

UNITED NATIONS  
SECURITY  
COUNCIL



Distr.  
GENERAL

S/10309\*  
15 September 1971  
ENGLISH  
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH/FRENCH

REPORT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL SPECIAL MISSION  
TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUINEA ESTABLISHED UNDER  
RESOLUTION 295 (1971)

\* This is an advance edition of the report, which will be issued later as Special Supplement No. 4 to the Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-sixth year.

Letter dated 14 September 1971 from the members of the  
Security Council Special Mission to the Republic of  
Guinea established under resolution 295 (1971)  
addressed to the President of the Security Council

We have the honour to submit herewith the report of the Security Council Special Mission to the Republic of Guinea established in accordance with paragraph 2 of resolution 295 (1971) and the consensus of the Security Council adopted at its 1576th meeting.

., Sir, etc.

Syrian Arab Republic      (Signed) George J. TOMEH

Argentina                      (Signed) Julio C. CARSALES.

/...

CONTENTS

	<u>Paragraphs</u>
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . .	1 - 11
A. Establishment of the Special Mission . . . . .	1 - 9
B. Terms of reference and procedure . . . . .	10 - 11
II. VISIT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUINEA . . . . .	12 - 14
III. CONSULTATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF GUINEA.	15 - 20
IV. DOCUMENTARY MATERIAL RECEIVED BY THE SPECIAL MISSION . . . .	21 - 24
V. VERBATIM RECORD OF MEETINGS OF THE SPECIAL MISSION	
A. Meeting with a delegation of the Government of the Republic of Guinea, headed by President Ahmed Sékou Touré	
B. Meeting with representatives of the Government of the Republic of Guinea	
C. Meeting with a delegation of the Government of the Republic of Guinea, headed by President Ahmed Sékou Touré	

ANNEXES

- I. Photocopy of a map submitted by the Government of Guinea
- II. Document submitted by the Government of Guinea entitled  
    "Enemy plan for future aggression"

/...

## I. INTRODUCTION

### A. Establishment of the Special Mission

1. In a letter dated 3 August 1971 (S/10280) addressed to the President of the Security Council, the Permanent Representative of Guinea informed the Security Council that on 2 August the Security Services of the Republic of Guinea had intercepted conversations between Overseas Marine Units and two other headquarters units of the Portuguese Colonial Army discussing an imminent military aggression by Portugal against the Republic of Guinea. The aggression, the letter stated, was planned against main points along the frontier with Guinea (Bissau) particularly Gaoual, Koundara, Foulamo, Soufan, Soutoumore and Missira; and also against Conakry, the capital. It was presumably intended to liberate mercenaries and other persons implicated in the aggression of 22 November 1970 against the Republic of Guinea. The Government of Guinea requested an immediate meeting of the Security Council in view of the imminent threat to international peace and security.
2. The Security Council considered the complaint raised by the Republic of Guinea at its 1573rd meeting on 3 August 1971. In his statement, the Permanent Representative of Guinea stressed that the Republic of Guinea was, and had been for 12 years, the object of constant acts of aggression by Portugal. One of the most recent of those acts had taken place on 22 November 1970 when Portuguese forces and mercenaries had landed on the beach at Conakry, occupying military facilities and killing people without discrimination. His Government had brought to the Security Council's attention the new aggression that was being planned against Guinea in the conviction that the Council would take appropriate, effective and timely measures to safeguard the territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Guinea.
3. A joint draft resolution (S/10281) sponsored by Burundi, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Syria was introduced by the Permanent Representative of Somalia. After consultations among the members of the Council, during the course of which the draft resolution was revised, the Security Council adopted it unanimously as resolution 295 (1971).

4. The resolution reads as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Taking note of the letter addressed to the President of the Security Council by the Permanent Representative of Guinea (S/10280),

"Having heard the statement made by the Permanent Representative of Guinea at the 1573rd meeting of the Council,

"Bearing in mind that all States Members of the United Nations must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations (Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter),

"1. Affirms that the territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic of Guinea must be respected;

"2. Decides to send a Special Mission of three members of the Security Council to the Republic of Guinea to consult with the authorities and to report on the situation immediately;

"3. Decides that this Special Mission be appointed after consultation between the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General;

"4. Decides to maintain the matter on its agenda."

5. Consultations between the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General in accordance with paragraph 3 of resolution 295 (1971) began immediately. These consultations were, however, suspended following the receipt of a letter dated 4 August 1971 (S/10283) from the Permanent Representative of Guinea addressed to the President of the Security Council requesting that the dispatch of the Special Mission to the Republic of Guinea be delayed.

6. On 12 August 1971, the representative of Guinea addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council (S/10287) informing him that the Government of the Republic of Guinea, having considered Security Council resolution 295 (1971), agreed to receive, as soon as possible, the Special Mission referred to in that resolution. Immediately upon receipt of the letter, consultations between the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General were resumed. Consultations were also held with all members of the Security Council concerning the composition of the Special Mission.

/...

7. At the 1576th meeting of the Security Council held on 26 August 1971, the President of the Council stated that as a result of the consultations held, he had been authorized to make a statement expressing the consensus of the Council as follows:

"It is the consensus of the Security Council that the Special Mission called for in resolution 295 (1971) should be composed of two members of the Council instead of three. The Special Mission will proceed to Conakry to consult the Government of the Republic of Guinea on its complaint and will report back to the Council as soon as possible."

8. The consensus was approved by the Security Council without objection. On the same day, the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General issued a note (S/10299) stating that in view of the consensus adopted by the Council, it had been decided that the Special Mission to the Republic of Guinea would be composed of Argentina and Syria and that the Mission would be accompanied by the necessary staff from the Secretariat.

9. Subsequently the Special Mission was composed as follows: His Excellency Ambassador George J. Tomeh (Syria) and Mr. Julio C. Carasales (Argentina).

B. Terms of reference and procedure

10. The terms of reference for the Special Mission were set out in paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 295 (1971) as follows: "To consult with the authorities and to report on the situation immediately". In the consensus statement approved by the Security Council at its 1573rd meeting on 26 August, it was provided that the Special Mission would consult the Government of the Republic of Guinea on its complaint and would report back to the Security Council as soon as possible.

11. The procedures adopted by the Special Mission, within its terms of reference, included consultations with the Government of the Republic of Guinea on its complaint of 3 August 1971 and the receipt of documents and other relevant material provided by the Government.

## II. VISIT TO THE REPUBLIC OF GUINEA

12. The Special Mission visited the Republic of Guinea from 30 August to 2 September 1971. During that period, it held two meetings with a delegation led by H.E. Ahmed Sékou Touré, President of the Republic of Guinea and one working session with representatives of the Guinean Government. The names of the Guinean Ministers and other high officials who participated in the meetings and consultations with the Special Mission are given below:

Mr. Lansana Beavogui, Minister of State for Economic Affairs\*  
Mr. Ismail Touré, Minister for Financial Affairs\*  
Mr. N'Famara Keita, Minister for Exchanges\*  
Mr. Mamouna Touré, Minister for Co-ordination of Popular and Democratic Movements  
Mr. Léon Maka, President of the National Assembly  
Mr. Moussa Diakité, Minister for the Interior  
Mr. Mamadi Keita, Minister for Defence  
Mr. Damantang Camara, Minister for Foreign Affairs  
Mr. Louis Behanzin, Minister for Ideological Training and Information  
General Namory Keita, Chief of Staff  
Mr. El Hadj Abdoulaye Touré, Permanent Representative to the United Nations  
Mr. Fily Cissoko, General Secretary to the President of the Republic.

13. On 1 September, the Special Mission visited the town of Kindia at the invitation of the Guinean Government.

14. The Special Mission wishes to express its great appreciation for the hospitality, courtesy and assistance it received from the Guinean Government and people.

## III. CONSULTATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF GUINEA

15. At the first meeting held at the Presidential Palace on 31 August, the President of the Republic welcomed the Special Mission and, through it, thanked the Security Council for sending the Mission to Guinea.

16. The President then made a statement giving a detailed account of his country's complaint against Portugal and other related circumstances. In reply

---

\* Member of the National Political Bureau of the Parti Démocratique de Guinée.

the Special Mission thanked the President for his welcome and for receiving it personally. It requested a further meeting to carry on the consultations with the representatives of the Guinean Government.

17. At the second meeting held at the Palais du Peuple on the same day, the Special Mission had consultations with a Guinean delegation headed by Mr. Ismail Touré, Minister of the Financial Domain.

18. A number of questions were put by the Special Mission, to which members of the Guinean delegation replied. The Mission's aim was to elicit further information and clarification on points raised by the Guinean Government in its original complaint to the Security Council, and in the statement made by the President of the Republic at the previous meeting.

19. On 1 September, the Special Mission was again received by President Sékou Touré, members of his Government and other high officials. During this last meeting, the Special Mission reiterated its expression of thanks for the welcome accorded to it and stated its readiness to have further consultations if necessary. The President, in a concluding statement, summed up the situation referred by his Government to the Security Council.

20. The full record of the Special Mission's meetings and consultations is reproduced in section V below.

#### IV. DOCUMENTARY MATERIAL RECEIVED BY THE SPECIAL MISSION

21. In the course of the first meeting with the Guinean delegation, the Mission was shown a map containing a plan of attack on Guinea. A photocopy of the map was made available to the Mission and is reproduced as annex I to this report. The Mission was also given an explanatory note for the map which is reproduced as annex II.

22. Other documentation which the Mission received included the depositions of prisoners accused of plotting against the State in collusion with foreign Powers before the Guinean Commission of Enquiry. Copies of these depositions will be distributed to the members of the Security Council for their information.



23. Furthermore, the President of the Republic of Guinea read out the text of the following telegraphic message between two dissident elements which had been intercepted by the Guinean authorities:

"HAVE HONOUR OF RECALLING THAT MISSION DIALLO ACCOMPLISHED AND MEN FROM FRONT EN ROUTE FRONTIER BISSAU - CASAMANCE STOP REQUEST IMMEDIATE FUNDS FOR REMAINING RECRUITS STOP TROOPS STATIONED AGAINST FRONTIER BISSAU STOP FRONTIER FULLY REINFORCED AWAITING START ACTION STOP MISSION CONTINUES STAY FOR USUAL DESTINATION STOP ONE WEEK REMAINS STOP REQUEST THAT YOU CONTINUE STATIONING ON FRONTIER TROOPS POINTS INDICATED GUINEA."

24. Finally, the Special Mission was shown a sample collection of military uniforms identical to those of the Guinean Army and made in Guinea (Bissau). The uniforms, however, bore the inscription PAIGC on them. The Special Mission was informed that the uniforms were to be used by the attackers in order to create confusion in the Guinean ranks.

V. VERBATIM RECORDS OF THE MEETINGS OF THE SPECIAL MISSION

A. MEETING WITH A DELEGATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF  
GUINEA, HEADED BY PRESIDENT AHMED SEKOU TOURE

Held at the Presidential Palace, Conakry, Guinea,  
on Tuesday, 31 August 1971, at 11.30 a.m.

President Sékou TOURE (translated from French): Excellencies: I shall begin by welcoming you and by thanking through you, the Security Council for granting our request to get into touch with an information mission, whose presence in Conakry would enable us to give the Security Council some idea of what the people of Guinea are undergoing.

However, there is a duty that I must first discharge and that is to introduce my colleagues who, with me, constitute the delegation of the Government of Guinea. First, there is the Minister of State for Economic Affairs, Mr. Lansana Beavogui. Then there is the Minister for Financial Affairs, Mr. Ismail Touré; the Minister for Defence, Mr. Mamadi Keita; General Namory Keita, Chief of Staff; the Minister for Ideological Training and Information, Mr. Louis Behanzin. You already know our Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Mr. El Hadj Abdoulaye Touré. Beside me is the President of the National Assembly, Mr. Léon Maka. Next there is the Minister for Trade, Mr. N'Famara Keita. Next is the Minister for Co-ordination of Popular and Democratic Movements, Mr. Mamouna Touré; the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Damantang Camara. Finally, there is the Minister for the Interior, Mr. Moussa Diakité, and the General Secretary to the President of the Republic, Mr. Fily Cissoko.

