



**United Nations**

# **Report of the Disarmament Commission for 2003**

**General Assembly  
Official Records  
Fifty-eighth Session  
Supplement No. 42 (A/58/42)**

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*Note*

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## I. Introduction

1. At its fifty-seventh session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 57/95 of 22 November 2002, entitled "Report of the Disarmament Commission", in which the Assembly, inter alia:

5. *Recommended* that the Disarmament Commission continue the consideration of the following items at its 2003 substantive session:

- (a) Ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament;
- (b) Practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms;

6. *Requested* the Disarmament Commission to meet for a period not exceeding three weeks during 2003, namely from 31 March to 17 April, and to submit a substantive report to the General Assembly at its fifty-eighth session.

2. The Disarmament Commission, meeting at United Nations Headquarters, on 17 October 2002 for its organizational session (A/CN.10/PV.250), considered questions related to the organization of work and substantive agenda items for its 2003 substantive session, in accordance with the adopted "Ways and means to enhance the functioning of the Disarmament Commission" (A/CN.10/137) and in the light of the draft resolution later adopted as resolution 57/95. The Commission took up the question of the election of its officers, taking into account the principle of rotation of the chairmanship among the geographic regions, as well as the decision adopted by the Disarmament Commission at its 2002 session reconfirming the officers of the Bureau who had been elected for the 2002 session and asking them to remain in office for the 2003 substantive session. The Commission considered the provisional agenda for the 2003 substantive session and decided to establish a committee of the whole and two working groups to deal with two substantive items on the agenda. The Commission also decided that its next substantive session would be held from 31 March to 17 April 2003.

## II. Organization and work of the 2003 substantive session

3. The Disarmament Commission met at Headquarters from 31 March to 17 April 2003. In the course of its session, the Commission held six plenary meetings (see A/CN.10/PV.251-256) under the chairmanship of Mario Maiolini (Italy). Timur Alasaniya, Senior Political Affairs Officer of the Disarmament and Decolonization Affairs Branch, Department for General Assembly and Conference Management, served as the Secretary of the Commission.

4. During the 2003 session, the Bureau of the Commission was constituted as follows:

*Chairman:*

Mario Maiolini (Italy)

*Vice-Chairmen:*

Representatives of Algeria, Belarus, Canada, Czech Republic, Guatemala, Kazakhstan, Nepal and Venezuela

*Rapporteur:*

Mehiedine El Kadiri (Morocco)

5. At its 250th plenary meeting, on 17 October 2002, the Commission adopted its provisional agenda (A/CN.10/L.53), which read as follows:

1. Opening of the session.
2. Adoption of the agenda.
3. Organization of work.
4. Ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament.
5. Practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms.
6. Report of the Disarmament Commission to the General Assembly at its fifty-eighth session.
7. Other business.

6. At the same meeting, the Commission approved the general programme of work for the session (A/CN.10/2003/CRP.1) and decided to allocate four meetings to a general exchange of views.

7. On 31 March and 1 April, the Disarmament Commission held a general exchange of views on all agenda items (A/CN.10/PV.251-254). The representatives of the following countries made statements during the general exchange of views: Algeria, Argentina, Belarus, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, Greece (on behalf of the European Union), the Holy See, India, Indonesia, on behalf of States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Japan, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Mongolia, Nigeria (on behalf of the Group of African States), Nepal, Pakistan, Peru, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, South Africa, the Syrian Arab Republic, Switzerland, Ukraine, the United States of America and Venezuela.

8. At its first meeting, on 31 March, the Commission heard the statement of the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Jayantha Dhanapala.

9. On 10 April the Commission held a meeting of the Committee of the Whole, during which a remaining organizational issue was finalized: one Vice-Chairman from the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States was elected by acclamation.

10. In accordance with the decisions taken at its organizational session, the Disarmament Commission entrusted Working Group I with the mandate of dealing with agenda item 4, "Ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament". Working Group I met under the chairmanship of Alaa Issa (Egypt) and held 11 meetings between 2 and 17 April.

11. The Commission entrusted Working Group II with the mandate of dealing with agenda item 5, "Practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms". Working Group II, which met under the chairmanship of Santiago Irazabal Mourao (Brazil), held 11 meetings between 2 and 17 April.

12. At its 255th plenary meeting, on 17 April, the Disarmament Commission considered the reports of Working Group I on agenda item 4 and of Working Group II on agenda item 5. The reports of the subsidiary bodies of the Commission



and the conclusions and recommendations contained therein are included in section IV of the present report.

13. In accordance with past practice of the Disarmament Commission, some non-governmental organizations (NGOs) attended the plenary meetings.

### **III. Documentation**

#### **A. Documents submitted by the Secretary-General**

14. Pursuant to paragraph 7 of General Assembly resolution 57/95, the Secretary-General, by a note dated 28 January 2003, transmitted to the Disarmament Commission the annual report of the Conference on Disarmament, together with all of the official records of the fifty-seventh session of the General Assembly relating to disarmament matters (A/CN.10/201).

