisia.

Mediterranean region, including replies by three Member States on how to reach that goal.

General Assembly, 2002

The General Assembly took action on 13 draft resolutions dealing with the subjects discussed in this chapter.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

57/55 - Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East. The draft resolution was introduced by Egypt on 17 October, adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 21 October and by the General Assembly on 22 November. For the text of the resolution, see page 352.

First Committee. Speaking after the vote, Israel reiterated its known position that while it continued to support the creation of a mutually verifiable nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region, it believed that the political realities in the Middle East precluded this goal. It believed that such a zone should be based on arrangements freely arrived at by all States of the region concerned. This would entail direct negotiations between those States after they had established full peaceful and diplomatic relations. Israel held that the continuing threats against its very existence by elements in the Middle East and beyond had a critical impact on the region's ability to establish such a zone. In its view, efforts in the context of this resolution required an incremental approach starting with modest confidence-building measures followed by the creation of a stable environment of peace and reconciliation leading to establishing a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction.

57/67 - Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status. The draft resolution was introduced by Mongolia on 17 October. The sponsor submitted a revised draft on 23 October [A/57/510/p.17] in which several changes were made and a new operative paragraph was added [operative paragraph 4] through which the General Assembly welcomed the efforts by Member States to cooperate with Mongolia in implementing resolution 55/33 S and the progress made in consolidating Mongolia's international security. The revised draft was adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 28 October and by the General Assembly on 22 November. For the text of the resolution, see page 372.

First Committee. In its statement after the vote, India praised Mongolia's actions to reinforce its nuclear-weapon-free status, including the adoption of national domestic legislation, and efforts, together with

appropriate UN bodies, to find ways to institutionalize at the international level its territory as a nuclear-weapon-free zone. While recognizing the support and security assurances it had received from Member States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, it expressed its own willingness to respond whenever required with all possible support and commitment to Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status.

57/69 - Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. On 10 October, Uzbekistan introduced the draft resolution on behalf of the sponsors (see page 171 for the sponsors). On 23 October, it introduced a revised draft in which changes were made to several operative paragraphs [A/57/510/p.18] so that the text better reflected the process underway, especially on drafting the treaty and its protocol. New texts were added (operative paragraph 3) which invited all five Central Asian States to continue consultations with the five nuclear-weapon-States on the draft treaty and its protocol, in conformity with the 1999 Disarmament Commission's agreed guidelines for the establishment of such zones; and requesting (operative paragraph 5) the Secretary-General to continue to assist the five States in their further work for the early establishment of this zone. The revised draft was adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 25 October and by the General Assembly on 22 November. For the text of the resolution, see pages 375.

First Committee. India praised the Central Asian States for their accomplishment and for the international support they had received for their efforts. At the same time, India was prepared to extend all possible support and commitment in response to an expressed need for the early realization of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region.

57/73 - Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas. The draft resolution was introduced by Brazil, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 171 for the sponsors), on 14 October. It was adopted by the First Committee on 21 October (as a whole: 148-3-4; op. para. 3, last 3 words: 141-2-8; and op. para. 3 as a whole: 145-1-8) and by the General Assembly on 22 November (as a whole: 160-3-5; op. para. 3, last 3 words: 151-2-8; and op. para. 3 as a whole: 156-1-8). For the text of the resolution, see pages 380.

First Committee. The United States, speaking also on behalf of the United Kingdom and France, explained their negative vote, pointing out that the draft sought to create a new zone, the geographical scope of which would include waters under international jurisdiction. They held that such a measure would be contrary to existing international law and would therefore be unacceptable to those States that were committed to respecting the Convention on the Law of the Sea. India explaining its negative votes on

retaining the last three words of operative paragraph 3 "and South Asia" and the paragraph as a whole, and its abstention on the draft as a whole, claimed that the draft was not only contrary to the established principles for establishing NWFZs, but also to the current realities in the region. While Pakistan cast a negative vote on the last three words in operative paragraph 3 and abstained on the paragraph as a whole citing realities in the region, it supported the draft's call for the creation of such zones in regions where these could be freely agreed among the concerned States. Spain abstained on the draft resolution because it could not support the proposal contained in operative paragraph 6 for an international conference of States parties and signatories to the NWFZ treaties. It saw no need for new legal or political elements to justify that conference, adding that both the 1999 report of the UNDC and the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference had already created a solid basis with regard to nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Conventional disarmament at regional levels

57/76 - Regional disarmament. The draft resolution was introduced by Pakistan, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 172 for the sponsors), on 17 October, adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 22 October and by the General Assembly on 22 November. For the text of the resolution, see page 386.

57/77 - Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels. The draft resolution was introduced by **Pakistan**, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 172 for the sponsors), on 16 October, adopted by the First Committee on 22 October (149-1-1) and by the General Assembly on 22 November (165-1-1). For the text of the resolution, see page 387.

First Committee. Speaking after the vote, India gave several reasons for its negative vote. It felt that the draft's call on the CD in operative paragraph 2 to consider principles for a framework of regional arrangements on conventional arms control was unproductive, since, in 1993, the UNDC had already adopted guidelines and recommendations for those approaches within the context of global security. It further stated that its security concerns were not confined to what had been referred to in the draft as "South Asia" and because the narrow definition of the draft resolution did not accurately reflect the security concerns in South Asia, it had adopted a restrictive approach.

- 57/88 Regional confidence-building measures: activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa. The draft resolution was introduced by the Central African Republic, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 173 for the sponsors), on 17 October, adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 28 October and by the General Assembly on 22 November. For the text of the resolution, see page 406.
- 57/52 Maintenance of international security-good neighbourliness, stability and development in South-Eastern Europe.. The draft resolution was introduced by the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 173 for the sponsors), on 18 October, adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 23 October and by the General Assembly on 22 November. For the text of the resolution, see page 346.
- **57/99 Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region.** The draft resolution was introduced by **Algeria**, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 173 for the sponsors), on 18 October, adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 23 October and by the General Assembly on 22 November. For the text of the resolution, see page 423.

Regional centres

- 57/87 United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament. The draft resolution was introduced by South Africa, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries on 18 October, adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 25 October and by the General Assembly on 22 November. For the text of the resolution, see pages 404.
- 57/89 United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean. The draft resolution was introduced by Trinidad and Tobago, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States, on 17 October, adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 25 October and by the General Assembly on 22 November. For the text of the resolution, see pages 408.
- 57/91 United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa. The draft resolution was introduced by Egypt, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Group of African States, on 17 October, adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 23 October and by the General Assembly on 22 November. For the text of the resolution, see pages 412.

57/92 - United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific. The draft resolution was introduced by Nepal, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 174 for the sponsors), on 17 October, adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 25 October and by the General Assembly on 22 November. For the text of the resolution, see pages 413.

Conclusion

The General Assembly, through its various resolutions addressing security and disarmament from the regional perspective, continued to recognize the indispensable role that the regional and subregional organizations played in this regard and the mutually reinforcing nature of these efforts to those made at the global and national levels.

The Security Council made some progress in its efforts to address ongoing inter-State or intra-State conflicts in different parts of the world, particularly in Africa.

Efforts to consolidate the existing NWFZs and to further expand such zones to other parts of the world continued with some moderate gains. The C5 reached agreement on the text of a treaty on a CANWFZ and were consulting the nuclear-weapon States with a view to having the treaty and its protocol finalized for signature in the near future.

Increased initiatives and measures at the regional and subregional levels to tackle the proliferation of small arms and light weapons formed an important part of international efforts in the areas of conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict peace-building, as well as fighting organized crime and drug trafficking.

The United Nations, through its three regional disarmament centres continued to assist States in their endeavors to consolidate peace and security, through tackling issues related to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, conventional arms control, especially small arms and landmines, and through promoting openness and transparency on military and security issues.

Coordination and cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations were strengthened in their common endeavor to seek solutions to the challenges confronting the world and the respective regions.

Other Issues

Introduction

THIS CHAPTER COVERS THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUES OF terrorism and disarmament; human rights, human security and disarmament; outer space, information security and the role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament; and the relationship between disarmament and development. These issues do not lend themselves to placement in any other topic chapter of this volume, nor do they share a common theme among themselves, but represent significant steps taken by the established multilateral disarmament machinery or by other multilateral bodies of the United Nations system.

Terrorism and disarmament

"Terrorism strikes not only its immediate victims but also at the heart of what the United Nations stands for. It threatens sovereignty, democracy, human rights, the rule of law and other principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. The Organization therefore has a vital interest, and a vital role to play, in the struggle against terrorism."

KOFI ANNAN, UNITED NATIONS, SECRETARY-GENERAL

The international community has responded to the terrorist attacks of 11September on the United States with an unyielding determination to combat international terrorism on all fronts. The battle against terrorism is integral to the entire mandate of the United Nations. Working closely with Member States and other international and regional organizations, the United Nations has continued its relentless efforts to combat terrorism in 2002.

The United Nations Security Council remained seized of the issue of international terrorism and continued the activities of its Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC). During the year, it adopted separate resolutions condemning the bomb attacks in Bali, Indonesia, the hostage-taking in Moscow, and the terrorist attack in Kenya. In addition, the Council,

¹ S/RES/1438 (2002).

meeting on the first anniversary of the 11 September attacks, adopted a Presidential Statement⁴ calling on all States and regional and subregional organizations to carry forward the battle against international terrorism and to build on their cooperation in the field. In January 2002, the Security Council, by adopting resolution 1390, decided that all States should take a series of measures with respect to Usama bin Laden, members of the Al-Qaida organization and the Taliban and others associated with them, which included freezing without delay their economic resources, preventing their entry into or transit through their territories, and preventing the supply, sale and transfer of arms and related materiel to them.⁵

During 2002, the CTC reported to the Security Council at regular intervals. The Council invited the CTC to focus on ensuring that all States had legislation in place covering all aspects of its resolution 1373(2001), and on building on a dialogue with international, regional and subregional organizations active in the areas covered by that resolution. The Council noted with satisfaction that 174 Member States and 5 others had submitted to the CTC, pursuant to the Council's resolution 1373, reports on steps they had taken to combat international terrorism and also called on the 17 Member States which had not done so to submit their reports urgently.⁶

On 4 October, the CTC held a meeting to commemorate its first anniversary. In his statement to the meeting, the Secretary-General endorsed the three-pronged strategy suggested by the Policy Working Group (PWG) report (see below) and stressed the importance of denying terrorists the opportunity to commit their acts by making greater efforts to achieve disarmament, as well as by giving technical support to States seeking to curb the flow of arms, funds and technology to terrorist cells. In this connection, the Secretary-General underlined the urgency to curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

The General Assembly's Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism⁸ continued to press ahead with its work on the development of a draft comprehensive antiterrorism convention aimed at filling the gaps left by the existing 12 sectoral treaties, but was unable to conclude negotiations on the convention. By

² S/RES/1444 (2002).

³ S/RES/1450 (2002).

⁴ S/PRST/2002/25.

⁵ S/RES/1390 (2002).

⁶ S/PRST/2002/10, S/PRST/2002/26 and S/PRST/38.

⁷ Press Release SC/7522.

The Ad Hoc Committee was established by General Assembly resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1996.

resolution 57/27, of 19 November 2002, the General Assembly requested the Ad Hoc Committee to continue its efforts to resolve the outstanding issues and called for the speedy completion of its work on a comprehensive antiterrorism convention and another on suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism.

During the debate in the First Committee, many Member States expressed their serious concerns over the possible possession and use of (WMD) by terrorists and the potentially disastrous consequences. These concerns were also reflected in a resolution entitled "Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction" adopted by the First Committee. The resolution urged all Member States to adopt or strengthen national measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring WMD. It also requested the Secretary-General to compile a report on measures already taken by international organizations on issues related to the linkage between the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of WMD; to seek views of Member States on additional relevant measures tackling the global threat of terrorists acquiring WMD; and to report on it to the General Assembly at its fifty-eighth session.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) held that the first line of defense against nuclear terrorism was strong physical protection of nuclear facilities and materials. At its Board of Governors meeting, in March, an action plan designed to upgrade worldwide protection against acts of terrorism involving nuclear and other radioactive materials was approved. According to the IAEA, national measures adopted by States for protecting nuclear facilities and material varied in their substance and application; also, there was wide recognition that the international physical protection regime needed to be strengthened. A number of States subsequently pledged funds and resources to support the plan.

In 2001, the Secretary-General established the PWG on the United Nations and Terrorism. Its mandate included identifying the long-term implications and broad policy dimensions of the issue of terrorism for the United Nations and formulating recommendations on steps that the United Nations system might take in this regard. The PWG submitted its report to the Secretary-General on 28 June. ¹⁰ In its report, the Group recommended that the activities of the United Nations should be part of a three-fold strategy supporting global efforts to: (a) dissuade disaffected groups from embracing terrorism; (b) deny groups or individuals the means to carry out acts of terrorism; and (c) sustain broad-based international cooperation in the struggle against terrorism.

⁹ A/RES/57/83.

 $^{^{10}}$ The report was published as document A/57/273 - S/2002/875.

The PWG's report contained a total of 31 recommendations, five of which were related to disarmament (recommendations 18-21 and 24). Given concerns that terrorists might seek access to WMD stockpiles or related technologies, the PWG stressed that United Nations activities in the field of disarmament must gain renewed relevance. The PWG further noted that the Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA) should draw public attention to the threat posed by the potential use of WMD in terrorist acts, in addition to strengthening its work in this area and to enhancing its capacity to assist the CTC. The PWG called for the establishment of a mechanism under DDA that would issue a biennial public report on the potential use of WMD in terrorist acts. This mechanism would make use of existing United Nations resources and specialized databases, as well as information received from Member States, and could serve as a barometer of terrorist threats. Furthermore, this mechanism could be available to assist the CTC, either directly, by providing analysis and advice, or indirectly, by recommending appropriate cooperation between the Security Council and relevant operational agencies, such as the IAEA or the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (recommendation 18). The PWG encouraged the development of the technical capabilities of the IAEA, the OPCW and the World Health Organization (WHO) to provide assistance to States in the event of the threat or use of WMD, other weapons and technologies (recommendation 19). The PWG also called for the facilitation of arrangements through which specialized agencies or related organizations could provide assistance and advice to States on how to develop and maintain an adequate civil defense capability against the use of WMD, other weapons or technologies (recommendation 20). It also proposed that United Nations offices should be tasked with drafting proposals to reinforce ethical norms, and creating codes of conduct for scientists, through international and national scientific societies and institutions that teach sciences or engineering skills related to weapons technologies. Such codes of conduct would seek to prevent the involvement of defense scientists or technical experts in terrorist activities and restrict public access to knowledge and expertise on the development. production, stockpiling and use of WMD or related technologies (recommendation 21). In addition, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and DDA were called upon to study the links between terrorism and organized crime, including drug trafficking, money-laundering, illicit trafficking of arms and corruption, all of which created an environment that enabled terrorist operations to expand (recommendation 24).

At both its sessions in 2002, the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters discussed issues concerning threats from the possible

development, acquisition and use of WMD (nuclear, chemical and biological weapons) by terrorists and put forward a number of recommendations.

The Board stressed that a multilateral approach remained the only effective way to combat terrorism involving WMD and reiterated the need to respect international law, including disarmament and arms control agreements on WMD. It underscored the important role that such agreements played in preventing the development and acquisition of WMD by non-State groups, as States were obliged to prohibit access to such weapons by unauthorized groups or persons. It defined two broad areas in which arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation instruments could help combat terrorism involving WMD: prevention and enforcement, and mutual cooperation for emergency response. The Board recommended that promoting the universality of existing agreements such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NTP), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) should be vigorously pursued. There was also a need to engage non-parties to those agreements in dialogues and consultations aimed at cooperation among all States in preventing the possession or development of WMD by terrorist groups. The Board recommended that the General Assembly should establish a governmental expert group to develop a comprehensive action plan to deal with nuclear terrorism. It also recommended that DDA undertake consultations with relevant international and regional organizations and serve as a focal point in the efforts to deal with the threat of WMD terrorism, including the regular exchange of information among States and interested organizations.

It put forward a number of specific proposals on combating WMD terrorism both in terms of prevention and emergency response. 11

General Assembly, 2002

57/83 - Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. On 10 October, a draft resolution entitled "Terrorism and weapons of mass destruction" was submitted by a number of countries. On 18 October, India introduced a revised draft resolution, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 442 for the sponsors), in which the title of the draft was changed to "Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction". Several preambular and operative paragraphs were also revised. However, a major change was made in operative paragraph 4 relating to the Secretary-General's mandate to convene a panel of governmental experts. In

¹¹ See the report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters (A/57/335, 22 August 2002).

the new text, he was requested to compile a report on measures already taken by international organizations; to seek views of Member States on additional measures; and to report to the 58th session of the General Assembly. The revised draft was adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 25 October and by the General Assembly on 22 November. For the text of the resolution, see pages 399.

First Committee. Pakistan supported the draft's objectives and stressed that chemical and biological weapons in the hands of terrorists posed a more immediate threat. Thus, there was an urgency to promote the compliance with and to further strengthen treaties in these areas.

While joining the consensus, three States explained their positions. Denmark, ¹² speaking on behalf of the European Union (EU) and countries associated with its statement, saw an urgent need to promote the adoption, universalization, full implementation and strengthening of multilateral treaties and international instruments in the field of disarmament, arms limitation and non-proliferation, particularly the NPT, and to enhance and develop active political dialogue at the bilateral or multilateral levels as a means to stop terrorists from acquiring WMD. Israel called for international efforts to halt the illicit trafficking in small arms, light weapons and explosives and to curb the proliferation of technology and dual-use items related to WMD and ballistic missiles by States or non-State actors that supported terrorism. For its part, Egypt hoped that future work on the issue would achieve the necessary balance between two frameworks — the international one governing WMD and the existing legal framework by the United Nations to combat international terrorism.

Outer space

During 2002, as in the past several years, the main activities of the United Nations concerning questions of outer space took place in the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (PAROS). No substantive work with respect to disarmament took place in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) as, once again, it was not able to establish an ad hoc committee on the

Denmark spoke on behalf of the European Union, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe associated with the European Union – Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia and the associated countries of Cyprus, Malta and Turkey, as well as the countries of the European Economic Area members of the European Free Trade Association – Iceland and Norway.

¹³ See the report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (A/57/20).

prevention of an arms race in outer space. Nevertheless, delegations continued to exchange views on the issues of the weaponization of outer space in plenary meetings of the CD and in the general debate in the First Committee, especially in the context of the United States' (US) withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty¹⁴ and the development and deployment of a national missile defense (NMD). In the Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement (Durban, 29 April), ¹⁵ the Ministers expressed their concerns over the negative implications of the development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile defense systems, while the withdrawal by the US from the ABM Treaty was seen as bringing new challenges to strategic stability and to the issue of PAROS. They also emphasized the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work in the CD on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In the CD itself, two distinct approaches to the issue were advocated. One held that new threats and challenges underlined the urgent need to begin negotiating a treaty prohibiting the weaponization of outer space. The other believed that no such new threat was emerging from outer space and that no negotiation was necessary. There was readiness, however, to discuss and explore the issue.

Conference on Disarmament, 2002

In 2002, the controversy persisted over the mandate for an ad hoc committee on PAROS and was one of the main reasons for the lack of agreement on the CD's programme of work.¹⁶

As a result, a subsidiary body on the prevention of an arms race in outer space was not established, and the discussion of PAROS was held during plenary meetings of the Conference.

China maintained that the abrogation of the 1972 ABM Treaty, intensification of the development of a missile defense incorporating outer space weapons systems, as well as the advancement of operational concepts on control of space and on asserting superiority in outer space were evidence of the imminent danger of the weaponization of outer space. These developments not only could lead to an arms race in outer space, but could also seriously damage the international disarmament and global strategic balance and security. China argued that the existing legal instruments pertaining to outer space fell short of meeting these new challenges. The

¹⁴ The withdrawal of the United States from the ABM Treaty became effective on 13 June 2002.

¹⁵ CD/1669, p. 4.

¹⁶ See also Chapter VI, page 213.

interests and assets of all States in outer space could only be safeguarded through negotiation and conclusion of legally binding instruments prohibiting the weaponization of and preventing an arms race in outer space. Accordingly, China advocated the re-establishment of an ad hoc committee on PAROS with a negotiating mandate in order to conclude one or more international legal instruments prohibiting the weaponization of outer space. In this regard, China maintained that the issue of PAROS was as important as other issues such as the prohibition of the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, nuclear disarmament or negative security assurances, and that all these issues should be accorded equal importance in the Conference on Disarmament, and be dealt with in a balanced way.¹⁷ Towards the end of the session, China submitted a draft decision on the establishment of an ad hoc committee on the PAROS¹⁸, which was an amended version of a corresponding decision in the so-called "Amorim proposal".¹⁹

The Russian Federation expressed its concern over the possibility of the extension of an arms race to outer space as a result of the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. It recalled proposals made by its Foreign Minister at the 56th session of the General Assembly on possible elements for a comprehensive agreement on the non-deployment of weapons in outer space. In particular, it referred to its proposal for a moratorium on deployment of weapons in outer space pending the conclusion of a relevant international agreement. The Russian Federation expressed its support for the beginning of negotiations in the CD on PAROS. In this regard, it recalled its package proposal on the establishment of an ad hoc committee to deal with nuclear disarmament along with the simultaneous establishment of an ad hoc committee on PAROS with a negotiating mandate.²⁰ At the same time, the Russian Federation was in favour of commencing negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) without linkages to any other issues.²¹

Subsequently, China and the Russian Federation submitted a joint working paper entitled "Possible elements for a future international legal agreement on the prevention of the deployment of weapons in outer space, the threat or use of force against outer space objects". ²² It was also cosponsored by Belarus, Indonesia, the Syrian Arab Republic, Viet Nam, and Zimbabwe. The working paper contained three basic obligations: (a) not to

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¹⁷ CD/PV.892, pp. 5 – 7; CD/PV.900, pp. 19–21.

¹⁸ CD/1682.

¹⁹ CD/1624.

²⁰ CD/1644.

 $^{^{21}}$ CD/PV.889, pp. 13 – 14; CD/PV.900, pp. 15 – 16.

²² CD/1679. See also A/57/418, Annex.

place in orbit around the Earth any object carrying any kinds of weapons, not to install such weapons on celestial bodies, or not to station such weapons in outer space in any other manner; (b) not to resort to the threat or use of force against outer space objects; and (c) not to assist or encourage other States, groups of States, international organizations to participate in activities prohibited by the treaty.

While introducing the proposal, China expressed the view that only a treaty-based prohibition of the deployment of weapons in outer space and the prevention of the threat or use of force against outer space objects could eliminate the danger of the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space. In its view, the CD was an ideal forum for negotiating such a treaty.²³ The Russian Federation, for its part, emphasized the urgent need for a new legal instrument to fill gaps in this area, such as the absence of prohibitions of the deployment in outer space of weapons other than WMD, and of anti-satellite weapons, which were further exacerbated after the ABM Treaty had ceased to exist. It proposed considering the establishment of international legal restrictions on the deployment of strike weapons in outer space. The Russian Federation stressed that a possible future agreement would not hinder outer space activities which were defense-related and which were based on the principles of the United Nations Charter. Moreover, the Russian Federation maintained that a future legal instrument should be seen as an additional legal protection for outer space objects in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter related to the non-use of force in international relations.²⁴

Algeria, Belarus, Chile, Cuba, Iraq, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Kenya, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the Syrian Arab Republic, Venezuela, Viet Nam, and Zimbabwe expressed support for the joint Russian-Chinese proposal. Egypt, while welcoming the proposal and supporting its main thrust, added that any future legal instrument concerned with the prevention of an arms race in outer space should ban all military use of outer space, and should also include provisions for cooperation and assistance in accordance with the terms of the preamble to the Outer Space Treaty.²⁵

The United States, stressing that the security and well-being of itself and its allies depended on the ability to operate in space, reiterated its commitment to the principle of exploration and use of outer space by all nations for peaceful purposes for the benefit of humanity. In its view, this also allowed defense and intelligence-related activities in pursuit of national

²³ CD/PV.907, pp. 20 – 21.

²⁴ CD/PV.907, pp. 17 – 19.

²⁵ CD/PV.912, pp. 2 – 3.

security goals. Emphasizing its firm commitment to the Outer Space Treaty, the United States believed that the current international regime regulating the use of space was effective and, therefore, it opposed the idea of negotiating a new outer space treaty. It was willing to support the establishment of an ad hoc committee on outer space that would carry-out broad-ranging discussions while the Conference conducted active and ongoing negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. However, it could not support any draft mandate that attempted to bias the work of such an ad hoc committee toward a particular goal or outcome. More important, the United States could not accept the view that the ad hoc committee should start its work with the preconceived idea that it would later be necessary to negotiate a legally binding instrument. It rather believed that it might be easier to reach consensus on a proposal to develop new confidence-building measures that could, for example, increase the flow of information or otherwise enhance openness and transparency about activities in space. ²⁶

Colombia, speaking on behalf of the Group of 21, stated that the prevention of an arms race in outer space assumed greater urgency because of legitimate concerns that existing legal instruments were inadequate to deter imminent attempts for the further militarization of outer space. In the Group's opinion, the consequences of the United States' withdrawal from the ABM Treaty ushered in new challenges. Accordingly, the Group of 21 emphasized the urgent need for commencement of substantive work on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. ²⁷

Algeria, speaking on behalf of five former CD Presidents, on their efforts to develop a proposal on the programme of work, admitted that the issue of PAROS was eluding drafters of the proposal and that two main approaches to it had been identified: a maximalist approach which advocated negotiations on a treaty prohibiting the militarization of outer space, and a minimalist one which recommended discussions and the exploration of different scenarios.²⁸

Ireland, speaking on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, emphasized that the CD had the primary role in the negotiations on a multilateral agreement or agreements on PAROS. The coalition believed that the Conference should complete the examination and update the 1992 mandate and establish a subsidiary body as early as possible.²⁹

Spain, and later Denmark, speaking on behalf of the European Union and associated States, stressed that any agreement on the commencement of the

²⁶ CD/PV.890, p.6; CD/PV.907, pp.15–16; and CD/PV.912, pp. 21–22.

²⁷ CD/PV.891, p.10.

²⁸ CD/PV.912, pp.5-6.

²⁹ CD/PV.907, p.7.

work of the Conference had to be based on interconnected elements: the immediate launch of negotiations on an FMCT, as well as efforts to address both nuclear disarmament and the prevention of an arms race in outer space in subsidiary bodies whose mandates should be both pragmatic and substantive in order to be universally acceptable.³⁰

Canada felt that, in the absence of the work in the CD on PAROS, a protocol to the Outer Space Treaty could be considered as an appropriate vehicle to prevent the weaponization of outer space.³¹

General Assembly, 2002

57/57 - Prevention of an arms race in outer space. The draft resolution was introduced by Egypt, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 429 for the sponsors), on 15 October, and was adopted by the First Committee on 22 October (151-0-2) and by the General Assembly on 22 November (159-0-3). For the text of the resolution, see page 356.

First Committee. Prior to the vote, the Russian Federation, explaining its positive vote, stated that political will was needed to prevent the weaponization of outer space, and regretted that current norms of international space law did not fully cover that possibility. It recalled several of its initiatives in that area: a joint draft document with China on potential elements of an international legal agreement on PAROS and the use of force or the threat of the use of force against space objects; a proposal for a moratorium on the emplacement of military equipment; and its preparedness to embark on new confidence-building measures.

Denmark ³² spoke on behalf of the EU and a group of Western, Central and Eastern European States who aligned themselves with the statement and supported the draft. In their view, the CD was the only international multilateral negotiating body where a decision on this work should be taken. Moreover, the EU was ready to support the establishment of a subsidiary body within the CD to deal with the issue based on a universal consensus mandate. These States reiterated it was the EU's priority to start negotiations

³⁰ CD/PV.893, p.10, and CD/PV.914, p.10.

³¹ CD/PV.898, p.6.

³² Denmark spoke on behalf of the European Union, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe associated with the European Union – Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia and the associated countries of Cyprus, Malta and Turkey, as well as the countries of the European Economic Area members of the European Free Trade Association – Iceland and Norway.

on a universal treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Human rights, human security and disarmament

"In an era where the world will no longer stand by in silence when gross and systematic violations of human rights are being committed, the United Nations is dedicated to addressing both the supply and demand aspects of the trade in small arms."

KOFI ANNAN, UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL

Efforts to address the issue of protecting civilians and human rights in time of international conflicts can be traced to the mid-nineteenth century. But it was not until after the Second World War that significant international legal instruments were concluded on the subject.³³ In 1981, the use of certain inhumane weapons was prohibited or restricted through an international treaty.³⁴ During the 1990s, due to the dramatic increase in the number of civilian casualties caused by landmines, the international community made systematic efforts to address the humanitarian problems associated with landmines, anti-personnel landmines in particular.³⁵ In the early 1990s, in response to an increase in the number of armed conflicts around the world, especially the rise in intra-State conflicts, the United Nations and other international organizations began to address questions related to SALW, the weapons of choice in such conflicts.³⁶ These efforts underlined the importance of protecting victims of such weapons, especially children and

^{33 1949} Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field; 1949 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea; 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners in Time of War; 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War; 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I); 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II).

³⁴ See the Convention on the Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW), and its Additional Protocols (I-IV); see also Chapter III, page 115.

³⁵ See Mine-Ban Convention of 1997, Amended Protocol II of CCW; also see Chapter III, page 130.

women during and after armed conflicts. In recent years, growing attention has been given to the link between human rights and WMD, other weapons which have indiscriminate effects and can cause superfluous injuries and suffering, as well as conventional weapons, particularly SALW, focusing on the threat posed by these weapons to the fundamental right to life.³⁷ This led, in 2001, to an initial discussion on the threat posed to human rights by WMD and SALW at the 53rd session of the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights³⁸ of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights.³⁹ The Sub-Commission decided to further consider the issue at its 54th session in 2002, requesting two members to elaborate further on the themes by preparing expanded working papers.

54th Session of the Sub-Commission

At its 54th session, the Sub-Commission continued its consideration of the two issues. The working papers submitted to the Sub-Commission were: "Human rights and weapons of mass destruction, or other weapons with indiscriminate effect, or of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering". 40 and "The question of the trade, carrying and use of small arms and light weapons in the context of human rights and humanitarian norms". 41

The paper on WMD and other weapons with indiscriminate effect or of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering⁴² pointed out that human rights were likely to be infringed by the use of particular weapons, such as nuclear weapons, biological and chemical weapons, anti-personnel mines, cluster bombs, fuel-air bombs, and weaponry containing depleted uranium. In analyzing the importance of both treaty and customary humanitarian law as sources of law relating to such weapons, the author

³⁶ See Report of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, A/CONF.192/15; see also Chapter III, page 104.

³⁷ See Universal Declaration of Human Rights at www. unhchr.cn/html.

³⁸ The United Nations Commission on Human Rights established a Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in 1947. The Sub-Commission meets annually and is composed of 26 experts who serve in their personal capacities.

³⁹ See *The Yearbook*, vol. 26: 2001, Chapter VI, pp.172-176.

⁴⁰ E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/38, Working paper submitted by Y.K.J. Yeung Sik Yuen.

⁴¹ E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/39, Working paper submitted by Barbara Frey.

⁴² E./CN.4/Sub.2/2002/38.

addressed each of these weapons in great detail. The executive summary of the working paper is annexed to this chapter.

On nuclear weapons, the paper noted that, up to date, there was no legal instrument banning nuclear weapons, which was a cause of concern. Quoting the 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the legality of the treat or use of nuclear weapons and potential disastrous consequences, the paper suggested that the use of nuclear weapons should be banned. It cited the recent United States Nuclear Posture Review that included plans for "first use" against seven states, five of which did not possess nuclear weapons. He also expressed concerns over the reported plans to develop "mini-nukes" and "bunker busters" intended for use in wars. The paper noted that there were already treaties banning biological and chemical weapons, though they had weaknesses, such as in verification.

The paper also evaluated anti-personnel mines, cluster bombs and fuel-air explosives under the category of weapons with indiscriminate effect. It concluded that such weapons in fact could not be used without indiscriminate effect. Further, he maintained that use of fuel-air explosives in the Balkans and Afghanistan had allegedly triggered earthquakes in those regions. Concerning weapons containing depleted uranium, the paper drew attention to the fact that its pyrophoric (highly flammable) nature made it a deadly and indiscriminate weapon, however, there was no legal instrument banning depleted uranium weapons.

The paper concluded that, in light of humanitarian law from all sources, weapons should be banned if their use: (a) had indiscriminate effects (no distinction between civilians and belligerents); (b) was out of proportion with the pursuit of legitimate military objectives; (c) adversely affected the environment in a widespread, long-term and severe manner; and (d) caused superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering.

On the basis of the existing legal norms and principles, and the nature of WMD as such, the paper argued that peace and security could not be achieved by the use of these horrific weapons and any use of such weapons would contravene humanitarian law and violate human rights.

During the discussion of the working paper, members of the Sub-Commission shared the concerns expressed in the working paper on the consequences of possible use of WMD and other weapons with indiscriminate effect on human rights and on the humanitarian situation. Members agreed that a more comprehensive study needed to be undertaken on this important issue. The Sub-Commission later decided to request an expanded and updated working paper on this topic to be considered at its fifty-fifth session in 2003, taking into account the comments and proposals

by other members of the Sub-Commission during the session. For the text of decision 2002/113, see Annex I of this chapter.

The working paper on human rights and small arms and light weapons ⁴³ dealt with SALW from the human rights perspective, focusing on their availability and misuse. The paper first examined the relationship between the two issues. The paper underlined the fact that the growing availability of SALW increased the incidence of internal conflicts, exacerbated conflicts by increasing the lethality and duration of violence, and heightened the sense of insecurity, leading to a greater demand for weapons. The paper pointed out that such weapons were used by State agents and non-State actors to facilitate a range of human rights abuses, including rape, enforced disappearance, torture, forced displacement, and forced recruitment of child soldiers.

In analyzing how current standards in international human rights and humanitarian law address those violations, the paper examined five different situations: (i) misuse of small arms by State agents; (ii) misuse of small arms by private persons when the State fails to exercise due diligence; (iii) misuse of small arms by State agents in armed conflict; (iv) misuse of small arms by non-State actors in armed conflict; and (v) small arms transfers with the knowledge that arms were likely to be used to commit serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. The paper pointed out that there were evolving norms of international human rights and humanitarian law that required States to exercise due diligence by (i) taking effective measures to prevent, prosecute and punish violations with small arms within their jurisdiction, and (ii) taking effective measures to prevent the transfer of small arms to human rights abusers. The paper suggested that, to begin to fill out the parameters of those evolving norms, the human rights community should gather and analyze data on the use of SALW in human rights violations.

During the discussion of the subject, several members of the Sub-Commission expressed satisfaction that the paper addressed the difficult issue of the involvement of non-State actors' in human rights violations with small arms. They emphasized that any study of the problem should address not only humanitarian considerations and the demand side of the problem, but also the question of supply, taking account of all involved, including State and non-State actors, whether in time of peace or in time of conflict.

The Sub-Commission then adopted resolution 2002/25⁴⁴ in which it expressed its grave concern that hundreds of thousands of people were killed or injured each year by SALW and that such arms were also used to facilitate

⁴³ E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/39.

⁴⁴ E/CN.4/2003/2 - E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/46.

other grave human rights abuses, including rape, enforced disappearance and torture. It stressed that the protection of human rights must be central to the development of further principles and norms regarding the transfer and use of SALW. The Sub-Commission encouraged States to adopt laws and policies regarding the manufacture, transfer and use of small arms, that comply with principles of international human rights and humanitarian law. The resolution also encouraged States to provide training to armed forces and law enforcement personnel on basic principles of international human rights and humanitarian law, especially with regard to the use of SALW. It requested that those who document human rights practices, including United Nations special rapporteurs. United Nations human rights monitors in field operations and NGOs, collect information and report specifically on human rights abuses committed with SALW. The Sub-Commission decided to appoint Ms. Frey (paper of the working paper) as Special Rapporteur with the task of preparing a comprehensive study on the prevention of human rights violations committed with SALW based on her working paper as well as the comments made during the discussion at the fifty-fourth session of the Sub-Commission. A preliminary report is due at the fifty-fifth session and a progress report will be made at the fifty-sixth. The final report will be submitted to its fifty-seventh session in 2005.

Disarmament and human security

"A further requirement for ensuring human security is disarmament, which involves a consistent and concerted effort from all. Progress here can both reduce global threats and save resources vital for social and economic well-being."

SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT,
ROAD MAP TOWARDS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
UNITED NATIONS MILLENNIUM DECLARATION

In recent years, more and more people have come to recognize that humanitarian concerns and human rights are really at the heart of peace, security and disarmament. In the new people-centred security concept, disarmament is humanitarian action.

In the 1990s, the disarmament community joined forces with the humanitarian and development communities to tackle the destructive effects of landmines, producing the Amended Protocol II to the Inhuman Weapons Convention (CCW), and then the Mine-Ban Convention signed in Ottawa in 1997. Since then, international efforts to tackle the devastating consequences of the proliferation and misuse of SALW have brought together actors from

the disarmament, human rights, humanitarian, health and development communities to address the multifaceted impact of these weapons.

DDA continued to be involved in efforts to engage the humanitarian and development community in a dialogue in their common mission to seek peace, security and development. On 7 November, DDA, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue co-sponsored a seminar in Geneva, entitled "Disarmament, Health and Humanitarian Action: Putting People First". Experts and practitioners from both the traditional disarmament community and the humanitarian and public health communities were brought together to discuss the people-centred approach to disarmament.

Participants at the seminar highlighted the need to consider disarmament from a human security perspective due to the potential devastating effects of the use of weapons on human beings. They also stressed that putting people first offered creative and practical ways to move a substantive disarmament agenda forward. One of the main themes of the seminar was the need to integrate the concerns of the humanitarian, human rights and public health communities with those of the traditional disarmament community. Two ideas emerged as particularly significant for the critical reflection on the nature of international disarmament efforts to date: that the development of a culture of prevention was essential and that effective disarmament action must be multi-faceted as the problem it sought to address, and must include as its ultimate goal the safety of people rather than the sole pursuit of national security. In addition, the need to educate policy-makers and the general public about the threat to human security posed by various types of weapons was stressed. It was also pointed out that assessment of the relationship between the effects of weapons and the context of their use was also valuable for the design of more robust disarmament regimes. The participants also called attention to the value of considering the effects of weapons – by putting people first - in thinking strategically about the future of disarmament and arms control instruments. 45

Information security and the role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament

Since 1998, the General Assembly has considered the issue of information security. In its annual resolutions on the subject, the General Assembly has requested the Secretary-General to seek views and assessments of Member States on the following issues: (a) general appreciation of information security; (b) the definition of basic notions related to information security,

⁴⁵ Conference Report, UNIDIR website: www.unidir.org.

including unauthorized interference with or misuse of information and telecommunications systems and information resources; and (c) the content of relevant information concepts aimed at strengthening the security of global information and telecommunications systems. ⁴⁶ The General Assembly, in its resolution 56/19, requested the Secretary-General to consider existing and potential threats in the sphere of information security and possible cooperative measures to address them; to conduct a study, with the assistance of a group of governmental experts, to be established in 2004, on the relevant international concepts aimed at strengthening the security of global information and telecommunications systems; and to report the outcome of that study to the Assembly at its sixtieth session.

During the 2002 General Assembly session, the Russian Federation again introduced a draft resolution on the subject. It noted that the rapid progress achieved in information and communication technologies was creating unprecedented possibilities for development and had become increasingly important to economic and social progress at both national and global levels. However, there was potential danger posed by advances in information technology for purposes that were incompatible with the goals of scientific and technological progress, the maintenance of international peace and security, the non-use or threat of use of force, the combat against international terrorism, the principle of non-intervention and respect for human rights and freedom. As the potential danger required the adoption of preventive measures, particularly in the light of the major threat of international terrorism, the proposed study by the governmental expert group had to address the whole range of questions connected with international information systems and produce appropriate recommendations.

While considering the draft resolution on the developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security, the First Committee had before it a report of the Secretary-General, submitted pursuant to resolution 56/19, containing the views of Member States and their assessments on different aspects of the issue. 47

The General Assembly, in its resolution 57/53, of 22 November, on the subject, called upon Member States to promote further at multilateral levels the consideration of existing and potential threats in the field of information security, as well as possible measures to limit the threats emerging in this field, consistent with the need to preserve the free flow of information;

⁴⁶ See General Assembly resolutions 53/70 of 4 December 1998, 54/49 of 1 December 1999, 55/28 of 20 November 2000, and 56/19 of 29 November 2001.

⁴⁷ A/57/166 and Add. 1. Replies were received from Cuba, Guatemala, Panama and the Syrian Arab Republic.

considered that the purpose of such measures could be served through the examination of relevant international concepts aimed at strengthening the security of global information and telecommunications systems, and reiterated its request to the Secretary-General, already contained in its resolution 56/19, to carry out a study on these concepts, with the assistance of a group of governmental experts, to be established in 2004.

Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament

The General Assembly again adopted a resolution on the role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament (see resolution 57/54 below). The resolution, taking into account the importance of international transfers of dual-use as well as high-technology products, services and know-how for peaceful purposes for the economic and social development of States, recognized the need to regulate such transfers through multilaterally negotiated. universally applicable, non-discriminatory guidelines. The resolution expressed concern about growing proliferation of ad hoc exclusive export control regimes that tended to impede the economic and social development of developing countries, and affirmed that scientific and technological progress should be used for the benefit of all mankind. It urged Member States to undertake multilateral negotiations with the participation of all interested States in order to establish universally acceptable, non-discriminatory guidelines for international transfers of dualuse goods and technologies and high technology with military applications.

General Assembly, 2002

57/53 - Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security. The draft resolution was introduced by the Russian Federation, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 427 for the sponsors), on 18 October and was adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 28 October and by the General Assembly on 22 November. For the text of the resolution, see page 349.

57/54 - The role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament. The draft resolution was introduced by India, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 428 for the sponsors), on 17 October, adopted by the First Committee on 23 October (93-46-18) and by the General Assembly on 22 November (90-48-21). For the text of the resolution and the voting pattern, see pages 351.

First Committee. Speaking after the vote the Republic of Korea explained its negative vote. It believed that the draft lacked balance by failing to acknowledge the contribution of current export control regimes to

deterring the proliferation of not only equipment and technologies related to WMD, but also of dual-use goods and technologies with wide military applications.

Relationship between disarmament and development

Different views among States persisted on the question of the relationship between disarmament and development. The vast majority of Member States, mostly non-aligned, continued to stress the importance of the issue and called for implementation of the action programme of the 1987 International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development. On the other hand, a number of other States, especially member States of the European Union and the United States, considered that there was no automatic link between the two concepts.

The Secretary-General submitted a report entitled "Relationship between Disarmament and Development", ⁴⁹ pursuant to General Assembly resolution 56/24 E, of 29 November 2001, in which the Assembly invited all Member States to communicate to him their views and proposals for the implementation of the action programme adopted at the 1987 International Conference, ⁵⁰ and requested that he report on action taken in that regard through appropriate organs and within available resources.

In this report, the Secretary-General informed Member States that, given the financial constraints of the Organization and the limited response by Member States to support action for the implementation of the action programme adopted at the International Conference on the subject, the Organization was able to undertake only an attenuated programme of activities in this connection. The Secretary-General therefore proposed that Member States consider the establishment of a group of governmental experts to undertake a reappraisal of the relationship between disarmament and development in the current international context as well as the future role of the Organization in this connection.

The General Assembly agreed with the recommendation of the Secretary-General and, by its resolution 57/65, of 22 November, requested that he present a report on the reappraisal of the situation at its fifty-ninth session. The Assembly requested him to do so within available financial

⁴⁸ See http://disarmament.un.org/cab/d&d.html or United Nations publication, sales no.E.87.IX.8

⁴⁹ A/57/167 and Add. 1.

⁵⁰ Ibid. Replies were received from: Cuba, Denmark on behalf of the European Union, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ecuador, El Salvador, Panama and Oatar.

resources and with the assistance of a group of governmental experts to be established in 2003 on the basis of equitable geographical distribution, while seeking the views of Member States.

Based on the mandate provided by General Assembly resolution 57/65, the first meeting of the Group of Governmental Experts on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development will be convened in November 2003 and will be followed by two more sessions in 2004.

DDA organized a panel discussion entitled "Disarmament and Development: New Choices for Security and Prosperity" on 29 April, at United Nations Headquarters. The discussion focused on reducing military expenditures through regional approaches, transparent government reporting, and defense conversion. The topics included: the positive impact of the settlement of disputes between States, particularly border disputes on the development prospects of the societies concerned; competing pressures on scarce resources for military expenditures and economic development; significant developments towards military transparency between States, particularly the development of a common standardized methodology for the measurement of recent defense spending by Argentina and Chile; the need for greater transparency of military expenditures by States in order to assess their economic and budgetary policies; the role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF); and issues of defense conversion and, in this context, an assessment of some case studies of defense industry restructuring. ⁵¹

General Assembly, 2002

57/65 - Relationship between disarmament and development. The draft resolution was introduced by South Africa, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, on 18 October, and was adopted by the First Committee on 28 October (156-1-4) and by the General Assembly on 22 November (160-1-4). For the text of the resolution and the voting pattern, see pages 370.

First Committee. Prior to the vote, France, cited three reasons for its abstention. In its view, the symbiotic relationship between disarmament and development mentioned in the sixth preambular paragraph did not take into account the concept of security without which neither issues could be understood; it questioned the automatic link between commitments to economic and social development and savings from disarmament suggested

⁵¹ The panelists were drawn from the Permanent Mission of Peru to the United Nations, the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the IMF and the Centre for Urban Affairs and Policy Research at Rutgers University.

in operative paragraph 5; and it felt that the mandate for a governmental expert group to reappraise the relationship between development and disarmament, including the future role of the United Nations needed the clarification and evaluation of Member States.

The United States, participating in the vote for the first time, attributed its negative vote to the new language in the draft which called for a reappraisal of the relationship between the two issues. It maintained its well-known position that disarmament and development were distinct issues that could not be linked, and detached itself from commitments to the 1987 Final Document.

The United Kingdom, which abstained in the vote, questioned several new elements in the draft, particularly the reason, outcome and value of the mandate for the expert group.

Two States that supported the draft, Belgium,⁵² speaking on behalf of several countries, and Germany recognized that while considerable benefits might accrue from disarmament, there was no automatic link between those savings and commitments to economic and social development. Furthermore, Germany recommended that the Secretary-General's report to the 59th General Assembly session mandated in operative paragraph 2 should consider the multidimensional nature of the relationship between disarmament and development and also examine the significant problems arising from over-armament in many regions of the developing world and the benefits from regional disarmament agreements that might be negotiated in those regions.

Depleted uranium

Questions related to the use of depleted uranium (DU) weapons continued to be raised by a number of States, international and regional organizations, and NGOs in connection with the 1991 Gulf War and the military intervention by NATO in Yugoslavia. As a follow-up to its work in 1999-2001 on the issue,⁵³ the United Nations Environmental Programme's (UNEP) expert teams carried out further investigations in Serbia and Montenegro⁵⁴ and in

⁵² Belgium spoke on behalf of Luxembourg and the Netherlands as well as Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Sweden.

⁵³ See Depleted Uranium in Kosovo, Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment, UNEP, 2001. The assessment was carried out in November 2000 and published in 2001.

⁵⁴ See UNEP Press Advisory: March 2002 and website: http://postconflict.unep.ch. Also, UNEP Progress Report: Clean-up of Environmental Hotspots - Implementation Phase, will be issued in March 2003.

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH).⁵⁵ The new studies had confirmed the presence of widespread, but low-level, DU contamination in both countries. Although the experts did not find that the levels of radioactivity could pose a direct threat to the environment or human health, they strongly recommended taking precautionary decontamination measures of the targeted buildings. They also recommended a public education campaign on the issue of DU ammunition in the environment. The most serious concern expressed in the UNEP studies was the potential for future groundwater contamination by corroding penetrators (ammunion tips made out of DU), therefore, they recommended that the water quality be monitored at DU sites annually.

General Assembly, 2002

During the consideration of the agenda item "General and complete disarmament", the First Committee had before it a draft resolution introduced by Iraq on 18 October, entitled "Effects of the use of depleted uranium in armaments". While introducing the draft in the First Committee on 18 October, and after referring to reports by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Health Organization (WHO) on the effects of DU weapons on humans and the environment, Iraq called on the international community to adopt a clear position on this matter. It expressed hope that the draft would have the support of Member States, on the basis of which the General Assembly would seek the views of States and relevant organizations on all aspects of the effects of the use of DU in armaments. However, because of differences among Member States on the question of DU, the First Committee failed to adopt the draft resolution (59-35-56, and 41 members not voting).

First Committee. Before the vote, the United States and Denmark⁵⁶, speaking on behalf of the European Union and other countries aligned with its statement, explained their negative votes. Their decisions were based on the grounds that comprehensive studies on the effects of the use of DU in armaments and its effects on health and the environment had already been

⁵⁵ See UNEP Press release issued in Nairobi and Sarajevo/Banja Luka on 11 November 2002. The final study entitled Depleted Uranium in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Post Conflict Environmental Assessment, will be published in March2003.

⁵⁶ Denmark, spoke on behalf of the European Union countries, the Central and Eastern Europe countries associated with the European Union – Bulbaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia – and the associated countries of Cyprus, Malta and Turkey, as well as the European Free Trade Association countries members of the European Economic Area - Iceland and Norway.

conducted by WHO and UNEP. Moreover, they could not subscribe to the implication (in preambular paragraphs two and three) that DU was a new type of WMD. Pakistan abstained on the vote because it believed that DU munitions were conventional weapons and the draft resolution's suggestion that they were WMDs was not borne by any objective evidence.

