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
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Namibia:

The Crisis in United States Policy Toward Southern Africa

Produced By:

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African Heritage Studies Association
American Committee on Africa
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Foreword and Recommendations

The Ambassador to the United Nations from the People's Republic of Angola, Elisio de Figueiredo, recently stated that the story of Namibia is the story of Africa, the history of Namibia is the history of Africa, and the tragedy of Namibia is the tragedy of Africa. We, the co-producers of this report on Namibia and the negotiations on United Nations Security Council Resolution 435, believe that the story of Namibia is also a tragedy for people of conscience around the world. It is a story of a proud and energetic people who have been subdued by force. It is a story of institutionalized racism and the export of the barbarous system of apartheid to a country whose independence is long overdue. Most critically, it is a story of a failed effort on the part of five western nations to compel South Africa to live up to norms of international law and conduct. South Africa's continued intransigence, despite the good-faith negotiations of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), its principal opponent in Namibia and the leader of the Namibian people's struggle for independence and freedom, has made a final settlement in Namibia ever more illusive.

The co-producers of this report believe it necessary to bring to the public's attention, once again, the magnitude of suffering that South Africa's rule has brought to the Namibian people. The transplanted system of apartheid not only represses the legitimate rights of the people to political participation, freedom from detention without trial and summary execution, and the right to participate fully in the economic life of the country, but it also creates economic and social disparities that make the indigenous people of Namibia among the poorest on earth. The story of Namibia, therefore, must focus on the legitimate rights of its people; it is not simply the story of diplomatic maneuverings and protracted negotiations.

As Americans, we also believe it important to provide a concise history of America's involvement with Namibia, and its involvement in international efforts to seek a peaceful solution to the Namibian crisis that will result in full independence for that nation.

Since South Africa's control over Namibia was made illegal officially in 1966, the territory's future has presented a relatively straightforward question of self-determination for the 1.5 million people who live there. Unfortunately, this rather clear objective has become tangled in a web of false solutions and extraneous issues. It is useful to examine the policies pursued by American administrations toward Namibia in the context of overall American interests and objectives in the southern Africa region.

Officially, the United States has opposed South African rule in Namibia since the UN revoked Pretoria's mandate in 1966. However, tempered by its economic, political, and strategic interests in the region, and by an often shortsighted perception of how best to protect those interests, the U.S. has failed to move South Africa.

U.S. economic interests in sub-Saharan Africa are heavily concentrated in the southern third of the continent. Nearly \$3 billion of direct investment, or about 60 percent of the sub-Saharan total, is located there. US-southern Africa trade totals more than \$6 billion. The area contains immense deposits of many strategic minerals that

are vital to industrial economies such as that of the United States, including the platinum group, manganese, vanadium, chromium and cobalt as well as a dominant share of the world's gold and diamond output and an internationally significant output of coal, uranium, copper and other minerals. With regional stability, the nations of the area could prosper and serve as a dynamic center for African economic progress. However, during the current regional turmoil the economic potential of the region is unrealized.

The U.S. has an interest in maintaining positive diplomatic and political relations with all of Africa, especially in international organizations. The support of these countries is largely influenced by their perception of U.S. policy toward apartheid in South Africa and Pretoria's illegal rule in Namibia. In South Africa and Namibia, the U.S. often has stated its support of political freedom and civil liberties for all the people of these countries and for an end to the illegal Pretoria control over Namibia. The denial of democratic majority rule in South Africa and Namibia risks an escalation of violence in the region that could destroy chances for economic development for years to come. It also risks triggering bitter controversy in the U.S. that could erode the consensus favoring progress on race relations here.

Finally, the U.S. has stated a goal of protecting its military and strategic interests in the region, and of minimizing Soviet influence in southern Africa. The Cape sea route is of strategic importance to the United States because much of the oil destined for the West is shipped along that route. Many of the minerals from several states in the region are also considered strategic for their use in U.S. production of military hardware.

For many years, American administrations believed that the best way to protect most of these interests was simply to maintain an unofficial alliance with the apartheid regime of South Africa. They theorized that economic and strategic interests mattered most, and that political interests were not immediately threatened because of the presence of the Portuguese colonial empire in southern Africa and independent Africa's dire need for economic aid from the U.S. Domestically, it was thought that a rhetorical condemnation of apartheid and a low profile on the questions of Namibia by the American government could forestall any large-scale criticism of U.S. policies toward the region.

There is a new reality in southern Africa. Moreover, the view outlined above has now lost credibility because of the failures it produced in the mid-1970s. U.S. economic interests are increasingly endangered by the possibility of the region's war escalating to the point of threatening U.S. "business as usual." As a result of South Africa's intransigence and its aggression in the region, the Soviet Union has gained significant influence in southern Africa. Moscow's influence results, in large measure, from its tangible support for the forces of change in the region that, for decades, have been seeking to end colonial exploitation and white minority rule. Concomitantly, U.S. influence in Africa has eroded because it was perceived as being on the wrong side of the conflicts in Mozambique and Angola, in Rhodesia (now known as Zimbabwe), in Namibia and in South Africa itself.

U.S. involvement and leadership in the negotiations for a Namibia settlement since 1977 have provided the US with new opportunities to strengthen its position in Africa and to create a more stable environment in the region for development.

Yet, the present administration's general posture of "constructive engagement" with the Pretoria regime may serve to undermine all the salutary good that could have flowed from a successful completion of the Namibia negotiations. Constructive Engagement argues that by having closer ties with Pretoria, Washington can quietly work to influence its behavior. As has been stated, little that is "constructive" has resulted from

the "engagement" with South Africa. South Africa has increased its intransigence in the context of the Resolution 435 negotiations; has stepped up its aggression against neighboring sovereign states; and has tightened the noose of oppression on its indigenous population by expediting its homeland policies; further curtailing black political rights; and by seeking to eliminate black leadership or organized opposition to apartheid.

A Namibia settlement would promote U.S. interests in southern Africa and Namibia by:

- Enhancing diplomatic credibility for the U.S. in Africa and advancing U.S. political influence in southern Africa in particular;
- Facilitating an eventual withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.
- Allowing the U.S. to pursue greater economic relations with Angola and an independent Namibia and to promote economic development in the region generally.

It often has been stated that the principal U.S. objective in the region is to curtail the expansion of the Soviet presence and influence in order to protect U.S. strategic interests. If this assertion is correct, then a speedy, peaceful settlement of the Namibia conflict is the best course to pursue. In this fashion, the U.S. would gain the credibility necessary to begin the difficult, and long overdue task, of working for a real democratic solution in South Africa itself. In the eyes of the current administration, the U.S. must "lay down a mantle of authority" in the region to assure security, stability and economic progress for the nations of southern Africa. Let that "authority" mean "positive influence" on the side of the legitimate aspirations of the majority of the region's people who have been exploited and repressed for so long. These people will soon be the masters of southern Africa's future.