Your presence here, as I said, is an excellent opportunity for us to draw the attention of the Security Council to the threats of war constantly hanging over our country. In appealing to the Security Council we considered that the problem of peace and security is at the same time a simple and a complex problem. It is simple because, if all régimes considered the well-being of mankind as their main concern, if all régimes had a correct historical conception based on the equality of all peoples, whatever their state of development, their religion or their colour, if all régimes were, in short, preoccupied with human happiness in the true sense of the word, then the problem of security and peace would be very simple since any solution that peace might require would lead to the convergence of the efforts of all peoples and nations, and mankind would never be faced with insoluble problems. Any problem facing all mankind would be solved in the interest of the unity and happiness of mankind. But the problem is complex to the extent that the reality with which we are familiar has to be taken into account. In many fields this reality creates conflicts between

(President Sékou Touré)

peoples and nations. This reality is dominated by the aggressiveness of imperialism. That word may not be to the liking of some, but it is one with which we have been familiar ever since we were born. We were born under the colonial régime and an era of liberty, responsibility and dignity was unknown to us until October 1958. But from then until now threats have been constantly hanging over our young nation. Régimes which, for reasons that may seem fundamental to them but which are not valid in international law, have always been hostile to Guinea and would like to put an end to the experiment on which our people have embarked.

As you know, Guinea is a small country, geographically speaking. It is a country of 250,000 square kilometres with a population of 4.2 million, a country which knew colonization for 60 years. That was a period which we regard as a period of eclipse in the history of our country. Before colonization, our country had the historic privilege of being the site of the capitals of great African empires and because of this historical background we have acquired a great awareness of dignity and responsibility. This explains, if you refer today to the history of colonial penetration in each of the countries of West Africa, why the people's opposition to colonization lasted longer. Here the struggle lasted for 18 years, 18 years of war, and after the colonial conquest, the struggle of our people continued and the will of our people to regain their lost freedom was expressed throughout the colonial period. When you visit Guinea now, you are struck by a paradox. Perhaps it cannot be explained immediately but you are at least inwardly aware of it: the fact is that this country has all the objective conditions for prodigious economic development. God has generously endowed it in all fields: agriculture; mineral wealth and thus industrial possibilities; hydro-electric resources; farming and the wealth of the seas. In all fields Guinea has the greatest potential compared with the other countries of Africa. The research which we have been conducting ever since our independence only confirms the great opportunity that nature has given our country. Thus the paradox is that this country, which has the greatest potential for rapid development in the economic field, during the 60 years of colonialism was completely lacking in industrialization and any noticeable development. I will tell you a secret: our people never accepted colonialism and the colonizers

(President Sékou Touré)

were aware of this. That is why no attempt was ever made to create the dynamic conditions from which the people could have benefited to the utmost in working out their destiny by being responsible for their future. And so throughout the entire period of colonization the people struggled on; and for our generation it is since the Second World War that political activities of a higher order have been organized and carried out in all aspects of national life. These activities were punished and brutally repressed. I need not remind you of the details, but, as you know, independence was not given to Guinea on a silver platter. So, as you will remember, in the years 1954-1958, not only in Guinea but also in Algeria and many other French colonies a struggle was organized with the goal of liberation. This struggle reached its climax in Algeria because our brothers, with weapons in their hands, preferred the maquis or death to colonial domination and all the false promises that might be made with it. Thus, at a given moment, world public opinion became aware of the profound contradiction between French colonialism and the peoples under French domination.

General de Gaulle came to power. He wished to remove those contradictions, but in his own way. If it had been in the way preferred by the colonies, then they would have had the right of self-determination as national units. But the French way of General de Gaulle was to create a new community, that is, the French community, whose policy-making organs would always be in Paris: the Assembly, the Senate, higher education, economic institutions, and so on. All that the colonial peoples were to be given was the right to set up small municipal communities and to have a "government", but the government would still be headed by the colonial governor.

A referendum was organized on 28 September 1958 around this new programme and the participants in the referendum were to be the people of France itself and the peoples colonized by France, with the exception of Algeria which was fighting. It was thought to use certain means of those days, for example corruption and threats -- and here I am speaking from personal experience. I have nothing against any nation but I shall tell you the truth. At that time I was Vice-President of the Government of Guinea and I know that vast sums of money were placed at our disposal to win our population over to the French cause.

/...

(President Sékou Touré)

But we in Guinea refused. The first source of wealth of course is the confidence of the people and this cannot be discounted betrayed for gold -- that was our answer. It was thought that if the 13 French colonies supported the new French proposal, Algeria would find itself isolated and a new psychological factor could be exploited against fighting Algeria. As there were some traitors and corrupt people in Algeria itself, they would have found support for the legitimacy of their position and international public opinion would have been misled. But we refused to support these plans and we unmasked the plot since they were contrary to the history of Africa and so we took a risk whose magnitude and implications were clear to us. But we could not shirk this risk especially when we realized that at the same time in Algeria millions of people were being killed as hundreds of people were being killed in our country. We preferred to follow the course of history. Of the 13 colonies, Guinea was the only one to choose independence. We were not by any means the richest country. We were even the most backward economically. We had no intellectual élite or technical know-how any more than the others. On the contrary, at the time of the vote there were only six university graduates in a population of 4 million. And all the organs of the colonial State were directly under the exclusive domination and control of Frenchmen.

We realized that social and collective considerations must come before individual considerations, and historical considerations before social considerations. No man or people has the right to take a decision today which will bring shame tomorrow. The country was without means. I would remind you that from 1947 to 1958, before independence, it was the Grand Council of French West Africa with its capital in Dakar on the one hand and France on the other which intervened to balance the budget of Guinea by subsidies amounting to 45 per cent each year. This gives you a clear idea of our backwardness because, in spite of a very small local budget, 45 per cent each year had to come from abroad. But we preferred independence. For us there is no dignity without independence.

Independence cannot be a gift; it must be won and it means responsibility. A

deprived of responsibility cannot be independent even though the word

"is" is applied to it. But how is responsibility exercised in practice?

... learned in universities; to learn to swim one has to jump into

(President Sékou Touré)

the water and the same is true of governing peoples. What did the former colonial Power do to foil us? It transferred all the funds from Guinea without handing over a single centime to the new Government, saying "Here are your country's funds. I am withdrawing with dignity." Everything was transferred, all the files; even my own birth certificate was taken away. The law records were transferred -- even international agreements with foreign companies, everything was transferred. That is why on the international level when we are likened to those other States which received independence gratuitously, this is a serious mistake because we paid for our independence with our blood, our sweat and all the difficulties we experienced in setting up an independent Guinea. Within a month all the French cadres such as doctors, professors, teachers, nurses and engineers were repatriated to France. They said, "Since they want to be independent, let them be independent and we'll see what happens." At the same time all funds and medical supplies were sent back to France. Not a single document was left in any public office. If you went to an infirmary you could not find a single syringe. Landrovers, ambulances and everything else were taken away, we were stripped bare. They said, "Now we'll see how they work."

What did our people do? They paid taxes for the coming year. In the first week of October 1958 we had to pay our taxes for the year 1959 so that the Government could have the necessary funds with which to administer the country and keep things going. Those soldiers who opted for the young independent State were stripped. Their uniforms disappeared. The police were also stripped. Not a single gun or a single cartridge was left even though all that had been paid for by our people; everything was taken away. This, then, was the condition in which Guinea entered national life. But we have no regrets for this gave us a maturity of mind and helped us greatly to realize from the outset that independence has to be paid for with our own strength and sacrifice.

Thus the people rallied to reorganize the country on a new basis and to get the new State going. But at the same time adversity continued to dog our footsteps. There were 20,000 Guinean troops in the French colonial army. We appealed to those who were in Indo-China and Algeria. We said to them: "When our people have chosen independence, you cannot prefer to fight in the colonial army against the independence of Algeria and the independence of other States.

/...

(President Sékou Touré)

Dignity requires you to come home. Leave everything and come home to build the country." Responding to this appeal, some 18,000 Guinean troops returned home. France then said to them: "Even those who have been in the army for 13 or 14 years will get no pension. We will not even give you the savings held back from your monthly pay." But they accepted those sacrifices and did honour to their people. We had no money in the Treasury and could therefore not even offer them a job. We told them "Go back to your villages and cultivate the land." Each one accepted his share of the sacrifice.

On the other hand, some 1,000 or 1,500 Guinean traitors to Africa preferred to remain in the colonial army fighting Algeria because they were promised fabulous sums of money. For selfish and shameful reasons they renounced Guinean nationality to adopt French nationality. Two or three years later, Algeria won its independence and became a sovereign State. And what happened to those traitors? They were kept in France and given menial jobs to do in certain towns.

In 1960, we could not use French currency, so we created our own currency and we collected the currencies in circulation, as was lawful. We told the French "Give us the exchange value. We have been using your currency up to now. We have 8,000 million instead of the former 12,000 million." But France refused and used this as a pretext to change the same currency that was circulating in Senegal and the Ivory Coast. In this way the CFA francs in Guinea were of no use to us and we were ruined. All the assets of the State, of every individual, now proved to be completely worthless!

But the struggle was not to end there. In 1960, all along our frontiers with Senegal and the Ivory Coast, troops assembled with the intention of attacking us. We were ultimately informed by Senegalese and Ivory Coast patriots of the dangers threatening us and fortunately, through the vigilance of our own citizens, the weapons which had been brought into our own country -- over 2,000 million CFA francs or 4 million dollars worth of weapons -- were discovered. These arms were shown here to the entire diplomatic corps with their marks of origin and other identification marks. They were captured along the Senegalese and Ivory Coast frontier and were given great publicity at the time in the French press.

/...



(President Sékou Touré)

This was revealed by a French journalist, who was assassinated because of it. He devoted several pages of a book to it. He gave all the details about the origins of this plot against Guinea. I refer to Georges Joffar.

In 1961, signs of a plot were discovered in our country. There were arrests and we found that it was part of the same struggle against the régime in Guinea. In 1965, 1967 and 1969, we experienced all the phases of a single plot to overthrow the people's régime in Guinea. But our enemies realize that the people of Guinea are well organized; they are not intellectually poor, though they are materially poor. That is our philosophy. It will be a long time before the States of Africa can achieve the same level of economic potential as the United States or France. But with the faculties God has given him, man can at all times be dignified; the poorest can have his dignity; whereas the richest, by his conduct, if it is contrary to the future of mankind and contrary to the future of other men, is without dignity: material wealth has therefore nothing to do with morality. Our policy is to be respectable and dignified.

I have no feeling of shame when a visitor comes to Guinea and sees slums and badly kept roads. I merely say: "We cannot afford it." The United States and France did not begin as rich countries. Their peoples worked, accepted discipline and, with time, they amassed their resources. And without the assistance of any other nation, Guinea can improve its condition. Who helped the United States? It was not Africa or Asia. Who helped France and Britain? We believe in self-help, and if those who are ahead of us had a proper sense of history, they would not remain aloof: they should help us. But if they refuse to help us, we must be able to help ourselves. That is our philosophy.

Well, our enemies have realized that from inside the country it is impossible to overthrow our régime, for all their plans have failed. They know the structures of our country. They know that all power is in the hands of the people. For us, the people are the only source of power, of legality and legitimate rule. The people administers itself and administers our property.

I am not going to speak of the organization of our country, of the philosophy behind it. With the development of nationalism in Guinea (Bissau) -- which in 1967, 1968 and 1969 won great victories against Portuguese colonialism -- we found the basis on which to establish a more solid alliance. Since then,

/...

(President Sékou Touré)

Portugal has become the point of departure, as it were. Everything moved to Guinea (Bissau). And in 1969, we had the failure of the most important phase of the Portuguese plot. Almost 60 or 70 per cent of all the General Staffs consisted of corrupt elements.

Today, we have material proof of corruption to the tune of \$25 million paid out at Dakar. When the Deputy Chief of Staff directed this plot with the Minister of Defence of the time, they thought they would succeed. But they failed. The idea came from inside and since nothing could be done inside, they thought that the forces should be properly organized so a country was needed to serve as a base. That country was Guinea (Bissau).