#### **B. Other documents, including documents submitted by Member States**

15. In the course of the Commission's work, the following documents, dealing with substantive questions, were submitted:

(a) A working paper entitled "Ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament", submitted by the Chairman of Working Group I (A/CN.10/2003/WG.I/WP.1);

(b) A working paper entitled "Ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament", submitted by the Chairman of Working Group I (A/CN.10/2003/WG.I/WP.1/Rev.1);

(c) A working paper submitted by Greece on behalf of the European Union, with the acceding and associated countries aligning themselves, on chapter V of the Chairman's working paper (A/CN.10/2003/WG.I/WP.2);

(d) Proposal of the five Central Asian States, submitted by Uzbekistan on behalf of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, on paragraph 8 of annex II to the Chairman's working paper (A/CN.10/2003/WG.I/WP.3);

(e) Proposals of the Non-Aligned Group, submitted by Indonesia on behalf of States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Non-Aligned Movement, concerning chapters IV and V of the Chairman's working paper (A/CN.10/2003/WG.I/WP.4 and A/CN.10/2003/WG.I/WP.5);

(f) A working paper submitted by Pakistan entitled "Ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament" (A/CN.10/2003/WG.I/WP.6);

(g) Five conference room papers submitted by the Chairman of Working Group I (A/CN.10/2003/WG.I/CRP.1-5);

(h) Two papers, entitled "Chairman's Proposal", submitted to Working Group I;

(i) A working paper entitled “Practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms” submitted by the Chairman of Working Group II (A/CN.10/2003/WG.II/WP.1);

(j) A working paper, entitled “Practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms” submitted by Greece, on behalf of the European Union, with the acceding and associated countries aligning themselves (A/CN.10/2003/WG.II/WP.2);

(k) A number of consolidated working papers were also submitted by the Chairman of Working Group II.

#### **IV. Conclusions and recommendations**

16. At its 255th plenary meeting, on 17 April, the Disarmament Commission adopted by consensus the reports of its subsidiary bodies and the conclusions and recommendations contained therein regarding agenda items 4 and 5. The Commission agreed to submit the texts of those reports, which are reproduced below, to the General Assembly.

17. At the same meeting, the Commission adopted, as a whole, its report to be presented to the General Assembly at its fifty-eighth session.

18. The report of Working Group I reads as follows:

##### **Report of Working Group I on agenda item 4**

1. At its organizational session on 17 October 2002 and its 251st meeting on 31 March 2003, the Disarmament Commission adopted its agenda for the 2003 substantive session (A/CN.10/L.53), and decided to allocate to Working Group I agenda item 4, entitled “Ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament”.

2. In connection with its work, Working Group I had before it the following documents:

(a) Chairman’s paper (A/CN.10/2000/WG.I/WP.1);

(b) A working paper submitted by China (A/CN.10/2000/WG.I/WP.2);

(c) A working paper submitted by France on behalf of the European Union, as well as Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Turkey (A/CN.10/2000/WG.I/WP.3);

(d) A working paper submitted by the United States of America (A/CN.10/2000/WG.I/WP.4);

(e) A working paper submitted by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine (A/CN.10/2000/WG.I/WP.5);

(f) A Chairman’s paper (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1);

(g) Working paper submitted by Viet Nam, on behalf of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/ WP.2);

- (h) A working paper submitted by India (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.3);
- (i) The Chairman's paper (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.4)
- (j) A working paper submitted by Sweden, on behalf of the European Union, with the associated countries aligning themselves (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.5);
- (k) A working paper submitted by Nepal (A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.6);
- (l) The Chairman's paper (A/CN.10/2003/WG.I/WP.1);
- (m) The Chairman's paper (A/CN.10/2003/WG.I/WP.1/Rev.1);
- (n) A working paper submitted by Greece on behalf of the European Union, with the acceding and associated countries aligning themselves (A/CN.10/2003/WG.I/WP.2);
- (o) A working paper submitted by Uzbekistan, on behalf of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (A/CN.10/2003/WG.I/WP.3);
- (p) Two working papers submitted by Indonesia on behalf of States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Non-Aligned Movement (A/CN.10/2003/WG.I/WP.4 and WP.5);
- (q) A working paper submitted by Pakistan (A/CN.10/2003/WG.I/WP.6);
- (r) Two Chairman's proposals;
- (s) Five conference room papers (A/CN.10/2003/WG.I/CRP.1-5).

3. The Working Group met under the Chairmanship of Alaa Issa (Egypt), and held 12 meetings between 2 and 17 April 2003. The Chairman also conducted a number of informal consultations. Timur Alasaniya of the Disarmament and Decolonization Affairs Branch, Department for General Assembly and Conference Management, served as the Secretary of the Working Group. Mika Murakami and Randy Rydell of the Department for Disarmament Affairs served as advisers to the Working Group.

4. The first two meetings were devoted to general comments on the Chairman's paper entitled "Ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament", contained in A/CN.10/2003/WG.I/WP.1. As a result, at the third meeting the Chairman presented a revised document, A/CN.10/2003/WG.I/WP.1/Rev.1, which was subsequently used as a basis for the work of the Group.

5. In the course of its deliberations, the Working Group devoted eight meetings to general discussions, during which comments, concrete ideas and proposals were presented by delegations on all sections of the working paper. Based on those submissions, the Chairman prepared a number of conference room papers (see A/CN.10/2003/WG.I/CRP.1-5), as well as two papers, entitled "Chairman's proposal", on sections 1 to 3 and on the entire text, respectively, the latest version of which is attached to the present report. This version was discussed, but no consensus was achieved on Chairman's proposal.

6. At its 12th meeting, on 17 April, the Working Group considered and adopted by consensus its report on agenda item 4.

## **Attachment**

In accordance with paragraph 6 of the report of Working Group I, a paper, entitled “Chairman’s proposal” was submitted for consideration and discussed. The paper, reproduced below, does not command any consensus.

### **Chairman’s proposal**

#### **Ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament**

##### **I. The importance of nuclear disarmament and the interrelationship between nuclear disarmament and international peace, security and stability**

1. “The attainment of the objective of security, which is an inseparable element of peace, has always been one of the most profound aspirations of humanity. States have for a long time sought to maintain their security through the possession of arms ... Yet the accumulation of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, today constitutes much more a threat than a protection for the future of mankind.”<sup>1</sup>

2. The nuclear disarmament process is closely intertwined with international peace and security. Progress in measures to strengthen the security of States and to improve the international situation in general is essential for disarmament, including nuclear disarmament. Conversely, advancement in the process of disarmament will positively impact on the establishment of a peaceful, secure and stable international environment. It is therefore in the interest of all States to contribute to the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, whether on a unilateral basis or through bilateral, plurilateral, regional or multilateral arrangements.