Recommendations

After evaluating a detailed analysis of the historical and current situation in Namibia, we wish to make four specific recommendations:

- The United States should remove the issue of the Cuban presence in Angola from the negotiations on Namibian independence. The Cuban presence is not an issue under the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 435, and its interjection into the negotiations has given aid and comfort to South Africa's intransigence, and has allowed South Africa the luxury of time so that it may proceed with an unacceptable "internal" settlement that will perpetuate the apartheid system within Namibia, albeit under another guise.
- We call upon Congress to pass a resolution or other appropriate legislation urging that the U.S. negotiating position be conformed to this view, and expressing the sense of the Congress that the administration should adopt a firmer position with South Africa. This position should include the threat of withdrawing all military, political and economic support should South Africa's intransigence continue.
- We urge the State Department to work more closely with other nations in the Western Contact Group to devise a more aggressive negotiating strategy with the South Africans, and to explore various political and economic pressures of a multilateral nature, including consideration of adopting Chapter VII sanctions

under the United Nation's charter.

- The current administration should begin to disengage from bilateral relations with South Africa if the talks continue to be unsuccessful. Moreover, the U.S. should first proceed with the recision of those new elements in the United States-South African relationship that have been created as part of this administration's "constructive engagement" policy. This would include an end to the training of the South African Coast Guard, decreases in or elimination of South Africa's honorary consulates and defense attaches in the United States, a re-imposition of export controls on items to the South African military and police, and a refusal to receive South African dignitaries. In addition, as part of the process of disengagement, the United States should wholeheartedly support the multilateral pressures described above.

Hopefully, this report will confirm the validity of these recommendations and will heighten the awareness of the readers and the American people of the need for a stronger and more vigorous posture toward South Africa. And, hopefully this report will reaffirm in the minds of all who are concerned for freedom, justice, equality and the right to self-determination that the SWAPO cause and the cause of the Namibian people is a just one. It must have our political and economic support in the days ahead.

History

The original Namibians were the San and the Khoi Khoi; they were later joined by the Herero and the Nama peoples, who were traditionally cattle herders. It is believed that the Damara arrived with the Nama, and worked among them as herdsmen. The pastoral Ovambos, who grew maize and raised cattle, lived in the north. They were the largest group, and the only predominantly agricultural tribe. The Ovambos produced surpluses that supported development of skilled craftsmen such as blacksmiths, potters and woodcarvers.¹

By the time Europeans arrived, they found various highly organized social and political systems among the indigenous people. Collective ownership of natural resources prevailed. Grazing rights were a frequent cause for dispute, but the concept of individual ownership and large-scale dispossessions of land was introduced by whites.²

The first Europeans to land on the Namibian coast were the Portuguese, who arrived in 1484. They were followed by other Portuguese, Dutch, and British expeditions. By the late 1700s trade relations were fairly well developed. Larger groups of European missionaries, traders and businessmen arrived throughout the latter part of the 19th Century. The Germans colonized parts of Namibia in the 1880s in an effort to build an empire in Africa. This marked the beginning of the conflict between Britain and Germany for possession of the coastal areas of present-day Namibia. The Germans expanded their control inland through purchases and so-called "treaties of protection" with rival chiefs. In 1890, they signed an agreement with the British to allocate acquired territories in the region.³ Thus, German South West Africa, a territory three times the size of Britain, was created, while the British retained Walvis Bay.

German Rule

German colonial exploitation was extremely brutal; it encountered sustained resistance from African communities and resulted in rebellions throughout the late 1890s with constant warfare between 1904 and 1908. The colonizers responded to these strong uprisings of the Herero and Nama peoples by conducting the 20th century's first genocide. Extermination campaigns in concentration camps resulted in the massacre of 54,000 of the 70,000 Herero people and 30,000 of the 50,000 Nama.⁴ Survivors were dispossessed of all their land, and their political and social structures were destroyed, leaving them to become a large, cheap wage labor pool for white employers. White settlement rapidly increased and laws were enacted that institutionalized racial oppression in a manner suggesting the system of apartheid that South Africa would impose years later.

League of Nations: South Africa's Mandate

During World War I, South African troops, acting on British orders, occupied the German colony of South West Africa. In 1920, South Africa was given a mandate by the newly formed League of Nations to administer the territory. Under the terms of the mandate, South Africa was to "promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants."⁵ These terms were ignored and additional laws were enacted to deny Africans political rights and to ensure a cheap labor supply. Among the new restrictions were the Master and Servants Proclamation of 1920, the Pass Laws of 1922, and the Contract Labor System formalized in 1925.⁶ Frequent uprisings were crushed, and the population was subdued by force.

The United Nations

When the League of Nations was superseded by the United Nations in 1945, countries administering League of Nations Mandates entered into UN Trusteeship Agreements drawn to eventuate in full independence for the territories. However, South Africa refused the Trusteeship System - the only mandatory power to do so - and demanded the full incorporation of Namibia into the Union of South Africa. When the UN refused to accept this demand, South Africa proceeded to ignore the UN's authority over the matter.⁷

In 1948, The Afrikaner National Party came to power in South Africa. The new regime made Namibia a fifth, *de facto*, province of South Africa, providing six seats for members of Parliament from Namibia in the South African parliament.⁸ In 1950, the International Court of Justice ruled that South Africa could not unilaterally change the status of Namibia and that the Mandate was still in force. South Africa ignored this ruling, enacting legislation that imposed the National Party's *apartheid* policy on the people of the territory.

With the passage of Resolution 2145 in 1966, the UN General Assembly terminated South Africa's mandate and placed Namibia under UN control. In 1969, the Security Council concurred in this action by adopting Resolution 264, which declared South African occupation illegal and called on South Africa to withdraw from Namibia. It also called for international diplomatic and economic isolation of South Africa whenever it acted on behalf of Namibia.

In 1971, the International Court of Justice at the Hague confirmed the UN action declaring South Africa's occupation illegal, and concluded that the only legal action South Africa could take would be to withdraw. Yet, South Africa continued to defy the world community and remained in Namibia. Despite South Africa's claims that administering Namibia was a financial drain and that it was charitable for Pretoria to govern Namibia, its determination to maintain control over Namibia reflected the extent to which Namibia was and is a source of wealth for South Africa.

America's Economic Ties with Namibia

American economic and political involvement in Namibia began in the latter part of the 18th Century through extensive trading with the Namibian people and whaling in Namibia's waters. An influx of American missionaries and miners increased American involvement between the 1840s and 1860s.⁹ American commercial interests in Namibia continued to grow even after Germany formally colonized the territory near the end of the 19th Century.