Now, why have we asked for an information mission this time? Because the last aggression, of 22 November, was foreseen by us and we even described it in a book published in 1968 under the title Defend the Revolution. You will find this passage. Once the internal revolt failed, only war was left and the enemy set about preparing it, because the progressive positions of Guinea in Africa, and internationally, are not to the liking of some nations. Knowing that we are poor and that we lack the necessary equipment, these nations want to crush our régime. They intended to recruit black and white mercenaries and do everything to recruit Guineans to give world public opinion the impression that this was a fratricidal war between Guineans. Aircraft and warships were to be used.

The enemy thinks that we are isolated. But a real human revolution can never be isolated. And we expected that, if ever war came to our country, it would be an opportunity for Africa to show its maturity, and that we would enjoy the support of all Africa and the entire world.

Such was the plan for future aggression. Almost two months before the aggression, in a public speech, I warned the people of Guinea and other fraternal African peoples and the world that an aggression was being prepared against Guinea -- and in every speech after that, even up to ten days before the actual

ok. Besides all that, we also had official documents of the Senegalese

Department of July 1970 -- four months before the November aggression --

at the department had found, on the soil of Senegal, people who had come to recruit mercenaries for Guinea (Bissau). Some of these recruiting agents, arrested by the Senegalese police were questioned. The Senegalese Government recorded the testimony.

(President Sékou Touré)

Some of the mercenaries recruited or the recruiting agents revealed that they were being trained in Guinea (Bissau) to attack Guinea. The pay of the mercenaries and methods of recruitment were all known in advance. We made this known, but no one took us seriously, even though we based ourselves on incontrovertible documents of the Senegalese Government bearing signatures and official stamps. We do not always agree with that Government, but this evidence cannot be refuted.

Therefore, despite all these precautions, the aggression was carried out. What was their aim? Target number one was to occupy Guinea and change the régime. Target number two was to seize the country's fabulous economic wealth. The latest research shows that Guinea is the leading country in the production of bauxite, the leading country in the production of iron -- ore with an iron content of 68 to 72 per cent. Diamonds are to be found everywhere in Guinea, as well as uranium and manganese. All the precious metals are to be found in this small country, not to mention the great hydro-electric potential of the waterfalls, and the great sources of electric power. God forbid that like other countries, we should mortgage our country's future.

We discuss and, when the findings are compatible with the people's interest, we enter into agreements or contracts. There is the Boké Agreement, for example, which, thanks to the support of the United States, gives 35 per cent to the investors and 65 per cent to Guinea. No such terms exist in any other African country. So any other agreements should follow the pattern of the Boké Agreement. France is embarrassed. Will it grant Guinea, which refused to vote for the community, what it denies Senegal or the Ivory Coast or others? These are the contradictions which these countries do not want to remove by looking at history realistically. Attempts are therefore made to use force to overthrow this Guinean régime and have peace. But people are always afraid of international opinion. They must not say that it is France or the Federal Republic of Germany or Lisbon. No. So they say that the Guineans are fed up with their régime, because there is poverty and a dictatorship in Guinea. Under this cover, the operation can be risked.

That then is the background of what happened. When the aggression occurred, you heard some radio stations putting out the version that it was not Portugal which had attacked, that there were no ships. But these ships were photographed

/...

(President Sékou Touré)

by some Embassies and no one will doubt the good faith of the Ambassadors of the United States, Tanzania, Algeria, Romania, Syria, etc. all of whom, giving their evidence before the Commission of Enquiry, said that they had seen this and that. It was difficult then to conceal the truth. It had to be admitted that Portugal came, but it was pretended that, if Portugal came, it was not against Guinea but to take back Portuguese who had been arrested. The French press continued its large-scale campaign financed by Minister Foccart and Jeune Afrique with journalists paid to make world public opinion believe that it was 500,000 Guinean exiles, expelled by the Guinean dictatorship, who wanted to return home and were prevented from doing so. All the crudest lies are being put about to blacken Guinea and to deprive Guinea of world public sympathy and support for its just cause. But there are the confessions of the arrested mercenaries who spoke to the Security Council Commission which came here and those of other local accomplices, because a country assembling military forces to conquer another country and change its régime must have accomplices inside the country in question. Even if there were dozens or even hundreds of Guinean accomplices, that cannot lessen the role of the country which has corrupted them in order to strengthen its own régime.

In many cases of aggression complicity has been discovered. So why not in Guinea? This is shown by the inquiry we have conducted since the aggression and you will find it. We have arrested some of our cadres. All of them confessed to their participation in the conspiracy. But what is more serious is that the Chief of Staff interarmes said that as long ago as 1961 he had been recruited by France for a mission to overthrow the régime. As long ago as 1964 or 1965, he had been recruited by the Federal Republic of Germany for the same cause.

Fodeba, our ex-Minister with all the armed forces, the gendarmine, the police, security, the army, air force, the navy, was also a member of three networks: the CIA, the French and the West German. Kaman, Keita, Noumandian, the Chief of Staff interarmes and his then Deputy were all members of these different networks. Karim Fofana, "Petit Touré", my cousin, Karim Bangoura' and Baldé Ousmane, all confessed that they belonged to the three networks. Some received 200,000 for joining, with an allowance of four or five thousand dollars per month; another one -- Karim Bangoura, a former Minister of Industry -- even reported that he had received as much as \$1,373,000.

/...

(President Sékou Touré)

Many of our economic failures are now explained by the same traitors. That is a sad fact, but it does explain somewhat why, from the outside, forces were sent to attack the country, because a fifth column was already operating within the country. But in so far as our internal problems are concerned, our people will deal with them. That is their problem. You can have confidence in the Guinean people, their organization, their determination.

What has happened to us could not happen to any other régime and leave it intact. Seventeen out of 24 Ministers, nine-tenths of our senior officers, and from 1969 to date, the commanders of nearly all the garrisons were involved, together with the Minister of Defence, the Minister of the Interior, the head of the gendarmerie, the Minister of Security, the Minister of Industry -- all the key sectors had been suborned for the purpose of changing the régime in Guinea. Today everything is being done to prevent world public opinion from learning of the NATO Powers' opposition to Guinea. Everything is being done to spread the story that this is merely a struggle between Guineans.

I can say, with honour, that I am perhaps one of the very few Heads of State who can drive alone in my car on a tour of all my country, at any time of the day or night. The opposition of our people? There cannot be any here because it is the people's own will that is applied. You can ask this of any Embassy here, even if it is the most determined enemy of the Guinean régime. No Government can impose something on a people against its will. The proof of this is that, before adoption by the Assembly, a bill is submitted to all the villages. Ask any Embassy. Even the penal code and the criminal procedure code are sent to the villages, districts and regions and discussed, before the National Assembly meets.

What contradiction can there be between such a régime and the people when the people themselves wield the power? It is not in our country that you will find the enemy of the régime. It is certain Powers which wish to crush us for purely economic reasons. The Algerian war -- there was less conflict in Tunisia and Morocco -- lasted so long because of the country's economic wealth. In the Congo there were all kinds of difficulties because of economic wealth. The last war in Biafra, why did it take place? Because of the wealth of Nigeria. And now Guinea, because of the fabulous wealth in its soil and subsoil, is the

/...

(President Sékou Touré)

next in line. Everything is done to grab that wealth but you cannot tell world public opinion that you are going to rob a country of its resources, that brutal force is being used against a people which should be left in peace, but that is the truth. Anything else is just a smokescreen to conceal the situation between Guinea and its enemies.

Our inquiries here show that another aggression is in preparation. The Minister of Defence has just been arrested. He had outside contacts and he has confessed not only to all that has already taken place, but to what is to happen in the future. People outside were saying that all that is happening in Guinea is mere rumour, that while it is claimed that the people are ready, two military camps were seized, using small forces. But when the Chief of Staff, the Commanding Officers of the camp, his deputy and the Minister of the Armed Forces, are all involved in the plot, it is easy to occupy a camp. The camp was disarmed and its stock of weapons taken away.

Today, we are able to understand certain weaknesses. We were unworthy. We must not only know whether our cause is a just one but also whether we have done everything possible. Many of the shortcomings we have noticed are now explainable by the treachery of our cadres. Thus, they themselves describe the new plan to be launched from Guinea (Bissau). This is all clear from their confessions. Some of them have informed us of their latest contacts with elements in Guinea (Bissau), the current training there, the equipment they have which they intend to use against us in their tactics. There are 10 or more Guineans and Frenchmen recently arrested who have more current information about what was going on in Guinea (Bissau) than those involved in the November operation. All this information is in the evidence which they were able to give because of their rank. We cannot and must not keep silent; it is our duty to pass it on to the Security Council. The plan of operation designated as 553-554-70-71, which was used for the November aggression, was in our hands. We did not, at the time, make it available to either the Security Council or the United Nations. We minimized the facts. Perhaps we were a little naive in thinking that no one in this twentieth century would go beyond opposition over the radio and in the newspapers, beyond the classical forms of subversion, and revert to boat diplomacy, sending boats filled with foreign troops to attack a country.

(President Sékou Touré)

We thought that that was no longer possible. We thought that international peace and security were such that no one could venture to behave like that. We therefore omitted to present this evidence. Now let us see what this plan that was put into question consisted of:

First phase: logistic and tactical support. First by sea. Units 105-223, throughout the entire first phase, will follow the routes for landing, furnishing protection and assistance if necessary. Once the objectives are attained by each group, two BA 12 landing-craft will take to the port area of Conakry 500 men to obtain and strengthen control of strategic points.

By land: points of departure, Senegal and the Ivory Coast. Ranger units 56-70 stationed in the areas will give all necessary support to the transport and infiltration group. From Tambacounda, Senegal, 300 men aboard camouflaged helicopters will be ready to assist the northern group; from Korogo, Ivory Coast, a similar number will assist the southern group.

Second phase: from Senegal, the Ivory Coast and the Congo, elements of the 1st and 3rd "Mediterranean" parachute regiments will proceed at the request of the new government established immediately after the occupation of the various targets indicated in the preceding plans. Fifteen minutes later a plane will arrive at the Conakry airport with the members of the new government, who will ask certain Powers (their names are given) for military assistance to disguise the external military intervention. The new government will immediately be recognized by forty-three countries mentioned in document 45, herewith, thus conferring a legal character on the operation.

That was the first phase: operation 553-554-70-71. The general plan of operation.

Composition: two naval groups, three land groups from outside, and one staff group will take part in the operation. First phase: two naval transport units, five light landing units, two land transport convoys from outside, five automobile transport convoys from within. (2) General mission: Internal opposition to the régime established by Sékou Touré, bound up with the interests of the free world, has given hope to the MSA -- I do not know what that stands for -- regarding the possibility of setting up in place of the present Government a nationalist government favourable to the interests of the Western world. This plan was drawn up through the special services of Portugal and with the full co-operation of friendly countries.

/...

(President Sékou Touré)

The NSA Mission: to open up, direct and exploit tactical and political possibilities at present existing in Africa. Bases of support as well as economic resources called for by the forces of political opposition in Guinea were planned to facilitate the work of certain officers and the acquisition on the spot of additional means of action requested in note 638-70, which was received through Senegal.

The general missions are as follows:

- (a) Transport group: stationed in landing and frontier areas;
- (b) Reception groups: setting up a radio and protective unit to assure maximum safeguards for frontier crossings and landings;
- (c) Action groups: group A: occupation and control of Boké and Labé, together with the airports and public services. After the arrival of the naval group. Defence of the points indicated on the detailed maps must be guaranteed not only during the occupation of the targets at Conakry, but until such time as complete and total mastery of the situation in the country is achieved. Group B: occupation, control and defence of the civilian and military targets indicated on the pertinent maps. The principal objective is control of the airports and public services at Kankan, N'Zérékoré and Kissidougou. Group C: landing points: Dubreka, Boffa and Forecariah. Immediately thereafter, organization of various commandos in a pincer movement towards the capital. For achieving the objectives assigned to each group, priority is given to the occupation of public establishments and local airports with immediate neutralization of local police and military forces and the arrest of prominent persons, in accordance with document No. 11. Point of departure for the naval units: Guinea (Bissau) Orange Naval Base.