3. The proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects is also a matter of universal concern. Measures to prevent nuclear proliferation in all its aspects, as well as the proliferation of other types of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, reinforce efforts for nuclear disarmament and are important in providing a positive international security environment for the advancement of nuclear disarmament. Similarly, progress in nuclear disarmament reinforces non-proliferation efforts. Furthermore, there is an interrelationship between nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and regional security situations.

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<sup>1</sup> Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly.

4. Through the years, the growing recognition by Governments of the threat posed by nuclear weapons to international peace and security and their interest in safeguarding the security of their people have led, inter alia, to the conclusion of a number of multilateral treaties providing for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, some of which have yet to enter into force.<sup>2</sup>

5. Recent developments have raised serious concern and presented significant challenges to international peace and security and to global disarmament efforts. They include the growing risk of terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons, which was highlighted after the tragic events of 11 September 2001 in the United States, as well as the updating of strategic defence doctrines in a manner that sets out new rationales for the use of nuclear weapons, and the risk of nuclear weapon proliferation. While appropriate measures will have to be envisaged in order to address the new risks and dangers that arise from such developments, it is worthwhile to recall that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

6. Success in the disarmament process also requires that all States strictly abide by the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and comply with all the provisions of Treaties and other legal instruments to which they are party, and refrain from actions which might adversely affect the pursuit of universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory efforts in the field of disarmament, including promoting adherence to relevant treaties and other legal instruments.

## **II. Achievements and current developments in nuclear disarmament**

7. The international community has remained seized of the question of nuclear disarmament as a priority of the United Nations and with the question of nuclear non-proliferation. While progress has been made in both these areas, the record has been mixed. Threats from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons persist and considerable uncertainty remains over the size of the existing nuclear arsenals and the availability of nuclear weapons materials. The present section outlines recent developments and achievements in the field of nuclear disarmament.

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<sup>2</sup> These treaties include: the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (Partial Test-Ban Treaty); the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty); the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (Seabed Treaty); the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Moon Treaty); the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco); the South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty (Rarotonga Treaty); the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok) and the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba).

**A. Achievements and developments at the unilateral, bilateral and plurilateral levels**

8. Progress has been made in reducing nuclear weapons and promoting non-proliferation through unilateral measures taken by the nuclear-weapon States. Progress has occurred for example in the following areas: the dismantlement of strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons, the reduction of nuclear forces in the status of alert, the withdrawal and dismantlement of delivery vehicles, withdrawal of nuclear weapons on a voluntary basis; the closing-down and dismantlement by some States of nuclear-weapon-related research and development facilities, nuclear testing sites and nuclear weapon related fissile material facilities, the elimination of medium and short-range missiles, the disposal of fissile material removed from military programmes and the withdrawal of nuclear weapons deployed outside their territories.

9. The nuclear-weapon States have also reaffirmed their commitment to United Nations Security Council resolution 984 (1995) on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT. In addition, one nuclear-weapon State has unconditionally forgone the first-use of nuclear weapons and the use or the threat to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

10. At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the nuclear-weapon States issued a joint declaration in which they declared that none of their nuclear weapons are targeted at any State. The nuclear-weapon States also committed themselves to placing, as soon as practicable, fissile materials designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or other relevant international verification arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes. In this connection, they have launched a number of initiatives to provide for the safe and effective management and disposition of such materials.

11. Moratoria on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions have been declared and remain in effect.

12. The United States and the Russian Federation concluded the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (the Moscow Treaty), which aims to reduce and limit strategic nuclear warheads. The General Assembly welcomed this Treaty and recognized its role in helping to establish more favourable conditions for actively promoting security and cooperation and enhancing international stability.<sup>3</sup> Those reductions, however, are not to be seen as a substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons. Additional bilateral efforts have addressed the management and disposition of fissile material for their production.

13. Other relevant developments include: the Final Declaration adopted at the thirteenth summit of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries in February 2003; the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction; the New Agenda Coalition's initiative, "Towards a Nuclear

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<sup>3</sup> Resolution 57/68.

Weapon Free World: the Need for a New Agenda”; as well as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s “Alliance’s Strategic Concept”.

**B. Achievements and developments at the regional level**

14. The important contribution of nuclear-weapon-free zones to the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the process of nuclear disarmament, as well as to regional and world peace and security has been universally recognized. To date, numerous States have signed or become parties to treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones covering more than 50 per cent of the Earth’s land mass.

15. The importance of nuclear-weapon-free zones has been given added recognition through the work of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. In 1993 and 1999, the Commission unanimously adopted guidelines and recommendations relating to such zones. The Commission noted that the Antarctic Treaty established the first continental demilitarized zone. The treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba have contributed towards the achievement of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament objectives and towards keeping the areas covered by those treaties free of nuclear weapons, in accordance with international law.

16. The General Assembly has, since 1980, annually adopted by consensus a resolution on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East as well as resolutions on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia since 1997, and has also recognized the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia.

**C. Achievements and developments at the multilateral level**

17. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), entered into force in 1970 and has been signed by a total of 188 States parties. The outcome of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference consisted of decisions on “Strengthening the review process for the Treaty”, on “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament” and on “Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” and one resolution entitled “Resolution on the Middle East”. At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, States parties adopted a Final Document by consensus. In particular, States parties agreed on practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Treaty.

18. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), adopted by the General Assembly on 10 September 1996, has been signed by 167 States and ratified by 98 States, including three nuclear-weapon States. Thirteen States whose adherence is required for entry into force of the Treaty have yet to ratify it. Two conferences of ratifying States have been held in 1999 and 2001, to consider measures to accelerate the ratification process and to facilitate the entry into force of the Treaty. Final declarations were adopted at both Conferences, and a joint ministerial declaration was issued by 15 Foreign Ministers in September 2002.

19. The Conference on Disarmament agreed in 1998 on a mandate for the negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and

effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Since 1999, the Conference on Disarmament has not made any progress due to a lack of agreement on its substantive programme of work.

20. Other developments include the tenth special session of the General Assembly, the first devoted to disarmament, which agreed that nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization and that effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority; the Millennium Summit, held from 6 to 8 September 2000, which resolved to strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, and to keep all options open for achieving that aim, including the possibility of convening an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers; as well as the Security Council summit meeting in 1992 which reaffirmed the crucial contributions of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation to international peace and security and underlined the need for all Member States to fulfil their obligations in these areas, and further stressed that the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constituted a threat to international peace and security.

### **III. Mechanisms dealing with nuclear disarmament and the role of the United Nations**

21. To give effect and provide support to their efforts in the field of disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament, Governments have created relevant mechanisms and machinery within and outside the United Nations. They have also, within the framework of specific multilateral agreements, established organizations mandated to implement and contribute to the strengthening of those agreements. The present section provides a brief survey of these existing mechanisms.

#### **A. Mechanisms dealing with nuclear disarmament within the United Nations system**

22. The General Assembly of the United Nations devotes special attention to the issue of disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, through the work of its First Committee, as well as the Disarmament Commission. In addition, the General Assembly has held three special sessions entirely devoted to disarmament, namely, in 1978, 1982 and 1988, addressing issues that included nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, peace, security and stability.

23. The Disarmament Commission, a subsidiary body of the General Assembly, is a deliberative body with the function of considering and making recommendations on various issues in the field of disarmament.

24. The Department for Disarmament Affairs facilitates the process of multilateral deliberation and negotiation and assists Member States in promoting, strengthening and consolidating multilaterally negotiated principles and norms in all areas of disarmament. It also provides support to conferences and meetings of States parties to multilateral disarmament agreements and supports the effective implementation of those treaties.



25. The Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters advises the Secretary-General on matters within the area of arms limitation and disarmament, to serve as the Board of Trustees of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and to advise the Secretary-General on the implementation of the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme.

26. UNIDIR undertakes independent research on disarmament and related problems, particularly international security issues. UNIDIR is mandated to provide the international community with more diversified and complete data on problems relating to international security, the arms race and disarmament.

#### **B. Other mechanisms dealing with nuclear disarmament**

27. The Conference on Disarmament was established in 1979 as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. The Conference has several nuclear disarmament related items on its agenda. During the past decade, it undertook negotiations on the comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

28. IAEA seeks to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world, and to ensure, through its safeguards, that nuclear materials or technology are not used to further any military purpose. To this end, the IAEA is the competent authority responsible for verifying compliance relating to its safeguards agreements with the States parties to the Treaties of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga as well as the NPT, whose States parties reaffirmed in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference that nothing should be done to undermine the IAEA's authority in this regard.

29. The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization is mandated to carry out the necessary preparations for the effective implementation of the CTBT and to prepare for the first session of the Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty.

30. The Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) oversees the implementation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation is responsible for a reporting system and for the exchange of information among the States parties to the Rarotonga Treaty. The Commission for the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone is responsible for implementing the provisions of the Treaty of Bangkok, including the establishment of verification and control procedures.

#### **IV. Conclusions**

31. During the course of their deliberations, members of the Disarmament Commission discussed proposals on ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament. A list of these proposals is contained in the annex to the present document. This list does not accord any priority to nor constitute an endorsement of any of the proposals by the Disarmament Commission. It is offered without prejudice to the national positions of Member States of the Commission.

32. The Commission endorses a principled, forward-looking approach, taking into account the reality on the ground, to nuclear disarmament and agrees on the importance of producing concrete, timely and practical results that promote nuclear disarmament. In this regard the Commission has endorsed the following general principles:

- (i) The ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The highest priority should continue to be the total elimination of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosives;
- (ii) The political will of States and the principle of undiminished security for all are key elements in achieving nuclear disarmament;
- (iii) Multilateralism is a fundamental principle in negotiations of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects. The potential value of unilateral, bilateral, regional and plurilateral initiatives that are consistent with these ends is also recognized;
- (iv) The importance of full and effective implementation by all States Parties to the NPT of their obligations pursuant to the Treaty and the decisions and resolution of the 1995 Review Conference and the Final Document adopted at the 2000 Review Conference;
- (v) Adherence to and full compliance with treaties and other international legal instruments, by their States Parties, in the areas of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects should be promoted;
- (vi) All appropriate measures consistent with international law aimed at preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons and the means to manufacture such weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction, including the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities, should be strengthened;
- (vii) The United Nations disarmament machinery should play an effective role in promoting the achievement of nuclear disarmament. The Member States affirm the important value of the Disarmament Commission as an appropriate United Nations forum, among others, for future multilateral deliberations on disarmament and means to achieve nuclear disarmament;
- (viii) The urgency of recommencing substantive work in the Conference on Disarmament, the international community's single multilateral negotiating forum for disarmament.

