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EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE TO THE SUDAN

Summary of urgent humanitarian requirementsReport of the Secretary-General

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. Over the last few years, the Government of the Sudan has found it increasingly difficult to cope with the cumulative impact of ongoing or recurrent emergencies ranging from internal strife, floods, drought, widespread famine, locust depredations and influxes of refugees from neighbouring countries. These emergencies have created additional social and economic burdens for the Sudanese people who were already adversely affected by the depressed state of the country's economy.

2. In June 1988, with a view to addressing these difficulties, Mr. Sadiq El Mahdi, Prime Minister of the Sudan, requested the Secretary-General to alert the international community to the grave situation prevailing in his country and to appeal on his behalf for the emergency assistance needed to respond to the urgent requirements of the affected people. The Government also requested United Nations support in order to undertake a comprehensive review of the situation; to update data on the number, condition and background of the affected population; and to develop a comprehensive strategy leading to the early implementation of a programme of immediate emergency assistance.

3. In response to the Government's request, the Secretary-General, in July of 1988, sent a high-level mission to the Sudan under the leadership of the Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Questions, Regional Co-operation, Decolonisation and Trusteeship. The main objective of this mission was to set up a timetable and an operational framework to reach the above objectives. However, the advent of torrential rains and devastating floods in early August 1988 effectively paralysed Khartoum, the country's capital, until mid-September and wrought additional destruction in several parts of the country, notably in the northern provinces. The implementation of the agreed programme was thus delayed by two months.

4. In late September, a follow-up mission led by the Director of the Office for Emergencies in Africa and including headquarters representatives from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator (UNDRO) and the World Health Organization (WHO) arrived in Khartoum. The mission received the full support of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator, the World Food Programme (WFP) Director of Operations and the staff of UNDP and WFP offices. The mission was effectively supported by the in-country representatives of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and WHO.

5. Throughout its stay mission members worked closely with officials at all levels of the Government. Policy and operational problems were discussed thoroughly and operational solutions devised in frank discussions. Mission members travelled to all accessible parts of the country where large numbers of displaced people had been reported. These field visits included high-level government officials responsible for the handling of matters related to the displaced population.

6. The mission also co-operated closely, during its stay in the Sudan, with local representatives of donor Governments and with representatives of non-governmental organisations. In collaboration with the latter, a number of project proposals were elaborated.

7. The findings and recommendations of the mission were discussed fully with, and approved, by the Prime Minister before it left the country on 11 October 1988.

Action taken by the General Assembly

8. On 5 October 1988, the Permanent Representative of the Sudan in a letter to the Secretary-General (A/43/244), requested the inclusion in the agenda of the General Assembly of an item entitled "Emergency assistance to the Sudan". Annexed to the letter was an explanatory memorandum.

9. In response to that request, the General Assembly, on 18 October 1988, adopted resolution 43/8 on emergency assistance to the Sudan. In that resolution,

"The General Assembly,

"...

"2. Expresses its gratitude to the States, and intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations that rendered support and assistance to the Government of the Sudan in its relief and rehabilitation efforts;

"3. Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General for the steps he has taken to co-ordinate and mobilize relief and rehabilitation efforts;

"4. Calls upon all States to contribute generously and respond urgently and effectively to the needs of relief operations, rehabilitation and reconstruction;

"5. Requests the Secretary-General, in close co-operation with the Government of the Sudan, to co-ordinate efforts of the United Nations system to help the Sudan in its emergency, rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts, to mobilize resources for the implementation of those programmes, and to keep the international community informed of those needs;

"6. Also requests the Secretary-General to appraise the Economic and Social Council at its first regular session of 1989 on his efforts and to report to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session on the implementation of the present resolution."

10. The present report has been prepared in conformity with paragraph 5 of the resolution.

/...

II. BACKGROUND TO THE CURRENT CRISIS IN THE SUDAN

11. The immediate causes of the current deep-seated social and economic crisis affecting the Sudan include:

- (a) Civil strife in the south;
- (b) Heavy rains and flooding in the central and northern areas of the Nile basin that have devastated large parts of metropolitan Khartoum and the communities along the northern reaches of the Nile;
- (c) Large numbers of refugees seeking extended asylum within its national territory;
- (d) Pockets of drought and famine;
- (e) Locust depredations.

