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2273rd MEETING: 24 APRIL 1981

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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/ . . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

2273rd MEETING

Held in New York on Friday, 24 April 1981, at 3.30 p.m.

President: Mr. Noel DORR (Ireland).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, France, German Democratic Republic, Ireland, Japan, Mexico, Niger, Panama, Philippines, Spain, Tunisia, Uganda, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2273)

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. The situation in Namibia:

Letter dated 10 April 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Uganda to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/14434)

The meeting was called to order at 4.25 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Namibia:

Letter dated 10 April 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Uganda to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/14434)

1. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with decisions taken at previous meetings [2267th to 2272nd meetings], I invite the representatives of Algeria, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Brazil, Burundi, Canada, Cuba, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, the Federal Republic of Germany, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Pakistan, Romania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Togo, the United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Benyahia (Algeria), Mr. Jorge (Angola), Mr. Kaiser (Bangladesh), Mr. Houngavou (Benin), Mr. Corrêa da Costa (Brazil), Mr. Simbananiye (Burundi), Mr. Morden (Canada), Mr. Malmierca (Cuba), Mr. Ashtal (Democratic Yemen), Mr. Gedle-Giorgis (Ethiopia), Mr. Jelonek (Federal Republic of Germany), Mr. Coumbassa

(Guinea), Mr. Rao (India), Mr. Kusumaatmadja (Indonesia), Mr. Shearer (Jamaica), Mr. Kasina (Kenya), Mr. Burwin (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Mr. Monteiro (Mozambique), Mr. Baba (Nigeria), Mr. Shahi (Pakistan), Mr. Marinescu (Romania), Mr. Niasse (Senegal), Mr. Conteh (Sierra Leone), Mr. Fourie (South Africa), Mr. Balasubramaniam (Sri Lanka), Mr. Akakpo-Ahiany (Togo), Mr. Salim (United Republic of Tanzania), Mr. Vrhovec (Yugoslavia), Mr. Kamanda wa Kamanda (Zaire), Mr. Goma (Zambia) and Mr. Mangwende (Zimbabwe) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

2. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the decision taken at the 2267th meeting, I invite the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia and the delegation of the Council to take places at the Security Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Lusaka (President of the United Nations Council for Namibia) and the other members of the delegation took places at the Council table.

3. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the decision taken also at the 2267th meeting, I invite Mr. Peter Mueshihange to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Mueshihange took a place at the Council table.

4. The PRESIDENT: The first speaker is the representative of Burundi. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

5. Mr. SIMBANANIYE (Burundi) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, the delegation of Burundi would like to congratulate you warmly on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of April. The acuteness of the problem which is currently being debated and the hope placed in this debate by the international community as a whole called for a statesman of your wisdom, far-sightedness and diplomatic experience to preside over these deliberations. Your thorough knowledge of the Namibian issue and your dedication to an appropriate end to the Namibian crisis will certainly impart to these deliberations the dynamism and energy called for by the seriousness of the question before us.

6. We should also like to congratulate your predecessor, Ambassador Florin of the German Democratic Republic, for the very exemplary manner in which he conducted the work of the Council last month.

7. Finally, we wish to thank all the members of the Council for their generosity in allowing us to participate in this historic debate on Namibia.

8. South Africa's constant refusal to abide by the resolutions of both the General Assembly and the Security Council as well as the judgment of the International Court of Justice¹ enjoining it to put an end immediately to its illegal occupation of the Territory of Namibia; Pretoria's rejection—which has now been demonstrated—of any dialogue aimed at peacefully leading Namibia to independence; the strengthening of its repressive machinery against Namibian patriots; the highly explosive situation inherent in such brutality—all those elements together explain sufficiently well the urgency of once more seizing the Council of the question of Namibia.

9. The failure last January of the Geneva meeting on Namibia, the new public outburst of sympathy from certain quarters for the policy of *apartheid*, the political closed-mindedness and the further manifestation of the arrogance of the racist South African régime as natural consequences of that new support, require from the Council and the entire international community a thorough reassessment of what therapy is needed to treat the virus of *apartheid*.

10. Now that the illegality of the occupation of Namibia by Pretoria no longer needs to be demonstrated, now that the legitimacy of the struggle of the Namibian people and the fact that that people is represented solely by its national liberation movement, the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), have won universal endorsement, the time has come to wonder about both the true reasons and the underlying motives for the present impasse in the process of the decolonization of Namibia, as well as about the relevance of the strategy used thus far to end the illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa.

11. Similarly, the hotbeds of tension, the permanent instability and insecurity which Pretoria is fostering and sustaining in the region and the punitive murderous raids which South Africa is repeatedly carrying out against the front-line States oblige us today to remind the Council of its primary responsibility as the principal organ charged with the maintenance of international peace and security.

12. Now that the legal basis for the decolonization of Namibia has been clearly laid down, the maintenance of the South African occupation in Namibia makes sense only if we put it within the framework of a many-sided geo-political struggle where the economic, ideological, strategic, military and racial factors explain Pretoria's stubbornness and the complicity of its allies.

The stakes involved for the latter are twofold: On the one hand, they want to ensure for their industries a continuous flow of strategic raw materials with which Namibia is replete and, on the other, they want to justify before the world the plundering of Namibian resources which they are carrying out in violation of Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia,² enacted on 27 September 1974 by the United Nations Council for Namibia.

13. Not being able to base themselves on law or morality in this case, they had but one way out to soothe their conscience, namely, to persuade the rest of the world community of some alleged imminent danger of communist invasion in the region. Pretoria wished in that way to get a tacit mandate from its allies to throw the menacing hypothetical demons of communism back into the sea. By thus transforming the genuine problem of decolonization into a false ideological conflict, Namibia remains, because of the abundance of its mineral wealth and its exploited manpower, the milch cow of the transnational corporations.

14. Since Pretoria's defeat in Namibia would sound the death-knell for this disgraceful exploitation, one can easily see how clever South Africa's allies are in piling up solutions to the Namibian question, one less credible than the other.

15. The so-called internal solution which would confer legitimacy on the traitors of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) still haunts Pretoria and its allies. Recognition by the international community of mini-groups of DTA would, according to the latter's supporters, meet a concern for democracy, justice and equity. The ulterior reason none the less remains true: such recognition would have the sad merit of weakening SWAPO, dividing the Namibians, making Namibia's independence illusory and thus perpetuating its present exploitation.

16. That South Africa is today intensifying its intransigency by burdening the negotiations with a new element—the phantom of DTA—means that it places some hope in a Muzorewa-style internal solution. That did not succeed in Zimbabwe; it has no reason to succeed in Namibia: for the same illness, the same cure.

17. The convening of the Council now would hardly have been justified if South Africa had not replied to the appeal by the international community at the Geneva meeting on Namibia with political closed-mindedness, with false leads, with exaggeration and with blackmail, which have always characterized the South African attitude in any negotiation on the Namibian question. In so doing, of its own will it closed the door to any dialogue.

18. South Africa had no other ambition at Geneva than that of having the United Nations approve the legitimacy of its slaves in DTA, the very ones whose request to participate in the present debate has been

rejected by the Council—a decision which did honour to it. Indeed, it could not listen to two representatives of the South African delegation—just as it could not do justice to the Namibian fighters who are falling on the field of honour—by listening to mini-groups which are identified with the executioners of their people.

19. If South Africa had been able to carry out its macabre strategy at Geneva, it would have had a free hand to fashion Namibia in its own image, to complete the dismemberment of that Territory by the savage exportation of bantustanization, thus putting an end for all time to the very existence of the Namibian nation.