Multilateralism and disarmament

In order to better tackle the challenges in the fields of disarmament and non-proliferation, including the prevention of the acquisition and use of WMD by terrorists, many Member States underlined, in various disarmament fora, the urgency and importance of reaffirming and strengthening multilateral cooperation in those fields at the 56th session of the General Assembly. A resolution on the subject introduced by the Chairman of the First Committee was adopted by consensus at that session. In resolution 56/24 T, the Assembly reaffirmed that multilateralism was a core principle in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation and that it should be strengthened in order to help maintain international peace and security and contribute to global efforts against terrorism. The Assembly called upon all Member States to renew and fulfil their individual and collective commitments to multilateral cooperation as an important means of pursuing and achieving their common objective in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation.

At the 57th session, two draft resolutions on the subject were initiated in the First Committee: one by Member States of the United Nations that are members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and the other by the Chairman of the First Committee.

The draft resolution of the NAM countries was adopted by the First Committee and the General Assembly. In it, the Assembly reaffirmed that multilateralism was the core principle in negotiations in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation; requested the States Parties to the relevant instruments on WMD to consult and cooperate among themselves in resolving their concerns with regard to cases of non-compliance as well as on implementation; and to refrain from resorting or threatening to resort to unilateral action. The Assembly also requested the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States on the issue of the promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation and to submit a report to its fifty-eighth session.

On 10 October, the Chairman of the First Committee submitted a draft resolution [A/C.1/57/L.26] entitled "Multilateral cooperation in disarmament and non-proliferation", which was subsequently revised several times. At the 23rd meeting, on 29 October, Cuba and the Islamic Republic of Iran submitted amendments to draft resolution L. 26/Rev. 3 (A/C.1/57/L.60),

suggesting the addition of a new text "reaffirming further multilateralism as the core principle in resolving disarmament and non-proliferation concerns". At the same meeting, the Chairman decided to withdraw his draft resolution as contained in document L.26/Rev.3, citing the difficulty of reaching consensus on the draft.

General Assembly, 2002

57/63 - Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation. The draft resolution was introduced by South Africa, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries on 18 October, and was adopted by the First Committee on 25 October (100-11-44) and by the General Assembly on 22 November (105-12-44). For the text of the resolution and the voting pattern, see pages 367.

First Committee. Before voting, three States explained their positions. While affirming its strong commitment to multilateral approaches to disarmament and non-proliferation, the United States stated that it would vote against the draft resolution because its language was unbalanced and its general tenor was more apt to create divisions rather than garner support for the principle of multilateralism. Denmark, 57 speaking on behalf of the European Union and several other countries aligned with the statement, and New Zealand both abstained on the vote. They not only shared the US' commitment and view, but they also felt that the text was unconstructive and confrontational because it did not acknowledge the effective and complementary role of unilateral, bilateral and plurilateral approaches to disarmament and non-proliferation.

Cuba, which spoke prior to the voting, said that it would vote for the draft because it believed the text supported the United Nations in its capacity as the appropriate multilateral framework to deal with current threats to international peace and security. Mindful that a growing trend in unilateralism was evolving in international relations, Cuba noted that reaffirming the validity of multilateralism in disarmament as reflected in the draft was timely.

⁵⁷ Speaking on behalf of the European Union, the Central and Eastern European countries associated with the European Union – Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia – and the associated countries of Cyprus, Malta and Turkey, as well as the European Free Trade Association countries members of the European Economic Area – Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway.

After the vote, Canada, Australia and Switzerland explained their abstentions. Overall, they stressed that multilateralism, while a core principle in their work, was not the sole approach to the global security system. Regrettably, the draft failed to recognize that bilateral, plurilateral, regional and national efforts and arrangements also complement multilateral measures. Canada expressed its difficulties with the draft's rigid tone and along with Switzerland could not embrace the confrontational language in operative paragraph 6 regarding unilateral actions and unverified noncompliance accusations. Australia, disagreed with concerns in the draft about the continuous erosion of multilateralism in the field of arms regulation, nonproliferation and disarmament. Instead, it cited the 2000 NPT Review Conference and the Chemical Weapons Convention their accomplishments in this field.

Mexico, said that it voted affirmatively because it supported the draft's objective of promoting multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation. Uruguay also voted for the draft despite some imperfections, particularly the request in operative paragraph 6 for States parties to refrain from unilateral actions to resolve conflicts, which it deemed unnatural and excessive.

Arms limitation and disarmament agreements

By resolution 56/24F of 29 November, entitled "Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control", the General Assembly had invited Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General information on the measures that they had adopted to promote the objectives envisaged in the resolution, and had requested him to submit a report on this information at its fifty-seventh session. The Secretary-General's report⁵⁸ contained replies received from seven Member States on the practical measures that they had undertaken.

General Assembly, 2002

57/64 - Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation agreements on disarmament and arms control. The draft resolution was introduced by South Africa, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, on 18 October, adopted by the First Committee on 23

⁵⁸ A/57/121 and Add.1 and 2. Replies were received from Bulgaria, Cuba, Iraq, Jordan, Panama, Poland and Qatar.

October (153-0-4) and by the General Assembly on 22 November (163-0-5). For the text of the resolution and the voting pattern, see pages 369 and 457.

57/86 - Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements. The draft resolution was introduced by the United States, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 444 for the sponsors), on 18 October, adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 23 October and by the General Assembly on 22 November.

First Committee. Cuba, Sierra Leone, and Mexico, speaking on behalf of itself and South Africa, explained their positions prior to voting. Mexico and South Africa held that strengthening the international architecture in the field of arms limitation, disarmament and non-proliferation was essential to promoting international peace and security. In that respect, the draft resolution confirmed their conviction that intensified efforts were needed to multilaterally strengthen the international framework in that area, and that a commitment should be made to ensure negotiation, conclusion and compliance, with regard to additional agreements in those fields. Sierra Leone emphasized that the principles of universality, multilateralism in disarmament and non-proliferation, and compliance were inextricably linked, and felt that its position was clearly reflected in operative paragraph 4 of the draft that welcomed the continuing UN role in restoring the integrity of, and fostering negotiations on, certain disarmament agreements in the removal of threats to peace.

Cuba regretted that the current draft text regressed from 1997 resolution 52/30 on the same subject since many substantive elements had been omitted. Absence of references to existing arms limitation and disarmament and non-proliferation agreements in operative paragraph 6; the conclusion of additional disarmament agreements in preambular paragraph 7; and requests for the Secretary-General to provide continued assistance to restore and protect the integrity of disarmament agreements were among the missing elements.

New Zealand, Brazil, and Egypt shared Cuba's concerns. The three States emphasized that verification remained a vital and indispensable tool, however, the new language in operative paragraph 6 failed to reflect its role as a tool for enhancing confidence and assessing compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements. New Zealand also noted that the language "treaties to which they are parties" in the 2nd and 3rd preambular paragraphs implied a weakening of customary international law and the rule of law in general. In particular, wording which would have acknowledged future work and the conclusion of additional disarmament agreements raised concerns for New Zealand about: insignificant progress in implementing the

13 steps in the 2000 NPT Final Document; jeopardizing a mechanism for verification and compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention; little effort to address dangers posed by WMD; and no request for action by the Secretary-General to assist States having difficulties with compliance. It made a point that in light of circumstances such as Iraq's non-compliance with Security Council resolutions, North Korea's possible non-compliance with the NPT and its own firm commitment to compliance with international treaties, it would have joined the sponsorship had the draft strongly urged countries to meet their treaty obligations. Egypt, citing certain articles from the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, stressed that any draft resolution adopted by the First Committee could never supersede the commitments of Member States that were full parties to international agreements.

Conclusion

The United Nations and other international and regional organizations continued to deal with all aspects of terrorism. The danger of acquisition and use of WMD by terrorist groups was underlined and a number of measures were formulated to prevent nuclear, biological and chemical materials or technology which could be used for weapons purposes from falling into the wrong hands. These concerns underscored the urgent need to strengthen the multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation regimes so as to contribute to the global efforts against terrorism and to prevent terrorists from acquiring WMD.

The General Assembly reaffirmed that multilateralism was the core principle of disarmament and non-proliferation. A possible arms race in outer space remained a major concern of the vast majority in the international community. However, the differences of opinion among Member States again prevented the Conference on Disarmament from establishing an ad hoc committee on this item.

More efforts were made by States and the United Nations to underline the inherent link between disarmament, human security and the protection of human rights. The Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, for the second year, discussed issues related to the threat to fundamental human rights posed by WMD and other types of weapons with indiscriminate effect or causing superfluous injury, as well as small arms and light weapons. The General Assembly again called upon Member States to strengthen their cooperation in addressing any potential negative impact on international security that the rapid development in the field of information and telecommunication may have had. Divergent views among Member States on the question of the relationship between disarmament and

development prevented progress on this important issue. A group of governmental experts to be created by the Secretary-General in 2003 will reappraise the relationship between disarmament and development in the current international context, as well as the future role of the Organization in this connection.

ANNEX I

Resolution 2002/25

The prevention of human rights violations caused by the availability and misuse of small arms and light weapons

The Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Guided by the principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants on Human Rights, the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 on the protection of war victims and the Additional Protocols thereto, and other relevant international instruments on human rights and humanitarian law,

Reaffirming the importance of the right to life as a fundamental principle of international human rights law, as established in article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 5 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

Deeply concerned that hundreds of thousands of persons are killed or injured each year by small arms and light weapons and that such arms are also used to facilitate other grave human rights abuses, including rape, enforced disappearance and torture,

Taking account of standards and principles adopted by international bodies, including the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by the General Assembly on 31 May 2001, and the Programme of Action adopted by the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects in July 2001,

Convinced that the protection of human rights must be central to the development of further principles and norms regarding the transfer and misuse of small arms and light weapons and that human rights are not being given adequate consideration in other contexts,

Recalling its decision 2001/120 of 16 August 2001, in which it decided to entrust to Barbara Frey the task of drafting, without financial implications, a working paper on the questions of (a) the trade and carrying of small arms

and light weapons; and (b) the use of such weapons in the context of human rights and humanitarian norms,

Taking into account the working paper submitted by Ms. Barbara Frey at its fifty-fourth session (E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/39),

- 1. Encourages States to adopt laws and policies regarding the manufacture, transfer and use of small arms that comply with principles of international human rights and international humanitarian law;
- 2. Also encourages States to provide training to armed forces and law enforcement personnel on basic principles of international human rights and humanitarian law, especially with regard to use of weapons, including the United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials;
- 3. Requests that those who document human rights practices, including United Nations special rapporteurs, United Nations human rights monitors in field operations and non-governmental organizations, seek out information and report specifically on human rights abuses committed with small arms and light weapons;
- 4. Endorses the conclusions and recommendations of the working paper on small arms and light weapons submitted by Ms. Frey (E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/39);
- 5. Decides to appoint Ms. Frey as Special Rapporteur with the task of preparing a comprehensive study on the prevention of human rights violations committed with small arms and light weapons based on her working paper as well as the comments received and the discussion that took place at the fifty-fourth session of the Sub-Commission and the Fifty-eighth session of the Commission, and requests the Special Rapporteur to submit a preliminary report to the Sub-Commission at its fifty-fifth session, a progress report at its fifty-sixth session and a final report at its fifty-seventh session;
- 6. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the Special Rapporteur with all the assistance necessary to enable her to accomplish her task;
- 7. Recommends the following draft decision to the Commission on Human Rights for adoption:

The prevention of human rights violations caused by the availability and misuse of small arms and light weapons

The Commission on Human Rights, taking note of Sub-Commission on Promotion and Protection of Human Rights resolution 2002/25 of 14August2002, decides to endorse the decision of the Sub-Commission to appoint Barbara Frey as Special Rapporteur with the task of preparing a comprehensive study on the prevention of human rights violations committed with small arms and light weapons based on her working paper

(E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/39) as well as the comments received and the discussion that took place at the fifty-fourth session of the Sub-Commission and the fifty-eighth session of the Commission, and its request to the Special Rapporteur to submit a preliminary report to the Sub-Commission at its fifty-fifth session, a progress report at its fifty-sixth session and a final report at its fifty-seventh session. The Commission also decides to endorse the request to the Secretary-General to provide the Special Rapporteur with all the assistance necessary to enable her to accomplish her task.

Decision 2002/113

Human rights and weapons of mass destruction, or with indiscriminate effect, or of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering

At its 22nd meeting, on 14 August 2002, the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, recalling its resolutions 1997/36 and 1997/37 of 28 August 1997 and its decision 2001/119 of 16 August 2001. in which it authorized Mr. Y.K.J. Yeung Sik Yuen to prepare, without financial implications, in the context of human rights and humanitarian norms, a working paper assessing the utility, scope and structure of a study on the real and potential dangers to the effective enjoyment of human rights posed by the testing, production, storage, transfer, trafficking or use of WMD or with indiscriminate effect, or of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, including the use of weaponry containing depleted uranium, and taking note of the working paper submitted to its present session by Mr. Sik Yuen (E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/38), decided, by 17 votes to 3. with 2 abstentions, to request Mr. Sik Yuen to submit, without financial implications, an expanded and updated working paper on this topic to be considered at its fifty-fifth session, in which due attention should be paid to the comments and proposals advanced during the debate at the fifty-fourth session on the working paper.

ANNEX II

Human rights and weapons of mass destruction, or with indiscriminate effect, or of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering

Executive Summary

Working paper submitted by Y.K.J.YeungSikYuen in accordance with Sub-Commission resolution 2001/36

The present working paper is submitted pursuant to Sub-Commission decision 2001/36 in conjunction with Sub-Commission resolutions 1997/36

and 1997/37. In resolution1997/36 the Sub-Commission expressed concern over the use of particular WMD or with indiscriminate effect, or of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, naming specifically nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, fuel-air bombs, cluster bombs, biological weaponry and weaponry containing depleted uranium. In that resolution the Sub-Commission also expressed its conviction that the use or threat of use of those weapons was "incompatible with international human rights and/or humanitarian law" and requested Sub-Commission member Clemencia Forero Ucros to prepare a working paper on that topic. Resolution1997/37 added the issue of illicit transfer of these weapons to the mandate. Decision2001/36 authorized Y.K.J. Sik Yuen to prepare the present working paper.

Part I of the working paper addresses the human rights and humanitarian law at issue, whilst Part II addresses the weapons themselves.

In analyzing the human rights likely to be infringed by the use of the listed weapons and categories of weapons, emphasis is placed on the right to life, the right to freedom from torture, the right to health and well-being, the prohibition of genocide and related rights contained in the primary human rights instruments. Emphasis is also placed on article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations owing to the obvious "threat power" of States in possession of these weapons.

Analyzing humanitarian law, the author first explains the importance of both treaties and customary humanitarian law as sources of law relating to weapons. The major provisions of the Hague Convention No.IV of 1907 and its annexed Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, beginning with the Martens Clause, article 22 on proportionality, and article 23 prohibiting poisonous weapons and weapons causing unnecessary suffering are presented. The Charter and the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) are cited as supportive of the strong role of customary humanitarian law. The major provisions relating to weapons that are contained in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the two Additional Protocols are considered. Special attention is drawn to common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions in the light of the indication of the ICJ that this provision is a "common yardstick" in any armed conflict, whether or not a particular State is a party to an armed conflict. Reference is made to the numerous provisions of Additional Protocol I that limit the types and uses of weapons. Stress is placed on the provision mandating States to determine prior to development and use of weapons whether a proposed weapon would violate any existing humanitarian law. This rule is considered by the ICJ as a rule of customary humanitarian law. The articles relating to the protection of the environment are also considered. Discussion of relevant provisions of the

Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, its Protocol and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and Their Destruction concludes the review of the instruments.

In the light of humanitarian law from all sources, the author concludes that weapons are to be considered banned if their use:

- (a) has indiscriminate effects (no distinction between civilians and belligerents);
 - (b) is out of proportion with the pursuit of legitimate military objectives;
- (c) adversely affects the environment in a widespread, long-term and severe manner;
 - (d) causes superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering.

Part II deals with the evaluation of the weapons themselves, beginning with nuclear weapons. Action at the General Assembly, the 1996 Advisory Opinion of the ICJ on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, numerous international treaties and scientific studies are reviewed. Regarding the use, transfer and stockpiling of nuclear weapons, the author finds serious double standards, lacunae and other flaws, inexplicable except for political reasons, given that nuclear weapons could not be used in any way that is compatible with the four-part test set out in Part I.

"Mini-nukes" and "bunker busters" are next presented, especially the B61-11. Alarm is expressed at the instruction of the Nuclear Posture Review of the United States that includes plans for "first use" against seven States, five of which are not States having nuclear weapons. The author finds the instruction contrary to human rights and humanitarian law, even relating to "mini-nukes" or the depleted uranium-fortified "bunker busters".

In the review of biological and chemical weapons, the major biological and chemical compounds are identified and the two major treaties banning the production, storage and use of these weapons are evaluated. The author draws attention to some of the weaknesses of the treaties, but then invites comparison with the absence of a similar "banning" treaty in regard to nuclear weapons, pointing out that chemical and biological weapons are the "poor man's nuclear weapons" and that the nuclear weapons States are few.

The author evaluates anti-personnel mines, cluster bombs and fuel-air explosives under the section "Weapons of indiscriminate effect", beginning with further provisions from Additional Protocoll relevant to such weapons. Regarding anti-personnel mines, the author focuses on those that are not manually detonated. Following a brief description of some provisions of the

Anti-Personnel Mines Convention, he notes major Powers that have not ratified it.

Turning to cluster bombs, the author indicates that the bombs' "submunitions" can saturate an area as large as several football fields. He stresses both the impossibility of containing them and the fact that if undetonated at delivery (cluster bombs have a high failure rate of between 5 and 30 percent), they may detonate long after the armed conflict is over. The undetonated-at-delivery cluster bombs become, essentially, land mines. Places where cluster bombs have been used in combat are identified. Some of the latest cluster bombs, which include "combined effects munitions" having light armour, anti-personnel and incendiary effects, are described. The author points out that the International Committee of the Red Cross has called for a moratorium on cluster bombs.


Regarding fuel-air explosives (also known as "hypo-barometric" because they are activated by air pressure and "daisy cutters" from the shape of the crater they leave), the author focuses on the BLU-82 (nicknamed "Big Blue"). The third generation fuel-air explosives use uranium powder. Owing to the sheer scale of the explosions from fuel-air explosives currently in use, the author concludes that they could not be used without indiscriminate effects. Further, he has found that scientists are expressing concern that use of fuel-air explosives in the Balkans and Afghanistan might have triggered earthquakes in those regions.

The author finds that he cannot list all possible weapons that could be viewed as weapons causing superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, but points out that all the weapons under consideration in the paper would fall equally under both categories.

An extensive evaluation of weaponry containing depleted uranium is then presented. Depleted uranium is defined and places where it has been used in combat are indicated: the Gulf region, the Balkans, possibly in Afghanistan and allegedly in the Middle East. The author points out that depleted uranium is included as class 2 material in the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, but as there is no specific treaty banning depleted uranium, its legality must be determined in terms of the rules set out in the paper, including evaluation prior to use. The author then sets out basic properties of depleted uranium with attention to the fact that it is pyrophoric (highly flammable) and when it burns it has an "aerosol" effect: the main reason that depleted uranium weapons are so deadly and indiscriminate. Depleted uranium particles in aerosol form when inhaled into the lungs will stay for many years, emitting radiation. Winds can cause depleted uranium that has settled to re-enter the air many years later.

The paper catalogues a number of incidents and studies showing the deaths and serious illnesses related to inhalation of depleted uranium - the key medical effects being cancers of those exposed and birth defects of children born of those who have inhaled depleted uranium. Illnesses reported by Gulf war veterans in the United States, United Kingdom and Iraq, and Iraqi civilians mirror the known medical effects of low-grade radiation poisoning. The author also shows that the users of depleted uranium have tried to keep the effects of depleted uranium secret and identifies a number of flawed studies (one by a military contractor) and misdeeds. He also points out that owing to pressure from Gulf war veterans and others, there are several important initiatives under way, including action by the World Health Organization, the UnitedNations Environment Programme and the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence. This section ends with a list of some of the many calls for a moratorium on the use of depleted uranium munitions.

The author concludes with the plea that peace and security cannot be achieved by the use of these horrific weapons, but rather only by adhering to humanitarian law and human rights. He also expresses concern about "space" weaponry, which he was unable to include in this paper.



Institutional aspects

Introduction

UN ACTIVITIES IN THE FIELD OF DISARMAMENT AND THE REGULATION OF ARMAMENTS continued to be carried out through the Organization's main organs: the General Assembly and the Security Council. The existing disarmament machinery 1 consists of the General Assembly, its two subsidiary bodies, namely, the First Committee and the Disarmament Commission (UNDC), and the Conference on Disarmament (CD) — the "single multilateral negotiating forum" on disarmament of the international community. In addition, questions of disarmament are dealt with in other international frameworks established on the basis of multilateral, regional and bilateral agreements.

Since its re-establishment in 1998,² the Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA) has been conducting its activities through five branches and three regional centers: Conference on Disarmament Secretariat and Conference Support Branch (Geneva); Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch; Conventional Arms (including Practical Disarmament Measures) Branch; Monitoring, Database and Information Branch; Regional Disarmament Branch; Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa; Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific; and Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Developments and trends, 2002

By its resolutions 55/162 of 14 December 2000 and 56/95 of 14 December 2001, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to prepare an annual report on progress achieved by the United Nations system and

¹ See part IV of the Final Document adopted by the General Assembly at its first special session devoted to disarmament, in 1978, resolution S-10/2. The General Assembly has held three sessions devoted to disarmament: the first special session on disarmament (SSOD I) was the tenth special session of the General Assembly (1978), SSOD II was its twelfth special session (1982) and SSOD III was its fifteenth special session (1988).

² See Secretary-General's Bulletin (ST/SGB/1998/10).

Member States towards implementing the Millennium Declaration.³ Pursuant to those resolutions, the Secretary-General submitted his first annual report, entitled "Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration" on 31 July 2002. The report focused on commitments made in all chapters of the Millennium Declaration and on issues that were particularly salient over the past year, and paid particular attention to cross-cutting relationships among them. The report also highlighted the two themes designated for the year 2001: preventing armed conflict, and the treatment and prevention of major diseases, including HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis. In his report, the Secretary-General noted that despite some signs of progress, the world community had a long way to go towards fulfilling the Declaration's goals.

With regard to disarmament, the report called on Member States to redouble their efforts to pursue disarmament and arms control objectives which was indispensable to achieving world peace and security.

The report noted that in May and June, the world held its breath as tensions rose between India and Pakistan. The crises, combined with compelling evidence of the possibility of nuclear, chemical and biological terrorism in the wake of the 11 September terrorist attacks, had made the importance of eliminating weapons of mass destruction clearer than ever. Global military spending exceeded US \$800 billion a year. The pace towards the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons, remained slow, leaving more than 30,000 such weapons in existence.

The report noted the completion of the reduction by the United States and Russian Federation of their nuclear arsenals to the level of 6,000 strategic warheads each under START I. The two countries also signed the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions on 24 May 2002, which committed them to reduce their strategic nuclear warheads to levels of between 1,700 and 2,200 over a period of 10 years, as an important step towards the fulfillment of their obligations under the Non Proliferation Treaty. Yet they and other States parties to the NPT needed to do more to translate the results achieved at the 2000 Review Conference on the treaty into specific actions. Strong support for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was reaffirmed at the Conference on Facilitating Entry into Force of the CTBT held in November 2001, and pending the entry into force of the CTBT, a moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions should be maintained. The report noted that efforts continued to implement the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and all 8.6 million chemical weapons declared by the United States, the

³ A/RES/52/2 on the United Nations Millennium Declaration.

^{4 -} A/57/270 and Corr.1, part II, paras. 20 - 25.

Russian Federation, India and the Republic of Korea (declared possessor States parties) have been inventoried and are re-inspected on a regular basis. Although no consensus was reached on a biological weapons verification protocol in November 2002, the States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) would continue their efforts to reach an agreement on a multilateral approach to reinforce the ban on biological weapons. The report further underlined a vital area for action was the control and disposal of surplus and illicit SALW. At the 2001 United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects held in July 2001, Member States agreed to develop laws, regulations and administrative procedures to control the production, export, import, transit or retransfer of SALW. Essentially, States needed laws and institutions to prevent the illicit flows of arms and the legal might and political will to hold offenders accountable. In the meantime, the United Nations continued to support national programmes of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and will work to circulate data on the import and export of these weapons.

After considering the Secretary-General's report on the "implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration, the General Assembly adopted resolution 57/144 entitled "Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit". The resolution, taking note with appreciation of the Secretary-General's report, recognized that uneven progress was made so far in achieving the objectives agreed upon in the Millennium Declaration. It invited the organizations and agencies of the United Nations system, the Bretton Woods institutions and the World Trade Organization (WTO), and civil society to continue to vigorously pursue the achievement of the Declaration's objectives. It called upon Member States to support, as appropriate, the measures set forth in the thematic sections of the report on preventing armed conflict, and decided to consider, at its 58th session, the convening of a high-level plenary meeting during the sixtieth session of the General Assembly to review the implementation of the Millennium Declaration and to consider the quinquennial comprehensive report of the Secretary-General on the progress achieved towards implementing the Millennium Declaration.

Conference on Disarmament, 2002

The CD was in session from 21 January to 29 March, 13 May to 28 June and 29 July to 13 September, and concluded by adopting its report 5 to the General Assembly. The presidency of the Conference was successively assumed by:

⁵ Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/57/27).

Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany and Hungary⁶. Sixty-five members⁷ participated in the session. In addition, 37 other States,⁸ at their request, were invited to take part. The Conference adopted the same agenda as at its 2001 session.⁹ Pakistan advocated the inclusion of two additional items on missiles in all its aspects and on conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels, however, consensus was not reached on the proposal.

Throughout the annual session, successive presidents conducted intensive consultations among members with a view to reaching agreement on the programme of work. These consultations took as a starting point the proposal contained in document CD/1624 (also referred to as the "Amorim proposal" presented in 2000). Moreover, some new ideas were also presented aimed at overcoming the existing impasse and disconnecting the issues, which for several years had prevented agreement on the programme of work of the Conference and consequently its substantive work.

In particular, Markku Reimaa of Finland, during his presidency, came forward with a few versions of a draft decision on the establishment of four subsidiary bodies (on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for weapons purposes; on negative security assurances; on nuclear disarmament; and on prevention of an arms race in outer space) outside the framework of the existing proposals on the programme of work. Following a number of consultations, he introduced a revised draft decision which called for the establishment of an ad hoc committee on the prohibition of the production of

⁶ According to the Conference's rules of procedure, the Presidency rotates among its members on a monthly basis.

Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe.

⁸ Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Gabon, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Holy See, Jordan, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malta, Monaco, Oman, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovenia, Sudan, Thailand, and Yemen.

fissile material, a working group on negative security assurances (with the references to their previously agreed mandates), and working groups on nuclear disarmament and on PAROS (without specifying their mandates). The decision was supplemented by a schedule of activities of subsidiary bodies as well as by a distribution of their respective chairmanships among the groups of States. ¹¹ The proposal, however, did not command consensus.

Under the presidency of Hubert de La Fortelle of France, the conference continued consultations in two directions. First, he attempted to establish whether and how the Conference could begin a dialogue on its agenda issues; secondly, he sought ways of overcoming the existing impasse in the Conference's programme of work. His consultations also fell short of reaching consensus on the CD's programme of work.

In addition to continuing efforts to adopt a programme of work, Volker Heinsberg of Germany, after assuming the presidency, initiated discussion on the agenda item entitled "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons", taking into account new threats stemming from the possibility of building and using "dirty bombs" by terrorists. Following consideration of the item at an informal meeting, the President proposed the appointment, in 2003, of a special coordinator to seek the views of the Members of the Conference on radiological weapons. However, the proposal did not come to fruition due to the deadlock over an overall programme of work in the CD.

Statements made by delegations or groups of delegations during plenary meetings and informal consultations generally reiterated their priorities with regard to the Conference's programme of work. Although a number of delegations continued to consider the "Amorim Proposal" (CD/1624) as a good basis for further consultations on the programme of work, it was not possible to find an agreement on a mandate for a subsidiary body on a PAROS and, consequently, to start the substantive work of the Conference.

China continued to express the view that the issues of PAROS, a fissile material cut-off treaty, nuclear disarmament and negative security assurances

The 2002 substantive agenda items were: (a) cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; (b) prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters; (c) prevention of an arms race in outer space; (d) effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (e) new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons; (f) comprehensive programme of disarmament; and (g) transparency in armaments.

¹⁰ See *The Yearbook* vol. 25: 2000, p. 182.

¹¹ CD/1670.

should be accorded equal importance and be dealt with in a balanced way. It maintained therefore that the proposed mandate for an ad hoc committee on outer space contained in CD/1624 should be strengthened and expressed its support for a negotiating mandate as proposed by the Russian Federation during the 2000 session of the Conference. ¹² Subsequently, China submitted a draft decision on the establishment of an ad hoc committee, which contained the language in CD/1624, but amended, so as to ensure that the work of the Committee be conducted "with a view to negotiating a relevant international legal instrument." China expressed its readiness to accept the whole programme of work contained in CD/1624, provided that the Conference accepted its amended language on the issue of outer space.

The United States believed that the existing outer space regime was sufficient and saw no need for new outer space arms control agreements. It could not accept the Chinese draft decision since, in its view, the mandate contained therein prejudged the outcome of an in-depth discussion on outer space. Further, the United States reiterated that its priority goal was negotiations to conclude a fissile material cut-off treaty. In that context, it was also prepared to participate in good faith in the work of ad hoc committees that would foster serious discussion of topics related to nuclear disarmament and outer space.

The Russian Federation reiterated its package proposal on the establishment of an ad hoc committee on PAROS with a negotiating mandate. ¹⁴ At the same time, the Russian Federation was in favour of commencing negotiations on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for weapons purposes without linking it to the launching of any other negotiations.

Colombia, on behalf of the Group of 21, stressed that the programme of work of the Conference should be responsive to new challenges and to the interests and priorities of all its members in the field of disarmament, non-proliferation in all its aspects, and international peace and security. The Group of 21 was ready to join efforts aimed at reaching agreement on a comprehensive programme of work, provided that it reflected priorities of all members of the Conference. Recalling its previous proposals on the programme of work, the Group of 21 reaffirmed that nuclear disarmament remained its highest priority and emphasized the need to commence negotiations on the total elimination of nuclear weapons without delay. It also reiterated the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work on

¹² CD/1644.

¹³ CD/1682.

¹⁴ CD/1644.

PAROS. The Group of 21 expressed its deep concern about the erosion of multilateralism and emphasized the importance of collective international efforts to enhance and maintain international peace and security, which could be best addressed through multilaterally negotiated non-discriminatory disarmament and non-proliferation treaties. 15

India, while supporting the position of the Group of 21, reiterated its readiness to accept CD/1624, if it could enable the Conference to adopt the programme of work.

Spain, speaking on behalf of the European Union and associated States, stressed that any agreement on the commencement of the work of the Conference had to be based on three interconnected elements: the immediate launch of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, as well as efforts to address both nuclear disarmament and the PAROS in subsidiary bodies whose mandates should be both pragmatic and substantive in order to be universally acceptable. The European Union was of the view that the proposal for the programme of work contained in CD/1624 contained elements for a rapid agreement, provided that all members of the Conference displayed a spirit of openness and pragmatism.

Towards the end of the session, five former presidents of the Conference (Algeria, Belgium, Chile, Colombia and Sweden), concerned over the continuing impasse in the Conference, introduced a joint proposal, ¹⁶ expressing the hope that it would facilitate consensus on the programme of work during the next session of the Conference in 2003. The proposal envisaged the establishment of four ad hoc committees (on negative security assurances, nuclear disarmament, a fissile material cut-off treaty and outer space). It also envisaged the appointment of three special coordinators entrusted with consultations on new types of WMD and new systems of such weapons, on a comprehensive programme of disarmament, and on transparency in armaments. ¹⁷ The initiative was based on various proposals presented to the Conference over the last few years and was the first joint effort of its kind in its history. The proposal was generally welcomed by many delegations.

Despite these efforts, the Conference did not agree on the programme of work, nor did it establish any mechanism to deal with specific agenda items during the session. At the beginning of its 2002 session, however, it appointed three Special Coordinators: ¹⁸ on the review of its agenda

¹⁵ CD/PV.891, pp. 9 – 10.

¹⁶ CD/1693.

¹⁷ CD/PV.912, pp. 7 – 9.

¹⁸ Decision CD/1667.

(Republic of Korea); on the expansion of its membership (Bulgaria); and on its improved and effective functioning (Sri Lanka), who reported on their consultations at the end of the session. ¹⁹ The Conference took note of these reports, and recommended that special coordinators on relevant procedural issues be appointed, if deemed necessary, during its 2003 session.

In its report to the General Assembly, the Conference emphasized that its 2002 session witnessed frequent debates, active plenary discussions, enhanced cooperation and a number of efforts, including an unprecedented cross-group effort to develop a programme of work. Based on these efforts and with a view to commencing early work on various agenda items during its 2003 session, the Conference requested the current and the incoming presidents to conduct appropriate consultations during the intersessional period and, if possible, make recommendations on the Conference's work in 2003, taking into account all existing proposals and views presented and discussions held at the 2002 session.

Disarmament Commission, 2002

The UNDC held two meetings of its organizational session for 2002, on 2 November 2001 and 10 April 2002 respectively. It considered questions related to the organization of work and substantive matters in accordance with the document "Ways and means to enhance the functioning of the Disarmament Commission"²⁰ and in the light of General Assembly resolution 55/35 C. At its first organizational meeting, the Commission decided to establish a Committee of the Whole and two working groups to deal with the two substantive items on its agenda and adopted the provisional agenda for its 2002 session. At its second organizational meeting (on 10 April, and resumed on 17 April), the Commission, due to extraordinary circumstances (overlapping of meeting schedules), decided to hold its next substantive session in 2003 and to continue consideration of the two agenda items: (a) ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament, and (b) practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms. It was also understood that the postponing of the session did not constitute or create any precedent whatsoever. It also decided to hold its 2003 substantive session between 31 March and 17 April.

The question of a fourth special session on disarmament

A number of States, mostly non-aligned, continued to call for convening a fourth special session on disarmament of the General Assembly (SSOD IV)

¹⁹ CD/PV.911, pp. 19-21; 22-24; and 14-19, respectively.

²⁰ A/CN.10/137.

in various disarmament fora. They reiterated that SSOD IV would offer an opportunity to review, from a perspective more in tune with the current international situation, the most critical aspects of the process of disarmament and to mobilize the international community and public opinion in favour of the elimination of nuclear and other WMD and of the control and reduction of conventional weapons. Therefore, they considered that there was an urgent need to reach a consensus on its objectives and agenda.

During the debate on the subject, the First Committee had before it a report of the Secretary-General²¹ submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 56/24 D requesting him to seek the views of Member States on the objectives, agenda and timing of the special session and to report to the General Assembly at its fifty-seven session. Pursuant to that request, the Secretary-General, on 4 March 2002, addressed a note verbale to Member States inviting them to provide information on the subject. Six Member States replied.²² Although Member States remained divided on the objectives and agenda for SSOD IV, they agreed by resolution 57/61 to establish an open-ended working group, working on the basis of consensus, to consider the objectives and agenda, including the possible establishment of the preparatory committee, for SSOD IV. It further requested the open-ended working group to hold an organizational session in order to set the date for its substantive sessions, and to submit a report on its work, including possible substantive recommendations, before the end of the fifty-seventh session.

In the communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement²³, held in Durban, on 29 April, the participants reiterated once again their support for the convening of SSOD IV to review and assess the implementation of SSOD I, while reaffirming its principles and priorities. The NAM also expressed their deep concern over the lack of consensus in the UNDC on the subject, and called for further steps leading to the convening of such a session.

Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters

The Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters held two sessions in 2002, from 30 January to 1 February in New York and from 17 to 19 July in Geneva, under the chairmanship of Arundahati Ghose of India. (See Annex I for the membership of the Board, page 232). The Secretary-General submitted a report to the General Assembly on the work of the Board in 2002,²⁴ covering both its sessions.

²¹ A/57/120 and Add. 1 and 2.

²² Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Iraq, Panama and Qatar.

²³ CD/1669, para. 85.

During 2002, the Board focused its deliberations on the following issues:

(a) weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, in particular nuclear safety and security, and the preparedness of the public health systems to deal with bioterrorism; (b) biological weapons and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC); (c) implementation of the Programme of Action (PoA) adopted at the 2001 United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects; (d) weaponization of outer space; and (e) disarmament and development.

The Board agreed that, in order to seriously address the threat of terrorism and the danger of the possible acquisition and use of WMD by terrorists, it was imperative to strengthen and further develop a multilateral legal framework for arms control. The Board put forward a number of recommendations on preventing terrorist groups from developing, acquiring or using WMD, including the establishment of a governmental expert group to develop a comprehensive action plan to deal with nuclear terrorism. The Board emphasized the urgent need to strengthen the BWC, particularly in view of the dangers posed by potential bioterrorism.

The Board welcomed the adoption of the PoA at the 2001 United Nations Conference as an important first step taken by the international community to combat and eradicate the illicit trade in SALW and expressed its concern over the lack of norms banning the transfer of those weapons to non-State actors. The Board agreed to review its own accomplishments and to discuss how to improve its functioning in 2003 on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of its establishment.

At both sessions, the Board made, after intensive deliberations, a number of recommendations and proposals. On the issue concerning threats from the possible development, acquisition and use of WMD by terrorists, it recommended that the General Assembly should establish a governmental expert group to develop a comprehensive action plan to deal with nuclear terrorism; periodic consultations among the States parties of multilateral disarmament agreements should be held to review the attempts by non-State groups to develop and acquire WMD; the Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee should coordinate all international efforts to prevent terrorist acquisition or development of WMD.

It also recommended: the DDA should undertake consultations with relevant international and regional organizations and should serve as a focal point in the efforts to deal with terrorist threats linked to WMD; the Secretary-General should be entitled to resort to Article 99 of the Charter in

²⁴ A/57/335.

such cases; the coverage of the existing database of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on illicit trafficking of nuclear material should be made more comprehensive; that given the vulnerability of civilian nuclear establishments to sabotage, quick action should be taken at both the national and international levels to redress the situation; international mechanisms for mutual assistance in case of emergencies due to attack or threat by terrorist should be established or strengthened; the CD should take up the issue of radiological weapons again in the light of the potential threat of terrorist attacks with such weapons; and as tactical nuclear weapons posed serious risks, they merited enhanced safeguards and security.

It proposed to States to penalize, in their national legislation and in international criminal law, the abuse of biotechnology for terrorist purposes, including activities running counter to the provisions of the BWC, and strictly enforcing such laws; developing national capabilities of detection and investigation by strengthening international cooperation between intelligence communities and law enforcement agencies, at the bilateral and the multilateral levels; promoting bilateral and multilateral cooperation and assistance in the field of non-proliferation aimed at reducing the biological weapons threat; and enhancing international cooperation at the multilateral level to prevent illegal trafficking of biological agents and equipment that can be used for terrorist purposes.

The Board recommended a number of measures related to chemical weapons, such as reaffirming the undertaking by the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention to prevent unauthorized access to chemical warfare agents and precursor substances; and providing full physical security to chemical weapons agents in storage prior to their destruction, as well as to the destruction facilities.

On the issue of emergency response to WMD terrorism, the Board deemed the following measures useful: preparation of societies, notably their public health systems, for the early detection of diseases (provision of disease surveillance systems, sufficient diagnostic equipment, education of health workers and doctors) and rapid response to the outbreak of diseases caused by bioterrorist attacks (vaccination, stockpiles of medicine for effective disease treatment); the establishment of an international vaccine bank with the necessary communication, transport and personal infrastructure to make an immediate impact at the point of attack.

On the issue of strengthening the BWC, the Board proposed that (a) the Secretary-General, with the assistance of the Department for Disarmament Affairs, could assist the process by convening consultations among the States parties and undertaking public campaigns. This could include holding seminars and workshops to prepare for the resumed session of the Fifth

Review Conference;²⁵ and (b) the President and the Bureau of the Fifth Review Conference could undertake consultations to monitor the implementation of the outcome of the previous Review Conference.

On issues related to SALW, the Board focused its discussions on several issues, such as the ban on transferring SALW to non-State actors, domestic control of civilian possession of such weapons, strengthening of national export control systems, and promoting a culture of peace. The Board expressed its deep concern over the lack of norms prohibiting the transfer of SALW to non-State actors, especially in Africa. It stressed that the United Nations should play an important role in strengthening the capacity of civil society to combat the illicit trade in SALW. It further agreed that the United Nations could play a crucial role in: (i) mobilizing public opinion; (ii) encouraging and assisting States in drafting legislation; (iii) training; (iv) promoting the exchange of regional and national experiences; (v) collecting, collating and disseminating information related to combating the illicit trade in these weapons, and (vi) forging global norms to apply in local situations.

On the issue of PAROS, the Board regretted the inability of the Conference on Disarmament to start substantive work on the subject. It agreed that there was a need to strengthen coordination and cooperation between the CD and the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in addressing issues related to the subject.

As Board of Trustees for the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), the Board heard the report of the Director of the Institute on its activities during the period August 2001 to July 2002 and the planned activities for 2003. It adopted UNIDIR's 2002 programme budget, and approved the programme of work and budget of the Institute for 2003. (For UNIDIR's activities, see Chapter VII, page 258).

Disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services

The Department for Disarmament Affairs continued to provide training for young diplomats, especially those from developing countries, through the United Nations fellowship, training and advisory services programme that started in 1979 as a follow-up to a decision of the General Assembly taken at its tenth special session in 1978.²⁷

In 2002, fellowships were awarded to young diplomats from 30 Member States (later, one fellow resigned from the participation in the programme). 28 Member States were encouraged to promote gender equality when

²⁵ See Chapter II, Biological and chemical weapons.

²⁶ A/57/302.

²⁷ Resolution S-10/2, para. 108.

nominating candidates to the programme of fellowships on disarmament, resulting in the participation of eight women in the programme. As in previous years, the programme comprised three segments: a study session in Geneva; study visits to intergovernmental organizations working in the field of disarmament and to Member States, at their invitation; and a study session at the United Nations Headquarters in New York.

The programme commenced on 2 September in Geneva and concluded on 6 November in New York. It included lectures by representatives of delegations to the Conference on Disarmament and the First Committee, by United Nations officials, including senior officials from DDA, and by representatives of the Geneva International Peace Research Institute and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces; and attendance at meetings of the CD and the First Committee of the General Assembly. At United Nations Headquarters, the fellows also attended a two-day seminar on non-proliferation and disarmament issues organized by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies, and a number of panel discussions sponsored by the DDA. During the programme, fellows conducted research projects and prepared papers on disarmament-related topics of their own choice.

Study visits were undertaken to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in The Hague, and to the IAEA as well as to the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) in Vienna. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany hosted the fellows in Berlin, where they were briefed by, and held a round-table discussion with senior officials and experts of the Department of Disarmament and Arms Control of the Federal Foreign Office. The fellows also visited the Nammo Buck GmbH conversion plant. At the invitation of the Government of Japan, the fellows visited Tokyo, Nagasaki and Hiroshima. In Tokyo, the fellows met with senior officers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and were introduced to the arms control and disarmament policies of the Government of Japan. In Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the fellows visited memorial museums at the atomic bomb hypocenters, met with survivors and heard lectures on social and medical

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²⁸ Australia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Chile, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Democratic Republic of the Congo (fellow resigned), Ethiopia, Germany, Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malawi, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Myanmar, Palau, Panama, Republic of Korea, Sao Tome and Principe, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Turkey and Ukraine.

legacies of atomic bombing. Furthermore, the fellows took part in a seminar with the researchers of the Hiroshima Peace Institute.

At the conclusion of the Programme, the fellows were awarded certificates at a ceremony held at the UN Headquarters presided over by the Chairman of the First Committee and the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs.

At its 57th session, the General Assembly had before it a report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services.²⁹ In his report, the Secretary-General stated that, since its inception, the programme trained some 600 officials from about 150 Member States, a large number of whom held positions of responsibility in the field of disarmament within their own Governments. The Secretary-General was gratified that the programme continued to contribute to enhancing expertise in disarmament in Member States, particularly in developing countries, and to developing greater awareness of the importance and benefits of disarmament and a better understanding of the concerns of the international community in the field of disarmament and security. The Secretary-General also expressed his appreciation to all Member States and organizations that have consistently supported the programme over the years, thereby contributing to its success, particularly to the Government of Germany for hosting the participants of the programme since 1980 and to the Government of Japan on the occasion of its twentieth annual study visit for the fellows, which included events in Nagasaki and Hiroshima.

Department for Disarmament Affairs

The Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA) continued to advise and assist the Secretary-General in the discharge of his responsibilities under the Charter and mandates given by the General Assembly and Security Council in the sphere of disarmament. Its activities fell within five broad areas.

First, DDA provided technical and substantive assistance to various disarmament bodies: the CD, the UNDC, the First Committee, the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, and the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters. It also served United Nations conferences, meetings of States parties to multilateral conventions, such as the Fifth Review Conference of the States parties to the BWC (resumed session); the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference; the Fourth Annual Conference of the Mine Ban Convention; Fourth Annual Conference of States Parties to the Amended Protocol II to the CCW; and the Meeting of the States Parties to the

²⁹ A/57/168.

CCW. In addition, DDA followed developments with regard to the four existing treaties on nuclear-weapon-free zones and continued to provide substantive assistance in the finalizing of the text of a treaty for a Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone.

Second, DDA provided both substantive and technical service to four groups of governmental experts carrying out studies on: tracing illicit SALW; disarmament and non-proliferation education; the issue of missiles in all its aspects; and the explosive remnants of war and mines other than antipersonnel mines. For details, see Chapters I, III and VII.

Third, on the basis of the General Assembly mandates and decisions of treaty bodies, the Department issued reports containing official information received from governments on arms transfers in seven major categories of conventional arms (Register of Conventional Arms) and arms expenditures (standardized instrument for international reporting of military expenditures). In addition, the Department maintained a database on transparency under the Mine-Ban Convention and a database on signatories, ratification and accession by States to multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements on its website. On the basis of the PoA on SALW, DDA also maintained a database containing national points of contacts and national reports on the implementation of the PoA, as well as on national legislations on SALW, provided by States on a voluntary basis.

The fourth area was related to coordination of, or participation in activities among a number of United Nations (UN) and UN-related bodies. DDA continued to serve as focal point for the Coordinating Action on Small Arms Mechanism (CASA) and for the open-ended Group of Interested States on Practical Disarmament Measures. Within the framework of activity of these two bodies. DDA cooperated closely with other UN Departments. Programmes, Agencies as well as States in efforts to address, in a coordinated and comprehensive manner, the multifaceted challenge posed by the proliferation of SALW and to build sustained peace through deweaponization of societies in post-conflict situations. The Department also chaired the Steering Group on Disarmament and Development. It worked closely with the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMASD) which serves as the focal point for mine action within the United Nations, on landmine-related matters, such as consolidating the existing legal norms, mine clearance and victim assistance. It participated in the Policy Working Group (PWG) on the United Nations and Terrorism mandated to identify the long-term implications and broad policy dimensions of the issue of terrorism for the United Nations and to formulate recommendations on steps the United Nations system might take (for details, see chapter V of this volume). It continued its cooperation with the Office of the Special Adviser on Gender

Issues and the Advancement of Women of the Department for Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) on issues related to gender and disarmament and with United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the Office of Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict on disarmament and children, and their protection in conflict situations.

The fifth area of activities was related to information dissemination, raising public awareness of disarmament and maintaining close liaison with UNIDIR, other research and educational institutions outside the United Nations, and with NGOs. The Department implemented the United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services programmes. It organized symposia, seminars and round-table discussions in New York and in a number of Member States on a wide range of issues in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. To heighten public awareness of disarmament, and as a part of its information activities, DDA disseminated to Member States and the international community objective information on disarmament and security matters through its website, publications and other activities. For further details concerning DDA's Disarmament Information Programme, see Chapter VII.

In addition, in the course of the year, DDA provided training for interns in various aspects of its work, such as following the debate in the General Assembly and the First Committee and reporting thereon, assisting in preparations of other meetings and research tasks, drafting portions of publications and contributing to various databases.

Regional centres

DDA continued to oversee and coordinate the activities of its three regional centres, established by the General Assembly with their respective mandates, and organized, together with them, regional conferences, symposia and round-table discussions on disarmament and security issues. ³⁰ As activities of the centres are funded from voluntary contributions, in each resolution it adopted on the centres, the General Assembly appealed to all States, as well as to international governmental and non-governmental organizations and foundations, to make voluntary contributions in order to strengthen their programmes and activities and to facilitate their implementation. For details on the substantive activities of the three centres, see Chapter IV, and for lists of their publications, see Chapter VII, Annex IV. See Appendix X, p. 477 for

³⁰ See the reports of the Secretary-General on the regional centres: A/57/162 (Africa), A/57/260 (Asia and the Pacific) and A/57/116 (Latin America and the Caribbean).

the list of reports and notes of the Secretary-General that were prepared by DDA and issued throughout the year.

The Regional Centre in Africa, in Lome, continued to experience considerable financial problems preventing it from operating at full scale to implement its work programme. The Director continued to pursue intensive fund-raising activities, undertaking a series of visits and maintaining contacts with a number of Member States, including Belgium, Cameroon, Canada, France, Japan, Nigeria, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. In September, a Finnish Government delegation visited the Centre in connection with that Government's pledged-funding of its projects SATCRA (Small Arms Transparency and Control Regime in Africa).

The Centre's proposal to establish a Group of Friends of the Centre in the framework of the African Union (AU) with the objective of mobilizing resources from African donors in support of the Centre's activities was discussed at the AU Summit of Heads of State and Government (Durban, 3-8 July). It is expected that the African Commission would discuss this matter again at the next Executive Council of the AU in Maputo in July 2003.

