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REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE
UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN CYPRUS

(for the period 2 December 1970 to 19 May 1971)

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INTRODUCTION

1. This report on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus covers developments from 2 December 1970 to 19 May 1971 and brings up to date the record of the activities of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) pursuant to the mandate laid down in Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and subsequent resolutions of the Council relating to Cyprus.

2. The situation in the last six months with regard to the prevention of a recurrence of fighting has remained generally calm. However, the marked lack of progress in the intercommunal talks and in efforts towards a return to normal conditions has resulted in an increase in tension and a deterioration of the political atmosphere.

I. THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS

A. Composition and deployment

3. At the end of the period covered by my last report, the strength of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was 3,007 military personnel and 175 civilian police (S/10005, para. 3). On 19 May 1971, the composition of the Force was as follows:

<u>Military</u>			<u>Total</u>
Austria	- HQ UNFICYP	1	55
	- Field hospital	<u>54</u>	
Canada	- HQ UNFICYP and military police	47	581
	- Battalion	<u>53</u>	
Denmark	- HQ UNFICYP and military police	15	292
	- Battalion	<u>277</u>	
Finland	- HQ UNFICYP and military police	11	284
	- Battalion	<u>273</u>	
Ireland	- HQ UNFICYP and military police	13	429
	- Battalion	<u>416</u>	
Sweden	- HQ UNFICYP and military police	10	273
	- Battalion	<u>263</u>	
United Kingdom	- HQ UNFICYP and military police	148	1,093
	- Battalion	619	
	- Reconnaissance Squadron	124	
	- UNFICYP logistic support units	154	
	- Helicopter support	44	
	- Contingent HQ	<u>4</u>	
Total military personnel			3,007

Civilian police

Australia	45
Austria	45
Denmark	40
Sweden	<u>40</u>

Total civilian police 170

TOTAL UNFICYP 3,177

4. The following changes took place during the period covered by this report:

(a) Austria: A partial rotation was carried out.

(b) Canada: The 1st Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, replaced the 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry.

(c) Denmark: The 15th Battalion replaced the 14th Battalion.

(d) Finland: A partial rotation took place. The incoming troops form part of the 15th Finnish Battalion.

(e) Ireland: The 20th Infantry Group replaced the 19th Infantry Group.

(f) Sweden: The 46th Battalion replaced the 45th Battalion.

(g) United Kingdom: The 1st Battalion, the Gordon Highlanders, replaced the 3rd Battalion, the Royal Green Jackets. C Squadron, The Royal Hussars (PWO), replaced C Squadron, The Royal Scots Greys. 1 Squadron, The Royal Corps of Transport, replaced 60 Squadron, The Royal Corps of Transport.

(h) The Government of Australia has informed the Secretary-General of its intention to reduce the Australian Police unit from fifty to forty men. The first five-man reduction took place in May, in connexion with the replacement of one-half of the members of the unit. The second reduction is scheduled for November 1971.

5. The number of manned military observation posts (OPs) has been reduced from fifty-six to fifty-four.

6. The Force is now deployed as follows (see attached map):

HQ UNFICYP, including HQ UNCIVPOL

Combined staff

Force Reserve (British Reconnaissance Squadron)

Austrian Field Hospital

Nicosia District

Canadian Contingent
Danish Civilian Police

Famagusta District

Swedish Contingent
Swedish Civilian Police

Larnaca District

Irish Contingent

Limassol Zone

British Contingent
Australian Civilian Police

Lefka District

Danish Contingent
Austrian Civilian Police

Kyrenia District

Finnish Contingent
Austrian Civilian Police

7. A further review of certain aspects of the Force to make a more economical use of the administrative effort has been completed. As a result, certain reductions have been achieved in the number of vehicles assigned to the Force.

8. The number of UNCIVPOL police stations and sub-stations has remained unchanged during the period covered by this report.

9. The Force remains under the command of Major-General D. Prem Chand. My special representative in Cyprus continues to be Mr. B.F. Osorio-Tafall.

B. Function and guiding principles

10. The function of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus was defined by the Security Council in its resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 in the following terms:

"in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions".

11. That resolution was reaffirmed by the Council in its subsequent resolutions of 13 March, 20 June, 9 August, 25 September and 18 December 1964; 19 March, 15 June, 10 August and 17 December 1965; 16 March, 16 June and 15 December 1966; 19 June and 22 December 1967; 18 March, 18 June and 10 December 1968; 10 June and 11 December 1969; 9 June and 10 December 1970.
12. The guiding principles governing the operation of the Force, as summarized in my report of 10 September 1964 (S/5950, para. 7), remain in effect. The duties of UNCIVPOL are as outlined in my report of 2 May 1964 (S/5679, para. 4).
13. The Political Liaison Committee continues to meet, as a rule, every two weeks. The UNFICYP Deputy Chief of Staff, who acts as Chairman, the Senior Political and Legal Adviser and his staff, the Police Adviser and the Force Economics Officer meet separately with Liaison Officers representing the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, with a view to sorting out specific current intercommunal problems through liaison and discussions. UNFICYP considers that the Committee should not normally be regarded as the venue for the discussion of the basic issues involved in the Cyprus situation, as higher channels are always available for that purpose. Between 2 December 1970 and 19 May 1971, the Committee held thirteen meetings with the Government Political Liaison Officer and twelve with the Turkish Cypriot Liaison Officer.

Casualties

14. During the period under review, UNFICYP has suffered no casualties attributable to intercommunal incidents. Three British soldiers and one British airman have died as a result of accidents.