20. The resistance of SWAPO and the United Nations to this machiavellian plan, the rejection of the representativeness of the puppets of DTA explain the wrath of South Africa and the undue, ill-considered charges brought against the United Nations—cavalier charges of partiality and irresponsibility.

21. The intransigence and arrogance of Pretoria spring from the many-sided support of its allies and from the flabbiness and indulgence of the Council when it is a question of applying to South Africa the economic sanctions required in such circumstances by Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. Such a procedure, we were often told, sins by being unrealistic, inoperative and harmful to the very ones whom we are trying to save from South African tyranny.

22. The only viable alternative, we were then told, is that of negotiation and non-violence. We accepted that game, hoping that those who gave us such counsel would use their influence with Pretoria to bring it back to reason and legality.

23. The debacle of the Geneva meeting on Namibia will have at least had the merit of unmasking the inconsistency of speaking with a forked tongue: on the one hand, providing Pretoria with capital and strengthening its war machine and, on the other, offering nothing more than an olive branch in the form of a negotiation that is still-born because Pretoria has always opposed it.

24. In presenting itself as the region's guarantor and defender of the interests of the Western world, Pretoria today finds itself the subject of new outbursts of sympathy on the part of certain Powers. Now, in the name of safeguarding those interests, Pretoria's access to the capital and arsenals of those same Powers is not only guaranteed but further strengthened: hence the constant attempt of Pretoria to extend its murderous reach as far as its firepower will allow. The front-line States, the constant targets of its wrath, whose only crime has been to harbour refugees fleeing from *apartheid*, find themselves attacked with regularity. They will have to bewail their dead, contemplate the ruins of their infrastructure, while the Security Council remains indifferent, paralysed by the very ones who are arming South Africa.

25. Are we to understand that safeguarding the interests and the freedom of this world which calls itself free must include the oppression and suppression of the freedom of the black peoples of South Africa and Namibia?

26. Such a notion on the part of Pretoria's allies is neither in keeping with their long-term interests nor faithful to the teachings of their own history. The experience of some in the matter of decolonization, the attempts of others to subject entire peoples to their will, have proved to them in the rather recent past that a people's thirst for freedom, dignity and sovereignty is at the same time irresistible, irreducible and irreversible. The struggle of the Namibian people, as painful and as long as it may be, is that kind of struggle. The Pretoria régime, by its obstinacy and its refusal to face reality, carries within itself the seeds of its own destruction.

27. We have not come here today to prove the illegality of South Africa's occupation of Namibia. The General Assembly and the International Court of Justice did that in the past. Nor have we come here to expose the hideousness of the *apartheid* régime. A long time ago, the General Assembly described *apartheid* as a crime against humanity. We have come here to ask the Council to measure up to its responsibilities and to apply against South Africa the sanctions it deserves because of the illegality of its behaviour—that is, to apply fully and strictly the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter.

28. In particular, we would remind the permanent members of the Security Council, especially those which initiated resolution 435 (1978), that the reversal and hardening of the South African position with regard to Namibia neither changes nor in any way dilutes the responsibilities they bear under that resolution.

29. Any withdrawal, any abandonment, any evasion whatsoever on their part in regard to the commitments of resolution 435 (1978) would deeply erode their credibility not only in the Council and in the United Nations as a whole, but also in the eyes of public opinion in their respective countries. We dare to hope that they will face up to the new challenge of South Africa with the firmness required by the seriousness of the present situation.

30. Our appeal is not in any way prompted by feelings either of unreality or of frustration, as certain members of the Council would have people believe; rather, it has been prompted by our objective analysis of the bitter experience of unkept promises by partners in whom we had placed our trust.

31. For almost two decades now, the consideration of the question of Namibia in the Council has metamorphosed into a rock of Sisyphus. We believe that any further hesitation by the Council would not be in the interest of the Council nor in that of the Namibians

who are being felled by South African bullets; still less would it be in the interest of international peace and security.

32. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the Minister in the Presidency of Mozambique, Mr. José Oscar Monteiro. I welcome him here and I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

33. Mr. MONTEIRO (Mozambique) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, may I greet in you and through you the valiant people of Ireland and its Government and wish you every success in the conduct of these proceedings.

34. The independence of Namibia, the independence of a people, is not a subject for mere rhetoric nor a simple matter of resolutions. And yet we are compelled to come here once again to discuss freedom, to discuss independence—delayed too long, not because it will not take place tomorrow, but because it should have happened yesterday; delayed too long particularly because Namibia is a Territory under the direct responsibility of the United Nations, whose Charter and practice identify independence and self-determination as essential principles of international relations.

35. Yet here we are again. We have come in large numbers. The African countries and the countries members of the non-aligned movement have spoken out here with remarkable unanimity which reflects the profound commitment of the millions of citizens and the many Governments we represent in regard to the situation in Namibia and, in particular, the very latest developments.

36. What brings us here in such large numbers and makes us act in such a resolute manner is our solidarity as peoples which not so long ago were under colonial domination with the people of Namibia and our sense of outrage at South Africa's conduct in the recent phase of the settlement process designed to achieve Namibia's independence.

37. The peoples under domination in Africa and throughout the world know how to wage war and accept death so as to create life. And yet freedom fighters are not professional warriors who thrive on bloodshed and suffering. They have the courage to make peace, if that course will guarantee the fundamental rights of independence and freedom which are the very objectives of armed combat.

38. Although we were aware of the deficiencies in the application of the plan for Namibia prepared by the five Western Powers [S/12636], and although we were concerned about this, all of us, along with SWAPO, decided to accept the plan as a viable basis while awaiting the long-hoped-for independence of Namibia in a process where the democratic objectives of the liberation struggle were guaranteed by just and free elections under United Nations supervision.

39. And yet how many concessions had to be made. We had to agree that the question of Walvis Bay would be discussed only by the independent Government of Namibia; that elections not be organized by the United Nations but merely supervised by it; that South African racist troops keep bases, including in the military zone. And, each time, the five Western Powers told us that those conditions were essential in order to break the deadlock and to set the process in motion.

40. What deadlock? Deadlock created by whom? Precisely by South Africa, the world champion of illegality, the expert in breaking promises.

41. It was in that spirit of searching for solutions that we went to Geneva. From the beginning to the end of the meeting we witnessed constant manifestations of arrogance and bad faith and a repetition of the self-same threats and ultimatums *vis-à-vis* the United Nations, the self-same attempts to distort the nature of the meeting.

42. We had, for instance, agreed to allow the puppets to participate, if they so wished, in the delegation of the South African racist régime which had officially appointed them. And yet we witnessed a deliberate charade and crude propaganda designed to present them as the genuine spokesmen for SWAPO. Is that surprising? Suffice it to recall the manner in which South Africa behaved at the outset of the Western Powers' initiatives on Namibia. I shall not go over the long history of prevarication which the Ministers and other representatives who have spoken before me have recalled so vividly and which makes such a bulky international record.

43. As soon as we began to speak about elections, South Africa began to establish, under the label of political parties, puppet groups which it promotes inside and outside the country, as we have seen at Geneva and thereafter.

44. Since in the plan approved in Council resolution 435 (1978) there is a reference to the transfer of power to the Namibian Government after the elections, South Africa, which until then governed the colony in the best colonial tradition through an Administrator-General, was suddenly swept up in the winds of change which had taken 20 years to blow from Cape Town to Windhoek and began creating a government with local ministers.