The Centre continued to build partnership with other organizations working on similar issues on the continent, including the OAU/African Union, the African Centre for Strategic Studies (USA), the National Democratic Institute (USA), the Institute for Strategic Studies (South Africa) and the African Leadership Forum (Nigeria). It also continued to develop and consolidate collaboration and cooperation on research projects with several institutions, such as Institute Français des Relations Internationales (IFRI) (France), Centre d'etudes d'Afrique noire (CENA) (France), the Group for Security Information Research (Belgium), the Centre for Democratic Empowerment (Liberia), the Campaign for Good Governance (Sierra Leone), International Alert (UK), BASIC (UK), the Bonn International Centre for Convention (BICC) the Centre for Democracy and Development (UK), the Geneva Centre for the Democratization of Armed Forces and the African Strategic and Peace Research Group (Nigeria). The Centre completed the first year of its Fellowship Programme on Peace, Security and Disarmament in Africa and began its second year. The Centre participated in discussions focused on practical modalities for the implementation of a project by itself and the Pretoria-based Institute for Security Studies (ISS) to backstop efforts by the African Union Commission to implement both the Bamako Declaration and the PoA on SALW. It assisted the United Nations country team in organizing the Dag Hammarskjöld Memorial Peace Initiative Training Programme in Zambia (September).

The Centre continued to publish and to distribute its quarterly bilingual newsletter, "African Peace Bulletin", which focuses on relevant

developments in the field of peace, security and disarmament and related issues, mainly on the African continent. It also published a number of occasional papers dealing with specific issues related to the security situation and conflicts in Africa.

For other activities of the Centre and its publications, see Chapter IV and VII, Annex IV on page 265.

The Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific continued to serve as a useful forum for regional and subregional dialogue on specific region-wide security concerns and global and regional disarmament issues. It continued to carry out its activities mainly through: (a) organizing regional meetings on disarmament and security issues; (b) providing assistance to the five Central Asian States in finalizing the text of a treaty on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia; and (c) providing assistance to Mongolia in consolidating its nuclear-weapon-free status. The Centre organized, within the limited financial resources received as voluntary contributions from Member States and other interested organizations, a number of meetings (for details see Chapter IV).

The Centre participated in a subproject in Cambodia of the larger four-country project on peace education carried out by DDA and the Hague Appeal for Peace, a major goal being to sustain weapon collection programmes by transforming societies from a culture of violence into cultures of peace through education. For more information on the project, see Chapter VII.

To increase public awareness of United Nations activities in the field of disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, the Centre developed a website providing information on disarmament and security issues in the region and on the activities of the Center. It also prepared a brochure about the Centre which was widely distributed in the Asia-Pacific region.

Consultations on the relocation of the Regional Centre to Kathmandu continued throughout the year. To enable the Centre to function effectively, the General Assembly, in its resolution 56/25 F of 29 November 2001, urged the Secretary-General to ensure the physical operation of the Regional Centre from Kathmandu within six months of the date of signature of the host agreement. Pursuant to that request, DDA presented to Nepal a draft Host Country Agreement in December 2001 and a draft Memorandum of Understanding regarding the operational costs to be borne by the host country in May 2002. The Department followed up on these two documents with the Nepalese authorities via a letter to them in December 2002. The host country and DDA continued their efforts to finalize the two documents.³¹ The General Assembly, in its resolution 57/92 of 22 November 2002, again urged the Secretary-General to implement its request related to the physical

operation of the Centre from Kathmandu. For other aspects of its activities, see Chapter IV page 158.

The Regional Centre for Latin America and the Caribbean (UN-LiREC), in Lima, continued to carry out activities dealing with both subregional and regional issues, training and dissemination of information, and in particular, activities related to promoting existing firearms — and landmines — related agreements, involving the diplomatic community, members of parliament, law enforcement officers, and non-governmental organizations. Much attention was paid to destruction of firearms, ammunition and landmines, as well as to the training of officers dealing with these issues in the countries of the region.

In August 2002 the Center started a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DD&R) project which would allow it to act as a platform for addressing DD&R issues and facilitating coordination between the various actors involved in these processes through activities, meetings, seminars, capacity-building and educational sessions, specifically focusing on the reintegration phase of the DD&R processes. Efforts have been made by the Centre to seek possible partners, such as international organizations and NGOs, as well as possible donors for the project.

The Centre continued to maintain cooperation and coordination with other United Nations agencies and entities. It provided support to a regional workshop "Transparency in Armaments" (Lima, November), which was hosted by the Government of Peru, and organized by DDA in collaboration with the Governments of Canada, Germany, Japan and the Netherlands. In May, it signed two memoranda of understanding: one with the Swedish Fellowship Reconciliation (SWEFOR) for cooperation on measures to reduce illegal trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, and the other with the UN-affiliated University for Peace in Costa Rica on joint measures to facilitate cooperation and coordination in Latin America and the Caribbean through research and training activities on matters related to peace, disarmament and development.

The Centre's Regional Clearing-House Programme on Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives was reinforced both in human resources and financially. The Director continued to undertake an intensive fund-raising campaign and as a result contributions have increased considerably in comparison with the previous year. In spite of the relative success achieved in fund-raising, the financial situation for core funding of the Centre remained precarious and its functioning was still hampered by the lack of sufficient resources. The Centre continued to publish its two series of

³¹ A/57/342.

publications: (a) "Policy Brief" and (b) "Latin America and Caribbean Regional Perspectives". It has also continued to devote considerable time and effort to develop information packages concerning various weapons destruction and stockpile management, and prepared three folders for: Regional Clearing-House Programme on Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives: Training the Trainers; the Parliamentary Exchange Initiative on Firearms in Latin America and the Caribbean; and Latin American and Caribbean NGOs Capacity-building, Networking and Strengthening of their Advocacy Means. The Centre initiated the planning and production of posters, brochures, CD-ROMs and audio-visual material to publicize the various projects under development. For more details on the activities of the Centre and list of its publications, see Chapters IV and VII, pages 172 and 265.

General Assembly, 2002

The General Assembly held a general debate at its plenary meetings between 12 and 20 September, ³² in the course of which a number of Member States, many represented at the level of Head of State or Government addressed a wide range of disarmament and security questions in the light of the new challenges and threats to international peace and security.

The First Committee, meeting under the chairmanship of Matia Mulamba Semakula Kiwanuka of Uganda, held a general debate on all its agenda items, listed in Annex II to this chapter, between 30 September and 4 October and on 7, 9 and 10 October, and structured discussion (thematic discussion and introduction of draft resolutions) from 14 to 18 October, and took action on draft resolutions from 21 to 23 and on 25, 28 and 29 October.³³

The General Assembly took action on four draft resolutions dealing with the subjects discussed in this chapter.

57/95 - Report of the Disarmament Commission. The draft resolution was introduced by Italy, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 447 for the sponsors), on 15 October, adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 23 October and by the General Assembly on 22 November. For the text of the resolution, see page 417.

57/96 - Report of the Conference on Disarmament. The draft resolution was introduced by Hungary on 14 October, adopted without a vote by the

Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-seventh Session, Plenary meetings, 2nd to 19th meetings.

Ibid., First Committee, 2nd to 23rd meetings.

First Committee on 23 October and by the General Assembly on 22 November. For the text of the resolution, see page 418.

First Committee. The Member States who spoke before or after the vote expressed concern over the deadlock in multilateral disarmament negotiations within the CD. Speaking before the vote, Chile reiterated its support for the new initiative by five former presidents of the CD³⁴ to overcome the five-year impasse in that body.

Although Germany joined the consensus vote, it had serious concerns over the stalemate in that body. It held that given current terrorist threats, there was no reason to hold negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) hostage to negotiations on the weaponization of outer space, and therefore strongly urged the CD to start work on an FMCT. It also recommended that the CD consider reviving discussions on radiological weapons independent of other issues on its agenda and, in that vein, hoped that its paper on that topic³⁵ would contribute to active discussions in the Conference (see Chapter I).

57/61 - Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. On 18 October, South Africa, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries introduced a draft resolution entitled "Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament". On 28 October, the sponsors introduced a revised draft resolution, (see page 430 for the sponsors) in which minor revisions were made to the first three operative paragraphs so that a consensus text would be achieved. The revised draft was adopted without a vote by the First Committee at the same meeting and by the General Assembly on 22 November. For the text of the resolution, see page 365.

57/93 - United Nations disarmament fellowship training and advisory services. The draft resolution was introduced by Nigeria, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 446 for the sponsors), on 14 October, adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 23 October and by the General Assembly on 22 November. For the text of the resolution, see page 415.

³⁴ A joint proposal on the CD's programme of work was introduced towards the end of the session by five former presidents of the Conference (Algeria, Belgium, Chile, Colombia and Sweden). See CD/PV 912, pp. 7-9.

³⁵ CD/1681.

Conclusion

During the General Assembly's general debate at the 57th session, Member States stressed the importance of the implementation and follow-up to the Millennium Declaration in a comprehensive, integrated, coordinated and balanced manner at all levels. They decided to consider, at the fifty-eighth session of the Assembly, convening a high-level plenary meeting during the sixtieth session to review the implementation of the Declaration. Combating terrorism was still a predominant topic during the general debate. Many Member States expressed, in the First Committee, serious concerns over the threats arising from terrorism using WMD.

The General Assembly, on the recommendation of the First Committee, adopted 51 resolutions and 2 decisions, of which 30 were adopted by consensus.

The substantive session of Disarmament Commission did not take place for the first time in recent years due to problems of overlapping dates of meetings and decided to continue substantive deliberations at its 2003 session. Due to persisting differences among Member States regarding priority in disarmament negotiations, the CD again did not agree on a programme of work and therefore was not able to carry out any substantive work.

The Department for Disarmament Affairs continued to carry out its activities by providing technical and substantive assistance to various disarmament bodies and experts study groups, coordinating or participating in several interdepartmental activities, and cooperating with other international organizations dealing with issues related to its mandates. It continued collecting and issuing reports containing information received from governments, and carried out an active information programme. In order to cope with new challenges and address cross-cutting issues, such as the illicit trade in SALW, DDA endeavoured to enhance its coordination and cooperation with other United Nations departments and agencies. It also started to explore new areas of activities, such as terrorism and WMD, disarmament and non-proliferation education, human rights, human security and disarmament, and gender perspectives on disarmament. It strengthened its work in the area of assisting States in need through training and capacity-building.

ANNEX I

Members of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, 2002

Vicente Berasategui, Ambassador of the Argentine Republic to the United Kingdom, London

- Arundhati Ghose (Chair), Ambassador and Member, Union Public Service Commission, New Delhi
- Pascal Boniface, Director, Institute of International and Strategic Relations, (IRIS), Paris
- Rolf Ekéus, High Commissioner on National Minorities Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), The Hague
- Nabil Fahmy, Ambassador of Egypt to the United States, Washington, D.C.
- Shai Feldman, Head, The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv
- Gelson Fonseca, Jr., Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations, New York
- Mariama Bayard Gamatié, Consultant, Niamey
- Raimundo González, Ambassador of Chile to Austria, Vienna
- Kostyantyn I. Gryshchenko, Ambassador of Ukraine to the United States, Washington, D.C.
- Hu Xiaodi, Ambassador of China for Disarmament Affairs, Geneva, Switzerland
- Maleeha Lodhi, Ambassador of Pakistan to the United States, Washington, D.C.
- Miguel Marín Bosch, Under Secretary for Asia, Africa, Europe and Multilateral Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mexico City
- Abdul S. Minty, Deputy Director General: Multilateral Department of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria
- Harald Müller, Director, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, Frankfurt
- William C. Potter, Director, Center for Nonproliferation Studies And Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA
- Boris D. Pyadyshev, Ambassador Editor-in-Chief, International Affairs, Moscow
- Jane Sharp, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Defence Studies, Kings College, London
- Jill Sinclair, Director General, International Security Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa
- Kongit Sinegiorgis, Director-General for African Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Addis Ababa
- Yoshitomo Tanaka, Ambassador, President, Radio Press, Inc., Tokyo
- Nugroho Wisnumurti, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations and other International Organizations, Geneva

Patricia Lewis [ex officio member], Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva

ANNEX II

Agenda items of the General Assembly as allocated to the First Committee

- 1. Reduction of military budgets (item 57)
- 2. Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament (item 58)
 - 3. Question of Antarctica (item 59)
- 4. Maintenance of international security good-neighbourliness, stability and development in South-Eastern Europe (item 60)
- 5. Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security (item 61)
- 6. Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament (item 62)
- 7. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East (item 63)
- 8. Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons (item 64)
 - 9. Prevention of an arms race in outer space (item 65)
- 10. General and complete disarmament (item 66): [The General Assembly decided that some portions of the annual report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (A/57/278) dealing with the subject matter of item 66 would be drawn to the attention of the First Committee in connection with its consideration of item 66.]
 - (a) Notification of nuclear tests;
 - (b) Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda;
 - (c) United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education;
 - (d) Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol;
 - (e) Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status:
 - (f) Preservation of and compliance with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems;

- (g) Missiles;
- (h) Reducing nuclear danger;
- (i) Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;
- (j) Relationship between disarmament and development
- (k) Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control;
- (1) Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas;
- (m) Regional disarmament;
- (n) Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels;
- (o) Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction;
- (p) Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and on Their Destruction;
- (q) Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures;
- (r) Transparency in armaments;
- (s) Nuclear disarmament;
- (t) Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons;
- (u) Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them;
- (v) The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects;
- (w) Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia;
- (x) United Nations conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers in the context of nuclear disarmament.
- 11. Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly (item 67):
 - (a) United Nations Disarmament Information Programme;

- (b) United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services;
- (c) Regional confidence-building measures: activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa;
- (d) Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons;
- (e) United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament;
- (f) United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa;
- (g) United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean;
- (h) United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific.
- 12. Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session (item 68):
 - (a) Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters;
 - (b) United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research;
 - (c) Report of the Disarmament Commission;
 - (d) Report of the Conference on Disarmament.
 - 13. The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East (item 69).
- 14. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (item 70).
- 15. Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region (item 71).
- 16. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (item 72).
 - 17. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (item 73).
 - 18. Election of the officers of the Main Committees (item 5).

Studies, education and information

Introduction

CVER THE YEARS, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY HAS REQUESTED the Secretary-General to carry out studies in an effort to deepen and advance its work on a specific disarmament issue. The studies are conducted with the assistance of experts recommended by their governments to ensure appropriate geographic and political balance so that as many perspectives as possible are taken into account. Since 1980, thirty studies have been conducted on a wide-ranging assortment of issues, starting with the first pioneering Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons. Two studies, started in 2001, were completed in 2002: the issue of missiles in all its aspects and disarmament and non-proliferation education.

The United Nations maintains an information and education programme in the field of disarmament within its Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA), focusing on nuclear issues, the illicit trade in small arms, military expenditures and transparency measures. DDA undertakes a range of activities and delivers information products in print and electronic form, in addition to cooperating with other United Nations offices and international organizations, including specialized disarmament organizations, in their information and education efforts. In 2002, in addition to a heightened focus on education because of the study mentioned above, DDA began a partnership with the NGO Hague Appeal for Peace on a small arms peace and disarmament education project in four countries on four continents.

Through the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), in-depth research is conducted on disarmament and security with the aim of assisting the international community, as well as the wider disarmament academic, research and non-governmental communities, in disarmament thinking, decisions and efforts. UNIDIR explores both current and future security issues, examining topics as varied as tactical nuclear weapons, refugee security, cyber warfare, regional confidence-building measures, and small arms.

Disarmament studies

Studies completed in 2002

This year, the reports of two expert studies were presented to the 57th session of the General Assembly. The panel of governmental experts on the issue of missiles in all its aspects and the group of governmental experts on disarmament and non-proliferation education completed their work and presented their reports to the Secretary-General.

The issue of missiles in all aspects

By resolution 55/33 A, entitled "Missiles", the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a panel of governmental experts, established on the basis of equitable geographic distribution, to prepare a report on the issue of missiles in all its aspects for consideration at its fifty-seventh session. In 2002, the Panel under the chairmanship of Antonio Vallim Guerreiro of Brazil held its second and third sessions from 1 to 5 April and from 1 to 9 July respectively in New York, completing the report for submission to the Secretary-General.¹

The report of the Secretary-General represented the first effort by the United Nations to address the issue of missiles in all its aspects. It provided an overview of the background and current situation in the field of missiles, including on existing missile capabilities, missile characteristics, peaceful uses of missile technology, driving factors in the acquisition and development of missiles and measures related to missiles. The report also described a number of concerns related to, inter alia, the increasing numbers, ranges, technological sophistication and geographic spread of missiles, their capacity for delivering weapons of mass destruction (WMD), in particular nuclear weapons, as well as conventional weapons, missile defenses and their strategic consequences, the potential use of space launch vehicle technology for missile development, the role of missiles in military doctrines and the role and scope of confidence-building measures.

The report concluded that issues related to missiles in all its aspects, as outlined in the report, were regarded as serious concerns for international peace and security in the world today. These concerns were of both a regional and global order. The questions related to missiles were multifaceted and increasingly complex and could not be dealt with adequately without due attention to regional and global security dimensions. While noting the existence of international measures in the field of missiles, the report acknowledged that at present there are no universally accepted norms or

A/57/229.

instruments to deal specifically with missile related concerns in all their aspects. The Panel noted the multiple approaches currently undertaken to deal with the issue of missiles both within and outside the United Nations. The deliberations and the present report of the Panel represented the first effort by the United Nations to address the issue of missiles in all its aspects. The report recognized that continued international efforts were essential to deal with the issue of missiles in the interest of international peace and security. The Panel noted the role of the United Nations in the field of missiles. It did not single out any particular course or combination of actions on the issue of missiles. The issues identified in the present report and all approaches undertaken at the national, bilateral, regional, plurilateral and multilateral levels, including the initiatives described herein, need to be further explored. For other missile-related subjects, see Chapter I.

Study on disarmament and non-proliferation education

"Education is, quite simply, peace-building by another name. It is the most effective form of defence spending there is." 2

KOFI ANNAN, UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL

Alarmed at the general level of complacency about the threat that nuclear weapons in particular still posed to international security, and acting on the belief that education in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation could help to combat that drift, the members of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters recommended that the Secretary-General convene a Expert group of governmental experts to conduct a study on various aspects of formal and informal disarmament and non-proliferation education (DNP) and training. The Secretary-General transmitted that idea to the General Assembly in his report on the activities of the Board for 2000.³ Pursuant to resolution 55/33 E of 20 November 2000, the group met for four sessions in three venues in 2001 and 2002.⁴ The report of the Secretary-General,

² See SG/SM/7292 DC/2676, 2 February 2000 at www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000.

³ A/55/349.

⁴ The Group held four sessions: from 18 to 20 April 2001 in New York; from 8 to 10 August 2001 in Monterey, California (Monterey Institute of International Studies); from 11 to 15 March in Geneva; and from 22 to 26 July 2002 in New York. A significant portion of the Group's work was carried out electronically, including consultations with experts who were unable to attend the panel's meetings, to exchange ideas about its work and draft the final report.

containing the study,⁵ was presented to the First Committee on 9 October and a public launch event was held the same day.

The General Assembly adopted resolution 57/60 on 22 November conveying the recommendations in the study "for implementation, as appropriate, by Member States, the United Nations and other international organizations, civil society, non-governmental organizations and the media." Those recommendations have laid the groundwork for renewing the commitment of the United Nations to education and training in the field, to coordinating those efforts within the Organization and related international organizations, and expanding partnerships in DNP education with the academic, educational and non-governmental communities.

The last major effort made by the United Nations in the field of disarmament education was the convening twenty-two years ago of the World Congress on Disarmament Education at UNESCO House in Paris, from 9 to 13 June 1980. That Congress adopted a Final Document that mapped out an ambitious global programme of disarmament education policies, activities and projects for the international community. The United Nations maintained a strong commitment to disarmament education, but with a focus on informal education of the public, on the one hand, and of highly specialized audiences of disarmament practitioners, on the other. The present study not only promotes continued informal education and training objectives, but also highlights the need for integrating DNP education into formal education at the primary, secondary, tertiary and post-graduate levels.

"Despite the Cold War ending nearly 13 years ago, there is proliferation of a staggering number and variety of weapons from small handguns to weapons of mass destruction. Education on how to curb and reverse this trend is urgently required."

HELEN CLARK, PRIME MINISTER OF NEW ZEALAND⁸

⁵ A/57/124.

⁶ Final Document, World Congress on Disarmament Education, Paris, 9-13 June 1980, SS-80, CONF.401/REV/COL.51. See also the United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, vol. 5, 1980 (United Nation publication, Sales. No. B.81.IX.4) or http://disarmament.un.org/education/docs/unesco.pdf.

For a brief history, see Ballantine, E. & Hill, F. (2001). Lessons from past UN disarmament education efforts. Disarmament Forum, 3, pp. 13-17.

⁸ Message at the launch of the UN Study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education, New York, 9 October 2002 and fourth session in 2002. See www.disarmament/un.org/education/study-launch.

Third and fourth sessions in 20029

In 2002, under the continued chairmanship of Miguel Marín-Bosch of Mexico, the Group of Experts met in March 2002 in Geneva, giving special attention to two areas of its mandate—one dealing with post-conflict peacebuilding, and the other with the many ways that disarmament education has been carried out. (See Annex II for the composition of the Group.) At this meeting, the experts, representatives of United Nations and other international organizations specialized in disarmament or education, were joined by two members of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters¹⁰, as well as UNESCO's International Bureau of Education¹¹ and held special sessions with representatives from nearly 20 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and private education institutions deeply immersed in disarmament education and international security issues. ¹² The educational work and resources dealt with issues such as mine risk education; 13 a teaching module for chemical and biological disarmament efforts: 14 a post-graduate degree programme in arms control, ¹⁵ the development of textbooks on nuclear nonproliferation aimed at parliamentarians, 16 incorporating peace education programmes in high schools,¹⁷ and the role of journalism in DNP education 18

The Group was updated on the work to supplement its survey on disarmament and non-proliferation education with individuals and institutes

For a summary account of the progress made during the first and second sessions of the Group of Experts, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 26, 2001, pp. 204-206.

William Potter, Director, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies and Mariama Bayard Gamatié, Consultant on development and gender issues, Niger.

¹¹ The IBE is an international centre for the content of education, founded in Geneva in 1925 as a private institution. In 1929, it extended its membership to governments and thus became the first intergovernmental organization in the field of education. In 1969, the IBE joined UNESCO as an integral, yet autonomous, institution.

¹² For the complete list, see http://disarmament.un.org/education.html.

¹³ International Committee of the Red Cross.

¹⁴ The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

¹⁵ Centre d'Etudes de Sécurité Internationale et de Maîtrise des armaments; University of Marne-La-Vallée, France.

¹⁶ PIR Centre, Moscow.

¹⁷ Life-Links, Sweden.

¹⁸ Baltic Media Centre, Denmark, Media Action International and BBC World Service, London.

in under-represented regions. ¹⁹ The survey will stand as a permanent aspect of the Group's efforts.

To gain a better insight into how to devise ways of introducing disarmament and non-proliferation education into post-conflict situations, the Group heard from persons engaged in the peace and disarmament process in Bougainville, ²⁰ DDA's small arms disarmament and peace initiatives project in Gramsh, Albania, ²¹ peace consolidation efforts in Ghana and Niger ²² and peace education efforts in Latin America. ²³ An independent artist also made a presentation on the importance of the arts in educating the public on disarmament and non-proliferation issues. ²⁴

At the final session, the Group concentrated its activity on finalizing the language in the report and heard presentations on incorporating disarmament into peace education, ²⁵ on outer space, ²⁶ and on the global survey of disarmament and non-proliferation education. ²⁷

Unprecedented role for non-governmental organizations

Pursuant to the request of the General Assembly that the panel's work include oral and written presentations from NGOs in the field, more than 50 academics, educators and NGO representatives participated in the Group's work throughout its four sessions. In addition, the Group of Experts sought and received written contributions from more than 70 research institutes, educational institutions, NGOs and museums from more than 40 countries. Eurther, the panel circulated its draft report for outside peer review among NGOs and academic and research institutes and worked intensely to integrate the varied responses and suggestions into the text. NGO representatives succeeded in arguing in favour of the importance of ensuring that education programs cover the full range of weapons systems — light weapons, major

¹⁹ Educators for Social Responsibility (Metro New York chapter) and the University of Maryland's Program on Global Security and Disarmament.

²⁰ James Tanis, Bougainvillean peace process, Papua New Guinea.

²¹ Elton Skendaj, National Coordinator designate, DDA and Hague Appeal for Peace Gramsh project, Albania.

²² University of Pretoria, South Africa.

²³ Educating Cities Latinamerica.

²⁴ Marguerite Kahrl, artist, United States.

²⁵ The Hague Appeal for Peace.

²⁶ The Kurtz Institute.

²⁷ Global Guide to Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education, (Program on Global Security and Disarmament, University of Maryland, and Educators for Social Responsibility, New York Metro chapter).

conventional weapons and WMD, including nuclear weapons. The report also reflects a key input from the NGO sector, namely, that the results have to be accessible to countries in the global north and south.

Report of the expert group

There has never been a greater need for education in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation, especially with regard to WMD, but also in the field of small arms and international terrorism, declares the report. Since the end of the cold war, changing concepts of security and threat have demanded new thinking. Such new thinking will arise from those who are educated and trained today.²⁹

The study consisted of eight parts: an introduction, six sections corresponding to the group's mandate³⁰ and a section on practical measures to promote disarmament and non-proliferation education.³¹ The core of the report contained 34 substantive recommendations focusing on several important priorities and principles (see Annex to this chapter), including: Many of the recommendations are aimed at Governments, some at the non-governmental community, but most are directed at the United Nations and other international organizations. The report also provided a useful summary

²⁸ For survey, see www.disarmament.un.org/education/stdy-ann2.html and www.disarmament.un.org/education/stdy-ann3.html., also refer to Global Guide to Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education, op.cit., footnote 27. For other core documents see "Final Document and Report, UNESCO World Congress on Disarmament Education, 1980; Magnus Haavelsrud, Target: Disarmament Education, 2002; Magnus Haavelsrud (ED): Disarming: Discourse on violence and peace; Evgeniy Gorkovskiy, "Disarmament Education: statement delivered before the conference on "Building the Future Today – World Peace," Mexico City, 2 April 2001; Education for Disarmament, Disarmament Forum, 3, 2001.

²⁹ A/57/124, Summary.

³⁰ See A/RES/55/33 E in *The Yearbook*, vol. 25: 2000, pp. 412-413.

³¹ Four annexes to the report were published electronically. Annex I contains a resource list of United Nations representatives, educators, researchers and representatives of NGOs who have participated in the work of the Group of Experts. Annex II consists of information received from governments, research institutes, educators and educational institutions and NGOs (based on responses to the survey). Annex III suggests resources for disarmament and non-proliferation education and training, including web links, and Annex IV contains a summary of activities in disarmament and non-proliferation education and training by organizations of the United Nations system, including web links. For annexes see: http://disarmament.un.org/education/stdy-annex.html.

of the objectives of contemporary disarmament and non-proliferation education, as follows:

- · to learn how to think rather than what to think about issues;
- to develop critical thinking skills in an informed citizenry;
- to deepen understanding of the multiple factors at the local, national, regional and global levels that either foster or undermine peace;
- · to encourage attitudes and actions which promote peace;
- to convey relevant information on and to foster a responsive attitude to current and future security challenges through the development and widespread availability of improved methodologies and research techniques;
- to bridge political, regional and technological divides by bringing together ideas, concepts, people, groups and institutions to promote concerted international efforts towards disarmament, non-proliferation and a peaceful and non-violent world.³²

"Another tenet of the report is that education as a disarmament and non-proliferation strategy must make use of a combination of traditional and innovative teaching techniques to convey information, enhance analytical thinking and otherwise facilitate a change in mind-sets."

FROM HELP SCHOOLS TO PROMOTE A SAFER WORLD BY JAYANTHA DHANAPALA AND WILLIAM C. POTTER INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 3 OCTOBER 2002

Ways to promote education and training in disarmament and nonproliferation at all levels of formal and informal education

Different groups require different pedagogic approaches and methods. What a school-age child in a refugee camp needs to know about disarmament is not the same as what is required for a border guard, let alone for a political official or a high school teacher. The recommendations under this heading cover a diverse spectrum of actors and audiences, infrastructures and technologies.³³

The panel strongly supported the development of additional educational materials, but stressed that materials needed to be translated into the six official UN languages (as well as other languages, when feasible) and made available in print as well as online. The panel was sensitive to the need to adapt materials for different countries or regions. It also supported several

³² A/57/124, p.10.

³³ A/57/124, Summary.

training programmes, though it suggested that funding for such programs ought to come from Member States.

Throughout the report, the panel was particularly forward-looking in its treatment of NGOs, and numerous recommendations included them. Its first recommendation focused on increasing countries' attention to disarmament and non-proliferation education, including establishing public bodies to advise them on these issues. The group also endorsed establishment of an international consortium "of scholars and representatives of civil society, to work in parallel with and as a complement to international disarmament and non-proliferation efforts." To extend partnerships on these issues, the panel encouraged Member States "to include parliamentarians and/or non-governmental advisers in delegations to United Nations disarmament-related meetings." ³⁵

Several recommendations focused on harmonizing and coordinating efforts among international organizations. One encouraged the United Nations University (UNU) and the University for Peace (UPEACE) to develop new courses on disarmament and non-proliferation; while others suggested that DDA together with its three regional centres, UNIDIR, UNU and UPEACE establish a virtual library of lessons learned and organize training programmes for educators and trainers ("train the trainers"). Still, another provision encouraged UNU and UPEACE to assist cities and prefectures in hosting seminars on disarmament and non-proliferation.

Ways to utilize evolving pedagogical methods, particularly the revolution in information and communications technology

The panel highlighted some of the opportunities that were presented by new information and communication technologies, including improved access to distance learning, multimedia and hypermedia programmes. It also mentioned the advantages of self-paced learning. At the same time, however, the panel stressed the importance of including a wide range of activities, not limited to computer-based programmes. Suggestions included role-plays and simulation games, films, visual and performance arts, photography, poetry and creative writing. The group placed particular emphasis on participatory learning.

The panel also supported DDA's role as a clearinghouse for information about non-proliferation and disarmament education within the UN system. The report outlined a series of desired characteristics for a disarmament and non-proliferation online education resource site to be developed by DDA. In

³⁴ A/57/124, p.12.

³⁵ Ibid. p.17.

addition to developing the site in the six official UN languages, DDA was also encouraged to include links to existing resources, recommendations by the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters and recommendations from the interagency group described above.

Ways to introduce disarmament and non-proliferation education into postconflict situations as a contribution to peace-building

This brief section focused on post-conflict situations, encouraging a wide range of groups to include disarmament education and training in peace-building efforts. The report placed particular emphasis on encouraging Member States to include disarmament and non-proliferation education in military staff training.

Ways in which the United Nations system and other international organizations can harmonize and coordinate their efforts in disarmament and non-proliferation education

One of the core recommendations in this area was that each United Nations body and international organization with special competence in these areas designate a focal point for this topic. In periodic meetings, these representatives were charged with several responsibilities, including: promoting disarmament and non-proliferation education at all levels and regions, networking and sharing experiences and best practices, encouraging incorporation of elements of this work into public information products, while consulting and seeking partnerships with governments, regional organizations and academic and research institutions, among others. The inter-agency group "is encouraged to invite the participation of civil society, especially educators and NGOs, in its work." DDA was charged with facilitating this part of the group's work.

Activities surrounding the launch of the expert group's report

The United Nations study was officially launched on 9 October 2002 and introduced to the First Committee the same day. The event began with a roundtable discussion among a diverse group of panel members, educators and students and United Nations and governmental officials. The standing-room only crowd welcomed the report enthusiastically and participated in a wide-ranging discussion of strategies for its implementation. The informal roundtable was followed by the formal public launch of the report, with another distinguished group of speakers, including the Under-Secretary-

³⁶ /57/124 p.20.

General for Disarmament Affairs and the Chairman of the Group of Experts. A message was read from Prime Minister Helen Clark of New Zealand.³⁷

Immediately following the public launch, the Chairman of the Group of Experts presented the study to the First Committee.

Conclusion

The overall objective of disarmament and non-proliferation education and training is to impart knowledge and skills to individuals to empower them to make their contribution, as national and world citizens, to the achievement of concrete disarmament and non-proliferation measures and the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.³⁸

If fully implemented and funded, the programme outlined in the recommendations of the experts holds significant promise in helping to meet the aforementioned objective. Particularly important aspects of the programme include raising awareness of disarmament and non-proliferation education, ensuring that diverse groups participate in these efforts, have access to material on disarmament and non-proliferation education, fostering critical and ethical thinking and encouraging collaboration within the United Nations as well as between civil society and UN organizations.

The current threats to national and international security cannot be resolved through a continuation of the culture of violence. Instead, they must be addressed through effective disarmament and non-proliferation policies, supported by long-term education and training programmes.

Studies in progress

The work of the Group of Governmental Experts on the feasibility of developing an international instrument to enable States to identify and trace, in a timely and reliable manner, illicit small arms and light weapons, established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 56/24 V of 24 December 2001, held its first session in Geneva from 1 to 5 July. At that session, it considered the views of Member States and heard presentations from both governmental and NGO experts on relevant topics related to its work. For more information on the Group's first session see Chapter III. The two remaining meetings will be held in February and May 2003. The Group's finding will be the subject of a report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly at its fifty-eighth session. For the composition of the group of experts, see Annex III.

³⁷ See footnote 8.

³⁸ A/57/124, Summary.

Studies mandated in 2002

Four new studies were mandated in 2002. Pursuant to resolution 57/53, entitled "Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security", the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to conduct a study on relevant international concepts aimed at strengthening the security of global information and telecommunications systems, with the assistance of a group of governmental experts, to be established in 2004 on the basis of equitable geographical distribution, and with the help of Member States in a position to render such assistance. The outcome of the study will be submitted to the Assembly, at its sixtieth session in 2005. Resolution 57/53 is discussed in Chapter V (see page 193).

By resolution 57/65, entitled "Relationship between disarmament and development", the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General, within available financial resources, and with the assistance of a group of governmental experts to be established in 2003 on the basis of equitable geographical distribution, while seeking the views of States, to present a report to the Assembly, at its fifty-ninth session. The report will contain recommendations for a reappraisal of the relationship between disarmament and development in the current international context, as well as the future role of the Organization in this connection. Resolution 57/65 is discussed in Chapter V (see page 195).

By resolution 57/71, entitled "Missiles", the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a panel of governmental experts, to explore further the issue of missiles in all its aspects. A report is to be submitted to the Assembly at its fifty-ninth session in 2004. A summary of the first report of the Secretary-General on this issue is contained in this chapter. Resolution 57/71 is discussed in Chapter I (see page 62).

By resolution 57/75, entitled "Transparency in armaments", the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of governmental experts to be convened in 2003, on the basis of equitable geographical representation, to prepare a report on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development. The report should take into account the work of the Conference on Disarmament (CD), the views expressed by Member States and the reports of the Secretary General on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development, with a view to a decision at the Assembly's fifty-eighth session in 2003. Resolution 57/75 is discussed in Chapter III (see page 128).

United Nations Disarmament Information Programme (UNDIP)

The Department's activities reflected an expanded outreach programme in three substantive priority areas: weapons of mass destruction; conventional weapons, especially small arms and light weapons; and disarmament and non-proliferation education. The information tools for carrying out the Programme were public speaking engagements, press releases, print and electronic publications, its website, symposia, panel discussions and exhibits. DDA cooperated closely with the Department of Public Information (DPI), particularly in connection with the information strategy for the first NPT Preparatory Committee.

Publications

DDA continued to maintain its core publication programme, including the United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, the occasional paper series and the quarterly DDA Update. The Department introduced some innovations to its publications during the year. In 2002, DDA made increasing use of its website to provide easier and quicker access to many of its publications, e.g., the DDA Update and the occasional paper series are now available online within one day of their completion. (See Annex III for a list of publications).

Website

The Department redesigned its website to render it more issue oriented. It includes broad-based issues such as weapons of mass destruction (WMD), conventional weapons and regional disarmament. It also contains articles on emerging issues such as the link between disarmament and international terrorism, as well as on gender perspectives on disarmament and children and disarmament. It continued to provide up-to-date material on press releases and statements of the Secretary-General and other senior UN officials, information on current and upcoming events in the field of disarmament, including background documentation. Also added to the website is an educational resource section that covered the progress of the work of the Group of Governmental Experts on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education. The educational resource section also highlighted both a power-point presentation on peace and disarmament and an electronic version, as well as a page of related links to education and information programmes of research and educational institutions and organizations.

DDA's website is frequently used and provides 24-hour service worldwide. Web statistics indicate that users from more than 150 countries in Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe, North and South America have visited it. For

³⁹ See DDA website: www.un.org/Dept./dda.

the second half of 2002 (an estimated 184 days), figures showed that visitors who obtained information amounted to 153,098 (an average of 832 visitors/day) and 1,166,266 views (an average of 6,338 page views/day). Many visitors were attracted to DDA's home and overview pages, the WMD index page, the terrorism page, the conventional arms index page, the small arms page, and the page on the Non Proliferation Treaty. The DDA web email box also received hundreds of e-mails from around the world. These facts demonstrate that disarmament is an issue of global interest and that DDA's serves as an important resource in the Internet world of disarmament for Member States, NGOs and academic and other institutions.

Based on the statistics cited above, the Department gave added attention to the following disarmament databases: (a) General Assembly resolutions and decisions on disarmament items (including voting patterns and sponsors); (b) status of disarmament and arms regulation agreements; (c) submissions of Member States to the UN Register of Conventional Arms and the standardized reporting on military expenditures; and (d) reports submitted under article 7 by States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction.

Disarmament agenda for the 21st century- Beijing Conference

Growing fears of new arms races, global military competition and the deteriorating international security situation precipitated a high-level three-day international conference on "A disarmament agenda for the 21st century", in Beijing, from 2-4 April, co-hosted by the United Nations and the Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of China. Its purpose was to explore these concerns and to collectively attempt to identify effective responses.

"What Sun Tsu accomplished in the 5th century BC with respect to the Art of War, we too—all of us, regardless of age, governmental rank, or nationality must now resolve to achieve in the 21st century as we seek to master a new historic and urgent challenge, the Art of Disarmament."

JAYANTHA DHANAPALA⁴¹

⁴⁰ DDA considers a visitor someone who opens its website. Visits are counted as one per day, regardless of how many times that user opens the web page. Each visitor may view more than one web page, which accounts for the difference between visits and views on a daily basis.

With a view to having the broadest possible perspectives on the issues on its agenda, high-level government officials from 19 countries from five continents, along with 15 representatives from non-governmental groups and academia, were invited to participate in the Conference. They were joined by a number of observers from the diplomatic missions in Beijing and from other parts of China. The Foreign Minister of China, Tang Jiaxuan, and the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Jayantha Dhanapala, opened the Conference. The formal agenda included presentations and discussions on defense doctrines, nuclear disarmament, preventing an arms race in outer space, missile proliferation and missile defense, and conventional arms.

The following papers were presented at the Conference:

- US views on arms control by Mark A. Groombridge, Special Assistant to John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, United States Department of State
- Defence, disarmament and the United Nations by Ramesh Thakur, Vice Rector, United Nations University, Tokyo
- Nuclear disarmament and the elimination of nuclear dangers, two presentations by Hans-Joachim Daerr, Commissioner of the Federal Government for Arms Control and Disarmament, Germany, and Ron McCoy, Chair of the Malaysian Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War
- An effective way to prevent an arms race in outer space: the early negotiation and conclusion of an international legal instrument by Qiao Zonghuai, Vice Foreign Minister, People's Republic of China
- Prevention of an arms race in outer space by Lloyd Axworthy, former Foreign Minister, Canada
- Missile proliferation and missile defence, two presentations by Miguel Maríin-Bosch, Under Secretary for Asia, Africa, Europe and Multilateral Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mexico, and Javad Zarif, Deputy Foreign Minister, Islamic Republic of Iran⁴³

⁴¹ Opening remarks, United Nations//China Beijing Conference, 2-4 April 2002.

⁴² List of participants is available on DDA website at www.disarmament.un.org/ddapublications/op6contents.htm.

⁴³ Javad Zarif's paper was presented by Hamid Eslamizad, Director, Department for Disarmament and International Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamic Republic of Iran.

- Regional approaches to disarmament: an African approach to an African vision by Nozizwe Madala-Routledge, Deputy Minister of Defence, South Africa
- Security after 11 September: regional initiatives in CBMs and arms control by William Paterson, First Assistant Secretary, International Security Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia
- The role of civil society in disarmament issues: realism vs. idealism? by Jody Williams, 1997 Nobel Peace Laureate, and Campaign Ambassador, International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Washington, D.C.

Among the ideas that received broad support were: disarmament in general; multilateralism; the United Nations role in promoting nuclear disarmament and in developing new, non-discriminatory norms governing conventional weapons, missiles and the prevention of an arms race in outer space; practical disarmament measures, technology and threats to international security. Specific proposals emanating from the conference included: disarmament and non-proliferation, terrorism, preventing an arms race in outer space, controls over aircraft and missiles, and conventional weapons. The seminar is the subject of DDA Occasional Paper No. 6, available in English at www.disarmanent.un.org/chinaconf.htm.

DDA panels, NGO panel discussions and participation in the NPT

The Information Programme has further intensified its interaction with NGOs and research institutes. DDA continued its policy of cooperating closely with NGOs and sought ways to improve existing relationships. Broadening DDA's bilateral relationship with coalition NGOs, such as the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) and Reaching Critical Will, proved one way to achieve this goal.

Symposia and panel discussions

DDA held a number of presentations and panel discussions on peace and security issues in 2002, aimed at diplomats, non-governmental organizations, Secretariat staff, press and the public.

Asymmetrical Warfare and the Revolution in Military Affairs

On 25 January, the Department hosted a videoconference presentation on "Asymmetrical Warfare and the Revolution in Military Affairs since 11 September". The guest speaker, Vladimir Slipchenko, retired Major General of the Russian Federation, presented an analysis of emerging military and security trends following the terrorist attacks in the United States. Secretariat staff from various departments in Geneva and New York as well as UNIDIR attended the event.⁴⁴

Biological Weapons Convention and Bio-Terrorism

In the light of the collapse of the negotiations in July 2001 in the ad hoc working group on a draft verification protocol for the Biological Weapons Convention and the suspension of the work of the Fifth Review Conference of the Convention in November, DDA organized a panel discussion in New York, on 30 January, to coincide with the convening of the first session in 2002 of the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters. The Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Jayantha Dhanapala, moderated the discussions on the following aspects of the Convention: ⁴⁵

- Future of the Biological Weapons Convention by Tibor Toth (President, Fifth Review Conference, BWC)
- Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention by Alfredo Labbe Villa (Deputy Permanent Representative of Chile, Geneva)
- Access to technological and scientific cooperation by Decio Ripandelli (Director, Administration and External Relations, International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology, Trieste, Italy)

Disarmament and Development: New choices for security and prosperity

With a revived interest in re-examining the issue of disarmament and development after the Cold War and at the turn of the century, on 29 April, DDA sponsored a panel discussion on the subject with a focus on Latin America and the Caribbean region. Speakers included Marco Balarezo, (Deputy Permanent Representative, Mission of Peru), Reynaldo Bajraj, (UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean), Nancy Happe (International Monetary Fund) and Sean DiGiovanna (Rutgers University, Center for Urban Affairs and Policy Research). 46

Disarmament in conflict prevention

The need to broaden its scope of conflict prevention measures has led the United Nations to tap into the collective assets of its system to address the cross-cutting nature of conflict prevention⁴⁷ Against this background, DDA held a one-day panel discussion on "Disarmament in Conflict Prevention" in New York on 1 October. In opening the discussion, the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament noted that disarmament and conflict prevention

⁴⁴ For the text of Mr. Slipchenko's comments, contact DDA, Monitoring, Database and Information Branch (MDI).

⁴⁵ For the texts of the presentations, contact DDA's, MDI Branch.

⁴⁶ For further information and the texts of the presentations, contact DDA's Conventional Arms Branch.

⁴⁷ See report of the Secretary-General, A/55/985.

were not two separate issues. He stressed the need for the international community to see disarmament and conflict prevention as mutually reinforcing means to serve international peace and security. The agenda included the following presentations:

- The role of disarmament in prevention of armed conflict by Angelica Arce de Jeannet, Minister, Permanent Mission of Mexico to the United Nations
- Practical disarmament measures by Herbert Wulf, former Director, currently Senior Fellow of Bonn International Center for Conversion, Germany
- Ten basis points for a successful disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme by Adriaan Verheul, Special Assistant to the Assistant-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations
- The role of NGOs in disarmament and conflict prevention by Patricia Lewis, Director, UNIDIR, Geneva
- Sierra Leone: Pre-war and post-war security by Sylvester Ekundayo Rowe, Deputy Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone to the United Nations

The Panel's proceedings are available in DDA Occasional Paper No. 7, or online at www.disarmament.un.org/ddapublications/op7contents.htm.

The impact of 11 September on the disarmament agenda for the 21st century

In order to continue the dialogue that began with the Beijing Conference (see above) on disarmament issues for the 21st century and to assess the impact of the tragic events of 11 September on them, on 3 October, DDA held a panel discussion during the first week of the First Committee. After opening remarks by the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs that also served to launch the publication of DDA Occasional Paper 6 on the UN-China Conference, the Right Honorable Kim Campbell, former Prime Minister of Canada, pointed to the need to find a new paradigm in approaches to disarmament after the catalytic events of 11 September.

"Although we think of nuclear weapons as being the 'luxury' of the very rich, highly developed countries, or countries who at least have resources that they can devote to what is considered very expensive weaponry, because of the changes in technology, we are now looking at the possibility that nuclear weapons coming to be seen as the 'weapons of the poor."

RT. HONORABLE KIM CAMPBELL, 3 OCTOBER 2002

Presentations addressed the following issues:

- Nuclear weapons and doctrines, and the world order by Professor Ramesh Thakur, Vice Rector, United Nations University
- Chemical, Biological and Conventional Weapons by Christer Ahlstrom, Deputy Director, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
- Post 11 September 2001: Missile Threats by Rebecca Johnson, Executive Director of the Acronym Institute

Outer Space Treaty at thirty-five

Threats to the maintenance of outer space as an environment free from the arms race have been mounting over the last several years. For several reasons, the issue of preventing an arms race in outer space continued to be linked to the issue of progress in nuclear disarmament in the context of seeking a programme of work for the CD (see Chapter V for further information). To cast light on this debate, on 14 October, DDA organized in collaboration with The Kurtz Institute of Peacemaking a seminar on the status of the Outer Space Treaty 35 years after its entry into force, chaired by Dr. Colleen Driscoll, Director of the Institute.

Sir Arthur C. Clarke, science and science fiction writer, Chancellor of the International Space University and inventor of the communication satellite, opened the panel with a special video message. The discussion began with opening remarks by the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, followed by the presentations listed below:

- Positive versus negative military uses by Dr. Ram S. Jakhu Ramu,
 Associate Professor, Institute of Air and Space Law, Faculty of Law, McGill University, and Director of the Center for the Study of Regulated Industries, also at McGill University, Canada
- Legal issues in the use of outer space by Professor Frans Gerhard von der Dunk, Co-Director, International Institute of Air and Space Law, Faculty of Law, University of Leiden, Netherlands
- Benefits of peaceful applications of space technology for humanity by Ambassador Raimundo Gonzalez, Chairman of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, London
- Special commentary by HU Xiaodi, Ambassador of China to the CD

There was general agreement among the speakers that the five treaties that form the architecture of the current international legal regime dealing with outer space, including the Outer Space Treaty, have been successful so far in ensuring that weapon systems with strike capabilities remain *de facto*, if not *de jure*, banned from space. While the regime on its own does not guarantee the prevention of an arms race in outer space, it plays a significant role in achieving that end. ⁴⁸

UN Register of Conventional Arms

"The Register enjoys wide international support, and its progress in recent years has been highly encouraging. If the effectiveness of this tool is strengthened further, it can serve as a significant early-warning mechanism, contributing with other instruments to the prevention of conflict and to restraint in arms acquisition."

KOFI ANNAN, UN SECRETARY-GENERAL 10TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE UN REGISTER OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS⁴⁹

To mark the 10th anniversary of the UN Register of Conventional Arms, a symposium was held in New York, on 15 October, sponsored by DDA in cooperation with the Governments of Canada, Germany, Japan and the Netherlands. The Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs opened the discussion, followed by remarks from Hendrik Wagenmakers, Ambassador (ret.) and former Chairman of the Group of Governmental Experts on the Register of Conventional Arms from 1992 and 1994; Mitsuro Donowaki, Ambassador (ret.) and Special Assistant to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan; Christopher Westdal, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Canada to the CD and Volker Heinsberg, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Germany to the CD. 50

NGO panels

The Department continued to collaborate with the NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security and the Department of Public Information (DPI) in organizing a number of events in 2002, including a series of panel discussions and other activities during the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference. Later in the year, in the traditional framework of Disarmament Week commemorations, on 22 October a discussion was held on "Reducing the risk of biological weapons", which heard position statements by Ambassadors Donald Mahley (United States) and David Broucher (United Kingdom). Matthew Meselson of the Harvard Sussex program on CBW Armament and Arms Limitation explicated his proposal for national means of criminalizing the use of

⁴⁸ For further information and texts of presentations, contact DDA's MDI Branch.

⁴⁹ Seewww.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/sgsm8355.doc.htmforPress Release SG/SM/8355 DC/2839.

 $^{^{50}}$ For further information about the symposium, contact DDA's CAB Branch.

biological weapons by States. On 24 October, a discussion of "The disarmament agenda: engagement or urgent call" heard views from Randy Rydell of DDA, Eric Javits Ambassador of the United States delegation to the CD, Kevin Dowling, Head of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation for the Department of Foreign Affairs of Ireland, and Dr. Randall Forsberg of the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies. Speakers debated the better path to disarmament by either engaging with current disarmament mechanisms like the CD, or through grassroots organizations outside of official structures to lobby influential governments. ⁵¹

NPT Preparatory Committee 2002/NGO participation

In collaboration with Member States, DDA facilitated the participation of NGOs at the 2002 NPT Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) held in New York from 8-19 April. Nearly 200 representatives from 62 NGOs attended the first session. Several hundred others attended parallel events that took place during the two-week period. A formal meeting of the session was devoted to presentations by NGOs at which 14 NGOs from around the world made statements on nuclear issues from a variety of perspectives. A wide spectrum of parallel events sponsored by NGOs ranged from seminars and panel discussions such as a Global Security Institute Peace Award to more technical events like the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research's Treaty Compliance Forum. The latter, held on the second day of the PrepCom, was a daylong event open to delegates and NGOs alike and focused on the question of compliance by nuclear-weapon States with their treaty obligations and the growing threats of state and non-state proliferation.