When South African control replaced German colonial rule at the end of World War I, American investment in Namibia expanded. However, after the war, the United States

under President Woodrow Wilson was responsible, in large part, for preventing South Africa from annexing Namibia as it had hoped to do.¹⁰ South Africa was given a mandate to administer the territory instead, and American private investment continued to grow. At this time, U.S. investors were concentrated in the transportation sector and in Namibia's fashion fur trade.

After World War II, new American investment grew in the mining sector. This proved to be extremely profitable area, because of the vast mineral resources of the land and the large cheap labor pool created by South African exploitation of the populace through the contract labor system. In the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, U.S. investment grew more and encompassed new sectors, such as the fishing industry and off-shore mining. Today, approximately 130 American transnational corporations trade in Namibia. Thirty-five (35) maintain a direct presence in the territory. More than 70 percent of these companies entered Namibia through contracts with South Africa after the United Nations, with U.S. support, officially revoked South Africa's mandate over the territory in 1966.¹¹

Inside Namibia

In 1964, South Africa directly imposed its apartheid policy on Namibia by dividing the country into separate "bantustans" or "homelands" for the African population along ethnic lines. Using this device, South Africa hoped to convince the world that it was leading each "ethnic group" toward self-determination in order to gain international acceptance. These policies, which are virtually the same as those imposed on the African majority in South Africa, have several aims and objectives, including:

- To divide the Namibian nation along racial and ethnic lines and to foster tribal divisions through South African-promoted "ethnic" governments.
- To suppress the consciousness of national unity that had grown from early anti-colonial revolts.
- To ensure a continuous supply of cheap African labor to the white economy by forcing Africans into arid, small "homelands" that cannot sustain the population.
- To deprive black people of any rights in "white areas" where they work by making them "citizens" of a "homeland."
- To transfer repressive powers to the "homeland" governments while retaining overall control.¹²

These policies, along with a host of other repressive laws, have had a devastating effect on the lives of black Namibians. For example, the severely limited educational opportunities, health facilities and housing for the black population are allocated on a discriminatory and unequal basis. In the educational system of Namibia an estimated \$1,500 a year is spent on each white student, while only \$215 is spent on each black student.¹³ Infant mortality rates for blacks are high (163 for each 1,000 blacks versus 21 for each 1,000 whites), while life expectancy for blacks is 33 years, compared with 72 years for whites.¹⁴

The economy of Namibia is dominated by western transnational corporations and South African companies. Though Namibia is a country rich in mineral resources, the economy is profoundly distorted, with foreigners expropriating the wealth while the black population remains one of the poorest in the world.¹⁵

While the forms of Pretoria's political control in Namibia have changed over the years, these changes have represented only tactical shifts rather than any diminution of South Africa's absolute authority over the territory. When the National Party took over power in 1948 it argued that the mandate had ended and that South Africa now ruled by right of occupation. It proceeded to lay plans for the full annexation of the territory that were formally enacted in the 1960s. World opinion continued to oppose South Africa's occupation and when the political and military situation began to change in Namibia during the mid-1970s, resulting from the demise of the Portuguese colonial empire in southern Africa, South Africa began to look for alternatives to annexation

that would nevertheless maintain the political, military and economic status quo in Namibia. The result was a conference called by the all-white National Party of Namibia for all "peoples" in the territory to discuss its future. Only organizations representing single ethnic groups were allowed to attend.

This conference, called the Turnhalle Constitutional Conference for the building in which it was held in Windhoek, continued sporadically for several years. Its final proposals for self-rule along ethnic lines under a two-tiered government were eventually adopted as Pretoria's scheme for an internal settlement. In the meantime South Africa had appointed an Administrator General to Namibia who was given the authority to rule by proclamation.

South Africa held elections in Namibia in December 1978 to form a 50-member "constituent assembly." Boycotted by SWAPO and almost all of the country's 40-odd political parties, the election was essentially a struggle between the two white-led political alliances that grew out of the Turnhalle Conference. In 1979 the South African Administrator General converted the assembly into a "National Assembly" (first-tier government) and in 1980 established "Ethnic Governments" (second tier) for the homelands. He also created a "Council of Ministers" of 12 members from the assembly in 1980.¹⁶ Thus, while there was an internal government in the formalistic sense, its activities were subject to the approval of the South African Administrator General, as the ruling authority in the country, while South Africa's massive army of occupation was and continues to be the ruling force.

On Jan. 18, 1983, South Africa dissolved the National Assembly and announced that it was resuming "direct rule" in the territory. Few observers ever believed that South Africa had ever really abandoned *de facto* rule even during the tenure of the National Assembly and Council of Ministers.

The Economy

Under the South African division of land in Namibia, the "white areas" cover nearly two-thirds of the territory and contain almost all of Namibia's known mineral deposits, diamond reserves and the majority of the active agricultural and fishing sectors. Namibia's economy, therefore, is characterized by an extremely wealthy white-owned sector that controls all the territory's most valuable natural resources, as contrasted with a separate subsistence economy in the black "homelands." This unequal system provides a constant supply of black workers from the "homelands" who, in order to survive, must seek an income in the white economy (in the mines, on the farms or as domestics) to supplement what is raised in subsistence farming. Based on 1977 estimates, the average income for whites was \$3,000 per year, while the average for blacks was \$125.¹⁷ Roughly half of the black labor force (250,000) engages in subsistence agriculture with incomes around \$30 per year.¹⁸ Of the rest, 75,000 domestic workers earn between \$125 and \$200 per year; 50,000 laborers on white farms and ranches earn \$250 to \$400 per year. Only miners' incomes, at \$1,500 annually, approach half of the average white annual per capita income.¹⁹ While black contract labor has created Namibia's wealth and major industries, black workers and communities where they live receive few of the benefits.

Efforts to organize black workers in order to achieve greater work force equity and much-needed benefits were blocked outright until 1978. Since then, such efforts have been hampered by continued government restrictions on union activities. New legislation now permits trade unions to be organized, but this legislation is largely illusory. No unions with strong shop-floor organization have been permitted. The statutory

registration requirements are intended to place unions under strict government control. The National Union of Namibia Workers, a countrywide union organization affiliated with SWAPO, is debarred from registration and official recognition.²⁰ Unions are not allowed to engage in political activity and most African workers (those employed in the agricultural and domestic sectors) are without any form of union protection.