12. As a result of the above, a significant portion of the national population is considered severely affected in terms of nutrition, health, water and shelter requirements. It is also clear that the most affected are those who are least able to fend for themselves, i.e. those who have been displaced by war and low-income rural people who have been forced by drought to migrate to the Khartoum metropolitan area. Both groups have come to urban areas or to districts free from civil strife because they can no longer provide adequate food and shelter for their families in their areas of origin. Those who have only recently arrived in Khartoum, and are not yet integrated into the urban economy, have been doubly affected by the impact of the floods that struck the capital in August of this year.

A. The conflict in the south: the plight of the displaced

13. The renewed war in the south, which is now in its fifth year, has settled into a long-term, tragic conflict. Vast areas of the south have been devastated by both war and famine. Thousands of families have fled the hinterlands to seek food and safety in the towns protected by the Government. The principal cities of the South are now host to thousands of rural people living in spontaneous settlements and relief camps at the edge of the towns. Food supplies to these areas are marginal and tenuous, and in recent months many people unable to obtain food have begun to move northward.

14. The conflict has also intensified in areas along the borders between the country's northern and southern regions. Thousands of displaced people have fled northward from Bahr el-Ghazal province. Some have fled east to Ethiopia. The fighting does not affect southerners only. In recent months, the border towns of Kurmuk and Qessan in the Blue Nile Province were attacked and this resulted in the displacement of approximately 35,000 people who have now settled in and around Damazin.

15. As the situation in southern Sudan continues to deteriorate, the stream of people moving within the southern region, seeking the relative safety of government-held towns or travelling north has reached an estimated level of 200 families per day. Some authorities estimate that as much as 80 per cent of the population of southern Sudan may have been uprooted by the war and resulting famine, but it is impossible, at this stage, to check these estimates.

16. For a variety of reasons, it is clear that the most urgent emergency requirement is to support those persons who are fleeing from the conflict in the south in search of safe haven and food. Many have sought refuge in the Government-held towns in the southern region. Many others, after reaching the provinces of southern Darfur and southern Kordofan, have followed the railway northward from Wau and Aweil to Babanusa, stopping at Abyei, El Meiram, Muglad and Babanusa itself. Others have gone directly towards the southern administrative centres of these two provinces, and have concentrated in areas such as Safaha and zones south of Nyala in southern Darfur and in Kadugli in southern Kordofan.

17. The condition of the displaced as they first enter this transitional zone is appalling. The majority of those arriving in the camps are women and children; there are few men between the ages of 12 and 40. Many families have suffered personal attacks, family members have been separated and lost and most are in an extremely poor state of nutrition and health. There are large numbers of orphans or abandoned children above six years of age; few below six years of age have survived. Death rates among those who have arrived are alarmingly high, sometimes exceeding 10 in 1,000 per day for brief initial periods until food aid can be provided.

18. It is obvious that most people would prefer to remain in areas close to their homes if they felt safe and had access to food. However, owing to the lack of security and economic opportunity they are often forced northwards, in the ultimate hope of reaching Khartoum. It is therefore a strategy of the Government to find ways to settle people in safe areas as near as possible to their original homes where they can sit out the war or settle permanently, while leading productive lives and retaining the safety of their cultural environment and their kinship ties.

B. The recent floods

19. Towards the end of July and during August 1988, the central and northern Sudan experienced a series of extremely heavy rains. On the night of 4-5 August, the intensity of the rains reached an unprecedented scale. More water fell in one hour than fell over the city in the last two years. Over 80 per cent of the surface area of Khartoum was inundated. Approximately 200,000 houses and shelters were destroyed and many communities had to be temporarily abandoned. The waters flooded several hundred thousand open pit latrines, creating health hazards throughout the city. In many areas, the flood waters did not recede until late in September. Several late season rain storms hampered the drying process and reflooded a number of zones, destroying even more houses and hampering relief efforts.

