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REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN CYPRUS

(for the period 20 May to 30 November 1971)

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INTRODUCTION

1. This report on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus covers developments from 20 May 1971 to 30 November 1971 and brings up to date the record of the activities of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) pursuant to the mandate laid down in Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and subsequent resolutions of the Council relating to Cyprus.
2. Developments in the island in the last six months have been affected by uncertainties relating to the future of the intercommunal talks. Although there has been no recurrence of fighting, there has been a marked increase in tension and in the number of provocative incidents, and this has prevented progress towards a return to more normal conditions.

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I. THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS

A. Composition and deployment

3. At the end of the period covered by my last report, the strength of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was 3,007 military personnel and 170 civilian police (S/10199, paragraph 3). On 13 November 1971, the composition of the Force was as follows:

<u>Military</u>			<u>Total</u>
Austria	- HQ UNFICYP	1	
	- Field hospital	<u>55</u>	56
Canada	- HQ UNFICYP and military police	37	
	- Battalion	<u>548</u>	585
Denmark	- HQ UNFICYP and military police	17	
	- Battalion	<u>279</u>	296
Finland	- HQ UNFICYP and military police	11	
	- Battalion	<u>277</u>	288
Ireland	- HQ UNFICYP and military police	10	
	- Battalion	<u>381</u>	391
Sweden	- HQ UNFICYP and military police	9	
	- Battalion	<u>277</u>	286
United Kingdom	- HQ UNFICYP and military police	145	
	- Battalion	588	
	- Reconnaissance Squadron	119	
	- UNFICYP logistic support units	155	
	- Helicopter support	38	
	- Contingent HQ	<u>4</u>	<u>1,049</u>
	Total military personnel		2,951

Civilian police

Australia	38
Austria	49
Denmark	41
Sweden	<u>40</u>

Total civilian police 168

TOTAL UNFICYP 3,119

4. The following changes took place during the period covered by this report:

(a) Austria: A partial rotation was carried out.

(b) Canada: The 2nd Battalion, The Royal 22nd Regiment replaced the 1st Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry.

(c) Denmark: The 16th Battalion replaced the 15th Battalion.

(d) Finland: A partial rotation took place. The incoming troops form part of the 16th Finnish Battalion.

(e) Ireland: The 21st Infantry Group replaced the 20th Infantry Group.

(f) Sweden: The 47th Battalion replaced the 46th Battalion.

(g) United Kingdom: The 1st Battalion, The Royal Irish Rangers, replaced the 1st Battalion, The Gordon Highlanders; A Squadron, The Royal Hussars (PWO), replaced C Squadron, The Royal Hussars (PWO); and 8 Squadron, The Royal Corps of Transport, replaced 1 Squadron, The Royal Corps of Transport.

(h) The Australian Police unit has completed the second phase of its reduction (see S/10199, paragraph 4 (h)).

(i) At the request of the Secretary-General, the Government of Austria has agreed to increase the Austrian Police unit from 45 to 55. This increase will compensate for the reduction in the Australian Police unit referred to above.

5. Because of an increase in tension in the area, it has been necessary to man the static UNFICYP observation post on the Nicosia golf course day and night. This brings to 55 the number of permanently manned posts maintained by UNFICYP throughout the island.

6. The Force is now deployed as follows (see attached map):

HQ UNFICYP, including HQ UNCIVPOL

Combined staff

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Force Reserve (British Reconnaissance Squadron)

Austrian Field Hospital

Nicosia District

Canadian Contingent
Austrian Civilian Police

Famagusta District

Swedish Contingent
Swedish Civilian Police

Larnaca District

Irish Contingent
Swedish Civilian Police

Limassol Zone

British Contingent
Australian Civilian Police

Lefka District

Danish Contingent
Danish Civilian Police

Kyrenia District

Finnish Contingent
Austrian Civilian Police

7. The Armoured Car Section of the Irish Contingent was withdrawn by decision of the Government of Ireland prior to the rotation of the 20th and 21st Infantry Groups. As a result, the over-all strength of the Irish Contingent has been reduced by 36 all ranks.
8. A further review of locally employed civilians has been carried out and certain additional savings in personnel to those referred to in my last report (S/10199, paragraph 7) have been achieved.
9. The number of UNCIVPOL police stations and substations has remained unchanged during the period covered by this report. However, in view of the increase in the

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strength of the Austrian Police unit, and in order to improve the co-ordination of police activities between the Kyrenia and Nicosia Districts, the Austrian Civilian Police have taken over responsibility for Nicosia District from the Danish Civilian Police, and the latter have replaced the Austrian Police in Lefka District.

10. The Force remains under the command of Major-General D. Prem Chand. My Special Representative in Cyprus continues to be Mr. B.F. Osorio-Tafall.

Casualties

11. During the period under review, UNFICYP has suffered no casualties attributable to intercommunal incidents. One Danish and one British soldier and one Australian police officer died as a result of accidents, and one Irish soldier died of natural causes.

Discipline

12. The over-all discipline and bearing of the officers and men of the United Nations Force has continued to be of a high order and reflects credit on the contingent commanders, their staffs and the armed forces of the contributing nations.

B. Function and guiding principles

13. The function of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus was defined by the Security Council in its resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 in the following terms:

"in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions".

14. That resolution was reaffirmed by the Council in its subsequent resolutions of 13 March, 20 June, 9 August, 25 September and 18 December 1964; 19 March, 15 June, 10 August and 17 December 1965; 16 March, 16 June and 15 December 1966; 19 June and 22 December 1967; 18 March, 18 June and 10 December 1968; 10 June and 11 December 1969; 9 June and 10 December 1970 and 26 May 1971.

15. The guiding principles governing the operation of the Force, as summarized in my report of 10 September 1964 (S/5950, paragraph 7), remain in effect. The duties of UNCIVPOL are as outlined in my report of 2 May 1964 (S/5679, paragraph 4).

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C. Relations with the Government and with
the Turkish Cypriot leadership

16. UNFICYP has maintained, as in the past, close liaison and kept good working relations with the Government of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot leadership. The Political Liaison Committee continues to meet as a rule every two weeks. The UNFICYP Deputy Chief of Staff, who acts as Chairman, the Senior Political Adviser and his staff, the Police Adviser and the Force Economics Officer meet separately with liaison officers representing the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, with a view to sorting out specific current intercommunal problems through liaison and discussion. Between 20 May 1971 and 30 November 1971 the Committee held 14 meetings with the Government Political Liaison Officer and 13 with the Turkish Cypriot Liaison Officer. It is relevant to an understanding of certain aspects of liaison with the Turkish Cypriot community to recall the Secretary-General's special report to the Security Council of 3 January 1968 (S/8323) on the subject of the decision by the Turkish Cypriot leadership to establish a "provisional Cyprus Turkish administration". There has been a tendency during the past few months on the part of the Turkish Cypriots to omit the word "provisional" whenever references to this body are made in Turkish Cypriot publications, but UNFICYP has received no official information from the leadership on this subject.

D. Freedom of movement of the United Nations Force

17. Since my last report, there have been eight incidents in which UNFICYP has been denied freedom of movement. Four of these incidents may be attributed to members of the National Guard and four to Turkish Cypriot fighters. Three cases appear to have arisen as a result of local Turkish Cypriot fighters acting contrary to local understandings. Three other cases were caused by ignorance or misunderstanding of orders, and one resulted from an order from Headquarters National Guard, the effect of which would have been to alter the interpretation of restricted areas.