For Group A, point X-2, Oujéné, Ivory Coast. Mobile command post 5375 on the general operations map prepared by Eduardo da Silva, approved by Watson.

This document was in our hands before the aggression; but we did not think that anyone could come by sea and attack us in broad daylight. We were afraid that we should make ourselves look ridiculous by making it public. France has no representative here; there is hostility between us. We are not in agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany; all Germans have been expelled from Guinea.

We have no representatives with Portugal; so long as Portugal continues to maintain its presence in Africa, we shall never have any diplomatic relations with that

Of all that NATO group, it is only with the United States of America

/...



(President Sékou Touré)

that we have excellent relations. Therefore, as soon as the aggression took place, I requested the Ambassador of the United States to be good enough to communicate with me. I told him: "I have this document, but I have not made it public. I did not want to make myself look ridiculous. But now the aggression has begun. Here we have phase A. Phase A having failed, phase B cannot be carried out. I request you to forward this document to President Nixon on my behalf." The document was forwarded to President Nixon, and he examined it. He asked for the necessary information from his technical services, and they refuted those documents. He wrote me a long letter denying the accuracy of the document. I believed the version he gave me and have never made these documents public.

But since the first phase was carried out to the letter -- and that I know first-hand -- I said when we received the second document: "We are not going to remain silent about this. It is better for world public opinion to know about it." So now I come to that document.

Some friends in Guinea (Bissau) -- and here let me say that, although it is the Portuguese who are occupying so-called Portuguese Guinea, that does not mean that all Portuguese are colonialists; Africa has some great friends in Portugal, and I pay tribute to them, even though anonymously -- some friends, as I said, sent me some documents concerning the plan of aggression. They photocopied them and had them sent to me. Here is the plan for the new attack that was sent to me. Later we had the same plan in detail. Here is the detailed plan. They made sure to put on it the flag of Guinea and the rubber stamp of the National Liberation Front, so as to create the continuing impression that it was not Portugal that was attacking, nor France, nor the Federal Republic, but that it was Guineans who were attacking.

The air force plan of Portuguese Guinea is here, the naval attack plan is here, everything is here in condensed form. We received it and we ran off copies for our various garrisons. The explanation of the plan is there, just as with the first plan. It says: take-off point and centre of action, Guinea (Bissau).

First: infantry to operate in coastal Guinea, starting from Buba -- that is an island in Guinea (Bissau) -- by motorized transport through Kandiafara, Kaluka, to reach Boké and occupy it, taking any action necessary. (Boké is the

/...

(President Sékou Touré)

bauxite area, with large companies operating there.) They were to occupy Boké, for further action, first against Kindia, operating from Diaka, Dirota, Linguinal, Fria and Tondon cutting off Kindia and preventing the troops from the interior from reinforcing Conakry.

Second, an attack on Conakry, along the Boké line, by air and sea -- Boké, Boffa, Dubréka, kilometre 36 -- to cut off the special area of Conakry up to kilometre 36 and to occupy the city in collaboration with parachute elements in the Gbessia sector and with naval forces.

Next, the infantry, acting in Middle Guinea (towards the north, on the Senegalese border, where, as is known, there are at present mercenary forces. When we sent a message to the Security Council, Senegal denied our charges. But I swear to you on my honour that the troops are there. The second-phase operation was not carried out. But they are still there for the next aggression). To continue: when Conakry is occupied, these troops are to occupy the north and act as reinforcements. These troops from Senegal leave a part of Belí (Guinea (Bissau)) by motorized vehicle, and by way of Lagui, Koumbia, Gaoual, Sériba, Tianguel-Bory, reach Labé and occupy it with a view to further actions, principally against Conakry and then against Kankan. These troops are to link up with elements from Kadara, on the frontier with Guinea (Bissau).

Thirdly, infantry operating in Upper Guinea, from Somotou in Guinea, and by motorized vehicle to Kankan through Saladou, Tiriru, Mandiana, occupying it and linking up with the occupation troops in Middle Guinea (at Labé) through Kankan, Kouroussa, Banko, etc.

Naval forces: three groups of ships to sail from Bissau, in close formation. Arriving at Rio Munez (near Boké), two groups to continue out at sea southward in the area of latitude 9-20 North and longitude 15-10 West. The third group skirts the coast at a distance of about 40 or 50 kilometres and heads towards Conakry. This third group will consist of light warships and landing-craft

rying troops and material. The first two groups, with the above-mentioned  
tes, set their course for Conakry. Arriving at a point about

--- from Conakry, they separate. The first continues on to Conakry, and  
arn frontier to break up any counter-attack coming  
from Sierra Leone or from the southern frontier. This group could, if there

(President Sékou Touré)

were no intervention troops, give support to the groups attacking Conakry. The group going directly to Conakry could provide support or reinforcement.

Air forces: two groups, one for reprisals, to go about attacking various points and towns and creating havoc -- a group for reprisals and intimidation; the other group, for airborne troops, transported by air from Kthio Guinea (Bissau), to head for Conakry on the line of Boffa, co-ordinates 9-40 latitude North, 14-20 longitude West. The reprisal group continues on to Conakry to carry out its mission. The second group, airborne and air-lifted, occupies the airport at Gbessia and cuts off the Conakry airport and the Alpha Yaya camp, and isolates the Conakry peninsula by surrounding it. From Odjéné in the Ivory Coast: (a) with airborne and air-lifted troops, take the Faranah airport and occupy it for logistic purposes; (b) counter any operations from Sierra Leone and Liberia and provide any support that might be needed for the troops at Kindia and Conakry.

This new plan was communicated to us by friends of ours, the same ones who gave us the first information which we underestimated but which turned out to be very accurate. Subsequently, we monitored some exchanges of telegrams. Two naval units were off the coast and were communicating with Bissau. One of the ships said: "We have a large number of Ivory Coast nationals aboard and would like to know the exact date". Bissau replied that there had been a slight change and that at such-and-such a date and time a precise answer would be given. It was following this that we requested that the matter should be brought to the attention of the Security Council, wishing never again to underestimate such a situation.

On 23 August, the Guinean authorities on the frontier with the Ivory Coast transmitted to us a report informing us of the contents of a telegram they had just intercepted between a training camp that was supposed to have been set up in the Ivory Coast and Guinea (Bissau). In Guinea (Bissau) there was a renegade Guinean who had been a minister in Guinea, was now with them in Guinea (Bissau) and was in correspondence with some of their accomplices in the Ivory Coast:

"HAVE HONOUR TO RECALL THAT I ACCOMPLISHED MISSION DIALLO ON FRONT EN  
ROUTE FRONTIER BISSAU-CASAMANCE STOP REQUEST IMMEDIATE FUNDS FOR REMAINING  
RECRUITS STOP TROOPS STATIONED AGAINST FRONTIER BISSAU STOP FRONTIER FULLY  
REINFORCED AWAITING START ACTION STOP MISSION CONTINUES STAY FOR USUAL  
DESTINATION STOP ONE WEEK REMAINS STOP REQUEST THAT YOU CONTINUE STATIONING  
OF FRONTIER TROOPS POINTS INDICATED GUINEA"

/...

(President Sékou Touré)

Since the operation is in two parts, this telegram confirms the plan given to us involving the operation by Portuguese Guinea, the first phase aiming at Koundoura, and the second operation coming from the frontiers of Senegal and the Ivory Coast. Because of the gravity of this document, we thought it useful, before we were confronted with further deplorable events, to inform the Security Council immediately. We learnt that a commission of inquiry was coming to Conakry and we sent a cable saying: If it is a commission of inquiry, it is of no use. We cannot give any proof regarding the state of advancement of the preparations for aggression being made in Guinea (Bissau) against Guinea. We are simply informing the Security Council of the information given to us, which, taken all together, convinces us that a second aggression is being prepared against the independence of our country. That information we can give. Objective proof can be found only in Guinea (Bissau). Any inquiry in Guinea (Bissau) will disclose the existence of these camps. Any inquiry at Niakolokoba will disclose the existence of the troops on the frontier with Senegal and the Ivory Coast. This is also true. That is the point of our request.

Furthermore, we are informed by another message that soon the Portuguese troops deployed along the border of Senegal will all be sent to the Guinean frontier. I give you this information for what it is worth. I myself can scarcely believe it, but I do not wish to underestimate anything. We are told that the tactic would consist in setting up a buffer-zone between Senegal and Guinea (Bissau), where international forces could guarantee surveillance, while all the Portuguese troops along the frontier would be used against the Republic of Guinea. A delegation from the Security Council visiting our country could be seized of such a proposal by Senegal and the Portuguese colonial authorities. For the time being, however, since the Security Council has no official proposal before it, I dare make no comment, for to do so would betray those who are fighting in Portuguese Guinea so that one day they may be free. This may be a way of liquidating PAIGC, the National Liberation Movement, and of trying to overthrow the régime in Guinea. We have placed the news on record for whatever purpose may be found necessary.

I am going to turn over to you several depositions made in court by certain of our leaders who were implicated in the Portuguese aggression against our

(President Sékou Touré)

country, in which they reveal at considerable length the new plans for aggression against the Republic of Guinea.

Therefore, in conclusion, I must say that, ever since its independence, the Republic of Guinea has been under constant threat. We know the motives behind this long-standing plot. But what bothers us most today is that one country, Portuguese Guinea, is going to serve as a base for aggression; that is the reason we formally accuse Portugal, even though the Federal Republic of Germany and France are giving maximum assistance. The fact is that the territory where the training is going on and from which our country is to be attacked is neither French nor German; that is why our complaint is directed against Portugal. We know, too, that behind Portugal there is a whole coalition of interests opposed to our country's independence.

You are here on a mission of consultation with our Government. I think that the information given to you is what the Security Council should know in order to judge the justified fears of our country and Government, because despite the unanimous condemnation by world public opinion, nations and international organizations of those who organized the November 1970 aggression, we are convinced that military preparations are under way for another aggression and it is our duty in defence of our independence accurately to inform the Security Council, whose primary responsibility it is, at the world level, to uphold international law and respect for the territorial integrity, freedom and sovereignty of every nation.

Mr. TOMEH (Syria) (translated from French): I wish to thank you very warmly -- on my own behalf and also on behalf of my colleague Mr. Carasales -- for the words of welcome which you, Mr. President, kindly addressed to us, and also for the special honour you have paid us in personally receiving the Special Mission. We are deeply touched by your gesture.

As members of the Security Council's Special Mission to Guinea we have the privilege of being here, in conformity with the Security Council's decision, to discharge the important mandate entrusted to us. It is a great honour for us to be here in this great Republic of Guinea, one of the first countries in Africa to liberate itself from colonialism and attain its independence, while always struggling for the cause of liberation and the prosperity of your people.

/...

(Mr. Tomeh, Syria)

We have been greatly encouraged by what you have been good enough to say about us, the United Nations and the Security Council, which sent us on this mission. We consider that the continuing support which we have been receiving is irrefutable evidence of your country's and your Government's attachment to the great principles of the Charter and the United Nations. In our turn, we promise you, Mr. President of the Republic and Ministers, to spare no effort in effectively discharging our task, and we assure you of our full co-operation.

President Sékou TOURE (translated from French): I would like to show you also some uniforms which have been made in Guinea (Bissau) for the troops with the label "PAIGC" to make people think that Guineans are fighting each other. Here are the uniforms the army of aggression will wear to sow confusion. We genuinely believed in the sincerity of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Everyone knows my philosophy as Head of State; everyone knows that I am anti-capitalist, for the régime of Guinea. Why? I shall explain. When we won our independence, there was not a single Guinean with property worth \$4,000 --- not a single one. No Guinean had a million francs. Perhaps 50 Guineans had an old lorry.

We received loans as a community. The United States helps us -- not me but the people of Guinea -- the USSR, China, all countries and even recently liberated Algeria. Anyone with the means to do so has tried to help us to create what we lack. So, as I have said, this help must not be given to any individual but to the community, hence the community feeling with which all these investments are regarded.

I had great trust in the Federal Republic of Germany in spite of all. I was in touch with Mr. Lübke and, quite frankly, he made a great impression upon me. I found him a man of advancing years, maturity, and dignity and very humane, and I placed my full trust in the man -- and this, of course, had its repercussions on our relations with his country, for I forgot that man is one thing and government another.