20. The areas most seriously affected were the spontaneous, unplanned settlements at the outer fringes of the city, many of which had been established in low-lying areas. Whole communities were devastated with people losing not only their shelter, but most of their belongings. The predominant types of housing in the low-income areas were structures made of earthen materials - sun-dried mud bricks, rammed earth and various wattle and daub structures. In many of the zones where the displaced from the South had huddled, the structures were made of cartons and make-shift materials, few of which were able to withstand the wind and rain. The flood inflicted added destruction in the islands and the agricultural zones bordering the Nile in the northern region. Over 80 per cent of all farmland was inundated.

21. In late September, a FAO mission reviewed the situation and put together a number of project proposals designed to assist farmers to recover their productive capacity as quickly as possible and to exploit the potential of a high rainfall season. Many of the requests received are urgent, particularly those for the winter season in the northern region, where planting starts in mid-October. The vital inputs included seed, fertiliser, pumps and spare parts. In October, a large World Bank mission visited Khartoum to assess the socio-economic impact of the floods and to develop, with the Government, a programme for the reconstruction of the affected areas. The mission's report covers all main sectors and addresses, as well, the reconstruction needs of Khartoum. As the recommendations of the FAO and World Bank mission will be addressed in different contexts, and are not specifically related to urgent humanitarian requirements, they are not covered in this report.

C. The dimensions of the problem

22. The current emergency is believed to affect over 2 million people who are in urgent need of assistance, although not all are accessible. The population affected is estimated as follows:

<u>Area</u>	<u>Population</u>
Displaced people in northern Bahr el-Ghazal	250 000
Displaced people in the transitional zone	350 000
Displaced people in Upper Nile and Equatoria	250 000
Displaced people in Khartoum in unplanned settlements	950 000
Flood-affected people in Khartoum in the planned areas	250 000
People affected by flooding north of Khartoum	200 000
People affected by flooding in the eastern region	20 000
TOTAL	<u>2 270 000</u>

23. In addition, a considerable number of people are reported to have lost their homes to flooding in small settlements along the Blue Nile and Atbara rivers. The extent of damage from locust depredation is not yet known, but this is likely to cause additional hardship for a significant portion of the rural people. Altogether, there may be as many as 2.5 million people in urgent need of food, shelter and/or medical attention.

24. Defining who must be served is often complicated by the unavailability of accurate statistical data about the various populations. In no case has this been more difficult than in enumerating the displaced. As part of the preparation for the present appeal, a review of data concerning the location and number of the displaced who are accessible to relief assistance was carried out by the government services concerned, in co-operation with the United Nations technical team and non-governmental organisations. The findings are shown in the table on the following page.

Table 1. Estimated displaced population in the Sudan a/

<u>Province</u>	<u>Sites</u>	<u>Current displaced population fourth quarter 1988</u>	<u>Projected displaced population end 1989 b/</u>
S. Darfur	Paired settlements	17 000	35 000
S. Kordofan	Abyei El Meiram Muglad Babanusa El Tibbun Kadugli	52 000	85 000
N. Kordofan	El Obeid En Nahad	15 000	30 000
Central Provinces	Kosti/Kenana Damazin Wad Medani Sennar	100 000	150 000
Upper Nile	Malakal Renk	80 000	100 000
Bahr el-Ghazal	Aweil Wau	150 000	100 000
Equatoria	Juba Yei Torit	170 000	160 000
Khartoum	Khartoum Khartoum North Omdurman	<u>950 000</u>	<u>1 200 000</u>
TOTAL		<u>1 534 000</u>	<u>1 950 000</u>

a/ Limited to those that can be reached in towns, camps or settlements; exclusive of those self-settled in urban or rural areas.

b/ These estimates are intentionally conservative. As the situation evolves, the number of displaced people requiring assistance in 1989 could exceed the above projections.

III. RESPONSE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

25. Having examined the report of the Government and the inter-agency needs assessment mission, which forms the basis of the appeal document, 1/ the Secretary-General considers that the situation in the Sudan constitutes a complex emergency (see A/42/657, para. 10).