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II. ACTIVITIES TOWARDS PREVENTING A RECURRENCE OF
FIGHTING AND CONTRIBUTING TO THE RESTORATION
AND MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER

A. Military situation

(i) Armed forces in Cyprus other than UNFICYP

(a) Government armed forces

18. The strength of the National Guard appears to have been increased substantially during the past 6 months. Its organization and deployment have not materially altered. The call-up of the second half of the 1953 age group took place on 20 July, and the second half of the 1951 age group was demobilized.

19. Training activity has shown a marked increase, and a higher standard of training has been apparent. Summer training camps on the north and east coasts of the Island started later than usual and some closed down earlier than in previous years. UNFICYP has been notified in advance of all live range firing, and in most cases of field exercises.

(b) Turkish Cypriot armed elements

20. There are indications of a substantial increase in the strength of the Turkish Cypriot fighters. No major change has taken place in either the organization or the deployment of Turkish Cypriot fighter units. However, there has been a significant improvement in the over-all combat efficiency and capability of the fighter units.

21. Training activity has continued to increase; in particular, 2 major island-wide alert exercises have been held. In most instances, UNFICYP has been informed of live range firing and field exercises.

(c) Greek and Turkish national contingents

22. The strength and locations of both national contingents remain unchanged.

23. A partial rotation of the Greek National Contingent took place on 19 July 1971. UNFICYP was given advance notice of the rotation and was advised of quantities and types of military stores imported.

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24. On 29 September 1971, half of the Turkish National Contingent was rotated; in this connexion, as in past years, both the Government of Cyprus and the Government of Turkey requested UNFICYP's good offices. UNFICYP facilitated the rotation by negotiating the quantities of ammunition and military stores to be imported, providing observers to assist on the wharf and furnishing transport and escorts. The rotation took place without incident, owing in large measure to the co-operation extended to UNFICYP by both parties in adhering to past practice.

(ii) General assessment of the situation with regard to
preventing a recurrence of fighting

25. The military situation has been noticeably more tense, particularly in the areas of direct confrontation (S/9814, paragraph 25, and S/10005, paragraph 34). While there has been no progress in UNFICYP efforts to produce an effective disengagement of the opposing armed forces, UNFICYP has been able, through prompt action, to prevent local incidents from becoming more serious. Nevertheless, the period under review has been characterized by a considerable degree of military activity, resulting in some periods of acute sensitivity. The tendency on the part of both sides to give increasing prominence to military parades on the many days of national celebration often gives rise to apprehension and is a constant cause of concern to UNFICYP.

26. The Government has continued to express its apprehension at the increasing Turkish Cypriot fighter presence and activities throughout the island, particularly in Limassol, Famagusta, Nicosia, in the area around Chatos village and in parts of Lefka District. It has also regularly drawn attention to the training programmes carried out openly by the Turkish Cypriot fighters which have greatly improved their military capability, and to what it characterizes as efforts to extend the limits of the Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas throughout the island. The Turkish Cypriot leadership, for its part, has expressed concern at the increased activities of the National Guard and the impact of the increased military capability of the National Guard on the present and future security of the Turkish community.

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27. Both the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership have, as in the past, brought to the attention of UNFICYP any moves which they consider to be a breach of the status quo. UNFICYP investigates each of these complaints with the greatest care and attention with a view to ensuring that neither side gains a unilateral advantage over the other with the inevitable resultant increase in tension and danger of a recurrence of fighting.

28. Most of the activities complained of are of a military character, but, in sensitive areas, certain civilian activities can also add to suspicion and tension and become the subject of complaints. UNFICYP has continued to perform the difficult task of investigation and evaluation of situations brought to its notice in order to ascertain the status quo ante, which, it should be noted, can be most difficult in cases where complete records are not available and where each side presents a totally different version. On this basis UNFICYP can give advice or make requests to one side or the other with a view to restoring or improving the situation. Whatever success UNFICYP may have had in preventing attempted changes in the status quo from escalating into serious military confrontations can be attributed to the co-operation it had received from both sides and their willingness to accept UNFICYP's independent judgement and to follow its advice. Unfortunately, there have been a number of instances during the period under review where UNFICYP's recommendations have not been accepted and its advice and requests have either not been followed or have been responded to only after a considerable lapse of time.

29. In this connexion UNFICYP is bound to note that during the period under review there have been 8 instances of unilateral attempts by the Government to change the status quo to which UNFICYP has objected, of which 3 remain outstanding; while on the Turkish Cypriot leadership side there have been 24 instances, of which 10 remain outstanding. This apparent lack of co-operation with UNFICYP regarding a basic aspect of its mandate, namely to prevent the recurrence of fighting, is a matter of deep concern to UNFICYP because it is bound to affect UNFICYP's ability to settle disputes and ease tensions that might arise in the future. UNFICYP trusts that both sides appreciate the need to support UNFICYP's position and that they will endeavour to respond more positively than heretofore to the advice and requests it finds it necessary to proffer from time to time in the interests of maintaining peace.

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30. At present there is considerable tension arising from situations along the Green Line in Nicosia, in Selemani and in the Chatos/Marathovouno area. Each of these problems is being actively pursued by UNFICYP by patient negotiation and persuasion.

31. Tension developed along the Green Line in Nicosia when, in August, Turkish Cypriot fighters took retaliatory action against a move by the National Guard which involved only a change in accommodation and had therefore been approved by UNFICYP as being of no military significance. Turkish Cypriots retaliated by commencing to build a new fortification, to which the National Guard took exception, warning that it might lead to retaliatory measures on its part. Despite requests by UNFICYP, the Turkish Cypriot fighters declined to halt their work and eventually UNFICYP was obliged to place an observation post on the site in order to neutralize the effect of the construction. Negotiations are still proceeding.

32. Further tension developed in the same general area when in October the Turkish Cypriot Football Association began staging football matches on a field situated in the area of the Green Line in the western part of Nicosia. No games had been played on this field since the beginning of the intercommunal troubles, and previous requests for permission to use the field for this purpose had been denied by UNFICYP. The Government has objected to the use of the field on the grounds that it constitutes a forward move and a significant change in the status quo along the Green Line. While UNFICYP has no inherent objection to activities of this kind if they are and remain of a genuinely civilian character, it has been acutely conscious of the grave security risks that are involved with large crowds congregating in an area which is literally between military positions occupied by armed personnel of both sides. It also considers that the appearance anywhere in the field of Turkish Cypriot uniformed personnel, whether for purposes of crowd control or otherwise, would constitute a violation by the party concerned of its obligations in this sensitive area of the Green Line, involving the responsibilities of UNFICYP. The Turkish Cypriot leadership has given assurances that the field will be used for sporting purposes only and that no uniformed personnel will appear on the field forward of their existing positions, but this undertaking has not been fully observed. The leadership has also accepted full responsibility for any situation that might develop affecting the safety of the spectators. UNFICYP is continuing to negotiate in the hope of finding a solution

satisfactory to both sides, and in this connexion the Turkish Cypriot leadership recently found it possible, at UNFICYP's request, to suspend the games for 3 weeks.