45. But despite the many years of procrastination and successive unreasonable demands, the reality which we must face is—if I may say so—that a cat is always a cat and a puppet is always a puppet. The truth which came out so clearly in Geneva and which dampened all the fireworks set off by the racists is undeniable: in elections where there is a minimum of equity SWAPO will be the uncontested winner. The truth is that the traitors and the puppets will have the fate that traitors and puppets have always had throughout

generations: they will be discarded in the dustbin of history by their own past masters.

46. It is quite clear that the intention was to sabotage Geneva in order not to have to implement resolution 435 (1978), in particular as regards democratic elections. There was the red herring, the false problem of the impartiality of the United Nations, which was publicized by the world press. In passing, we must say that sometimes we were taken in by that game.

47. Does anyone seriously believe today that the reason for the blocking of resolution 435 (1978) by the South African racists is any doubt about United Nations impartiality in supervising an electoral process which, let me remind representatives, is to be organized by the authorities of South Africa themselves?

48. In fact what is this racist South African Government—a Government that bases its action on the institutionalized denial of democracy and whose philosophy is white power at any price—which dares to question the impartiality of the United Nations, its General Assembly, its Security Council and its Secretary-General, who so strictly carry out their work?

49. In our opinion there are two parallel plans with a few points of contact: the first is that of the United Nations, whose goal is to achieve the independence of Namibia; the other is that of South Africa, which, unable to maintain the *status quo*, tries to create a puppet Government in order to keep Namibia under South Africa's political and economic power.

50. One of the peculiarities of the South African plan is that it uses the United Nations plan, forums, our honesty, our good will, our candour, our word and our principles whenever that suits it. That is total hypocrisy.

51. In this context, the requests for participation by DTA, presented in the name of democracy, are not likely to bring about the success of this process but, rather, will lead to sabotaging it. As experience has proved, each concession that we make moves us farther away from our goal.

52. I should like the countries that have submitted these requests to realize that it is their own plan that they are jeopardizing.

53. We have heard Mr. Pik Botha getting upset because his official was not accepted at this series of meetings. Why, then, has he not invited him to speak in his Parliament, which is 100 per cent white, or to be a member of his Government, which is 100 per cent white, or to visit him in his home, which is 100 per cent white, or his neighbourhood, which is 100 per cent white? Why does he not at the very least shake his hand?

54. Have we not seen South Africa—and this takes the cake—demand guarantees of protection for minorities and a democratic system in Namibia while the majority in South Africa does not yet enjoy the most elementary of the rights that are enjoyed by the minority?

55. The African countries and the countries members of the non-aligned movement feel abused in this exercise because of the refusal of the Government of South Africa to keep its word. Is this behaviour of South Africa normal? What is this South Africa, that it has such effrontery?

56. South Africa is a minority régime, colonialist, aggressive and sanguinary. It is a country in which the overwhelming majority of the population is foreign in its own homeland, where whites are kept apart from blacks, where bantustanization separates blacks from other blacks in a machiavellian plan.

57. South Africa is Sharpeville; it is Sharpeville every day in Johannesburg, in Durban, in the mines and in the schools. It is the country in which 600 children were killed in cold blood in the streets of Soweto, without any indictments, without any guilty parties, without any sentences being passed, for the simple reason that no crime had been committed!

58. South Africa is the country in which simple friendship between persons of different races constitutes a crime. It is the country in which the colour of one's skin determines where one sits, where one eats, where one lives and with whom one may speak. It is the country in which many among us here would have to live apart from our wives and children because we are of different races.

59. When the Government of the United States of America declares that the liberation movements are terrorist they are thus reinforcing the racist and colonialist aggressors. Statements to the effect that the national liberation movements are not fighting for their own people but are agents of a third party not only offend the dignity of a people but serve to justify massacres. Statements to the effect that the struggle against "terrorism" has priority give free rein to the most sanguinary instincts, which leads to inevitable aggression against the front-line States.

60. Those who make public statements in support of the armed groups in South Africa in order to destabilize the Government of the People's Republic of Angola are flagrantly interfering in the internal affairs of a State member of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the non-aligned movement and the United Nations. Every country's stability is threatened. All these statements and actions constitute unparalleled support for the homeland of *apartheid*.

61. We must also say that the present situation and the failure of so much effort and sacrifice are linked with

the failure of those who were to take the necessary steps to put pressure on South Africa—especially the Western countries that have sponsored the plan—to do so. At the first confrontation, using whatever artifice, they abandoned and went back on the principles and methods agreed upon in Security Council resolution 435 (1978).

62. What further concessions are we called upon to make? We categorically refuse to be accomplices in this stupid game. We refuse to allow ourselves to be used in this South African game.

63. We are told to put forward constructive proposals instead of resolutions or sanctions. But, in reality, for the last four years serious and constructive people have been engaged in taking serious and constructive actions. The result is there, and, what is more, it has the stamp of approval of the international community: resolution 435 (1978).

64. When some speak of building they should first remember not to neglect or destroy what has been built by others.

65. We are told not to abandon the search for a peaceful settlement, but we are the ones who have not abandoned it. It is the United States Administration that has sabotaged resolution 435 (1978) and is attempting to replace it by other proposals.

66. The proposals for action before the Council constitute precisely the last-ditch effort—before force is used—to make South Africa put an end to armed oppression and war and acts of aggression against the Namibian people and other African peoples. Is there a better way to find peace?

67. We were told to wait until the new United States Administration had taken over, and we are now told to wait until the West undertakes a new initiative. The purpose is to oblige us to make yet further concessions and to give further guarantees to colonialism in Namibia.

68. Resolution 435 (1978) is resolution 435 (1978). It is indivisible. We cannot accept it and not accept it at the same time, nor can we play on words to go back on agreements that have been accepted formally by our Governments.

69. We should recall that a few months ago it was in fact the five Western Powers that told us that their original plan had become a Security Council resolution and could therefore not be amended, and that the South African Government had agreed.

70. We will never accept the argument that Namibia will become independent more quickly if we give colonialism further guarantees. After all, the colonialist settlers have had guarantees for the last 50 years, and that certainly has not brought about the independence of the Namibian people.

71. If one is concerned about the fate of people, one must remember that they are generous. People who have been freed from colonialism know all too well what oppression is, and they certainly would not want to oppress others. No one has the right to stand in for the sovereign people of Namibia. SWAPO, which represents the legitimate aspirations of the people of Namibia—a fact that has been proved in the political and armed struggle and is now uncontested—stated in clear terms that it was prepared to implement resolution 435 (1978).

72. We say, enough! There has been enough procrastination. People are dying. Let us apply the United Nations plan quickly, without any change, qualification or prevarication.

73. The economic and financial relations between the Western Powers and South Africa make it possible for the *apartheid* régime to maintain its illegal occupation of Namibia, to wage acts of aggression against neighbouring countries and constantly to refuse to implement the decisions of the international community. It is therefore incumbent upon the Western countries to put an end to their collusion with South Africa. In order to be consistent with the plan, they must apply effective comprehensive mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

74. The choice is not between the raw materials of South Africa and the raw materials of the rest of Africa. It is not a matter of choosing between East and West. The choice is between *apartheid* and human dignity, between aiding oppression or upholding freedom.

75. Instability and subversion reign in southern Africa, perpetrated by the *apartheid* régime. The racist minority régime seems to feel it has the right to intervene militarily everywhere in Africa south of the equator. It uses the pretext that it is defending its own borders against communism and the liberation movements, SWAPO and the African National Congress (ANC). But when South Africa invaded Angola in 1975, there were no SWAPO or ANC bases. South African troops joined the Portuguese colonial army to fight against FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique) in 1965, when the war zone was 2,000 kilometres to the north of the South African border. Now they kill refugees and proclaim that they have destroyed ANC military bases. They emplace bombs in Swaziland and Botswana, and organize armed subversion in Zambia. They attack Lesotho in a so-called crusade against communism. They invade and bombard the territory of Angola. South Africa's true objective is to try by all means to frustrate the intentions of its neighbours to liberate themselves economically.