Discipline

15. The over-all discipline and bearing of the officers and men of the United Nations Force have continued to be of a high order, and reflect credit on the contingent commanders, their staffs and the armed forces of the contributing countries.

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C. Relations with the Government and with
the Turkish Cypriot leadership

16. UNFICYP has maintained, as in the past, close liaison and kept good working relations with the Government of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot leadership.

D. Freedom of movement of the United Nations Force

17. During the period covered by this report, there were eight incidents involving a denial of freedom of movement to UNFICYP elements. Three may be attributed to members of the National Guard and five to Turkish Cypriot fighters. Seven cases were the result of local actions by subordinate commanders and were caused by misunderstandings and, in one instance, allegedly due to orders not having been received.

II. ACTIVITIES TOWARDS PREVENTING A RECURRENCE OF
FIGHTING AND CONTRIBUTING TO THE RESTORATION
AND MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER

A. Military situation

(i) Armed forces in Cyprus other than UNFICYP

(a) Government armed forces

18. The over-all strength, organization and deployment of the National Guard has not changed significantly during the past six months. The call-up of the first half of the 1953 age group took place between the 20th and 22nd of January 1971, while the first half of the 1951 age group was demobilized.

19. Training activity has remained at the same level as in the past, and UNFICYP has been notified in advance of field exercises and live-range firing. As usual, summer training camps are being organized on the north and east coasts of the island.

(b) Turkish Cypriot armed elements

20. There has been no significant change in the over-all strength or deployment of fighter units. The organization is now firmly based on a standard infantry pattern, with a number of districts commanded by the headquarters in Nicosia.

21. Training activity has continued to increase, and UNFICYP has been given notice of field exercises and live firing.

(c) UNFICYP Assessment

22. Although there have been no major changes in the strengths of the National Guard and the Turkish Cypriot fighters, the standards of discipline, training and organization have continued to improve with the passage of time.

(d) Greek and Turkish national contingents

23. The two national contingents have remained in the locations they occupied in 1963, and their strengths remain unchanged. A partial rotation of the Greek National Contingent took place on 15 January 1971. UNFICYP was given advance notice of this rotation and was advised of quantities and types of military stores

imported. Further notifications of the arrival of certain military stores for the contingent were subsequently received and an UNFICYP representative was invited to view the stores at the docks.

24. Half of the Turkish National Contingent was rotated on 26 February 1971. The quantity of ammunition and stores to be imported was negotiated with the Government of Cyprus through UNFICYP's good offices. UNFICYP provided escorts, observers and transport. A major problem arose when the disembarkation of the troops had to be suspended for more than two hours, at the request of the Cyprus Government, as three Turkish patrol boats which had escorted the troop transport approached the coast in the vicinity of Boghaz, to the north of Famagusta. One of the boats came to some 150 metres from the shore, while the other two remained at a distance of about one and a half miles. Turkish Embassy officials on the quay explained to UNFICYP and Cyprus Government representatives that that patrol boat had drifted owing to mechanical trouble; as it was in danger of running aground, they sought the Cyprus Government's consent for the two other patrol boats to render assistance. Permission was granted and the rotation was resumed as soon as all three boats had left the area. There were no further delays but, later in the day, the Cyprus Government complained that one of the Turkish patrol boats was cruising within twelve miles of the coast, the territorial waters limit adopted by Cyprus. These incidents caused tension to rise.

25. The semi-annual rotations of the Turkish National Contingent are strictly speaking a matter between the Governments of Cyprus and Turkey. UNFICYP's good offices and assistance are extended, at the request of both parties, in the context of paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 186 (1964). Each rotation is a delicate operation, requiring considerable preliminary negotiations and preparations by UNFICYP, as well as special security precautions to prevent untoward incidents. Any unusual activities are liable to make this task more difficult; it is hoped therefore that UNFICYP will receive a maximum degree of co-operation in adhering to past practice, so as to facilitate the smooth completion of the rotations. In the exercise of its good offices, UNFICYP specifically checks, in the presence of Cyprus Government officials, the numbers of Turkish military personnel disembarking and embarking during each such operation.

(ii) General assessment of the situation with regard to preventing a recurrence of fighting

26. The military situation has continued to be relatively calm on the surface, but UNFICYP's efforts to bring about a relaxation in the areas of direct confrontation (S/9814, para. 25, and S/10005, para. 34) have failed, as in the past, to produce any positive results. While the level of tension has fluctuated, the atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence, so essential to achieve an improvement of the situation, is still noticeably lacking. Instead, there have been periods of considerable military display and acute sensitivity.
27. The Government has repeatedly expressed its concern at an apparent increase in Turkish Cypriot fighter presence and activity throughout the island, particularly in Limassol and the neighbouring villages. It has also been perturbed at the intensive overt training programmes now being carried out in Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas, coupled with what it believes to be a considerable stepping up of the distribution of locally manufactured arms and ammunition, since full freedom of movement was restored by the Government early in 1968.
28. UNFICYP has maintained a close and constant watch on the situation and, by anticipation and prompt intervention, has on several occasions prevented changes in the status quo that were attempted by local commanders. One such situation developed suddenly in early March 1971 in Paphos District, where the Government Forestry Department was carrying out work on a new track for afforestation purposes which would have passed in the vicinity of Turkish Cypriot fighter positions east of Yallia. UNFICYP wishes to place on record the excellent co-operation received from both sides on that occasion.
29. Throughout most of the period, uniformed Turkish Cypriot fighters, as mentioned in the preceding reports (S/10005, para. 55), continued to appear in the Turkish Cypriot quarter of Limassol, marching to and from their training area. Strong protests by UNFICYP have now had the desired effect and the status quo ante has been restored. There were also quite a few instances of Turkish Cypriot fighters appearing in full uniform and parading with weapons outside the Limassol stadium, thereby changing the status quo.
30. Three shooting incidents have taken place on the Nicosia Green Line during the past six months. Both National Guard and Turkish Cypriot fighters continue to appear on the Green Line from time to time, and work on essential repairs to positions has been carried out. The direct confrontation in this densely populated area continues to be a matter of serious concern to UNFICYP.