At that time we ordered our military uniforms from Germany and we sent our soldiers to Germany for training. For the aggression in November, the same weapons and the same uniforms that we were using were given to the mercenaries

(President Sékou Touré)

to cause confusion when they disembarked at 2 o'clock in the morning. If you are surprised that our reaction was not immediate, it was, first, because they had accomplices in our general staffs and secondly, because these accomplices had created the conditions for defeat by secretly taking away all weapons from our garrisons and the popular militia had been deprived of their weapons; and thirdly, because the mercenaries were wearing the same uniform as our own men and in the darkness it was difficult for people to recognize them. Was it an enemy? Was it one of ours? Who could tell? From 2 a.m. to 6 a.m. there was no counter-attack; only when the sun rose was it discovered that the mercenaries were wearing the same uniforms, but with a green arm-band. And as soon as that was known the people reacted immediately and all the mercenaries were arrested or killed. Victory became possible between 2 a.m. and the evening.

But our enemies are still trying to create confusion because they know that our friends in Algeria have just sent us uniforms. When brother Boumedienne telegraphed asking what he could do, I said that our factory which makes uniforms is not operating and I asked him to make our uniforms. So these uniforms were made in Algeria. I do not know how the enemy came to know about this. They certainly have accomplices who know what uniforms are to be worn. They have just done the same thing, putting "PAIGC" somewhere. They must know that where there is no "PAIGC", we are there. And if ever we take them, they will say that these are not regular forces of the colonial army but men of PAIGC. But has PAIGC anything to gain by attacking the Republic of Guinea? I say "No", because if there is one country that regards them as a people with a right to freedom, it is Guinea.

Even if imperialism crushes us because we are helping and sheltering the nationalist militants of PAIGC who are struggling for the freedom of their country, even if we must die with them, our solidarity is something they can count on. The only dispute is between us and those who want to get hold of our economic wealth and who are doing all these things in order to destroy any people's régime in Guinea.

Mr. TOMEH (Syria) (translated from French): May I ask you whether you can give us the actual photocopies of the plan. You gave us the plan as reproduced from the photocopies.

President Sékou TOURE (translated from French): It is a photocopy. That is what we managed to get and the explanation there is ours.

Excellencies, without consulting you, we have thought of organizing a kind of programme. Outside the conversations, we have thought that tomorrow, Wednesday, you might visit a region which is situated 130 km. from here and see the people, enter into contact with them and then return. Your departure is set for Thursday morning. When you return from Kindia, if you have other questions, if you would like a second meeting, we shall be at your disposal. After that second meeting, you should be able to leave for New York on Thursday morning.

Mr. TOMEH (Syria) (translated from French): We thank you and your colleagues. I should like to assure you that our Special Mission is at your disposal. Perhaps, we could arrange for a meeting this afternoon with your Ministers so that my colleagues and I might be able to put some further questions to the members of your delegation.

President Sékou TOURE (translated from French): Certainly. They are at your disposal.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.



B. MEETING WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF  
THE REPUBLIC OF GUINEA

Held at the Palais du Peuple, Conakry, Guinea  
on Tuesday, 31 August 1971, at 6.15 p.m.

/...

Mr. CARASALES (Argentina) (interpretation from Spanish): I should like to ask a few questions. It is my desire to discharge to the best of my ability the mission entrusted to us by the Security Council, namely, to consult with the authorities of Guinea concerning the complaint which Guinea made to the Security Council, so that we may be able to report to the Security Council as soon as possible.

In the letter which the Permanent Representative of Guinea, Ambassador El-Hadj Abdoulaye Touré, addressed to the Security Council on 3 August 1971 (S/10280) and also in the statement made to us this morning by His Excellency the President of the Republic of Guinea, reference is made to the fact that on 2 August 1971 the Intelligence Service of the Republic of Guinea intercepted conversations between naval units and two Portuguese army units which mentioned a future aggression against the Republic of Guinea. If it is at all possible, I should like to know more about those intercepted messages. Were they verbal messages, transmitted by radio, or were they telegraph messages, perhaps in Morse code or some other code? I should also like to know in what language they were and if there is a textual transcript of the message exchanged. Also, if they were verbal messages, was any recording made of them?

Mr. Ismail TOURE (interpretation from French): Yes, the Department of National Defence has those texts. They were radio messages monitored at N'zérécoré by the Department of National Defence and Security. Those radio messages were probably in French. I say probably because while I can't make them out, I think they are in French because they were messages by French-speaking units to another group of French-speaking units of Guinean origin. We can, of course, give you a copy of the transcript of those messages.

Mr. CARASALES (Argentina) (interpretation from Spanish): As I understand it, then, there is no recording, but there is a textual transcript of the messages - perhaps later this will be confirmed by the authorities of Guinea - and they were transmitted in French.

Mr. Ismail TOURE (interpretation from French): Yes, in French.

/...

Mr. TOMEH (Syria): I wish to refer to the letter which was sent by your Permanent Representative to the United Nations to the Security Council and to which my colleague has just referred, namely, document S/10280, dated 3 August 1971. In the first paragraph of that letter we read that the intercepted messages discussed "an imminent military aggression by Portugal against the Republic of Guinea". The word "imminent", to the best of my understanding, means that something is to happen very shortly, perhaps in a day or two. How can you explain the fact that no aggression has taken place so far?

Mr. Ismail TOURE (interpretation from French): I think that the aggression was imminent because, according to all the information available, men were ready along the frontier with Guinea (Bissau) and other trained troops were in Senegal and the Ivory Coast. According to this information which came from various overlapping sources and was cross-checked showing an astonishing degree of accuracy, we know that the strategy as planned was first of all to set in motion the forces in Guinea (Bissau) along our frontier, and the second stage would depend on the military results of the first stage. Those forces in the Ivory Coast and Senegal would then move, and we cannot tell what other forces would move in a third and a fourth phase. We know that the men are stationed. The recruiting has already been done. The military means are available to them, and the plans, which you have heard about today, are ready. Why have the dates been changed? That is a valid question. We must say that even for the aggression of 22 November there were changes according to the conditions on the aggressor's side and also according to conditions in Guinea. In the case of the November 22nd aggression, there were three dates, as is known. At one time the aggressors thought that their preparations had reached a sufficiently ripe stage for launching an attack at any moment. In such cases, since it is a political/military operation, certain conditions have to be fulfilled, for example, the element of surprise. There are also other conditions which are not entirely within the control of the aggressor. With respect to the 22 November attack, the Chief of State had precise information concerning the date of 2 October, and he made that public. That created a state of vigilance in Guinea, which, of course, was taken into account by the aggressors, and they delayed the

/...

(Mr. Ismail Toure)

date of their aggression, which had been possible and imminent up to 2 October. It was postponed until 15 November, and after further consultations it was postponed until 19 November. That was a last-minute change because there was a moon on 19 November and it would have meant taking fewer chances if the landing could be made on a moonless night. But, as I have said, there is also the factor that the people of Guinea and its defence forces were vigilant. There were also other factors, for example, the weather and others, which were not under the control of the aggressors. So here again in the light of our past experience we can say that since January 1971 the aggression was under consideration and it was decided upon for 1971. The first information that we received in March gave two or three alternative dates with a minimum period of about six months for training and organization. So when we refer to the period of gestation or imminence of the attack we mean that at any time, even tomorrow, the attack could take place. There have been several dates since July. According to all the information we have received, the attack must necessarily take place before the end of this year, or by November 1971 at the latest. That is the situation as it is. I am sure that it is thanks to the organization, information and decisions taken in Guinea that some of the dates considered by the enemy as favourable for aggression had to be abandoned. Consequently, the President was perfectly right in saying that the aggression was imminent.

Mr. DIAKITE (interpretation from French): The last message, monitored in French this week in Conakry definitely states that the attack should have taken place between now and 5 September. That was the last message monitored between the units in communication from the Ivory Coast to Guinea (Bissau). That is the information I wish to add to the statement of the head of the delegation.

Mr. Ismail TOURE (interpretation from French): Information dated 8 May fixed July as the latest date for the aggression. Thus whenever a date was given it was always the earliest possible date and the latest possible date in each case.

/...

Mr. CAMARA (interpretation from French): In the particular case of the message brought to your attention which referred to the imminence of the aggression, the plan was to attack us before 7 August. That is why we said it was imminent. Now the question put by the Ambassador is why, although it was said to be imminent, there was no aggression. That can be explained by the fact that at the same time as we informed the Security Council we also ordered the general mobilization of the people and we sent messages to alert all defence positions on the border and inside the country, so the aggressor knew that we were ready for him and would have to change the date planned for the attack. He also knew that the case had been brought before the Security Council.

Mr. TOMEH (Syria): Can we therefore say that among the factors that delayed the act of aggression was the fact that the aggression and its imminence had been reported to the Security Council and urgently discussed by the Council and that a resolution or decision had been adopted?

Mr. CAMARA (interpretation from French): Yes. I would like to add that this was due in the first place to the state of mobilization of our people, those who listen to the radio. At the same time, our enemies knew that the Security Council had been informed of the matter and that the time had proved to be unsuitable. That is why they had to put off the attack to a later date.

Mr. Ismail TOURE (interpretation from French): I do not think that there is any single answer; there are several possible answers. Of course, we are not in the confidence of the enemy. We can only weigh all the possible answers and see what factor was most responsible for putting off the attack. We know that there is the intention to attack as early as possible; we do know that, that is, as soon as an attack can be successful. That is the crux. We have to remember in any case that from the outset of the aggression of 22 November, as soon as the aggressors realized they had lost the first round, they decided to plan another attack. The Security Council must understand that. So the situation which existed on 22 November may recur at any moment and this perpetual state of tension, this constant threat, is intolerable for a people, and it is intolerable

/...

(Mr. Ismail Toure)

that there should be this declared war against a peaceful people. I think that is ample justification for our anxiety and our appeal to the United Nations and for an inquiry to be carried out in the countries around us where there are troops concentrated which are being trained for an attack against Guinea. For example, in the Ivory Coast there is a renegade, Captain Soumah Abu, who with another renegade, Conté Saydou, is commanding the key unit in that country. They do not bother to conceal the fact and they are being financed, as you know from the results of our investigation.

There is another key unit stationed in Guinea (Bissau). It is the largest and has the most military equipment. These things are all known. These troops are there. They are waiting for the latest D Day to launch an attack against Guinea.

So it would be most desirable in any event for the Security Council to look at what is going on beyond our frontiers for the answers to the question. We can only give you the little information we are able to glean, the plans that fall into our hands, the messages that we have monitored and the depositions of those who were implicated in the first aggression. There are many examples we could cite based on the statements of people whose integrity must be respected. For example, Monsignor Tchidimbo played a star role in the world press reports, which said that he had been arbitrarily arrested - that he had not been implicated in the plot - and others said that he had been shot. Only last week he himself stressed the feeling of anxiety when he was a member of the West German network, which was fully implicated in the aggression. He wanted it to succeed, but when the aggression failed, Gemayel, who was in charge of co-ordinating the attack at the level of the internal networks, said that since there were weapons left over they should be used in Guinea. Thus he implied that it was the end of one aggression and the beginning of another. In his testimony, he said he attached great importance to that sentence because it was very meaningful: it meant that the aggressor has not given up, has not demobilized within the country or outside. While it is true that within our frontiers, thanks to the efforts of the Party, the danger is lessening, we are unable to control what is going on outside our frontiers. But if we were to mention all the statements indicating that there are w new plans of attack, we would find 20 or 30 of them. I would have to mention

/...

(Mr. Ismail Toure)

an ex-Chief of Staff Noumandian, who was arrested. He worked for the West German network and for the French colonial network. He too said that an aggression was being prepared and was imminent, that he had information from other military elements at the Boké frontier, and that he was responsible for arranging a welcome for the aggressive forces to be launched from the Boké area for attack on Gaoual and Koundara. All these are authentic statements.