76. South Africa has already proved, by its behaviour towards Africa and the rest of the world, that it represents a threat to international peace and security. The United Nations has the historic and urgent task of neutralizing that threat by taking specific steps to put

an end to colonialism in Namibia and to *apartheid* in South Africa.

77. We are here along with so many other sovereign States because the United Nations acted at the right time to assume its responsibilities. I wanted to recall that at a time when, in order to cover up complicity, we once again hear sung the siren song of defeatism regarding the limitations of the United Nations. If there are limitations, they are those of some Members of the Organization, who are thus accountable to the world and to history.

78. We call upon the Security Council to act swiftly. With every passing day people are dying—many people, according to the war commercials from South Africa itself. We would sound the call to action, so that illegality does not become a habit, so that justice, racial equality, may finally be called by its only right name: freedom.

79. The struggle continues!

80. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, Mr. Agha Shahi. I welcome him here and I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

81. Mr. SHAHI (Pakistan): I am grateful for this opportunity to address this important series of meetings of the Security Council on the question of Namibia. I should like to avail myself of this opportunity to express to you, Mr. President, the congratulations of my delegation on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council. Pakistan and Ireland enjoy cordial relations and co-operate closely in international forums.

82. May I also voice our appreciation of the able conduct of the work of the Council last month by Ambassador Florin of the German Democratic Republic.

83. These meetings of the Council are an expression of the universal concern over the attempt to frustrate an important initiative of the United Nations to bring to an end the colonial era in Namibia. The Council is once again confronted with the defiance of the will of the world community by a racist colonial Power, whose massive and persistent violations of human rights in pursuit of its inhuman policies of *apartheid* led to its exclusion from participation in the proceedings of the General Assembly. The situation created by South Africa's rejection of the Security Council's plan for Namibia jeopardizes the peace and security of the African continent. The Council cannot therefore shirk its responsibility to meet this situation. It must act in total solidarity with the liberation struggle of the Namibian people until the process of decolonization is carried to its logical end in South West Africa.

84. In 1978, the Security Council adopted resolution 435 (1978), which provided a framework for the inde-

pendence of Namibia. By that resolution, the Council decided to establish a United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), in order to assist the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in implementing the mandate conferred upon him by the Council's earlier resolution, namely 431 (1978), to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations.

85. The adoption of those resolutions, with the concurrence of the permanent members of the Security Council, led the world to hope that the colonial chapter in the history of Namibia would soon be closed. The third world countries, in particular, which share a common historical experience with the Namibian people, welcomed that development. The Security Council decision in resolution 435 (1978) was endorsed by all the important international forums, including the OAU, the non-aligned movement and the Organization of the Islamic Conference.

86. Nearly three years have elapsed since the adoption of this Council resolution but no progress has been made towards the realization of its promise. The pre-implementation talks at Geneva last January, which were designed to set a date for the commencement of the implementation of the United Nations plan, collapsed in consequence of South Africa's unwarranted accusation against the United Nations of partiality, its questioning of the competence of the United Nations to supervise free and fair elections in Namibia.

87. The failure of the Geneva talks has exposed the real motives of the racist colonial régime in Pretoria, which continues to deny the people of Namibia its inalienable right to self-determination and to control and exploit the natural resources of its land. The Government of South Africa could not have spurned the United Nations initiative were it not sustained by the support of external forces which stand to profit by the continued subjugation of the Namibian people. Another factor contributing to South Africa's growing aggressiveness is its massive arms buildup through the importation of sophisticated armaments and the development of its nuclear-weapons capability, the purpose of which is to intimidate the front-line States and to strengthen its colonial hold over Namibia.

88. Viewed in the historical perspective, South Africa's behaviour at Geneva is hardly a matter for surprise. Rationality and respect for international law and morality have no place in colonial and racist thinking. But the international community cannot view with indifference South Africa's repudiation of the Security Council's decision. It cannot permit South Africa to continue its exploitation of Namibia and to frustrate the legitimate aspirations of the Namibian people to self-determination and national independence. The universally acclaimed United Nations plan, which envisaged the signing of a cease-fire,

the establishment of a demilitarized zone, the deployment of UNTAG and the holding of free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations, has by no means lost its relevance and validity. It cannot be abandoned. The Council has an inescapable responsibility to compel South Africa to implement resolution 435 (1978) within a given time-frame.

89. The indignation of the third world countries over the failure of the Geneva talks has been voiced loud and clear. At the New Delhi Conference in February last, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Non-Aligned Countries strongly condemned the South African racist régime for its persistent refusal to withdraw from Namibia and its deliberate sabotage of the Geneva meeting. They declared that those acts constituted a threat to peace. The Ministers called upon the Security Council to impose urgently comprehensive mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, so as to compel the Pretoria régime to terminate its illegal occupation of Namibia.³ The same call was repeated when the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Countries met at the ministerial level at Algiers last week. The OAU Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa, held at Arusha last January, and the thirty-sixth ordinary session of the Council of Ministers of OAU, held recently at Addis Ababa, have also called for effective measures against South Africa under Chapter VII of the Charter.

90. The call for comprehensive mandatory economic sanctions against the racist colonialist régime is fully justified. Unless the United Nations imposes coercive measures, South Africa will not cease and desist in its evil design to continue its illegal occupation of Namibia and its plunder of the country's natural resources. The Security Council must not fail to give heed to the concern of the world community and must not resile from its own commitment to the liberation of Namibia. It must act firmly to compel South Africa to withdraw from all Namibian territories.

91. As a non-aligned Islamic country, Pakistan has always extended full support to the just struggle of all peoples against colonialism, imperialism and racism in all their manifestations, and to the efforts of the United Nations towards decolonization. Our stand is based on the ideological foundations of our State which rest on respect for human dignity, universal brotherhood and equality, and on our immutable commitment to the right of all peoples to self-determination. Consistent with that position, we have extended unqualified support to the courageous people of Namibia, who are waging a determined struggle, under the leadership of SWAPO, against one of the vilest forms of racism and colonial domination.

92. I should like once again to reiterate Pakistan's steadfast support for the people of Namibia. We look forward to an early triumph of their heroic struggle

for the liberation of their country. We believe that the application of comprehensive mandatory sanctions against South Africa by the Security Council at this critical juncture will give a powerful impetus to this historic process.

93. Mr. NISIBORI (Japan): This series of meetings of the Security Council is a dramatic demonstration of the importance which the international community attaches to the question of Namibia. My delegation is particularly impressed by the presence of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of numerous Member States. We regard their active participation in the deliberations of the Council as a reflection of their countries' commitment to finding a solution to the question of Namibia. I assure the Council that Japan fully shares their commitment, and is determined to facilitate, in any way it can, peaceful and constructive efforts towards the achievement of Namibia's independence.

94. Almost three months ago, on 30 January, the Security Council met to consider the outcome of the pre-implementation meeting on Namibia which had been convened at Geneva with the aim of creating an atmosphere of trust and understanding and of expediting an agreement on the date for a cease-fire and on the implementation of the settlement plan. Then the General Assembly resumed its thirty-fifth session for a week in early March to discuss further the question of Namibia. It is important that the South African Government understand the grave international concern which was expressed at those meetings, and which continues to be expressed at these present meetings of the Council.