(iii) Observance of the cease-fire

31. There were four shooting incidents confirmed by UNFICYP during the period under review. After investigation by UNFICYP, one of these was attributed to Government security forces and three to Turkish Cypriot fighters. In all four cases the shootings could be considered as violations of the cease-fire. In addition, there were six cases of accidental discharge of weapons by National Guard and three cases by Turkish Cypriot fighters.

32. Emphasis continues to be given with encouraging results to the prevention of incidents, as well as to the maintenance of the status quo in sensitive areas.

Summary of shooting incidents

	2 Dec 70 to ...May 71	2 Jun 70 to 1 Dec 70	2 Dec 69 to 1 Jun 70	3 Jun 69 to 1 Dec 69	3 Dec 68 to 2 Jun 69	8 Jun 68 to 2 Dec 68	8 Mar 68 to 7 Jun 68	7 Dec 67 to 7 Mar 68
Nicosia District (from 23 Feb 70)	6	8	5	10	5	16	6	8
Famagusta Zone (until 28 Feb 70)	-	-	3	6	1	1	3	5
Famagusta District (from 1 Mar 70)	2	3	2	-	-	-	-	-
Larnaca District (from 9 Mar 70)	2	-	1	-	-	-	-	-
Limassol Zone (less Kophinou Dist. from 9 Mar 70)	1	1	3	5	7	4	1	6
Lefka District	-	-	-	3	7	11	8	23
Kyrenia District	2	-	2	6	5	33	21	25
TOTAL	13	12	16	30	25	65	39	67

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B. Developments relating to the maintenance
of law and order

33. The UNFICYP civilian police (UNCIVPOL) has continued to contribute to the maintenance of law and order in Cyprus.

34. UNCIVPOL has kept close liaison with the Cyprus Police and the Turkish Cypriot Police element. Both Greek and Turkish Cypriots have continued to show confidence in UNCIVPOL, and this has greatly facilitated their task.

35. During the period under review, UNCIVPOL has conducted about 700 investigations into incidents that might have intercommunal aspects. The variety of inquiries was considerable. Deaths from different causes, accidents, assaults, straying and theft of livestock, illegal cultivation of land, damage to crops and property, as well as unlawful digging for antiquities in the Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas, were the subject of the more frequent investigations. UNCIVPOL continued to lend support to other branches of UNFICYP, e.g., in the field of agriculture and public services (paras. 42-48 below).

36. Twenty-one Greek Cypriots accused of taking part in the raid on the Limassol central police station in May 1970 (S/10005, para. 70) were convicted and sentenced by the Nicosia Assize Court to terms of imprisonment. On 19 January 1971, the President of the Republic suspended the remainder of these prison sentences, as well as those of ten other persons convicted for their participation in the "National Front" illegal organization (S/9814, para. 39). The suspension might be ended at the President's direction at any time. Since then, one of the probationers has been rearrested upon being found carrying a weapon illegally. On the other hand, a Turkish Cypriot, convicted of carrying a machine-gun in a Government-controlled area, and sentenced to four years' imprisonment (S/10005, para. 51), was also released.

37. Since early February, the Cyprus police has been conducting a vigorous campaign against illegal cultivation of, and trafficking in, narcotics, particularly cannabis. Many arrests of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots have been effected. This increase in police activity, especially the stopping and searching of persons and vehicles at temporary roadblocks, and the interrogations at police stations, has led to some complaints from Turkish Cypriots, particularly in March. UNCIVPOL investigated all such complaints brought to its attention and helped to ease the resulting tensions. At present, the number of complaints is considerably lower. For its part, the Turkish Cypriot police element has also taken special measures in Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas to combat narcotics offences.

III. ACTIVITIES TOWARDS A RETURN TO NORMAL CONDITIONS

38. Since my last report (S/10005), there have been no significant changes in regard to a return to normal conditions, with the exception of some developments toward a restoration of public services and in the field of economic co-operation.

39. In the economic field, contacts between Greek and Turkish Cypriots have been maintained, especially in the private sector and in a number of semi-autonomous and non-governmental institutions. The tendency towards separate economic development has, however, not been reversed. On account of poor agricultural production, the rate of growth of the Cyprus economy as a whole in 1970 was slower than in 1969, but other sectors have maintained their upward trend and, except for Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas, conditions of full employment have prevailed. To meet the acute demand for skilled workers in certain trades, various courses open to Greek and Turkish Cypriots alike have been conducted by the Cyprus Productivity Centre. For example, 35 Turkish Cypriots participated in an accelerated training programme for specialization in trades related to the building industry, under the supervision of a Turkish Cypriot instructor especially engaged for the purpose. Twenty Greek and 27 Turkish Cypriots completed courses for welders, auto mechanics, electricians and metal smiths at the Dhekelia Trade Training Centre organized under an agreement concluded between the Cyprus and British Governments. Similarly, Turkish Cypriot students have been attending courses at the Higher Technical Institute and the Hotel and Catering Institute, sponsored by the Government and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) with the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the International Labour Organization (ILO) as executing agencies, respectively.