The first NPT Youth Caucus on 17 April drew a large and enthusiastic student audience (around 200). Educators for Social Responsibility Metro (ESR-Metro)⁵² organized a panel of high school students to address other youth - and their teachers- on issues related to nuclear weapons, nuclear power and the threat of terrorism, all ultimately posing the question, "Can we really afford the high price of nuclear weaponry and nuclear power?"

The Peace Women Forum, sponsored by the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, convoked more than 200 activists and academics for a colourful event devoted to peace and security issues from a feminist perspective. The forum considered the impact of Security Council

⁵¹ For further information, see the Special NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security at www.disarm.igc.org.

⁵² For further information, contact http://www.esrmetro.org.

resolution 1325, specifically highlighting the issue of women in international peace and security.

Other events were organized by Greenpeace International, the Middle Powers Initiative (MPI), Western States Legal Fund, Physicians for Social Responsibility and GRACE. On the last day of the 2002 PrepCom, the NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security organized a concluding panel, entitled "Into the Future", that explored the road ahead to next year's PrepCom and ultimately the 2005 Review Conference.

For a list of symposia and panels organized by DDA, see Annex VI.

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

By a note to the General Assembly, the Secretary-General transmitted the report of the Director of UNIDIR on the activities of the Institute for the period August 2001 to July 2002. The proposed programme of work and budget for 2002-2003 was also submitted for the consideration of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, acting as the Board of Trustees of the Institute UNIDIR at its thirty-ninth session (17-19 July). In October, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) reviewed the report as well as the plan for 2002-2003 and made comments for the benefit of the Director and the Board of Trustees. Pursuant to resolution 55/35 of 20 November 2000, and at a recommendation of the Board of Trustees, there was an increase subvention from the UN budget for 2002 to ensure the independence of the Institute. 54

During the year, UNIDIR's research programme⁵⁵ focused on: global security, regional security, and human security and disarmament. In the broader framework of global security, the Institute carried out research on the implementation of treaties already concluded as well as on issues relevant to current negotiations. It organized a number of seminars on issues of relevance to the Conference on Disarmament: outer space and security, nuclear terrorism and a WMD-free zone in the Middle East, and carried out a study on tactical nuclear weapons. As far as regional security was concerned, the Institute focused on peacekeeping operations and specific issues related to Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, North-East Asia, South Asia and Central Asia. In the field of human security, the Institute focused its research efforts on issues related to small arms in West Africa, weapons destruction and stockpile management in South Africa, weapons for development, regional and cross-regional perspectives on illicit trafficking in small arms,

⁵³ A/57/302.

⁵⁴ See documents A/C.5/2 and A/56/511.

⁵⁵ See website: www.unidir.org.

and disarmament and humanitarian action. The Geneva Forum held a number of seminars on small arms. UNIDIR continued its research project on participatory evaluation of the implementation of the Mine-Ban Convention. The project involves a broad spectrum of governmental and NGO representatives and resulted in a major report, briefing papers and other articles.

As the links between security and health were increasingly of interest to the debate on disarmament and security, UNIDIR cooperated with the World Health Organization and other UN institutions and NGOs on the effects of/and issues pertaining to interpersonal violence and the spread of weapons. The Institute continued to be engaged in an extensive network with specialized agencies and institutions of the UN system and other organizations through electronic means, its publications, conferences, seminars and discussions. A list of UNIDIR's publications during the period under review is contained in Annex V to this chapter.

General Assembly, 2002

The General Assembly took action on two draft resolutions dealing with the subjects discussed in this chapter.

57/60. United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education. The draft resolution was introduced by Mexico, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 430 for the sponsors), on 9 October. On 16 October and again on 18 October, [A/57/510, pp. 8-9] the sponsors presented a revised text with minor changes to some of the paragraphs. The revised draft resolution was adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 23 October and by the General Assembly on 22 November.

First Committee. France, while welcoming the outcome of the study, had some reservations about the wording in the fourth preambular paragraph. The selective listing of categories of arms and the omission of others, such as anti-personnel mines, did not seem to reflect the results of the study; the emphasis given to WMD in that same paragraph seemed to be unbalanced; and the reference to terrorism appeared irrelevant.

57/90. United Nations Disarmament Information Programme. The draft resolution was introduced by Mexico, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 445 for the sponsors), on 15 October, adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 23 October and by the General Assembly on 22 November.

ANNEX I

Composition of the Group of Governmental Experts on the issue of missiles in all its aspects

- Yukiya Amano, Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo
- Hamid Baeidi-Nejad, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Iran (Islamic Republic of) to the United Nations, New York
- Lt. Col. Salah Bourougaa, Algiers, (first session)
- Franck Brunet, Direction des affaires stratégiques, de sécurité et du désarmement, Ministère des affaires etrangères, Paris, (third session)
- Olivier Caron, Direction des Affaires stratégiques de sécurité et du désarmement, Ministère des affaires etrangères, Paris, (first and second sessions)
- Milan Cigánik, Head, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Department of OSCE, Disarmament and Council of Europe, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Slovak Republic
- Jean Du Preez, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of South Africa to the United Nations, New York, (first session)
- Antonio José Guerreiro, Department of International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brasília
- Heiner Horsten, Director Nuclear Disarmament and Weapons of Mass Destruction-Non-Proliferation, Foreign Office, Berlin, (first session)
- Alaa Issa, First Secretary, Permanent Mission of Egypt to the United Nations, New York
- Jeremy Issacharoff, Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem
- Tom Kennedy, Non-Proliferation Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, (first session)
- Riaz Mohammad Khan, Additional Foreign Secretary, United Nations and Economic Coordination, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad
- Andrii Kuzmenko, Assistant Counsellor to the State Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ukraine
- Lee Ho-jin, Ambassador, Deputy Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations, New York
- Rüdiger Lüdeking, Director Nuclear Disarmament and WMD-Non-Proliferation, Foreign Office, Berlin, (second and third sessions)
- Vitali A. Lukyantsev, Senior Counsellor, Department for Security and Disarmament Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow
- Thomas Markram, Deputy Permanent Representative, South African

Permanent Mission, Geneva, (second and third sessions)

Robert McDougall, Director, Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa

Atilio Molteni, Ambassador, Buenos Aires

Samantha Purdy, Non-Proliferation Department Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, (second and third sessions)

David Reese, Adviser to the Australian Government, Canberra

Sheel Kant Sharma, Joint Secretary (Disarmament), Ministry of External Affairs, Delhi

Yuri O. Thamrin, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations, New York

Vann H. Van Diepen, Director, Office of Chemical, Biological and Missile Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C.

Luis Winter, Ambassador, Director of Special Issues, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Santiago

Wu Haitao, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of China to the United Nations, New York

ANNEX II

Participants in one or more sessions of the Group of Governmental Experts to prepare a United Nations Study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education

United Nations and international organizations

Department of Public Information

Department for Disarmament Affairs

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

Office of the Special Advisor on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)

UNESCO/International Bureau of Education (IBE)

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)

United Nations University (UNU)

Other international organizations

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)
PrepCom for CTBTO

Organization associated with the UN

University for Peace (UPEACE)

List of Representatives of Civil Society

Kamel Abujaber (President, Jordan Institute of Diplomacy, Amman)

Colin Archer (International Peaca Bureau, Geneva)

George Baldwin (Cooperative Monitoring Center, NM)

Bent Noerby Bonde (Baltic Media Centre, Denmark)

Li Bin (Arms Control Program, Institute of International Studies, Tsinghua University)

Ruth Bonner (International Baccalaureate Organization)

Alicia Cabezudo (Ciudades Ecuadoras America Latina/Educating Cities in Argentina; Member of the International Advisory Board for the Hague Appeal for Peace)

Laurence Desvignes (International Committee of the Red Cross)

Sue Dobbyn (Critical Issues Forum, San Andreas High School, Las Cruces, NM; participant in Ms. Colleen Driscoll (The Kurtz Institute of Peacemaking)

Rosita Ericsson (Media Action International)

Kazunari Fujii (Sokka Gakkai International)

Jozef Goldblat (Institut Universitaire des Hautes Etudes Internationales, IUHEI/Senior Researcher, University of Geneva and UNIDIR)

Natalie Goldring (Executive Director, Program on General Disarmament, Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland)

Olena Gorova (Life-Links, Sweden)

Camille Grand (Université de Marne-la Vallée, France)

Magnus Haavelsrud (Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Norway)

Gerd Hagmeyer-Gaverus (SIPRI, Sweden)

Peter Herby (International Committee of the Red Cross)

Felicity Hill (Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, NY)

Ian Hill (International Baccalaureate Organization)

Pervez Hoodbhoy (Visiting Professor, Theory Group for Quarks, Hadrons and Nuclei, University of Maryland)

Catherine A. Odora Hoppers (University of Pretoria, South Africa)

Wayne Jacoby (Global Education Motivators, Chestnut Hill College, Philadelphia, PA (via videoconference)

Marguerite Kahrl (Artist, USA)

Anton Khlopkov (PIR Center, Moscow)

Bruce Larkin (University of California, Santa Cruz)

Ulrich Lehner (Ambassador, Geneva Centre for Security Policy)

John W.R. Leppingwell (CNS Assistant Director for Information and Education Technology, Monterey Institute for International Studies)

Arjun Makhijani (Institute for Energy and Environmental Research Takoma Park, MD)

Edouard Markiewicz (Media Action International)

Andrew Murray (Baker Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, Juniata College)

Eudora Pettigrew (Chair IAUP/UN Commission on Disarmament Education, Conflict Resolution and Peace and Member of the Executive Committee of the International Association of University Presidents)

Sara Poelhman-Doumbouya (Women's International League for Peace & Freedom)

Betty Reardon (Peace Education Program, Hague Appeal for Peace)

Jenni Rissanen (former Geneva analyst for Disarmament Diplomacy)

Margherita Romanelli (Instituto d'Alti Studi Internazionai di Reggio Emilia, Italy)

Amy Sands (Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies)

Ben Sanders (Executive Chairman of the New York office, Programme for the Promotion of Nuclear Nonproliferation (PPNN)

Benedikt Schoenborg (Soka Gakkai Suisse)

John Simpson (University of Southampton, UK)

Bernard Sitt (Centre d'Etudes de Sécurité Internationale et de Maîtrise des armaments, Université de Marne-la Vallée. France)

Elton Skendaj (DDA/Hague Appeal for Peace Gramsh project, Albania)

Emily Slater (Quaker UN Office, Geneva)

Kathleen Sullivan (Metro Area Coordinator, Nuclear Education Project, Educators for Social Responsibility)

James Tanis (Bougainvillean peace process, Papua New Guinea)

Massoumeh Torfeh (BBC World Service, London)

Antonio Torrenzano (Institut d'Etat Technologique Leopoldo Nobili, Italy)

Fred Wehling (Education Coordinator, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies)

Cora Weiss (International Peace Bureau and Hague Appeal for Peace)

ANNEX III

Composition of the Group of Governmental Experts on identifying and tracing illicit small arms and light weapons

- Ibrahim Abdul-Hak Neto, Secretary at the Division of Disarmament and Sensitive Technologies, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brasilia
- Alhassan Chado Akoji, Brigadier General, Ministry of Defense, Garki-Abuja, Nigeria
- Terrence Austin, Chief of the National Tracing Center, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Washington, D.C.
- Kofi A. Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations, New York
- Contrôleur Général des Armées, Etienne Bosquillon de Jenlis, Ministry of Defense, Paris
- Fu Cong, Counsellor, Department of Arms Control and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing,
- Ahmed Darwish, Ambassador, of Egypt to Namibia, Windhoek
- Lyubomir Ivanov, Director of Nato and International Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sofia
- Tariq Javed, Section Officer (Disarmament), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad
- Karen Kastner, Manager of Policy and Strategic Issues, Canadian Air Transport and Security Authority, Ottawa
- Ambeyi Ligabo, Head of International Organizations, Conferences, and Small Arms Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Nairobi
- B. J. Lombard, Political Counsellor, Permanent Mission of the Republic of South Africa to the CD, Geneva
- Lt. Col. (ret) José Rufino Menéndez Hernández, Centre for Disarmament and International Security Studies, Havana
- Miroslava Olaguidel Dominguez, Ministry of Navy, Mexico City
- Guy Sander, Senior Investigator Officer, H. M. Customs and ExciseLaw Enforcement Investigation, Custom House, London
- Toshio Sano, Minister, Permanent Mission of Japan to the CD, Geneva
- Police Col. Naras Savestanan, Superintendent, Interpol, Bangkok
- Dirk Jan Smit, Customs Policy and Legislation Department, Ministry of Finance, The Hague
- Rakesh Sood, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of India to the CD, Geneva
- Errol Strong, Assistant Commissioner of Police and Security Liaison Officer,

Embassy of Jamaica, Washington, D.C.

Stefano Toscano, First Secretary, Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the United Nations, New York

Graciela Uribe de Lozano, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bogota

Vladimir Ivanovich Yermakov, Director for Arms and Technology Transfer Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow

ANNEX IV

Publications and other materials of the Department for Disarmament Affairs or produced in collaboration with the Department.

The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, vol. 26: 2001 (Sales No. E.02.IX.1)

DDA Update, March-April 2002

DDA Update, June-July 2002

DDA Update, September-October 2002

Occasional Paper No. 6, A Disarmament Agenda for the twenty-first century, October 2002. (UN-China Disarmament Conference, 2-4April2002).

Disarmament and children, May 2002

Disarmanent and Non-Proliferation Education – Launch of the UN Study, 9
October 2002

Disarmament Resolutions and Decisions of the Fifty-seventh Session of the United Nations General Assembly, December 2002

Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC)

African Peace Bulletin/Bulletin Africain de la Paix, August-September-October 2002, Special Issue No. 27

Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC)

Regional Perspectives #3:

United Nations Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures:
Participation by Latin America and the Caribbean

Regional Perspectives # 4:

United Nations Register of Conventional Arms: Participation by Latin
American and Caribbean States

Regional Perspectives # 5:

International Seminar on Illicit Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons: Understanding of the Problem

ANNEX V

Publications of UNIDIR

Research reports

- Project Coast: Apartheid's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme, by Chandre Gould and Peter Folb, 2002, 312p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.02.0.10.
- Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Time for Control, by Taina Susiluoto, 2002, 176p., United Nations publication Sales No. GV.E.02.0.7.
- Le Conseil de sécurité a l'aube du XXIième siècle: quelle volontéet quelle capacité a-t-il de maintenir la paix et la sécurité internationales?, par Pascal Teixeira, 2002, 106 p., United Nations, Sales No. GV.F.02.0.6.
- Costs of Disarmament Rethinking the Price Tag: A Methodological Inquiry into the Costs and Benefits of Arms Control, by Susan Willett, 2002, 70p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.02.0.3.
- Missile Defence, Deterrence and Arms Control: Contradictory aims or compatible goals?, in cooperation with Wilton Park, 2002, 39p., United Nations publication, UNIDIR/2002/4.

Disarmament Forum

One, 2002: NGOs as Partners

Two, 2002: Human Security in Latin America

ANNEX VI

List of symposia and panels sponsored by DDA

Asymmetrical warfare and the Revolution in Military Affairs, 25 January Biological Weapons Convention and Bio-Terrorism, 30 January


Disarmament and Development: New choices for security and prosperity, 29April

Panel launch of the United Nations Study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education, 9 October

Outer Space Treaty at Thirty Five, 14 October

Tenth Anniversary of the Register of Conventional Arms, 15 October





APPENDIX I

Status of multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements

The data contained in this appendix have been furnished by the depositaries of the treaties or agreements concerned, as follows:

Secretary-General of the United Nations

Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques.

Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.

Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction.

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction.

Canada and Hungary

Treaty on Open Skies.

France

Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.

Mexico

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco).

Netherlands

Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty).

Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity

African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty).

Organization of American States

Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials.

Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions. Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America

Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water.

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof.

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.

Thailand

Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Bangkok Treaty).

United States of America

Antarctic Treaty.

Secretary General of the Forum Secretariat

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga).

Inclusion of information concerning the treaties and agreements of which the Secretary-General is not the depositary is as reported by the respective depositaries and implies no position on the part of the United Nations with respect to the data reported.

The total number of parties has been calculated on the basis of information received from the depositaries.

Actions reported in the period 1 January to 31 December 2002

The following list shows actions reported, if any, during the period 1 January to 31 December 2002 with regard to multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements.^a

Accession is indicated by (a), acceptance by (A), approval by (AA) and succession by (s). In the case of multi-depositary clauses, depositary action may be completed with one or more of the several depositaries. The letters "O", "B", "M", "L", and "W" indicate where the reported action was completed: "O" for Ottawa, "B" for Budapest, "M" for Moscow, "L" for London, and "W" for Washington.

Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare

SIGNED AT GENEVA: 17 June 1925

ENTERED INTO FORCE: for each signatory as from the date of deposit of its ratification; accessions take effect on the date of the notification by the depositary Government

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENT: France

NEW PARTIES:None

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 132

The Antarctic Treaty

SIGNED AT WASHINGTON: 1 December 1959

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 23 June 1961

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENT: United States of America

NEW PARTIES:None

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 45

Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water

SIGNED BY THE ORIGINAL PARTIES^b IN MOSCOW: 5 August 1963

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 8 August 1963

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 10 October 1963

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W)

NEW PARTIES:None

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 124

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 27 January 1967 ENTERED INTO FORCE: 10 October 1967

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W)

NEW PARTIES:None

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 97

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT MEXICO CITY: 14 February 1967
ENTERED INTO FORCE: for each Government individually

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENT: Mexico

NEW PARTIES: Cuba

Cuba —23 October

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 39°

Amendment to article 7^d

NEW RATIFICATIONS: None

Amendment to article 25^e

NEW RATIFICATIONS: El Salvador —14 January

Amendment to articles 14, 15, 16, 19 and 20f

NEW RATIFICATIONS: None

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 1 July 1968

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 5 March 1970

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W)

NEW PARTIES: Cuba (M) (a) —4 November

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 188

Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 11 February 1971

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 18 May 1972

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W)

NEW PARTIES:None

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 92

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 10 April 1972

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 26 March 1975

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom of Great

Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W)

NEW PARTIES: Holy See (W) (a) —4 January
Morocco (L) —21 March

Morocco (L) —21 March
Mali —25 November

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 147

Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT GENEVA: 18 May 1977

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 5 October 1978

DEPOSITARY: The Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW PARTIES: Lithuania (a) —16 April
Panama (a) —13 May

Armenia (a) —15 May

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 69

Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT NEW YORK: 18 December 1979

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 11 July 1984

DEPOSITARY: The Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW PARTIES: gNone

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 10

Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT NEW YORK: 10 April 1981

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 2 December 1983

DEPOSITARY: The Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW PARTIES: Morocco —19 March
Albania (a) —28 August

Albania (a)
TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 90

Amended Protocol II (entered into force on 3 December 1998)

 Morocco
 —19 March

 Croatia
 —25 April

 Latvia
 —22 August

 Albania
 —28 August

 Slovenia
 —3 December

TOTAL NUMBER OF ACCEPTANCES: 68

Protocol IV (entered into force on 30 July 1998)

Morocco —19 March
Croatia —25 April
Albania —28 August
Guatemala —30 August
Slovenia —3 December
Mauritius —24 December

TOTAL NUMBER OF ACCEPTANCES: 67

Amendment to Article 1 of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons

PARTIES: Canada (A) —22 July
United Kingdom (A) —25 July
Australia (A) —3 December
Sweden (A) —3 December
Holy See (A)i —9 December

France (AA) —10 December Hungary —27 December

NUMBER OF PARTIES: 7

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga)

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT RAROTONGA: 6 August 1985

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 11 December 1986

DEPOSITARY: The Secretary-General of the Forum Secretariat

NEW PARTIES:None

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 17

Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty)

SIGNED AT PARIS: 19 November 1990 ENTERED INTO FORCE: 9 November 1992 DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENT: Netherlands

NEW PARTIES:None

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 30 Agreement on Adaptation

ADOPTED AND SIGNED AT ISTANBUL: 19 November 1999

NOT YET IN FORCE^k
NEW SIGNATORIES: None
NEW RATIFICATIONS: None
TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 1

Treaty on Open Skies

SIGNED AT HELSINKI: 24 March 1992

NOT YET IN FORCE

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Canada and Hungary

NEW RATIFICATIONS: Sweden^m (O), (B) (a) —28 June Finland (B) (a) —12 December (O) (a) —13 December

Latvia (O) —13 December

TOTAL NUMBER OF RATIFICATIONS: 29

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction

SIGNED AT PARIS: 13 January 1993 ENTERED INTO FORCE: 29 April 1997

DEPOSITARY: The Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW PARTIES: Saint Vincent & the Grenadines —18 September

Samoa —27 September
Thailand —10 December

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 148

Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty)

SIGNED AT BANGKOK: 15 December 1995 ENTERED INTO FORCE: 27 March 1997 DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENT: Thailand

NEW PARTIES:None

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 10

African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty)

SIGNED AT CAIRO: 11 April 1996

NOT YET IN FORCEⁿ

DEPOSITARY: The Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity

NEW SIGNATORIES: None

TOTAL NUMBER OF SIGNATORIES: 55

NEW RATIFICATIONS: Lesotho —14 March

NEW RATIFICATIONS: 1

TOTAL NUMBER OF RATIFICATIONS: 20°

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT NEW YORK: 24 September 1996

NOT YET IN FORCEP

DEPOSITARY: The Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW SIGNATORIES: Botswana —16 September

TOTAL NUMBER OF SIGNATORIES: 166

NEW RATIFICATIONS: San Marino —12 March

Burkina Faso —17 April
Venezuela —13 May
Kazakhstan —14 May
Niger —9 September
Georgia —27 September
Samoa —27 September
Botswana —28 October

TOTAL NUMBER OF RATIFICATIONS: 97

Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT WASHINGTON, D.C.: 14 November 1997

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 1 July 1998

DEPOSITARY: Organization of American States

NEW PARTIES:^q Grenada —16 January

Venezuela —14 May

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 16

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Mine-Ban Convention)

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT OTTAWA: 3 December 1997

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 1 March 1999

DEPOSITARY: The Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW PARTIES:^r

Democratic Republic of Congo (a)-2 May

Suriname

-23 May —5 July

Angola Afghanistan (a)

—11 September

Cameroon Comoros (a) -19 September -19 September

Gambia

-23 September

Central African Republic (a) -8 November

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 130

Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT GUATEMALA CITY: 7 June 1999

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 21 November 2002 DEPOSITARY: Organization of American States

NEW SIGNATORIES: None

NEW RATIFICATIONS: El Salvador -8 March

Paraguay Peru

-22 October -25 November

TOTAL NUMBER OF RATIFICATIONS: 7

Signatory or party reported	Antarctic Treaty	BW	Celestial Bodies	СТВТ	cwc	Geneva Protocol	NPT	Outer Space	PTBT	SeaBed
Afghanistan		s r			s	r	s r	s r	s r	s r
Albania		r		s	s r	r	r	·		
Algeria		r		S	s r	r	r	r	S	г
Andorra				s			r			
Angola				s		r	r		·	
Antigua and Barbuda				S		r	r	r	r	r
Argentina	s r	s r		s r	s r	r	r	s r	s r	s r
Armenia		r		S	s r		r		r	
Australia	s r	s r	r	s r	s r	r	s r	s r	s r	s r
Austria	r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r
Azerbaijan				s r	s r		r			
Bahamas		r			s		r	r	r	r
Bahrain		r		s	s r	r	r	<u> </u>		

Signatory or party reported	Antarctic Treaty	вw	Celestial Bodies	СТВТ	CWC	Geneva Protocol	NPT	Outer Space	РТВТ	SeaBed
Bangladesh		r		s t	s r	r	r	r	r	
Barbados		s r				L	s r	r		
Belarus		s r		s r	s r		r	s r	s r	s r
Belgium	s r	s t		s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r
Belize		r		s			r			
Benin		s r		s r	s r	r	s r	r	s r	s r
Bhutan		r			s	r	г		r	
Bolivia		s r		s r	s r	r	s r	s	s r	s
Bosnia and Herzegovina		r		s	s r		r		r	r
Botswana		s r		s r	r		s r	s	r	s r
Brazil	r	s r		s r	s r	s r	r	s r	s r	s r
Brunei Darussalam		r		s	s r		r			
Bulgaria	r	s r		s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r

Signatory or party reported	Antarctic Treaty	BW	Celestial Bodies	СТВТ	cwc	Geneva Protocol	NPT	Outer Space	РТВТ	SeaBed
Burkina Faso		r		s r	s r	r	s r	s r	s	
Burundi		s		S	s r		r	s	s	S
Cambodia		s r		s г	s	r	r			S
Cameroon				S	s r	r	s r	S	S	S
Canada	r	s r		s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r
Cape Verde		r		s	s	r	r		r	r
Central African Republic		S		s	s	r	r	s	r	s r
Chad				s	s		s r		s r	
Chile	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	r	s r	s г	
China	r	r		s	s r	r	ı	г		r
Colombia	r	s r		s	s r		s r	s	s r	s
Comoros				s	s		r			
Congo		r		s	s		r			r

Signatory or party reported	Antarctic Treaty	ВW	Celestial Bodies	ствт	cwc	Geneva Protocol	NPT	Outer Space	РТВТ	SeaBed
Cook Islands				S	s r					
Costa Rica		s r		s r	s r		s r		s r	s
Côte d'Ivoire		s		s	s r	r	s r		s r	r
Croatia		r		s r	s r		r		r	
Cuba	r	s r			s r	r	r	r		r
Cyprus		s r		S	s r	r	s r	s r	s r	s r
Czech Republic	r	r		s t	s r	r	r	r	r	r
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	r	r				r	r			
Democratic Republic of the Congo		s r		S	s		s r	S	s r	
Denmark	r	s r		s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r
Djibouti				s	s		r			
Dominica		r			s r		r			

Signatory or party reported	Antarctic Treaty	вw	Celestial Bodies	СТВТ	cwc	Geneva Protocol	NPT	Outer Space	PTBT	SeaBed
Dominican Republic		s r		s	s	r	s r	s r	s r	s r
Ecuador	r	s r		s r	s r	r	s r	s r	s r	
Egypt		S		S		s r	s r	s r	s r	
El Salvador		s r		s r	s r	s	s r	s r	s r	
Equatorial Guinea		r		S	s r	r	r	r	r	S
Eritrea					r		r			
Estonia	r	r		s r	s r	s r	r	-		
Ethiopia		s r		S	s r	s r	s r	s	S	s r
Fiji		s r		s r	s r	r	r	r	r	
Finland	r	s r		s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r
France	s r	r	s	s r	s r	s г	r	s r		
Gabon		S		s r	ѕ г		r		s t	
Gambia		s r		:	s r	r	s r	s	r	s

Signatory or party reported	Antarctic Treaty	вw	Celestial Bodies	СТВТ	cwc	Geneva Protocol	NPT	Outer Space	РТВТ	SeaBed
Georgia		r		s r	s r		r			
Germany	r	s r		s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r
Ghana		s r		S	s r	r	s r	s	s r	s r
Greece	t	s r		s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r
Grenada		r		s r	s	r	г			
Guatemala	r	s r	s	S	s	r	s r		s r	s r
Guinea				s	s r		r			S
Guinea-Bissau		r		S	S	r	r	r	r	r
Guyana		s		s r	s r		r	s		
Haiti		s		s	s		s r	s	s	
Holy See		r		s r	s r	r	r	s		
Honduras		s r		S	s		s r	s	s r	S
Hungary	r	s r		s r	s r	r	s r	s r	s r	s r

Signatory or party reported	Antarctic Treaty	BW	Celestial Bodies	СТВТ	cwc	Geneva Protocol	NPT	Outer Space	РТВТ	SeaBed
Iceland		s r		s r	s r	r	s r	s r	s r	s r
India	r	s r	s		s r	s r		s r	s r	r
Indonesia		s r		s	s r	r	s r	S	s r	
Iran (Islamic Republic of)		s r		S	s r	r	s r	S	s r	s r
Iraq		s r				r	s r	s r	s r	s r
Ireland		s r		s r	s r	r	s r	s r	s r	s r
Israel				s	s	r		s r	s r	
Italy	r	s r		s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r
Jamaica		г		s г	s r	r	s r	s r	s r	s r
Japan	s r	s r		s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r
Jordan		s r		s r	г	r	s r	s	s r	s r
Kazakhstan			r	s r	s r		r	r		
Kenya		r		s r	S T	r	s r	r	r	

Signatory or party reported	Antarctic Treaty	BW	Celestial Bodies	СТВТ	cwc	Geneva Protocol	NPT	Outer Space	РТВТ	SeaBed
Kiribati				s r	r		r			
Kuwait		s r		S	s r	r	s r	r	s r	
Kyrgyzstan				S	s		r			
Lao People's Democratic Republic		s r		s r	s r	r	s r	s r	s r	s r
Latvia		r		s r	s r	r	r			r
Lebanon		SГ				r	s r	s r	s r	s
Lesotho		s r		s r	s r	r	s r	s		s r
Liberia		s		S	S	r	s r		s r	s
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya		r		s		r	s r	r	s r	r
Liechtenstein		r		s	s r	r	r			r
Lithuania		r		s r	s r	s r	r			
Luxembourg		s r		s r	s r	s r	s r	s	s r	s r

Signatory or party reported	Antarctic Treaty	вw	Celestial Bodies	СТВТ	cwc	Geneva Protocol	NPT	Outer Space	РТВТ	SeaBed
Madagascar		s		s	S	r	s r	r	s r	s
Malawi		S		s	s r	г	r		r	
Malaysia		s r		s	s r	r	s r	s	s r	s r
Maldives		r		s r	s r	r	s r			
Mali		s r		s r	s r		s r	Т	S	s
Malta		s r		s r	s r	t	s r		r	s r
Marshall Islands				s	s		r			
Mauritania				s	s r		r		s r	
Mauritius		s r			s r	r	s r	г	r	s r
Mexico		s r	r	s r	s r	r	s r	s r	s r	r
Micronesia (Federated States of)				s r	s r		r			
Monaco		r		s т	s r	г	r			
Mongolia		s r		s r	s r	r	s r	s r	s r	s r

Signatory or party reported	Antarctic Treaty	BW	Celestial Bodies	СТВТ	cwc	Geneva Protocol	NPT	Outer Space	ртвт	SeaBed
Morocco		s r	s r	s r	s r	r	s r	г	s r	s r
Mozambique				S	r		r			
Myanmar		S		s	s		r	s r	s r	s
Namibia				s r	s r		r			
Nauru				s r	s r		r			
Nepal		s		s	s r	r	s r	s r	s r	s r
Netherlands	r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r
New Zealand	s r	s r		s г	s r	r	s г	s г	s r	s г
Nicaragua		s r		s r	s r	s r	s r	s	S T	s r
Niger		s r		s r	s r	r	r	s r	s r	s r
Nigeria		s r		s r	s r	r	s r	r	s r	
Niue										
Norway	s r	s r		s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r

Signatory or party reported	Antarctic Treaty	BW	Celestial Bodies	СТВТ	cwc	Geneva Protocol	NPT	Outer Space	РТВТ	SeaBed
Oman		r		S	s r		r			
Pakistan		s r	r		s r	r		s r	s r	
Palau							r			
Panama		s r		s r	s r	г	s r	s	s r	s r
Papua New Guinea	r	r		s	s t	r	r	r	r	
Paraguay		r		s r	s r	r	s r		s	s
Peru	r	s r	s	s r	s r	r	s r	s r	s r	
Philippines		s r	s r	s r	s r	r	s r	s	s r	r
Poland	r	s r		s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r
Portugal		s r		s r	s r	s r	r	r	S	r
Qatar		s r		s r	s r	r	r			r
Republic of Korea	r	s r		s r	s r	r	s r	s r	s r	s r
Republic of Moldova				s	s r		r			

Signatory or party reported	Antarctic Treaty	BW	Celestial Bodies	СТВТ	cwc	Geneva Protocol	NPT	Outer Space	РТВТ	SeaBed
Romania	r	s r	s	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r
Russian Federation	s r	s r		s r	s r	r	s r	s r	s r	s r
Rwanda		s r			s	r	r	s	s r	s r
Saint Kitts and Nevis		r			S	r	r			
Saint Lucia		r		s r	s r	r	r			
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines		r			s r	r	r	r		r
Samoa				s r	s r		r		s r	
San Marino		s r		s r	s r		s t	s r	s r	
Sao Tome and Principe		r		s			r			r
Saudi Arabia		s r			s t	r	r	r		s r
Senegal		s r		s r	s r	r	s r		s r	S
Seychelles		r		S	s r		r	r	r	r

Signatory or party reported	Antarctic Treaty	BW	Celestial Bodies	СТВТ	cwc	Geneva Protocol	NPT	Outer Space	РТВТ	SeaBed
Sierra Leone		s r		s r	s	r	r	s r	s r	s
Singapore		s r		s r	s r		s r	r	r	s r
Slovakia	r	r		s r	s r	r	r	r	r	r
Slovenia		r		s r	s r		r		r	r
Solomon Islands		r		S		r	r			r
Somalia		s					s r	s	S	
South Africa	s r	s r		s r	s r	r	r	s r	r	s r
Spain	r	s r		s r	s r	s r	r	r	s r	r
Sri Lanka		s r		s	s r	r	s r	s r	s r	
Sudan					r	r	s r		s r	S
Suriname		r		S	s r		r		r	
Swaziland		r		s	s r	r	s r		r	s r
Sweden	r	s r		s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r

Signatory or party reported	Antarctic Treaty	ВW	Celestial Bodies	ствт	cwc	Geneva Protocol	NPT	Outer Space	РТВТ	SeaBed
Switzerland	r	s r		s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r
Syrian Arab Republic		S				r	s r	r	s r	
Tajikistan				s r	s r		г			
Thailand		sг		s	S T	s r	r	s r	s r	
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia		r		s r	r		г			
Togo		s r		s	s г	r	s r	s r	s г	s r
Tonga		r				r	r	r	r	
Trinidad and Tobago					r	r	s r	s	s r	
Tunisia		s r		s	s r	r	s г	s г	s r	s r
Turkey	r	s r		s r	s r	s г	s r	s r	s r	s r
Turkmenistan		r		s r	s r		r			

Signatory or party reported	Antarctic Treaty	ВW	Celestial Bodies	ствт	CWC	Geneva Protocol	NPT	Outer Space	РТВТ	SeaBed
Tuvalu							r			
Uganda		r		s r	s r	r	r	r	s r	
Ukraine	r	s r		s r	s r		r	s r	s r	s r
United Arab Emirates		s		s r	s r		Г	г		
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	s r	s r		s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r
United Republic of Tanzania		s			s r	r	r		s r	s
United States of America	s r	s r		S	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r
Uruguay	r	r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s
Uzbekistan		r		s r	s r		r			
Vanuatu		Γ		s			r			

Signatory or party reported	Antarctic Treaty	BW	Celestial Bodies	СТВТ	cwc	Geneva Protocol	NPT	Outer Space	РТВТ	SeaBed
Venezuela	г	s r		s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	
Viet Nam		r		s	s r	r	r	r		r
Yemen		s r		s	s r	r	s r	r	s r	s r
Yugoslavia		s r		s	г	s r	s r	s	s r	s r
Zambia				s	s r		r	r	r	r
Zimbabwe		r		s	s r		r			

			Protocols	s to the Conve	ntion on Certai	n Conventions	l Weapons		
Signatory or party reported	CCW	Amendment to Article 1 of the CCW	P. 1	P.H	P.III	Amended P. II	P. IV	ENMOD	Mine-Ban Convention
Afghanistan	s		_		-			r	r
Albania	r		х	х	х	х	х		sr
Algeria			-	-		-		r	sr
Andorra			-	_					sr
Angola			_	_		_			sr
Antigua and Barbuda			-	-	_	-	_	r	sr
Argentina	s r		х	x	x	х	x	r	sr
Armenia			_	_	_	-		r	
Australia	s r	r	x	х	x	х	х	s r	sr
Austria	s r		х	х	x	x	x	r	sr
Azerbaijan			_	_			_		

			Protocols	to the Conver	ition on Certai	n Conventiona	l Weapons		
Signatory or party reported	ccw	Amendment to Article 1 of the CCW	P. I	P.II	P.III	Amended P. II	P. IV	ENMOD	Mine-Ban Convention
Bahamas			-	-	_	_	_		sr
Bahrain			_	_		_			
Bangladesh	r		х	х	x	х	x	r	sr
Barbados			_	_		_	_		sr
Belarus	s r		х	х	х	_	x	sr	
Belgium	s r		x	х	x	х	x	sr	sr
Belize			_	_	_		_		sr
Benin	r		х	_	х	_	_	sг	sr
Bhutan			_		_	-	_		
Bolivia	r		х	х	х	х	x	s	sr
Bosnia and Herzegovina	r		х	х	х	х	х		sr
Botswana			_	-	_	_	-		sr

			Protocols	to the Conve	ntion on Certai	n Conventions	l Weapons		
Signatory or party reported	ccw	Amendment to Article I of the CCW	P. I	P.II	P.III	Amended P. II	P. IV	ENMOD	Mine-Ban Convention
Brazil	r		х	x	х	х	х	sr	ST
Brunei Darussalam			_	_	_	_	_		s
Bulgaria	s r		x	х	х	х	x	s r	sr
Burkina Faso			-	_		_	_		sr
Burundi			_	_		_			s
Cambodia	r		х	х	x	х	х		s r
Cameroon			-	_			_		sr
Canada	s r	г	х	х	x	x ·	x	s r	sr
Cape Verde	r		х	х	х	х	x	r	sr
Central African Republic			_		_	_			r
Chad			_	_	_	_	_		s r

		P		s to the Conve	ntion on Certai	in Conventions	l Weapons		
Signatory or party reported	ccw	Amendment to Article 1 of the CCW	P.I	P.II	P.III	Amended P. II	P. IV	ENMOD	Mine-Ban Convention
Chile			_	_	_	_		r	sr
China	s r		х	х	х	x	х		
Colombia	r		х	х	х	x	х		sr
Comoros			_	_	_	_	-		r
Congo			_	_	_	_			r
Cook Islands			_	-	_	-	-		s
Costa Rica	r		х	х	х	x	x -	r	s r
Côte d'Ivoire			_	_	-	-	_		sr
Croatia	r		х	х	х	х	х		sr
Cuba	s r		х	х	x	_	_	sr	
Cyprus	r		x	х	x	-		sr	S
Czech Republic	r		х	x	x	x	x	sr	sr

			Protocols	to the Conver	ntion on Certai	n Conventiona	l Weapons		
Signatory or party reported	ccw	Amendment to Article 1 of the CCW	P. I	P.II	P.III	Amended P. II	P. IV	ENMOD	Mine-Ban Convention
Democratic People's Republic of Korea			_					r	
Democratic Republic of the Congo			_	_	_	_	_	s	r
Denmark	s r		х	х	х	x	х	sr	sr
Djibouti	r		х	х	х				sr
Dominica			_	_	-	_		r	sr
Dominican Republic									sr
Ecuador	sr		х	х	x	х			sr
Egypt	s			-	_	_		r	
El Salvador	r		х	х	x	х	х		sr
Equatorial Guinea			_	_	_	-	_		г

			Protocols	to the Conver	ntion on Certai	n Conventiona	l Weapons		
Signatory or party reported	ccw	Amendment to Article 1 of the CCW	P. I	P.II	P.III	Amended P. II	P. IV	ENMOD	Mine-Ban Convention
Eritrea			_	_	_	_	_		r
Estonia	r		х	_	х	x	x		
Ethiopia			_		_	_	_	s	s
Fiji			_	_	_	_	-		sr
Finland	s r		х	x	x	x	x	sr	
France	s r	r	х	х		х	х		sr
Gabon			_	_	****		-		sr
Gambia			_	-	-	_	_		sr
Georgia	r		х	х	x	_			
Germany	s r		х	х	х	х	х	sr	sr
Ghana			-	-	_	_	-	sr	sr
Greece	sr		х	x	x	х	х	r	s

			Protocols	to the Conver	ition on Certai	n Conventiona	il Weapons		
Signatory or party reported	ccw	Amendment to Article 1 of the CCW	P. I	P.II	P.III	Amended P. II	P. IV	ENMOD	Mine-Ban Convention
Grenada	1			_	_	_	_		sr
Guatemala	r		х	x	x	х	х	r	sr
Guinea			-	-	_	_	_		sr
Guinea-Bissau			_	_	_	_	_		sr
Guyana			_	_	_	_	_		s
Haiti			_	_		_			S
Holy See	r	r	х	x	x	х	х	S	sr
Honduras				-	_	_	_		sr
Hungary	s r	r	х	х	x	x	х	sr	sr
Iceland	s		_	_	_	_		s	sr
India	s r		х	х	х	x	х	sr	
Indonesia			-	_	_		-		s

			Protocols	to the Conver	ntion on Certai	n Conventiona	l Weapons		
Signatory or party reported	ccw	Amendment to Article 1 of the CCW	P. I	P.II	P.III	Amended P. II	P, IV	ENMOD	Mine-Ban Convention
Iran (Islamic Republic of)			: 			_		s	
Iraq			_	-	-		_	s	
Ireland	s r		х	х	x	х	х	sr	sr
Israel	r		x	х	_	х	x		
Italy	sr		х	х	х	х	х	sr	sr
Jamaica				-	_	_	_		sr
Japan	s r		х	х	x	х	х	r	sr
Jordan	r		х	-	х	х	_		sr
Kazakhstan			-	_	-	_	_		
Kenya				_	_	_	_		sr
Kiribati					_				r

		-	Protocols	to the Conver	l Weapons				
Signatory or party reported	ccw	Amendment to Article 1 of the CCW	P. I	P.II	P.JII	Amended P. II	P. IV	ENMOD	Mine-Ban Convention
Kuwait	.,,,,		_		_	_	-	r	
Kyrgyzstan	· · ·		_	_	_	_	_		
Lao People's Democratic Republic	r		x	х	х			sr	
Latvia	r		x	x	х	x	х		
Lebanon			_		_	_	_	s	
Lesotho	г		х	х	x	_	_		sr
Liberia			_		_		_	s	r
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya					_	_	_		
Liechtenstein	sr		x	х	x	х	х		sr
Lithuania	r		х	_	х	х	x	r	s
Luxembourg	sr		х	х	х	х	х	s	sr

			Protocols	to the Conver	ition on Certai	n Conventions	il Weapons		
Signatory or party reported	ccw	Amendment to Article I of the CCW	P. I	P.II	P.III	Amended P. II	P. IV	ENMOD	Mine-Ban Convention
Madagascar			_	_	_		_		sr
Malawi			_			_	_	r	sr
Malaysia			_	_			-		sr
Maldives	r		x	_	х	х	х		sr
Mali	r		х	х	х	x	х		sr
Malta	r		х	x	x	_	_		sr
Marshall Islands			<u></u>	-	-	_	-		S
Mauritania			_	_	_		_		sr
Mauritius	r		х	х	х	x	x	r	sr
Mexico	s r		х	х	х	_	x		sr
Micronesia (Federated States of)			_		_	_	-		

Signatory or party reported			Protocols	to the Conver	l Weapons				
	ccw	Amendment to Article I of the CCW	P. I	P.II	P.III	Amended P. II	P. IV	ENMOD	Mine-Ban Convention
Monaco	r		х	_		х	_		sr
Mongolia	sr		x	х	х	_	х	sr	
Morocco	s r	i	-	х		х	х	s	
Mozambique			_	_	_	_	-		sr
Myanmar			_	_		_			
Namibia			_		_	-	_		sr
Nauru	r		х	х	х	х	х		r
Nepal			-	-	_	_	_		
Netherlands	s r		х	х	х	х	х	sr	sr
New Zealand	s r		х	x	х	х	х	r	sr
Nicaragua	s r		-	-	_	х	х	s	sr
Niger	r		х	х	х	-		r	sr

			Protocols	to the Conver	l Weapons				
Signatory or party reported	ccw	Amendment to Article 1 of the CCW	P. I	Р.П	P.III	Amended P. II	P. IV	ENMOD	Mine-Ban Convention
Nigeria	s			_	_		_		r
Niue			_		_	_	_		sr
Norway	s r		x	х	х	х	х	sr	sr
Oman			_	_	_		_		
Pakistan	sr		х	х	х	х	х	r	
Palau			_	-	_	_	****		
Panama	r		x	х	х	х	х	r	sr
Papua New Guinea			_	_	_		_	r	
Paraguay			_	_	_	_	_		sr
Peru	r		x		х	х	х		sr
Philippines	s r		х	х	x	х	х		sr
Poland	sr		х	х	х		_	sr	s

			Protocols	to the Conve	l Weapons				
Signatory or party reported	ccw	Amendment to Article 1 of the CCW	P. I	P.II	P.III	Amended P. IJ	P. IV	ENMOD	Mine-Ban Convention
Portugal	sr		x	х	х	х	х	s	sr
Qatar				_	_				sr
Republic of Korea	r		х	-	. –	х	_	r	
Republic of Moldova	r		x	х	х	-	х		sr
Romania	s r		x	х	x		_	sr	sr
Russian Federation	s r		x	х	x	_	x	sr	
Rwanda			_	_		_	_		sr
Saint Kitts and Nevis			_	_	-	-	_		sr
Saint Lucia			_	_	_		_	r	sr
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines			_	_	_	_	_	r	sr
Samoa				_			_		sr

			Protocols	to the Conve	ition on Certai	n Conventions	l Weapons		
Signatory or party reported	ccw	Amendment to Article 1 of the CCW	P. I	P.II	P.III	Amended P. II	P. IV	ENMOD	Mine-Ban Convention
San Marino			_		_				sr
Sao Tome and Principe			_	-	_	_	_	r	s
Saudi Arabia			_	<u> </u>			-		
Senegal	r		_	_	x	х	_		s r
Seychelles	r		_	Ī-	-	х	x		sr
Sierra Leone	s				_	_	_	s	sr
Singapore			_	_	_	-	-		
Slovakia	r		х	х	x	x	х	r	sr
Slovenia	r		х	х	х	х	х		s r
Solomon Islands			_	-	_	_	-	r	sr
Somalia			_	_	_	_	_		
South Africa	r		х	х	х	х	х		sr

			Protocols	s to the Conver	ntion on Certai	n Conventiona	l Weapons		
Signatory or party reported	ccw	Amendment to Article I of the CCW	P. [P.II	P.III	Amended P. II	P. IV	ENMOD	Mine-Ban Convention
Spain	s r		х	х	x	х	х	sr	sr
Sri Lanka			_			_	-	sr	
Sudan	s		-	_	-	_	_		s
Suriname				-		_	_		sr
Swaziland			_	_	_	_	_		sr
Sweden	s r	r	х	x	x	х	х	r	sr
Switzerland	s r		x	х	х	х	х	r	sr
Syrian Arab Republic			_	-	_		_	s	
Tajikistan	r		_			x	x	r	r
Thailand			_	_	_	_	_		sr
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	г		х	х	х		_		г

			Protocol	s to the Conve	ntion on Certa	in Conventiona	al Weapons		
Signatory or party reported	ccw	Amendment to Article 1 of the CCW	P, I	P.II	P.III	Amended P. II	P. IV	ENMOD	Mine-Ban Convention
Togo	s r		х	х	х	_	_		sr
Tonga			_		_	_			
Trinidad and Tobago			_	-	_	-	-		sr
Tunisia	r		х	х	х		_	s r	sr
Turkey	s		х	х	x	-	-	s	
Turkmenistan			_	_	-	_	-		sr
Tuvalu			-	1-	_	_	-		
Uganda	r		х	x	х			s	sr
Ukraine	s r		х	х	х	x		sr	s
United Arab Emirates		1	_	-	-	-	_		

			Protocols	to the Conver	l Weapons				
Signatory or party reported	ccw	Amendment to Article 1 of the CCW	P.1	P.H	P.III	Amended P. II	P. 1V	ENMOD	Mine-Ban Convention
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	sr	г	х	x	х	х	х	sr	sr
United Republic of Tanzania									sт
United States of America	s r		х	х		х	_	sr	
Uruguay	r		x	х	х	x	х	r	sr
Uzbekistan	r		х	x	х	_	х	r	
Vanuatu			_	_	_	-	_		s
Venezuela			_	_		_	-		sr
Viet Nam	s		х	х	х	_	_	r	
Yemen			_	_	_	_		sr	sr

Composite table of signatories and parties to multilateral treaties - conventional weapons as of 31 December 2002, as reported by depositaries (continued)

(s) signed; (r) ratified (including acceptances, accessions, approvals, successions); (x) consent to be bound

			Protocol	ļ					
Signatory or party reported	ccw	Amendment to Article 1 of the CCW	P. I	P.II	P.III	Amended P. II	P. 1V	ENMOD	Mine-Ban Convention
Yugoslavia	s r		х	х	х	_			
Zambia			-	_	-	_	-		sr
Zimbabwe			-		-	_	-		sr

			CF	E					
Signatory or party reported	Treaty of Tlatelolco	Treaty of Rarotonga	1992	1999 s	Open Skies	Bangkok Treaty	Pelindaba Treaty	Firearms Convention	Convent'l. Acquisitions
Algeria							s r		
Angola							S		
Antigua and Barbuda	s r							S	
Argentina	s r							s r	S
Armenia			r						
Australia		s r							
Azerbaijan			r						
Bahamas	s r							s r	
Barbados	s r							S	
Belarus			r	r	s r				
Belgium			s r		s r				
Belize	s r							s r	

			CF	Æ		- ·			
Signatory or party reported	Treaty of Tlatelolco	Treaty of Rarotonga	1992	1999 s	Open Skies	Bangkok Treaty	Pelindaba Treaty	Firearms Convention	Convent'l. Acquisitions
Benin							s		
Bolivia	s r						1	s r	S
Botswana		-					s r		
Brazil	s r							s r	s
Brunei Darussalam						s r			
Bulgaria			s r		s r				
Burkina Faso							s r		
Burundi							s		-
Cambodia						s r			
Cameroon							s		
Canada			s r		s r			S	s r
Cape Verde						<u> </u>	s		
Central African Republic			,				S		