26. Accordingly, steps similar to those that were taken when complex emergencies occurred in other countries in Africa (Ethiopia; Mozambique; and the Sudan itself in 1985-1986) will be taken on his behalf in the Sudan. These will include:

- (a) In the field:
 - (i) The appointment of a Special Co-ordinator for Emergency Relief Operations;
 - (ii) The reactivation of the United Nations Emergency Operations Group, consisting of representatives of the United Nations, which had been set up originally at the time of the 1985-1986 famine;
 - (iii) The setting up in the Office of the Special Co-ordinator in Khartoum of an Emergency Operations Unit, consisting of international and local staff members;
- (b) At United Nations Headquarters:
 - (i) The Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Questions, Regional Co-operation, Decolonization and Trusteeship, assisted by the Director of the Office for Emergencies in Africa has been assigned the responsibility for facilitating, on behalf of the Secretary-General, the provision and co-ordination of emergency assistance to the Sudan. The Office for Emergencies in Africa will be assisted by the inter-agency African Emergency Task Force (A/41/683/Add.1, para. 9 (c)) and the Director will have day-to-day responsibility for co-ordination;
 - (ii) The Special Co-ordinator in the field will report to the Secretary-General through the Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Questions, Regional Co-operation, Decolonization and Trusteeship.

27. In accordance with paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 43/8, the appeal focuses primarily, as a first and urgent measure, on the emergency humanitarian requirements facing a large segment of the country's population. The present report is an abridgement of a comprehensive document on the emergency humanitarian requirements of the Sudan, which is under process and which will be made available to Member States in due course. Even in this limited context it is recognized that the appeal is not complete, for a number of reasons. In the first place, the situation in the Sudan is not static. Potentially serious complications such as the threat of massive locust depredations may result in the near future in radical revisions in the estimates of food aid requirements.

28. Given the short time available to the mission and the need to issue this appeal as soon as possible, it has not been possible to include within its scope all emergency and rehabilitation requirements that need rapid attention. For example, some specific resettlement programmes for displaced persons are under preparation and will require additional work before they can be presented to the donor community. These proposals will need to be addressed subsequently.

29. The main purpose of this appeal is, thus, to meet the most pressing emergency and humanitarian requirements of the displaced people of the Sudan. A response to this appeal will permit the Government of the Sudan to meet the urgent and, in some cases life saving, need of:

- (a) Displaced persons in the southern Sudan;
- (b) Displaced persons in the transitional zone between the southern and northern regions;
- (c) Those affected by floods in Khartoum;
- (d) Those affected by river flooding north of Khartoum, who have mainly shelter requirements.

30. There are many needs arising from the recent disasters that will require medium-term rehabilitation and reconstruction aid. Thousands of houses need to be rebuilt in Khartoum. Electrical, water, communications and road systems have to be rehabilitated and reconstructed in Khartoum and the other flood-affected cities. Additional boreholes need to be drilled and sanitation and hygiene programmes need to be instituted along with a wide range of community development and urban upgrading schemes to relieve the suffering of the urban poor. There are continuing requirements for assistance to refugee-impacted villages in the eastern regions of Sudan (A/43/523) and there are many communities in and around Khartoum in need of rehabilitation assistance.

31. However, as urgent as these needs are, they require a more balanced and comprehensive approach based on detailed studies and careful planning. Furthermore, while the problems addressed are urgent, they are not life-threatening. Thus, these requirements will be presented to the donor community in a related, follow-up appeal which will be made as soon as feasible. In this context, a Joint Working Group established under the leadership of the Commissioner of the Displaced of the Sudanese Government has already begun to work on the formulation of projects which stress the longer-term needs of the displaced. Other projects now under elaboration will be co-ordinated with the plans and programmes currently being developed to assist in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the affected areas, or to relieve the socio-economic pressure placed on several parts of the country by the presence of large numbers of refugees.

IV. POLICY STATEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT

32. In order to provide a comprehensive framework to guide the programme of assistance for the displaced, the Joint Working Group operating under the auspices of the Ministry of Social Welfare, Zakat and Displaced, has elaborated the policy framework presented below. This framework was reviewed and approved by Mr. Sadiq El Mahdi, Prime Minister of the Sudan, and the main body of the policy statement is reproduced in the following paragraphs:

"...