40. No rapprochement has been noticed on such basic issues as investments and economic policy. The Turkish Cypriot leadership continues to hold the position that, pending an over-all solution of the Cyprus problem, it remains responsible for the economic development of areas under its control, using for this purpose the financial assistance provided by Turkey. Among other measures, a fund has been established to subsidize Turkish Cypriot investment projects and provide medium and long-term agricultural, industrial and commercial credit with the help of co-operatives which have been given increased responsibility in development schemes.

For its part, the Cyprus Government, which is fully aware of the great economic inequality between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, has reiterated its willingness to help raise the latter's living standards and to allocate funds for investments in Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas, provided it has over-all supervision and financial control over such projects.

41. It would seem that it will be difficult to utilize fully and rationally the human and other resources of the island if the present trend towards separate economic development is maintained, especially when the preparation of the new Five-Year Plan for 1972-1976 is in its final stages. It has been suggested in this connexion that one way to foster some form of intercommunal economic co-operation would be the establishment of closer links between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot co-operative movements and regular exchanges of views between Greek and Turkish Cypriots within economic planning institutions (S/10005, para. 75).

42. The severe drought conditions which last year affected the crops in the island's central plain have been alleviated by this year's heavy rainfall. Above average harvests are expected from grape and other fruit crops and from cereals.

43. Turkish Cypriots appear to be taking greater interest in agricultural projects undertaken by the Government with the assistance of the World Food Programme (WFP) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). Thus, at the end of April 1971, out of a total of 1,476 participants in an important mixed farming project (S/9814, paragraph 47), 245 were Turkish Cypriots. In the soil and conservation project (S/9814, paragraph 46), 1069 out of an estimated 10,000 applicants approved for the period October 1970-July 1971 were Turkish Cypriots. It is believed that there is still room for considerably increased Turkish Cypriot participation in this project. It is also anticipated that Turkish Cypriots will take even greater advantage of courses and other activities offered in the project to strengthen veterinary services (S/10005, paragraph 78). Co-operation of the Turkish Cypriot farmers with various produce marketing boards and the Grain Commission continues to be good, but the Turkish Cypriot co-operatives feel that there are still opportunities for further improvement here.

44. As in the past, UNFICYP has assisted in solving disputes between Greek and Turkish Cypriots over such problems as land encroachment and damages due to unauthorized grazing and cultivation. In most cases, complaints have been dealt

with promptly at the local level and settled by payment of compensation to the injured party.

45. Since my last report, there has been further progress towards normalization of public services. Talks on a technical level, initiated by UNFICYP late in 1970 to resume the provision of electricity in Turkish Cypriot villages, are progressing and the Electricity Authority of Cyprus (EAC) is at present carrying out preparatory village surveys. If this whole scheme can be implemented, it will affect about twenty Turkish Cypriot or mixed villages (S/10005, paragraph 79).

46. Though long-standing difficulties over water supply and irrigation still exist, there have been encouraging developments. Chronic water shortages in such Turkish Cypriot villages as Temblos (Kyrenia District), Kivisil, Melousha and Alaminos (Larnaca District) appear to the way to being overcome through new water schemes. These arrangements were facilitated by the readiness of some Turkish Cypriot villages to make payments on long-standing water bills and debts. UNFICYP has assisted in these negotiations and, as in the past, has continued to help in solving a variety of disputes over water.

47. With the assistance of UNFICYP, further efforts have been made to normalize the Cyprus telephone services.

48. Extension of other public services to Turkish Cypriots is envisaged. Negotiations have been initiated concerning postal service facilities, particularly with reference to Ktima and Larnaca, and it is hoped that agreements will soon be reached.

49. There has been little change with regard to the reintegration of Turkish Cypriots into the social insurance scheme, although discussions on the matter are continuing between Greek and Turkish Cypriot experts. It is to be hoped that an agreement on this long-standing issue will soon be forthcoming, because the longer this problem remains unsettled, the greater the difficulties in arriving at a solution (S/10005, paragraphs 81 and 82).

50. UNFICYP has continued its efforts towards assisting the authorities concerned in checking and preventing illegal excavations and also, within the limited resources available to it, in restoration work on certain places of worship.

51. There has been a new development on the question of Turkish Cypriot displaced persons. The Government, through its representative at the intercommunal talks, has put forward a programme for their return to their villages. This plan envisages

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initially a return to thirteen villages by 31 August 1971, when the Government estimates that housing repairs will be completed there. A further eight villages are scheduled to be ready for resettlement by the end of 1971, depending on the willingness of the Turkish Cypriots to return to the first thirteen villages. The Government also states that repair work has been completed already in a further fourteen villages and that these villages are ready for immediate resettlement (S/10005, para. 83).

52. In its programme, the Government reiterates that returning Turkish Cypriots will come under Government administrative control and policing as well as being subject to the jurisdiction of its courts (S/9233, paragraph 47). It also reserves the right to restrict temporarily the return to mixed villages of certain individuals whose presence in its view might cause difficulties to peaceful village coexistence. The Government has further renewed its offer of some provisional resettlement aid (S/9233, paragraph 47), but feels that it cannot consider compensation and damage claims of Turkish Cypriots without at the same time considering Greek Cypriot claims. Furthermore, assistance given will be based on current needs and not on damage suffered in the past.