33. Selemani is a village situated just outside the Turkish Cypriot enclave of Limnitis; it was abandoned during the troubles in 1963/64. Although it has been unoccupied since then, the Turkish Cypriot villagers have continued to work their fields. Early this year, the villagers began to repair their houses and to take up residence in some of them again. No objection was raised to this activity, but it was agreed locally by all parties that the resettlement could proceed on condition that the village was not fortified and that there would be no armed or uniformed personnel in it. To ensure security, since the village is situated between opposing military positions, and to assist UNFICYP in ensuring that the terms of the agreement were kept, UNFICYP established an observation post in the village. Subsequently the Government informed UNFICYP of its intention to send in a Cyprus Police patrol in order to reassert its authority over the village. In this connexion, the Government drew attention to its general policy regarding the resettlement of abandoned villages which included the stipulation that returning villagers would be subject to the Government's normal administrative and police authority. When the question was raised with the Turkish Cypriot leadership, they informed UNFICYP that there could be no question of CYPOL exercising any authority in Selemani, which was a Turkish Cypriot village and which, if not within the Turkish Cypriot enclave, was within the area they controlled. The Government did not accept this argument and insisted on the need to send in a CYPOL patrol. However, UNFICYP advised restraint and suggested that the best solution would be for UNFICYP to continue to ensure that no military forward move should take place and that the village should not be occupied or fortified by uniformed and armed fighters. While the Government has not accepted this suggestion, it has not in fact attempted to send CYPOL patrols into the village. On the other hand, to UNFICYP's regret, armed and uniformed Turkish Cypriot fighters have been appearing in the village for the past few months and, despite UNFICYP's strongest protests, continue to do so. UNFICYP is still pressing the leadership on this matter, which is daily becoming of increasing gravity.

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34. The tension in the Chatos/Marathovouno area has arisen in connexion with difficulties experienced by Greek Cypriot farmers in cultivating some of their fields close to and within areas controlled by Turkish Cypriots. This is not a new problem; when it arose in 1969, UNFICYP assisted in arriving at a local arrangement whereby the number of farmers intending to work in their fields the next day would be notified to UNFICYP, which would pass on this information to the Turkish Cypriots. When the problem arose again at the beginning of this summer, UNFICYP attempted to persuade both sides to abide by the existing arrangement. It was able to convince the Turkish Cypriots to do so, but not all of the Greek Cypriots. As a result, Greek Cypriot farmers who went to their fields without prior notification through UNFICYP were warned off by members of the Turkish Cypriot police element. The Government protested that farmers were being denied access to their fields and that the Turkish Cypriots, armed and in uniform, were moving forward and thus expanding the areas they controlled. In the event, the harvest was completed, despite a number of incidents.

35. Now that the sowing and ploughing season has arrived, the Government has complained that Greek Cypriot farmers not only of Marathovouno but also of Trypimeni are being denied access to their fields and has stated that if this continues, it will have no alternative but to give them police protection. The Turkish Cypriots are also dissatisfied with the "notification" arrangement and have begun to insist locally that, in future, names must also be given or, failing that, that the farmers should individually seek the permission of the Turkish Cypriot police element. In the face of these opposed positions, UNFICYP is endeavouring to arrive at an arrangement satisfactory to both sides, which would enable the farmers to go about their work without unnecessary impediment.

36. A serious incident occurred on 22 July 1971 when a Turkish Cypriot shepherd grazing his sheep near Kokkina was shot at from a National Guard post and was wounded in the leg. Because UNFICYP observed the whole of this incident it was able to give a speedy and independent account of it and therefore to prevent any escalation. It is understood that the National Guardsman responsible was disciplined.

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37. There was another serious incident on 27 August. On that day a bus carrying 28 uniformed Turkish Cypriot fighters, 1 of whom had a pistol, and 2 other Turkish Cypriots in civilian clothes, was intercepted by CYPOL and the Turkish Cypriot fighters arrested. The bus was travelling from 1 Turkish Cypriot village (Sinda) to another (Yenagra) through a Government-controlled area on the main Nicosia-Famagusta road. One hour later Turkish Cypriots from the village of Sinda took hostages at gun point on the same road. This action was apparently taken as a result of local decision and, according to the Turkish Cypriots involved, was a reprisal for the earlier arrest of Turkish Cypriot fighters. Only the prompt intervention of UNFICYP and the co-operation it received from both the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership prevented an even more serious situation from developing and made possible the speedy release of all the individuals, with the exception of the pistol carrying fighter. The latter was subsequently brought to court and released on bail.

(iii) Observance of the cease-fire

38. There were 10 shooting incidents confirmed by UNFICYP during the period under review. After investigation by UNFICYP, 5 of these were attributed to Government security forces and 3 to Turkish Cypriot fighters, while the remaining 2 involved both sides. One of these cases involved an exchange of fire which took place on the Kyrenia road between Cyprus Navy personnel, who claimed to have lost their way, and Turkish Cypriot police elements; each side maintained that the other was the first to open fire. In another case, shots are believed to have been exchanged near Larnaca between National Guardsmen and Turkish Cypriots who, it was claimed, were poaching. Still another incident occurred in the Lefka District, when a National Guardsman fired 1 round at 2 UNFICYP soldiers. Although the soldiers were wearing United Nations headress, the Guardsman claimed that he mistook them for Turkish Cypriots. In all 9 cases, the shootings could be considered as violations of the cease fire.

39. In addition, there were 3 cases of accidental discharge of weapons by Government security forces and 9 cases by Turkish Cypriot fighters. Though emphasis continues to be placed on the prevention of incidents, as well as on the maintenance of the status quo in sensitive areas, the period under review has seen the largest number of shooting incidents since December 1969. A tabulation of shooting incidents, covering the period since March 1968 is reproduced below.

Summary of shooting incidents

	20 May 71 to 30 Nov. 71	02 Dec. 70 to 19 May 71	02 June 70 to 01 Dec. 70	02 Dec. 69 to 01 June 70	03 June 69 to 01 Dec. 69	03 Dec. 68 to 02 June 69	08 June 68 to 02 Dec. 68	08 Mar. 68 to 07 June 68
Nicosia District (from 23 Feb. 1970)	8	6	8	5	10	5	16	6
Famagusta District (until 28 Feb. 1970)	-	-	-	3	6	1	1	3
Famagusta District (from 1 Mar. 1970)	2	2	3	2	-	-	-	-
Larnaca District (from 9 Mar. 1970)	1	2	-	1	-	-	-	-
Limassol zone (less Kophinou District) (from 9 Mar. 1970)	3	1	1	3	5	7	4	1
Lefka District	6	-	-	-	3	7	11	8
Kyrenia District	2	2	-	2	6	5	33	21
TOTAL	22	13	12	16	30	25	65	39

B. Developments relating to the maintenance
of law and order

40. The civilian police element of UNFICYP (UNCIVPOL) has continued to contribute to the maintenance of law and order in Cyprus. UNCIVPOL has maintained close liaison with the Cyprus Police and the Turkish Cypriot police element. Both Greek and Turkish Cypriots have continued to show confidence in UNCIVPOL, and this has greatly facilitated its task.

41. During the period 16 May to 30 November 1971, UNCIVPOL has submitted approximately 750 reports arising from observations or investigations of incidents which have had some inter-communal connotation. The volume of work has remained fairly steady during the past 2 years. Inquiries covered a variety of subjects, such as deaths from different causes, woundings, accidents, assaults, straying and theft of livestock, illegal cultivation, damage to crops and property, and police activities generally. UNCIVPOL continued to lend support to other activities of UNFICYP, especially in such matters as agriculture and public services.