95. On 3 March, during the deliberations at the resumed thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly,⁴ my delegation strongly expressed its regret over the intransigent attitude taken by the South African Government at the Geneva meeting. We also expressed the hope that the South African Government would correctly understand the present situation and the growing indignation of the world community, and that it would not stymie efforts for a peaceful solution to this problem. The Government of South Africa should be aware of the fact that there is a mounting international demand, as evidenced by the convening of the Security Council, for consideration of further measures to secure South Africa's compliance with the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). My delegation hopes that the South African Government will review the implications of the failure of the pre-implementation meeting, and urgently reconsider its position with a view to resolving at an early date the question of Namibia on the basis of resolution 435 (1978). The precious opportunity to achieve a long-awaited and internationally acceptable solution must not be lost.

96. Japan has consistently supported, and highly evaluated, the efforts of the five Western countries in seeking an early and peaceful solution to this problem. Such efforts include their settlement proposal

[S/12636], the adoption of resolution 435 (1978), and their initiatives for conciliation and mediation.

97. In this connection, my delegation notes with sincere appreciation the ongoing efforts of the five Western States, and particularly the meeting convened in London on 22 and 23 April by senior officials of those Governments. My delegation has examined with great interest the joint press statement issued at the conclusion of that meeting, and is in complete agreement with their assessment that resolution 435 (1978) continues to provide a solid basis for a transition to independence in Namibia. We welcome the decision to continue intensive consultations among the contact group representatives, and to convene in Rome at an early date a meeting of the five Ministers for Foreign Affairs. We earnestly hope that these efforts will facilitate the achievement of a solution to the Namibian question. The commitment of the five Western Powers to search for an internationally acceptable settlement underlines my delegation's belief that any constructive means towards a peaceful solution should be thoroughly explored. Japan is prepared to examine seriously all constructive proposals which may be presented.

98. My Government has repeatedly expressed its intention to co-operate to the best of its ability with the efforts of the international community aimed at achieving an early solution, through peaceful means, of the question of Namibia.

99. Japan recognizes the significant role being played by SWAPO in the movement for Namibian independence, and pays a high tribute to the position it took at the Geneva meeting in expressing its readiness to sign a cease-fire agreement. At this juncture, my delegation would like to confirm Japan's position that, ultimately, representation of the Namibian people should be determined by the Namibian people themselves, through free and fair elections.

100. I have on previous occasions—most recently in my speech before the General Assembly on 3 March—explained the measures which the Government of Japan has taken in conjunction with the international community's efforts to bring independence to Namibia. I shall not reiterate those measures here. Rather, I wish to inform the Council of two examples of my Government's latest efforts to help the people of Namibia and their African neighbours.

101. On the occasion of the observance of the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Japan pledged on 19 March a substantial voluntary contribution to the trust funds and programme for southern Africa, including the United Nations Institute for Namibia. Moreover, at the International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa, which was recently held at Geneva, Japan pledged a \$20 million voluntary contribution to the African refugee programmes. This is in addition to its regular contribution of \$16 million to international organizations which deal with refugee and humanitarian problems.

102. The Government of Japan extends such co-operation to its friends in Africa in the hope of mitigating their suffering and of helping their nation-building efforts. And when independence is finally achieved in Namibia, Japan will be ready to extend co-operation to nation-building efforts there as well.

103. I should like to close my remarks today by expressing my delegation's sincere wish that the people of Namibia will in the very near future be able to enjoy, as citizens of a free and independent State, the fundamental rights, privileges and responsibilities for which they have been struggling so courageously.

104. Mr. YANGO (Philippines): Mr. President, let me begin by congratulating you on your assumption of the high office of President of the Security Council for the month of April and to offer to you my delegation's whole-hearted co-operation and support in the performance of your duties. In the short time that you have represented Ireland on the Security Council, you have fully demonstrated the skills and qualities of an accomplished diplomatist and of a tactful and seasoned negotiator. Let me add that you epitomize the commendable traits of determination, patience and fairness. We have no doubt that under your leadership the Security Council will be able to discharge its responsibilities effectively.

105. My delegation takes this occasion also to express its deep appreciation to the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Florin, for the splendid manner in which he steered the business of the Council last month.

106. For the past few days, we have been deliberating the situation in Namibia that has resulted from the refusal of the racist régime of Pretoria to comply with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations—in particular Security Council resolutions 385 (1976), 435 (1978) and 439 (1978).

107. My delegation, like the other members of the international community, had every fervent hope that, with the adoption of these Council resolutions, the South African régime would decide to abandon its attitude towards Namibia and respond constructively to the universal call for the speedy implementation of the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia.

108. However, the continued intransigence, prevarication and hollow excuses of the colonialist and racist régime of South Africa once again surfaced at the multi-party pre-implementation meeting on Namibia, which was held at Geneva from 7 to 14 January 1981. The Geneva talks were intended to reach agreement on a date for the cease-fire and the start of the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). The Secretary-General's report [S/14333], which is factual and comprehensive, vividly depicts the stance adopted by South Africa and clearly shows where the blame for the failure of the Geneva talks should lie.

109. In the face of South Africa's callous disregard of the will of the international community and its continued illegal occupation of Namibia in defiance of relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, it behoves us at this juncture to act firmly and decisively to bring about South Africa's compliance with the resolutions and decisions of the United Nations—compliance which is long overdue. In this connection, we wish to call upon the members of the contact group of Western States to do their utmost to achieve this objective. They have already done very much in the past, to their great credit, but a final push is necessary on their part, as they are the countries that could greatly and truly influence the thinking of South Africa.

110. The position of my delegation is clear. The Philippines has constantly adhered to the view that the process of decolonization should be achieved by negotiations and peaceful change. Based on that yardstick, we have welcomed and supported the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia, initiated by the contact group of Western States. As a consequence, the Philippines has supported all positive moves towards the early implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978). It is precisely because of our commitment to the process of decolonization and our unflinching support for the efforts of the United Nations to bring Namibia to genuine independence that we feel that urgent measures as a last resort should now be taken against South Africa under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, after all these years of patient but fruitless negotiations.

111. To allow South Africa to persist in its arrogance and in its defiance of the resolutions of the United Nations would only serve to erode the credibility of the Security Council in the eyes of the international community. It thus becomes necessary to impose comprehensive mandatory sanctions against South Africa.

112. Once comprehensive mandatory sanctions are imposed against South Africa, it is to be hoped that it will abandon its baseless ambitions towards Namibia and, consequently, agree to a process leading to the attainment by the Namibian people of genuine independence.

113. However, any negotiated settlement of the question of Namibia outside the framework of the United Nations plan and without the participation of SWAPO as the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people would only further heighten tension in southern Africa, with dire consequences for international peace and security.

114. The hour is long past; the moment of truth has come. The choice is now left to us. The attention of the entire international community is riveted on the outcome of this debate. We must take resolute and bold action and, with firmness of conviction and political courage, send a clear message to South Africa that it

cannot continue its illegal occupation of Namibia, its persistent defiance of the United Nations, its war of repression against the people of Namibia, its repeated acts of aggression launched from bases in Namibia against independent African States and its policy of colonialist expansion—all of which constitute a serious threat to international peace and security.

115. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Republic of Tanzania, Mr. Salim A. Salim. I welcome him here and invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

116. Mr. SALIM (United Republic of Tanzania): Mr. President, I want to thank you and the other members of the Council for affording me the opportunity to address this august body. I do so as one of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs given a specific mandate by the OAU through the decision of the session of its Council of Ministers held last February at Addis Ababa. In giving a mandate to several Ministers for Foreign Affairs to come to this session, the OAU was underscoring the importance we attach to the current deliberations of the Council on the issue of Namibia. Similarly, the decision of the extraordinary ministerial meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Countries, held at Algiers, to request several Ministers for Foreign Affairs to participate in this debate in the name of the non-aligned movement is testimony to the seriousness with which the non-aligned countries view this series of meetings. The fact that so many Ministers for Foreign Affairs and other Cabinet Ministers from Africa, Asia, Latin America and Europe have been in New York for several days to participate in and follow very closely the Council's deliberations attests not only to our collective commitment to the struggle of the people of Namibia but also to our belief and confidence in the responsibilities and capabilities of this institution. Clearly, therefore, we have not come to New York simply for the purpose of debate for debate's sake. Neither have we come to New York only to go through familiar ground or engage in sterile and acrimonious exchanges.

117. We are here because we believe that the evolution of the situation with respect to Namibia has reached a crossroads. The challenges before the Council, therefore, are enormous. Through its actions the Council can make easier the path towards the freedom of Namibia and thus minimize the dangers of the growing confrontation in southern Africa. On the other hand, if the Council is to be immobilized and fails to respond to the needs of the hour, those who cause such immobilization will not escape the judgement of history as having contributed to further violence, misery and confrontation in that part of our continent, with serious and imponderable consequences for international peace and security.

118. My delegation is extremely gratified that this debate is being held under your stewardship, Mr. Presi-

dent. The credentials of your country as a firm opponent of colonialism and injustice and a faithful defender of United Nations principles, goals and objectives are well known. It is particularly fitting that an Irish representative should be presiding over deliberations of the Council on an issue which is of immediate and unquestionable concern to the United Nations. As a Tanzanian I take comfort in your presidency, conscious of the very warm and friendly relations that exist between our two countries; as an African I am equally happy to see you presiding, because we are familiar with your country's consistent support of the struggle of our peoples for self-determination and independence and against racial tyranny; and as an individual who has had the benefit and privilege of knowing you I feel particularly reassured by your presidency since your skills, talents and ability are a matter of record.

119. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs and other representatives of the African and non-aligned countries who have preceded me in this debate have eloquently and forcefully articulated our concerns about the present situation. They have gone through the history of the Namibian question before the United Nations. They have effectively exposed South Africa's consistent and persistent defiance of the will of the international community and, in particular, the decisions and resolutions of the Security Council. It should therefore not be necessary for me to engage in a lengthy exposé on the fact of South Africa's continued illegal occupation of Namibia, notwithstanding the decision of the General Assembly in 1966 [*resolution 2145 (XXI)*] to revoke its mandate and the decisions of this Council to call upon it to withdraw from Namibia or, for that matter, the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice¹ affirming the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia. Indeed, one would have thought that, considering what we all perceive to be an international consensus on the issue of Namibia, it would not be necessary for us to explain why it is incumbent upon the Council to exert the necessary pressure with a view to implementation of its own decisions. But as the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Nigeria, my brother Alhaji Ali Baba, rightly observed [*2270th meeting*], there are those who have even questioned the propriety of convening this series of meetings of the Council, arguing that the Council's deliberations will not enhance the path towards the resolution of the Namibian conflict. We are quite frankly flabbergasted by such positions. We are no less amazed by the exhortations for the patience, tolerance and realism that are expected of the African States.

120. For the truth is that in the history of the evolution of the Namibian question Africa and its leaders at all levels have been more than patient and have exercised not only utmost restraint in the face of constant provocations but also an extraordinary degree of statesmanship. Those who would deny us of this position are not only being uncharitable to history but also doing injustice to the very process of negotiations. I should like briefly to elucidate on this point.

121. I had the singular honour and privilege of presiding over the Security Council when it adopted resolution 385 (1976) in 1976. I remember very vividly how that resolution was hailed as eloquent testimony to reason and statesmanship. It is interesting to observe that, before the adoption of that resolution, one of the consistent appeals made by our friends the Western representatives in the Council both in public and private meetings was an appeal to the African States to be realistic, to be patient and to work for a negotiated solution. Resolution 385 (1976) was therefore considered to provide a basis for South African withdrawal from Namibia without delay. But South Africa remained defiant.

122. Again, in the same exhortations for realism, Africa was urged to exercise restraint and to support efforts aimed at putting into operation resolution 385 (1976).

123. It was against that background that Africa was requested to report and did respond positively to the initiative of the five Western members of the Security Council—the representatives of Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the United Kingdom and the United States. That initiative culminated in the Western proposal [*S/12636*]—and here I wish to emphasize that it was a Western proposal—which was ultimately adopted as a United Nations plan through Security Council resolution 435 (1978).

124. We all realize that there has been a new Administration in the United States. But we do hope that the representatives of the other four Western countries will have fully apprised the representatives of the new Administration of the tremendous efforts which were made, culminating in the adoption of that resolution. We particularly hope that all our Western colleagues will recall the solid backing that they consistently received from the African States—first, in the process leading to the preparation of that plan and, secondly, in the negotiations which culminated in the adoption of that plan by the United Nations. Those negotiations were long, arduous and painstaking. From Africa's perspective, they involved many of our heads of State, Ministers for Foreign Affairs and other representatives, and throughout we have supported the contact group of Western States. Throughout we have done so in the belief that they would exercise their enormous influence with South Africa by virtue of their extensive links in order to urge upon the Pretoria régime the implementation of the United Nations decision on Namibia. It is to be regretted, therefore, that in the light of that background, and in particular in the light of one concession after another made by SWAPO in the course of the negotiations, and supported by the African States, the negotiations have continued to be blocked by the South African régime, as was recently manifested in its sabotaging of the pre-implementation meeting at Geneva.

125. It has now been three years since Security Council resolution 435 (1978) endorsing the Western plan

was adopted. The representative of the United Kingdom [227]st meeting] was right in pinpointing the disappointment, the anger and the frustration which have been expressed by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs from Africa and other non-aligned countries. It should, however, be noted that the frustrations that we all feel and the indignation that we all share are stronger—and justifiably so—than those expressed in those statements. That is because, in the last five years or so, both before and subsequent to the adoption of resolution 435 (1978), we have been subjected to one frustrating experience after another. At every critical moment of the negotiations, when the international community was led to believe that implementation of the plan was imminent, the South African régime has invariably come out with new demands, new prevarications and new pretexts, all aimed at effectively blocking the path to negotiations. And during these experiences, it has been SWAPO and the African States which have been urged to make concessions in order to accommodate South Africa. And, incredible as it may sound, those concessions have indeed been made—only to find South Africa coming up with something new. The five Western Powers know this.

126. Before the pre-implementation meeting at Geneva, for example, when all the tangible demands of South Africa had been met, the Pretoria régime then brought up an intangible one, namely, the so-called creation of a climate of trust and confidence. Before we went to Geneva, the representatives of the five Western Powers, with whom we had extensive contacts, expressed confidence that Geneva would produce the required results. Yet, as we all know, Geneva failed and it failed precisely because the South African régime did not, and apparently does not, want a negotiated solution.

127. In the light of this defiance, therefore, what are we expected to do? Are we seriously, in the name of realism and patience, expected to fold our hands and await Namibia's salvation until such time that the South African régime has decided that sufficient conditions have been created to install a puppet régime in perpetuity? Are we seriously expected, in the name of realism, to acquiesce in the massive repressions that the *apartheid* régime has embarked upon against the freedom fighters and other patriots in Namibia? Are we seriously expected, in the name of realism, patience and moderation, to stand idly by while South Africa uses Namibia as a springboard for constant aggression against Angola and Zambia? Are we seriously expected, in the name of realism, to allow South Africa to embark on calculated and systematic international terrorism, not only within Namibia, but beyond its own borders as manifested in its recent criminal acts of aggression against the People's Republic of Mozambique? Those are serious and legitimate questions. They are not academic questions. The people of southern Africa have to experience daily the arrogance and defiance of the South African Government. Namibians lose their lives daily. Ango-

lans similarly are victims. The constant harassment of Zambia is a matter of record. For Africa, therefore, the freedom and independence of Namibia is a crucial issue. It is, indeed, a life-and-death issue. That is why we have consistently supported the five Western Powers in their plan, and that is why we remain very concerned over the failure of the implementation of the United Nations plan.