53. It is understood that Mr. Denktash has asked Mr. Clerides for a number of clarifications and that the two interlocutors are currently reviewing certain details in the Government proposals. Among other items, Mr. Denktash has suggested that a mixed committee be formed to examine the question of rehabilitation aid, preferably with UNFICYP participation. However, the Government is of the opinion that the administrative machinery and procedure used by Greek Cypriot displaced persons should also be adequate for Turkish Cypriots. This means that each displaced person would submit an application for assistance to his district officer who, after a preliminary investigation, would refer it for evaluation to a committee of three civil servants from the Ministries of Finance, Interior and Labour and Social Insurance.

54. The current exchange of views on the Government's proposals is receiving wide coverage from both the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot media and reactions on both sides have been varied.

55. Apart from its proposals for resettlement, the Government reports that it has spent considerable funds on repairs to Turkish Cypriot buildings in a number of villages over the past four years (S/9814, paragraph 56). However, in some

villages such as Nisou, Kithasi, Prastio (Limassol), Peristerona, only a small number of displaced persons have returned. In others, such as Skylloura, Ayios Vasilies, Lapithos and Dhorios, the Government reports that it has made repairs to damaged buildings, but no Turkish Cypriots appear to be returning.

56. An encouraging trend towards the resettlement of the mixed village of Potamia (Nicosia District) appears to have been marred by some unfortunate incidents which occurred between November 1970 and March 1971, involving Turkish Cypriots and the local Cyprus police. These incidents have been investigated by UNCIVPOL and have been discussed with appropriate Ministries and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, and UNFICYP has made efforts to remove the sources of friction. It is hoped that the tensions in Potamia and, to a lesser degree, in some other villages, have now been eased and that they will not impair the progress towards reaching a general solution to this long-standing problem.

57. Again it is regretted that there has been no improvement on the problem of freedom of movement (S/10005, paragraph 85). The Government has repeatedly expressed its disapproval of the policy of the Turkish Cypriot leadership in denying to Greek Cypriots the use of a number of major public roads. Complaints are also still being received from areas where Greek Cypriot farmers are being denied access to fields which lie in Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas, particularly in the Chatos/Lefkoniko region. The Turkish Cypriot leadership has made it clear that its position on the question of freedom of movement remains unchanged, and that the passage of Greek Cypriots through Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas is linked with the security of its community as well as other aspects of the Cyprus problem which are under discussion at the intercommunal talks.

58. UNFICYP continues to operate convoys on the Nicosia-Kyronia road and to provide emergency escorts for Greek Cypriots through certain Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas. It is also called upon to use its good offices in securing the release of Greek Cypriot individuals who stray outside Government-controlled areas. UNFICYP continues to hold the view expressed in previous reports (S/9814, paragraph 59), that it should be possible, pending a solution to the political problems, to arrange the opening to civilian traffic of at least some main public roads, such as the Famagusta/Chatos/Nicosia road and the Pyrgos/Kokkina/Pelis road which are at present closed to Greek Cypriots (S/10005, paragraph 86).

IV. INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS

59. Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash have continued to meet in private. They have had twelve meetings in the fourth round of their talks, which began on 21 September 1970 (S/10005, para. 98). On 30 November 1970, Mr. Clerides is reported to have put forward certain views aimed at bridging, through a "package deal", remaining differences concerning the executive, legislative and judiciary as well as on the public service, the police and "local government". During the ensuing meetings, the interlocuters are said to have focused their attention primarily on the issue of "local government", but the question of displaced persons has also come under considerable review, particularly in February and early March (see paras. 51-55 above).

60. There were no meetings between 29 March and 28 April, as Mr. Denktash had gone to Ankara for consultations with the new Turkish Government. Prior to Mr. Denktash's departure, Mr. Clerides conveyed to him in writing his Government's position on a number of pending issues as well as clarifications of the proposals he had submitted to him on 30 November 1970. Shortly after Mr. Denktash's return it was announced that he had communicated to Mr. Clerides his side's stand on various matters, including an outline of a "package deal".

61. In a number of public statements, Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash made it clear that, although they still disagreed on fundamental principles, they would continue the talks in an effort to find a peaceful solution. In replying to a question put to him by a journalist, Mr. Denktash, in the presence of Mr. Clerides, made it clear that there would be no time-limit to their discussions and that they did not think they had wasted time since June 1968 when the talks started; however, it had to be borne in mind that any unnecessary prolongation was harmful as new factors might come up, causing increased difficulties. For his part, Mr. Clerides stressed that it was imperative to continue the talks because they constituted the only way to a peaceful settlement. He reiterated in public, inter alia, that the solution to be found must be based on the principle of a unitary State and that a partitionist, federal, cantonal or any other such arrangement would not be acceptable, as this would be tantamount to the creation of a State within a State. Mr. Clerides said that, within the framework of these principles, his side had

formulated and presented the proposals of 30 November 1970, safeguarding the Turkish Cypriot representation in a single executive, legislative and judiciary and their participation in State administrative organs in proportion to their population strength, as well as envisaging an expansion of "local government". These proposals, in which, Mr. Clerides said, he budged from his original position, exhausted the negotiating margins; any conciliatory move would therefore have to come from the Turkish Cypriots. He added that if there was no constructive response, the local talks would be led into a state of stagnation and would run the risk of being turned into a high level "liaison committee" engaged in problems of a current nature. For his part, Mr. Denktash stated that the Turkish Cypriots wanted a solution which would not be used by the Greek Cypriots as a springboard to union of Cyprus with Greece (Enosis) and which would be based on the separate existence and partnership of the two communities. He emphasized in this context that since the start of the intercommunal talks all Turkish Cypriot proposals were calculated to keep the door to Enosis closed, through permanent and guaranteed independence. Mr. Denktash explained to the press that in his latest letter of 28 April to Mr. Clerides, he had offered certain suggestions which he hoped would be viewed in the spirit in which they were made.