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## Annex

### **Proposals for possible ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament**

1. Universal adherence to and compliance by States parties with treaties and other legal instruments in the area of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.
2. Fulfilment of the unequivocal undertaking in accordance with Article VI of the NPT treaty to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear arsenals, leading to nuclear disarmament.
3. Commitment of States to eliminate the concept of international security based on promoting and developing military alliances and policies of nuclear deterrence.
4. The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.
5. Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament.
6. The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.
7. Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally.
8. Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.
9. Entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, without delay and without conditions, in accordance with constitutional processes and the provisions of the Treaty, and a moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending the entry into force of the Treaty.
10. The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.
11. Commitment by the nuclear-weapon States to withdraw and not to deploy their nuclear weapons outside their national territories.
12. Commitment by the nuclear-weapon States to stop the qualitative improvement, development, production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems including with a view to the use of nuclear weapons in the scenario of conventional warfare.
13. Progress by the nuclear-weapon States towards the removal of the first-use posture from security doctrines and to eventual agreement on an internationally and legally binding instrument on the joint undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

14. Achievement of a multilateral and legally binding instrument on negative security assurances within the framework of the NPT and pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
15. The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process.
16. Conclusion of IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements and Model Additional Protocol agreements.
17. The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency.
18. Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes.
19. The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives.
20. Agreement in the Conference on Disarmament on a programme of work which includes the establishment of:
  - (a) An ad hoc committee to immediately commence negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices with a view to their conclusion within five years.
  - (b) An ad hoc committee to immediately commence negotiations on nuclear disarmament.
  - (c) An ad hoc committee to negotiate on negative security assurances.
  - (d) An ad hoc committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, with a view to negotiating a relevant international legal instrument.
21. Commencement of multilateral negotiations leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination within a specified framework of time.
22. Strengthening of the existing nuclear-weapon-free zones and establishment of new nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned.
23. Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

24. An international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers as recommended by heads of State and Government of the States Members of the United Nations in the Millennium Declaration.
25. Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons.
26. Regular reports, within the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty strengthened review process, by all States parties to the Treaty on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", and recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996".
27. Moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, pending the commencement of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.
28. Development and consolidation of measures to prevent the illicit transfer of nuclear and radioactive materials, through, inter alia, the relevant amendments of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, as well as the effective enforcement and strengthening of export control systems at the global, regional and national levels.
29. Strengthening measures, aimed at preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and materials and technologies related to their manufacture, including, inter alia, resolving outstanding issues related to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism with a view to its speedy adoption, bearing in mind that the most effective way of preventing terrorists from acquiring such weapons is to eliminate them.
30. Implementation of the NPT, by the States parties to the Treaty, and of the decisions and the resolution adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, as well as implementation of the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference.
31. Cessation and reversal of the nuclear arms race with a view to achieving nuclear disarmament.
32. Commitment by all States to legally binding instruments on nuclear arms reduction with provisions ensuring irreversibility, verification and transparency.
33. Signature and ratification of the Pelindaba Treaty by all regional States, as well as the signature and ratification by the nuclear-weapon States that have not yet done so of the relevant protocol recognizing that security assurances are available to States parties to the Treaty.
34. Continuing consultations between ASEAN and the nuclear-weapon States (NWS) on the Protocol of the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone to enable the NWS to become parties to the Protocol of the Treaty of Bangkok as soon as possible.

19. The report of Working Group II reads as follows:

### **Report of Working Group II on agenda item 5**

1. At its 2002 organizational session (250th meeting) on 17 October 2002 and its 251st meeting on 31 March 2003, the Disarmament Commission adopted its agenda for the 2003 substantive session (A/CN.10/L.53), and decided to allocate to Working Group II agenda item 5 entitled “Practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms”.

2. The Working Group, under the chairmanship of Santiago Irazabal Mourao (Brazil), held 12 meetings between 2 and 17 April. Saijin Zhang, assisted by Tam Chung, of the Disarmament and Decolonization Affairs Branch, Department for General Assembly and Conference Management, served as the Secretary of the Working Group, and Nazir Kamal of the Department for Disarmament Affairs served as an adviser to the Working Group.

3. Based on the intersessional informal consultations, the Chairman submitted a working paper (A/CN.10/2003/WG.II/WP.1). In this connection a working paper was also submitted by Greece, on behalf of the European Union, with the acceding and the associated countries aligning themselves (see A/CN.10/2003/WG.II/WP.2).

4. At its first meeting, Working Group II agreed to take up the Chairman’s working paper as a basis for discussion, and commented on the structure of the paper. From its second meeting, the Working Group started to engage in substantive discussion and consultations on the Chairman’s working paper. During this period, written and oral proposals were made by delegations. As a result, the Chairman submitted four revisions of his paper.

5. At its 12th meeting, on 17 April, the Working Group considered the latest version of the Chairman’s paper, but was unable to reach consensus on it, and decided to attach to this report the Chairman’s consolidated working paper (Rev.4), entitled “Practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons”.

6. At the same meeting, on 17 April, the Working Group considered and adopted by consensus its report on agenda item 5.

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## Attachment

### Chairman's consolidated working paper, Rev.4

#### I. Introduction

1. The Working Group was entrusted with the task of dealing with "Practical confidence-building measures (CBMs) in the field of conventional arms". The references to confidence-building measures made by the Working Group are neither mandatory nor prescriptive.

2. The ultimate goals of CBMs, in the field of conventional arms, are to strengthen international peace and security, to improve relations among States, to promote the social, economic and cultural well-being of their peoples, and to contribute to the prevention of war. Its objectives are to reduce and even eliminate the dangers of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities, to help prevent military confrontation as well as covert preparations for the commencement of armed conflict, to reduce the risk of surprise attacks and of the outbreak of armed conflict by accident. By doing so, CBMs, in the field of conventional arms, adopted at different levels, complement each other and contribute to strengthening peace, security and stability at all levels. CBMs, in the field of conventional arms, by promoting increased transparency among States, can also play an important role in crisis management and post-conflict situations.