128. We have not come to the Council merely because we are interested in yet another resolution on the issue of Namibia. The United Nations has adopted enough resolutions on this issue. We have come to the Council in order to urge it to shoulder its responsibilities seriously and ensure the implementation of its own decisions. We have come to the Council also to impress on the three Western permanent members of the Council their own responsibility in working for the scrupulous implementation of a plan of which they and their colleagues of Canada and the Federal Republic of Germany were the authors. Is it not ironical that it should be up to us to make appeals to our Western colleagues to work for the implementation of their own plan?

129. The representative of the United Kingdom, speaking on behalf of the contact group yesterday, *inter alia* referred to the successful Lancaster House Conference on Zimbabwe and pointed out that "it was always clear that it was in the long-term interest of all the parties that Zimbabwe should proceed to independence by negotiated settlement rather than by ultimate resolution through armed struggle" [*ibid.*, para. 91]. I should like to make one or two observations in respect of that statement. In the first place, there has never been any doubt on the part of Africa that negotiated solutions were always preferred to the necessity of armed resistance. The Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa,⁵ adopted in 1969, made this point unequivocally clear. Yet, as the Manifesto itself pointed out, the alternative to a negotiated solution is not the *status quo*. When the path to a negotiated solution is blocked, the freedom fighters have no option but to fight for their freedom, and free Africa's obligation and commitment in that context are unambiguously clear.

130. In this context it should be recalled that while we have all hailed the results of Lancaster and have all paid a deserved tribute to the United Kingdom Government for its decision to shoulder seriously its responsibility over Zimbabwe, we have never been in doubt that Lancaster was made possible only by at least two crucial factors: first, the armed resistance waged by the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe and, consequently, the enormous sacrifice made by Zimbabweans in that struggle; and, secondly, the pressure of the international community, including, notwithstanding its limitation, the pressure of sanctions.

131. Consequently, one of the lessons of the Zimbabwe experience that becomes quite clear is that for

as long as the road to negotiations continues to be blocked, a combination of pressures, both internal and external, is an essential prerequisite for a just and lasting solution. What was true of Zimbabwe is no less true of Namibia. For as long as the South African Government continues to act in a defiant and recalcitrant manner, emulating in the process the behaviour which was consistently adopted by the Smith régime, our responsibility becomes evident. It is to exert maximum pressure on the South African régime in order to ensure the implementation of United Nations decisions and in particular Council resolution 435 (1978).

132. We in Africa believe that the Council can act decisively towards that path by invoking enforcement measures provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. At the same time, Africa is under no illusions about its own responsibilities. That is why at the meeting held at Lusaka, Zambia, in February of this year, the front-line States and Nigeria, as stated in the Lusaka communiqué:

“... concluded that with the failure of the Geneva conference, SWAPO had no alternative but to intensify the liberation war in Namibia and in this connexion reaffirmed the unflinching support for SWAPO. They also appealed to all freedom- and peace-loving countries of the world to support SWAPO in all fields, including economic, diplomatic and military assistance.”

At the same time, the Lusaka Summit reaffirmed, according to the communiqué:

“... their conviction that the South African racist régime can only be brought to the negotiating table for peaceful settlement of the Namibian question if economic and political pressure was brought to bear on her by the contact group of the five Western States and the international community as a whole.”

133. The spirit and letter of that position were further endorsed and reinforced by the Council of Ministers of the OAU when it met at Addis Ababa in February and March last and decided to intensify support for SWAPO. Clearly, therefore, Africa takes seriously its responsibility with respect to the Namibian question. Happily, also, the non-aligned movement as a whole has taken the issue with the seriousness that it deserves, as manifested by the important decision of the extraordinary ministerial meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Countries held at Algiers.

134. But what of the Security Council? And, more specifically, what about the responsibilities of the five Western Powers? Do the Western countries, particularly those that are members of the contact group, want to see the intensification of the armed struggle in Namibia before they can recognize that the time has come for them to exert the necessary pressure

on South Africa with a view to getting a negotiated solution and thus minimizing the suffering of all concerned? For the issue at stake before the Council is not to devise means in order to “settle down for the long siege”. The issue is how the Council can assume its responsibilities in a situation which clearly threatens international peace and security.

135. Let me say in all solemnity that we in Africa do not view this situation lightly. Let me stress that it took a lot of reflection and considered judgement before we came to the Council. It would have been logical for us to have asked for a meeting of the Council immediately after the failure of the pre-implementation meeting at Geneva. That we did not do so is testimony to our patience and our preparedness to be as accommodating as humanly possible.

136. Those who are familiar with the realities of southern Africa would not fail to appreciate the degree of patience and reasonableness demonstrated thus far by the African States. We have been reasonable and patient even when our people have faced death and devastation. Has the Council forgotten the Cassinga massacre carried out by the South African authorities on the eve of Security Council deliberations on the Namibian question in May 1978? Has the Council forgotten that, more often than not when there appeared to be a ray of hope in breaking one deadlock or another in the negotiations, the South Africans used the opportunity to commit callous acts of aggression against African States? Has the Council forgotten that the South African régime not only has defied every resolution on Namibia adopted by the Council but has proceeded to intensify its own repression in Namibia? Has it been forgotten that when the United Nations called for the holding of free and fair elections under United Nations supervision and control and when we were being informed that the South African Government had accepted the United Nations plan, the Pretoria régime embarked on a series of measures within Namibia calculated to create one *fait accompli* after another in contravention of United Nations decisions? Yet we are told that we have not been patient; yet we are being exhorted to be realistic. Have words lost their meaning? Are patience and reason tantamount to acquiescence in continued defiance of United Nations decisions?

137. Let me emphasize that we have not come to the Council seeking confrontation with anyone, but certainly not with the Western States. But we have come to this august body which is primarily responsible for international peace and security to seek measures which would in fact reduce the suffering of the people of Namibia in particular and those of southern Africa in general and consequently arrest what is clearly a rapidly deteriorating situation threatening international peace and security. In short, the African States, which have come to the Council have come seeking the implementation of the United Nations plan as embodied in resolution 435 (1978).

138. Supporting this plan without equivocation means supporting an end to violence in Namibia. Working for the implementation of this plan means encouraging the path to a negotiated solution in the crisis in southern Africa. What we ask of the Council is to do no more than enforce its own decisions. What we expect of the Western countries members of the contact group is simply and clearly to support their own plan.

139. It is imperative to emphasize that the road to negotiation has been blocked not because of a lack of a framework for a solution. What has been missing has been South Africa's commitment to implement the plan. Geneva failed not because there were some shortcomings as far as the United Nations plan was concerned, but rather owing to the fact that South Africa used Geneva simply to perpetuate its known opposition to a genuinely negotiated solution. If, therefore, we are interested in getting a negotiated solution to the problem of Namibia we should not be searching for red herrings; we should address ourselves to the problem squarely—and the problem remains South Africa's intransigence.