Mr. CARSALES (Argentina) (interpretation from Spanish): Going back to the message exchanged on 2 August 1971 which was intercepted by the Intelligence Service of the Republic of Guinea, to which reference was made a while ago, and especially taking into account the fact that the message was in French, as we were just told, I should like to know whether the Guinean authorities have formed any opinion with respect to the persons who exchanged the message. Apparently they were communications between foreign naval units, according to the letter from the Permanent Representative of Guinea to the Security Council, and other units stationed in Guinea (Bissau). Specifically, I should like to know whether the Guinean authorities have been able to establish more precisely who exchanged the messages. If the answer is yes, then I should like to know the basis on which their identity was more precisely determined.

Mr. Ismail TOURE (interpretation from French): Yes. I think we can take a particular case. In one of the messages one of the persons was Conté Saydou and one was Naby Youla. Conté Saydou was on a mission in Guinea (Bissau) and Naby Youla was in the Ivory Coast. Those are two known elements, known for the role they have been playing, not only in past operations, but also in preparations for further operations against Guinea. Of course, the Portuguese military is the main element that is being used against Guinea and it is being furnished by Portugal, but every effort is made to make it look as if Guinean elements are involved, the purpose being to sow confusion and make the world believe that this is simply a struggle between Guineans in exile against the Republic of Guinea. An attempt is being made to give the impression that these are exiles who are opposed to the régime in Guinea and are trying to return to their country. That manoeuvre has been widely denounced, and it is well known that Portugal is

/...

(Mr. Ismail Toure)

responsible and that it has outside support. So the first responsibility for the aggression lies with Portugal and its allies. But Portugal is using Guineans as instruments and in the case of at least the two Guineans of whom I am speaking they speak nothing but French and cannot communicate in any other language.

There were other messages between naval units, and copies of them, I think, do exist. They are foreign naval units, but for those lying off the coast of Conakry, the case was clear.

Mr. CARASALES (Argentina) (interpretation from Spanish): To continue my previous question: the naval units to which the Minister referred are foreign naval units, but do you have any clearer idea of the nationality of those naval units?

Mr. Ismail TOURE (interpretation from French): Their first nationality is their aggressiveness - their action against the security and fundamental rights of the Republic of Guinea; that is their first nationality. Whether their second is Portuguese, or German, or some other, we do not know. But the main thing is that there is this permanent aggressive intent.

Mr. CARASALES (Argentina) (interpretation from Spanish): To continue with the remarks of the Minister: both in the statement made by the President of the Republic this morning and in statements made here this afternoon and in the transcript of testimony given by certain persons being held which we received this morning, there are frequent references to States other than Portugal, which are apparently responsible for a policy that could be described as unfriendly towards Guinea. The charge made by the Republic of Guinea referred exclusively to the Government of Portugal. But it has been said on many occasions that mercenary elements are being trained on the territory of Senegal and the Ivory Coast. I should like to ask whether the Government of Guinea has discussed this problem with the Governments of Senegal and the Ivory Coast. Has this question been raised in the Organization of African Unity, or has any other action been taken in this matter to which the President referred this morning?

/...



Mr. Ismail TOURE (interpretation from French): I think the President of the Republic has made it quite clear that there is a fundamental contradiction which explains the aggression of 22 November and which is no doubt at the basis of the new preparations. I refer to the contradiction between Portugal and Guinea, because Portuguese territory is being used as a springboard for open aggression against the territorial integrity and the political independence of Guinea and large military units are still in territory under Portuguese control, and their manifest intention is to make a new attack on Guinea. There are, of course, military elements in the Ivory Coast and in Senegal. That is true. The 22 November attack showed that the fact that the aggressive troops were trained, officered and transported by Portuguese regular elements meant that Guinea had no other responsibility because of other implications, since the aggression was nipped in the bud by the Guinean people. But if the aggression had developed, we know what would have happened. Taking examples, from Europe in the war of 1939-1945, as you know the war began between a small number of States and then it gradually spread. At first the number of States involved was small, then later many more became involved, starting from the first victim country. In other words, we cannot complain to the United Nations about any basic ideological conflicts between ourselves and many other nations. We can only report irrefutable facts, contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, namely, the attack on our territorial integrity and the use of a territory under control of another State by aggressive forces against our own country. So we have to make a clear distinction between general ideological differences and contradictions, between systems on the one hand, and the violation of the fundamental rights of States, on the other. And it is Portugal which has been violating these rights.

Mr. TOMEH (Syria): Following the submission of the letter of your Permanent Representative to the Security Council, the Council - as I stated before - met immediately, on 3 August 1971, and adopted resolution 295 (1971) on that same day. Operative paragraph 1 of that resolution reads as follows:

"Affirms that the territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic of Guinea must be respected."

Would you, Sir, or any of your colleagues wish to comment on that operative paragraph of the Security Council resolution?

/...

Mr. Ismail TOURE (interpretation from French): Our colleague, the Permanent Representative of Guinea to the United Nations, can answer that question.

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (Guinea) (interpretation from French): That was of course the first decision taken by the Security Council in this matter. Our colleagues are aware that when the sponsors of that resolution met, the first request of the Guinean delegation to the United Nations was that the territorial integrity of the Republic of Guinea should be respected. Of course, that clearly means that there should be no aggression against the national territory of Guinea from outside or from within.

That was the comment which I wished to make on that question.

Mr. TOMEH (Syria): We have heard the comment just made by a fellow representative at the United Nations. We know the modalities under which the United Nations and the Security Council discharge their responsibilities. Indeed, the comment that was just made was taken more or less from the Charter itself. But when I put my question I had in mind rather the future, in relation to the affirmation made by your Government that an aggression is expected. My question therefore is: Do you think that the above-quoted operative paragraph of the resolution of the Security Council, or the resolution itself, will have any influence in deterring another aggression? What other modalities have you in mind, what expectations have you, in coming again to the Security Council?

Mr. Abdoulaye TOURE (Guinea) (interpretation from French): We consider that the request made by the Government of the Republic of Guinea to the United Nations, to the Security Council, is a token of our confidence - the confidence of the Government of the Republic of Guinea - in the Security Council, which we regard as a moral force which can and should prevent aggression against any territory whatsoever. This confidence which we have placed in the Security Council derives from the fact that that formula is enshrined in the Charter, and ever since our accession to independence we have affirmed our observance and support of the Charter. All States should respect the Charter.

(Mr. Abdoulaye Toure, Guinea)

As for the future, we note that the people of Guinea are determined to continue to defend their freedom by themselves, and we did not, on 22 November, wait for the United Nations; we defended ourselves. Now if the international community, through the United Nations, were to contradict itself, break its commitment and not respect its own Charter - to which all countries have freely acceded - that would prove that nations could not place their hopes in the United Nations. We feel, therefore, that the United Nations and the Security Council must assume their full responsibility to implement the Charter through respect for the territorial integrity of the Republic of Guinea.

Mr. Ismail TOURE (interpretation from French): To those very appropriate and accurate observations just made by our colleague, I should like to add that, in the light of our experience since our accession to independence, we can say that to prevent any new aggression against Guinea we must of course look at the nature of the aggression that was attempted in the past and failed.

As I said a little while ago - and I repeat it now - there are, of course, many countries which dislike Guinea. That is a fact known to all. Similarly, Guinea dislikes many countries. That is also obvious. But there is such a thing as world opinion and international morality - and that means that disliking a régime does not always justify the use of armed forces to attack a country and a people. From 1958 to 1970 we had sharp differences with France. That is a known fact, because our independence was gained in circumstances of open opposition from the beginning to the French Government and General de Gaulle. But from the very outset France made no attempts to send French commandos to attack Guinea directly, because such action would have been condemned by the United Nations and by world opinion and international morality. So there are limits, and that is why we are stressing the case of Portugal, which gives France and other forces hostile to the Guinean régime a semblance of justification for aggression. And that Portuguese action is of course in contradiction to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. The presence in Guinea of the General Staff of the freedom-fighters of Guinea (Bissau) and the presence of white Portuguese prisoners of the PAIGC in Guinea has been the pretext for Portugal's operations. So Portugal has taken

/...

(Mr. Ismail Toure)

upon itself a heavy dual responsibility. On the one hand, it has tried to establish as a justification for its action something which is not a justification, because Guinea, as a Member of the United Nations, has the duty and even the right to help the independence movement. That is, I think, quite clearly indicated among the purposes of the United Nations. Secondly, if the liberation movement has been able to capture prisoners, it has a right to keep those prisoners wherever it wishes. But when Portugal permits the territory over which it exercises control to be used by forces hostile to Guinea to train and prepare an attack against Guinea, that action is quite rightly condemned by the United Nations. So we say that Guinea has no interest in distorting the facts of the matter by expecting the Security Council to issue any formal warnings to all countries which are against Guinea calling upon them to respect Guinea's territorial integrity and political independence.

We are concerned, for the time being, with having the Council issue such an appeal to one State alone which has violated the territorial integrity and political independence of Guinea - and that State is Portugal. What we want for the future is that concrete measures should be taken to prevent Portugal from further violating the Charter by violating the territorial integrity and political independence of Guinea by participating in a complex operation hostile to Guinea, using military means, for open aggression against Guinea from territory under Portuguese control.

I have said before that these Portuguese operations are political and military in character. If they were purely military, that would be the end of the United Nations, because then any two countries would settle their problems by taking up arms against each other. The world would have reached such a state of moral degradation that the United Nations would no longer be able to function. But if only Portugal was involved, that could very well happen because its action is tantamount to banditry. We hope that the Security Council will examine past events and the present preparations being made in Guinea (Bissau), for which Portugal alone is responsible.

We have neighbouring countries which do not share our political views. I to Senegal and the Ivory Coast. We have lived side by side ever since our endence. France, which bore a grudge against us, but has been on good terms

/...

(Mr. Ismail Toure)

with them never attempted to launch an aggression such as that of 22 November from the territories of Senegal and the Ivory Coast. But this time the French colonialists got the best of the bargain because while they helped Portugal, they left it to Portugal to bear the heaviest responsibility before international opinion. So, if we want this first paragraph to be truly operative, it must envisage concrete measures such as an on-the-spot inquiry in Guinea (Bissau) and every means of pressure on Portugal to force it not to let territory under its control be used for any new aggression against Guinea, as it did on 22 November.

Mr. CARASALES (Argentina) (interpretation from Spanish): I thank you for all the answers which the delegation of Guinea has been good enough to give to my questions. I would like the delegation of Guinea to know that the questions which I have asked and will ask are solely for the purpose of discharging the mission entrusted to me by the Security Council as effectively as possible, and because I know quite well that the members of the Security Council wish to have all the information that the authorities of Guinea may be able to furnish in connexion with the complaint of 3 August last.

I am going to refer now to the map which the President of the Republic gave us this morning. We received a photocopy of this map and we were told that it had been obtained thanks to the collaboration of persons resident in territory under Portuguese control who do not approve of the policies of the Portuguese Government. The map shows possible movements of aggression against the Republic of Guinea. We were also given an interpretation of this map made by the Guinean authorities themselves, as I understand it, and my question is this. Was the interpretation that has been made of this map which is rather detailed based exclusively on the map or has the Government of Guinea other elements of information which supplement or explain this map, a copy of which was given to us?

Mr. Ismail TOURE (interpretation from French): Yes, we have other elements of information. They are to be found in the statements made by the accused, that is to say, those who were implicated in the attack of 22 November, both military and civilians. In answer to questions put to them by the commission

/...

(Mr. Ismail Toure)

of inquiry, which asked them to reveal everything they knew about new plans of attack being prepared in Guinea (Bissau) against the Republic of Guinea, they gave information which tallied with the indications on the General Staff map. For example, if you take the evidence given by Captain Doumbouya, who was arrested in Gaoual, he said that he had been contacted by a courier. In these matters there are usually couriers or estafettes travelling between the units stationed in Guinea (Bissau), and those regarded as sympathizers in Guinea itself, that is, members of the internal network in Guinea. They carry written or verbal messages giving information about the new preparations. Thus, the facts which emerged from the depositions of these accused persons were corroborated by the graphic indications in the plan you have, so that from these different sources, especially information obtained by the commission of inquiry, we were able to prepare this interpretation or explanation of the detailed map. In essence, the idea is to attack from the territory of Guinea (Bissau). That fact is stated in all the evidence. The plan is also to give prominence as much as possible to Guinean elements recruited abroad as mercenaries, in Senegal or the Ivory Coast or Guinea (Bissau), and to concentrate them in Guinea (Bissau), where they can be trained by Portuguese and other foreign experts. They are already stationed along our frontier with Guinea (Bissau), they are having the finishing touches put on their training and we know that they have been equipped and provided with uniforms, samples of which we showed you this morning. They are on the verge of launching an attack. Of course, no one knows how this will all end, nobody knows what they're trying to accomplish, but we know that they are ready to attack. All this information has come to us through the information given by their accomplices inside Guinea and by them in maps which we intercepted. So the key fact is that territories under Portuguese control will serve as a springboard for the attack.