It is estimated that one-third to one-half of Namibia's Gross National Product (GNP) is taken each year by outside interests.²¹ The major sectors of the economy, mining and fishing, are dominated by overseas multinational corporations. About 90 percent of the mining industry production is controlled by two companies, Consolidated Diamond Mines and Tsumeb Corporation.²² Tsumeb is controlled by two U.S. companies: American Metal Climax (AMAX) and the Newmont Mining Corporation. The large scale exploitation of Namibia's uranium has recently become another major concern. This is concentrated in the Rossing Mine, the largest open cast uranium mine in the world, which is controlled by the Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation of Britain. All companies in Namibia operate in violation of UN Decree # 1. This decree prohibits exploitation of Namibian resources because of South Africa's continued illegal rule.

These economic and commercial relationships also have significance for South Africa. South Africa receives most of the taxes collected in Namibia and corporate payments for mineral rights. The black population cannot, by law and by organization of the economy, share in the revenues generated to either the public or private sectors. Clearly, despite the heavy costs of maintaining a military and governmental presence in the territory, Namibia provides a net cash flow to South Africa. This economic infusion results, in large measure, from the exploitative economic system imposed on Namibia by Pretoria.

Opposition and Collaboration: Political Parties in Namibia

The long tradition of organized opposition to South African occupation was reflected anew in the 1940s and 1950s. Black leaders (notably the Herero and Nama chiefs), supported by Namibian student groups inside South Africa, repeatedly petitioned the UN for Namibia's independence. However, the contract workers provided the most powerful base for development of a popular national liberation movement. That movement began in Cape Town in 1957 with the formation of the Ovamboland Peoples Congress, renamed the Ovamboland Peoples Organization (OPO) a year later. The OPO was open to all Namibians. Its immediate aim was to protest against the conditions of contract workers. The organization drew heavily on the support of contract laborers and was, in this manner, able to organize in almost all parts of Namibia. It also built support on the northern agricultural communities, largely through the strong organizing work of Herman Toivo Ja Toivo, one of the founders.

In December 1959, protesters against forced removals of Africans to a new ghetto in Windhoek were attacked by police, who killed 11 and wounded 54. Subsequently, most of the nationalist leaders were arrested, banned or restricted.²³ These events fostered a broader form of resistance against the South African occupation of Namibia and exploitation of Namibian workers and resources.

SWAPO

On April 19, 1960, the OPO was reorganized as the South West Africa People's Organization. SWAPO's stated objective is the complete liberation of the Namibian people and their land from colonial oppression and exploitation. Under Sam Nujoma,

a railway worker who fled Namibia in 1960 to avoid arrest and detention, SWAPO has built external offices in Africa and Europe.

Since its inception, SWAPO has pursued its political objectives of national liberation for Namibia through negotiations, mass organization inside Namibia, and international campaigns. The organization had hoped that Namibia's independence could be gained through peaceful means but was increasingly met with a violent response. At a national congress in Windhoek in 1961, SWAPO resolved that political and military activity were complementary and should be pursued simultaneously.²⁴

Nevertheless SWAPO continued for several years to pursue only peaceful means to achieve liberation. The military campaign was finally launched in August 1966, while the political leadership sought to negotiate and welcomed UN efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement.

The People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), the military wing of SWAPO, is only one element of the broader political strategy the organization has pursued since 1960. SWAPO maintains informal study groups throughout Namibia while the Youth League, the Elders Council and the Women's Council have engaged in public education and mobilization campaigns. Though made illegal in 1981, public SWAPO meetings are frequent in some areas.

SWAPO has never been formally banned by South Africa, but extensive arrests, detentions, imprisonment of leadership figures and repressive laws and proclamations have made open political activity increasingly difficult and dangerous. Though SWAPO's Windhoek office is routinely raided and its workers detained, supporters inside Namibia continue many organizing activities, including some public rallies.

SWAPO has established itself as a national movement representing the Namibian people, not just the Ovambo tribe, as is often claimed by its opponents.²⁵ It has been noted by the International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa that "Though Ovambos are among SWAPO's most numerous supporters, they are also the largest group of the Namibian population (40 to 50 percent) and will, in any independent government, form a majority of voters and representatives."²⁶ SWAPO's Executive Committee also reflects the diversity of its national constituency. The SWAPO permanent representative to the UN and leader of their negotiating team is not an Ovambo.

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) recognized SWAPO as the liberation movement of the Namibian people in 1965, and, in 1973 the UN General Assembly accepted it as the authentic representative of the Namibian people. SWAPO was granted full observer status in 1976.²⁷

Material aid to SWAPO comes from several organizations and countries. The OAU donates large amounts annually through its African Liberation Committee. Religious organizations, such as the World Council of Churches (through its Programme to Combat Racism) and the Lutheran World Federation, provide money for educational and refugee relief work. Many African countries also provide bilateral aid, and some give sanctuary and provide facilities to Namibian refugees. The Eastern bloc countries and the Soviet Union also provide bilateral material support to SWAPO, as do several Western European countries, Sweden foremost among them. In addition, in Western countries that do not provide aid, community organizations and coalitions have raised monies and materials for SWAPO's refugee centers.

Minor Parties

There are more than 40 political parties in Namibia.²⁸ This large number reflects the racial and ethnic divisions fostered by South Africa, the inability of the parties to

organize nationally and the limited role allowed political parties in Namibia. These parties are confined to addressing only ethnic or local concerns, and are unable to alter the prevailing economic and political system imposed on the country. In contrast, it also reflects broad support for SWAPO resulting from its 22 years of organizing efforts throughout the country and its development of a viable strategy to gain independence for Namibia through a national liberation movement.

Of these minor parties, the principal African ones are the South West Africa National Union (SWANU), mainly supported by Hereros,²⁹ and the SWAPO-Democrats, a small group that broke away from SWAPO in 1978.

By boycotting the South African-run elections in 1978, the majority of these minor parties sought to demonstrate their desire for genuine independence through internationally supervised elections.

White Political Parties, Alliances and Control

The major white party in Namibia, the National Party, has close ideological and political ties with its counterpart, the ruling party in South Africa, and supports the same policies of separate development. Between 1950 and 1977, all the Namibia representatives in the South African parliament were National Party members (white representation from Namibia was abolished in 1977 as part of the internal settlement approach). In 1979 the party accused South Africa's foreign minister of "surrendering the whites of the territory."³⁰ Simultaneously, it withdrew from the National Assembly in Namibia to protest passage of the Abolishment of Racial Discrimination Act.³¹ The Act, while unenforced, purported to change petty apartheid in Namibia.

The National Party split in 1977 after Dirk Mudge, a prominent member of the white delegation to the Turnhalle Conference, made a bid for the leadership of the party and was defeated. Mudge then created the all-white Republican Party to develop a political base among whites that supported his leadership of the dominant political alliance to emerge from the Turnhalle Conference, the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA).