			CI	E					
Signatory or party reported	Treaty of Tlatelolco	Treaty of Rarotonga	1992	1999 s	Open Skies	Bangkok Treaty	Pelindaba Treaty	Firearms Convention	Convent'l. Acquisitions
Chad							s		
Chile	s r							s	s
China	s r	s r					s r		
	(A.P.II) ^t	(P.2 & 3) ^u	-				(P.I & II) ^v		
Colombia	s r				-			s	s
Comoros					-		s		
Congo							s		
Cook Islands		s r							
Costa Rica	s r							s r	s
Côte d'Ivoire							s r		
Cuba	s r								
Czech Republic			s r		s r				

			CI	FE					
Signatory or party reported	Treaty of Tlatelolco	Treaty of Rarotonga	1992	1999*	Open Skies	Bangkok Treaty	Pelindaba Treaty	Firearms Convention	Convent'l. Acquisitions
Democratic Republic of the Congo							S		
Denmark			s r		s r				
Djibouti							S		
Dominica	s r								S
Dominican Republic	s r							s	
Ecuador	s r							s r	s r
Egypt							S		·
El Salvador	s r							s r	s r
Eritrea							s		
Ethiopia	*					<u> </u>	S		
Fiji		s r							
Finland					r				

			CI	E					
Signatory or party reported	Treaty of Tlatelolco	Treaty of Rarotonga	1992	1999 s	Open Skies	Bangkok Treaty	Pelindaba Treaty	Firearms Convention	Convent'l. Acquisitions
France	s r	s r	s r		s r		s r		
	(A.P.I &sII) ^t	(P.1-3) ^u					(P.I-III) ^v		
Gabon							S		
Gambia							s r		
Georgia			r		s r				
Germany			s r		s r				
Ghana							S		
Greece			s r		s r				
Grenada	s r							s r	
Guatemala	s r							S	s r
Guinea						····	s r		
Guinea-Bissau							s		

	Т	Teacher of	CI	FE	0	Danahala	Pelindaba	Firearms	Convent'l.
Signatory or party reported	Treaty of Tlatelolco	Treaty of Rarotonga	1992	1999*	Open Skies	Bangkok Treaty	Treaty	Convention	Acquisitions
Guyana	s r							S	
Haiti	s r							s	S
Honduras	s r							s	S
Hungary			s r		s r				
Iceland			s r	-	s r				
Indonesia						s r			
Italy			s r		s r				
Jamaica	s r							s	
Kazakhstan			r						
Kenya							s r		
Kiribati		s r							_
Kyrgyzstan					s				

	70	T	CI	FE.	0		5 t 1 t	T	
Signatory or party reported	Treaty of Tlatelolco	Treaty of Rarotonga	1992	1999s	Open Skies	Bangkok Treaty	Pelindaba Treaty	Firearms Convention	Convent'l. Acquisitions
Lao People's Democratic Republic						s r			
Latvia					r				
Lesotho							s r		
Liberia							S		
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya							s		
Luxembourg			s r		s r				
Malawi							S		
Malaysia						s r			
Mali							s r		
Mauritania	1						s r		
Mauritius				<u> </u>			s r		
Mexico	s r							s r	s

			CI	FE .					_
Signatory or party reported	Treaty of Tlatelolco	Treaty of Rarotonga	1992	1999 s	Open Skies	Bangkok Treaty	Pelindaba Treaty	Firearms Convention	Convent'l. Acquisitions
Morocco		i					S		
Mozambique							s		
Myanmar						s r			
Namibia							s		
Nauru		s r							
Netherlands	s r		s r		s r				
	(A.P.I) ^t								
New Zealand		s r							
Nicaragua	s r							s r	S
Niger							s		
Nigeria							s r		
Niue		s r							
Norway			s r		s r				

			CI	PE					
Signatory or party reported	Treaty of Tlatelolco	Treaty of Rarotonga	1992	1999 s	Open Skies	Bangkok Treaty	Pelindaba Treaty	Firearms Convention	Convent'l. Acquisitions
Panama	s r							s r	
Papua New Guinea		s r							
Paraguay	s r						1	s r	s r
Peru	s r							s r	s r
Philippines						s r			
Poland	-		s r		s r				
Portugal			s r		s r				
Republic of Moldova			r						
Romania			s r		s r				
Russian Federation	s r	s r	s r		s r		s		
	(A.P.II) ^t	(P.2 & 3) ^u					(P.I & II) ^v		
Rwanda							s		

			CI	Έ					
Signatory or party reported	Treaty of Tiatelolco	Treaty of Rarotonga	1992	1999 s	Open Skies	Bangkok Treaty	Pelindaba Treaty	Firearms Convention	Convent'l. Acquisitions
Saint Kitts and Nevis	s r							s	
Saint Lucia	s r							S	
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	s r							S	
Samoa		s r							
Sao Tome and Principe							s		
Senegal							s		
Seychelles							s		
Sierra Leone							s		
Singapore					"	s r			
Slovakia			s r		s r				
Solomon Islands		s r							
South Africa							s r		

Signatory or party reported	Treaty of Tlateloico	Treaty of Rarotonga	CF 1992	E 1999 s	Open Skies	Bangkok Treaty	Pelindaba Treaty	Firearms Convention	Convent'l. Acquisitions
Spain			s r		s r	,			
Sudan			3 1		3 1				
Sudan							S		
Suriname	s r							s	
Swaziland							s r		
Sweden					r				
Thailand						s r			
Togo							s r		
Tonga		s r							
Trinidad and Tobago	s r							s	
Tunisia							s		
Turkey			s r		s r				
Tuvalu		s r							
Uganda							s		

Signatory or party reported	Treaty of Tlatelolco	Treaty of Rarotonga	CI 1992	FE 1999 ^s	Open Skies	Bangkok Treaty	Pelindaba Treaty	Firearms Convention	Convent'l. Acquisitions
Ukraine			r		s r				
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	s r	s r	s r		s r		s r		
	(A.P.I & II) ^t	(P.1-3) ^u					(P.I & II) ^v		
United Republic of Tanzania							s r		
United States of America	s r (A.P.I & II) ^t	s (P.1-3) ^u	s r		S T		s (P.I & II) ^v	S	S
Uruguay	s r							s r	s r
Vanuatu		s r							
Venezuela	s r							S T	S

	T		CFE						
Signatory or party reported	Treaty of Tlateloico	Treaty of Rarotonga	1992	1999s	Open Skies	Bangkok Treaty	Pelindaba Treaty	Firearms Convention	Convent'l. Acquisitions
Viet Nam						s r			
Zambia							s		
Zimbabwe							ѕг		

Notes:

- ^a The texts of treaties concluded up to 1992 are contained in Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements, 4th edition;: 1992, vols. 1 and 2 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.93.IX.11), in Status, 5th edition: 1996 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.97.IX.3), and thereafter in the relevant volumes of the United Nations Disarmament Yearbook. The texts and status data are also posted on the website of the Department for Disarmament Affairs: www.un.org/Depts/dda.
- ^b The original parties are the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States.
- ^c Total includes the five nuclear-weapon States and the Netherlands, which have ratified one or both of the Additional Protocols. The Treaty is fully in force for all the regional States that ratify it and waive the requirements under article 28.
- ^d Amendment adopted by the General Conference of OPANAL, pursuant to resolution 267 (E-V) of 3 July 1990.
- ^c Amendment adopted by the General Conference of OPANAL, pursuant to resolution 268 (XII) of 10 May 1991.
- f Amendment adopted by the General Conference of OPANAL, pursuant to resolution 290 (VII) of 26 August 1992.
 - g Article 19, paragraph 4, states:
 - "For each State depositing its instrument of ratification or accession after the entry into force of this Agreement, it shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date of deposit of any such instrument."
 - h Article 5, paragraphs 2 and 3, of the Convention state:
 - "2. For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force six months after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.
 - 3. Each of the Protocols annexed to this Convention shall enter into force six months after the date by which twenty States have notified their consent to be bound by it in accordance with paragraph 3 or 4 of Article 4 of this Convention."
- i "... declares the acceptance on the part of the Holy See of said amendment to Article 1 of the Convention, considering that in accordance with paragraph 4 of amended Article 1 the right of the Parties, "by all legitimate means, to maintain or re-establish law and order in the state or to defend the national unity and territorial integrity of the state" should be interpreted in conformity with international humanitarian law, the United Nations' Charter and other international rules."
- ^j Total includes nuclear-weapon States-China and the Russian Federation, which have ratified Protocols 2 and 3, and France and the United Kingdom, which have ratified Protocols 1-3.
 - ^k Article 31, paragraph 3, states:
 - "This Agreement on Adaptation shall enter into force 10 days after instruments of ratification have been deposited by all States Parties listed in the Preamble, after which time the Treaty shall exist only in its amended form."

¹ Article XVII, paragraph 2, states:

"This Treaty shall enter into force 60 days after the deposit of 20 instruments of ratification, including those of the Depositaries, and of States Parties whose individual allocation of passive quotas as set forth in Annex A is eight or more."

^m The Government of the Kingdom of Sweden declares that it undertakes faithfully to perform and carry out all stipulations therein contained with the reservation that the stipulations concerning taxation in Article 34 in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961, to which the Treaty refers, shall not apply to Swedish nationals or to persons who are resident in Sweden.

ⁿ Article 18, paragraph 2, states:

"It [this Treaty] shall enter into force on the date of deposit of the twenty-eighth instrument of ratification."

^o Total includes France, which has ratified Protocols I, II and III, and China and the United Kingdom which have ratified Protocols I and II.

p Article XIV, paragraph 1, states:

"This Treaty shall enter into force 180 days after the date of deposit of the instruments of ratification by all States listed in Annex II to this Treaty, but in no case earlier than two years after its opening for signature."

^q Article XXV, states:

"This Convention shall enter into force on the 30th day following the date of deposit of the second instrument of ratification. For each State ratifying the Convention after the deposit of the second instrument of ratification, the Convention shall enter into force on the 30th day following deposit by such State of its instrument of ratification."

^r Article 17, paragraph 2, states:

"For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or

accession."

⁸ Agreement on Adaptation.

^t A.P. means Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

^u P. means Protocol to the Treaty of Rarotonga.

^v P. means Protocol to the Pelindaba Treaty.

Fifth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

FINAL REPORT

Introduction

 The Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, in the section dealing with the review of Article XII of the Convention, contained the following decision:

"The Conference decides that a Fifth Review Conference shall be held in Geneva at the request of the majority of States Parties, or in any case, not later than 2001".1

- 2. By resolution 55/40, adopted without a vote on 20 November 2000, the General Assembly, *inter alia*, noted that, at the request of the States Parties, a Fifth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention would be held at Geneva from 19 November to 7 December 2001, and that, following appropriate consultations, a Preparatory Committee for that Conference had been formed, open to all States Parties to the Convention, and that the Preparatory Committee would meet in Geneva from 25 to 27 April 2001.
- 3. The Preparatory Committee held three meetings at Geneva from 25 to 27 April 2001. At its last meeting, on 27 April 2001, the Preparatory Committee adopted its report, which was issued as a pre-session document of the Conference (BWC/CONF.V/PC/1).

Organization of the Conference

4. In accordance with the decision of the Preparatory Committee, the Conference was convened on 19 November 2001 at the Palais des Nations in Geneva for a period of three weeks. At its sixth plenary meeting on 7 December 2001, the Conference decided by consensus to adjourn its proceedings and reconvene at Geneva from 11 to 22 November 2002. The organization, participation, work, documentation and decisions of the Conference during this initial session are recorded in the Interim Report (BWC/CONF.V/12), adopted on 7 December 2001.

¹ BWC/CONF.IV/9

5. In accordance with the decision of the Conference, a resumed session of the Conference was convened on 11 November 2002 at the Palais des Nations in Geneva.

Participation at the Conference

- 6. Participation at the initial session of the Conference is recorded in the Interim Report.
- 7. Ninety-four States Parties to the Convention participated in the resumed session of the Conference as follows: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Lithuania, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen and Yugoslavia.
- 8. In addition, four States that had signed the Convention but had not yet ratified it participated in the resumed session without taking part in the decision-making, as provided for in rule 44, paragraph 1 of the Rules of Procedure: Egypt, Madagascar, Myanmar, Nepal.
- 9. One State, Israel, neither Party nor Signatory to the Convention, participated in the resumed session as an Observer, in accordance with rule 44, paragraph 2 (a).
- 10. The United Nations, including the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), attended the resumed session of the Conference in accordance with rule 44, paragraph 3.
- 11. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the World Health Organization (WHO) participated in the resumed session as Observers. In addition, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (ICGEB), upon their request, were granted Observer status during the resumed session. Sixteen non-governmental organizations and research institutes attended the resumed session of the Conference under rule 44, paragraph 5.
- 12. Lists of all delegations to the Conference, at its initial and resumed sessions, are contained in documents BWC/CONF.V/INF.3 and BWC/CONF.V/INF.5 respectively.
- 13. The Credentials Committee held two meetings, and at its second meeting on 6 December 2001 adopted its report on the credentials of States Parties (BWC/CONF.V/CC/1).

Work of the Conference

- 14. The work of the Conference during its initial session is recorded in the Interim Report.
- 15. During the resumed session, the Conference held a further three plenary meetings, in addition to the six plenary meetings held during the initial session.
- 16. At its seventh plenary meeting on 11 November 2002, the Conference approved the cost estimates for the resumed session, as contained in BWC/CONF.V/13, and adopted the President's proposal for a flexible programme of work for the resumed session, with the schedule of meetings to be determined as needed in consultation with the General Committee and the Regional Group Coordinators.

Documentation

17. A list of documents of the Conference is contained in Annex III to this Report.

Decisions and Recommendations

- 18. At its eighth plenary meeting on 14 November 2002, the Conference decided, by consensus, as follows:
 - (a) To hold three annual meetings of the States Parties of one week duration each year commencing in 2003 until the Sixth Review Conference, to be held not later than the end of 2006, to discuss, and promote common understanding and effective action on:
 - thee adoption of necessary national measures to implement the prohibitions set forth in the Convention, including the enactment of penal legislation;
 - (ii) national mechanisms to establish and maintain the security and oversight of pathogenic microorganisms and toxins;
 - (iii) enhancing international capabilities for responding to, investigating and mitigating the effects of cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease;
 - strengthening and broadening national and international institutional efforts and existing mechanisms for the surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating of infectious diseases affecting humans, animals, and plants;
 - the content, promulgation, and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists.
 - (b) All meetings, both of experts and of States Parties, will reach any conclusions or results by consensus.
 - (c) Each meeting of the States Parties will be prepared by a two week meeting of experts. The topics for consideration at each annual

meeting of States Parties will be as follows: items i and ii will be considered in 2003; items iii and iv in 2004; item v in 2005. The first meeting will be chaired by a representative of the Eastern Group, the second by a representative of the Group of Non-Aligned and Other States, and the third by a representative of the Western Group.

- (d) The meetings of experts will prepare factual reports describing their work.
- (e) The Sixth Review Conference will consider the work of these meetings and decide on any further action.
- 19. At the same meeting, the Conference approved the nomination by the Eastern Group of Ambassador Tibor Tóth of Hungary as Chairman of the 2003 meetings. At the ninth plenary meeting the Conference approved the cost estimates for the meetings to be held in 2003, 2004 and 2005, as contained in document BWC/CONF.V/14. The Conference requested the Depositaries of the Convention to consult with a view to establishing suitable dates for the 2003 meetings, and to notify States Parties accordingly.
- 20. At the eighth plenary meeting, the Conference decided that the Sixth Review Conference would be held in Geneva in 2006, and would be preceded by a Preparatory Committee.
- 21. At the same meeting, the Conference adopted by consensus its Final Document, comprising a Final Report (BWC/CONF,V/L.1), with oral amendments made at the ninth plenary meeting, and three annexes: Annex I Interim Report of the Conference; Annex II Rules of Procedure of the Conference; Annex III List of documents of the Conference.

Report of the Fourth Annual Conference of the States Parties to Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects¹

I. Introduction

- 1. Article 13 of Amended Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices (Amended Protocol II) adopted on 3 May 1996 by the Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW), provides for a Conference of the States Parties to that Protocol to be held annually for the purpose of consultations and cooperation on all issues relating to the Protocol.
- 2. In its resolution 56/28, adopted on 29 November 2001, the General Assembly of the United Nations welcomed the convening, on 10 December 2001, of the Third Annual Conference of the States Parties to Amended Protocol II, in accordance with article 13 thereof, and called upon all States Parties to Amended Protocol II to address at this meeting, *inter alia*, the issue of holding the fourth annual conference in 2002.
- 3. In accordance with operative paragraph 3 of the United Nations General Assembly resolution 56/28, the Third Annual Conference addressed the issue of holding the Fourth Annual Conference in 2002 and decided that the issues of the dates and duration would be addressed at the Second Review Conference of the States Parties to the CCW. The Conference also decided that a preparatory meeting for the Fourth Annual Conference was not required. The Conference agreed to recommend to the Fourth Annual Conference a provisional agenda as contained in Annex IV of the Final Document of the Conference (CCW/AP.II/CONF.3/4). It also considered the estimated costs of the Fourth Annual Conference and recommended them for adoption at the time of the Conference in 2002 (CCW/AP.II/CONF.3/4, Annex V). The Second Review Conference of the States Parties to the CCW held from 11 to 21 December 2001, decided that the Fourth Annual Conference of the States Parties to Amended Protocol II might begin on 11 December 2002.

¹ CCW/AP.II/CONF.4/3 (Part I)

II. Organization of the Fourth Annual Conference

- 4. The Fourth Annual Conference was opened on 11 December 2002 by the President of the Third Annual Conference, Ambassador Christian Faessler of Switzerland.
- 5. At its first meeting, on 11 December 2002, the Conference re-elected by acclamation Ambassador Christian Faessler of Switzerland as President of the Fourth Annual Conference. It also elected Ambassador Dimiter Tzantchev of Bulgaria and Ambassador Sha Zukang of China as Vice-Presidents.
- 6. Also at its first meeting, the Conference appointed Mr. Vladimir Bogomolov, Political Affairs Officer, Department for Disarmament Affairs, Geneva Branch, as Secretary-General of the Conference. Mr. Bantan Nugroho, Political Affairs Officer, Department for Disarmament Affairs, Geneva Branch, served as Secretary of the Fourth Annual Conference.
- 7. The following 48 States which have notified the Depositary of their consent to be bound by Amended Protocol II participated in the work of the Conference: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and United States.
- 8. The following three Signatory States: Egypt, Nigeria and Turkey, also participated in the work of the Conference.
- 9. The following 19 States not parties to Amended Protocol II participated as observers: Chile, Cuba, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Georgia, Honduras, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malta, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sri Lanka and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
- 10. The representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), European Commission, Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) also participated in the work of the Conference.
- 11. Representatives of the German Initiative to Ban Landmines, Handicap International (Belgium), Handicap International (France), Human Rights Watch, International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), Landmine Action, Mennonite Central committee and Mines Action Canada attended public meetings of the Conference.

III. Work of the Fourth Annual Conference

12. At its first plenary meeting, on 11 December 2002, the Conference adopted its agenda, as contained in Annex I, and noted that the Rules of Procedure for Annual Conferences of the States Parties to Amended Protocol II, adopted at the First Annual Conference held in 1999, together with the statement of the President which had been

made in connection with the adoption of these Rules of Procedure, were applicable, mutatis mutandis, to the Fourth Annual Conference.

The Conference decided to amend Rules 3 and 7 of the Rules of Procedure in order to increase the number of Vice-Presidents from 2 to 3 to secure a balanced representation of geographical groups in the General Committee of the Conference.

The amended Rule 3 will read as follows:

"The Conference shall elect from among the States Parties participating in the Conference a President and 3 Vice-Presidents. These officers shall be elected so as to ensure the representative character of the General Committee provided for in Rule 7."

The amended Rule 7 will read as follows:

"The General Committee shall be composed of the President, who shall preside, 3 Vice-Presidents and the Chairmen of any other subsidiary organs."

- 13. At the same meeting, the Conference adopted the arrangements for meeting the costs of the Conference, as contained in document CCW/AP.II/CONF.3/1.
- 14. Also at that meeting the Conference decided to conduct its work in plenary meetings.
- 15. At the same meeting the Conference received a message from the Secretary-General of the United Nations that was delivered by the Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Chief of the Geneva Branch of the Department of Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Enrique Román-Morey.
- 16. The following delegations took part in the general exchange of views: Argentina, Australia, Cambodia, Canada, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Denmark (on behalf of the European Union and associated States) India, Israel, Japan, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Senegal, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States.

Representatives of Human Rights Watch and International Campaign to Ban Landmines also took the floor.

The statements made during the general exchange of views are reflected in the summary records of the Conference, which will be issued at a later date, as part of the final document of this Conference.

- 17. In accordance with paragraph 4 of Article 13 of the Protocol, the Conference had before it 42 national annual reports from the following States: Argentina (2), Australia, Austria, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, China, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain (2), Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States. The reports contained information on:
- (a) dissemination of information on the Protocol to armed forces and civilian populations;
 - (b) mine clearance and rehabilitation programmes;
- (c) steps taken to meet technical requirements of the Protocol and any other relevant information pertaining thereto;
 - (d) legislation related to the Protocol;

- (e) measures taken on international technical information exchange, on international cooperation on mine clearance, and on technical cooperation and assistance:
 - (f) other relevant matters; and
 - (g) information to the UN-database on mine clearance.
- 18. To facilitate the discussions on agenda item 9, entitled "Consideration of matters arising from reports by High Contracting Parties according to paragraph 4 of Article 13 of the Amended Protocol II", the delegation of Switzerland submitted a paper entitled "Synopsis of the National Annual Reports", containing an analysis of the National Annual Reports 2002, which was welcomed by the participants and attached as Annex II.

Switzerland proposed the introduction of a cover sheet to the National Annual Report to simplify the submission of the Reports. This proposal should be subject to a decision to be taken at the next Annual Conference (see Annex II).

IV. Conclusions and Recommendations

- 19. At its second meeting, on 11 December 2002, the Conference decided to issue an appeal to all States that had not yet done so to take all measures to accede to Amended Protocol II as soon as possible. The appeal is contained in Annex III.
- 20. The Conference recommended that the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as Depositary of Amended Protocol II, and the President of the Conference, on behalf of the States Parties, exercise their authority to achieve the goal of universality of Amended Protocol II. To this effect, the Conference requested the President to consider reporting to the 58th session of the United Nations General Assembly on his endeavours. The Conference also called on the States Parties to promote wider adherence to Amended Protocol II in their respective regions.
- 21. The Conference decided that the President and Vice-Presidents should be designated at the end of the current conference in order to assure the continuity of the preparatory work by the presidency. Therefore, the Conference decided to nominate Ambassador Dimiter Tzanchev of Bulgaria as President-designate of the Fifth Annual Conference of the States Parties to be held in 2003 and representatives of China, South Africa and Switzerland as Vice-Presidents-designates.
- 22. The Conference addressed the issue of holding the Fifth Annual Conference in 2003 and decided that the issues of the dates and duration would be addressed at the Meeting of the States Parties to the CCW to be held on 12-13 December 2002. The Conference decided that a preparatory meeting for the Fifth Annual Conference was not required. The Conference agreed to recommend to the Fifth Annual Conference a provisional agenda, as contained in Annex IV. It also considered the estimated costs of the Fifth Annual Conference and recommended them for adoption at the time of the Conference in 2003 (Annex V).
- 23. At its final meeting, on 11 December 2002, the Fourth Annual Conference adopted its report as contained in document CCW/AP.II/CONF.4/CRP.1, as orally amended, which is being issued as document CCW/AP.II/CONF.4/3.

ANNEX HITO THE REPORT TO THE FINAL DOCUMENT OF THE THIRD ANNUAL CONFERENCE

An Appeal of the States Parties to Amended Protocol II to the CCW on the Occasion of the Fourth Annual Conference

We, the States which have notified the Depositary of their consent to be bound by Amended Protocol II to the CCW, meeting in Geneva on 11 December 2002 for our Fourth Annual Conference:

Bearing in mind the important contribution of Amended Protocol II to international efforts to alleviate the suffering caused by certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects;

Noting that Amended Protocol II is the only international legal instrument which covers all types of mines, booby traps and other devices;

Having reviewed the operation and status of Amended Protocol II, in accordance with paragraph 3(a) of Article 13;

Having considered the national annual reports (42) presented by States which have notified the Depositary of their consent to be bound by Amended Protocol II;

Welcome the fact that, since the First Annual Conference held in December 1999, 24 more States have notified the Depositary of their consent to be bound by Amended Protocol II, thus bringing the total number of States which have adhered to this Protocol to 69;

Emphasize the importance of achieving the widest possible adherence to Amended Protocol II;

Urge all States that have not yet done so to take all measures to accede to it as soon as possible.

Declaration of the Fourth Meeting of the States Parties to the Mine Ban Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction¹

- 1. We, the States parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, along with other States, international organizations and institutions and non-governmental organizations, gathered in Geneva, reaffirm our unwavering commitment to the total eradication of anti-personnel mines and to addressing the insidious and inhumane effects of these weapons. We commit ourselves to intensify our efforts in those areas most directly related to the core humanitarian objectives of the Convention.
- 2. We celebrate the growing support for the Convention, ratified by 116 States and acceded to by another 12. With an additional 17 countries having signed, but not yet ratified the Convention, the number of States parties and signatories now totals 145, including more than 40 mine-affected States. We call upon those that have not done so, to ratify or accede to the Convention. We also call upon all States in the process of formally accepting the obligations of the Convention, to provisionally apply the terms of the Convention.
- 3. We recognize that the new international norm established by the Convention is being demonstrated by the successful record of implementation of the Convention, including the conduct of many States not party to the Convention respecting the provisions therein. A total of 88 States parties no longer possess stockpiled anti-personnel mines, including 34 which have completed stockpile destruction since the entry into force of the Convention. A further 22 States parties are in the process of destroying their stockpiles. Furthermore, over US\$1 billion has been allocated since the Convention was negotiated to address the global landmine problem, in addition to the resources being allocated by mine-affected countries themselves.
- 4. We feel encouraged by the fact that over the past year, a considerable amount of land was cleared of anti-personnel mines, that casualty rates in several of the world's most mine-affected states have again decreased, that landmine victim assistance has improved, and that our cooperative efforts continue to contribute to this progress.

¹ APLC/MSP.4/2002/1

- 5. While recognizing the success of the Convention, we remain deeply concerned that anti-personnel mines continue to kill, maim and threaten the lives of countless innocent people each day, that the terror of mines prevents individuals from reclaiming their lives and that the lasting impact of these weapons denies communities the opportunity to rebuild long after conflicts have ended.
- 6. We deplore any use of anti-personnel mines. Such acts are contrary to the object and purpose of the Convention and exacerbate the humanitarian problems already caused by the use of these weapons. We urge all those who continue to use, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain and/or transfer anti-personnel landmines, to cease immediately and to join us in the task of eradicating these weapons. We particularly call upon the States outside the Convention, which have recently used anti-personnel mines and/or continue to produce to stop these activities.
- 7. We expect those States, which have declared their commitment to the object and purpose of the Convention and which continue to use anti-personnel mines, to recognize that this is a clear violation of their solemn commitment. We call upon all States concerned to respect their commitments.
- 8. Recognizing the need to secure full compliance with all obligations of the Convention, we reaffirm our commitment to effectively implement the Convention and to comply fully with its provisions. We do so in the spirit of cooperation and collaboration that has characterized this process. In the event of serious concerns of non-compliance with any of the obligations of the Convention, we acknowledge our responsibility to seek clarification of these concerns, in this cooperative spirit.
- 9. We recall that the four-year maximum time period for the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines is less than one year away for those States which became parties in 1999. We also recall that as soon as possible, but not later than 10 years after the entry into force of this Convention, each State party must undertake to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control. We encourage continuing national, regional and international initiatives aimed at fulfilling these obligations. At the same time, we congratulate those States parties that have already destroyed their stockpiles of anti-personnel mines and those that have made substantial progress in clearing mined areas.
- 10. We call upon all Governments and people everywhere to join in the common task to meet the enormous challenges of mine action, including victim assistance, to provide the technical and financial assistance required, and, where appropriate, to integrate these efforts into national development strategies. As States parties committed to the eradication of anti-personnel mines, we reiterate that assistance and cooperation for mine action will flow primarily to those that have forsworn the use of these weapons forever through adherence to, implementation of, and compliance with the Convention.
- 11. We recognize that to achieve the promise of this unique and important humanitarian instrument, we must continue working tirelessly in all parts of the world to end the use of anti-personnel mines, to destroy stockpiles, to cease development, production and transfers of these weapons, to clear mined areas to free land from its deadly bondage, to assist victims to reclaim their lives with dignity and to prevent new victims.

- 12. We reaffirm that progress to free the world from anti-personnel mines would be promoted by the commitment by non-State actors to cease and renounce their use in line with the international norm established by this Convention. We urge all non-State actors to cease and renounce the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines according to the principles and norms of International Humanitarian Law.
- 13. We warmly welcome the substantial progress made during the intersessional work programme. This programme continues to focus and advance the international community's mine action efforts, it greatly assists in our collective aim to implement the Convention and it provides a forum for mine-affected and other States to share experiences, acquire knowledge and enhance efforts to implement the Convention. We express our satisfaction that the intersessional work programme has been carried out in the Convention's tradition of partnership, dialogue, openness and practical cooperation. We welcome the increasing participation of mine-affected States in the intersessional work programme and the valuable contribution of the Sponsorship Programme.
- 14. To further enhance the intersessional process, we commit ourselves to intensify our efforts in those areas most directly related to the core humanitarian objectives of the Convention. We recommit ourselves to proceed with our work in a manner consistent with the principles that have well served the intersessional programme to date, particularly informality and cooperation. We furthermore call upon all States parties and other interested actors to continue to participate actively in the work of the Standing Committees.
- 15. We acknowledge the positive work of the Coordinating Committee tasked with the coordination of the intersessional work programme, and its role in the strengthening of the intersessional process. We thank the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) for its essential support and its commitment to the intersessional process. And we express our appreciation to the GICHD for the prompt manner in which it established the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) in accordance with the decision taken by the States parties at the Third Meeting of the States Parties and to the ISU for quickly demonstrating its effectiveness and value to States parties.
- 16. We acknowledge the contributory role of the United Nations agencies involved in Mine Action.
- 17. We express our gratitude to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and other relevant non-governmental organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and to regional and national organizations and agencies for their important and substantive contribution to the intersessional process and to the overall implementation and consolidation of the Convention.
- 18. In reflecting upon our progress and accomplishments, and in considering the work that lies ahead, we reconfirm our conviction to make anti-personnel mines objects of the past, our obligation to assist those who have fallen victim to this terror, and our shared responsibility to the memories of those whose lives have been lost as a result of the use of these weapons, including those killed as a result of their dedication to helping others by clearing mined areas or providing humanitarian assistance.

Report of the Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects ¹

- 1. The Second Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW) held at Geneva on 11-21 December 2001 in its Final Declaration decided to commission follow-up work on decisions arising from the Second Review Conference of the Convention, under the oversight of the Chairman-designate of a meeting of the States Parties to the Convention to be held on 12-13 December 2002 in Geneva, in conjunction with the Fourth Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II, which may begin on 11December 2002. For that purpose the Conference decided to establish an open-ended Group of Governmental Experts with separate Coordinators to:
 - (a) discuss ways and means to address the issue of Explosive Remnants of War (ERW). In this context the Group shall consider all factors, appropriate measures and proposals, in particular:
 - factors and types of munitions that could cause humanitarian problems after a conflict;
 - technical improvements and other measures for relevant types of munitions, including sub-munitions, which could reduce the risk of such munitions becoming ERW;
 - the adequacy of existing International Humanitarian Law in minimizing post-conflict risks of ERW, both to civilians and to the military;
 - warning to the civilian population, in or close to, ERWaffected areas, clearance of ERW, the rapid provision of
 information to facilitate early and safe clearance of
 ERW, and associated issues and responsibilities;
 - assistance and co-operation.
 - The Coordinator shall undertake work in an efficient manner so as to submit recommendations, adopted by consensus, at an early date for consideration by the States Parties, including whether to proceed with

¹ CCW/MSP/2002/2

negotiating a legally-binding instrument or instruments on ERW and/or other approaches.

(b) further explore the issue of mines other than anti-personnel mines (MOTAPM). The Coordinator shall submit a report, adopted by consensus, to the States Parties.

The Conference also decided that the Chairman-designate shall undertake consultations during the intersessional period on possible options to promote compliance with the Convention and its annexed Protocols, taking into account proposals put forward, and shall submit a report, adopted by consensus, to the States Parties.

The Conference also decided to invite interested States Parties to convene experts to consider possible issues related to small calibre weapons and ammunitions, such as: military requirements; scientific and technical factors/methodology; medical factors; legal/treaty obligations/standards; financial implications; and in this respect, report on their work to the States Parties to the Convention. These meetings shall have no implications for the CCW budget.

At the same Conference, the States Parties also agreed that the Chairmandesignate shall consult States Parties on financial arrangements and the programme of work and that the intersessional work will be conducted in accordance with the Rules of Procedure adopted by the Second Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention.

- 2. The Conference recommended the appointment of Ambassador Rakesh Sood of India as Chairman-designate of the Meeting of the States Parties to be held at Geneva from 12-13 December 2002, and appointed two Coordinators for the Group of Governmental Experts: Ambassador Chris Sanders of the Netherlands on Explosive Remnants of War, and Minister Counsellor Peter Kolarov of Bulgaria on Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines.
- 3. The Group of Governmental Experts held three sessions during 2002. The deliberations and activities of all three sessions of the Group are reflected in CCW/GGE/I/2 of 28 May 2002, CCW/GGE/II/1 of 26 July 2002 and CCW/GGE/III/1 of 11 December 2002.
- 4. The Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention was held at Geneva from 12 to 13 December 2002.
- 5. On 12 December 2002, the Session was opened by the Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Chief of the Geneva Branch of the Department for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Enrique Roman-Morey.
- 6. At the same meeting, the Meeting of the States Parties confirmed by acclamation the nomination of Ambassador Rakesh Sood of India as Chairman of the Meeting.
- 7. At its first plenary meeting, on 12 December 2002, the Meeting of the States Parties adopted its agenda with oral amendments as contained in Annex I.
- 8. At the same meeting, the Meeting of the States Parties adopted the Rules of Procedure as adopted and used by the Second Review Conference (CCW/CONF.II/PC.1/1 with oral amendments) and financial arrangements for the

Meeting as contained on pages 46 and 47 of the Final Document of the Second Review Conference (CCW/CONF.II/2).

- 9. At the same plenary meeting, the Meeting of the States Parties unanimously confirmed the nomination of Mr. Vladimir Bogomolov, Political Affairs Officer, Department for Disarmament Affairs, Geneva Branch, as Secretary-General of the Meeting. He was assisted by Mr. Bantan Nugroho, Political Affairs Officer, as Secretary of the Meeting.
- 10. At the same plenary meeting, the Meeting of the States Parties agreed in the context of the short duration of the Meeting to have a streamlined bureau consisting of the Chairman, Group Coordinators and Working Group Coordinators, on the understanding that this does not constitute a precedent for future meetings of States Parties.
- 11. At its first plenary meeting on 12 December, the Meeting of the States Parties received a message from the Secretary-General of the United Nations, which was delivered by the Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Chief of the Geneva Branch of the Department for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Enrique Roman-Morey.
- 12. The following States Parties to the Convention participated in the work of the Meeting of the States Parties: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austral, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States.
- 13. The following Signatory States also participated in the work of the Meeting: Egypt, Nigeria and Turkey.
- 14. The following States not parties to the Convention participated as observers: Chile, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sri Lanka and Venezuela.
- 15. The representatives of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) took part in the work of the Meeting.
- 16. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) also took part in the work of the Meeting.
- 17. The representatives of the following organizations also took part in the work of the Meeting: African Union, European Commission, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), German Initiative to Ban Landmines, Handicap International (Belgium), Handicap International (France),

Human Rights Watch, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), Landmine Action, Mennonite Central Committee and Mines Action Canada.

- 18. The Meeting of the States Parties held three plenary meetings.
- 19. The Chairman of the Meeting of the States Parties, Ambassador Rakesh Sood of India, submitted the Report of the Group of Governmental Experts to the Meeting of the States Parties for its consideration.
- 20. The following States participated in the general exchange of views: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, China, Croatia, Cuba, Denmark (on behalf of the European Union and associated States), Egypt, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, France, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, and United States.

Representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Human Rights Watch (HRW), International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and Landmine Action also participated in the general exchange of views.

- 21. The Meeting of the States Parties decided that the Working Group on Explosive Remnants of War would continue its work in the year 2003 with the following mandate:
 - (a) (i) To negotiate an instrument on post-conflict remedial measures of a generic nature which would reduce the risks of ERW. These measures would be based on a broad definition covering most types of explosive munitions, with the exception of mines. Abandoned munitions would have to be included. In these negotiations, questions need to be considered regarding, inter alia, responsibility for clearance, existing ERW, the provision of information to facilitate clearance and risk education, warnings to civilian populations, assistance and cooperation, and a framework for regular consultations of High Contracting Parties. These negotiations would have to establish the scope of this instrument consistent with Article I of the Convention as amended at its Second Review Conference.
 - (a) (ii) To explore and determine whether these negotiations could successfully address preventive generic measures for improving the reliability of munitions that fall within the agreed broad definition, through voluntary best practices concerning the management of manufacturing, quality control, handling and storage of munitions. Exchange of information, assistance and cooperation would be important elements of such best practices.
 - (b) Separate from the negotiations under (a): to continue to consider the implementation of existing principles of International Humanitarian Law and to further study, on an open ended basis, possible preventive measures aimed at improving the design of certain specific types of munitions, including sub-munitions, with a view to minimize the humanitarian risk of these munitions

- becoming ERW. Exchange of information, assistance and cooperation would be part of this work.
- (c) In the context of the activities described above, meetings of military experts can be conducted to provide advice in support of these activities.
- 22. The Meeting of the States Parties decided that the Working Group on Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines would continue its work in the year 2003 with the following mandate:
 - (a) To continue to explore the issue of mines other than anti-personnel mines. The group shall consider the most appropriate way to reduce the risks posed by the irresponsible use of mines other than anti-personnel mines, including the possibility to conclude a negotiating mandate for a new instrument and other appropriate measures. The Group of Governmental Experts shall take into account:
 - the necessity to strike the right balance between humanitarian concerns and military utility of MOTAPM;
 - existing restrictions on such mines in Amended Protocol II to the CCW;
 - technical and other measures aimed at minimizing the humanitarian risks posed by such mines as well as the modalities for their effective implementation, such as international cooperation and assistance, transition periods etc.;
 - questions involving the use of MOTAPM by non-state actors:
 - any question involving other aspects of such mines.
 - (b) In the context of the activities described above, meetings of military experts can be conducted to provide advice in support of these activities.
- 23. The Meeting of the States Parties decided that the Chairman-designate shall undertake consultations during the intersessional period on possible options to promote compliance with the Convention and its annexed Protocols, taking into account proposals put forward, and shall submit a report, adopted by consensus, to the States Parties.
- 24. The Meeting of the States Parties took note of the report presented by Switzerland related to Small Calibre Weapons and Ammunition. The Meeting invites interested States Parties to the Convention to continue informal meetings at expert level with regard to identified subject areas for possible further development.
- 25. At its third plenary meeting, the Meeting of the States Parties decided to commission follow-up work under the oversight of the Chairman-designate of a Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention to be held on 27-28 November 2003 in Geneva in conjunction with the Fifth Annual Conference of the States Parties to Amended Protocol II.

- 26. At the same plenary meeting, on 13 December 2002, the Meeting of the States Parties decided that the intersessional work of the Group of Governmental Experts will be undertaken in three sessions in Geneva during 2003:
 - 10 14 March 2003
 - 16 27 June 2003
 - 17 24 November 2003.
- 27. The Meeting of the States Parties addressed the issue of the dates and duration of the Fifth Annual Conference of the States Parties to Amended Protocol II and decided that it be held on 26 November 2003 in Geneva.
- 28. Without prejudice to the generally accepted principle of rotation, the States Parties decided to re-designate Ambassador Rakesh Sood of India as Chairman of the Meeting of the States Parties to be held in the year 2003, and reappointed the two Coordinators for the Group of Governmental Experts: Ambassador Chris Sanders of the Netherlands on Explosive Remnants of War, and Minister Counsellor Peter Kolarov of Bulgaria on Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines.
- 29. At the final plenary meeting, the Meeting of the States Parties adopted its report, as contained in document CCW/MSP/2002/CRP.1, as orally amended, which is being issued as document CCW/MSP/2002/2 and the cost estimates of the three sessions of the Group of Governmental Experts, of the Fifth Annual Conference of the States Parties to Amended Protocol II and of the Meeting of the States Parties to be held in 2003.

Text of disarmament resolutions and decisions

Resolution 57/50

Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling its previous resolutions on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons,

Recalling also its resolutions 51/37 of 10December 1996 and 54/44 of 1December 1999 relating to the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons,

Recalling further paragraph 77 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

Determined to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction that have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of weapons of mass destruction identified in the definition of weapons of mass destruction adopted by the United Nations in 1948,

Noting the desirability of keeping the matter under review, as appropriate,

- 1. Reaffirms that effective measures should be taken to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction;
- 2. Requests the Conference on Disarmament, without prejudice to further overview of its agenda, to keep the matter under review, as appropriate, with a view to making, when necessary, recommendations on undertaking specific negotiations on identified types of such weapons;
- 3. Calls upon all States, immediately following any recommendations of the Conference on Disarmament, to give favourable consideration to those recommendations:
- 4. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Conference on Disarmament all documents relating to the consideration of this item by the General Assembly at its fifty-seventh session;
- 5. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to report the results of any consideration of the matter in its annual reports to the General Assembly;
- 6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session the item entitled "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament".

Resolution 57/51 Question of Antarctica

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 54/45 of 1December 1999, in which it requested the Secretary-General to submit a report consisting of the information provided by the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties on their consultative meetings and on their activities in Antarctica, and on developments in relation to Antarctica,

Taking into account the debates on the question of Antarctica held since its thirty-eighth session,

Conscious of the particular significance of Antarctica to the international community, including for international peace and security, the global and regional environment, its effects on global and regional climate conditions, and scientific research.

Reaffirming that the management and use of Antarctica should be conducted in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and of promoting international cooperation for the benefit of mankind as a whole,

Recognizing that the Antarctic Treaty, which provides, inter alia, for the demilitarization of the continent, the prohibition of nuclear explosions and the disposal of nuclear wastes, the freedom of scientific research and the free exchange of scientific information, is in furtherance of the purposes and principles of the Charter,

Noting with satisfaction the entry into force of the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty on 14January 1998, under which Antarctica has been designated as a natural reserve, devoted to peace and science, and the provisions contained in the Protocol regarding the protection of the Antarctic environment and dependent and associated ecosystems, including the need for environmental impact assessment in the planning and conduct of all relevant activities in Antarctica,

Welcoming the continuing cooperation among countries undertaking scientific research activities in Antarctica, which may help to minimize human impact on the Antarctic environment.

Welcoming also the increasing awareness of and interest in Antarctica shown by the international community, and convinced of the advantages to the whole of mankind of a better knowledge of Antarctica,

Reaffirming its conviction that, in the interest of all mankind, Antarctica should continue for ever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and that it should not become the scene or object of international discord,

1. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General on the question of Antarctica and the role accorded by the Secretary-General to the United Nations Environment Programme in preparing his report, and also of the Twelfth Special Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, held in TheHague from 11 to 15September 2000, the Twenty-fourth Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, held in St. Petersburg, Russian Federation, from 9 to 20July 2001, and the Twenty-fifth Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, held in Warsaw from 10 to 20September 2002;

- 2. Recalls the statement under chapter 17 of Agenda 21, adopted by the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, that States carrying out research activities in Antarctica should, as provided for in article III of the Antarctic Treaty, continue:
- (a) To ensure that data and information resulting from such research are freely available to the international community;
- (b) To enhance the access of the international scientific community and the specialized agencies of the United Nations system to such data and information, including the encouragement of periodic seminars and symposia;
- 3. Welcomes the invitations to the Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme to attend Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings in order to assist such meetings in their substantive work, and urges the parties to continue to do so for future consultative meetings;
- 4. Welcomes also the practice whereby the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties regularly provide the Secretary-General with information on their consultative meetings and on their activities in Antarctica, and encourages the parties to continue to provide the Secretary-General and interested States with information on developments in relation to Antarctica, and requests the Secretary-General to submit a report which shall consist of that information to the General Assembly at its sixtieth session:
- 5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session the item entitled "Question of Antarctica".

Maintenance of international security — good-neighbourliness, stability and development in South-Eastern Europe

The General Assembly,

Recalling the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed in Helsinki on 1August 1975,

Recalling also the United Nations Millennium Declaration,

Recalling further its resolutions 48/84B of 16December 1993, 50/80B of 12December 1995, 51/55 of 10December 1996, 52/48 of 9December 1997, 53/71 of 4December 1998, 54/62 of 1December 1999, 55/27 of 20November 2000 and 56/18 of 29November 2001.

Convinced of the necessity of enhancing the overall conflict prevention and resolution capability of the United Nations system and other relevant regional organizations to prevent the outbreak of conflicts,

Emphasizing the crucial importance of the full implementation of Security Council resolution 1244(1999) of 10June 1999 on Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and stressing, inter alia, the role and responsibility of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, supported by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the European Union, and of the Kosovo Force in that regard, as well as the importance of the implementation of Security

Council resolutions 1345(2001) of 21March 2001 and 1371(2001) of 26September 2001.

Reiterating the importance of the South-East European Cooperation Process and its contribution to security, stability and good-neighbourly relations in South-Eastern Europe, and recalling in particular the Joint Statement issued by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the South-East European Cooperation Process in Belgrade on 19June 2002,

Welcoming the progress made in the normalization of relations among all States of the Balkan region,

Reaffirming the validity of the Agreement for the delineation of the borderline between the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, signed in Skopje on 23February 2001,

Welcoming the signing of stabilization and association agreements and/or European agreements between the countries of the region and the European Union and its member States,

Emphasizing the crucial importance of strengthening regional efforts in South-Eastern Europe on arms control, demining, disarmament and confidence-building measures, and concerned that, in spite of the ongoing efforts, the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects persists,

Welcoming the establishment by the United Nations Development Programme and the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe of the small arms clearing house in Belgrade, and affirming its support for all initiatives in the region for combating the destabilizing accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons,

Mindful of the importance of national and international activities of all relevant organizations aimed at the creation of peace, security, stability, democracy, cooperation and economic development and the observance of human rights and good-neighbourliness in South-Eastern Europe,

Reaffirming its determination that all nations should live together in peace with one another as good neighbours,

- 1. Reaffirms the need for full observance of the Charter of the United Nations;
- 2. Calls upon all States, the relevant international organizations and the competent organs of the United Nations to respect the principles of territorial integrity and sovereignty of all States and the inviolability of international borders, to continue to take measures in accordance with the Charter and the commitments of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and through further development of regional arrangements, as appropriate, to eliminate threats to international peace and security and to help to prevent conflicts in South-Eastern Europe, which can lead to the violent disintegration of States;
- 3. Reaffirms the urgency of consolidating South-Eastern Europe as a region of peace, security, stability, democracy, cooperation and economic development and for the promotion of good-neighbourliness and the observance of human rights, thus contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security and enhancing the prospects for sustained development and prosperity for all peoples in the region as an integral part of Europe, and recognizes the role of the United Nations, the

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the European Union in promoting regional disarmament;

- 4. Calls upon all participants in the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, as well as all concerned international organizations, to continue to support the efforts of the States of South-Eastern Europe towards regional stability and cooperation so as to enable them to pursue sustainable development and integration into European structures;
- 5. Calls upon all States and relevant international organizations to contribute to the full implementation of Security Council resolution 1244(1999) on Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as well as Council resolutions 1345(2001) and 1371(2001);
- 6. Recognizes the efforts made and activities undertaken in Kosovo by the United Nations and the Kosovo Force for the establishment of a multi-ethnic and stable Kosovo, thus contributing to a further improvement of the overall security situation in the region;
- 7. Rejects the use of violence in pursuit of political aims, and stresses that only peaceful political solutions can assure a stable and democratic future for South-Eastern Europe;
- 8. Stresses the importance of good-neighbourliness and the development of friendly relations among States, and calls upon all States to resolve their disputes with other States by peaceful means, in accordance with the Charter;
- 9. Urges the strengthening of relations among the States of South-Eastern Europe on the basis of respect for international law and agreements, in accordance with the principles of good-neighbourliness and mutual respect;
- 10. Recognizes the efforts of the international community, and welcomes in particular the assistance already provided by the European Union and the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe as well as other contributors in promoting the long-term process of democratic and economic development of the region;
- 11. Stresses the importance of enhanced regional cooperation for the development of the South-Eastern European States in the priority areas of infrastructure, transport, trade, energy and environment;
- 12. Also stresses that the rapprochement of the South-Eastern European States with the European Union will favourably influence the security, political and economic situation in the region, as well as good-neighbourly relations among the States;
- 13. Further stresses the importance of regional efforts aimed at preventing conflicts that endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, and in this regard notes with satisfaction the role of the Multinational Peace Force for South-Eastern Europe;
- 14. Emphasizes the importance of continuous regional efforts and intensified dialogue in South-Eastern Europe aimed at arms control, disarmament and confidence-building measures as well as strengthening cooperation and undertaking appropriate measures at the national, subregional and regional levels to prevent all acts of terrorism;

- 15. Recognizes the seriousness of the problem of anti-personnel mines in some parts of South-Eastern Europe, welcomes in this context the efforts of the international community in support of mine action, and encourages States to join and support these efforts;
- 16. Urges all States to take effective measures against the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects and to help programmes and projects aimed at the collection and safe destruction of surplus stocks of small arms and light weapons, and stresses the importance of closer cooperation among States, inter alia, in crime prevention, combating terrorism, trafficking in human beings, organized crime, drug trafficking and money-laundering;
- 17. Calls upon all States and the relevant international organizations to communicate to the Secretary-General their views on the subject of the present resolution;
- 18. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-ninth session the item entitled "Maintenance of international security good-neighbourliness, stability and development in South-Eastern Europe".

Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 53/70 of 4December 1998, 54/49 of 1December 1999, 55/28 of 20November 2000 and 56/19 of 29November 2001,

Recalling also its resolutions on the role of science and technology in the context of international security, in which, inter alia, it recognized that scientific and technological developments could have both civilian and military applications and that progress in science and technology for civilian applications needed to be maintained and encouraged,

Noting that considerable progress has been achieved in developing and applying the latest information technologies and means of telecommunication,

Affirming that it sees in this process the broadest positive opportunities for the further development of civilization, the expansion of opportunities for cooperation for the common good of all States, the enhancement of the creative potential of humankind and additional improvements in the circulation of information in the global community,

Recalling, in this connection, the approaches and principles outlined at the Information Society and Development Conference, held in Midrand, South Africa, from 13 to 15May 1996,

Bearing in mind the results of the Ministerial Conference on Terrorism, held in Paris on 30July 1996, and the recommendations that it made,

Noting that the dissemination and use of information technologies and means affect the interests of the entire international community and that optimum effectiveness is enhanced by broad international cooperation,

Expressing concern that these technologies and means can potentially be used for purposes that are inconsistent with the objectives of maintaining international stability and security and may adversely affect the integrity of the infrastructure of States to the detriment of their security in both civil and military fields,

Considering that it is necessary to prevent the use of information resources or technologies for criminal or terrorist purposes,

Noting the contribution of those Member States that have submitted their assessments on issues of information security to the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraphs 1 to 3 of resolutions 53/70, 54/49, 55/28 and 56/19,

Taking note of the reports of the Secretary-General containing those assessments,

Welcoming the initiative taken by the Secretariat and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research in convening an international meeting of experts in Geneva in August 1999 on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security, as well as its results,

Considering that the assessments of the Member States contained in the reports of the Secretary-General and the international meeting of experts have contributed to a better understanding of the substance of issues of international information security and related notions.

Confirming the request to the Secretary-General contained in paragraph4 of its resolution 56/19,

- 1. Calls upon Member States to promote further at multilateral levels the consideration of existing and potential threats in the field of information security, as well as possible measures to limit the threats emerging in this field, consistent with the need to preserve the free flow of information;
- 2. Considers that the purpose of such measures could be served through the examination of relevant international concepts aimed at strengthening the security of global information and telecommunications systems;
- 3. Invites all Member States to continue to inform the Secretary-General of their views and assessments on the following questions:
 - (a) General appreciation of the issues of information security;
- (b) Definition of basic notions related to information security, including unauthorized interference with or misuse of information and telecommunications systems and information resources;
- (c) The content of the concepts mentioned in paragraph2 of the present resolution:
- 4. Requests the Secretary-General to consider existing and potential threats in the sphere of information security and possible cooperative measures to address them, and to conduct a study on the concepts referred to in paragraph2 of the present resolution, with the assistance of a group of governmental experts, to be established in 2004, appointed by him on the basis of equitable geographical distribution and with the help of Member States in a position to render such assistance, and to submit a report on the outcome of the study to the General Assembly at its sixtieth session;

5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session the item entitled "Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security".

Resolution 57/54 The role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recognizing that scientific and technological developments can have both civilian and military applications and that progress in science and technology for civilian applications needs to be maintained and encouraged,

Concerned that military applications of scientific and technological developments can contribute significantly to the improvement and upgrading of advanced weapons systems and, in particular, weapons of mass destruction,

Aware of the need to follow closely the scientific and technological developments that may have a negative impact on international security and disarmament, and to channel scientific and technological developments for beneficial purposes,

Cognizant that the international transfers of dual-use as well as high-technology products, services and know-how for peaceful purposes are important for the economic and social development of States,

Also cognizant of the need to regulate such transfers of dual-use goods and technologies and high technology with military applications through multilaterally negotiated, universally applicable, non-discriminatory guidelines,

Expressing concern about the growing proliferation of adhoc and exclusive export control regimes and arrangements for dual-use goods and technologies, which tend to impede the economic and social development of developing countries,

Recalling that in the Final Document of the Twelfth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Durban, South Africa, from 29August to 3September 1998, it was noted with concern that undue restrictions on exports to developing countries of material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes persist,

Emphasizing that internationally negotiated guidelines for the transfer of high technology with military applications should take into account the legitimate defence requirements of all States and the requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, while ensuring that access to high-technology products and services and know-how for peaceful purposes is not denied,

1. Affirms that scientific and technological progress should be used for the benefit of all mankind to promote the sustainable economic and social development of all States and to safeguard international security, and that international cooperation in the use of science and technology through the transfer and exchange of technological know-how for peaceful purposes should be promoted;

- 2. Invites Member States to undertake additional efforts to apply science and technology for disarmament-related purposes and to make disarmament-related technologies available to interested States;
- 3. Urges Member States to undertake multilateral negotiations with the participation of all interested States in order to establish universally acceptable, non-discriminatory guidelines for international transfers of dual-use goods and technologies and high technology with military applications;
- 4. Encourages United Nations bodies to contribute, within existing mandates, to promoting the application of science and technology for peaceful purposes;
- 5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session the item entitled "Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament".

Resolution 57/55 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3263(XXIX) of 9December 1974, 3474(XXX) of 11December 1975, 31/71 of 10December 1976, 32/82 of 12December 1977, 33/64 of 14December 1978, 34/77 of 11December 1979, 35/147 of 12December 1980, 36/87A and B of 9December 1981, 37/75 of 9December 1982, 38/64 of 15December 1983, 39/54 of 12December 1984, 40/82 of 12December 1985, 41/48 of 3December 1986, 42/28 of 30November 1987, 43/65 of 7December 1988, 44/108 of 15December 1989, 45/52 of 4December 1990, 46/30 of 6December 1991, 47/48 of 9December 1992, 48/71 of 16December 1993, 49/71 of 15December 1994, 50/66 of 12December 1995, 51/41 of 10December 1996, 52/34 of 9December 1997, 53/74 of 4December 1998, 54/51 of 1December 1999, 55/30 of 20November 2000 and 56/21 of 29November 2001 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Recalling also the recommendations for the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East consistent with paragraphs60 to 63, and in particular paragraph63(!), of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

Emphasizing the basic provisions of the above-mentioned resolutions, which call upon all parties directly concerned to consider taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East and, pending and during the establishment of such a zone, to declare solemnly that they will refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party, to agree to place their nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and to declare their support for the establishment of the zone and to deposit such declarations with the Security Council for consideration, as appropriate,

Reaffirming the inalienable right of all States to acquire and develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,

Emphasizing the need for appropriate measures on the question of the prohibition of military attacks on nuclear facilities,

Bearing in mind the consensus reached by the General Assembly since its thirty-fifth session that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would greatly enhance international peace and security,

Desirous of building on that consensus so that substantial progress can be made towards establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East,

Welcoming all initiatives leading to general and complete disarmament, including in the region of the Middle East, and in particular on the establishment therein of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons,

Noting the peace negotiations in the Middle East, which should be of a comprehensive nature and represent an appropriate framework for the peaceful settlement of contentious issues in the region,

Recognizing the importance of credible regional security, including the establishment of a mutually verifiable nuclear-weapon-free zone,

Emphasizing the essential role of the United Nations in the establishment of a mutually verifiable nuclear-weapon-free zone,

Having examined the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 56/21,

- 1. Urges all parties directly concerned to consider seriously taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, and, as a means of promoting this objective, invites the countries concerned to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
- 2. Calls upon all countries of the region that have not done so, pending the establishment of the zone, to agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;
- 3. Takes note of resolution GC(46)/RES/16, adopted on 20September 2002 by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency at its forty-sixth regular session, concerning the application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East;
- 4. Notes the importance of the ongoing bilateral Middle East peace negotiations and the activities of the multilateral Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security in promoting mutual confidence and security in the Middle East, including the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone;
- 5. Invites all countries of the region, pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, to declare their support for establishing such a zone, consistent with paragraph63(!) of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, and to deposit those declarations with the Security Council;
- 6. Also invites those countries, pending the establishment of the zone, not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or permit the stationing

on their territories, or territories under their control, of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices;

- 7. Invites the nuclear-weapon States and all other States to render their assistance in the establishment of the zone and at the same time to refrain from any action that runs counter to both the letter and the spirit of the present resolution;
 - 8. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General;
- 9. Invites all parties to consider the appropriate means that may contribute towards the goal of general and complete disarmament and the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the region of the Middle East;
- 10. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to pursue consultations with the States of the region and other concerned States, in accordance with paragraph7 of resolution 46/30 and taking into account the evolving situation in the region, and to seek from those States their views on the measures outlined in chapters III and IV of the study annexed to his report of 10October 1990 or other relevant measures, in order to move towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East:
- 11. Also requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its fifty-eighth session a report on the implementation of the present resolution;
- 12. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East".

Resolution 57/56

Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure nonnuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the need to allay the legitimate concern of the States of the world with regard to ensuring lasting security for their peoples,

Convinced that nuclear weapons pose the greatest threat to mankind and to the survival of civilization,

Welcoming the progress achieved in recent years in both nuclear and conventional disarmament.

Noting that, despite recent progress in the field of nuclear disarmament, further efforts are necessary towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Convinced that nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons are essential to remove the danger of nuclear war,

Determined to abide strictly by the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations on the non-use of force or threat of force.

Recognizing that the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of nonnuclear-weapon States need to be safeguarded against the use or threat of use of force, including the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, Considering that, until nuclear disarmament is achieved on a universal basis, it is imperative for the international community to develop effective measures and arrangements to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from any quarter,

Recognizing that effective measures and arrangements to assure non-nuclearweapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons can contribute positively to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons,

Bearing in mind paragraph59 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, in which it urged the nuclear-weapon States to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and desirous of promoting the implementation of the relevant provisions of the Final Document,

Recalling the relevant parts of the special report of the Committee on Disarmament submitted to the General Assembly at its twelfth special session, the second special session devoted to disarmament, and of the special report of the Conference on Disarmament submitted to the Assembly at its fifteenth special session, the third special session devoted to disarmament, as well as the report of the Conference on its 1992 session,

Recalling also paragraph12 of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, contained in the annex to its resolution 35/46 of 3December 1980, which states, inter alia, that all efforts should be exerted by the Committee on Disarmament urgently to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Noting the in-depth negotiations undertaken in the Conference on Disarmament and its Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, with a view to reaching agreement on this question,

Taking note of the proposals submitted under the item in the Conference on Disarmament, including the drafts of an international convention,

Taking note also of the relevant decision of the Twelfth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Durban, South Africa, from 29August to 3September 1998, as well as the relevant recommendations of the Organization of the Islamic Conference,

Taking note further of the unilateral declarations made by all the nuclear-weapon States on their policies of non-use or non-threat of use of nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States,

Noting the support expressed in the Conference on Disarmament and in the General Assembly for the elaboration of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, as well as the difficulties pointed out in evolving a common approach acceptable to all,

Taking note of Security Council resolution 984(1995) of 11April 1995 and the views expressed on it.

Recalling its relevant resolutions adopted in previous years, in particular resolutions 45/54 of 4December 1990, 46/32 of 6December 1991, 47/50 of 9December 1992, 48/73 of 16December 1993, 49/73 of 15December 1994, 50/68 of 12December 1995, 51/43 of 10December 1996, 52/36 of 9December 1997, 53/75 of 4December 1998, 54/52 of 1December 1999, 55/31 of 20November 2000 and 56/22 of 29November 2001.

- 1. Reaffirms the urgent need to reach an early agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- 2. Notes with satisfaction that in the Conference on Disarmament there is no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, although the difficulties with regard to evolving a common approach acceptable to all have also been pointed out;
- 3. Appeals to all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to work actively towards an early agreement on a common approach and, in particular, on a common formula that could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character:
- 4. Recommends that further intensive efforts be devoted to the search for such a common approach or common formula and that the various alternative approaches, including, in particular, those considered in the Conference on Disarmament, be explored further in order to overcome the difficulties;
- 5. Also recommends that the Conference on Disarmament actively continue intensive negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement and concluding effective international arrangements to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, taking into account the widespread support for the conclusion of an international convention and giving consideration to any other proposals designed to secure the same objective;
- 6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session the item entitled "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use

Resolution 57/57

Prevention of an arms race in outer space

The General Assembly,

Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,

Reaffirming the will of all States that the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be for peaceful purposes and shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development,

Reaffirming also the provisions of articlesIII and IV of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,

Recalling the obligation of all States to observe the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations regarding the use or threat of use of force in their international relations, including in their space activities,

Reaffirming paragraph80 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in which it is stated that in order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty,

Recalling its previous resolutions on this issue, and taking note of the proposals submitted to the General Assembly at its tenth special session and at its regular sessions, and of the recommendations made to the competent organs of the United Nations and to the Conference on Disarmament,

Recognizing that prevention of an arms race in outer space would avert a grave danger for international peace and security,

Emphasizing the paramount importance of strict compliance with existing arms limitation and disarmament agreements relevant to outer space, including bilateral agreements, and with the existing legal regime concerning the use of outer space,

Considering that wide participation in the legal regime applicable to outer space could contribute to enhancing its effectiveness,

Noting that the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, taking into account its previous efforts since its establishment in 1985 and seeking to enhance its functioning in qualitative terms, continued the examination and identification of various issues, existing agreements and existing proposals, as well as future initiatives relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and that this contributed to a better understanding of a number of problems and to a clearer perception of the various positions,

Noting also that there were no objections in principle in the Conference on Disarmament to the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee, subject to re-examination of the mandate contained in the decision of the Conference on Disarmament of 13February 1992,

Emphasizing the mutually complementary nature of bilateral and multilateral efforts in the field of preventing an arms race in outer space, and hoping that concrete results will emerge from those efforts as soon as possible,

Convinced that further measures should be examined in the search for effective and verifiable bilateral and multilateral agreements in order to prevent an arms race in outer space, including the weaponization of outer space,

Stressing that the growing use of outer space increases the need for greater transparency and better information on the part of the international community,

Recalling, in this context, its previous resolutions, in particular resolutions 45/55B of 4December 1990, 47/51 of 9December 1992 and 48/74A of 16December 1993, in which, inter alia, it reaffirmed the importance of confidence-building measures as a means conducive to ensuring the attainment of the objective of the prevention of an arms race in outer space,

Conscious of the benefits of confidence- and security-building measures in the military field,

Recognizing that negotiations for the conclusion of an international agreement or agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space remain a priority task of the Ad Hoc Committee and that the concrete proposals on confidence-building measures could form an integral part of such agreements,

- 1. Reaffirms the importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space and the readiness of all States to contribute to that common objective, in conformity with the provisions of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies;
- 2. Reaffirms its recognition, as stated in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, that the legal regime applicable to outer space does not in and of itself guarantee the prevention of an arms race in outer space, that the regime plays a significant role in the prevention of an arms race in that environment, that there is a need to consolidate and reinforce that regime and enhance its effectiveness and that it is important to comply strictly with existing agreements, both bilateral and multilateral;
- 3. Emphasizes the necessity of further measures with appropriate and effective provisions for verification to prevent an arms race in outer space;
- 4. Calls upon all States, in particular those with major space capabilities, to contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space and of the prevention of an arms race in outer space and to refrain from actions contrary to that objective and to the relevant existing treaties in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation;
- 5. Reiterates that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, has the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects;
- 6. Invites the Conference on Disarmament to complete the examination and updating of the mandate contained in its decision of 13February 1992 and to establish an adhoc committee as early as possible during its 2003 session;
- 7. Recognizes, in this respect, the growing convergence of views on the elaboration of measures designed to strengthen transparency, confidence and security in the peaceful uses of outer space;
- 8. Urges States conducting activities in outer space, as well as States interested in conducting such activities, to keep the Conference on Disarmament informed of the progress of bilateral and multilateral negotiations on the matter, if any, so as to facilitate its work;
- 9. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session the item entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space".

Resolution 57/58 Reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons

The General Assembly, Recalling its resolution 55/33D of 20November 2000, Stressing the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States, in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, a goal to which all States parties to the Treaty are committed under its articleVI,

Recognizing that disarmament and non-proliferation are essential for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Reaffirming the necessity of strict compliance by all parties with their obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the necessity of upholding their commitments in associated decisions and final documents agreed upon at the 2000 and 1995 Review Conferences,

Noting the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, issued at TheHague on 8July 1996,

Noting the importance attached to the issue of reducing non-strategic nuclear weapons by the Secretary-General in his report to the Millennium Assembly,

Stressing the commitment made in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference to the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons,

Concerned that the total number of nuclear weapons deployed and in stockpile still amounts to many thousands,

Reiterating that it is the particular responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States for transparent, verifiable and irreversible reductions of nuclear weapons, leading to nuclear disarmament,

Emphasizing that further reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons should be accorded priority and be carried out in a comprehensive manner,

- 1. Agrees that reductions and elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons should be included as an integral part of the nuclear-arms reduction and disarmament process;
- 2. Agrees also that reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons should be carried out in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner;
- 3. Agrees further on the importance of preserving, reaffirming, implementing and building upon the 1991 and 1992 presidential nuclear initiatives of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics/Russian Federation on non-strategic nuclear weapons;
- 4. Calls upon the Russian Federation and the United States of America to formalize their presidential nuclear initiatives into legal instruments and to initiate negotiations on further effectively verifiable reductions of their non-strategic nuclear weapons;
- 5. Stresses the importance of special security and physical protection measures for the transport and storage of non-strategic nuclear weapons, and calls upon all nuclear-weapon States in possession of such weapons to take the necessary steps in this regard;
- 6. Calls for further confidence-building and transparency measures to reduce the threats posed by non-strategic nuclear weapons;

- 7. Calls also for concrete agreed measures to reduce further the operational status of non-strategic nuclear weapons systems;
- 8. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session an item entitled "Reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons".

Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 53/77 Y of 4December 1998, 54/54 G of 1December 1999 and 55/33C of 20November 2000,

Convinced that the existence of nuclear weapons is a threat to the survival of humanity,

Declaring that the participation of the international community as a whole is central to the maintenance and enhancement of international peace and stability, and that international security is a collective concern requiring collective engagement,

Declaring also that internationally negotiated treaties in the field of disarmament have made a fundamental contribution to international peace and security, and that unilateral and bilateral nuclear disarmament measures complement the treaty-based multilateral approach towards nuclear disarmament,

Noting the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, issued at TheHague on 8July 1996,

Declaring that any presumption of the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States is incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and with the broader goal of the maintenance of international peace and security,

Declaring also that it is essential that the fundamental principles of transparency, verification and irreversibility should apply to all nuclear disarmament measures,

Convinced that the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons constitutes an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process,

Declaring that each article of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is binding on the respective States parties at all times and in all circumstances and that it is imperative that all States parties be held fully accountable with respect to the strict compliance with their obligations under the Treaty, and that the undertakings therein on nuclear disarmament have been given and that their implementation remains the imperative,

Expressing its deep concern that, to date, there have been few advances in the implementation of the thirteen steps agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Stressing the importance of regular reporting in promoting confidence in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Expressing its deep concern at the continued failure of the Conference on Disarmament to deal with nuclear disarmament and to resume negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty

banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,

Expressing grave concern that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has not yet entered into force,

Expressing deep concern that the total number of nuclear weapons deployed and stockpiled still amounts to thousands, and at the continuing possibility that nuclear weapons could be used,

Acknowledging that reductions in the numbers of deployed strategic nuclear warheads envisaged by the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions ("the Moscow Treaty") represent a positive step in the process of nuclear de-escalation between the United States of America and the Russian Federation, while stressing that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons,

Noting that, despite these bilateral achievements, there is no sign of efforts involving all of the five nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons,

Expressing its deep concern that emerging approaches to the broader role of nuclear weapons as part of security strategies could lead to the development of new types, and rationalizations for the use, of nuclear weapons,

Expressing concern that the development of missile defences could impact negatively on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and lead to a new arms race on earth and in outer space,

Stressing that no steps should be taken which would lead to the weaponization of outer space,

Expressing its deep concern at the continued retention of the nuclear-weapons option by those three States that have not yet acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, in particular given the effects of regional volatility on international security, and in this context, the continued regional tensions and deteriorating security situation in South Asia and the Middle East,

Welcoming Cuba's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco,

Welcoming also the conclusion of negotiations among the Central Asian States on a treaty on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region, and underlining the importance of its entry into force as soon as possible,

Welcoming further the progress in the further development of nuclear-weaponfree zones in some regions and, in particular, the consolidation of that in the southern hemisphere and adjacent areas,

Recalling the United Nations Millennium Declaration, in which the heads of State and Government resolved to strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons, and to keep all options open for achieving this aim, including the possibility of convening an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers,

Taking into consideration the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States, in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all the States parties to the Treaty are committed under articleVI of the Treaty,

- 1. Reaffirms that any possibility that nuclear weapons could be used represents a continued risk for humanity;
- 2. Calls upon all States to refrain from any action that could lead to a new nuclear arms race or that could impact negatively on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation;
- 3. Also calls upon all States to observe international treaties in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and to duly fulfill all obligations flowing from those treaties;
- 4. Calls upon all States parties to pursue, with determination and with continued vigour, the full and effective implementation of the substantial agreements reached at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the outcome of which provides the requisite blueprint to achieve nuclear disarmament;
- 5. Calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to respect fully their existing commitments with regard to security assurances, pending the conclusion of multilaterally negotiated legally binding security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties, and agrees to prioritize this issue with a view to making recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
- 6. Also calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to increase their transparency and accountability with regard to their nuclear weapons arsenals and their implementation of disarmament measures;
- 7. Reaffirms the necessity for the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to consider regular reports to be submitted by all States parties on the implementation of article VI of the Treaty as outlined in paragraph 15:12 of the 2000 Final Document, and on paragraph 4(c) of decision 2 of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty;
- 8. Calls upon nuclear-weapon States to implement the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons commitments to apply the principle of irreversibility by destroying their nuclear warheads in the context of strategic nuclear reductions and avoid keeping them in a state that lends itself to their possible redeployment;
- 9. Agrees on the importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty;
- 10. Calls for the upholding and maintenance of the moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty;

- 11. Underlines the urgency of the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in the context of the progress in implementing the international system to monitor nuclear weapons tests under the Treaty;
- 12. Agrees that the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons should be accorded priority and that nuclear-weapon States must live up to their commitments in this regard;
- 13. Agrees also that reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons should be carried out in a transparent and irreversible manner and that the reduction and elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons should be included in the overall arms reductions negotiations. In this context, urgent action should be taken to achieve:
- (a) Further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process;
- (b) Further confidence-building and transparency measures to reduce the threats posed by non-strategic nuclear weapons;
- (c) Concrete agreed measures to reduce further the operational status of nuclear weapons systems;
- (d) The formalizing of existing informal bilateral arrangements regarding non-strategic nuclear reductions, such as the Bush-Gorbachev declarations of 1991, into legally binding agreements;
- 14. Calls upon nuclear-weapon States to undertake the necessary steps towards the seamless integration of all five nuclear-weapon States into a process leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons;
- 15. Agrees that the Conference on Disarmament should establish without delay an adhoc committee to deal with nuclear disarmament;
- 16. Agrees also that the Conference on Disarmament should resume negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives;
- 17. Agrees further that the Conference on Disarmament should complete the examination and updating of the mandate on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects, as contained in its decision of 13February 1992, and re-establish an adhoc committee as early as possible;
- 18. Calls upon those three States that are not yet parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States, promptly and without condition, and to bring into force the required comprehensive safeguards agreements, together with additional protocols, consistent with the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards approved by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency on 15May 1997, for ensuring nuclear non-proliferation, and to reverse clearly and urgently any policies to pursue any nuclear weapons development or deployment and refrain from any action that could

undermine regional and international peace and security and the efforts of the international community towards nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation;

- 19. Calls upon those States that have not yet done so to conclude full-scope safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency and to conclude additional protocols to their safeguards agreements on the basis of the Model Protocol:
- 20. Reaffirms the conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime and contributes towards realizing the objective of nuclear disarmament, and supports proposals for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones where they do not yet exist, such as in the Middle East and South Asia:
- 21. Calls for the completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Russian Federation and the United States of America and for consideration to be given to the possible inclusion of other nuclear-weapon States;
- 22. Calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to make arrangements for the placing, as soon as practicable, of their fissile material no longer required for military purposes under International Atomic Energy Agency or other relevant international verification and to make arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes in order to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes;
- 23. Affirms that a nuclear-weapon-free world will ultimately require the underpinning of a universal and multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument or a framework encompassing a mutually reinforcing set of instruments;
- 24. Acknowledges the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 55/33C, and requests him, within existing resources, to prepare a report on the implementation of the present resolution;
- 25. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session the item entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda", and to review the implementation of the present resolution at that session.

Resolution 57/60

United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 55/33E of 20November 2000,

Reaffirming the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation and the commitment of Member States to take concrete steps in order to strengthen that role.

Welcoming the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education, prepared by the Secretary-General with the assistance of governmental experts, pursuant to the above-mentioned resolution,

Convinced that the need has never been greater for disarmament and non-proliferation education, especially on weapons of mass destruction, but also in the field of small arms and light weapons, terrorism and other challenges to international security and the process of disarmament,

Recognizing the importance of the role of civil society, including non-governmental organizations, in the promotion of disarmament and non-proliferation education,

- 1. Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General for providing Member States with the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education, which contains a series of recommendations for immediate and long-term implementation;
- 2. Conveys the recommendations for implementation, as appropriate, by Member States, the United Nations and other international organizations, civil society, non-governmental organizations and the media;
- 3. Requests the Secretary-General to prepare a report reviewing the results of the implementation of the recommendations and to submit it to the General Assembly at its fifty-ninth session;
- 4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-ninth session an item entitled "Disarmament and non-proliferation education".

Resolution 57/61

Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 49/75 I of 15December 1994, 50/70 F of 12December 1995, 51/45 C of 10December 1996, 52/38 F of 9December 1997, 53/77AA of 4December 1998, 54/54 U of 1December 1999, 55/33 M of 20November 2000 and 56/24D of 29November 2001.

Recalling also that, there being a consensus to do so in each case, three special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament were held in 1978, 1982 and 1988, respectively,

Bearing in mind the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, adopted by consensus at the first special session devoted to disarmament, which included the Declaration, Programme of Action and Machinery for Disarmament,

Bearing in mind also the objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Taking note of paragraph145 of the Final Document of the Twelfth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Durban, South Africa, from 29August to 3September 1998, which supported the convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which would offer an opportunity to review, from a perspective more in tune with the current international situation, the most critical aspects of the process of disarmament and to mobilize the international community and public opinion in favour of the elimination

of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and of the control and reduction of conventional weapons,

Taking note also of the report of the Disarmament Commission on its 1999 substantive session and of the fact that no consensus was reached on the item entitled "Fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament",

Desiring to build upon the substantive exchange of views on the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament during the 1999 substantive session of the Disarmament Commission.

Recalling the United Nations Millennium Declaration, adopted by the heads of State and Government during the United Nations Millennium Summit held in New York from 6 to 8September 2000, in which they resolved "to strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, and to keep all options open for achieving this aim, including the possibility of convening an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers",

Reiterating its conviction that a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament can set the future course of action in the field of disarmament, arms control and related international security matters,

Emphasizing the importance of multilateralism in the process of disarmament, arms control and related international security matters,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General, regarding the views of Member States on the objectives, agenda and timing of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament,

- 1. Decides to establish an open-ended working group, working on the basis of consensus, to consider the objectives and agenda, including the possible establishment of the preparatory committee, for the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, taking note of the paper presented by the Chairman of Working Group II during the 1999 substantive session of the Disarmament Commission as well as the reports of the Secretary-General regarding the views of Member States on the objectives, agenda and timing of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;
- 2. Requests the open-ended Working Group to hold an organizational session in order to set the date for its substantive sessions, and to submit a report on its work, including possible substantive recommendations, before the end of the fifty-seventh session of the General Assembly;
- 3. Requests the Secretary-General, within existing resources, to provide the open-ended Working Group with the necessary assistance and services as may be required to discharge its tasks;
- 4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session the item entitled "Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament".

Resolution 57/62

Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol The General Assembly. Recalling its previous resolutions on the subject, in particular resolution 55/33J of 20November 2000.

Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling the long-standing determination of the international community to achieve the effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical and biological weapons as well as the continuing support for measures to uphold the authority of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17June 1925, as expressed by consensus in many previous resolutions.

Emphasizing the necessity of easing international tension and strengthening trust and confidence between States.

Welcoming the initiatives by some States Parties to withdraw their reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol,

- 1. Takes note of the note by the Secretary-General;
- 2. Renews its previous call to all States to observe strictly the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17June 1925, and reaffirms the vital necessity of upholding its provisions;
- 3. Calls upon those States that continue to maintain reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol to withdraw them;
- 4. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its fifty-ninth session a report on the implementation of the present resolution.

Resolution 57/63

Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and nonproliferation

The General Assembly,

Determined to foster strict respect for the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

Recalling its resolution 56/24T of 29November 2001 on multilateral cooperation in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation and global efforts against terrorism and other relevant resolutions,

Recalling also the purpose of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security, and to that end, to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace, as enshrined in the Charter,

Recalling further the United Nations Millennium Declaration, which states, inter alia, that the responsibility for managing worldwide economic and social

development, as well as threats to international peace and security, must be shared among the nations of the world and should be exercised multilaterally and that, as the most universal and most representative organization in the world, the United Nations must play the central role.

Convinced that in the globalization era and with the information revolution, arms regulation, non-proliferation and disarmament problems are more than ever the concern of all countries in the world, which are affected one way or another by these problems and, therefore, should have the possibility to participate in the negotiations that arise to tackle them,

Bearing in mind the existence of a broad structure of disarmament and arms regulation agreements resulting from non-discriminatory multilateral negotiations with the participation of a large number of countries, regardless of their size and power,

Aware of the need to advance further in the field of arms regulation, non-proliferation and disarmament on the basis of universal, multilateral, non-discriminatory negotiations with the goal of reaching general and complete disarmament under strict international control,

Recognizing the complementarity of bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral negotiations on disarmament,

Recognizing also that the proliferation and development of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, are among the most immediate threats to international peace and security which need to be dealt with, with the highest priority,

Considering that the multilateral disarmament agreements provide the mechanism for States parties to consult one another and to cooperate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of, the provisions of the agreements and that such consultations and cooperation may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with the Charter,

Stressing that international cooperation, peaceful settlement of disputes, dialogue and confidence-building measures would contribute essentially to the creation of multilateral and bilateral friendly relations among peoples and nations,

Being concerned at the continuous erosion of multilateralism in the field of arms regulation, non-proliferation and disarmament, and recognizing that a resort to unilateral actions by Member States in resolving their security concerns would jeopardize international peace and security and undermine confidence in the international security system as well as the foundations of the United Nations itself,

Reaffirming the absolute validity of multilateral diplomacy in the field of disarmament, and determined to promote multilateralism as an essential way to develop arms regulation and disarmament negotiations,

- 1. Reaffirms multilateralism as the core principle in negotiations in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation with a view to maintaining and strengthening universal norms and enlarging their scope;
- 2. Also reaffirms multilateralism as the core principle in resolving disarmament and non-proliferation concerns;

- Urges the participation of all interested States in multilateral negotiations on arms regulation, non-proliferation and disarmament in a non-discriminatory manner;
- 4. Underlines the importance of preserving the existing agreements on arms regulation and disarmament, which constitute an expression of the results of international cooperation and multilateral negotiations in response to the challenges facing mankind;
- 5. Calls once again upon all Member States to renew and fulfil their individual and collective commitments to multilateral cooperation as an important means of pursuing and achieving their common objectives in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation;
- 6. Requests the States parties to the relevant instruments on weapons of mass destruction to consult and cooperate among themselves in resolving their concerns with regard to cases of non-compliance as well as on implementation, in accordance with the procedures defined in those instruments, and to refrain from resorting or threatening to resort to unilateral actions or directing unverified non-compliance accusations against one another to resolve their concerns;
- 7. Requests the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States on the issue of the promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation and to submit a report to the General Assembly at its fifty-eighth session;
- 8. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session an item entitled "Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation".

Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 50/70 M of 12December 1995, 51/45E of 10December 1996, 52/38E of 9December 1997, 53/77 J of 4December 1998, 54/54 S of 1December 1999, 55/33 K of 20November 2000 and 56/24F of 29November 2001.

Emphasizing the importance of the observance of environmental norms in the preparation and implementation of disarmament and arms limitation agreements,

Recognizing that it is necessary to take duly into account the agreements adopted at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, as well as prior relevant agreements, in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms limitation,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General,

Mindful of the detrimental environmental effects of the use of nuclear weapons,

1. Reaffirms that international disarmament forums should take fully into account the relevant environmental norms in negotiating treaties and agreements on disarmament and arms limitation and that all States, through their actions, should

contribute fully to ensuring compliance with the aforementioned norms in the implementation of treaties and conventions to which they are parties;

- 2. Calls upon States to adopt unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures so as to contribute to ensuring the application of scientific and technological progress in the framework of international security, disarmament and other related spheres, without detriment to the environment or to its effective contribution to attaining sustainable development;
- 3. Welcomes the information provided by Member States on the implementation of the measures they have adopted to promote the objectives envisaged in the present resolution;
- 4. Invites all Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General information on the measures they have adopted to promote the objectives envisaged in the present resolution, and requests the Secretary-General to submit a report containing this information to the General Assembly at its fifty-eighth session;
- 5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session the item entitled "Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control".

Resolution 57/65

Relationship between disarmament and development

The General Assembly,

Recalling the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly concerning the relationship between disarmament and development,

Recalling also the adoption on 11September 1987 of the Final Document of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development,

Recalling further its resolutions 49/75 J of 15December 1994, 50/70 G of 12December 1995, 51/45D of 10December 1996, 52/38D of 9December 1997, 53/77 K of 4December 1998, 54/54 T of 1December 1999, 55/33 L of 20November 2000 and 56/24E of 29November 2001,

Bearing in mind the Final Document of the Twelfth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Durban, South Africa, from 29August to 3September 1998, and the Final Document of the Thirteenth Ministerial Conference of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Cartagena, Colombia, on 8 and 9April 2000,

Welcoming the different activities organized by the high-level Steering Group on Disarmament and Development and the views and proposals received from Governments on the issue, as contained in the report of the Secretary-General,

Stressing the importance of the symbiotic relationship between disarmament and development in current international relations, and concerned at increasing global military expenditure, which could otherwise be spent on development needs,

Taking into account developments in the context of disarmament and international security since the end of the cold war, as well as new perspectives and

goals on development issues emerging from, inter alia, the United Nations Millennium Declaration, the Doha Ministerial Declaration of the World Trade Organization, adopted on 14November 2001, the Monterrey Consensus of the International Conference on Financing for Development, adopted on 22March 2002, and the Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development and the Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, adopted on 4September 2002,

Mindful of the changes in international relations that have taken place since the adoption on 11September 1987 of the Final Document of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, including the development agenda that has emerged over the past decade,

Bearing in mind the new challenges for the international community in the field of development, poverty eradication and the elimination of the diseases that afflict humanity,

- 1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to resolution 56/24E, including its proposal to consider the establishment of a group of governmental experts to undertake a review of the relationship between disarmament and development in the current international context, as well as the role of the Organization in this connection;
- 2. Requests the Secretary-General, within available financial resources and with the assistance of a group of governmental experts to be established in 2003 on the basis of equitable geographical distribution, while seeking the views of States, to present for the consideration of the General Assembly at its fifty-ninth session a report with recommendations for a reappraisal of the relationship between disarmament and development in the current international context, as well as the future role of the Organization in this connection;
- 3. Calls upon the high-level Steering Group on Disarmament and Development to strengthen and enhance its programme of activities, in accordance with the mandate contained in subparagraph (ix) b of paragraph35(c) of the action programme adopted at the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development;
- 4. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to take action, through appropriate organs and within available resources, for the implementation of the action programme;
- 5. Urges the international community to devote part of the resources made available by the implementation of disarmament and arms limitation agreements to economic and social development, with a view to reducing the ever widening gap between developed and developing countries;
- 6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session the item entitled "Relationship between disarmament and development".

National legislation on transfer of arms, military equipment and dual use goods and technology

The General Assembly,

Recognizing that disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation are essential for the maintenance of international peace and security and that effective national control over the transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods and technology is an important tool in achieving these objectives,

Recalling that the States parties to the international disarmament and non-proliferation treaties have undertaken, inter alia, both to control transfers that could contribute to proliferation activities and to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of materials, equipment and technological information for peaceful purposes, in accordance with the provisions of those treaties,

Considering that the exchange of national legislation, regulations and procedures on the transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods and technology contributes to mutual understanding and confidence among Member States,

Convinced that such an exchange would be beneficial to Member States that are in the process of developing such legislation,

Reaffirming the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with Article51 of the Charter of the United Nations,

- 1. Invites Member States that are in a position to do so to enact or improve national legislation, regulations and procedures to exercise effective control over the transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods and technology, while ensuring that such legislation, regulations and procedures are consistent with the obligations of States parties under international treaties;
- 2. Encourages Member States to provide, on a voluntary basis, information to the Secretary-General on their national legislation, regulations and procedures on the transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods and technology, as well as the changes therein, and requests the Secretary-General to make this information accessible for Member States:
- 3. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session an item entitled "National legislation on transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods and technology".

Resolution 57/67

Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 53/77D of 4December 1998 and 55/33 S of 20November 2000,

Recalling also the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations as well as the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

Bearing in mind its resolution 49/31 of 9December 1994 on the protection and security of small States,

Proceeding from the fact that nuclear-weapon-free status is one of the means of ensuring the national security of States,

Convinced that the internationally recognized status of Mongolia will contribute to enhancing stability and confidence-building in the region as well as promote Mongolia's security by strengthening its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the inviolability of its borders and the preservation of its ecological balance,

Taking note of the adoption by the Mongolian parliament of legislation defining and regulating its nuclear-weapon-free status as a concrete step towards promoting the aims of nuclear non-proliferation,

Bearing in mind the joint statement of the five nuclear-weapon States on security assurances to Mongolia in connection with its nuclear-weapon-free status as a contribution to implementing resolution 53/77D as well as their commitment to Mongolia to cooperate in the implementation of the resolution, in accordance with the principles of the Charter,

Noting that the joint statement has been transmitted to the Security Council by the five nuclear-weapon States,

Mindful that the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, at the Ministerial Meeting of its Coordinating Bureau, held at Durban, South Africa on 29April 2002, has welcomed and expressed its support for the policy of Mongolia to institutionalize its nuclear-weapon-free status as a concrete contribution to the international efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation regime and enhance predictability in north-east Asia,

Noting other measures taken to implement resolution 55/33S at the national and international levels,

Welcoming Mongolia's active and positive role in developing peaceful, friendly and mutually beneficial relations with the States of the region and other States,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 55/33S,

- 1. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 55/33S;
- 2. Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General for the efforts to implement resolution 55/33S;
- 3. Endorses and supports Mongolia's good-neighbourly and balanced relationship with its neighbours as an important element of strengthening regional peace, security and stability;
- 4. Welcomes the efforts made by Member States to cooperate with Mongolia in implementing resolution 55/33S, as well as the progress made in consolidating Mongolia's international security;
- 5. Invites Member States to continue to cooperate with Mongolia in taking the necessary measures to consolidate and strengthen Mongolia's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the inviolability of its borders, its economic security, its ecological balance and its nuclear-weapon-free status, as well as its independent foreign policy;

- 6. Appeals to the Member States of the Asia and Pacific region to support Mongolia's efforts to join the relevant regional security and economic arrangements;
- 7. Requests the Secretary-General and relevant United Nations bodies to continue to provide assistance to Mongolia in taking the necessary measures mentioned in paragraph5 above;
- 8. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its fifty-ninth session on the implementation of the present resolution;
- 9. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-ninth session the item entitled "Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status"

Bilateral strategic nuclear arms reductions and the new strategic framework

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 53/77Z of 4December 1998 and other relevant resolutions,

Welcoming the completion of strategic arms reductions codified in the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START) by Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States of America,

Agreeing that new global challenges and threats require the building of a qualitatively new foundation for strategic relations between the United States of America and the Russian Federation,

Noting with satisfaction the building of the new strategic relationship between the United States of America and the Russian Federation based on the principles of mutual security, trust, openness, cooperation and predictability,

Appreciating the joint determination of the two countries to work together and with other nations and international organizations to promote security, economic well-being and a peaceful, prosperous free world,

Applauding the agreement whereby each country will reduce its strategic nuclear warheads to a number that does not exceed 1,700 to 2,200, as specified in the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions ("the Moscow Treaty"), by 31December 2012,

Believing that the agreed strategic reductions advance the commitment of both the United States of America and the Russian Federation under articleVI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Appreciating that the United States of America and the Russian Federation will continue to work closely together, including through cooperative programmes, to ensure the security of weapons of mass destruction and missile technologies, information, expertise and material,

1. Welcomes the commitment of the two countries to strategic nuclear warhead reductions in the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions ("the Moscow Treaty"), signed on 24May 2002, which is an important result of this new bilateral strategic relationship and which will help to establish more favourable conditions for actively promoting security and cooperation and enhancing international stability;

- 2. Looks forward to the entry into force of the Moscow Treaty at the earliest possible date;
- 3. Notes with satisfaction the Joint Declaration signed by the United States of America and the Russian Federation in Moscow on 24May 2002, which, inter alia, created the Consultative Group for Strategic Security, chaired by Foreign and Defence Ministers, through which the United States of America and the Russian Federation will strengthen mutual confidence, expand transparency, share information and plans and discuss strategic issues of mutual interest;
- 4. Recognizes that the Group of Eight Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, launched by leaders at the Kananaskis Summit, held at Kananaskis, Canada, on 26 and 27 June 2002, will enhance international security and safety by supporting specific cooperation projects, initially in the Russian Federation, to address non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety issues;
- 5. Invites all countries, as appropriate, to join the Group of Eight commitment to the non-proliferation principles endorsed by the Group of Eight leaders at the Kananaskis Summit aimed at preventing terrorists, or those who harbour them, from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological and biological weapons, missiles, and related materials, equipment and technology;
- 6. Invites the United States of America and the Russian Federation to keep other States Members of the United Nations duly informed of their strategic offensive reductions;
- 7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session an item entitled "Bilateral strategic nuclear arms reductions and the new strategic framework".

Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 52/38 S of 9December 1997, 53/77A of 4December 1998 and 55/33W of 20November 2000 and its decisions 54/417 of 1December 1999 and 56/412 of 29November 2001,

Recalling also paragraphs 60, 61, 62 and 64 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and recalling further the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and of the report of its Main Committee II concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia,

Convinced that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones contributes to the achievement of general and complete disarmament,

Emphasizing the importance of internationally recognized treaties on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in different regions of the world and on the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime,

Welcoming the adoption by the Disarmament Commission at its 1999 substantive session of principles and guidelines for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned,

Considering that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region will heighten the security of the States concerned and strengthen global and regional peace and security,

Recalling the Almaty Declaration on the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Central Asia, adopted by the leaders of the Central Asian States on 28February 1997, the statement issued at Tashkent on 15September 1997 by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia and the Communiqué of the Consultative Meeting of Experts of the Central Asian Countries, the Nuclear-Weapon States and the United Nations, held at Bishkek on 9 and 10July 1998, with a view to elaborating acceptable ways and means of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia,

Reaffirming the universally recognized role of the United Nations in the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones,

- 1. Notes with appreciation the support of all States for the initiative to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia;
- 2. Takes note of the elaboration by experts of all five Central Asian States at the meeting held at Samarkand, Uzbekistan, from 25 to 27September 2002, of a draft treaty for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia and protocol thereto;
- 3. Invites all five Central Asian States to continue consulting with the five nuclear-weapon States on the draft treaty for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia and the protocol thereto, in conformity with the 1999 Disarmament Commission agreed guidelines for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones;
- 4. Welcomes the decision by all five Central Asian States to sign the Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty as soon as possible;
- 5. Requests the Secretary-General, within existing resources, to continue to provide assistance to the five Central Asian States in their further work for the early establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia;
- 6. Decides to continue its consideration of the question of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia at its fifty-eighth session under the item entitled "General and complete disarmament".

Resolution 57/70

Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them

The General Assembly,

Considering that the illicit proliferation and circulation of and traffic in small arms impede development, constitute a threat to populations and to national and regional security and are a factor contributing to the destabilization of States,

Deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the illicit proliferation and circulation of and traffic in small arms in the States of the Sahelo-Saharan subregion,

Noting with satisfaction the conclusions of the United Nations advisory missions dispatched by the Secretary-General to the affected countries of the subregion to study the most appropriate way of halting the illicit circulation of small arms and collecting them,

Welcoming the designation of the Department for Disarmament Affairs of the Secretariat as a centre for the coordination of all activities of United Nations bodies concerned with small arms.

Thanking the Secretary-General for his report on the causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa, and bearing in mind the statement on small arms made by the President of the Security Council on 24September 1999,

Welcoming the recommendations resulting from the meetings of the States of the subregion held at Banjul, Algiers, Bamako, Yamoussoukro and Niamey to establish close regional cooperation with a view to strengthening security,

Welcoming also the decision taken by the Economic Community of West African States concerning the renewal of the Declaration of a Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa, adopted at Abuja on 31 October 1998,

Recalling the Algiers Declaration adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its thirty-fifth ordinary session, held at Algiers from 12 to 14July 1999,

Emphasizing the need to advance efforts towards wider cooperation and better coordination in the struggle against the illicit proliferation of small arms through the common understanding reached at the meeting on small arms held at Oslo on 13 and 14July 1998 and the Brussels Call for Action adopted by the International Conference on Sustainable Disarmament for Sustainable Development, held at Brussels on 12 and 13October 1998,

Bearing in mind the Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons, adopted at Bamako on 1December 2000,

Recalling the millennium report of the Secretary-General,

Welcoming the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, adopted by the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, and calling for its expeditious implementation,

Recognizing the important role that the organizations of civil society play in detection, prevention and raising public awareness, in efforts to curb the illicit traffic in small arms,

- 1. Notes with satisfaction the Declaration of the Ministerial Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa, held in Abuja on 8 and 9May 2000, and encourages the Secretary-General to pursue his efforts in the context of the implementation of General Assembly resolution 49/75G of 15December 1994 and the recommendations of the United Nations advisory missions, aimed at curbing the illicit circulation of small arms and collecting such arms in the affected States that so request, with the support of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa and in close cooperation with the African Union;
- 2. Encourages the establishment in the countries of the Sahelo-Saharan subregion of national commissions to combat the illicit proliferation of small arms, and invites the international community to lend its support wherever possible to ensure the smooth functioning of the commissions;
- 3. Welcomes the decision to renew the Declaration of a Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa, adopted by the heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of West African States in Abuja on 31October 1998, and encourages the international community to support the implementation of the moratorium;
- 4. Encourages the involvement of organizations and associations of civil society in the efforts of the national commissions to combat the illicit traffic in small arms and their participation in the implementation of the moratorium on the importation, exportation and manufacture of small arms and light weapons in West Africa as well as in the implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects;
- 5. Encourages also cooperation among State organs, international organizations and civil society in combating the illicit traffic in small arms and supporting operations to collect the said arms in the subregions;
- 6. Calls upon the international community to provide technical and financial support to strengthen the capacity of civil organizations to take action to combat the illicit trade in small arms:
- 7. Takes note of the conclusions of the meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Economic Community of West African States, held in Bamako on 24 and 25March 1999, on the modalities for the implementation of the Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development, and welcomes the adoption by the meeting of a plan of action;
- 8. Takes note also of the conclusions of the African Conference on the Implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms: Needs and Partnerships, held in Pretoria, South Africa, from 18 to 21March 2002;
- 9. *Invites* the Secretary-General, and those States and organizations that are in a position to do so to provide assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them;
- 10. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to consider the matter and to report to it at its fifty-eighth session on the implementation of the present resolution;

11. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session the item entitled "Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them".

Resolution 57/71 Missiles

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 54/54 F of 1December 1999, 55/33A of 20November 2000 and 56/24 B of 29November 2001,

Reaffirming the role of the United Nations in the field of arms regulation and disarmament and the commitment of Member States to take concrete steps to strengthen that role,

Realizing the need to promote regional and international peace and security in a world free from the scourge of war and the burden of armaments,

Convinced of the need for a comprehensive approach towards missiles, in a balanced and non-discriminatory manner, as a contribution to international peace and security,

Bearing in mind that the security concerns of Member States at the international and regional levels should be taken into consideration in addressing the issue of missiles,

Underlining the complexities involved in considering the issue of missiles in the conventional context.

Expressing its support for the international efforts against the development and proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction,

Considering that the Secretary-General, in response to resolution 55/33A, established a Panel of Governmental Experts to assist him in preparing a report for the consideration of the General Assembly at its fifty-seventh session on the issue of missiles in all its aspects,

- 1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General on the issue of missiles in all its aspects;
- 2. Requests the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States on the report on the issue of missiles in all its aspects and to submit a report to the General Assembly at its fifty-eighth session;
- 3. Requests the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a Panel of Governmental Experts, to explore further the issue of missiles in all its aspects and to submit a report for consideration by the General Assembly at its fifty-ninth session;
- 4. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General containing the replies from Member States on the issue of missiles in all its aspects, submitted pursuant to resolution 56/24B;
- 5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session the item entitled "Missiles".