If this threat from Guinea (Bissau) were eliminated, that would be the end of the military aspect of this political/military aggression. If the military aspect was removed, then the United Nations could trust Guinea not to be caught up in the purely political quarrels in Africa because its aim is African unity and it could never allow itself to fall into a trap, into which imperialism, and even French imperialism, failed to lead us into for many years, that is to say, into frontier conflicts with Senegal, Ivory Coast, Mali or Sierra Leone. In each of

/...

(Mr. Ismail Toure)

these States, there is a different régime. There were times when troops were concentrated on our frontiers with Mali. Guinean territory was bombed by a unit stationed in Mali but in the end the forces of French imperialism which sought to provoke a conflict were routed. The conflict was soon localized. There was no need to address any complaint to the Security Council or to the United Nations. But in the case of Portugal we feel that it is our duty as the representative of the people of Guinea and on its behalf to bring a complaint to the Security Council, because Portugal is a Member of the United Nations, and I am wondering how Portugal can continue to be a Member of the United Nations when it is constantly violating all the hallowed principles of the Organization. Nobody is to blame; things are as they are.

Mr. CARASALES (Argentina) (interpretation from Spanish): Mr. Minister, to recapitulate all that we heard this morning and this afternoon, I understand that the elements which, we might say, make up the dossier of the Government of Guinea in relation to Guinea's complaint to the Security Council of 3 August 1971 would be the following: first, messages exchanged on 2 August last, to which reference was made a while ago and of which the text will be sent to us subsequently by the Government of Guinea; second, the map of which we received a photocopy this morning; third, there is presumably a telegraph message monitored a few days ago, and, unless I am mistaken it was a message between persons in a training camp in the Ivory Coast and persons in the territory of Guinea (Bissau), the text of which was read out to us this morning by the President of the Republic; and, fourth, the statements made by prisoners, copies of which were given to us this morning - at least copies of some of them. In addition to these four elements, to which I have referred, can the Government of Guinea provide us with any other material which might be of use to the Security Council in relation to the complaint of 3 August last?

Mr. Ismail TOURE (interpretation from French): Yes. I think I can add the uniforms which were manufactured to sow confusion between the mercenaries coming from Guinea (Bissau) and the national troops of Guinea. These were sent to us through friendly channels. They might be added to the dossier. At the

/....

(Mr. Ismail Toure)

time of the first aggression the mercenaries had been careful to wear the same uniform as the Guinean national troops, the only difference being the armbands that the mercenaries wore. This time they were a little more clever and used the PAIGC badge in order to create more confusion, because they know that the PAIGC members are welcome in Guinea.

Mr. TOMEH (Syria): Excellency, I want to associate myself with my colleague from Argentina in thanking you and in conveying through you our sincere thanks to the President for the information you have given us so far. There is one point that I would like to clarify. My colleague, in reviewing the pieces of evidence submitted to us so far, has enumerated four, to which you have added a fifth, namely the uniform that was being fabricated. However, between the Spanish language and the French translation, there was one point which - although it did not escape me - was not completely clear to me. That is the file of the depositions of the prisoners which you gave us this morning. Do you consider it to be in totality part of the evidence to be submitted?

Mr. Ismail TOURE (interpretation from French): Yes, I think that all this information on tape can be used. I think it is useful also that we should consult with each other in order to supplement the information you have received by giving you all the depositions giving precise information about the new aggressive preparations being made from Portuguese Guinea (Bissau). I would like to say in passing that these accused persons have involved other countries apart from Portugal, although Portugal serves as a cover and must bear primary responsibility. They are the only ones who are bound by their statements. Guinea is concerned in this taped evidence only with the reality of the preparations under way threatening its independence and territorial integrity. Any mention of other countries that are acting as accomplices of Portugal and their relations with

/...



(Mr. Ismail Toure)

Portugal is not a matter with which we are dealing now. Those relations can be discovered only from information given by accomplices who have been arrested and are against us.

Mr. TOMEH (Syria): I should like to thank the Minister for his promise to provide us with all this additional information. I have still a last question to put to him. However, I believe that Mr. Carasales wishes to follow up my last question. It would be more logical for him to do so at once.

Mr. CARASALES (Argentina) (interpretation from Spanish): I think that the question that was put by Ambassador Tomeh was most appropriate, regarding the character of the prisoners' depositions that were given to us this morning. I must confess that, after receiving the file of depositions which was given to us this morning as members of the Security Council mission by the President of the Republic, I find that they are an integral part of the evidence being furnished by the Government of Guinea to the Security Council in connexion with its complaint of 3 August last. That is why I would like to ask, in the light of what the Minister just told us, that is, that the depositions of the prisoners were binding only on themselves and not on the Government of Guinea, which is logical enough - I would like to know specifically whether we, as a mission of the Security Council, are authorized to attach these depositions which have been handed to us and any others which may be given to us in future as an integral part of the evidence furnished by the Government of Guinea for the information of the Security Council?

Mr. Ismail TOURE (interpretation from French): Yes, of course. The depositions commit the prisoners only, solely in respect of the other countries mentioned by them. The threat to us comes from Portugal even if Portugal's name is not mentioned on a tape. Apart from this, as I have said before, there are criticisms, of course, directed against other countries including the Republic of Guinea, as you will hear in the recorded depositions, because some of the people recruited to fight against us do not like the Guinean régime and they were fighting against the people of Guinea and the independence of Guinea. They are not tender towards us or towards anyone else, and it is on this precise point that I said that their statements were

/...

(Mr. Ismail Toure)

binding only upon themselves. But the taped evidence is, of course, perfectly valid, and you may regard it unreservedly as an integral part of the information we have collected.

Mr. TOMEH (Syria): Am I to understand that we are going to have another working session tomorrow?

Mr. Ismail TOURE (interpretation from French): Yes, that can be considered, but we felt that you might want to put further questions to the President of the Republic, who is perfectly willing to give you further information not only on the subject we have been discussing here but on any other subject relating to Guinea's national life. Whether political, economic, social or cultural, the President is prepared to give you full information concerning our country.

Mr. TOMEH (Syria): I do not want to abuse your kindness and generosity, but I am afraid that if I do not put this question now, I will forget it tomorrow. In the letter I referred to, from Ambassador Touré to the President of the Security Council of 3 August, paragraph 2 uses the following terms: "These attacks are presumably intended to liberate mercenaries and others." What does the word "others" refer to specifically? Other mercenaries? The second point is this. Have there been any other mercenaries taken prisoner recently, or, to be more specific, after the attack of 22-23 November? If such is the case, did these new mercenaries give depositions, and, what are their nationalities?

Mr. Ismail TOURE (interpretation from French): If we take the local interpretation as we use this term in Guinea, all those elements now in gaol can be said to be mercenaries. There are no two categories; they are all mercenaries. But, to be better understood in the Security Council, when we mentioned mercenaries, we referred also to trained armed elements coming from

/...

(Mr. Ismail Toure)

outside and by others we meant guides or scouts, local accomplices, and any other elements which helped the aggressors on the spot, but for us they are all mercenaries. Perhaps we should add that the attack on Conakry was not solely intended to liberate mercenaries. According to some prisoners, the attack on Conakry was also aimed at depriving the country of its political and administrative leadership. This was a fundamental objective. By depriving the country of its legitimate leadership and thus releasing mercenaries and others held in prison and assembling elements, perhaps taken among these, which could be used to establish a new régime to be imposed upon Guinea - that was the objective of the lightning attack on Conakry, to deprive the country of its leadership and then afterwards to occupy part of the territory at the frontier with Guinea (Bissau) and, using that occupied territory, occupied by mercenaries, to throw in larger forces after establishing a provisional puppet government to fulfil the hopes of the imperialists to share in the wealth of our country.

I think that was the essence of the political/military operation: to find a supporting point for use by these trained bands and establish a new Government, secure international diplomatic recognition, so that it could attain the political objective of bringing in larger forces and thus securing permanent control of the country's wealth and perhaps divide it up. That could only be done once the country had been stripped of its leadership, which is in Conakry and nowhere else.

With regard to prisoners, I should like to say that they are all of the same category - whether they are soldiers, civilians or technicians, engineers, whether from abroad or from Guinea - they are all alike; they are all mercenaries.

Mr. TOMEH (Syria): On behalf of my colleague and myself, I wish to thank Your Excellency and all your colleagues for your patience and for the answers that you have given us. We want to assure you that we shall continue faithfully to carry out the mandate given us by the Security Council, which ultimately serves the cause of international peace and security.

/...

Mr. Ismail TOURE (interpretation from French): Your Excellencies, I too should like to thank you. I cannot draw any conclusions - I shall leave that to the Head of State, who is directly concerned with your stay here - but we do wish to thank you, because the purpose of your mission is of interest to our people, our security and our future; it is therefore a vital matter for us.

We are entirely at your disposal to make your stay a useful one. You are concerned with the peace of the world and respect for the founding principles of the United Nations which mobilize all men of goodwill, whatever their nationality, and which make life worthwhile and distinguish the lives of men from those of animals and things. Moreover, you head a mission which is of interest to world opinion, especially African opinion and public opinion in Guinea particularly. It is a very important and delicate mission. We place ourselves always at the disposal of your Mission.

Once again, we should like to thank you for the efforts which you have already made and those which you will make in future to assist us in very difficult and precarious material conditions. We should also like to offer our apologies for any difficulties you might have encountered in your work, but we thank you and are very satisfied with this meeting, which has been most instructive.

The meeting rose at 8 p.m.

/...

C. MEETING WITH A DELEGATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC  
OF GUINEA, HEADED BY PRESIDENT AHMED SEKOU TOURE

Held at the Presidential Palace, Conakry, Guinea,  
on Wednesday, 1 September 1971, at 8 p.m.

Mr. TOMEH (Translated from French): Mr. President, we wish to thank you personally for the warm welcome and the attention you have been kind enough to give us. We should also like to express the most cordial thanks to the members of your Government with whom we had discussions yesterday and today. I am sure that I speak for my colleague as well as myself when I say that these days have really been a fruitful and interesting experience for us, as it has given us an opportunity to see your beautiful country.

Before taking leave of you, we thought that we might perhaps, as it were, take stock with you as a follow-up to our discussions of yesterday and today. And if you for your part should have any questions to put to us, we are at your disposal.

President Sékou TOURE (translated from French): I wish to thank you most sincerely for the attention you have been kind enough to give to the problems that are of concern to us.

As I said to you when we first met, often, when peoples bring their problems before international bodies, no radical solutions can be applied to them. We know from experience that problems of peace are dealt with in a tentative manner. Yet the under-developed countries - those which have suffered a historical lag in their development and which hunger and thirst for security and peace as factors of development - would hope for more radical solutions. Thus, problems which some nations disregard because they themselves have passed the stage at which they arise are of prime importance to other countries and other nations.

Our purpose in having recourse to the Security Council is twofold. To begin with, we wanted to do our duty for providing objective information on the facts of our situation and on the threat which looms over our hopes, in order that to the greatest extent possible, on the basis of a correct understanding of what we consider to be a legitimate objective, world opinion and international bodies may be able, firstly, to realize that we are not at variance with the objectives sought by all nations, and, secondly, to contribute in a degree commensurate with their dedication to unity and world solidarity to guaranteeing the purposes of our development. Next, the role which we also seek to perform is to bring home clearly to the conscience of the world the seriousness of certain attitudes towards countries and nations that are considered weak. In fact, true strength lies in the legitimacy and legality of positions, in the just human and historical content of

/...