140. We listened yesterday with the utmost attention to the statement made by the representative of the United Kingdom on behalf of the five Western Powers [2271st meeting]. We noted with interest the communiqué issued by the senior officials of the five Western Powers meeting in London [*ibid.*, para. 88]. We are seriously concerned that instead of addressing itself to the nitty-gritty of the issue—namely, the failure of the South African régime to comply with resolution 435 (1978)—the London communiqué seems to provide grounds for further prevarication on the part of the South African régime. On the one hand, we are told that resolution 435 (1978) provides a solid basis for transition to independence in Namibia. Yet, on the other hand, we are told that the plan needs to be strengthened. One wonders whether the word "strengthened" is not a euphemism for revision of the plan. And if that is the case, then the fears and apprehension of SWAPO, of the African States and of the overwhelming majority of the international community are more than justified. For, as the front-line States clearly declared at the summit meeting which took place at Luanda on 15 April of this year, what is urgently needed at this point in time is the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) without any further delay, prevarication, qualification or modification. To proceed on the path of amending the plan—which, as I stated earlier, is a product of arduous and prolonged negotiations—would seriously risk side-tracking the plan itself and would in the process frustrate the entire negotiating process.

141. We sincerely hope, therefore, that the Governments of the contact group will bear in mind these considerations and, rather than proceed with an exercise which can only lead to further delay and further frustration, use their influence to exert pressure where it is absolutely and urgently needed—namely, on the South

African Government. The Council would be making an important contribution to the solution of the Namibian problem and to international peace and security if it acted firmly and decisively by adopting measures aimed at the scrupulous implementation of its resolution 435 (1978).

142. I cannot conclude without paying a well-deserved tribute to the Secretary-General and his collaborators in the Secretariat for their untiring efforts, patience and determination in pursuit of the objectives of the United Nations concerning Namibia.

143. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

144. Mr. BURWIN (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya): Mr. President, at the outset I should like to take this opportunity to thank you, and through you the other Security Council members, for allowing me to participate in these deliberations.

145. I take this opportunity also to congratulate you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month. I am pleased to see you, an able diplomat with high qualities, presiding over the Council at this crucial stage. We are sure that under your wise leadership the Council will be able to discharge its important duties.

146. I should like also to extend my delegation's warmest congratulations to Ambassador Florin of the German Democratic Republic, who presided over the Council last month.

147. Close to 15 years have passed since the General Assembly adopted its resolution 2145 (XXI), which provided for the termination of South Africa's Mandate over Namibia and placed administration of Namibia under the direct responsibility of the United Nations. Since then South Africa's administration of the region has been illegal. The International Court of Justice confirmed that in the advisory opinion it issued on 21 June 1971¹ upon the request of the Council. In turn, in its resolution 301 (1971), the Council confirmed the Court's opinion. Since then the United Nations has been calling upon South Africa to withdraw from the region to enable the Namibian people to exercise the right to self-determination and independence. Regrettably, however, South Africa's régime paid no attention to all those calls or to resolutions of the United Nations. Thus we now find ourselves discussing this issue, which has been on the agenda of the General Assembly for the past 35 years.

148. This series of meetings of the Council is of special significance because it comes at a time when all the peaceful international efforts to find a solution to the problem of Namibia, including the recent pre-implementation meeting at Geneva, have failed. It also comes at a time when the tense situation in southern

Africa has escalated to a degree which threatens peace and security in the region because of the intensification of the campaigns of oppression, detention and execution conducted by South Africa's racist régime against the black citizens of Namibia and the increasing aggression against the front-line States. That régime has also increased its evil manoeuvres inside the Namibian region in a desperate attempt to eliminate SWAPO, the sole and legitimate representative of the Namibian people, and to grant legitimacy to the surrogate Government it has established there.

149. The whole international community acknowledges that South Africa's occupation of Namibia is illegal. Yet all international efforts to force South Africa to withdraw from the region have failed because that régime still refuses to implement any United Nations resolutions on this issue. The recent Geneva meeting proved beyond any doubt the intransigence of that régime and its refusal to implement United Nations resolutions, and particularly Security Council resolution 435 (1978), despite SWAPO's declaration that it was prepared to cease fire and immediately to commence implementing the United Nations plan for Namibia.

150. South Africa's racist régime persists in challenging the United Nations resolutions on Namibia. That is not peculiar, coming from a such a racist régime, which is established on the most repugnant and loathsome policy known to man and whose existence lacks any legitimacy. But what is truly peculiar is that the régime finds States—permanent members of the Council—which co-operate with it, while those States claim to be concerned with human rights and the defence of man's freedom.

151. Those States which have strategic economic interests and investments in South Africa and Namibia find it in their interest to have South Africa continue its control over the region and maintain the *status quo* in Namibia so that they may maintain their investments and accumulate enormous wealth at the expense of the Namibian people.

152. South Africa's racist régime would not have persisted in challenging United Nations resolutions had it not been for the direct and indirect support and approval it receives from the Western States, foremost among them the United States of America. It is regrettable that we find those States, which care for none but their own interests, even at the expense of human values and morality, persisting in violating resolutions of the United Nations and of all other international organizations by providing both moral and material support to South Africa's racist entity. They also provide South Africa with arms and technical expertise to develop its military capability, which it applies in the massacres and other atrocious acts it commits against the African peoples in Namibia and South Africa, and in its acts of aggression against the neighbouring States, particularly Angola, Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia.

153. The implementation of resolution 435 (1978) has become an imperative and urgent matter in view of the current situation in the region. It is incumbent upon the Council to seek the implementation of that resolution by all means. The five Western States must prove that they are just as sincere about this by exercising pressure on South Africa for the implementation of the United Nations plan, without delay or amendment.

154. It is high time for the Council fully to shoulder its responsibilities by applying comprehensive economic sanctions against South Africa under Chapter VII of the Charter and in compliance with the wish of the majority of members of the international community as expressed in the communiqué of the Conference of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries held at New Delhi,³ and also in compliance with the resolution of the thirty-sixth ordinary session of the OAU Council of Ministers, held at Addis Ababa last February [S/14390, annex], as well as with the programme of action endorsed by the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Countries in its extraordinary ministerial meeting held at Algiers from 16 to 18 April [S/14458, annex].

155. The application of such sanctions will strengthen the confidence of the world's peoples in this international instrument and in its ability to carry out its responsibilities in maintaining international peace and security. It will also be a proper step towards forcing South Africa to withdraw its forces and administration from the region and to begin negotiations with SWAPO, as the sole and legitimate representative of the Namibian people, so that the region will gain independence before the end of this year.

156. The failure of the Security Council to take deterrent measures against South Africa with regard to Namibia is the result of the positions taken by the Western States which are permanent members of the Security Council and their use of the veto in the Council. We hope that those States will review their positions and weigh their interests in South Africa against their interests in 50 African States. They must realize that the patience of the African peoples will not last forever, while they are witnessing their brethren in southern Africa suffering all kinds of oppression and being denied their right to freedom and a decent life.

157. I do not wish to conclude without thanking the Secretary-General for the efforts he is making to find a solution for this issue.

158. In conclusion, we hope that this series of meetings will arrive at solemn and stern resolutions against South Africa. We reaffirm our country's solidarity with the Namibian people in its just struggle for self-determination and independence and we shall continue to provide all moral and material assistance to SWAPO, as it is the sole and legitimate representative of the Namibian people.

The meeting rose at 6.25 p.m.

NOTES

¹ *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16.*

² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 24, vol. I, annex II.*

³ A/36/116 and Corr.1, paras 45 and 46.

⁴ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fifth Session, Plenary Meetings, 104th meeting.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, Twenty-fourth Session, Annexes, agenda item 106, document A/7754.