Political control inside Namibia today is held by white-dominated bodies and South African-appointed officials. These include the civil service and the Administrator General's office, which both have direct links with South Africa, and the white political parties and white-dominated multi-racial alliances that are accommodating South Africa's plans for Namibia's future. The creation of a National Assembly, a Council of Ministers and regional "ethnic" governments inside Namibia did very little to alter the reality of South African political control over the territory.

The civil service, staffed by 15,000 South Africans, is considered the mechanism for political control among whites in the territory. It is the chief source of constituent support for the National Party's front alliance, formally known as the Action Front for the Retention of the Turnhalle Principles (AKTUR). AKTUR and its members have resisted even minor reforms to apartheid legislation in Namibia. In an effort to create the impression that South Africa is moving toward "self-government" in Namibia, the civil service has undergone some changes. Some of its functions will be carried out by an ostensibly "independent" Namibian civil service in the future. This service will, however, remain under South African control through the Administrator General, the highest political authority inside Namibia. The enforcement of politically repressive legislation and proclamations is, of course, carried out by the police and South African military.

AKTUR was one of the two new multi-racial alliances that grew from the Turnhalle Constitutional Conference in 1977. The other is the DTA. The DTA was formed by Dirk Mudge as an alliance between his Republican Party and the majority of the black groups that had taken part in the conference (primarily Bantustan representatives and South African-endorsed leaders of ethnic groups whose traditional leaders refused to participate in the Turnhalle Conference). The DTA dominated the National Assembly and had hoped to see that body become the executive and legislative authority in Namibia. Though publicly supporting continued negotiations for a UN-led internationally acceptable settlement, the DTA increasingly had pressed for Spring 1983 elections as a predicate for independence, whether or not the UN or SWAPO were involved. At a UN-sponsored "pre-implementation" conference of all parties in Geneva in January 1981, Mudge told the U.S. ambassador to the UN, Donald McHenry, that, "I am not going to agree to an election so long as I know I am going to lose."³² The DTA receives considerable financial backing from South Africa and from groups in West Germany.³³ Until he resigned in January 1983, Mudge headed the Namibian Council of Ministers, whose 11 other members also come from the DTA.

South Africa's decision to resume "direct rule" in Namibia simply removed the mask from South Africa's absolute control in the territory. Mudge and the DTA may try to use the new situation to portray themselves as true opponents of Pretoria but observers from all sides are skeptical about the chances for success of such a ploy.

AKTUR consists of the National Party and a few black representatives. The AKTUR alliance takes an even more extreme position, arguing that Namibia must retain an ethnic structure based on the homeland scheme. AKTUR proposes that homeland "governments" participate only in a second tier of a white controlled Namibian government. It had opposed granting the National Assembly more power. AKTUR's position on any proposed settlement is of considerable importance to the South African government. If AKTUR members feel betrayed in the final analysis, they could provoke strong internal opposition to the South African government within the National Party (of South Africa) and possibly precipitate large-scale disaffection from the party.

Other white political parties include the extreme right-wing Herstigte National Party and the Federal Party, which declares itself a non-racial political force in favor of national reconciliation.

The Church

Along with the other popular forces working for the independence of Namibia, the Christian church also is now an outspoken critic of the South African occupation.

Christian missionaries were among the first whites to establish contact with the indigenous people of Namibia in the mid-1800s. With the military defeat of African resistance to German colonial occupation, Christianity spread rapidly among all sections of Namibian society and became the prevalent religion. This had a strong influence both on the early (non-violent) struggle for independence and on the later political stand of the church.

In the 1940s and 1950s, Namibian churches increasingly became autonomous from European-based missionary societies. During this period, church leaders and missionaries also were among those petitioning the UN Trusteeship Council and protesting South Africa's occupation of Namibia. In 1972, the Evangelical Lutheran Church (with an almost entirely African membership of 193,000) and the Evangelical Lutheran Ovambokavango Church (with a mostly African membership of more than 316,000) adopted a federal

church structure that represents more than a third of Namibia's population. The Anglican Church's 60,000 members and the Catholic Church's 100,000 members also are mainly Africans.

While individual clergy have opposed the oppression of black people in Namibia for years, the church as an institution clearly began to identify with the struggle for independence in the early 1970s. In a letter to the South African Prime Minister in 1971, the Lutheran churches condemned the intimidation and humiliation of black Namibians and stressed the unity of the people as one nation. Since this open letter, the church has played an increasingly important role in focusing world attention on human rights violations in the country, providing internal opposition to mass detentions and torture, and in helping to shape international opinion generally. The Council of Churches of Namibia, formed in October 1978 and now composed of the Lutheran, Anglican, African Methodist Episcopal, Roman Catholic and Methodist churches, has helped to reveal the fraudulent nature of the internal settlement elections of 1978 and has stated its support for a speedy implementation of an unchanged Resolution 435. Many clergy have been expelled from the territory because of their support for national independence, and a seminary as well as church printing presses and offices have been destroyed by bombs.

The War

Extreme economic and political power disparities between blacks and whites in Namibia result from rule by coercion rather than by consent. Beginning with the German genocide campaign and continuing through South Africa's repressive police state legislation and emergency measures, the system of exploitation in Namibia, during each period of its development, has been sustained by massive force.

In 1966, SWAPO launched its military effort to end South African control in Namibia. This action was consistent with its 1961 decision, made at the National Congress, to pursue political and military efforts concurrently.

In the early years of the war, the PLAN guerrillas faced serious supply shortage and communication problems. During that period, attacks were limited to the north-eastern parts of the territory nearest to SWAPO bases in Zambia.

The South African build-up of troops and bases in Namibia began slowly, after a nationwide series of strikes that swept Namibia in 1971-1972. Troops were used to break strike meetings and carry out mass arrests in 1972. In 1975, South Africa used Namibia to launch a massive invasion into Angola in an attempt to install Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) as the government in Luanda during the civil war that broke out following independence from Portugal that year. Despite the South African invasion and CIA support for its opponents, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) maintained power in the country and with the assistance of Cuban troops, invited to Angola by MPLA President Agostino Neto, the South African troops were defeated and forced to withdraw in March 1976. During the invasion, South Africa established several large bases on Namibian soil. After their retreat from Angola, the South African forces remained in Namibia.