(President Sékou Toure)

ideas and attitudes. Weakness, on the other hand, is anything which fails to regard man as the centre of interest. This, in our eyes, has nothing to do with democracy, race and religion, which are attributes of man.

Africa has suffered a protracted lag. This lag, which has been partially overcome in Asia and in Latin America, is still very great in the continent of Africa. It is for this reason that knowledgeable Africans demand much more from international bodies, because they are well aware of the gulf between the level of development in their continent and in other continents.

The Security Council is a body of vital importance. But this importance is daily being eroded by the fact that, instead of maintaining itself as a supranational body whose acts must treat mankind as one and indivisible and must be based on a constant quest for international peace and security, the Security Council, because of the way it is constituted and the principles on which it operates, has unfortunately continued, like the United Nations, to mirror international differences. The truth must be spoken: although we need it today, we feel that the Council is overtaken by the needs of mankind, that it lags behind these needs. If a more correct view had been taken of the Council's role, its operations could have been placed on such a footing that the supreme guarantee of all the rights of all the peoples of the world might have been truly and effectively safeguarded there. The fact that the United Nations is still a forum where all philosophies clash, where ideological argument can occur, where the relationships of force between different acts and between different forms would be mirrored through some of the decisions of the Organization, may have its advantages, provided, however, that the Security Council stands on a different plane so as to reflect, in a unitary manner, nothing less than universal aspirations, over and above differences between races, over and above individual or collective self-interest, over and above everything which may divide mankind. The Council should be the supreme safeguard for everyone. Through the Council, a small people should feel equal in size to a large people.

Having made these preliminary remarks, we believe that it is still our duty to help, by means of healthy criticism, to improve the Security Council as an instrument serving the nations of the world. It may be that the delegation which came here in November was shocked by the language I used. However, that language

/...

(President Sékou Toure)

reflected the legitimate reaction of a country which has confidence in the Security Council and which deplores the fact that security needs cannot be met as we should wish by the Council because the latter is guided by other considerations.

Cast your minds back: the date was the 22nd and we were under attack all along our coasts. As an independent and sovereign country, a Member of the United Nations, we reported this situation to the international body and requested its immediate help in safeguarding the independence of the Guinean State, the territorial integrity of the Guinean nation. The Security Council replied: we are going to send a commission of inquiry and then, afterwards, we shall consider whether the complaint is justified. It is fortunate for us that the outcome of the affair was in our favour and that warlike ambitions were victoriously countered by the people of Guinea. But let us suppose for a moment that the opposite had happened; let us suppose that on the 22nd the entire Guinea people, standing erect but unarmed, had been crushed by outside forces imposing their will on that people. What would the Security Council's attitude have been? I have asked myself this question. The Council would simply have recorded the brutal act with which mankind was confronted. Although such an act could not bear any stamp of legitimacy or legality, the Security Council would have recorded it.

It is of course true that, for any people, courage consists in defending its own, without relying too much on outsiders. This philosophy is correct, but it is wanting in so far as mankind cannot be regarded as having any fundamental guidelines; for if all peoples were agreed on respect for international law, were agreed in recognizing the sovereignty of every nation, were agreed in recognizing the right of every people to adopt whatever system suits it without having to fear intervention by another people and interference by outside forces, then every people engaged in self-defence ought to be entitled to have recourse to an international body and instantaneously to receive from it the assistance needed to safeguard its independence, which is bound up with world peace. Peace, as we have said, is not simply the absence of war; peace is equilibrium, on the basis of legitimacy and legality, internal equilibrium at the level of each nation, safeguarding individual liberties and thus ensuring equality for all individuals. Consequently, all nations, whatever their size, have as national entities the same rights vis-à-vis the international body, which has the duty of supporting just causes at the level of each of the nations of the world.

/...



(President Sékou Toure)

We say therefore that, in having recourse to you a second time, we are well aware that no international force will be sent to help us. That is out of the question. We saw that on the first occasion. It is for this reason that we have taught our people the vital necessity of defending themselves. And they will defend themselves. We have said and we have written: even if there were thousands of millions of mercenaries, they could not impose their government here unless the people of Guinea had been wiped out. No one believed us, but it is a fact. Our purpose is to convince world opinion of the reality of the conspiracy, which is not among our own people. Desperate attempts are made to spread the belief that 500,000 Guineans have left the country because of the "dictatorship which has overtaken the people of Guinea" and that these 500,000 men are organizing so that they can "liberate their country".

With a view to putting an end to such propaganda, I am going to make an official request to you; it is that the Security Council may send a delegation - and I do not say a delegation of friendly countries, but a delegation, quite simply, of persons who believe that dictatorship prevails in Guinea. This delegation will be able to go anywhere and to familiarize itself with the entire human, social, economic, political and cultural situation in the country. This does not require any official record. All that is needed is a number of men, possessed of their own senses, who will see what is happening in Guinea, who will see whether, from the standpoint of freedom and dignity, this is not superior to what they have observed elsewhere. They will not find the Guinea system lagging behind a great many systems of which they habitually sing the praises.

I accordingly ask you to make this request on our behalf, namely, that anyone who thinks in this way should come to see for himself the entire situation in our country.

Leaving that aside, we know that it is imperialism that bears animosity against Guinea. We know it. It is not Guineans. Those Guineans are tools. Unfortunately, there are unenlightened Guineans, just as there are unenlightened people in every country. In Latin America, for example, one sees elements imposed on their own people by imperialism. One sees them in Asia. One sees them in the Middle East. Why should it be otherwise in the case which affects Guinea? This international fact of life exists in Guinea too. The root of the problem,

/...

(President Sékou Toure)

however, is that some developed nations would like to keep us in a state of dependence, that they refuse to discuss matters openly with us to see whether they could share with us in developing certain resources of ours which they need, that these nations would prefer to use brute force to impose a system of their choice and thus to obtain the unrestricted use of Guinea's resources. The root problem is that these nations have not adapted themselves to the exigencies of peace and security, that they are not willing to regard international law and the right of self-determination of every nation as a genuine force. They would still like to impose their will by brute strength. This is the tragic situation which has its impact on Guinea's relations with certain NATO countries. The second tragic situation is that we are about to have recourse once again to these selfsame countries, because nearly all of them are represented in the Security Council. So those we must have recourse to are those we are complaining against! Will they be capable of partitioning their minds so as to understand that, while the interests of their nations are a fact, over and above those interests there are human dignity, human truth, human history, universal law? To the extent that those high values are given substance, the desire of the people of Guinea, which is to be allowed to live in freedom on their own soil, will surely be taken into account. Contrariwise, to the extent that the Security Council is regarded as merely a tool in the hands of a few nations, it will end up by simply doing what those nations themselves are trying to do, namely, stifling the truth and maintaining confusion in order that arbitrariness may prevail over law and justice.

Consequently, in thanking you for coming here and in thanking the Security Council for having delegated you, we thought that it was incumbent on us to raise the discussion, while at the same time affirming our continuing total confidence in the Security Council, despite our awareness that its constitution and its method of operating still fall very far short of what we regard as the basis for a true international equilibrium for the lasting and effective protection of the legitimate rights of every people, so that all peoples may live as brothers, as friends, applying the sum of their creative capacity to the daily task of raising the level of happiness of every man and every people. We reiterate to you our confidence and we hope that the Security Council will keep in mind, not NATO, but its own lofty purpose, which is to serve the cause of peace, that is to say, an impersonal cause.

/...

(President Sékou Toure)

What we are asking is that Portugal, which is apparently the chosen executor of a collective plan, should not use the colony of Guinea (Bissau) to launch aggression against us. In these modern times of ours, conflicts must be waged by equally modern methods. Newspapers, the radio, intellectual and moral media are available; let those who feel obliged to engage in conflict with us use those media, but let them abandon the use of artillery and small arms.

That is what we are asking of the Security Council. We have no aggressive intention towards any people or any State. The purpose of our recourse to the Security Council is to ensure that our right to live in peace will be respected.

This, I say again, is the sole motive of our request.

In conclusion, I repeat what I said at the outset, namely, that we request the Security Council, the United Nations, to appoint any kind of delegation, with any membership, to make contact with Guinea and come here, if only in a personal capacity, to see what life is like in this country and what kind of political, economic, social and cultural relations exist among the Guinean people, to see what philosophy guides the behaviour of the individual Guinean and of Guinea as a collective entity. I can safely forecast that such a delegation, even if it were composed of enemies, would have to acknowledge that Guinea's intentions are not warlike, that all the Guinea people yearn for is to enjoy their freedom to the full and to attend to their own development, while helping to strengthen their co-operative links with all the peoples of the world.


Once again, I thank you and hope that your visit to Guinea will advance the sacred cause of security and peace.


/...

ANNEX I

PHOTOCOPY OF A MAP SUBMITTED BY THE  
GOVERNMENT OF GUINEA

/...





TM 645 K52

H 40Z 27

A-R 108P


H.6 A

S-067

34 52

S-CA 52 FT

9° N



## ANNEX II

### DOCUMENT SUBMITTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF GUINEA ENTITLED "ENEMY PLAN FOR FUTURE AGGRESSION"

#### A. BASES OF DEPARTURE AND AXES OF ADVANCE FROM GUINEA (BISSAU)

##### I. ENEMY INFANTRY OPERATING IN LOWER GUINEA

From Buba (Guinea-Bissau) motorized units will proceed via Kandiafara and Kaluka to Boké with a view to occupying it for other operations against:

1. KINDIA - along the axis of advance Diaka - Dirota - Linguawal - Fria and Tondon with a view to occupying Kindia and preventing our troops from sending reinforcements to Conakry.

2. CONAKRY - along the axis Boké - Dubréka - Km 36, with a view to:

(a) isolating the special zone of Conakry at position Km 36 and occupying the city in conjunction with parachutists dropped into the Gbessia sector and naval forces.

##### II. ENEMY INFANTRY OPERATING IN CENTRAL GUINEA

From Beli (Guinea-Bissau) motorized units will advance along the axis Lagui Koumbia - Gaoual - Sériba - Tianguel - Bory, to Labé and occupy it with a view to further operations primarily against Conakry and then against Kankan.

This troop is to link up with the elements at Koundara.

##### III. ENEMY INFANTRY OPERATING IN UPPER GUINEA

From Somotoù (Odjéné) motorized units will advance on Kankan along the axis Saladou - Tiriro - Mandiana, occupy it and link up with the Central Guinea occupation forces at Labé via Kankan, Kouroussa, Banko, Bissikirima, Koin, Labé.

#### B. NAVAL FORCES

Three (3) groups of ships setting out from Bissau, in close formation, will arrive at the mouth of the River Nunez; two (2) groups will continue on a southerly course on the high sea in the area of 9° 20' North latitude and 15° 10' West longitude.

/...



The third group (probably consisting of small craft) will move along the coast at a distance of approximately 40 to 50 kilometres out to sea and head towards Conakry. This third group may include light warships and landing craft, carrying troops and equipment.

The first two groups at the co-ordinates referred to will head for the entrance to Conakry. When they are approximately 60 kilometres from Conakry, they will part company. The first group will go on towards Conakry and the second will head for the southern border to break up any counter-attack from Sierra Leone or the southern border (Benty). In the event that no opposing forces engage it, this group can lend support to the enemy forces operating against Conakry. The group moving directly on Conakry may act either as enemy supporting forces or as enemy reinforcements.

#### C. AIR FORCES

Two (2) operational forces, one for retaliation and intimidation and the other for airlifted and airborne troops proceeding from Kthio (Guinea-Bissau) will head for Conakry. At Boffa, (co-ordinates  $9^{\circ} 40'$  North and  $14^{\circ} 20'$  West longitude) the retaliation force will continue towards Conakry to carry out its mission; the second force of airborne and airlifted troops will occupy the airport at Gbessia, cut off the airport at Conakry and Camp Alpha Yaya and isolate the peninsula of Conakry by encirclement.

#### From Odjéné (Ivory Coast)

(a) Airborne and airlifted troops will take Faranah airport and occupy Faranah for logistical purposes.

(b) They are to counteract our forces coming from Sierra Leone and to give every possible support to the enemy troops at Kindia and Conakry.

-----