42. During the period under review, the Government pursued its determination to assert authority over the whole of the area under its control. It has done so by establishing new police posts and increasing its patrolling. It also continues to maintain its right to carry out police patrols in sensitive areas, but UNFICYP is pleased to note that, in most instances, prior warning has been given to it when such patrols were contemplated. This has enabled UNFICYP to exercise its good offices and, with the co-operation of both sides, to avoid confrontations. There was an exception, however, at Alekhtora in June, when CYPOL officers carried out an early morning arrest in a purely Turkish Cypriot village without notifying UNFICYP. This action gave rise to tension, which subsided only after UNFICYP's intervention.

43. CYPOL has been very active in endeavouring to bring narcotics trafficking and road accident problems under control. This has given rise to complaints from Turkish Cypriots of discriminatory and aggressive conduct at roadblocks and traffic checks. However, in the main, there was little evidence produced to substantiate these allegations. Having regard to the number of Turkish Cypriots moving daily in Government-controlled areas during times when intercommunal tension and suspicion was acute, the number of such incidents leading to protests was relatively small and indicates a certain improvement of the situation.

44. The Turkish Cypriot leadership has also increased the level of activities of its police element. Road checks have been carried out within the areas under its control to ensure that Turkish Cypriots carry licences of various kinds issued by the leadership. There has been a tendency for members of the Turkish Cypriot police element to appear in uniform on the fringes of areas they control, and especially in sensitive areas. UNFICYP has protested these developments, though with only limited success. The Government sees these trends as a significant attempt to change the status quo and to erode its authority.

45. UNFICYP has also noted increased efficiency within the Turkish Cypriot police element and possibly higher morale, which has had the effect of better policing within Turkish Cypriot enclaves and controlled areas.

46. There was a commendable example of co-operation with UNFICYP by CYPOL and the Turkish police element, coupled with restraint by the higher leadership on both sides, when, on 30 July, during a period of extreme tension, a 17-year old boy from a village in the Chatos area apparently ran amok and shot and killed his grandmother. He ran away and subsequently shot and killed an aged Greek Cypriot shepherd before he was arrested by the Turkish Cypriot police element. Both sides co-operated fully with UNFICYP and exercised restraint to ensure that this unfortunate incident did not exacerbate the existing tense situation.

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III. ACTIVITIES TOWARDS A RETURN TO NORMAL CONDITIONS

47. Since my last report (S/10199), there has been little to indicate a reversal in the trend towards separate development of the economies of the two communities on the island. Moreover, the two public services remain quite separate.

48. Again I have to report that in the economic field, though contacts are still maintained in private, semi-autonomous and non-governmental institutions, the Turkish Cypriots appear to be intent on building up their own economy rather than seeking ways of integrating their activities with those of the Government. An exception to this has been the increased interest of Turkish Cypriot farmers in United Nations sponsored development schemes such as the mixed farming project (UNDP/WFP), the project to strengthen veterinary services (UNDP/FAO) and the soil conservation project (UNDP/WFP). Interest has also been shown, though to a lesser degree, in participation in such UNDP assisted projects as the Cyprus Productivity Centre (UNDP/ILO) and the Higher Technical Institute (UNDP/UNESCO/ILO). At present, Turkish Cypriots seem to be showing little or no interest in courses offered by the Hotel and Catering Institute (assisted by UNDP/ILO).

49. The economic disparity between the two communities is still apparent and there are indications of a serious unemployment problem among certain sections of the Turkish Cypriot population. Both the Government and the Greek Cypriot private business sector have called for closer co-operation in order to raise the economic level of the Turkish Cypriot community, but so far the Turkish Cypriots have been hesitant to respond fully to these overtures. The Cyprus Development Bank continues to offer its services to Turkish Cypriots, but it will not offer loans unless it has over-all financial control in the implementation of projects supported by its credits. The Turkish Cypriot leadership will not agree to this as they see it as an attempt to encroach on their authority in the areas they control.

50. There is still some co-operation through the marketing boards, though the Turkish Cypriots claim that they do not have enough say in the activities of those boards. The Turkish Cypriot grain crop was again sold through the Cyprus Grain Commission this year, though the Turkish Cypriots have asked for a change in the existing arrangements. In particular, they charge that the Commission

discriminates against Turkish Cypriot producers by refusing to give them the same credits and advantageous terms it extends to Greek Cypriot producers. Relations between the co-operative movements on the two sides do not appear to have been strengthened to any extent, although there was a hopeful sign early in November when discussions took place between representatives of the two co-operative movements. It is believed that the possibility of co-operation between the two movements was one of the subjects discussed.

51. At the time of writing, the new Five Year Plan (1972-1976) has not been completed, but there appears to be little hope for an integrated economic development of the two communities through this scheme. Each side continues to maintain its own planning office and there is still a complete lack of contact between them (S/10199, paragraph 41).

52. As anticipated in my last report, the heavy spring rains resulted in a satisfactory cereal crop. Potato, grape and olive harvests were also good. However, unseasonal summer rains caused considerable damage to the almond crop and to soft fruit crops such as apricots, plums and cherries, and the carob harvest, an important source of income in certain areas, was not as large as was hoped.

53. An important part of the work of UNFICYP continues to be investigating and giving assistance in disputes between the two communities over land encroachment, unauthorized grazing and cultivation and crop damage.

54. There has been little progress in the normalization of public services. There has been no change in the problem of water supply to Turkish Cypriot villages in need since my last report. The villages of Kivisil, Alaminos and Temblos, about which optimism was previously expressed (S/10199, paragraph 46), appear to be no better off than in the past, though bore-holes are being drilled around Temblos which could serve that village. In the face of continuing shortages, Turkish Cypriots are now beginning to establish their own water schemes. UNFICYP has continued to assist the two communities to solve disputes over the use of jointly operated water schemes.

55. In February 1971, the Electricity Authority of Cyprus (EAC) completed plans for the electrification of 23 Turkish Cypriot villages as part of the preparation for carrying out a technical agreement for the normalization of electricity distribution. The plans, however, as well as the agreement itself, are still

subject to ratification by the Government. Work is in progress towards the electrification of Limnitis and Evdhimou, which was agreed to outside the above-mentioned normalization plan. In the case of Limnitis, however, the Government has refused to grant financial assistance normally given to villages for installing street lighting on the grounds that to do so it must have the right to inspect the village books, a right the Turkish Cypriot leadership is not willing to concede. This dispute and the Government's delay in ratifying the agreement have caused resentment amongst the Turkish Cypriot community, and incidents concerning meter reading and bill collections have increased since my last report. The Government has complained that Turkish Cypriots do not pay for the electricity they consume and has expressed concern over the means used to supply Turkish Cypriot industrial units with electricity. The Government has repeatedly objected to Turkish Cypriots making unauthorized electrical connexions which it contends have placed a dangerous strain on local grids. The Turkish Cypriot leadership has defended this practice on the grounds of necessity, in view of the refusal of the Government to extend the required facilities. According to the EAC, the Turkish Cypriot community ignored an invitation to appoint one of their number to the EAC Board.