The independence of Angola in 1975, and South Africa's defeat in 1976, allowed PLAN to escalate the armed resistance to South Africa's occupation of Namibia and to create a new military zone inside the territory by using new bases in southern Angola. Each year since, PLAN has sharply increased the number of attacks, the level of penetration (operating in central and southern Namibia was well) and the frequency of successful missions against South African military and economic targets.³⁴ Throughout, PLAN has appeared able to secure and to expand the support of the local people by employing strategies that avoid civilian casualties and respect mission property and personnel.³⁵ South Africa's continued refusal to implement Resolution 435, the increased militarization of the country, and increased repression and human rights violations against the population have also served to broaden the support for SWAPO's military campaign, including support from sectors of the population that were formerly opposed to the use of violent force to help achieve independence.

South Africa has responded to the escalation of the war by further militarizing Namibia, attacking SWAPO's civilian supporters and increasing the number of assaults on Angola. Troop escalation began in earnest following the South African defeat in Angola. From 1976 to 1979, the northern regions of Namibia became saturated with

new troops and heavy armor.³⁶ From 1980 to the present, the South African strategy has focused on sustained attacks against Angola. These attacks are directed more and more against Angolan infrastructure, civilian and military targets. South African troop levels are estimated by most informed observers to have reached between 70,000 and 100,000 in 1982. Forces have been concentrated, since June 1981, along and inside the Angolan border.

South African use of UNITA insurgents and mercenary forces (especially former white Rhodesian forces) in southern Angola had, for a time, hidden the extent of South Africa's war against Angola. The massive invasions of Angola in 1981 and 1982 represented major developments in the war. Supported by constant air strikes, South African troops engaged Angolan army units up to 120 miles inside Angola. Wide media coverage only recently alerted Western readers that the Namibian war, had, by all accounts, become a war against Angola. However, this situation had prevailed for at least two years.

South Africa began trying to "Namibianize" the war by recruiting several "ethnic" battalions of 600 soldiers each and by introducing conscription for all Namibians aged 16-25 in January, 1981.³⁷ Pretoria hopes that this will foster the impression of an "independent" South West Africa Defense Force, and lessen the number of whites from South Africa serving in Namibia. The conscription program has largely failed: within four months of its announcement, 8,000 young Namibians fled to join SWAPO.

South Africa's army of occupation intrudes upon every aspect of Namibian daily life. In an attempt to lessen popular support for SWAPO and to portray the South African Defense Force as the defenders of the Namibian people, South African soldiers have assumed numerous "civilian" roles, including acting as teachers, agricultural advisers and doctors. But the repressive role of the Security Forces remains painfully apparent. The General Secretary of the Lutheran World Ministries visited Namibia in 1979 and emphasized that "evidence of South African army brutality among all segments of the population is overwhelming, pervasive and capable of documentation."³⁸ In a report dated May 16, 1982, Bishop Kleopas Dumeni of the Evangelical Lutheran Ovambo Church provides a detailed account of an assault by South African soldiers on the congregation at Elombe Parish during worship service. The service was interrupted and men were tortured and beaten. A British Council of Churches team visited Namibia in 1981 and released a report in 1982 detailing their investigative findings on charges of South African troop brutality and torture. The report indicates that the assault on Elombe Parish was not an isolated incident.

As a result of the daily repression and harassment, thousands of Namibians have crossed the border to Angola or traveled to Zambia. From June 1978, when South Africa began registering voters for its own version of elections, refugees were crossing the borders at a rate of 550 a week.³⁹ Out of a total population of about 1.5 million, more than 70,000 Namibians are in exile.

Toward A Settlement

Since the official revocation of its mandate in 1966, South Africa has maintained control over Namibia in defiance of the people of Namibia, the United Nations, the International Court of Justice and world opinion. In that year, the United Nations was entrusted with the responsibility of defending the rights and interests of the territory and its people. Accordingly, in May 1967, the General Assembly established the UN Council for Namibia as the legal administering authority for Namibia. Though the council has been unable to play this role, it has performed several important functions. Through use of the United Nations Fund for Namibia, created in 1970 to finance its activities, the council has helped Namibian refugees, organized training programs for Namibians, issued travel documents and established an emergency program of economic and technical assistance to Namibia. In 1976, the UN Institute for Namibia—which provides civil service and administration training and conducts research into the economic and social problems of reconstruction for an independent Namibia—was opened in Lusaka, Zambia. Yet, the UN has been unable to fulfill its chief responsibility for the territory: to apply the principle of self-determination to Namibia and to end South Africa's illegal occupation.

Over the years, the UN has tried, in various ways, to pressure South Africa into acceptance of a Namibian settlement. The most forceful proposals for pressure have been consistently blocked in the Security Council by the "triple veto" of Britain, France and the United States. In December 1973, after two years of fruitless effort, the UN discontinued its policy of "dialogue" with the South African government, intended to bring a settlement. During the fall of 1974, a resolution to expel South Africa from the United Nations received 10 votes in the Security Council (one more than enough for adoption) but was defeated by the triple veto. The following year, a draft resolution for a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa was blocked by the first triple veto cast on a specifically Namibian issue. In 1976, another sanctions resolution was vetoed by the "Western Big Three."¹

A confluence of military and political events in the mid-1970s caused Pretoria to reassess its position in Namibia. In response to continued international pressure and to new political and military realities of the region (largely due to the independence of Angola and Mozambique and the war in Rhodesia, now known as Zimbabwe), South Africa began to pursue a new strategy.

Characterized as a "two-track strategy" by former US Ambassador to the UN Donald McHenry, this strategy allowed South Africa to appear responsive to international opinion by negotiating for an international settlement while, at the same time, pursuing an internal settlement. Initially, South Africa pursued only the internal settlement. But subsequent events have made it clear that this approach will only prolong the process for reaching a final settlement. Ambassador McHenry, the chief architect of United States' Namibia policy under the Carter administration, has argued that South Africa viewed an international settlement as in its own interest, because only such a settlement was

likely to end the political dispute in the international arena, as well as end the war in Namibia itself.² Yet, in four years, the Carter policy failed to gain South Africa's acceptance of a settlement. Arguably, obstructions to the application of international sanctions and lack of greater Western pressure only strengthened Pretoria's resolve to wait for an international settlement on its own terms. Failing to reach such a settlement, South Africa continued to pursue the internal settlement for which it had laid the foundations in the mid-1970s.

The Turnhalle Affair: Preparing for a *Fait Accompli*

Nowhere were South Africa's political intentions made more manifest than in the September, 1975 Turnhalle Constitutional Conference. The conference was convened at the Turnhalle building in Windhoek and was attended by representatives from 11 separate "population groups" and a white delegation. South Africa claimed that the Conference was to be an open debate on all options for Namibia's independence, but only delegations accepting the racial and ethnic divisions imposed by Pretoria and representing only one "population group" were allowed to attend. This precluded the involvement of SWAPO and others who rejected racialism or tribalism as the basis for an acceptable national solution.