62. In two letters dated 24 March and 1 April 1971 respectively, addressed to me through the Permanent Mission of Turkey (S/10174 and S/10179), Vice-President Kuchuk spoke of certain ominous developments which were giving his community cause for anxiety. In particular, he took exception to a passage of a speech delivered by President Makarios on 14 March in a village of the Karpas Peninsula (Famagusta District) in which the President was quoted as saying that Cyprus was Greek and would be delivered undivided to Greece. Dr. Kuchuk stressed that this statement and similar pro-Enosis statements by other leading Greek Cypriot personalities could only undermine the meaning and effect of the intercommunal talks and lead to grave consequences for international peace. He re-emphasized in this connexion that his community stood for a peaceful solution on the basis of independence, guaranteed fully and effectively against Enosis, and retaining the political status of partnership of the two communities. Similar views were expressed by the Turkish Government, e.g. in the communiqué of 17 April on Mr. Denktash's talks in Ankara, which made it known that the Turkish Government

and the Turkish Cypriot community would continue constructive and patient efforts for finding a peaceful solution which, apart from securing the balance of rights and interests set up between the two communities under the Agreements, would also have to be placed within a framework that would effectively preserve the independence of Cyprus and would prevent any new interference with the international status of Cyprus or its Constitution.

63. On 6 April the Cyprus Government, following a special Council of Ministers meeting, announced that its basic line of policy remained unchanged and continued to be the pursuit of the local talks, which were the only correct procedure for a solution of the Cyprus problem. When questioned shortly thereafter by a journalist on the matter of Enosis, President Makarios replied that the national aspirations of a people could not be repudiated but that the question of Enosis did not depend on the will and the desire of the Greek Cypriot people alone. His Foreign Minister, Mr. Kyprianou, in an interview on 24 April, declared that the aim of the local talks was a constitutional restructure of a unitary State; the talks did not aim at examining the nature of independence and generally the external aspect of the Cyprus question, which would be the subject of deliberations at another level. He added that the Turkish stand for fettered independence was a basic element in the policy for the creation of a situation which would promote partition by means of outside interventions.

64. As to the Greek Government, its Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Xanthopoulos-Palamas, emphasized in a press conference on 24 April that his Government was doing everything possible to promote progress in the intercommunal talks, and expressed the hope that both sides would show a spirit of constructive contribution towards finding a peaceful solution.

65. On 6 May the Permanent Representative of Cyprus, Ambassador Rossides, in a letter addressed to me (S/10187), alluded to Dr. Kuchuk's communications of 24 March and 1 April and indicated inter alia that, Cyprus having been predominantly Greek in character through the millenia, its preservation as a single undivided unit was a historical responsibility, and that the natural ethnic sentiments of a large majority of Cypriot people for union with Greece had never been concealed and were well known in the United Nations. Ambassador Rossides stressed that the Government of Cyprus had nevertheless decided to exert every effort for the achievement of a peaceful and lasting solution of the problem on the

basis of a sovereign, independent and unitary State, as provided in General Assembly resolution 2077 (XX) of 18 December 1965, which the Government of Cyprus was ready and willing to implement in its entirety. It had been considered, the Permanent Representative continued, that union with Greece was not realistically achievable; it was the Turkish side which during the last thirty months had been striving to demonstrate that it was bent on rendering the solution of an independent unitary State also non-achievable. In his letter, the Permanent Representative of Cyprus also complained about the Turkish Cypriots' refusal to reciprocate the gestures of goodwill and the normalization measures taken by the Government. He further took exception to certain parts of a speech made by Dr. Kuchuk at Alaminos on 10 April 1971 in which, according to Ambassador Rossides, Dr. Kuchuk said that Cyprus would become Turkish and the Greeks would be thrown out, and that the Turkish Cypriot villagers should avoid any economic, social and other contacts with the Greeks.^{1/}

66. In another letter, dated 3 May 1971, addressed to me (S/10185), the Permanent Representative of Cyprus, on instructions from his Government, drew attention to a number of statements made by high Turkish Government officials, which he described as bellicose and seemingly calculated to create and intensify tension. Ambassador Rossides objected to the Turkish Cypriots being called by Prime Minister Erim "our fellow citizens" and to Cyprus being referred to by the spokesman of the Turkish Foreign Ministry as the "68th province of Turkey". The Permanent Representative's letter reiterated moreover that the local talks had been practically stalled by Turkish Cypriot insistence on introducing new and more partitionist elements under the guise of "local government".

67. The Permanent Representative of Turkey replied to Ambassador Rossides' communication of 3 May (S/10185) in a letter which he addressed to the Secretary-General on 12 May 1971 (S/10194). He wrote that the Turkish side stood firmly by the 1960 Treaties which prohibited both Enosis and partition, while the Greek Cypriot leaders had made it plain that Enosis was their real aim. Ambassador Bayulken said that Prime Minister Erim had been misquoted by Ambassador Rossides since Mr. Erim had referred to the Turkish Cypriots not as "fellow citizens" but as "fellow kinsmen". Mr. Bayulken added that the reference to Cyprus as the "68th province of Turkey" was a "non-statement by an unidentified, imaginary Turkish spokesman".