The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming its resolution 56/24 V of 24December 2001,

Recalling its resolutions 50/70B of 12December 1995, 52/38 J of 9December 1997, 53/77E and 53/77 T of 4December 1998, 54/54 R of 1December 1999, 54/54 V of 15December 1999 and 55/33Q of 20November 2000,

Emphasizing the importance of early and full implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, adopted by the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects,

- 1. Decides to convene in New York in July 2003 the first of the biennial meetings of States, as stipulated in the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects to consider the implementation of the Programme of Action at the national, regional and global levels;
- 2. Welcomes the convening of the Group of Governmental Experts established to assist the Secretary-General to undertake a study on the feasibility of developing an international instrument to enable States to identify and trace, in a timely and reliable manner, illicit small arms and light weapons, and requests him to submit the study to the General Assembly at its fifty-eighth session;
- 3. Encourages all initiatives to mobilize resources and expertise to promote the implementation of the Programme of Action and to provide assistance to States in its implementation;
- 4. Decides to consider at its fifty-eighth session further steps to enhance international cooperation in preventing, combating and eradicating illicit brokering in small arms and light weapons, taking into consideration the views of States, provided to the Secretary-General, on further steps that could be taken;
- 5. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to collate and circulate data and information provided by States on a voluntary basis, including national reports, on the implementation by those States of the Programme of Action;
- 6. Also requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its fifty-eighth session on the implementation of the present resolution;
- 7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session the item entitled "The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects".

Resolution 57/73

Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 51/45B of 10December 1996, 52/38 N of 9December 1997, 53/77 Q of 4December 1998, 54/54 L of 1December 1999, 55/33 I of 20November 2000 and 56/24G of 29November 2001,

Welcoming the adoption by the Disarmament Commission at its 1999 substantive session of a text entitled "Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned",

Welcoming also the ratification by Cuba of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which fulfils the establishment of the first inhabited nuclear-weapon-free zone, encompassing all States of Latin America and the Caribbean,

Welcoming further the ratification by the Kingdom of Tonga of the Treaty of Rarotonga, in December 2001, which completes the list of original parties to the South Pacific nuclear-free-zone treaty,

Welcoming the endorsement from heads of State and Government at the thirtythird Pacific Islands Forum, held in Suva from 15 to 17August 2002, for a nuclearweapon-free southern hemisphere,

Welcoming also the meeting between the Secretary General of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and representatives of the Pacific Islands Forum secretariat, held in New York in April 2002, aimed at identifying areas for further cooperation,

Determined to pursue the total elimination of nuclear weapons,

Determined also to continue to contribute to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects and to the process of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, in particular in the field of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, with a view to strengthening international peace and security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling the provisions on nuclear-weapon-free zones of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament,

Stressing the importance of the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba, establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, as well as the Antarctic Treaty, to, inter alia, achieve a world entirely free of nuclear weapons,

Underlining the value of enhancing cooperation among the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty members by means of mechanisms such as joint meetings of States parties, signatories and observers to those treaties,

Recalling the applicable principles and rules of international law relating to the freedom of the high seas and the rights of passage through maritime space, including those of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,

- 1. Welcomes the continued contribution that the Antarctic Treaty and the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba are making towards freeing the southern hemisphere and adjacent areas covered by those treaties from nuclear weapons;
- 2. Calls for the ratification of the treaties of Rarotonga and Pelindaba by all States of the region, and calls upon all concerned States to continue to work together in order to facilitate adherence to the protocols to nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties by all relevant States that have not yet done so;

- 3. Welcomes the steps taken to conclude further nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, and calls upon all States to consider all relevant proposals, including those reflected in its resolutions on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and South Asia;
- 4. Affirms its conviction of the important role of nuclear-weapon-free zones in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and in extending the areas of the world that are nuclear-weapon-free, and, with particular reference to the responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States, calls upon all States to support the process of nuclear disarmament and to work for the total elimination of all nuclear weapons;
- 5. Calls upon the States parties and signatories to the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba, in order to pursue the common goals envisaged in those treaties and to promote the nuclear-weapon-free status of the southern hemisphere and adjacent areas, to explore and implement further ways and means of cooperation among themselves and their treaty agencies;
- 6. Welcomes the vigorous efforts being made among States parties and signatories to those treaties to promote their common objectives, and considers that an international conference of States parties and signatories to the nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties might be held to support the common goals envisaged in those treaties;
- 7. Encourages the competent authorities of the nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties to provide assistance to the States parties and signatories to those treaties so as to facilitate the accomplishment of these goals;
- 8. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session the item entitled "Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas".

Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 54/54B of 1December 1999, 55/33 V of 20November 2000 and 56/24M of 29November 2001,

Reaffirming its determination to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, which kill or main hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenceless civilians and especially children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe consequences for years after emplacement,

Believing it necessary to do the utmost to contribute in an efficient and coordinated manner to facing the challenge of removing anti-personnel mines placed throughout the world, and to assure their destruction,

Wishing to do the utmost in ensuring assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including the social and economic reintegration, of mine victims,

Welcoming the entry into force, on 1March 1999, of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, and noting with satisfaction the work undertaken to implement the Convention and the substantial progress made towards addressing the global landmine problem,

Recalling the First Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention, held at Maputo from 3 to 7May 1999, and the reaffirmation made in the Maputo Declaration of a commitment to the total eradication of anti-personnel mines.

Recalling also the Second Meeting of States Parties to the Convention, held at Geneva from 11 to 15September 2000, and the Declaration of the Second Meeting of States Parties reaffirming the commitment to implement completely and fully all provisions of the Convention,

Recalling further the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Convention, held at Managua from 18 to 21September 2001, and the Declaration of the Third Meeting of States Parties reaffirming the unwavering commitment both to the total eradication of anti-personnel mines and to addressing the insidious and inhumane effects of those weapons,

Recalling the Fourth Meeting of States Parties to the Convention, held at Geneva from 16 to 20September 2002, and the Declaration of the Fourth Meeting of States Parties reaffirming the commitment of the States parties to intensify further their efforts in those areas most directly related to the core humanitarian obj 'ives of the Convention.

Noting with satisfaction that additional States have ratified or acceded to the Convention, bringing the total number of States that have formally accepted the obligations of the Convention to one hundred and twenty-nine,

Emphasizing the desirability of attracting the adherence of all States to the Convention, and determined to work strenuously towards the promotion of its universalization,

Noting with regret that anti-personnel mines continue to be used in conflicts around the world, causing human suffering and impeding post-conflict development,

- 1. Invites all States that have not signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction to accede to it without delay;
- 2. Urges all States that have signed but not ratified the Convention to ratify it without delay;
- 3. Stresses the importance of the full and effective implementation of, and compliance with, the Convention;
- 4. *Urges* all States parties to provide the Secretary-General with complete and timely information as required under article? of the Convention, in order to promote transparency and compliance with the Convention;
- 5. *Invites* all States that have not ratified the Convention or acceded to it to provide, on a voluntary basis, information to make global mine action efforts more effective;

- 6. Renews its call upon all States and other relevant parties to work together to promote, support and advance the care, rehabilitation and social and economic reintegration of mine victims, mine risk education programmes, and the removal of anti-personnel mines placed throughout the world and the assurance of their destruction;
- 7. Invites and encourages all interested States, the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations to participate in the programme of intersessional work established at the First Meeting of States Parties to the Convention and further developed at the Second, Third and Fourth Meetings of States Parties to the Convention;
- 8. Requests the Secretary-General, in accordance with article11, paragraph2, of the Convention, to undertake the preparations necessary to convene the Fifth Meeting of States Parties to the Convention at Bangkok from 15 to 19September 2003, and, on behalf of States parties and in accordance with article11, paragraph4, of the Convention, to invite States not parties to the Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations to attend the Meeting as observers;
- 9. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session the item entitled "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction".

Resolution 57/75 Transparency in armaments

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 46/36 L of 9December 1991, 47/52 L of 15December 1992, 48/75 E of 16December 1993, 49/75C of 15December 1994, 50/70D of 12December 1995, 51/45H of 10December 1996, 52/38 R of 9December 1997, 53/77 V of 4December 1998, 54/54 O of 1December 1999, 55/33U of 20November 2000 and 56/24 Q of 29November 2001 entitled "Transparency in armaments",

Continuing to take the view that an enhanced level of transparency in armaments contributes greatly to confidence-building and security among States and that the establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms constitutes an important step forward in the promotion of transparency in military matters,

Welcoming the consolidated report of the Secretary-General on the Register, which includes the returns of Member States for 2001,

Welcoming also the response of Member States to the request contained in paragraphs9 and 10 of resolution 46/36L to provide data on their imports and exports of arms, as well as available background information regarding their military holdings, procurement through national production and relevant policies,

Stressing that the continuing operation of the Register and its further development should be reviewed in order to secure a Register that is capable of attracting the widest possible participation,

- 1. Reaffirms its determination to ensure the effective operation of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, as provided for in paragraphs 7 to 10 of resolution 46/36L;
- 2. Calls upon Member States, with a view to achieving universal participation, to provide the Secretary-General by 31May annually with the requested data and information for the Register, including nil reports if appropriate, on the basis of resolutions 46/36L and 47/52L, the recommendations contained in paragraph64 of the 1997 report of the Secretary-General on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development and the recommendations contained in paragraph94 of the 2000 report of the Secretary-General and the appendices and annexes thereto;
- 3. Invites Member States in a position to do so, pending further development of the Register, to provide additional information on procurement from national production and military holdings and to make use of the "Remarks" column in the standardized reporting form to provide additional information such as types or models;
- 4. Reaffirms its decision, with a view to further development of the Register, to keep the scope of and participation in the Register under review and, to that end:
- (a) Recalls its request to Member States to provide the Secretary-General with their views on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development and on transparency measures related to weapons of mass destruction;
- (b) Requests the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of governmental experts to be convened in 2003, on the basis of equitable geographical representation, to prepare a report on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development, taking into account the work of the Conference on Disarmament, the views expressed by Member States and the reports of the Secretary-General on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development, with a view to a decision at its fifty-eighth session;
- 5. Requests the Secretary-General to implement the recommendations contained in his 2000 report on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development and to ensure that sufficient resources are made available for the Secretariat to operate and maintain the Register;
- 6. *Invites* the Conference on Disarmament to consider continuing its work undertaken in the field of transparency in armaments;
- 7. Reiterates its call upon all Member States to cooperate at the regional and subregional levels, taking fully into account the specific conditions prevailing in the region or subregion, with a view to enhancing and coordinating international efforts aimed at increased openness and transparency in armaments;
- 8. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its fifty-eighth session on progress made in implementing the present resolution;
- 9. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session the item entitled "Transparency in armaments".

Resolution 57/76 Regional disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 45/58 P of 4December 1990, 46/36 I of 6December 1991, 47/52 J of 9December 1992, 48/75 I of 16December 1993, 49/75 N of 15December 1994, 50/70 K of 12December 1995, 51/45 K of 10December 1996, 52/38 P of 9December 1997, 53/77 O of 4December 1998, 54/54 N of 1December 1999, 55/33 O of 20November 2000 and 56/24H of 29November 2001 on regional disarmament,

Believing that the efforts of the international community to move towards the ideal of general and complete disarmament are guided by the inherent human desire for genuine peace and security, the elimination of the danger of war and the release of economic, intellectual and other resources for peaceful pursuits,

Affirming the abiding commitment of all States to the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations in the conduct of their international relations

Noting that essential guidelines for progress towards general and complete disarmament were adopted at the tenth special session of the General Assembly,

Taking note of the guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security adopted by the Disarmament Commission at its 1993 substantive session,

Welcoming the prospects of genuine progress in the field of disarmament engendered in recent years as a result of negotiations between the two super-Powers,

Taking note of the recent proposals for disarmament at the regional and subregional levels,

Recognizing the importance of confidence-building measures for regional and international peace and security,

Convinced that endeavours by countries to promote regional disarmament, taking into account the specific characteristics of each region and in accordance with the principle of undiminished security at the lowest level of armaments, would enhance the security of all States and would thus contribute to international peace and security by reducing the risk of regional conflicts,

- 1. Stresses that sustained efforts are needed, within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament and under the umbrella of the United Nations, to make progress on the entire range of disarmament issues;
- 2. Affirms that global and regional approaches to disarmament complement each other and should therefore be pursued simultaneously to promote regional and international peace and security;
- 3. Calls upon States to conclude agreements, wherever possible, for nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and confidence-building measures at the regional and subregional levels;
- 4. Welcomes the initiatives towards disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and security undertaken by some countries at the regional and subregional levels;

- 5. Supports and encourages efforts aimed at promoting confidence-building measures at the regional and subregional levels to ease regional tensions and to further disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation measures at the regional and subregional levels;
- 6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session the item entitled "Regional disarmament".

Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 48/75 J of 16December 1993, 49/75 O of 15December 1994, 50/70 L of 12December 1995, 51/45 Q of 10December 1996, 52/38 Q of 9December 1997, 53/77 P of 4December 1998, 54/54 M of 1December 1999, 55/33 P of 20November 2000 and 56/24I of 29November 2001.

Recognizing the crucial role of conventional arms control in promoting regional and international peace and security,

Convinced that conventional arms control needs to be pursued primarily in the regional and subregional contexts since most threats to peace and security in the post-cold-war era arise mainly among States located in the same region or subregion,

Aware that the preservation of a balance in the defence capabilities of States at the lowest level of armaments would contribute to peace and stability and should be a prime objective of conventional arms control,

Desirous of promoting agreements to strengthen regional peace and security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces,

Noting with particular interest the initiatives taken in this regard in different regions of the world, in particular the commencement of consultations among a number of Latin American countries and the proposals for conventional arms control made in the context of South Asia, and recognizing, in the context of this subject, the relevance and value of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which is a cornerstone of European security,

Believing that militarily significant States and States with larger military capabilities have a special responsibility in promoting such agreements for regional security,

Believing also that an important objective of conventional arms control in regions of tension should be to prevent the possibility of military attack launched by surprise and to avoid aggression,

- 1. Decides to give urgent consideration to the issues involved in conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels;
- 2. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to consider the formulation of principles that can serve as a framework for regional agreements on conventional arms control, and looks forward to a report of the Conference on this subject;
- 3. Requests the Secretary-General, in the meantime, to seek the views of Member States on the subject and to submit a report to the General Assembly at its fifty-eighth session;

4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session the item entitled "Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels".

Resolution 57/78

A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 49/75 H of 15December 1994, 50/70C of 12December 1995, 51/45 G of 10December 1996, 52/38 K of 9December 1997, 53/77U of 4December 1998, 54/54D of 1December 1999, 55/33 R of 20November 2000 and 56/24N of 29November 2001,

Recognizing that the enhancement of international peace and security and the promotion of nuclear disarmament mutually complement and strengthen each other,

Reaffirming the crucial importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as the cornerstone of the international regime for nuclear non-proliferation and as an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, and welcoming Cuba's accession to the Treaty,

Recognizing the progress made by the nuclear-weapon States in the reduction of their nuclear weapons unilaterally or through their negotiations, including the completion of the reductions of strategic offensive weapons according to the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I) and the recent signing of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions ("the Moscow Treaty") by the United States of America and the Russian Federation, which should serve as a step for further nuclear disarmament, and the efforts for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation by the international community,

Reaffirming the conviction that further advancement in nuclear disarmament will contribute to consolidating the international regime for nuclear non-proliferation, ensuring international peace and security,

Welcoming the continuation of a moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions since the recent nuclear tests,

Welcoming also the successful adoption of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and stressing the importance of implementing its conclusions,

Welcoming further the constructive start of the strengthened review process at the first session, held in New York from 8 to 19April 2002, of the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to be held in 2005,

Welcoming the successful convening of a series of seminars aiming at further reinforcement of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards in Latin America, Central Asia, Africa and the Asia-Pacific region, and sharing the hope that the conference to be held in Tokyo in December 2002 will further strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, including universalization of its safeguards agreements and the additional protocols thereto, by making utmost use of the outcomes of the aforementioned seminars.

Encouraging the Russian Federation and the United States of America to continue their intensive consultations in accordance with the Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship between the two States,

Welcoming the Final Declaration of the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, convened in New York from 11 to 13November 2001 in accordance with articleXIV of the Treaty,

Recognizing the importance of preventing terrorists from acquiring or developing nuclear weapons or related materials, radioactive materials, equipment and technology,

Stressing the importance of education on disarmament and non-proliferation for future generations, and noting with satisfaction the submission of the report of the Group of Governmental Experts on this issue by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly,

- 1. Reaffirms the importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and calls upon States not parties to the Treaty to accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon States without delay and without conditions;
- 2. Also reaffirms the importance for all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to fulfil their obligations under the Treaty;
- 3. Stresses the central importance of the following practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement articleVI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and paragraphs3 and 4¢) of the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty:
- (a) The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as well as a moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending the entry into force of that Treaty;
- (b) The establishment of an adhoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament as early as possible during its 2003 session to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the report of the Special Coordinator of 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives, with a view to its conclusion within five years and, pending its entry into force, a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons;
- (c) The establishment of an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament as early as possible during its 2003 session in the context of establishing a programme of work;
- (d) The inclusion of the principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures;
- (e) An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States, as agreed at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of

Nuclear Weapons, to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties to the Treaty are committed under articleVI of the Treaty;

- (f) Deep reductions by the Russian Federation and the United States of America in their strategic offensive arsenals, while placing great importance on the existing multilateral treaties, with a view to maintaining and strengthening strategic stability and international security;
- (g) Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all:
- (i). Further efforts by all the nuclear-weapon States to continue to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally;
- (ii). Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to their nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to articleVI of the Treaty and as voluntary confidence-building measures to support further progress on nuclear disarmament;
- (iii). The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process;
- (iv). Concrete agreed measures to reduce further the operational status of nuclear weapons systems;
- (v). A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination:
- (vi). The engagement, as soon as appropriate, of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons;
- (h) Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control;
- 4. Recognizes that the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons will require further steps, including deeper reductions by all the nuclear-weapon States in the process of working towards achieving their elimination;
- 5. Invites the nuclear-weapon States to keep the Members of the United Nations duly informed of the progress or efforts made towards nuclear disarmament;
- 6. Emphasizes the importance of a successful Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 2005 as the second session of the Preparatory Committee will be convened in 2003;
- 7. Welcomes the ongoing efforts in the dismantlement of nuclear weapons, notes the importance of the safe and effective management of the resultant fissile materials, and calls for arrangements by all the nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under International Atomic Energy Agency or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for

peaceful purposes to ensure that such material remains permanently outside of military programmes;

- 8. Stresses the importance of further development of the verification capabilities, including International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world;
- 9. Calls upon all States to redouble their efforts to prevent and curb the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, confirming and strengthening, if necessary, their policies not to transfer equipment, materials or technology that could contribute to the proliferation of those weapons, while ensuring that such policies are consistent with the obligations of States under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
- 10. Also calls upon all States to maintain the highest possible standards of security, safe custody, effective control and physical protection of all materials that could contribute to the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in order, inter alia, to prevent those materials from falling into the hands of terrorists;
- 11. Welcomes the adoption of resolution GC(46)/RES/12 on 20September 2002 by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and stresses the importance of the said resolution, in which it is recommended that the Director General, the Board of Governors and member States of the Agency continue to consider implementing the elements of the plan of action outlined in resolution GC(44)/RES/19, adopted on 22September 2000 by the General Conference of the Agency, to promote and facilitate the conclusion and entry into force of safeguards agreements and additional protocols, and calls for the early and full implementation of that resolution;
- 12. Encourages the constructive role played by civil society in promoting nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

Resolution 57/79 Nuclear disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 49/75E of 15December 1994 on a step-by-step reduction of the nuclear threat, and its resolutions 50/70P of 12December 1995, 51/45O of 10December 1996, 52/38L of 9December 1997, 53/77X of 4December 1998, 54/54P of 1December 1999, 55/33T of 20November 2000 and 56/24R of 29November 2001 on nuclear disarmament,

Reaffirming the commitment of the international community to the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

Bearing in mind that the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction of 1972 and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction of 1993 have already established legal regimes on the complete

prohibition of biological and chemical weapons, respectively, and determined to achieve a nuclear weapons convention on the prohibition of the development, testing, production, stockpiling, loan transfer, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons and on their destruction, and to conclude such an international convention at an early date.

Recognizing that there now exist conditions for the establishment of a world free of nuclear weapons, and stressing the need to take concrete practical steps towards achieving this goal,

Bearing in mind paragraph50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, calling for the urgent negotiation of agreements for the cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems, and for a comprehensive and phased programme with agreed time frames, wherever feasible, for the progressive and balanced reduction of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time,

Noting the reiteration by the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of their conviction that the Treaty is a cornerstone of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament and the reaffirmation by the States parties of the importance of the decision on strengthening the review process for the Treaty, the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, the decision on the extension of the Treaty and the resolution on the Middle East, adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Reiterating the highest priority accorded to nuclear disarmament in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and by the international community,

Welcoming the entry into force of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I), to which Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States of America are States parties,

Reiterating its call for an early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty,

Noting with appreciation the signing of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions ("the Moscow Treaty") by the United States of America and the Russian Federation as a significant step towards reducing their deployed strategic nuclear weapons, while calling for further irreversible deep cuts in their nuclear arsenals,

Noting with appreciation also the unilateral measures taken by the nuclear-weapon States for nuclear arms limitation, and encouraging them to take further such measures.

Recognizing the complementarity of bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament, and that bilateral negotiations can never replace multilateral negotiations in this respect,

Noting the support expressed in the Conference on Disarmament and in the General Assembly for the elaboration of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and the

multilateral efforts in the Conference on Disarmament to reach agreement on such an international convention at an early date,

Recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, issued on 8July 1996, and welcoming the unanimous reaffirmation by all Judges of the Court that there exists an obligation for all States to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

Mindful of paragraph114 and other relevant recommendations in the Final Document of the Twelfth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Durban, South Africa, from 29August to 3September 1998, calling upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish, on a priority basis, an adhoc committee to commence negotiations in 1998 on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time,

Recalling paragraph72 of the Final Document of the Thirteenth Ministerial Conference of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Cartagena, Colombia, on 8 and 9April 2000,

Bearing in mind the principles and guidelines on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, adopted by the Disarmament Commission at its substantive session of 1999.

Welcoming the United Nations Millennium Declaration, in which heads of State and Government resolve to strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons, and to keep all options open for achieving this aim, including the possibility of convening an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers,

Reaffirming that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States should refrain from the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons in settling their disputes in international relations,

Seized of the danger of the use of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, in terrorist acts and the urgent need for concerted international efforts to control and overcome it,

- 1. Recognizes that, in view of recent political developments, the time is now opportune for all the nuclear-weapon States to take effective disarmament measures with a view to achieving the elimination of these weapons;
- 2. Also recognizes that there is a genuine need to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in strategic doctrines and security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination;
- 3. Urges the nuclear-weapon States to stop immediately the qualitative improvement, development, production and stockpiling of nuclear warheads and their delivery systems;
- 4. Also urges the nuclear-weapon States, as an interim measure, to de-alert and deactivate immediately their nuclear weapons and to take other concrete measures to reduce further the operational status of their nuclear-weapon systems;

- 5. Reiterates its call upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake the step-bystep reduction of the nuclear threat and to carry out effective nuclear disarmament measures with a view to achieving the total elimination of these weapons;
- 6. Calls upon the nuclear-weapon States, pending the achievement of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, to agree on an internationally and legally binding instrument on a joint undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and calls upon all States to conclude an internationally and legally binding instrument on security assurances of non-use and non-threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States;
- 7. Urges the nuclear-weapon States to commence plurilateral negotiations among themselves at an appropriate stage on further deep reductions of nuclear weapons as an effective measure of nuclear disarmament;
- 8. Underlines the importance of applying the principle of irreversibility to the process of nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures:
- 9. Welcomes the positive outcome of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held in New York from 24April to 19May 2000;
- 10. Also welcomes the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States, in the Final Document of the Review Conference, to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under articleVI of the Treaty, and the reaffirmation by the States parties that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and calls for the full and effective implementation of the steps set out in the Final Document;
- 11. Urges the nuclear-weapon States to carry out further reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process;
- 12. Calls for the immediate commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator and the mandate contained therein:
- 13. Urges the Conference on Disarmament to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years;
- 14. Calls for the conclusion of an international legal instrument or instruments on adequate security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States;
- 15. Also calls for the early entry into force and strict observance of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty;
- 16. Expresses its regret that the Conference on Disarmament was unable to establish an adhoc committee on nuclear disarmament at its 2002 session, as called for in General Assembly resolution 56/24R;

- 17. Reiterates its call upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish, on a priority basis, an adhoc committee to deal with nuclear disarmament early in 2003 and to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament leading to the eventual total elimination of nuclear weapons;
- 18. Calls for the convening of an international conference on nuclear disarmament in all its aspects at an early date to identify and deal with concrete measures of nuclear disarmament:
- 19. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its fifty-eighth session a report on the implementation of the present resolution;
- 20. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session the item entitled "Nuclear disarmament".

The Conference on Disarmament decision (CD/1547) of 11 August 1998 to establish, under item 1 of its agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", an ad hoc committee to negotiate, on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 48/75L of 16December 1993, 53/77I of 4December 1998, 55/33Y of 20November 2000 and 56/24J of 29November 2001,

Convinced that a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices would be a significant contribution to nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation,

Recalling the 1998 report of the Conference on Disarmament, in which, inter alia, the Conference records that, in proceeding to take a decision on this matter, that decision is without prejudice to any further decisions on the establishment of further subsidiary bodies under agenda item 1 and that intensive consultations will be pursued to seek the views of the members of the Conference on Disarmament on appropriate methods and approaches for dealing with agenda item 1, taking into consideration all proposals and views in that respect,

- 1. Recalls the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to establish, under item 1 of its agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", an adhoc committee which shall negotiate, on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator and the mandate contained therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
- 2. Urges the Conference on Disarmament to agree on a programme of work that includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty.

Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 51/45N of 10December 1996, 52/38G of 9December 1997, 53/77M of 4December 1998, 54/54H of 1December 1999, 55/33G of 20November 2000 and 56/24P of 29November 2001,

Convinced that a comprehensive and integrated approach towards certain practical disarmament measures often is a prerequisite to maintaining and consolidating peace and security and thus provides a basis for effective post-conflict peace-building, namely the rehabilitation and social and economic development in areas that have suffered from conflict; such measures are, inter alia, collection and responsible disposal, preferably through destruction, of weapons obtained through illicit trafficking or illicit manufacture as well as of weapons and ammunition declared by competent national authorities to be surplus to requirements, particularly with regard to small arms and light weapons, unless another form of disposition or use has been officially authorized and provided that such weapons have been duly marked and registered; confidence-building measures; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; demining; and conversion,

Noting with satisfaction that the international community is more than ever aware of the importance of such practical disarmament measures, especially with regard to the growing problems arising from the excessive accumulation and uncontrolled spread of small arms and light weapons, which pose a threat to peace and security and reduce the prospects for economic development in many regions, particularly in post-conflict situations,

Stressing that further efforts are needed in order to develop and effectively implement programmes of practical disarmament in affected areas as part of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration measures so as to complement, on a case-by-case basis, peacekeeping and peace-building efforts,

Taking note with appreciation of the report of the Secretary-General on prevention of armed conflict, which, inter alia, refers to the role which the proliferation and illicit transfer of small arms and light weapons play in the context of the build-up and sustaining of conflicts and proposes certain measures relating to those weapons that can help to prevent such conflicts,

Taking note of the statement by the President of the Security Council of 31August 2001 underlining the importance of practical disarmament measures in the context of armed conflicts, and, with regard to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, emphasizing the importance of measures to be taken to contain the security risks stemming from the use of illicit small arms and light weapons,

Also taking note of the report of the Secretary-General prepared with the assistance of the Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, and in particular the recommendations contained therein, as an important contribution to the consolidation of the peace process through practical disarmament measures,

Taking into account the deliberations at the 2001 substantive session of the Disarmament Commission in Working Group II on agenda item 5, entitled "Practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms", and encouraging the Disarmament Commission to continue its efforts aimed at the identification of such measures.

Welcoming the Programme of Action adopted by the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, which should be implemented expeditiously,

- 1. Stresses, in the context of the present resolution, the particular relevance of the "Guidelines on conventional arms control/limitation and disarmament, with particular emphasis on consolidation of peace in the context of General Assembly resolution 51/45N", adopted by the Disarmament Commission by consensus at its 1999 substantive session;
- 2. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General on the consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures, submitted pursuant to resolution 51/45N, and once again encourages Member States, as well as regional arrangements and agencies, to lend their support to the implementation of recommendations contained therein;
- 3. Welcomes the activities undertaken by the group of interested States that was formed in New York in March 1998, and invites the group to continue to analyse lessons learned from previous disarmament and peace-building projects, as well as to promote new practical disarmament measures to consolidate peace, especially as undertaken or designed by affected States themselves;
- 4. Encourages Member States, including the group of interested States, to lend their support to the Secretary-General, relevant international, regional and subregional organizations, in accordance with ChapterVIII of the Charter of the United Nations, and non-governmental organizations in responding to requests by Member States to collect and destroy small arms and light weapons in post-conflict situations;
- 5. Thanks the Secretary-General for his report on the implementation of resolution 56/24P, taking into consideration the activities of the group of interested States in this regard;
- 6. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education;
- 7. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its fifty-eighth session a report on the implementation of practical disarmament measures, taking into consideration the activities of the group of interested States in this regard;
- 8. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session the item entitled "Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures".

Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction

The General Assembly,

Recalling its previous resolutions on the subject of chemical weapons, in particular resolution 56/24K of 29November 2001, adopted without a vote, in which it noted with appreciation the ongoing work to achieve the objective and purpose of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction,

Determined to achieve the effective prohibition of the development, production, acquisition, transfer, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and their destruction,

Noting with satisfaction that since the adoption of resolution 56/24K, four additional States have ratified the Convention or acceded to it, bringing the total number of States parties to the Convention to one hundred and forty-seven,

- 1. Emphasizes the necessity of universal adherence to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, ad calls upon all States that have not yet done so to become parties to the Convention without delay.
- 2. Notes with appreciation the ongoing work of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to achieve the objective and purpose of the Convention, to ensure the full implementation of its provisions, including those for international verification of compliance with it, and to provide a forum for consultation and cooperation among States parties;
- 3. Stresses the importance of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in verifying compliance with the provisions of the Convention as well as in promoting the timely and efficient accomplishment of all its objectives;
- 4. Also stresses the vital importance of full and effective implementation of and compliance with all provisions of the Convention;
- 5. Urges all States parties to the Convention to meet in full and on time their obligations under the Convention and to support the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in its implementation activities;
- 6. Stresses the importance to the Convention that all possessors of chemical weapons, chemical weapons production facilities or chemical weapons development facilities, including previously declared possessor States, should be among the States parties to the Convention, and welcomes progress to that end;
- 7. Welcomes the cooperation between the United Nations and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons within the framework of the Relationship Agreement between the United Nations and the Organization, in accordance with the provisions of the Convention;
- 8. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session the item entitled "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction".

Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction

The General Assembly,

Recognizing the determination of the international community to combat terrorism, as evident in relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions,

Deeply concerned by the growing risk of linkages between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and in particular by the fact that terrorists may seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction,

Acknowledging the consideration of issues relating to terrorism and weapons of mass destruction by the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters,

Taking note of resolution GC(46)/RES/13, adopted on 20September 2002 by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency at its forty-sixth regular session, and the setting up of an Advisory Group on Security in the Agency to advise the Director General on the Agency's activities relating to nuclear security,

Taking note also of the report of the Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism,

Mindful of the urgent need for addressing this threat to humanity within the United Nations framework and through international cooperation,

Emphasizing that progress is urgently needed in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation in order to help maintain international peace and security and to contribute to global efforts against terrorism,

- 1. Calls upon all Member States to support international efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery;
- 2. Urges all Member States to take and strengthen national measures, as appropriate, to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and materials and technologies related to their manufacture, and invites them to inform the Secretary-General, on a voluntary basis, of the measures taken in this regard;
- 3. Encourages cooperation among and between Member States and relevant regional and international organizations for strengthening national capacities in this regard;
- 4. Requests the Secretary-General to compile a report on measures already taken by international organizations on issues relating to the linkage between the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to seek the views of Member States on additional relevant measures for tackling the global threat posed by terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction, and to report to the General Assembly at its fifty-eighth session;
- 5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session an item entitled "Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction".

Resolution 57/84 Reducing nuclear danger

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind that the use of nuclear weapons poses the most serious threat to mankind and to the survival of civilization.

Reaffirming that any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would constitute a violation of the Charter of the United Nations,

Convinced that the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

Convinced also that nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons are essential to remove the danger of nuclear war,

Considering that, until nuclear weapons cease to exist, it is imperative on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to adopt measures that assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Considering also that the hair-trigger alert of nuclear weapons carries unacceptable risks of unintentional or accidental use of nuclear weapons, which would have catastrophic consequences for all mankind,

Emphasizing the imperative need to adopt measures to avoid accidental, unauthorized or unexplained incidents arising from computer anomaly or other technical malfunctions,

Conscious that limited steps relating to detargeting have been taken by the nuclear-weapon States and that further practical, realistic and mutually reinforcing steps are necessary to contribute to the improvement in the international climate for negotiations leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons,

Mindful that reduction of tensions brought about by a change in nuclear doctrines would positively impact on international peace and security and improve the conditions for the further reduction and the elimination of nuclear weapons,

Reiterating the highest priority accorded to nuclear disarmament in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and by the international community,

Recalling that in the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons it is stated that there exists an obligation for all States to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control,

Recalling also the call in the United Nations Millennium Declaration to seek to eliminate the dangers posed by weapons of mass destruction and the resolve to strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, including the possibility of convening an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers,

1. Calls for a review of nuclear doctrines and, in this context, immediate and urgent steps to reduce the risks of unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons;

- 2. Requests the five nuclear-weapon States to take measures towards the implementation of paragraph1 of the present resolution;
- 3. Calls upon Member States to take the necessary measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects and to promote nuclear disarmament, with the objective of eliminating nuclear weapons;
- 4. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to paragraph5 of General Assembly resolution 56/24C of 29November 2001;
- 5. Requests the Secretary-General to intensify efforts and support initiatives that would contribute towards the full implementation of the seven recommendations identified in the report of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters that would significantly reduce the risk of nuclear war, and also to continue to encourage Member States to endeavour to create conditions that would allow the emergence of an international consensus to hold an international conference as proposed in the United Nations Millennium Declaration, to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers, and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its fifty-eighth session;
- 6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session the item entitled "Reducing nuclear danger".

Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 49/75K of 15December 1994, 51/45M of 10December 1996, 52/38O of 9December 1997, 53/77W of 4December 1998, 54/54Q of 1December 1999, 55/33X of 20November 2000 and 56/24S of 29November 2001,

Convinced that the continuing existence of nuclear weapons poses a threat to all humanity and that their use would have catastrophic consequences for all life on Earth, and recognizing that the only defence against a nuclear catastrophe is the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the certainty that they will never be produced again,

Reaffirming the commitment of the international community to the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free world,

Mindful of the solemn obligations of States parties, undertaken in articleVI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, particularly to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear-arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament,

Recalling the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Emphasizing the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, adopted at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Recalling the adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in its resolution 50/245 of 10September 1996, and expressing its satisfaction at the increasing number of States that have signed and ratified the Treaty,

Recognizing with satisfaction that the Antarctic Treaty and the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba are gradually freeing the entire southern hemisphere and adjacent areas covered by those treaties from nuclear weapons,

Noting the signing of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions ("the Moscow Treaty"), by the United States of America and the Russian Federation on 24May 2002, following the demise of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, and urging them to take further steps under the Moscow Treaty as well as through bilateral arrangements or agreements and unilateral decisions towards the irreversible reduction of their nuclear arsenals.

Stressing the importance of strengthening all existing nuclear-related disarmament, arms control and reduction measures,

Recognizing the need for a multilaterally negotiated and legally binding instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the threat or use of nuclear weapons,

Reaffirming the central role of the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, and regretting the lack of progress in disarmament negotiations, particularly nuclear disarmament, in the Conference during its 2002 session,

Emphasizing the need for the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time,

Expressing its deep concern at the lack of progress in the implementation of the thirteen steps to implement articleVI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Desiring to achieve the objective of a legally binding prohibition of the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, threat or use of nuclear weapons and their destruction under effective international control,

Recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, issued on 8July 1996,

Taking note of the relevant portions of the note by the Secretary-General relating to the implementation of resolution 56/24S,

- 1. Underlines once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control;
- 2. Calls once again upon all States immediately to fulfil that obligation by commencing multilateral negotiations leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment,

stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination:

- 3. Requests all States to inform the Secretary-General of the efforts and measures they have taken on the implementation of the present resolution and nuclear disarmament, and requests the Secretary-General to apprise the General Assembly of that information at its fifty-eighth session;
- 4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session the item entitled "Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons".

Resolution 57/86

Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament and nonproliferation agreements

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 52/30 of 9December 1997 and other relevant resolutions on the question,

Recognizing the abiding concern of all Member States for maintaining respect for rights and obligations arising from treaties to which they are parties and other sources of international law,

Convinced that observance by Member States of the Charter of the United Nations, treaties to which they are parties and other sources of international law is important for the strengthening of international security,

Mindful of the fundamental importance of full implementation and strict observance of agreements and other agreed obligations on arms limitation and disarmament and non-proliferation by States parties if individual nations and the international community are to derive enhanced security from them,

Stressing that any violation of such agreements and other agreed obligations by States parties not only adversely affects the security of States parties but can also create security risks for other States relying on the constraints and commitments stipulated in those agreements and other agreed obligations,

Stressing also that any weakening of confidence in such agreements and other agreed obligations diminishes their contribution to global or regional security and undermines their credibility and effectiveness,

Recognizing, in this context, that full compliance by States parties with all provisions of existing agreements and the resolving of compliance concerns effectively by means consistent with such agreements and international law can, inter alia, contribute to better relations among States and the strengthening of world peace and stability.

Believing that compliance with all provisions of arms limitation and disarmament and non-proliferation agreements by States parties is a matter of interest and concern to all members of the international community, and noting the role the United Nations has played and should continue to play in that regard,

Welcoming the contribution to international peace and regional security that full compliance by States parties with verification provisions of arms limitation and disarmament and non-proliferation agreements provides,

Also welcoming the universal recognition of the critical importance of the question of compliance with and verification of arms limitation and disarmament and non-proliferation agreements, and other agreed obligations,

Recognizing, in the light of the threat of international terrorism, that it is especially important that States parties comply with arms limitation and disarmament and non-proliferation obligations and commitments,

- 1. Urges all States parties to arms limitation and disarmament and non-proliferation agreements to implement and comply with the entirety of all provisions of such agreements;
- 2. Calls upon all Member States to give serious consideration to the implications that non-compliance by States parties with any provisions of agreements in the fields of arms limitation and disarmament and non-proliferation has for international security and stability, as well as for the prospects for progress in those fields:
- 3. Calls upon Member States to support efforts aimed at the resolution of compliance questions by means consistent with such agreements and international law, with a view to encouraging strict observance by all States parties of the provisions of arms limitation and disarmament and non-proliferation agreements and maintaining or restoring the integrity of such agreements;
- 4. Welcomes the role that the United Nations has played and continues to play in restoring the integrity of, and fostering negotiations on, certain arms limitation and disarmament and non-proliferation agreements and in the removal of threats to peace;
- 5. Encourages efforts by all States parties to pursue additional areas of cooperation, as appropriate, that can increase confidence in compliance with existing arms limitation and disarmament and non-proliferation agreements and reduce the possibility of misinterpretation and misunderstanding;
- 6. Notes the contribution that effective verification procedures for arms limitation and disarmament and non-proliferation agreements frequently can make in enhancing confidence in the compliance with those agreements;
- 7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-ninth session an item entitled "Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament and non-proliferation agreements".

Resolution 57/87

United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 56/25C of 29November 2001 regarding the maintenance and revitalization of the three United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament,

Recalling also the reports of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean,

Reaffirming its decision, taken in 1982 at its twelfth special session, to establish the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme, the purpose of which is to inform, educate and generate public understanding and support for the objectives of the United Nations in the field of arms control and disarmament,

Bearing in mind its resolutions 40/151G of 16December 1985, 41/60J of 3December 1986, 42/39D of 30November 1987 and 44/117F of 15December 1989 on the regional centres for peace and disarmament in Nepal, Peru and Togo,

Recognizing that the changes that have taken place in the world have created new opportunities as well as posed new challenges for the pursuit of disarmament and, in this regard, bearing in mind that the regional centres for peace and disarmament can contribute substantially to understanding and cooperation among States in each particular region in the areas of peace, disarmament and development,

Noting that in paragraph146 of the Final Document of the Twelfth Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries, held at Durban, South Africa, from 29August to 3September 1998, the heads of State or Government welcomed the decision adopted by the General Assembly on maintaining and revitalizing the three regional centres for peace and disarmament in Nepal, Peru and Togo,

- 1. Reiterates the importance of the United Nations activities at the regional level to increase the stability and security of its Member States, which could be promoted in a substantive manner by the maintenance and revitalization of the three regional centres for peace and disarmament;
- 2. Reaffirms that, in order to achieve positive results, it is useful for the three regional centres to carry out dissemination and educational programmes that promote regional peace and security and that are aimed at changing basic attitudes with respect to peace and security and disarmament so as to support the achievement of the principles and purposes of the United Nations;
- 3. Appeals to Member States in each region and those that are able to do so, as well as to international governmental and non-governmental organizations and foundations, to make voluntary contributions to the regional centres in their respective regions to strengthen their activities and initiatives;
- 4. Emphasizes the importance of the activities of the regional branch of the Department for Disarmament Affairs of the Secretariat;
- 5. Requests the Secretary-General to provide all necessary support, within existing resources, to the regional centres in carrying out their programmes of activities;
- 6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session the item entitled "United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament".

Regional confidence-building measures: activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the United Nations and its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

Recalling its resolutions 43/78H and 43/85 of 7December 1988, 44/21 of 15November 1989, 45/58M of 4December 1990, 46/37B of 6December 1991, 47/53F of 15December 1992, 48/76A of 16December 1993, 49/76C of 15December 1994, 50/71B of 12December 1995, 51/46C of 10December 1996, 52/39B of 9December 1997, 53/78A of 4December 1998, 54/55A of 1December 1999, 55/34B of 20November 2000 and 56/25A of 29November 2001,

Considering the importance and effectiveness of confidence-building measures taken at the initiative and with the participation of all States concerned and taking into account the specific characteristics of each region, since such measures can contribute to regional stability and to international peace and security,

Convinced that the resources released by disarmament, including regional disarmament, can be devoted to economic and social development and to the protection of the environment for the benefit of all peoples, in particular those of the developing countries,

Recalling the guidelines for general and complete disarmament adopted at its tenth special session, the first special session devoted to disarmament,

Convinced that development can be achieved only in a climate of peace, security and mutual confidence both within and among States,

Bearing in mind the establishment by the Secretary-General on 28May 1992 of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, the purpose of which is to encourage arms limitation, disarmament, nonproliferation and development in the subregion,

Recalling the Brazzaville Declaration on Cooperation for Peace and Security in Central Africa, the Bata Declaration for the Promotion of Lasting Democracy, Peace and Development in Central Africa, and the Yaoundé Declaration on Peace, Security and Stability in Central Africa,

Bearing in mind resolutions 1196(1998) and 1197(1998), adopted by the Security Council on 16 and 18September 1998 respectively, following its consideration of the report of the Secretary-General on the causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa,

Emphasizing the need to strengthen the capacity for conflict prevention and peacekeeping in Africa,

Recalling the decision of the fourth ministerial meeting of the Standing Advisory Committee in favour of establishing, under the auspices of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, a subregional centre for human rights and democracy in Central Africa at Yaoundé,

- 1. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General on regional confidence-building measures, which deals with the activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa in the period since the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 56/25A;
- 2. Reaffirms its support for efforts aimed at promoting confidence-building measures at regional and subregional levels in order to ease tensions and conflicts in Central Africa and to further peace, stability and sustainable development in the subregion;
- 3. Also reaffirms its support for the programme of work of the Standing Advisory Committee adopted at the organizational meeting of the Committee, held at Yaoundé from 27 to 31July 1992;
- 4. Notes with satisfaction the progress made by the States members of the Standing Advisory Committee in implementing the programme of activities for the period 2001–2002, in particular by:
- (a) Holding a Subregional Conference on the Protection of Women and Children in Armed Conflict in Central Africa at Kinshasa from 14 to 16November 2001;
- (b) Holding a meeting of Chiefs of Staff of the States members of the Standing Advisory Committee at Libreville from 18 to 20March 2002;
- (c) Holding the seventeenth ministerial meeting of the Standing Advisory Committee at Kinshasa from 22 to 26April 2002;
- (d) Holding the subregional consultation on the theme "Parity and development: participation of the Central African woman" at Douala from 28 to 30May 2002;
- (e) Holding the eighteenth ministerial meeting of the Standing Advisory Committee at Bangui from 26 to 30August 2002;
- 5. Emphasizes the importance of providing the States members of the Standing Advisory Committee with the essential support they need to carry out the full programme of activities which they adopted at their ministerial meetings;
- 6. Welcomes the creation of a mechanism for the promotion, maintenance and consolidation of peace and security in Central Africa, to be known as the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa, by the Conference of Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the Economic Community of Central African States, held at Yaoundé on 25February 1999, and requests the Secretary-General to give his full support to the effective realization of that important mechanism;
- 7. Emphasizes the need to make the early-warning mechanism in Central Africa operational so that it will serve, on the one hand, as an instrument for analysing and monitoring political situations in the States members of the Standing Advisory Committee with a view to preventing the outbreak of future armed conflicts and, on the other hand, as a technical body through which the member States will carry out the programme of work of the Committee, adopted at its organizational meeting held at Yaoundé in 1992, and requests the Secretary-General to provide it with the assistance necessary for it to function properly;

- 8. Requests the Secretary-General and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to continue to provide their full assistance for the proper functioning of the Subregional Centre for Human Rights and Democracy in Central Africa:
- 9. Requests the Secretary-General, pursuant to Security Council resolution 1197(1998), to provide the States members of the Standing Advisory Committee with the necessary support for the implementation and smooth functioning of the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa and the early-warning mechanism;
- 10. Also requests the Secretary-General to support the establishment of a network of parliamentarians with a view to the creation of a subregional parliament in Central Africa;
- 11. Requests the Secretary-General and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to continue to provide increased assistance to the countries of Central Africa for coping with the problems of refugees and displaced persons in their territories:
- 12. Thanks the Secretary-General for having established the Trust Fund for the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa:
- 13. Appeals to Member States and to governmental and non-governmental organizations to make additional voluntary contributions to the Trust Fund for the implementation of the programme of work of the Standing Advisory Committee;
- 14. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to provide the States members of the Standing Advisory Committee with assistance to ensure that they are able to carry on their efforts;
- 15. Also requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its fifty-eighth session a report on the implementation of the present resolution;
- 16. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session the item entitled "Regional confidence-building measures: activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa".

United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 41/60J of 3December 1986, 42/39K of 30November 1987 and 43/76H of 7December 1988 on the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, with headquarters in Lima,

Recalling also its resolutions 46/37F of 9December 1991, 48/76E of 16December 1993, 49/76D of 15December 1994, 50/71C of 12December 1995, 52/220 of 22December 1997, 53/78F of 4December 1998, 54/55F of 1December 1999, 55/34E of 20November 2000 and 56/25E of 29November 2001,

Underlining the revitalization of the Regional Centre, the efforts made by the Government of Peru and other countries to that end, as well as the important work done by the Director of the Centre,

Welcoming the report of the Secretary-General, which concludes that the Regional Centre has continued to act as an instrument for the implementation of regional initiatives and has intensified its contribution to the coordination of United Nations efforts towards peace and security,

Noting that security and disarmament issues have always been recognized as significant topics in Latin America and the Caribbean, the first inhabited region in the world to be declared a nuclear-weapon-free zone,

Welcoming the ratification by the Government of Cuba of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco).

Welcoming also the creation of the South American Zone of Peace and Cooperation, declared by the Presidents and Heads of State of South America, in Guayaquil, Ecuador, on 27July 2002,

Bearing in mind the important role that the Regional Centre can play in promoting confidence-building measures, arms control and limitation, disarmament and development at the regional level,

Also bearing in mind the importance of information, research, education and training for peace, disarmament and development in order to achieve understanding and cooperation among States,

Recognizing the need to provide the three United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament with sufficient financial resources and cooperation for the planning and implementation of their programmes of activities,

- 1. Reiterates its strong support for the role of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean in the promotion of United Nations activities at the regional level to strengthen peace, stability, security and development among its member States;
- 2. Expresses its satisfaction and congratulates the Regional Centre for the expansion of the vast range of activities carried out last year in the field of peace, disarmament and development, and requests the Regional Centre to take into account the proposals to be submitted by the countries of the region in promoting confidence-building measures, arms control and limitation, transparency, disarmament and development at the regional level;
- 3. Expresses its appreciation for the political support and financial contributions to the Regional Centre, which are essential for its continued operation;
- 4. Invites all States of the region to continue to take part in the activities of the Regional Centre, proposing items for inclusion in its agenda, making greater and better use of the Centre's potential to meet the current challenges facing the international community and with a view to fulfilling the aims of the Charter of the United Nations in the fields of peace, disarmament and development:
- 5. Recognizes that the Regional Centre has an important role in the promotion and development of regional initiatives agreed upon by the countries of Latin

America and the Caribbean in the field of weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons, conventional arms, including small arms and light weapons, as well as the relationship between disarmament and development;

- 6. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General on the relationship between disarmament and development, and supports the role that the Regional Centre plays in promoting those issues in the region in pursuit of its mandate to promote economic and social development related to peace and disarmament;
- 7. Appeals to Member States, in particular the States of the Latin American and Caribbean region, and to international governmental and non-governmental organizations and to foundations, to make and increase voluntary contributions to strengthen the Regional Centre, its programme of activities and the implementation thereof:
- 8. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the Regional Centre with all necessary support, within existing resources, so that it may carry out its programme of activities in accordance with its mandate;
- 9. Also requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its fifty-eighth session on the implementation of the present resolution;
- 10. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session the item entitled "United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean".