The conference opened with a call for a government based on ethnic representation at the tribal level, a controlling *de facto* white-dominated National government with veto power, Bantustan authorities in the rural areas and multiple ethnic enclaves in the urban areas.³ The UN responded to the proceedings of the Turnhalle Conference in January 1976 with the unanimous adoption of Security Council Resolution 385, the basic resolution setting out the mechanism for achieving self-determination and independence in Namibia. The resolution provided that: (1) South African officials must withdraw from Namibia immediately to be replaced by a temporary UN administration; (2) pending its withdrawal, South Africa should dismantle the bantustans and implement human rights in Namibia (abolish discriminatory and repressive legislation, release political prisoners, etc.); and (3) there should be territory-wide, non-ethnic elections, on a one-person-one-vote basis, to be held under "United Nations supervision and control" to elect a constituent assembly to draft a constitution for the territory.⁴

The Turnhalle Conference (financed by South Africa) continued for two years. During this period, hundreds of SWAPO members and supporters were arrested and detained without trial in an effort to reinforce political repression and to isolate the broad opposition to the conference within Namibia. In March 1977, the conferees produced a draft constitution that provided for 11 ethnic governments, a 50-member National Assembly and a Council of Ministers (to consist of 11 ethnic representatives and a white representative who would become chairman). The Turnhalle group simultaneously petitioned Pretoria to recognize an interim government in Namibia based on this "constitution."

The African states at the UN responded by discussing draft resolutions calling for a mandatory arms embargo and an end to all new loans and investment in South Africa.⁵ Seeking to avoid another embarrassing veto, the Western members of the Security Council at that time (United States, Britain, France, West Germany and Canada) joined to form the "Contact Group," also called the Western Five, and offered to negotiate terms for Namibia's independence on the basis of free nationwide elections under UN supervision.

The Western Initiative

The Contact Group held four rounds of talks during the remainder of 1977, meeting separately with the South African government, SWAPO and the Turnhalle representatives. As a result, the Western Five gained South Africa's agreement to suspend plans for an interim government based on the Turnhalle "constitution" and drafted a plan for an internationally supervised settlement. South Africa, however, had taken two unilateral actions in Namibia, while the Contact Group was drafting its proposal, to strengthen its control in the territory and to increase its bargaining position in relationship to the Contact Group's plan. The first action was the July appointment of a South African Administrator General to administer the territory until elections were held. The AG was given the power to legislate by proclamation for the country. The second action was the South African proclamation of August 1977, which transferred the administration of Walvis Bay (Namibia's only deep sea port) to the Cape Province of South Africa, so that none of the provisions in the Contact Group's proposals would apply to this important port. Administered as part of Namibia for 60 years, Walvis Bay is the home of the country's fishing and fish processing industries, and railhead for the line that would, under stable political conditions, connect Botswana and even Zimbabwe with the Atlantic ocean. In September 1977, the South African-appointed Administrator General took office in Windhoek, and Pretoria abolished the provisions for Namibia's six white members' seats in the South African parliament.

Though 1977 discussions conducted by the Contact Group were generally kept secret, they were reported to have gained the initial endorsements of the two principal contesting parties (South Africa and SWAPO) on certain compromises. The major issues agreed upon in the negotiations that year were as follows:

- The Turnhalle Conference would be disbanded. (It finally was dissolved in November 1977).
- South Africa would hold elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage with the participation of all political parties.
- An Administrator General would be installed in Namibia until independence. (This was an accommodation to what South Africa had already imposed.)
- UN supervision and control would be established through a Special Representative appointed by the UN Secretary General.
- The Special Representative's chief role would be to ensure that conditions were established allowing free and fair elections and an impartial electoral process.
- The Administrator General would repeal all discriminatory and repressive legislation.
- Law and order would remain the responsibility of South Africa.⁶

After "proximity talks" with South Africa and SWAPO between January and March 1978, the Contact Group formally offered its "Proposal for Settlement in Namibia" on

April 10, 1978. In addition to the principal agreements reached earlier in the negotiations, the proposal contained provisions for the following:

- The release and return to Namibia of all political prisoners.
- The return of all Namibian refugees.
- A cease-fire and the restriction of South African and SWAPO armed forces to bases.
- Phased withdrawal from Namibia of all but 1,500 South African troops within 12 weeks and prior to the start of the election campaign, with the remaining troops restricted to base.
- Demobilization of citizen forces, commandos and ethnic forces and the dismantling of their command structures.
- The peaceful return of SWAPO personnel outside of Namibia through designated entry points to participate in the elections.
- A United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) with military and civilian components to ensure the observance of the aforementioned provisions by all parties.⁷

South Africa accepted the plan two weeks later, but expressed reservations over the issue of Walvis Bay. On May 4, 1978, the South African army and air force attacked a SWAPO refugee camp at Kassinga in Angola, killing nearly 700 people, mostly women and children, and injuring another 1,500.⁸ Many believed that this action was intended to prevent SWAPO from accepting the settlement plan but on July 12, 1978, SWAPO accepted the plan. Later that month the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 432, insisting on the reintegration of Walvis Bay with Namibia.

On Aug. 20, 1978, UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim issued a report on the implementation of the Western Plan. South Africa immediately used the publication of the Secretary General's report to raise new objections. Pretoria objected to the size of the proposed UN military peacekeeping force of 7,500, the executive powers of the UN police and the date for the elections. SWAPO accepted the Waldheim Report in general. On Sept. 28, 1978, South Africa announced that it would unilaterally hold elections in Namibia by the end of the year. On Sept. 29, 1978, the Security Council adopted Resolution 435 endorsing the Waldheim Report. The UN hoped to force South Africa to abandon its plan for ethnically based elections and to prove its commitment to hold free elections under UN supervision. In November, 1978, the Security Council adopted Resolution 439, declaring that any South African-controlled elections would be void and that any person or body elected or created as a result of such an election would not be recognized.

Between 1978 and the present, South Africa has proved only its commitment to avoid the implementation of Resolution 435 at all costs while proceeding with its effort to impose an internal solution. Despite UN and Western Five efforts to accommodate South African criticism of the implementation plan embodied in Resolution 435, Pretoria insisted on holding its internal elections. South Africa justified these elections by asserting that they would not lead to independence, that it was still willing to cooperate in the implementation of the Western Plan, and that the elections should be regarded as an internal matter. The elections were held in Namibia in December 1978. South Africa utilized extreme military and employer intimidation of the populace in an effort to produce a larger turnout than was likely because of the general boycott of the "elections."