The Government's general policy for the displaced has three parts:

- (i) To provide for the basic needs of the displaced wherever they are throughout the country;
- (ii) To establish reception centres at interregional boundaries to help stem unchecked migration and to people as close as possible to their original homes; and
- (iii) To resettle the displaced in a participatory and voluntary fashion as close to their homes as possible.

The first two parts of the policy must be implemented immediately and simultaneously in order to satisfy urgent basic needs and to check migration. The effort to resettle people in a participatory manner will be implemented in the medium-term; however, planning for voluntary resettlement must be undertaken in the near future.

This policy is based on the following:

1. Immediate policy

- (a) Humanitarian considerations call upon us all to provide the displaced with their basic needs including shelter, food, health, education, security and a healthy environment.
- (b) Providing special health and medical services for the most vulnerable groups, i.e., the elderly, women and children.
- (c) Active involvement of the displaced in determining their own destiny, including preparation and implementation of plans and programmes for their settlement, as well as provision of essential services.
- (d) Providing the displaced with productive work opportunities, e.g., small farms and fisheries, and traditional crafts, particularly among the women to make them self-reliant and useful citizens as rapidly as possible. That, of course, would require providing them with seeds, fertiliser, appropriate agricultural tools and the expeditious allocation of arable land and other inputs for traditional crafts.

/...

- (e) Undertake studies and surveys to enumerate the displaced and categorize them on the basis of age, sex, qualifications, profession, etc., to enable the Government to provide them with work opportunities in line with their skills and aspirations.
- (f) Creating the proper social climate, providing the necessary security and improving living conditions of the displaced using a well-studied approach.
- (g) Upgrading some of the spontaneous camps established inside or outside residential areas to make them secure and suitable for living, having the basic services required. As for those who have settled spontaneously outside the camps, the Government will try to integrate them in the local communities, take care of them and strengthen the infrastructure and public services in those areas to cope with the increased population.
- (h) Establishment of reception centres at the interregional frontiers to care for the displaced so as to stop their movement to capitals and urban areas. This aims at helping them to stay close to their original areas, environment, and lifestyle they are accustomed to so that they may return once the cause for their displacement is removed. The areas selected for reception centres will also take into account existing labour shortages.
- (i) Raising public awareness of the problem of the displaced through regional and international fora with a view to mustering support to address their dilemma.
- (j) Learning from the experiences of other developing countries, particularly African countries.

2. Medium-term policy

Although the problem of the displaced is a Sudanese problem, the Government in the present circumstances and with its limited resources cannot provide solutions to this question without international assistance. The ideal solution to the problem of the displaced is their voluntary return to their areas of origin. To address this pressing problem, the Government intends to undertake the following:

- (a) Establish settlements in areas close to the original areas of the displaced and similar to them in climate and social environment with the proviso that these areas are void of tribal tensions and land disputes taking into account the possibility of utilising additional labour.
- (b) The settlements to be established are to be productive and will provide basic services as well as meet the needs of the displaced.
- (c) Every positive effort should be made to try to persuade the displaced to go back to their original regions or settle in areas close to them, and provide them with the assistance required to help them return or resettle.

3. The Government's policy towards international organisations and the non-governmental organisations

The problem of the displaced has been receiving special attention from the United Nations, regional and non-governmental organisations. In facing this problem, the Sudan welcomes the assistance that these organisations can offer, be it material or technical.

In order to achieve the utmost from this co-operation between the above organisations and the Government, it is necessary to unify communication channels and co-ordinate closely and constantly. All concerned Ministries are to monitor closely the work of these organisations and approve their programmes, activities and travel plans, in accordance with the Government's relevant policies, regulations and by-laws. Accordingly, non-governmental organisations working with the displaced fall under the direct supervision of the Ministry of Social Welfare, Zakat and Displaced, which in turn will co-ordinate with other Government bodies concerned.