Resolution 57/90

United Nations Disarmament Information Programme

The General Assembly,

Recalling its decision taken in 1982 at its twelfth special session, the second special session devoted to disarmament, by which the World Disarmament Campaign was launched.

Bearing in mind its resolution 47/53D of 9December 1992, in which it decided, inter alia, that the World Disarmament Campaign should be known thereafter as the "United Nations Disarmament Information Programme" and the World Disarmament Campaign Voluntary Trust Fund as the "Voluntary Trust Fund for the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme",

Recalling its resolutions 51/46A of 10December 1996, 53/78E of 4December 1998 and 55/34A of 20November 2000,

Welcoming the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme,

- 1. Takes note with appreciation of the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme;
- 2. Commends the Secretary-General for his efforts to make effective use of the limited resources available to him in disseminating as widely as possible, including by electronic means, information on arms limitation and disarmament to Governments, the media, non-governmental organizations, educational communities and research institutes, and in carrying out a seminar and conference programme;

- 3. Stresses the importance of the Programme, as a significant instrument in enabling all Member States to participate fully in the deliberations and negotiations on disarmament in the various United Nations bodies, and in assisting them in complying with treaties, as required, and in contributing to agreed mechanisms for transparency;
- 4. Notes with appreciation the cooperation of the Department of Public Information of the Secretariat and its information centres in pursuit of the objectives of the Programme;
 - 5. Recommends that the Programme focus its efforts:
- (a) To inform, to educate and to generate public understanding of the importance of multilateral action and support for it, including action by the United Nations and the Conference on Disarmament, in the field of arms limitation and disarmament, in a factual, balanced and objective manner, and, inter alia, to continue to publish in all official languages The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook and to report on the results of the survey of users, as well as to continue to produce adhoc publications in print and electronic form;
- (b) To continue to maintain the Disarmament Internet web site, including frequent updates of the databases such as the Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements and the disarmament-related Resolutions and Decisions of the General Assembly, as a part of the United Nations web site and to produce versions of the site in as many official languages as feasible;
- (c) To continue to intensify United Nations interaction with the public, principally non-governmental organizations and research institutes, to help further an informed debate on topical issues of arms limitation, disarmament and security;
- (d) To continue to organize discussions on topics of interest in the field of arms limitation and disarmament with a view to broadening understanding and facilitating an exchange of views and information among Member States and civil society;
- 6. *Invites* all Member States to make contributions to the Voluntary Trust Fund for the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme with a view to sustaining a strong outreach programme;
- 7. Takes note of the recommendations made in the study on disarmament and non-proliferation education submitted to the General Assembly at its fifty-seventh session and commends to the attention of the Secretary-General for implementation those recommendations relating to the United Nations, without cost to the regular budget of the Organization, and invites him to continue his support and cooperation with universities, other academic institutions and non-governmental organizations active in the education field in widening the worldwide availability of disarmament and non-proliferation education;
- 8. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its fifty-ninth session a report covering both the implementation of the activities of the Programme by the United Nations system during the previous two years and the activities of the Programme contemplated by the system for the following two years;
- 9. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-ninth session the item entitled "United Nations Disarmament Information Programme".

United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa

The General Assembly,

Mindful of the provisions of Article 11, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United Nations stipulating that a function of the General Assembly is to consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and arms limitation,

Recalling its resolutions 40/151G of 16December 1985, 41/60D of 3December 1986, 42/39J of 30November 1987 and 43/76D of 7December 1988 on the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, and its resolutions 46/36F of 6December 1991 and 47/52G of 9December 1992 on regional disarmament, including confidence-building measures,

Recalling also its resolutions 48/76E of 16December 1993, 49/76D of 15December 1994, 50/71C of 12December 1995, 51/46E of 10December 1996, 52/220 of 22December 1997, 53/78C of 4December 1998, 54/55B of 1December 1999, 55/34D of 20November 2000 and 56/25D of 29November 2001,

Aware of the widespread support for the revitalization of the Regional Centre and the important role that the Centre can play in the present context in promoting confidence-building and arms-limitation measures at the regional level, thereby promoting progress in the area of sustainable development,

Taking into account the report of the Secretary-General on the causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa,

Taking into account also the note by the Secretary-General containing the recommendations made by the Office of Internal Oversight Services of the Secretariat related to the programme management and administrative practices in the Department for Disarmament Affairs, in particular those recommendations concerning the United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament in Africa, in Latin America and the Caribbean, and in Asia and the Pacific,

Bearing in mind the efforts undertaken in the framework of the revitalization of the activities of the Regional Centre for the mobilization of the resources necessary for its operational costs,

Taking into account the need to establish close cooperation between the Regional Centre and the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution of the African Union, in conformity with the decision adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its thirty-fifth ordinary session, held at Algiers from 12 to 14July 1999,

Welcoming the adoption by the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, held in New York from 9 to 20July 2001, of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, and emphasizing the need for the appropriate implementation of the Programme of Action by all States,

1. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General, and commends the activities which the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in

Africa is continuing to carry out, in particular in support of the efforts made by the African States in the areas of peace and security;

- 2. Reaffirms its strong support for the revitalization of the Regional Centre, and emphasizes the need to provide it with the necessary resources to enable it to strengthen its activities and carry out its programmes;
- 3. Appeals once again to all States, as well as to international governmental and non-governmental organizations and foundations, to make voluntary contributions in order to strengthen the programmes and activities of the Regional Centre and facilitate their implementation;
- 4. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to provide the necessary support to the Regional Centre for better achievements and results;
- 5. Also requests the Secretary-General to facilitate the establishment of close cooperation between the Regional Centre and the African Union, in particular in the area of peace, security and development, and to continue to assist the Director of the Regional Centre in his efforts to stabilize the financial situation of the Centre and revitalize its activities:
- 6. Appeals in particular to the Regional Centre, in cooperation with the African Union, regional and subregional organizations and the African States, to take steps to promote the consistent implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects;4
- 7. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its fifty-eighth session on the implementation of the present resolution;
- 8. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session the item entitled "United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa".

Resolution 57/92

United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 42/39D of 30November 1987 and 44/117F of 15December 1989, by which it established the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and renamed it the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, with headquarters in Kathmandu and with the mandate of providing, on request, substantive support for the initiatives and other activities mutually agreed upon by the Member States of the Asia-Pacific region for the implementation of measures for peace and disarmament, through appropriate utilization of available resources,

Welcoming the report of the Secretary-General, in which he expresses his belief that the mandate of the Regional Centre remains valid and that the Centre could be a useful instrument for fostering a climate of cooperation for peace and disarmament in the region,

Noting that trends in the post-cold-war era have emphasized the function of the Regional Centre in assisting Member States as they deal with new security concerns and disarmament issues emerging in the region,

Commending the useful activities carried out by the Regional Centre in encouraging regional and subregional dialogue for the enhancement of openness, transparency and confidence-building, as well as the promotion of disarmament and security through the organization of regional meetings, which has come to be widely known within the Asia-Pacific region as the "Kathmandu process",

Expressing its appreciation to the Regional Centre for its organization of the eighth Kanazawa symposium on north-east Asia, on the theme "Security outlook in north-east Asia and new agenda for the Kanazawa process", held at Kanazawa, Japan, from 4 to 6June 2002, and the Fifth United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues, on the theme "The challenge of terrorism for international security and disarmament: global and regional impact", held at Kyoto, Japan, from 7 to 9August 2002.

Welcoming the idea of the possible creation of an educational and training programme for peace and disarmament in Asia and the Pacific for young people with different backgrounds, to be financed from voluntary contributions,

Noting the important role of the Regional Centre in assisting region-specific initiatives of Member States, including its assistance in the work related to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia, as well as to Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status, including the organization of a United Nations-sponsored non-governmental expert group meeting on the theme "Ways and means of strengthening Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status", held at Sapporo, Japan, on 5 and 6September 2001,

Appreciating highly the overall support that Nepal has extended as the host nation of the headquarters of the Regional Centre,

- 1. Reaffirms its strong support for the forthcoming operation and further strengthening of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific:
- 2. Underlines the importance of the Kathmandu process as a powerful vehicle for the development of the practice of region-wide security and disarmament dialogue;
- 3. Expresses its appreciation for the continuing political support and voluntary financial contributions to the Regional Centre, which are essential for its continued operation;
- 4. Appeals to Member States, in particular those within the Asia-Pacific region, as well as to international governmental and non-governmental organizations and foundations, to make voluntary contributions, the only resources of the Regional Centre, to strengthen the programme of activities of the Centre and the implementation thereof;
- 5. Requests the Secretary-General, taking note of paragraph6 of General Assembly resolution 49/76D of 15December 1994, to provide the Regional Centre

with the necessary support, within existing resources, in carrying out its programme of activities;

- 6. Urges the Secretary-General to ensure the physical operation of the Regional Centre from Kathmandu within six months of the date of signature of the host country agreement and to enable the Centre to function effectively;
- 7. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its fifty-eighth session on the implementation of the present resolution;
- 8. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session the item entitled "United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific".

Resolution 57/93

United Nations disarmament fellowship training and advisory services The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General,

Recalling its decision, contained in paragraph 108 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, to establish a programme of fellowships on disarmament, as well as its decisions contained in AnnexIV to the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly, the second special session devoted to disarmament, in which it decided, inter alia, to continue the programme,

Noting that the programme continues to contribute significantly to developing greater awareness of the importance and benefits of disarmament and better understanding of the concerns of the international community in the field of disarmament and security, as well as to enhancing the knowledge and skills of fellows, allowing them to participate more effectively in efforts in the field of disarmament at all levels.

Noting with satisfaction that the programme has trained a large number of officials from Member States throughout its twenty-four years of existence, many of whom hold positions of responsibility in the field of disarmament within their own Governments.

Recognizing the need for Member States to take into account gender equality when nominating candidates to the programme,

Recalling all the annual resolutions on the matter since the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly, in 1982, including resolution 50/71A of 12December 1995,

Believing that the forms of assistance available to Member States, in particular to developing countries, under the programme will enhance the capabilities of their officials to follow ongoing deliberations and negotiations on disarmament, both bilateral and multilateral,

1. Reaffirms its decisions contained in AnnexIV to the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly and the report of the Secretary-General approved by the Assembly in its resolution 33/71E of 14December 1978;

- 2. Expresses its appreciation to the Government of Germany for hosting the participants of the programme since 1980 and to the Government of Japan on the occasion of its twentieth annual study visit for the fellows, which includes events in Nagasaki and Hiroshima, and to the Government of the United States of America for having organized in 2001 a specific study programme in the field of disarmament, thereby contributing to the fulfilment of the overall objectives of the programme;
- 3. Expresses its appreciation to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and the Monterey Institute of International Studies for having organized specific study programmes in the field of disarmament in their respective areas of competence, thereby contributing to the objectives of the programme;
- 4. Commends the Secretary-General for the diligence with which the programme has continued to be carried out;
- 5. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to implement annually the Geneva-based programme within existing resources and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its fifty-ninth session;
- 6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-ninth session the item entitled "United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services".

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

The General Assembly,

Convinced that the use of nuclear weapons poses the most serious threat to the survival of mankind,

Bearing in mind the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8July 1996 on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,

Convinced that a multilateral, universal and binding agreement prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would contribute to the elimination of the nuclear threat and to the climate for negotiations leading to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, thereby strengthening international peace and security,

Conscious that some steps taken by the Russian Federation and the United States of America towards a reduction of their nuclear weapons and the improvement in the international climate can contribute towards the goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons,

Recalling that, in paragraph58 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, it is stated that all States should actively participate in efforts to bring about conditions in international relations among States in which a code of peaceful conduct of nations in international affairs could be agreed upon and that would preclude the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Reaffirming that any use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity, as declared in its resolutions

1653(XVI) of 24November 1961, 33/71B of 14December 1978, 34/83G of 11December 1979, 35/152D of 12December 1980 and 36/92I of 9December 1981,

Determined to achieve an international convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons, leading to their ultimate destruction.

Stressing that an international convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would be an important step in a phased programme towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, with a specified framework of time,

Noting with regret that the Conference on Disarmament, during its 2002 session, was unable to undertake negotiations on this subject as called for in General Assembly resolution 56/25B of 29November 2001,

- 1. Reiterates its request to the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations in order to reach agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances;
- 2. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly on the results of those negotiations.

Resolution 57/95 Report of the Disarmament Commission

The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the Disarmament Commission,

Recalling its resolutions 47/54A of 9December 1992, 47/54G of 8April 1993, 48/77A of 16December 1993, 49/77A of 15December 1994, 50/72D of 12December 1995, 51/47B of 10December 1996, 52/40B of 9December 1997, 53/79A of 4December 1998, 54/56A of 1December 1999, 55/35C of 20November 2000 and 56/26A of 29November 2001,

Considering the role that the Disarmament Commission has been called upon to play and the contribution that it should make in examining and submitting recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament and in the promotion of the implementation of the relevant decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session,

Bearing in mind its decision 52/492 of 8September 1998,

- 1. Takes note of the report of the Disarmament Commission;
- 2. Reaffirms the importance of further enhancing the dialogue and cooperation among the First Committee, the Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament;
- 3. Also reaffirms the role of the Disarmament Commission as the specialized, deliberative body within the United Nations multilateral disarmament machinery that allows for in-depth deliberations on specific disarmament issues, leading to the submission of concrete recommendations on those issues:
- 4. Requests the Disarmament Commission to continue its work in accordance with its mandate, as set forth in paragraph118 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, and with paragraph3 of Assembly resolution 37/78H of 9December 1982, and to that end to make every effort to

achieve specific recommendations on the items of its agenda, taking into account the adopted "Ways and means to enhance the functioning of the Disarmament Commission":

- 5. Recommends that the Disarmament Commission continue the consideration of the following items at its 2003 substantive session:
- (a) Ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament;
- (b) Practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms;
- 6. Requests the Disarmament Commission to meet for a period not exceeding three weeks during 2003, namely from 31March to 17April, and to submit a substantive report to the General Assembly at its fifty-eighth session;
- 7. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Disarmament Commission the annual report of the Conference on Disarmament, together with all the official records of the fifty-seventh session of the General Assembly relating to disarmament matters, and to render all assistance that the Commission may require for implementing the present resolution;
- 8. Also requests the Secretary-General to ensure full provision to the Disarmament Commission and its subsidiary bodies of interpretation and translation facilities in the official languages and to assign, as a matter of priority, all the necessary resources and services, including verbatim records, to that end;
- 9. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session the item entitled "Report of the Disarmament Commission".

Resolution 57/96 Report of the Conference on Disarmament

The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the Conference on Disarmament,

Convinced that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community, has the primary role in substantive negotiations on priority questions of disarmament,

Recognizing the need to conduct multilateral negotiations with the aim of reaching agreement on concrete issues for negotiation,

Recalling, in this respect, that the Conference has a number of urgent and important issues for negotiation,

- 1. Reaffirms the role of the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community;
- 2. Urges the Conference to fulfil that role in the light of the evolving international situation, with a view to making early substantive progress on priority items on its agenda;
- 3. Welcomes the strong collective interest of the Conference in commencing substantive work as soon as possible during its 2003 session;
- 4. Also welcomes the decision of the Conference to request its current President and the incoming President to conduct appropriate consultations during the intersessional period and, if possible, make recommendations, taking into account all

existing proposals and views presented and discussions held in the 2002 session to achieve this goal, as expressed in paragraph 43 of its report;

- 5. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to ensure the provision to the Conference of adequate administrative, substantive and conference support services;
- 6. Requests the Conference to submit a report on its work to the General Assembly at its fifty-eighth session;
- 7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session the item entitled "Report of the Conference on Disarmament".

Resolution 57/97

The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind its relevant resolutions,

Taking note of the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the latest of which is resolution GC(46)/RES/16, adopted on 20September 2002,

Cognizant that the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region of the Middle East would pose a serious threat to international peace and security,

Mindful of the immediate need for placing all nuclear facilities in the region of the Middle East under full-scope safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency,

Recalling the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on 11May 1995, in which the Conference urged universal adherence to the Treaty as an urgent priority and called upon all States not yet parties to the Treaty to accede to it at the earliest date, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities,

Recognizing with satisfaction that, in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Conference undertook to make determined efforts towards the achievement of the goal of universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and called upon those remaining States not parties to the Treaty to accede to it, thereby accepting an international legally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and to accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all their nuclear activities, and underlined the necessity of universal adherence to the Treaty and of strict compliance by all parties with their obligations under the Treaty,

Recalling the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on 11May 1995, in which the Conference noted with concern the continued existence in the Middle East of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, reaffirmed the importance of the early realization of universal adherence to the Treaty and called upon all States in the Middle East that had not yet done so, without exception, to

accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and to place all their nuclear facilities under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards,

Noting that Israel remains the only State in the Middle East that has not yet become party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Concerned about the threats posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons to the security and stability of the Middle East region,

Stressing the importance of taking confidence-building measures, in particular the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, in order to enhance peace and security in the region and to consolidate the global non-proliferation regime,

Emphasizing the need for all parties directly concerned to consider seriously taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and, as a means of promoting this objective, inviting the countries concerned to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and, pending the establishment of the zone, to agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards,

Noting that one hundred and sixty-six States have signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, including a number of States in the region,

- 1. Welcomes the conclusions on the Middle East of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
- 2. Reaffirms the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East;
- 3. Calls upon that State to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons without further delay and not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons, and to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, and to place all its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards as an important confidence-building measure among all States of the region and as a step towards enhancing peace and security;
- 4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its fifty-eighth session on the implementation of the present resolution;
- 5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session the item entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East".

Resolution 57/98

Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 56/28 of 29November 2001 and previous resolutions referring to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain

Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

Recalling with satisfaction the adoption, on 10October 1980, of the Convention, together with the Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments (ProtocolI), the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices (ProtocolII) and the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (ProtocolIII), which entered into force on 2December 1983,

Also recalling with satisfaction the adoption by the First Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, on 13October 1995 of the Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (ProtocolIV), and on 3May 1996 of the amended Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices (ProtocolII), which entered into force on 30July 1998 and 3December 1998 respectively,

Welcoming the results of the Second Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and commending the efforts of the President of the Conference,

Recalling with satisfaction the decision by the Second Review Conference, on 21December 2001, to extend the scope of the Convention and the Protocols thereto to include armed conflicts of a non-international character,

Recalling the decision by the Second Review Conference to commission followup work under the oversight of the Chairman-designate of a meeting of States parties to the Convention to be held on 12 and 13December 2002 at Geneva in conjunction with the Fourth Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended ProtocolII, and in this context the decision to establish an open-ended group of governmental experts with two separate coordinators on explosive remnants of war and on mines other than anti-personnel mines,

Welcoming the additional ratifications and acceptances of or accessions to the Convention and to amended ProtocolII and ProtocolIV, as well as accessions to the amendment of articleI of the Convention, adopted in 2001,

Recalling the role played by the International Committee of the Red Cross in the elaboration of the Convention and the Protocols thereto,

Noting that the rules of procedure of the First Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended ProtocolII provide for the invitation of States not parties to the Protocol, the International Committee of the Red Cross and interested non-governmental organizations to take part in the Conference,

Welcoming the particular efforts of various international, non-governmental and other organizations in raising awareness of the humanitarian consequences of explosive remnants of war.

Welcoming also the results of the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended ProtocolII, held at Geneva on 10December 2001,

- 1. Calls upon all States that have not yet done so to take all measures to become parties, as soon as possible, to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and the Protocols thereto, as amended, as well as the amendment of articlel extending the scope of the Convention, with a view to achieving the widest possible adherence to these instruments at an early date, and calls upon successor States to take appropriate measures so that ultimately adherence to these instruments will be universal;
- 2. Calls upon all States parties to the Convention that have not yet done so to express their consent to be bound by the Protocols to the Convention;
- 3. Calls upon all States parties to the Convention that have not yet done so to notify the depositary at an early date of their consent to be bound by the amendment extending the scope of the Convention and the Protocols annexed thereto to include armed conflicts of a non-international character:
- 4. Notes the mandate of the Second Review Conference for the establishment of a group of governmental experts with two separate coordinators to discuss ways and means to address the issue of explosive remnants of war and to explore further the issue of mines other than anti-personnel mines, respectively;
- 5. Also notes the decision by the Second Review Conference that the Chairman-designate shall undertake consultations on possible options to promote compliance with the Convention and the Protocols annexed thereto, as well as the decision to invite interested States parties to convene experts to discuss issues related to small-calibre weapons and ammunition;
- 6. Expresses support for the work conducted by the Group of Governmental Experts, and encourages the Chairman-designate and the Group to conduct work expeditiously with a view to submitting recommendations on explosive remnants of war to States parties for consideration at the earliest possible date, including on whether to proceed with negotiating a legally binding instrument or instruments on explosive remnants of war and/or other approaches, and with a view to submitting to the States parties reports on mines other than anti-personnel mines and on compliance;
- 7. Requests the Secretary-General to render the necessary assistance and to provide such services, including summary records, as may be required for the Meeting of States Parties to the Convention to be held on 12 and 13December 2002, as well as for any possible continuation of work after the Meeting, should the States parties deem it appropriate;
- 8. Also requests the Secretary-General, in his capacity as depositary of the Convention and the Protocols thereto, to continue to inform the General Assembly periodically of ratifications and acceptances of and accessions to the Convention and the Protocols thereto:
- 9. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session the item entitled "Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects".

Resolution 57/99

Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterraneanregion

The General Assembly,

Recalling its previous resolutions on the subject, including resolution 56/29 of 29November 2001,

Reaffirming the primary role of the Mediterranean countries in strengthening and promoting peace, security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region,

Bearing in mind all the previous declarations and commitments, as well as all the initiatives taken by the riparian countries at the recent summits, ministerial meetings and various forums concerning the question of the Mediterranean region,

Recognizing the indivisible character of security in the Mediterranean and that the enhancement of cooperation among Mediterranean countries with a view to promoting the economic and social development of all peoples of the region will contribute significantly to stability, peace and security in the region,

Recognizing also the efforts made so far and the determination of the Mediterranean countries to intensify the process of dialogue and consultations with a view to resolving the problems existing in the Mediterranean region and to eliminating the causes of tension and the consequent threat to peace and security, and their growing awareness of the need for further joint efforts to strengthen economic, social, cultural and environmental cooperation in the region,

Recognizing further that prospects for closer Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in all spheres can be enhanced by positive developments worldwide, in particular in Europe, in the Maghreb and in the Middle East,

Reaffirming the responsibility of all States to contribute to the stability and prosperity of the Mediterranean region and their commitment to respecting the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, as well as the provisions of the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

Noting the peace negotiations in the Middle East, which should be of a comprehensive nature and represent an appropriate framework for the peaceful settlement of contentious issues in the region,

Expressing its concern at the persistent tension and continuing military activities in parts of the Mediterranean that hinder efforts to strengthen security and cooperation in the region,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General,

- 1. Reaffirms that security in the Mediterranean is closely linked to European security as well as to international peace and security;
- 2. Expresses its satisfaction at the continuing efforts by Mediterranean countries to contribute actively to the elimination of all causes of tension in the region and to the promotion of just and lasting solutions to the persistent problems of the region through peaceful means, thus ensuring the withdrawal of foreign forces of occupation and respecting the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all countries of the Mediterranean and the right of peoples to self-determination, and therefore calls for full adherence to the principles of non-interference, non-

intervention, non-use of force or threat of use of force and the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force, in accordance with the Charter and the relevant resolutions of the United Nations:

- 3. Commends the Mediterranean countries for their efforts in meeting common challenges through coordinated overall responses, based on a spirit of multilateral partnership, towards the general objective of turning the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchanges and cooperation, guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity, encourages them to strengthen such efforts through, inter alia, a lasting multilateral and action-oriented cooperative dialogue among States of the region, and recognizes the role of the United Nations in promoting regional and international peace and security;
- 4. Recognizes that the elimination of the economic and social disparities in levels of development and other obstacles as well as respect and greater understanding among cultures in the Mediterranean area will contribute to enhancing peace, security and cooperation among Mediterranean countries through the existing forums;
- 5. Call upon all States of the Mediterranean region that have not yet done so to adhere to all the multilaterally negotiated legal instruments related to the field of disarmament and non-proliferation, thus creating the necessary conditions for strengthening peace and cooperation in the region;
- 6. Encourages all States of the region to favour the necessary conditions for strengthening the confidence-building measures among them by promoting genuine openness and transparency on all military matters, by participating, inter alia, in the United Nations system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures and by providing accurate data and information to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms;
- 7. Encourages the Mediterranean countries to strengthen further their cooperation in combating terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, taking into account the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, and in combating international crime and illicit arms transfers and illicit drug production, consumption and trafficking, which pose a serious threat to peace, security and stability in the region and therefore to the improvement of the current political, economic and social situation and which jeopardize friendly relations among States, hinder the development of international cooperation and result in the destruction of human rights, fundamental freedoms and the democratic basis of pluralistic society;
- 8. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a report on means to strengthen security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region;
- 9. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session the item entitled "Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region".

Resolution 57/100 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

The General Assembly,

Reiterating that the cessation of nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions constitutes an effective nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation measure,

Recalling that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, adopted by its resolution 50/245 of 10September 1996, was opened for signature on 24September 1996.

Stressing that a universal and effectively verifiable Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty constitutes a fundamental instrument in the field of disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation,

Encouraged by the signing of the Treaty by one hundred and sixty-six States, including forty-one of the forty-four needed for its entry into force, and welcoming the ratification of ninety-six States, including thirty-one of the forty-four needed for its entry into force, among which there are three nuclear-weapon States,

Recalling its resolution 55/41 of 20November 2000,

Welcoming the Final Declaration of the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, held in New York from 11 to 13November 2001,

- 1. Stresses the importance and urgency of signature and ratification, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the earliest entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty;
- 2. Welcomes the contributions by the States signatories to the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, in particular to its efforts to ensure that the Treaty's verification regime will be capable of meeting the verification requirements of the Treaty upon its entry into force, in accordance with articleIV of the Treaty;
- 3. Urges States to maintain their moratoria on nuclear-weapons test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, pending the entry into force of the Treaty;
- 4. Urges all States that have not yet signed the Treaty to sign and ratify it as soon as possible and to refrain from acts that would defeat its object and purpose in the meanwhile:
- Urges all States that have signed but not yet ratified the Treaty, in particular those whose ratification is needed for its entry into force, to accelerate their ratification processes with a view to their earliest successful conclusion;
 - 6. Urges all States to remain seized of the issue at the highest political level;
- 7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session the item entitled "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty".

Decision 57/515

United Nations conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers in the context of nuclear disarmament

The General Assembly decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fiftyeighth session an item entitled "United Nations conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers in the context of nuclear disarmament".

Decision 57/516

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction

The General Assembly:

- (a) Requests the Secretary-General to continue to render the necessary assistance to the depositary Governments of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, to provide such services as may be required for the implementation of the decisions and recommendations of the Review Conferences, as well as the decisions contained in the final report of the Special Conference of the States Parties to the Convention, held from 19 to 30 September 1994, and to render the necessary assistance and provide such services as may be required for the Fifth Review Conference, which is to reconvene at Geneva from 11 November to 22 November 2002;
- (b) Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session the item entitled "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction".

APPENDIX VII

Table of Resolutions and Decisions on Disarmament Issues

RESOLUTIONS

Res No.	Title	Ref in Text	Sponsors
57/50	Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament (58)	64 344	Armenia, Belarus , Georgia, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, RussianFederation, Ukraine (without a vote, p. 451)
57/51	Question of Antarctica (59)	345	Chairman (without a vote, p. 427)
57/52	Maintenance of international security — good-neighbourliness, stability and development in South-Eastern Europe (60)	173 346	Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta,

Res No.	Title	Ref in Text	Sponsors
57/52			Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, RussianFederation, SanMarino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Yugoslavia (without a vote, p.427)
57/53	Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security (61)	193 <i>349</i>	RussianFederation (without a vote, p. 428)
57/54	The role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament (62)	193 351	Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Congo, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Guyana, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Jordan, Kenya, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, ElSalvador, Singapore, SolomonIslands, SriLanka, Sudan, Tuvalu, VietNam, Zambia (90:48:21, p. 428)
57/55	Establishment of a nuclear- weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East (63)	170 352	Egypt (without a vote, p. 428)

Res No.	Title	Ref in Text	Sponsors
57/56	Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons (64)	51 354	Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Colombia, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, ElSalvador, Egypt, Fiji, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Jordan, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nauru, Pakistan, PapuaNewGuinea, SaudiArabia, SolomonIslands, SriLanka, Sudan, VietNam, Zambia (106:0:55, p. 429)
57/57	Prevention of an arms race in outer space (65)	185 356	
57/58	Reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons (66)	53 358	Brazil, Egypt, Fiji, Ireland , Mexico, Nauru, NewZealand, PapuaNewGuinea, Paraguay, SolomonIslands, SouthAfrica,
57/58			SaintVincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sweden, Tuvalu, Ukraine, Uruguay, Vanuatu (120:3:42, p.453)

Res No.	Title	Ref in Text	Sponsors
57/59	Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda (66)	430 360	5 , 5 ,
57/60	United Nations study on disarmament and non- proliferation education (66)	259 364	0 , 0
57/61	Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (66)	231 365	
57/62	Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol (66)	96 366	SouthAfrica, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (without a vote, p.455)

Res No.	Title	Ref in Text	Sponsors
57/63	Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation (66)	199 <i>367</i>	,
57/64	Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control (66)	200 369	SouthAfrica, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (without a vote, p.457)
57/65	Relationship between disarmament and development (66)	195 <i>370</i>	SouthAfrica, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (160-1-4, p.457)
57/66	National legislation on transfer of arms, military equipment and dual use goods and technology (66)	131 <i>372</i>	Netherlands (166-0-0, p.458)
57/67	Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status (66)	170 <i>372</i>	Mongolia (without a vote, p. 459)
57/68	Bilateral strategic nuclear arms reductions and the new strategic framework (66)	61 <i>374</i>	RussianFederation, United States of America (without a vote, p. 459)
57/69	Establishment of a nuclear- weapon-free zone in Central Asia (66)	171 <i>375</i>	Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan (without a vote, p.459)

Res No.	Title	Ref in Text	Sponsors
57/70	Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them (66)	128 376	Belgium, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Colombia, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali (on behalf of States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Economic Community of West African States), Malta, Monaco, Mozambique, Nauru, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria,
57/70			Norway, Portugal, Romania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Togo, Uganda, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Zambia, Zimbabwe (without a vote, p. 459)
57/71	Missiles (66)	62 379	Egypt, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of) (without a vote, p. 459

Res No. Title in Sponsors Text
57/72 The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects (66) 380 Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Fass Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroo Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuado ElSalvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan Kenya, Latvia, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Malta, Mexico

Res No.	Title	Ref in Text	Sponsors
57/72			Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Netherlands, NewGuinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, SaintLucia, Samoa, SanMarino, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, SolomonIslands, SouthAfrica, Spain, SriLanka, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, PapuaNewVenezuela, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe (without a vote, p. 460)
57/73	Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas (66)	171 380	Angola, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil , Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,

Egypt, ElSalvador, Eritrea,

Res No.	Title	Ref in Text	Sponsors
57/73			Ethiopia, Fiji, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nauru, NewZealand, Nicaragua, Panama, PapuaNewGuinea, Paraguay, Peru, Samoa, Senegal, Singapore, SolomonIslands, SouthAfrica, Sudan, Thailand, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, VietNam (160-3-5, p. 460)
57/74	Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (66)	130 <i>382</i>	Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark,

Res No. Title	Ref in Sponsors Text
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57/74

Diibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, ElSalvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Fiji, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Netherlands, NewZealand, Nicaragua. Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, PapuaNewGuinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Moldova. Romania, Rwanda, SaintLucia, SaintKitts and Nevis. SaintVincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, SanMarino, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, SolomonIslands, SouthAfrica, Spain, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand,

Res No.	Title	Ref in Text	Sponsors
57/74			the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe (143-0-23, p.461)
57/75	Transparency in armaments (66)	128 <i>384</i>	Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, ElSalvador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Latvia, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali,

Res No.	Title	Ref in Text	Sponsors
57/75			Malta, Monaco, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, NewZealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, PapuaNewGuinea, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, RussianFederation, Samoa, SanMarino, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, SolomonIslands, SouthAfrica, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zambia (143-0-23, p.462)
57/76	Regional disarmament (66)		Bangladesh, Egypt, Georgia, Indonesia, Jordan, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan , Peru, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Turkey (without a vote, p.463)
57/77	Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels (66)	172 387	Bangladesh, Belarus, Georgia, Germany, Italy, Nepal, Pakistan , Peru, Spain, Ukraine (165-1-1, p.463)

Res No.	Title	Ref in Text	Sponsors
57/78	A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons (66)	55 388	Australia, Bangladesh, Côte d'Ivoire, Honduras, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, PapuaNewGuinea, Ukraine (156-2-13, p.463)
57/79	Nuclear disarmament (66)	57 391	Algeria, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, ElSalvador, Fiji, Ghana, Guinea, Haiti, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mongolia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Panama, PapuaNewGuinea, Philippines, Samoa, SaudiArabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, SolomonIslands, SriLanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Thailand, Tonga, United Republic of Tanzania, Uganda, Uruguay,
57/79			VietNam, Zambia, Zimbabwe (107-41-21, p. 464)

Res No.	Title	Ref in Text	Sponsors
57/80	The Conference on Disarmament decision (CD/1547) of 11 August 1998 to establish, under item 1 of its agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", an ad hoc committee to negotiate, on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (66)	58 395	Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Kenya, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Monaco, Morocco, Myanmar, Nauru, Netherlands, NewZealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, RussianFederation, SanMarino, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia, SouthAfrica, SolomonIslands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Zambia (without a vote, p. 465)
57/81	Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures (66)	128 396	Afghanistan, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh,

Res		Ref
No.	Title	in Sponsors Text

57/81

Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, ElSalvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, PapuaNewGuinea, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, RussianFederation, SanMarino, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, SolomonIslands, Spain,

Res No.	Title	Ref in Text	Sponsors
57/81			Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe (without a vote, p. 465
57/82	Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (66)	96 398	Canada, Poland (without a vote, p. 465)
57/83	Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction (66)	179 399	, ,
57/84	Reducing nuclear danger (66)	58 400	,
57/84			SolomonIslands, Sudan, Tuvalu, Zambia (107-46-17, p.465)

Res No.	Title	Ref in Text	Sponsors
57/85	Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (66)	59 401	
57/86	Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament and non-proliferation agreements (66)	201 403	, , ,

Res No.	Title	Ref in Text	Sponsors
57/86			Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liberia, Lithuania, Malawi, Marshall Islands, Monaco, Mongolia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zambia (without a vote, p. 467)
57/87	United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament (67)	173 404	SouthAfrica, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (without a vote, p.467)
57/88	Regional confidence-building measures: activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa (67)	173 406	Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda (without a vote, p.467)
57/89	United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (67)	173 408	Trinidad and Tobago, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States (without a vote, p. 467)

Res No.	Title	Ref in Text	Sponsors
57/90	United Nations Disarmament Information Programme (67)	259 410	Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Indonesia, Liberia, Malaysia, Mexico, Myanmar, NewZealand, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, SouthAfrica (without a vote, p.467)
57/91	United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (67)	173 <i>410</i>	Egypt, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Group of African States (without a vote, p.467)
57/92	United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific (67)	174 413	Afghanistan, Australia, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Maldives, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Myanmar, Nauru, Nepal, NewZealand, Pakistan, PapuaNewGuinea, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Samoa, SolomonIslands, SriLanka, Switzerland, Thailand, Tonga, Vanuatu, VietNam (without a vote, p.467)

Res No.	Title	Ref in Text	Sponsors
57/93	United Nations disarmament fellowship training and advisory services (67)	231 415	Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Ethiopia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Kenya, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe (without a vote, p.467)
57/94	Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons (67)	58 416	Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Colombia, Congo, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Guyana, Haiti,

Res No.	Title	Ref in Text	Sponsors
57/94			India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Jordan, Kenya, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Sudan, Tuvalu, Viet Nam, Zambia (110-45-12, p. 467)
57/95	Report of the Disarmament Commission (68)	230 <i>417</i>	,, .
57/96	Report of the Conference on Disarmament (68)	230 418	Hungary (without a vote, p.468)
57/97	The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East (69)	51 419	Egypt, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the League of Arab States (without a vote, p. 468)
57/98	Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (70)	130 <i>420</i>	Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland,

Res No.	Title	Ref in Text	Sponsors
57/98			Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Mongolia, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Yugoslavia (without a vote, p.469)
57/99	Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region (71)	173 423	Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Malta, Mauritania, Monaco, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,

Res No.	Title	Ref in Text	Sponsors
57/99			the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Yugoslavia (without a vote, p. 469)
57/100	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (73)	59 424	Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Liberia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Samoa, SanMarino, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey,
57/100			United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Venezuela (164-1-5, p.469)

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Res No.	Title	Ref in Text	Sponsors
57/515	United Nations conference to		Mexico (121-6-37, p.470)
	identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers in the context of nuclear disarmament (66)	425	
57/516	Convention on the Prohibition	96	Hungary (without a vote,
	of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on	426	p.471)
	Their Destruction (72)		

Voting patterns of resolutions and decisions on disarmament adopted by the General Assembly in 2002

Resolutions on disarmament questions

57/50 Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament, p. 64

Adopted without a vote

57/51 Question of Antarctica

Adopted without a vote

57/52 Maintenance of international security — good-neighbourliness, stability and development in South-Eastern Europe, p. 173

Adopted without a vote

57/53 Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security, p.193

Adopted without a vote

57/54 The role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament, p. 193

Adopted by a recorded vote of 90 to 48 with 21 abstentions as follows: In favour: Algeria, Angola, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nauru, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia

Against: Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic,

Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Yugoslavia

Abstaining: Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Brazil, Fiji, Georgia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Paraguay, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, South Africa, Tajikistan, Tonga, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uruguay, Uzbekistan

57/55 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, p. 170

Adopted without a vote

57/56 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure nonnuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, p.51

> Adopted by a recorded vote of 106 to 0 with 55 abstentions as follows: In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belize, Bhutan, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nauru, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia

Against: None

Abstaining: Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland,

Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Yugoslavia

Adopted by a recorded vote of 159 to 0 with 3 abstentions as follows:

Prevention of an arms race in outer space, p. 185

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria. Azerbaijan. Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania. Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia

Against: None

57/57

Abstaining: Israel, Micronesia (Federated States of), United States of America

57/58 Reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons, , p. 53

Adopted by a recorded vote of 120 to 3 with 42 abstentions as follows: In favour. Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi,

Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nauru, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia

Against: France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Micronesia (Federated States of), Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Uzbekistan, Yugoslavia

57/59 Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda, p.53

> Adopted by a recorded vote of 125 to 6 with 36 abstentions as follows: In favour. Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives,

Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nauru, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia

Against: France, India, Israel, Pakistan, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Albania, Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Micronesia (Federated States of), Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Uzbekistan, Yugoslavia

57/60 United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education, p.259

Adopted without a vote

57/61 Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, p. 231

Adopted without a vote

57/62 Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, p. 96

Adopted by a recorded vote of 164 to 0 with 3 abstentions as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein. Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands,

New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia

Against: None

Abstaining: Israel, Micronesia (Federated States of), United States of America

Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation, p.199

Adopted by a recorded vote of 105 to 12 with 44 abstentions as follows: In favour. Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Iran, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Libya, Syria, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia

Against: Bulgaria, Germany, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Micronesia (Federated States of), Portugal, Romania, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Greece, Hungary,

57/63

Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ukraine, Yugoslavia

Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control, p.200

Adopted by a recorded vote of 163 to 0 with 5 abstentions as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Liechtenstein, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia

Against: None

57/64

Abstaining: France, Israel, Micronesia (Federated States of), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

57/65 Relationship between disarmament and development, p. 195

Adopted by a recorded vote of 160 to 1 with 4 abstentions as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Australia. Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas. Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Diibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia

Against: United States of America

Abstaining: France, Israel, Micronesia (Federated States of), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

National legislation on transfer of arms, military equipment and dual use goods and technology, p.131

Adopted by a recorded vote of 166 to 0 with 0 abstentions as follows:

Against: NoneIn favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia,

57/66

Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius. Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia

Abstaining: None

57/67 Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status, p.170

Adopted without a vote

57/68 Bilateral strategic nuclear arms reductions and the new strategic framework, p. 61

Adopted without a vote

57/69 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia, p. 171

Adopted without a vote

57/70 Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them, p. 128

Adopted without a vote

57/71 Missiles, p. 62

Adopted by a recorded vote of 104 to 3 with 60 abstentions as follows: In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait,

Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia Against: Israel, Micronesia (Federated States of), United States of America

Abstaining: Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Yugoslavia The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, p.128

Adopted without a vote

Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas, p. 171 Adopted by a recorded vote of 160 to 3 with 5 abstentions as follows: In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico,

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Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia

Against: France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: India, Israel, Micronesia (Federated States of), Russian Federation, Spain

Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, p. 130

Adopted by a recorded vote of 143 to 0 with 23 abstentions as follows: In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Latvia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates,

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United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia

Against: None

Abstaining: Azerbaijan, China, Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Israel, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Micronesia (Federated States of), Morocco, Myanmar, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, United States of America, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam

57/75 Transparency in armaments, p. 128

Adopted by a recorded vote of 143 to 0 with 23 abstentions as follows: In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zambia

Against: None

Abstaining: Algeria, Bahrain, China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Myanmar, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen

57/76 Regional disarmament, p. 172

Adopted without a vote

57/77 Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels, p.172

Adopted by a recorded vote of 165 to 1 with 1 abstention as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guvana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia

Against: India

Abstaining: Bhutan

57/78 A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons, p.55

Adopted by a recorded vote of 156 to 2 with 13 abstentions as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde,

Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia

Against: India, United States of America

Abstaining: Brazil, China, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, Ireland, Israel, Mexico, Myanmar, New Zealand, Pakistan, South Africa, Sweden

57/79 Nuclear disarmament, p. 57

Adopted by a recorded vote of 107 to 2 with 5 abstentions as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal,

Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia

Against: Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Yugoslavia

Abstaining: Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Cyprus, Georgia, India, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mauritius, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Sweden, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan

57/80 The Conference on Disarmament decision (CD/1547) of 11 August 1998 to establish, under item 1 of its agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", an ad hoc committee to negotiate, on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, p.58

Adopted without a vote

57/81 Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures, p.128

Adopted without a vote

57/82 Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, p. 96

Adopted without a vote

57/83 Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, p.179

Adopted without a vote

57/84 Reducing nuclear danger, p. 58

Adopted by a recorded vote of 107 to 46 with 17 abstentions as follows: In favour. Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire,

Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia

Against: Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Yugoslavia

Abstaining: Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Brazil, China, Georgia, Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Paraguay, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan

Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, p.59

Adopted by a recorded vote of 117 to 30 with 24 abstentions as follows: In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica. Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru,

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Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia

Against: Albania, Andorra, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Liechtenstein, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Switzerland, Tajikistan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Yugoslavia

- 57/86 Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament and non-proliferation agreements, p. 201
 - Adopted without a vote
- 57/87 United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament, p. 173

 Adopted without a vote
- 57/88 Regional confidence-building measures: activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, p. 173

 Adopted without a vote
- 57/89 United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, p. 173

 Adopted without a vote
- 57/90 United Nations Disarmament Information ProgrammeAdopted without a vote, p. 259
- 57/91 United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, p.173
 - Adopted without a vote
- 57/92 United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, p. 174

 Adopted without a vote
- 57/93 United Nations disarmament fellowship training and advisory services, p.231
 - Adopted without a vote
- 57/94 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, p.58

Adopted by a recorded vote of 110 to 45 with 12 abstentions as follows: In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia

Against: Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Yugoslavia

Abstaining: Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan

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57/95 Report of the Disarmament Commission, p. 230
Adopted without a vote

57/96 Report of the Conference on Disarmament, p. 230
Adopted without a vote

57/97 The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, p. 51

Adopted by a recorded vote of 158 to 3 with 8 abstentions as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Libvan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein. Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia

Against: Israel, Micronesia (Federated States of), United States of America

Abstaining: Australia, Cameroon, Canada, Ethiopia, India, Papua New Guinea, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago

57/98 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, p. 130

Adopted without a vote

57/99 Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region, p.173

Adopted without a vote

57/100 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, p. 59

Adopted by a recorded vote of 164 to 1 with 5 abstentions as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape

Verde, Chile, China, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Oatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia

Against: United States of America

Abstaining: Colombia, India, Lebanon, Mauritius, Syria

57/515 United Nations conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers in the context of nuclear disarmament, p. 52

Adopted by a recorded vote of 121 to 6 with 37 abstentions as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Jamahiriya. Maldives, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia

Against: France, Israel, Micronesia (Federated States of), Poland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Yugoslavia

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Adopted without a vote

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APPENDIX XI

Abbreviations and acronyms

ABM Treaty Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty

APEC ASEAN Pacific Economic Cooperation

APLs anti-personnel landmines

APMs anti-personnel mines

ARF ASEAN Regional Forum

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

AU African Union

BICC Bonn International Centre for Convention

BMD ballistic missile defence

BWC Biological Weapons Convention

C5 the five Central Asian States

CANWFZ Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone

CARICOM Caribbean Community

CASA Coordinating Action on Small Arms

CBMs confidence-building measures

CCWs Certain Conventional Weapons

CD Conference on Disarmament

CENA Centre d'etudes d'Afrique noire

CFE Treaty Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

CHR Commission on Human Rights

CICA Conference on Interaction and Confidence-building

Measures in Asia

CICAD Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission

CICTE Inter American Committee against Terrorism

CIFTA Consultative Committee of the Inter-American

Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and

Other Related Materials

CIS Commonwealth of Independent States

CMC Cooperative Monitoring Center (US Sandia National

Laboratories)

CNCCAI National Commission for the Monitoring and

Collection of Illicit Arms

COPAX Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa

CSCAP Council for Security and Cooperation in the Asia-

Pacific

CTBT Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

CTBTO Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

Organization

CTCC Counter-Terrorism Committee

CWC Chemical Weapons Convention

DD&R disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

DDA Department for Disarmamemt Affairs

DESA Department for Economic and Social Affairs

DPI Department for Public Information

DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations

DPRK Democratic People's Republic of Korea

DU depleted uranium

EAPC Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2002

ECAAR Economists Allied for Arms Reduction

ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States

ECOMOG Economic Community of West African States

Monitoring Observer Group

ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States

ECPS Executive Committee on Peace and Security

ECS Experts Communicating System

EEA European Economic Area

EFTA European Free Trade Association

EISAS Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat of the

Executive Committee on Peace and Security

ERW Explosive Remnants of War

ESDP European Security and Defence Policy

EU European Union

FMCT Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty

FMT Fissile Material Treaty

FOC Friends of the Chair

FSR Forum for Security Cooperation

GCI Global Communications Infrastructure

GCS Global Control System

GICHD Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian

Demining

GSI Global Control System

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

IANSA International Action Network on Small Arms

ICBL International Campaign to Ban Landmines

ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile

Abbreviations and acronyms

ICGEB International Centre for Genetic Engineering and

Biotechnology

ICJ International Court of Justice

ICOC International code of conduct against ballistic missile

proliferation

ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross

IDC International Data Centre

IFRCRCS International Federation of Red Cross and Red

Crescent Societies

IFRI Institut français des relations internacionales

IMS International Monitoring System

ISIS Institute of Security and International Studies

ISU Implementation Support Unit (of the GICHD)

JDEC Joint Data Exchange Center

KFOR International Security Force in Kosovo

MANPADS Man Portable Air Defence Systems

MDI Monitoring, Database and Information Branch of

DDA

MESA Middle East and South Asian States

MIRV multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle

MOTAPM mines other than anti-personnel mines

MOU memorandum of understanding

MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime

NAC New Agenda Coalition

NAM Non-Aligned Movement

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGOs non-governmental organizations

The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2002

NMD national missile defence

NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group

NWFZ Nuclear-weapon-free zone

NNWS non-nuclear-weapon State

NWS nuclear-weapon State

OAS Organization of American States

OAU Organization of African Unity

OLA Office of Legal Affairs

OPANAL Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in

Latin America and the Caribbean

OPCW Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical

Weapons

OSCC Open Sky Consultative Commission

OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

OSI on-site inspection

PAROS prevention of an arms race in outer space

PCASED Programme for Coordination and Assistance for

Security and Development

PfP Partnership for Peace

PIC Peace Implementation Council (Dayton Agreement)

PoA Programme of Action

PTBT Partial Test-Ban Treaty

PTS Provisional Technical Secretariat of the CTBTO

PWG Policy Working Group (on the United Nations and

terrorism)

QDR Quadrennial Defense Review

Abbreviations and acronyms

RGSA Reference Group on Small Arms

RMA Revolution in Military Affairs

SACSQCA Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions

in Central Africa

SADC Southern African Development Community

SALW small arms and light weapons

SC Standing Committee

SCBMs Security and confidence-building measures

SCE Standing Committee of Experts

SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization

SEANWFZ South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone

SEECP South-East European Cooperation Process

SEEI South-East Europe Initiative (NATO)

SFOR Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina

SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile

SORT Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (Moscow

Treaty)

SPSEE Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe

SSI Swedish Radiation Protection Authority

SSOD special session on disarmament

START Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (I, II and III)

SWEFOR Swedish Fellowship of Reconciliation

TMD theatre missile defence

UNCED United Nations Conference on Environment and

Development

UNDC United Nations Disarmament Commission

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UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNEP United Nations Environmental Programme

UNIDIR United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

UNISPACE United Nations Conference on the Exploration and

Peaceful Uses of Outer Space

UNMAS United Nations Mine Action Service

UNMOVIC United Nations Monitoring, Verification and

Inspection Commission

UNODC United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime

UNSCOM United Nations Special Commission

VEREX Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to Identify

and Examine Potential Verification Measures from a

Scientific and Technical Standpoint

VERTIC Verification Research, Training and Information

Centres

WA Wassenaar Arrangement

WAANSA West African Network on Small Arms

WMD weapons of mass destruction

WTO World Trade Organization

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