56. The Turkish Cypriot leadership has expressed little interest in normalizing the telephone system until the electricity agreement is ratified.

57. A further request has been made by the Turkish Cypriot leadership for improvements to postal services in Ktima. The Government, however, has maintained that it regards the present services as adequate. The Government has also alleged that the leadership is operating its own postal services in areas under Turkish Cypriot control and has said that in these circumstances it may become necessary for it to reconsider the agreements made in 1966 towards normalization of postal services (S/7611, paragraphs 145-148).

58. During the period under review, a Government team of land registry clerks entered the Turkish Cypriot-controlled area around Louroujina to settle land claims. The work was completed without incident, requiring minimum UNFICYP supervision. It is the first example of this type of joint action since December 1963.

59. No further progress has been made towards the reintegration of Turkish Cypriots into the national social insurance scheme. In my last report, I stressed

the need to settle this matter speedily in view of the further backlog of complications which arise with the passage of time (S/10199, paragraph 49).

60. Little progress was made during the period under review towards solving the problem of Turkish Cypriot displaced persons. As mentioned above (see paragraph 33), about 20 families returned to the village of Selemeni, near Limnitis. Beyond this there have been no significant moves towards resettlement and no progress has been made towards implementing the Government's resettlement scheme mentioned in my last report (S/10199, paragraph 51). It is reported, however, that a refugee accommodation project involving 1,470 houses, which was launched in 1966 by the Turkish Cypriot leadership, is now nearing completion.

61. As emphasized in my previous reports, the question of freedom of movement for unarmed Cypriot civilians (S/10199, paragraphs 57-58) is one of the most serious irritants to Cypriots of both communities. The barring of access to land and the restrictions imposed over the use of certain roads have been a constant source of frustration and encumbrance to the individual Cypriot in his day-to-day social and economic pursuits. The Turkish Cypriot leadership maintains that the restrictions on access to areas under their control are primarily a matter of the security of their community and cannot be relaxed until the over-all problem is resolved. The leadership also claims that there are many areas controlled by the Government to which they are denied access. The Government, however, maintains that these are military restricted areas to which all Cypriots, whether Greek or Turkish, are denied access. In the absence of a marked improvement in relations between the two communities at the political level, there would seem to be little likelihood of a mutually satisfactory agreement on this question being reached in the near future.

62. UNFICYP continues to operate convoys on the Nicosia-Kyrenia road, provides emergency escorts through certain Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas, and accompanies farmers wishing to harvest crops in sensitive places. It continues to be called on to use its good offices in securing the release of Greek Cypriot individuals who stray into certain Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas.

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IV. INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS

63. Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash have continued to meet in private. They have now had 18 meetings in the fourth round of their talks which began on 21 September 1970, having met five times during the period under review - on 31 May, 26 June, 9 and 24 August and 20 September 1971.

64. At all but the first of these meetings, Mr. Clerides or Mr. Denktash delivered replies to letters previously received from one another. On 26 June, Mr. Clerides handed to Mr. Denktash his reply to the proposals made by Mr. Denktash in his letter of 28 April (see S/10199, paragraph 61). Subsequent correspondence was handed over on 9 August (by Mr. Denktash), on 24 August (by Mr. Clerides), and on 20 September (by Mr. Denktash).

65. Before reviewing developments concerning the talks, I should like first to report on the reaction to the following suggestion contained in my last report to the Security Council (S/10199, paragraph 83):

"In my view, what is needed to overcome this difficulty is an exercise of statesmanship by leaders of all the parties concerned whereby they would restate publicly their determination that the problem of Cyprus must be solved by arriving, through peaceful means, at a lasting agreement based on the independence and sovereignty of a unitary State of Cyprus. An undertaking of this kind could do much to clear up the present atmosphere of suspicion and hesitation and might thus serve to give a renewed impetus to the intercommunal talks."

66. Commenting on this suggestion, Mr. Clerides said that he did not disagree with it. His side was willing to continue constructively the exchange of views with the Turkish Cypriot community in a bid to bridge the differences and find a lasting solution based on the principle contained in that suggestion. He added however that recent statements by Turkish officials did not hold out promise of any such intention on the part of Turkey; indeed, Turkish policy seemed to be directed towards getting his side to agree to the principle that the solution to be arrived at would be a lasting one without Turkey agreeing that Cyprus should be sovereign and unitary.

67. Mr. Denktash denied the implication in Mr. Clerides' statement that his side was not seeking a permanent solution based on the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus. The main difficulty so far had been that the Greek Cypriots had been

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seeking a solution based on an independence which had its door open to enosis. A restatement by them that they were ready to agree to an independence which was closed permanently and effectively to any form of union with any other country, as was the case under the 1960 Agreements, would be a constructive step in the right direction. With regard to the term "unitary state", his side was not averse to a state which had the structure set out in the 1960 Agreements whereby the partnership status and rights of the Turkish Cypriot community were fully safeguarded and their security of life and property guaranteed. But, having regard to the way the Greek Cypriots had misused the term, his side was not prepared to tie itself to any terminology on the exact interpretation of which there had not yet been an agreement.

68. With regard to the developments concerning the intercommunal talks, it is with deep regret that I have to report that they have now reached a point which President Makarios has described as deadlock. The two interlocutors have spoken to the press from time to time disclosing, to some extent, the substance of the letters exchanged between them and giving their views on the progress of their talks. From these statements, it may be inferred that the letters exchanged, on which the recent discussions have been based, contain little that might indicate significant progress towards agreement. Rather, they appear to contain reviews of the ground covered during the talks over the past three years and restatements of the respective positions, as well as a consideration of the usefulness of continuing the talks on the present basis.

69. From the statements made by the two interlocutors, it is apparent that there is disagreement on two main issues, local government and guarantees for the independence of Cyprus.

70. On the issue of local government, Mr. Denktash has proposed a form of local autonomy for each community under the control of central communal authorities. In support of his proposals he has pointed out that his side has accepted a number of changes proposed by the Greek Cypriots concerning the Central Government of the Republic. Mr. Clerides has said that he is willing to accept separate authorities for communal affairs such as education, culture and personal status, as indeed is the case in many countries; matters of administration, however, are governmental affairs and in no country are they considered as communal.

71. Each side has placed on the other the responsibility for raising the question of guarantees, which both agree was not a matter within their terms of reference. Mr. Clerides has stated that it had always been understood that the question of guarantees would be considered at a different stage and level, should the interlocutors reach provisional agreement on constitutional issues. Mr. Denktash, for his part, has asserted that the question of guarantees had been introduced not by his side but by Archbishop Makarios who, earlier in 1971, had stated publicly that he would never sign an agreement that barred the way to enosis. This had made the issue a fundamental one for the Turkish Cypriot side, which would accept no agreement unless it closed the door to enosis.

72. With regard to the future of the intercommunal talks, both interlocutors have indicated their willingness to continue them although each has made it clear that the gap between their respective positions is considerable. Mr. Denktash has expressed his willingness to begin a "new exercise" based on agreed "new principles" if the other side should wish it, and provided that a time-limit were set.