V. OVERALL EMERGENCY STRATEGY FOR ASSISTANCE TO DISPLACED PERSONS

33. In order to alleviate the plight of people displaced by internal conflict, drought, flooding and severe economic crises, a co-ordinated attack must be made on the problems currently threatening the lives and well-being of the most affected. The following is a three-pronged approach focused on the geographic areas where the needs of the people are the most acute. The programme should be viewed as a first step in a long process, designed to meet most acute emergency needs on a priority basis and to lay the groundwork for future actions, programmes and activities that will expand assistance to other, but currently less critical, requirements. Implementation of this programme by the Government of the Sudan, working in close co-operation with the international donor community, can be seen as a demonstration of the Government's commitment to pursuing actively its newly elaborated policies on assistance to the displaced.

34. The interim programme recognizes that the ultimate solution is to remove the causes of displacement by establishing a lasting peace, thereby promoting development in areas most affected by war, drought and extreme poverty. It also recognizes that these efforts require inputs and close collaboration between the Government of the Sudan and the international community. The Government has stated that it resolved to facilitate that collaboration, and welcomes the support of both donors and non-governmental organizations.

35. The three elements of the interim programme are laid out in the following paragraphs.

A. The southern emergency relief programme

36. The main objectives of the programme are:

(a) To reduce the incidence of famine, starvation and disease throughout the south;

(b) To increase the support available to persons in situ so that they are not forced to migrate or undertake hazardous forays in search of food.

37. In order to increase food security, three established strategies will continue to be vigorously pursued, within the context of constantly evolving or shifting security constraints.

38. Firstly, supplies of food to the towns and administrative centres will be increased by:

(a) Resuming the dispatching of food convoys into the area from Uganda and Kordofan, as soon as conditions permit;

(b) Increasing the number of barge trains to cities along the Nile;

(c) Supporting the early start of airlifts either through the International Committee of the Red Cross or through other initiatives to points throughout the South, as a back-up option where road or rail transport is delayed. In this context, an airlift of 1,000 MT of grain from Entebbe to Juba is being mounted by WFP with donor financial support. Within the country, under the auspices of the RRC and with the financial and technical support of donors, current airlifts of some 2,500 MT of foodstuffs to Juba, Aweil and Abyei are being implemented. In addition, the option of airdrops into locations where no suitable airstrips are available will be closely examined.

39. Secondly, food reserves on the periphery of the South will be strengthened. In some areas, it may be possible to establish points on the periphery of the war-torn areas where starving people could go to collect food and take it back to their families.

40. Thirdly, efforts will be undertaken to establish food corridors so that increased tonnages of food can be delivered to designated distribution points in the South for distribution to families in the famine zones. This approach is being proposed by the ICRC in its plan to airlift emergency food aid to cities under the control of the Government and to other cities controlled by rebels. Should this initiative bear fruit, it should be extended as soon as possible to road, rail and river transport.

B. The transitional zone strategy

41. The overall objective for assistance in the transitional zone is to help the displaced to settle, or to sit out the conflict, in areas as close as possible to their original homes where they can lead productive lives and maintain their cultural and ethnic identity. The strategy has four components, as outlined below.

1. Increased security for the displaced in and around the transitional zone

42. The difficulties of recovering weapons from large numbers of civilians while the area is under the threat of war are manifest. As an interim and realistic step, the Government proposes first to strengthen its operational capacity and that of local governmental institutions in the area. This will be accomplished partly by assigning a senior-level team headed by an experienced emergency operations specialist in the centre of the troubled area and by establishing a forward operations base at Babanusa, in Southern Kordofan, from which to co-ordinate and support emergency response operations in both southern Darfur and southern Kordofan. This base will provide facilities to support the activities of various government organs in the area, as well as the related work of United Nations organisations and national and international non-governmental organisations. This base will become the focal point of an expanded administrative and logistics effort for relief operations in the area, and at the same time will permit greater command and co-ordination. The construction of the base will permit an expansion of humanitarian activities in the area and will facilitate their implementation by joint Government/non-governmental organization/United Nations teams. It is believed that this increased presence, in itself, will serve to curb the incidence of harassment of the displaced in some of the areas concerned and will contribute to a more rapid return to normalcy.