3. New non-military CBMs, in the field of conventional arms, and transparency measures help to overcome threats to international peace and security and confront the threats, concerns, and other challenges of the twenty-first century. By promoting transparency, dialogue, cooperation and trust, such CBMs in the field of conventional arms will bolster international security by improving coordinated, multilateral responses to problems in areas such as law enforcement, public health, eradication of poverty and economic and environmental policy.

4. Regional and global approaches to CBMs in the field of conventional arms are complementary and interrelated. CBMs, in the field of conventional arms, adopted at different levels can jointly contribute to strengthening peace, security, and stability. The relationship between the development of CBMs, in the field of conventional arms, and the international security environment can also be mutually reinforcing. The consolidation of mutual confidence at the bilateral, subregional and regional level has contributed positively to efforts undertaken with the aim of overcoming traditional threats and new security challenges.

5. States need a peaceful, stable, conducive and cooperative environment in which international relations are governed by international law, so that optimal conditions are created for relations with other States, thereby promoting the social, economic and cultural well-being of their peoples. Compliance with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations is an essential prerequisite in fostering such environment. Mutual security can bring about positive changes in relations among States.

6. By helping to create a climate in which the importance of the military dimension is gradually diminished, CBMs could facilitate and promote the process of arms limitation and disarmament, specially at regional and subregional levels. Given the enhanced awareness of the importance of compliance with arms limitation and conventional disarmament agreements, CBMs may also serve the additional objective of facilitating their verification.

7. Willingness to enhance international peace and security is essential for building confidence. The relationship between the development of CBMs in the field of conventional arms and a peaceful international environment are mutually reinforcing and complementary. Therefore, States should establish a security concept centred on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation and the settlement of disputes through dialogue, and never use or threaten to use force against other countries, inconsistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter, under any pretext.

8. A better relationship between States in the political, diplomatic, economic, military, institutional, cultural, educational, social and other fields, with broad participation of all sectors of the society generates confidence based on shared interests in a common future, characterized by mutual respect for sovereign equality of States and justice, based on international law. In this context CBMs, in the field of conventional arms, play a key role, whose efficiency would be improved if they were part of a broader integrated approach involving economic, environmental, cultural, and social policies.

9. Significant progress has been made in the field of CBMs and important work has been done and continues to be developed at different regional and subregional levels and in multiple forums. The United Nations has an important role to play in the field of CBMs.

10. CBMs, in the field of conventional arms, depend, ultimately, on the concrete security conditions and other interrelated aspects existing in a country, region or subregion.

10 bis. There is a need to devote greater attention to the threat to global and regional peace and stability posed by the expansion, proliferation and increasing sophistication of conventional weapons. The widening gap of technological capabilities and the size of military budgets between the rich and poor, the big and smaller nations, is leading to imbalance in conventional force capabilities at international and regional levels, specially regions simmering with tensions.

Alternative 10 bis. There is a need to devote greater attention to the threat to global and regional peace and stability posed by the expansion, proliferation and increasing sophistication of conventional weapons, that may lead to imbalance in conventional force capabilities at regional levels, specially in regions simmering with tensions.

## **II. Scope**

11. CBMs' potential for creating favourable conditions for progress in the conventional disarmament field should be fully utilized in all regions of the



world, insofar as they may facilitate and do not impair in any way the adoption of disarmament measures.

12. Disarmament measures can make a fundamental contribution to the prevention of war and should be taken into account when implementing confidence-building measures. In this regard, effective disarmament and arms limitation measures, which directly limit or reduce military potential, have high confidence-building value.

13. CBMs can be adopted in various forms, reflecting a set of interrelated factors of military as well as a non-military character, as agreed upon in section 1.3 of document A/51/182/Rev.1 of 9 June 1999. They can be agreed upon with the intention of creating legally binding obligations, in which case they represent international law among parties. They can, however, also be agreed upon through political commitments. The consistent and uniform implementation of such a political commitment over a substantial period of time may lead to the development of an obligation under customary international law.

14. Measures to build confidence must be tailored to specific situations. The effectiveness of a concrete measure will increase the more it is adjusted to the specific perceptions of threat or the requirements of a given situation or a particular region.

15. The confidence-building process can be facilitated, inter alia, by the rule of law and good governance at national and international levels, accountability and transparency based on the respect of international law, increased international financial and technical cooperation for development, and renewed effort for resource mobilization to facilitate the confidence-building process. Openness and cooperation in military matters can, as appropriate, enhance confidence and contribute to reducing regional and international tensions, thereby promoting international peace and security. It would also reduce uncertainty and unpredictability as well as reinforce the peaceful declarations and intentions of States.

16. Regional CBMs should be adopted on the initiative and with agreement of the State of the region concerned. In considering the adoption of regional CBMs countries should fully take into account the specific political, military and other conditions prevailing in that region.

17. The implementation of CBMs should take place in such a manner as to ensure the right of each State to undiminished security, guaranteeing that no individual State or group of States obtains advantages over others at any stage of the confidence-building process.

18. The building of confidence is a dynamic process. Experience and trust gained from the implementation of voluntary and militarily less significant measures can facilitate agreement on more beneficial measures. Whilst in a specific situation the implementation of far-reaching arrangements at an early stage might be attainable, it would normally appear that a gradual step-by-step process is more feasible.