73. The progress of the intercommunal talks has also been commented upon by members of the Greek and Turkish Governments. At the beginning of June, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Greece, Mr. Xanthopoulos-Palamas, and the Foreign Minister of Turkey, Mr. Olcay, held discussions in Lisbon during which they considered the question of Cyprus. Official statements issued by both embassies on 3 June said that the two leaders had emphasized the need for a speedy solution to the Cyprus question and expressed the hope that the intercommunal talks would be continued at a quicker tempo and in a constructive spirit. In a statement made on 6 June, Mr. Olcay said that he and Mr. Xanthopoulos-Palamas appreciated that the Turkish and Greek Governments had to show understanding and make every endeavour to bring the talks to a successful conclusion.

74. At a press interview given on 17 June, Mr. Xanthopoulos-Palamas was reported to have said that if the intercommunal talks failed to produce a solution, Greece and Turkey would begin consultations for the further handling of the issue. He added however that the talks were progressing and that no other process for the search for a solution was being considered.

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75. In an interview given on 15 July, Mr. Olcay was reported to have said that there was a need to fix a time-limit for solving the Cyprus problem since the intercommunal talks could not drag on indefinitely. He said that Turkey was not seeking the partition of Cyprus provided the status of Cyprus were not changed fundamentally and the partnership of the two communities were maintained, as defined in the 1960 treaties. In a further statement reported on 6 August, Mr. Olcay said that he would discuss the Cyprus issue with Mr. Xanthopoulos-Palamas in September when they met in New York during the session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

76. The President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, held discussions in Athens from 3 to 5 September 1971 with the Prime Minister of Greece, Mr. Papadopoulos, on the question of Cyprus. A joint communiqué stated that during the discussions there was a broad, mutual briefing and exchange of views which would prove particularly useful in the further handling of the Cyprus question. Speaking on his return to Cyprus, in reply to a question whether there had been any decision as to a new procedure to be followed in case the local talks reached a deadlock, the President said that various alternative procedures had been discussed and the one to be followed would be decided following consultations with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. With this aim in view, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Kyprianou, would be going to New York later in September.

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V. GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

77. As indicated in the preceding chapter (paragraphs 75-76), the Foreign Minister of Cyprus, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Greece and the Foreign Minister of Turkey came to United Nations Headquarters in September 1971 to attend the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly. While in New York, they continued their consultations on the Cyprus question and exchanged views with me on this subject in a constructive spirit.

78. In the course of their conversations with me, the current impasse in the intercommunal talks was reviewed in the light of the responsibilities of the United Nations and of the parties concerned. Mr. Kyprianou outlined the Cyprus Government's views on the impasse reached in the local talks as well as on ways of dealing with other aspects of the problem within the framework of the United Nations. Mr. Olcay and Mr. Xanthopoulos-Palamas, on behalf of their Governments, put forward certain views held in common by them as to methods of helping the interlocutors in the intercommunal talks to overcome their deadlock and make a new start. As a consequence of these exchanges of views, I had occasion to put forward certain procedural suggestions, which however did not prove immediately acceptable in all their aspects to all the parties concerned.

79. After careful consideration of the positions of the Governments concerned, I handed on 18 October to the Foreign Minister of Cyprus and to the Permanent Representatives of Greece and Turkey identical copies of an aide-mémoire which formalized my procedural suggestions referred to in the preceding paragraph. The aide-mémoire reads as follows:

"The presence at United Nations Headquarters of the Foreign Ministers of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey and of the Secretary-General's Special Representative in Cyprus made possible an exchange of views with the Secretary-General on steps that might usefully be taken to facilitate the search for a settlement of the long-term problems of Cyprus. As a consequence of these conversations the Secretary-General made a suggestion designed to reactivate and make more effective the intercommunal talks in Cyprus. Although certain aspects of this suggestion did not prove immediately acceptable to all the parties concerned, the proposal as a whole still seems to the Secretary-General to provide a new basis for achieving the ends which all the parties have in mind. For this reason the Secretary-General feels that it may be useful to put his suggestion in writing for the convenience and continued consideration of the parties.

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"The Secretary-General's suggestion is that with a view to facilitating the future conduct of the intercommunal talks, his Special Representative in Cyprus, Mr. B.F. Osorio-Tafall, should, in the exercise of the Secretary-General's good offices, take part in the talks between the representatives of the two communities. It is also suggested that the Governments of Greece and Turkey should each make available a constitutional expert who would attend the talks in an advisory capacity."

80. I had occasion in this connexion to make it clear that the role in the intercommunal talks of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, as envisaged in the aide-mémoire, would be in the context of the good offices which he had been exercising on my behalf and which had continued to be available to the parties directly concerned. There was no intention that the Special Representative should act as a mediator or put forward substantive proposals concerning solutions to the problem.

81. The reaction of the Government of Greece to my aide-mémoire was conveyed to me by its Permanent Representative on 19 October 1971; that of the Government of Cyprus, by its Foreign Minister on 19 October, and that of the Government of Turkey, by its Permanent Representative on 24 November. Of the two parties to the intercommunal talks, the Turkish Cypriot community's reaction was transmitted by Vice-President Kuchuk, through my Special Representative, on 29 November 1971, and that of Mr. Clerides on behalf of the Greek Cypriot community on 30 November. The Government of Greece accepted the suggestion in my aide-mémoire fully; the Government of Cyprus accepted it only in so far as the Representative of the Secretary-General was concerned, and the Government of Turkey accepted it with significant modifications. The Turkish Cypriot community accepted my suggestion with modifications, and has placed on record certain understandings in this connexion. The reaction of the Greek Cypriot community was the same as that of the Cyprus Government.

82. Since the suggestion made in my aide-mémoire of 18 October is still under active discussion with the parties, and since certain aspects of the matter are still under consideration by some of them, it has seemed to me that it would be premature to publish at this time a detailed account of the reactions received by me so far. I hope however to be in a position to report more fully to the Council on this matter by the time it meets to consider my report.

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83. It should be added that on 17 November, the Foreign Minister of Cyprus presented to me a number of additional points and alternative suggestions. Thus he indicated that the expanded local talks should concern themselves with the internal aspects of the Cyprus problem. In these talks, technical advice on constitutional matters could well be provided by experts appointed by the Secretary-General from United Nations personnel or countries not involved in the Cyprus problem. Such international aspects of the problem as the independence, equal sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of Cyprus might be dealt with on a governmental level in New York. As envisaged by the Cyprus Government, both the talks in Nicosia on the constitutional problem and those in New York on the international aspects would be within the framework of the Secretary-General's good offices and would be based upon specific terms of reference in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter. Alternative procedural solutions, such as the active participation of the Security Council, might also be considered.

84. In conveying his Government's views, the Permanent Representative of Turkey stressed that the intercommunal talks were of an exploratory nature and limited to constitutional matters, and arrangements to broaden them could not alter this status nor affect in any way the validity of the treaties on Cyprus. He further indicated that in his Government's view, the representatives of Greece and Turkey would take part in the talks in the exercise of their respective Governments' good offices, just as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General would take part in the exercise of the Secretary-General's good offices.

85. Vice-President Kuchuk, on behalf of his community, similarly is of the view that the talks should continue to be informal and exploratory, that they should be confined to constitutional matters, and that the broadening of the talks should not affect his community's position about the validity of the 1960 treaties and the Constitution of Cyprus, whose letter and spirit should be the point of departure and the basis of the talks in their new phase. Dr. Kuchuk also suggested measures to alleviate the hardships suffered by his community through the establishment, within the context of the Secretary-General's good offices, of mixed ad hoc committees with the participation of representatives of the United Nations and of the two communities.