^{1/} In a letter to the Secretary-General dated 17 May 1971 (S/10200), Dr. Kuchuk indicated that this statement was "concocted" by the Greek Cypriot press and had been publicly refuted by him. /...

68. On his return from Ankara on 19 April 1971, Mr. Denktash said that no one could stop the Greek side from finding out what the Greek Cypriots wanted about the future of Cyprus. This was their right. But there arose at the same time the right of the Turkish Cypriots to determine their own future vis-à-vis the independence which they owned together with the Greek Cypriots.

69. In a statement issued on 5 May, Mr. Denktash said with reference to the concepts of "unitary state" and "unfettered independence" that the intercommunal balance set out by the 1959-1960 Agreements must be maintained, thus respecting the political and juridical status of the Turkish Cypriot community. The Agreements had created a bi-communal unitary sovereign State. Mr. Denktash stressed on the same occasion that what his side wanted was not to fetter the independence of Cyprus but to continue the present guarantees which had saved the independence of Cyprus during the past seven years.

V. GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

70. As in the past, the good offices exercised on my behalf by my Special Representative in Cyprus, Mr. Osorio-Tafall, have, during the period covered by this report, continued to be available to the parties directly concerned. He has maintained close contact with the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership and has continued to be informed by Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash, whom he has met regularly, of the substance and prospects of their discussions.

VI. MEDIATION EFFORT

71. The situation regarding a resumption of the mediation function under paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 186 (1964) has remained unchanged since my last report, owing primarily to the widely differing and firmly held views on the matter of the three Governments most directly concerned.

VII. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

72. The costs to be borne by the Organization for the operation of UNFICYP for the period from its inception on 27 March 1964 to 15 June 1971 are estimated at \$128,514,000. This total does not include the amounts which would be required for the final repatriation of contingents and liquidation costs.

73. As at 19 May 1971, payments and pledges of voluntary contributions received from forty-nine Member States and four non-member Governments to cover those costs total the equivalent of \$120,826,582. To the above may be added \$1,102,000 which have been received as at 31 March 1971 from interest earned on investment of temporarily surplus funds, public contributions, gains on exchange and other miscellaneous income.

74. Accordingly, unless additional contributions are received, there will be a deficit on 15 June 1971 in the amount of approximately \$6,585,000, on the assumption that all pledges will be paid in full. It is necessary to point out, however, that this foreseeable deficit could increase to approximately \$16,868,000 in view of the limitation upon which the ultimate contribution of one Government against its pledges is conditioned; in consequence of this position, the United Nations cannot safely count on receiving payment of the full amount pledged by that Government unless additional contributions are received from other Governments.

75. If the Security Council should decide to extend for six months beyond 15 June 1971 the period during which the Force is to be stationed in Cyprus, it is estimated that the additional cost to the Organization, including the amount of \$458,000 as the cost of final repatriation of contingents and liquidation costs and assuming continuance of present reimbursement commitments, would be as follows:

UNFICYP COST ESTIMATE BY MAJOR CATEGORIES OF EXPENSE
(in thousands of US dollars)

I. Operation costs incurred by the United Nations

Movement of contingents	448
Operational expenses	555
Rental of premises	96
Rations	380
Non-military personnel, salaries, travel, etc.	775
Miscellaneous and contingencies	205
	<hr/>
Total, Part I	2,459

II. Reimbursement of extra costs of Governments providing contingents

Pay and allowances	3,600
Contingent-owned equipment	320
Death and disability awards	50
	<hr/>
Total, Part II	3,970
Grand total: Parts I and II	<u>6,429</u>

76. The above costs do not reflect the full costs of UNFICYP to Member and non-member States, since they exclude the extra costs which Members providing contingents or police units to the Force have agreed to absorb at their own expense rather than to seek as reimbursement from the United Nations. Based on reports received from certain of the Governments providing contingents or police units to the Force, the estimated amount of such extra costs which Governments would absorb at their own expense for an additional six-month period, if the mandate of UNFICYP is extended and the Governments concerned agree to continue the present arrangements, are as follows: Australia \$200,000, Austria \$160,000, Canada^{1/} \$904,707, Denmark \$230,000, Sweden \$485,000 and United Kingdom \$780,000. Finland and Ireland are also absorbing certain UNFICYP costs at their own expense.

^{1/} Exclusive of the cost of normal pay and allowances.

77. In order to finance the costs to the Organization of maintaining the Force for a period of six months after 15 June 1971 and to meet all costs and outstanding claims up to that date, it will be necessary for the Secretary-General to receive contributions totalling \$13,014,000, on the assumption that all pledges made so far will be paid in full.

VIII. OBSERVATIONS

78. It is with concern that I am compelled to report to the Security Council that in the period under review there has been little perceptible improvement in the situation in Cyprus and no indication of progress toward a negotiated solution of the underlying problems of the island. On the contrary, there has, on occasion, been a tendency on the part of spokesmen both for the Cyprus Government and for the Turkish Cypriot community to adopt uncompromising attitudes in their public statements. This has resulted in an aggravation of tension rather than in the relaxation which can best provide the climate for progress towards basic solutions.

79. Although the situation in the island remains apparently calm, recent developments have served to show once again the depth of feeling which still divides the two communities. The continuation of this situation is all the more hazardous because of the persistent confrontation of two well-armed military forces which continue to improve in operational capability with the passage of time. UNFICYP has continued, in pursuit of its mandate, to exert its best efforts to bring about a change in this situation and to prevent a recurrence of fighting.