### III. Principles

19. Practical CBMs in the field of conventional arms must fully respect all the purposes and principles of the Charter. In particular, the following principles enshrined in the Charter must be strictly observed: refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State; non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States; peaceful settlement of disputes; the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples; compliance in good faith with international agreements; and the sovereign equality of States.

20. Confidence-building requires consensus among the States participating in the process. States, in the exercise of their sovereign right should decide freely whether a confidence-building process is to be initiated and, if so, which measures are to be taken and how the process is to be pursued.

21. CBMs, in the field of conventional arms, by their nature, cannot be imposed, and therefore must be developed and agreed on a voluntary basis. CBMs, in the field of conventional arms, can be developed at different levels: unilateral, bilateral, subregional, regional and multilateral. Reciprocity can be an important aspect of CBMs, in the field of conventional arms.

22. CBMs, in the field of conventional arms, should be developed at a pace with which those States participating in the process are comfortable. Implementation of CBMs, in the field of conventional arms, once agreed should be carried out in good faith according to the terms agreed among the parties.

23. The relevant principles contained in guidelines previously adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission are also applicable, as under:

- Paragraph 8 of the “Guidelines on conventional arms control/limitation and disarmament, with particular emphasis on consolidation of peace in the context of General Assembly resolution 51/45 N”, adopted in 1999;
- Paragraph 14 of the “Guidelines for international arms transfers in the context of General Assembly resolution 46/36 H of 6 December 1991”, adopted in 1996;
- Paragraphs 9 to 31 of the “Guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security”, adopted in 1993;
- Paragraph 21 of the “Guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level”, adopted in 1988;
- Guidelines and recommendations for objective information on military matters (1992).

#### IV. Existing practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms

24. Following is an illustrative, non-exhaustive list of confidence-building measures voluntarily implemented at different levels in a number of regions. Building confidence is a dynamic, evolutionary process. The examples given below do not therefore necessarily lend themselves, in part or in whole, to automatic application or replication at the unilateral, bilateral, subregional, regional or universal level:

(a) Measures and guidelines as adopted by the General Assembly:

- United Nations standardized system of reporting on military expenditures (1980);<sup>4</sup>
- United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (1991);<sup>5</sup>
- Guidelines and recommendations for objective information on military matters (1992);<sup>6</sup>
- United Nations Programme of Action on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, adopted in 2001;
- United Nations Study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education;
- Dialogue Among Civilizations;

(b) Measures developed and implemented at certain regional, subregional, bilateral, unilateral levels:

- *Confidence-building measures in the political, military, economic, social, environmental and cultural fields; such as:*
  - (a) Information-sharing among law enforcement agencies in sensitive or disputed border areas, joint border and customs control activities;
  - (b) Adherence to relevant United Nations resolutions and guidelines in the field of conventional arms;
  - (c) National legislation and administrative regulations on arms export, import, transit, re-export and diversion;
  - (d) Providing information to the United Nations Secretary-General regarding destruction programmes of surplus, confiscated or collected weapons;
  - (e) Joint actions of armed forces in civilian emergency situations, including cooperation programmes in the event of natural disasters or to prevent such disasters, based on the request and authorization of the affected States and joint activities for sea rescue and in sea mine clearance;
  - (f) Consultations on limitation and control of conventional weapons;

<sup>4</sup> See resolution 35/142 B.

<sup>5</sup> See resolution 46/36 L.

<sup>6</sup> See document A/47/42.

- (g) Promotion of adherence to and universality of global legal instruments dealing with conventional arms, as well as regional, subregional and bilateral Conventions and/or Agreements that are already in place;
- (h) Identification and carrying out of activities and common projects to promote economic, social and cultural cooperation among neighbouring countries along their border;
- (i) Creation of joint border committees and joint committees of cooperation between States;
- (j) Establishment of demilitarized zones or of zones of peace;
- (k) Increased security and cooperation to face and combat threats like narcotraffic, terrorism, illicit traffic of arms, international or transnational organized crime, piracy and armed robbery at sea, etc.;
- (l) Measures against poverty in the context of addressing the causes of conflict;
- (m) Development and adoption of a standardized methodology for defence expenditures measurement;
- (n) Naval CBMs;
- (o) No armed forces deployed by either side in the border areas shall be used to attack the other side, or engage in military activities that threaten the other side or undermine peace, tranquillity and stability in the border areas;
- (p) Reducing or limiting military forces in the border areas to a minimum level compatible with friendly and good-neighbourly relations and consistent with the principle of mutual and equal security;
- (q) Reduction, limitation and decision on ceilings on military forces and armaments to be kept by each side in the border areas;
- (r) No military exercises of specified levels shall be held in mutually identified zones limiting the scale, scope and number of military exercises in the border areas;
- (s) Cooperation in marine environmental protection and marine scientific research;
- (t) Cooperation in safety of navigation and communication at sea and in search and rescue operation;
- (u) Sport competitions between military athletes;
- *Exchange of information on armed forces and on military activities, such as:*
  - (a) Organization structure, size and composition of armed forces;
  - (b) Plans for the deployment of major weapon and equipment systems;