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VI. MEDIATION EFFORT

86. The situation regarding a resumption of the mediation function under paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 186 (1964) has remained unchanged since my last report, owing primarily to the widely differing and firmly held views on the matter of the three Governments most directly concerned.

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VII. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

87. Voluntary contributions in the amount of approximately \$107.3 million have been paid to the UNFICYP Special Account by 49 Member States and four non-member Governments in respect of the periods from the inception of the Force on 27 March 1964 to 15 December 1971. In addition, voluntary contributions from public sources, interest earned on investment of temporarily undisbursed funds and other miscellaneous income received by the Account have totalled about \$1.2 million. Accordingly, some \$108.5 million have been made available to the UNFICYP Special Account toward meeting the costs of UNFICYP to the United Nations for the period through 15 December 1971.

88. The costs to be borne by the United Nations for the operation of UNFICYP for the period from the inception of the Force to 15 December 1971 are estimated at \$134.5 million. This figure includes the direct costs to the United Nations of maintaining the Force in Cyprus as well as the amounts to be paid to Governments providing contingents in respect of their extra and extraordinary costs for which they seek to be reimbursed by the United Nations, but does not include the amount that would be required for the final repatriation of contingents and the liquidation of the Force.

89. The amount of \$108.5 million so far received by the UNFICYP Special Account falls short of the requirement for \$134.5 million indicated above by approximately \$26.0 million. However, in addition to the voluntary contributions that have been paid already to the Account, a number of Governments have pledged but not yet paid voluntary contributions totalling approximately \$19.7 million. Of these unpaid pledges, some \$9.6 million are expected to be paid eventually. Unfortunately, this leaves a balance of approximately \$10.1 million for which contributions are not in any way assured.

90. If to the amount of \$108.5 million so far received the amount of \$9.6 million for assured pledges is added, the UNFICYP Special Account can be expected to have available to it approximately \$118.1 million. The difference between this figure and the costs to be met of approximately \$134.5 million is \$16.4 million. Accordingly, unless additional contributions from existing or from new pledges are received before 15 December 1971, the UNFICYP Special Account deficit as of

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that date will be \$16.4 million. A later paragraph of this report deals further with this deficit and the importance of its elimination.

91. If the Security Council should decide to extend for six months beyond 15 December 1971 the period during which the Force is to be stationed in Cyprus, it is estimated that the additional cost to the Organization, assuming continuance of present reimbursement commitments, would amount to approximately \$6.5 million as detailed below. The estimated \$0.5 million which would be required for the final repatriation of contingents and liquidation costs has been excluded from the figures below for purposes of convenience.

UNFICYP COST ESTIMATE BY MAJOR CATEGORY OF EXPENSE
(in thousands of US dollars)

<u>I. Operation costs incurred by the United Nations</u>	
Movement of contingents	164
Operational expenses	535
Rental of premises	96
Rations	380
Non-military personnel, salaries, travel, etc.	612
Miscellaneous and contingencies	<u>205</u>
Total, part I	1,992
<u>II. Reimbursement of extra costs of Governments providing contingents</u>	
Pay and allowances	4,100
Contingent-owned equipment	350
Death and disability awards	<u>50</u>
Total, part II	4,500
Grand total, parts I and II	<u>6,492</u>

92. The above costs do not reflect the full costs of UNFICYP to Member and non-member States, since they exclude the extra costs which Members providing contingents or police units to the Force have agreed to absorb at their own expense rather than seek as reimbursement from the United Nations. Based on reports received from certain of the Governments providing contingents or police units to the Force, the estimated amount of such extra costs which

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Governments would absorb at their own expense for an additional six-month period, if the mandate of UNFICYP is extended and the Governments concerned agree to continue the present arrangements, are as follows: Australia \$200,000, Austria \$160,000, Canada^{1/} \$863,755, Denmark \$230,000, Sweden \$325,000 and United Kingdom \$678,000. Finland and Ireland are also absorbing certain UNFICYP costs at their own expense.

93. In order to finance the costs to the Organization of maintaining the Force for a period of six months after 15 December 1971 and to meet all costs and outstanding claims up to that date, it will be necessary for the Secretary-General to receive contributions totalling \$22.9 million.

^{1/} Exclusive of the normal cost of pay and allowances.

VIII. OBSERVATIONS

94. The period under review has been marked by a deterioration of the general situation in Cyprus. Tension between the two communities of the island has noticeably increased and there have been a number of intercommunal incidents, some of them serious.

95. However, thanks largely to the presence of UNFICYP and its constant efforts to minimize incidents and defuse tense situations whenever they occur, a relative, though superficial, calm has been maintained. The task of UNFICYP has become increasingly difficult. It has been able to achieve only limited progress in the normalization of conditions in the island and none at all in the important fields of freedom of movement and deconfrontation.

96. Despite UNFICYP's efforts, the Turkish Cypriot leadership has continued to deny freedom of movement in the area it controls to unarmed Greek Cypriot civilians. The leadership ascribes its negative attitude to security reasons, but the fact remains that some 80 per cent of the population of Cyprus are deprived of their basic right to travel freely on the public roads of that area.

97. Nor has UNFICYP been able to achieve any progress with regard to deconfrontation. The persistent confrontation between the Cyprus National Guard and the Turkish Cypriot fighters has become more dangerous with the passage of time, as the two opposing forces have continued to improve their military efficiency and capability. An additional disturbing factor is that this increase in military efficiency and capability has led to a periodic tendency on the part of one side or the other to attempt to alter to its advantage the very delicate balance of military and police dispositions and patterns of activity along the Green Line and in other sensitive areas. In each such case UNFICYP has endeavoured to maintain the status quo, or when possible to make new arrangements in agreement with both sides. In this connexion, while the Cyprus Government has continued to co-operate with UNFICYP in most cases, the Turkish Cypriot leadership has been reluctant to extend to UNFICYP the same measure of co-operation as in the past. I wish to emphasize once again that UNFICYP can fulfil its responsibilities only if it has the co-operation of both sides. It is to be hoped that such co-operation will be extended to it in the future.

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98. There can be little doubt that much of the present climate of uneasiness is due to the uncertainties regarding the search for a solution of the Cyprus problem. As the intercommunal talks have gradually reached a deadlock, the hopes of three years ago have given way to frustration and tension. This tension has been recently deepened by rumours of the presence of General Grivas in the island and a related resurgence of the pro-enosis campaign among some sections of the Greek Cypriot population. As the prospect of an agreed solution has appeared to wane, the danger of a recurrence of violence has increased.

99. I remain convinced that the best way of achieving a solution to the Cyprus problem is through a negotiated agreement between the two communities on its constitutional aspects. On the other hand, I have come to the conclusion that the intercommunal talks in their present form have reached an impasse which cannot be overcome without some new impetus being given to them. Two considerations have led me to believe that it is possible to reactivate these talks. First, all the parties have agreed that the intercommunal talks should continue in modified form with a view to promoting the search for a solution of outstanding problems; and secondly, the discussions between the Governments of Greece and Turkey have recently led to joint efforts by them aimed at reactivating the intercommunal talks.