2. To increase assistance to the displaced in northern Bahr el-Ghazal

43. Efforts will be made to increase food security in and around Aweil and Wau to such an extent that food can trickle into the adjacent rural areas and help reduce localized deficits, thereby decreasing the need for migration.

3. Expansion of the paired settlement programme currently under implementation in southern Darfur

44. This innovative programme, initiated in southern Darfur by local authorities and a group of non-governmental organizations (MSF-B, Oxfam and SCF-UK), aims to establish settlements for the displaced in harmony with local villages, and to provide comprehensive assistance to both the displaced and the host communities in order to promote broader acceptance of the displaced within the host communities. Activities will include:

- (a) Upgrading of water systems;
- (b) Upgrading of basic social infrastructure e.g. schools and health clinics;
- (c) Improving agricultural development;
- (d) Reducing the likelihood of communicable diseases through improved supply of basic medicines to both communities;
- (e) Providing increased economic opportunities for both the displaced and residents of the host community.

45. The programme, which has begun in southern Darfur, will be replicated and expanded in southern Kordofan.

4. Exploration of the possibility of establishing new settlements in unpopulated areas or in the large, rainfed agricultural schemes or around Kosti

46. Since the resources do not presently exist to carry out massive new construction in these areas, detailed feasibility studies only will be carried out in the interim period and prepared for the follow-up appeal.

C. Khartoum programme

47. The recent floods have further underscored the vulnerability of the displaced communities residing in the metropolitan areas of Khartoum and other large cities. It is clear that the displaced and others living in unplanned or spontaneous settlements were the most affected. Furthermore, given the fact that they have the least access to resources and are living at the lowest levels of the economy, they will be the least economically able to cope with the disaster. This has been reflected in the rising malnutrition rates and the high incidence of diarrhoeal disease in the period since the floods occurred.

48. Recognising the hardships imposed on the displaced in Khartoum and other large cities, the Government is elaborating a strategy that will guide the reconstruction of the capital and make it possible for its inhabitants to have gradual access to an improved habitat. This urban reconstruction policy framework is currently under discussion with the specialists of the World Bank mission and has not as yet been finalised. The United Nations will address anew the problems of the urban displaced as soon as this framework is finalised.

49. In the interim, however, emergency programmes addressing supplementary feeding requirements, the provision of basic health care and assistance in the securing of drinking water will continue. The provision of some construction materials to some of the displaced families as well as those affected by the floods in the north of the country is also envisaged.

VI. EMERGENCY HUMANITARIAN REQUIREMENTS

50. Although the urgent needs of the Sudan are for various types of emergency assistance, the Government and the inter-agency needs assessment mission agreed that in order to provide a sound financial basis for the assistance requested, to facilitate its delivery, to clarify responsibilities for execution and to improve monitoring, emergency assistance should be delivered through clearly defined programmes or projects.

51. Accordingly, assistance from the international community is requested for the undertakings summarized below, which have a total cost of \$69,694,100. Full details of these projects, i.e. background, objectives, strategy for achieving the objective, duration, location, name of the implementing agency, description of the target population and details of the resources sought will be presented in the comprehensive report.

52. The programmes and projects are grouped into 10 categories, lettered (a) to (i).

<u>Category</u>	<u>Cost</u> \$US
(a) Strengthening governmental capacity in the transitional zone: construction of warehouses and provision of logistic support at the Babanusa base	6 316 000
(b) Assistance to the paired village schemes	5 000 000
(c) Food aid and logistics requirements	28 800 000
(d) Water and sanitation	7 238 000
(e) Relief and survival: shelter, blankets, cloth and utensils	12 344 400
(f) Health: drugs, immunization, nutrition and mother child health	4 036 100
(g) Agricultural assistance: seed, implements livestock	477 300
(h) Institutional support: strengthening of the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission and the Office of the Commissioner for the displaced (estimated)	2 400 000
(i) Emergency assistance through non-governmental organizations for water supply, medical assistance and feeding programmes	2 582 300
Total	<u>69 694 100</u>

Notes

1/ A comprehensive document on the emergency humanitarian requirements of the Sudan, based on the report of the inter-agency needs assessment mission, will be published shortly by the United Nations.