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- (c) Military disengagement to avoid conflict and ease tension;
  - (d) Exchange of data on the military forces and armaments;
  - *Dissemination of militarily relevant information, for example, on:*
    - (a) Arms transfers;
    - (b) Military budgets;
    - (c) Defence policy papers, statements, defence white papers;
    - (d) Defence doctrine, planning and expenditures;
  - *Notification, observations and visits to military facilities and activities, such as:*
    - (a) Prior notification should be given to the other side if such a military exercise is to be held with regard to type, level, planned duration and area of exercise as well as the number and type of units and formations participating in the military exercise;
    - (b) Gradual adoption of agreements regarding advance notification of military exercises;
    - (c) Visits to military bases and/or installations;
  - *Regional seminars on security issues, involving the participation of civilians and military personnel, such as:*
    - (a) Military doctrines;
    - (b) Security policy;
    - (c) Regional security perceptions;
    - (d) Confidence-building and security measures;
    - (e) Illegal arms traffic;
    - (f) Transfers of conventional arms;
    - (g) Laws of armed conflict;
    - (h) Defence conversion;
    - (i) Defence language school;
    - (j) Military medicine;
    - (k) "Track two meetings";
    - (l) Verification, disarmament and arms limitation, in the field of conventional weapons;
  - *Establishment of effective communications between military and political authorities of different States, for example on:*
    - (a) Mechanisms for consultation and joint efforts to deal with unusual military activities or hazardous incidents of military nature (including hotlines);

- (b) Development and establishment of communications among civilians or military authorities of neighbouring countries in accordance with their border situation;
- *Establishment of regional security institutions charged with facilitating a variety of tasks affecting the security of States in a region, such as:*
  - (a) Conflict prevention;
  - (b) Arms control;
  - (c) Elimination of illegal arms traffic;
  - (d) Contacts and exchanges among military officials, including heads of defence universities, colleges and institutions;
  - (e) Education for peace programmes;
  - (f) Arrangements for observing routine operations and exchange of civilian and military personnel for regular and advanced training;
  - (g) Exchange of advisory and financial assistance in safeguarding and improving control of surplus or obsolete weapons stockpiles, in particular small arms and light weapons storage facilities;
  - (h) Joint training for peacekeeping operations;
- *Politico-military aspects of regional security:*
  - (a) Effective control over armed forces by constitutionally established authorities vested with democratic legitimacy;
  - (b) Legislative approval of military expenditures;
  - (c) Instruction of armed forces personnel in international humanitarian law and rules governing armed conflict;
  - (d) Transparency and public access to information related to the armed forces.

## V. The way ahead

25. The Working Group reaffirms the importance of CBMs to enhance stability, improve relations among States, promote the social, economic and cultural well-being of their peoples, contribute to the prevention of war, and create favourable conditions for progress in disarmament. CBMs should be utilized wherever feasible and the confidence-building process at all levels should be further strengthened by the broadening and reinforcing of CBMs already implemented. The Working Group recognizes also that the United Nations can contribute to enhancing the effectiveness of CBMs by promoting complementarity between subregional, regional and global approaches as well as by establishing effective liaison and cooperation, with relevant subregional and regional bodies. The following measures could also be considered as possible ways to strengthen and improve confidence among States:

- (a) Global/universal

- The consideration of adherence to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocols, in particular the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition;
  - National and international efforts for conflict prevention, as an instrument, among others, for promoting sustainable development, as both activities are mutually reinforcing;
  - The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice;
  - The General Assembly in its resolution 46/36 L of 1991, on “Transparency in Armaments” requested the Conference on Disarmament to address the problem of, and the elaboration of practical means to increase, openness and transparency related to high technology with military application and to weapons of mass destruction, in accordance with existing legal instruments;
  - An expanded United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, as envisaged in General Assembly resolution 46/36 L;
  - The consideration of adherence by countries that produce or export landmines to the Ottawa Convention or to the Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Arms;
  - When negotiating multilateral agreements in the field of conventional weapons, the utmost shall be made to make sure those agreements are universally acceptable;
  - Consideration by the United Nations at the appropriate forum of the issue concerning the development and deployment of sophisticated conventional weapons, which may have destructive impact on human lives and environment;
  - Request the Conference Disarmament to consider the formulation of principles that can serve as a framework for regional agreements on conventional arms control;
  - The peaceful settlement of disputes through, inter alia, negotiations, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other peaceful means, as appropriate, in accordance with the Charter;
- (b) Unilateral, plurilateral, subregional and regional
- Full implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects;
  - Consideration of the establishment of regional registers for transfer of small arms and light weapons, taking into account the specific political and military conditions prevailing in different regions;

- Prior notification of major military exercises near the borders of other States;
- Promotion of enhanced security and disarmament at the regional level, while responding to the specific concerns and characteristics of each region;
- Measures against poverty in the context of addressing the root causes of conflict, and the promotion of development;
- Promotion and support of poverty eradication measures and national development strategies with a view for addressing the root causes of conflict;
- The granting of guarantees by the main military powers, as regards the agreements in the field of conventional weapons to be adopted by a given region;
- Removal of discriminatory restrictions on the transfer of dual-use technologies;
- Formalization of the understanding on a voluntary basis, among the States concerned, to provide prior adequate notification of flight tests of missiles;
- Safeguarding missiles non-aggression;
- Moratorium on the acquisition and deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems;
- Agreement on the non-use of force under any pretext and to strengthen regional peace and security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces;
- Non-use of force under any pretext, inconsistent with the Charter, and strengthening regional peace and security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces;
- Conventional arms balance and a political mechanism for the resolution of disputes;

(c) The role of the United Nations

- Collection, through the Department of Disarmament Affairs, of information, provided by Member States, regarding CBMs and its dissemination, inter alia, through:
  - A United Nations developed web site on existing CBMs that could serve as a valuable central source of information;
  - The organization of workshops, seminars and conferences, at the request of Member States, and with the help of the regional centres;
  - The establishment of an informal forum to exchange experiences and celebrate unofficial debates, which can meet once a year in the margins of the First Committee;
- The establishment of a United Nations register of experts on CBMs in the field of conventional arms;



- The establishment of a United Nations archive providing a comprehensive list of measures undertaken for confidence-building in various regions;
  - Strengthening the research capability of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in the field of CBMs.
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