80. I and my collaborators in UNFICYP have repeatedly urged all the parties concerned in the Cyprus problem to exercise restraint and moderation and especially to avoid the threat, or the use, of drastic retaliatory measures, which at worst would give rise to a renewed and acute conflict and at best can only cause a prolonged period of tension in the island. It is, in my view, essential to preserve the present calm in an effort to foster a genuine improvement in the relations between all the peoples of the island. Indeed, the increased co-operation in economic matters among various sections of the Cyprus population and the progressive extension of public services to the Turkish Cypriots are among the few really encouraging features of the period under review.

81. Despite the difficulties of the present situation, I remain firmly convinced that the best interest of all parties lies in continuing - in a genuine spirit of give and take - the intercommunal talks. These talks are unquestionably not only the best but in the present circumstances probably the only way to an agreed

settlement. It seems more than likely that if the intercommunal talks were to break down or to end in complete and admitted failure, a new and major crisis would shortly erupt in Cyprus. Such a crisis would not only have the gravest consequences for the people of the island, but might well also constitute a serious threat to peace and security in the eastern Mediterranean. This is an additional reason why progress in the intercommunal talks is so crucially important.

82. I sincerely hope that both of the above-mentioned considerations will give impetus to the efforts of the parties to the talks to reach agreement on the substantive issues under discussion, on some of which their positions, while still far apart in substance, have in fact been clarified and even brought somewhat closer together in the course of the past six months. What is lacking, and needs to be restored, is the parties' mutual confidence in each other's good faith and ultimate political objectives. I have noted with concern statements both by Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders which have lent themselves to serious misapprehension in this regard and have tended to erode mutual confidence. The fact is that Greek Cypriots find it difficult to accept any agreement which they fear will result, sooner or later, in partition. Similarly, Turkish Cypriots are alarmed at statements suggesting that some Greek Cypriots hope to arrive at the kind of settlement which will be a direct stepping stone to enosis with Greece.

83. In my view, what is needed to overcome this difficulty is an exercise of statesmanship by leaders of all the parties concerned whereby they would restate publicly their determination that the problem of Cyprus must be solved by arriving, through peaceful means, at a lasting agreement based on the independence and sovereignty of a unitary State of Cyprus. An undertaking of this kind could do much to clear up the present atmosphere of suspicion and hesitation and might thus serve to give a renewed impetus to the intercommunal talks.

84. In my last report, to the Security Council, I recommended for special attention two problems of crucial importance for a return to normal conditions. The first of these is the long-standing question of the Turkish Cypriot displaced persons. On this matter the Government has put forward a formula designed to be

a first step toward the solution of the problem. At the time of writing the Turkish Cypriot leadership, although it has requested clarification of the Government's formula, has stated its disagreement with some of its basic provisions. As a result there has, so far, been little progress in the resettlement and rehabilitation of a substantial number of refugees. The second problem is the question of de-escalation and deconfrontation by the military forces in the island. Although this has for a long time now been the subject of persistent efforts by UNFICYP, I regret to have to report that no substantial progress has been made during the period under review. An important factor in this impasse is the contention of the Turkish Cypriot leadership that a return to normal conditions in this field cannot take place without impairing its position with regard to the basic issues of the Cyprus problem which are under discussion in the intercommunal talks.

85. Another aspect of normalization is the question of freedom of movement through Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas for unarmed Greek Cypriot civilians. I take this opportunity to restate my hope that an early solution of this problem may be forthcoming.

86. There are strong indications that, unless a bold, imaginative and sincere effort is made on all sides to bridge the existing difficulties, Cyprus may be entering a new period of tension in which little substantial progress toward the solution of the main problems can be expected and the danger of renewed unrest is seriously to be feared. In such a situation I have no alternative but to recommend the extension of UNFICYP's mandate for a further period of six months until 15 December 1971. It is my understanding that all the parties principally concerned are in agreement with this recommendation. Although the possibility of a further reduction in the strength of the Force has been under constant consideration, it has become increasingly clear that, despite the highly unsatisfactory budgetary situation of UNFICYP, any sizable reduction of the operation would be inadvisable until an appreciable degree of deconfrontation between the forces on the island, at least in the more sensitive areas, can be achieved.

87. This is the nineteenth time that I have recommended to the Security Council the extension of the mandate of UNFICYP. The prospect of an apparently indefinite commitment for the United Nations in Cyprus poses fundamental problems for the

Organization in facing its responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security. I do not believe that it would be either possible or wise to postpone for very much longer a comprehensive review of this problem. I hope that members of the Security Council will give it the most serious consideration in the coming months and will give thought especially to constructive alternatives to the present arrangement.

88. In concluding this report, I wish to express my warm appreciation to the Governments which have provided contingents and personnel for UNFICYP, and to those who have made voluntary contributions for the support of the operation. I also take this opportunity to pay tribute to my Special Representative, to the Force Commander, to all the officers and men and to the civilian staff of UNFICYP, who have continued to carry out, with exemplary efficiency and devotion, the important task assigned to them by the Security Council.

MEDITERRANEAN SEA


One Sect UNICIVPOL (Australia)

One Sect UNICIVPOL (Sweden)

Cape Andreas

32°30' 33°00' 33°30' 34°00'

35° 30' 35° 00' 34° 30'



MAP NO. 1528 REV.18 UNITED NATIONS
MAY 1971

The boundaries shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

DEPLOYMENT OF UNFICYP
MAY 1971