100. I have described above (see chapter V) my efforts, in consultation with the Foreign Ministers of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey - and later with the representatives to the intercommunal talks - to give these talks a new form which might serve to reactivate them and to facilitate progress. With this in mind I made a suggestion which, although it did not wholly satisfy two of the original parties, was calculated to take their various preoccupations enough into account to be acceptable to all. Initially, my suggestion was fully accepted by one of these parties, accepted only in part by another, and accepted with modifications by a third. One of the two parties to the intercommunal talks also accepted my suggestions with modifications, and the other party accepted them only in part. Discussions on this matter are proceeding. I still feel that my suggestion has merit, and I would hope that after further consideration by, and discussion with, the parties concerned, it might yet prove acceptable as a new starting-point for the intercommunal talks. If such an outcome is achieved, I shall, of course, inform the Security Council immediately.

101. In my last report to the Security Council I stated that "what is lacking, and needs to be restored, is the parties' mutual confidence in each other's good faith and ultimate political objectives" (S/10199, para. 82). Since that time we have seen one step forward in the field of mutual confidence, as evidenced by the joint efforts of Greece and Turkey to remove some of the obstacles to a peaceful and just settlement of the Cyprus problem. As I have previously indicated, the basis of such a settlement should be found in the concept of an independent, sovereign and unitary state with the adequate participation of the two communities.

102. It is no secret that two fears especially dominate the Cyprus problem - on the Greek Cypriot side the fear of partition and on the Turkish Cypriot side the fear of enosis. I know that both these concepts are deeply rooted in the history of the problem and that it is difficult for some of the parties concerned to disown them. The truth is, however, that if the apprehensions aroused by these two ideas could be laid to rest, a large cloud would cease to hang over all efforts to reach a settlement. It seems to me that if the Security Council were able in some way to assist the parties in dispelling the difficulties created by these two ideas and, in doing so, to reaffirm its own determination to ensure that a just settlement was reached in Cyprus within the principles of the Charter and the spirit and letter of its resolutions on the subject, a great improvement in the atmosphere of the talks and in the relations between the parties might result.

103. I should like here to add that it would seem to me to be appropriate, and indeed most desirable, at this juncture, when the United Nations has been involved in this problem for so many years, and with considerable expenditure both of effort and resources, that the Security Council should become more actively involved in assisting the parties in the search for a solution to the Cyprus problem. On some of the basic issues it seems to me that the Council's advice, guidance and new initiatives, of course with the agreement of the parties, would be a reassuring and constructive element in their efforts to reach a settlement. It would be, of course, for the Council itself to consider how best it might play such a role.

104. As the search for a solution of the Cyprus problem continues, it is essential that every effort be made to maintain quiet in the island. In view of the present tension in Cyprus, I have no alternative but to recommend an extension of the mandate of UNFICYP for a further period of six months, until

15 June 1972. The Government of Cyprus and the Governments of Greece and Turkey have conveyed to me their agreement with this recommendation.

105. In making this recommendation I must refer once again to the financial problem facing UNFICYP. I have become increasingly concerned because collective action has not yet resulted in the working out of sound and effective arrangements for the adequate financing of the Force. This concern is shared both by the Governments contributing troops to UNFICYP and by others who have supported it financially. The deficit, even after taking full account of contributions which are eventually expected to be paid, has reached the substantial sum of \$16.4 million. As a result, the United Nations is not able to pay, on anything approaching a current basis, the amounts it owes to Governments which have in good faith furnished contingents and incurred extra costs in connexion with the UNFICYP operation. This situation obviously must not continue. In this connexion, I understand that certain interested Governments are working together informally on methods to ensure the required financing on a more regular basis. I sincerely appreciate the efforts being made and hope that they will prove to be successful.

106. In the past I have repeatedly voiced my misgivings about the present method of financing by voluntary contributions. I feel strongly that the maintenance of international peace and security is a collective responsibility of the United Nations which must be shared by all its Members. In the case of UNFICYP, the financial burden has been borne by a limited number of Governments, including some States not Members of the Organization. Many Members of the United Nations, on the other hand, including some of those who have special responsibilities with regard to the United Nations action in Cyprus, have not contributed to UNFICYP or have omitted to do so for a long period of time. The present system of financing results in obvious inequities which seem difficult to reconcile with the spirit of the Charter. Compared with the consequences of a recurrence of fighting in Cyprus, the cost of maintaining UNFICYP is relatively small. In view of the important task entrusted to UNFICYP by the Security Council and the results it has achieved, it would seem appropriate that all Members of the United Nations should give it the modest support it requires.

107. In paragraph 87 of my last report, I observed that the prospect of an apparently indefinite commitment for the United Nations in Cyprus posed fundamental problems

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to the Organization in facing its responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security. I expressed the hope that members of the Security Council would give this problem the most serious consideration in the coming months and would give thought especially to constructive alternatives to the present arrangement. I have not put forward any suggestions on this score, as at the present time the possibility of such alternatives would depend on the outcome of the current efforts to reactivate the intercommunal talks and on the effect of such a development on the situation in the island. This matter will be kept under review.

108. This is the last report which it is incumbent upon me, as Secretary-General, to submit to the Security Council on the question of Cyprus. It will be one of my lasting regrets that I cannot report, in accordance with the Security Council's resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964, that there has been found "a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem confronting Cyprus, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, having in mind the well-being of the people of Cyprus as a whole and the preservation of international peace and security".

109. I remember well the hopes and expectations engendered by the unanimous adoption of the Council resolution of 4 March 1964. It provided both for a United Nations Peace-keeping Force and for mediation. The Force, intended to be of only the most temporary nature - indeed, three months - was "to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions". The mediator, in the meantime, was to "use his best endeavours with the representatives of the communities" and with the Governments concerned to achieve the peaceful solution and agreed settlement to which I have already referred. Not only did the mediation called for by the Security Council meet with no success, but it also proved impossible to resume the search for an agreed solution in full measure.

110. Thus the hopes and expectations of 1964 are yet to be fulfilled. After nearly eight years, the solution of the Cyprus problem is still not in sight, conditions in the island remain precarious and I have to come once more before the Security Council - in fact for the twentieth time - to recommend a further extension of the mandate of UNFICYP. It is obvious that this situation cannot continue


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indefinitely, to the detriment of the people of Cyprus and as a lingering threat to international peace and security.

111. Despite the difficulties involved, I am deeply convinced that, given the necessary goodwill, the Cyprus problem is capable of solution. It is my earnest hope that, in accordance with the principles of the Charter, the parties to this problem will soon find it possible, in the interest of the well-being of the people of Cyprus and the cause of international peace and security, to make those necessary compromises and accommodations without which no settlement can be achieved.

112. In concluding this report, I wish to express my deep appreciation to the Governments which have provided contingents and personnel for UNFICYP and to those which have made voluntary contributions for the support of the Operation. I also wish to pay tribute to my Special Representative, to the Force Commander and to all the officers and men of UNFICYP as well as its civilian staff. They have continued to carry out with exemplary efficiency and devotion the important task assigned to them by the Security Council.

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MAP NO. 1528 REV. 19
UNITED NATIONS
DECEMBER 1971

The boundaries shown on this map do not imply
official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

**DEPLOYMENT OF UNFICYP
DECEMBER 1971**

UNFICYP operational boundaries

SYMBOLS

- Airfield, airstrip
- Sovereign Base Area
- Contour line (in feet)
- District boundary
- Road
- UNFICYP operational boundaries

0 10 20 30
MILES

0 10 20 30
KILOMETRES