The results were denounced as void by the UN, Namibian churches, SWAPO and most of the minor parties in the country as well. The Constituent Assembly, formed after the elections, was transformed into a National Assembly in May 1979 by the Administrator General. The DTA held 41 of the 50 seats in the assembly, and Dirk Mudge became chairman of the 12-member Council of Ministers also established by the Administrator General. The Administrator General maintained overall power over the Minister's Council, continued to make laws by proclamation and held a veto over any legislation drafted by the National Assembly.

Yet, the failure of the Western initiative in 1978 and the attempted internal solution by South Africa still did not persuade the Contact Group to impose sanctions against South Africa. Critics argue that it was the Western Five's refusal to seriously consider sanctions that emboldened South Africa in its delaying tactics. Leverage forsworn was leverage lost.

Throughout 1979 and 1980, the Contact Group's efforts to achieve an agreement on the implementation of Resolution 435 met with continual South African objections to certain parts of the UN plan. However, Resolution 435 represented a concession to South Africa by weakening most of the provisions of Security Council Resolution 385, the basic resolution on Namibia (adopted in January 1976) that established the mechanism for achieving self-determination and independence in the territory. While Resolution 435 was characterized as being "in accordance with" Resolution 385, it was a significant departure in several important ways: (1) The South African occupation regime would remain in Namibia and administer it until independence instead of being required to withdraw before elections; (2) Pretoria would not be required to dismantle the Bantustans; (3) The election would be run by South African officials who would choose the electoral system, register voters, provide ballot boxes and count the votes while the UN would be reduced to merely monitoring their conduct; and (4) The removal of Walvis Bay from Namibian jurisdiction was allowed, though the UN would seek its reintegration by supporting the "initiation of steps" to that end.⁹

Nonetheless, South Africa demanded more concessions. Initially, Pretoria's objections focused on the presence of SWAPO bases inside Namibia and the monitoring of SWAPO bases in neighboring countries. A proposal for a 50-kilometer wide demilitarized zone (DMZ) along Namibia's borders made by the late President Agostino Neto of Angola diminished that particular obstacle temporarily. South Africa then demanded that the "internal parties" in Namibia receive equal recognition and an active role in the negotiations. Next, South Africa demanded an end to all UN financial contributions to SWAPO and Namibia programs. Later, South Africa suggested that their secretly backed insurgents in Angola, UNITA, be included in the negotiation process.

During this period of South African stalling tactics, the Carter administration and the other Contact Group members defended their opposition to sanctions against Pretoria by arguing that these objections of South Africa could be overcome through negotiations. However, it was usually SWAPO, and not South Africa, that made concessions on several of these issues, in hopes of actually moving forward on implementation. South Africa consistently found new issues to raise as obstacles to the settlement plan. To its credit, the Carter administration did maintain that Resolution 435 was the only acceptable formula for a settlement and refused to allow any further weakening of the implementation plan.

In August 1980, South Africa indicated to the UN Secretary General that it had only two remaining major objections to implementation: the question of UN impar-

tiality toward SWAPO and the alleged lack of consultation by the Contact Group with the "internal parties" in Namibia. The Contact Group proposed an all-parties "pre-implementation" conference in Geneva to resolve these two issues and to set a cease-fire date. The Geneva Conference marked the culmination of the Carter administration and Contact Group's four-year effort to achieve Namibia's independence. In Geneva, the Western Five had hoped to gain agreement on a cease-fire date and to begin implementation of Resolution 435.

On January 5, 1981, the delegates assembled in Geneva for the opening of the conference. South Africa proceeded to use the conference as a propaganda platform for its various internal parties that formed its delegation (DTA, AKTUR, and a few other politically insignificant groups). In contrast, the SWAPO delegation showed restraint and stated its willingness to sign an immediate cease-fire and to abide by Resolution 435. After assailing what it alleged to be the partiality of the UN in favor of SWAPO, South Africa walked out, causing the collapse of the conference, and refused to sign even a declaration of intent. South Africa's performance at Geneva was not surprising to many. Most observers had anticipated another dilatory tactic by Pretoria to slow the negotiations until the administration of U.S. President Ronald Reagan could take office in Washington. South Africa believed that the new U.S. administration would be more favorably disposed toward South African concerns in Namibia and that, in conjunction with a conservative government in Britain, a new U.S.-Britain alliance would mean new possibilities for policies of even greater accommodation within the Contact Group.

The Reagan Approach

Even before the Reagan administration publicly declared its position on Namibia and South Africa, its principal objective to curtail expansion of the Soviet Union's presence, influence and control of resources in regions of importance to Washington, such as southern Africa, was widely known. This view, coupled with several events in early 1981, pointed to the likelihood of a much more accommodating U.S. approach to South Africa.

In a major television interview in early March 1981, President Reagan described South Africa as a "friendly country" and stressed that South Africa was "a country that strategically is essential to the free world in its production of minerals that we all must have."¹⁰ Two weeks later, the U.S. ambassador to the UN, Jeane Kirkpatrick, along with National Security Council and Pentagon officials, met with five South African military officers, including Pretoria's highest-ranking official in military intelligence. All these persons were in the U.S. illegally because the meetings constituted a violation of longstanding U.S. policy and of the UN mandatory arms embargo against South Africa. In March, the DTA leadership also visited Washington for talks with the administration; high level State Department officials met with the South African-backed leader of UNITA, Jonas Savimbi; and President Reagan asked Congress to repeal the Clark Amendment. The Clark Amendment, passed by Congress in January 1976, prohibited the flow of CIA funds and support to insurgents in Angola, and forbade U.S. sponsorship of paramilitary activities by anti-government insurgents such as UNITA.

In April, 1981 the assistant secretary of state-designate for African Affairs, Chester Crocker, made a two-week trip to 12 African countries to discuss the Namibian negotiations. He refused to meet with SWAPO leaders during the trip. During conversations with South African Foreign Minister Roelof "Pik" Botha and Defense Minister Magnus Malan in Pretoria, Crocker was informed that South Africa would not rule out an internationally acceptable settlement, but that it could not live with a SWAPO victory that left SWAPO with unchecked power.¹¹ At this point, the U.S. began promoting the idea of drafting a constitution before elections. Such a constitution would be intended to guarantee white minority "rights" (encompassing land and property privileges) and to limit the authority and independence of a future Namibian government. On April 30, the U.S., France and Britain again cast a triple veto in the Security Council to defeat a resolution for sanctions against South Africa. The resolution had been introduced in response to the regime's intransigence on Namibia.

In early May 1981, the Contact Group members met in Rome and agreed that they should develop new proposals in several areas to move the settlement process forward. They also reconfirmed that Resolution 435 provided a solid basis for a settlement. This represented a compromise within the Contact Group. For while the United States' commitment to Resolution 435 now seemed subordinate to combating "Soviet expansionism" in the region, and was conditioned on writing a constitution before elections (thereby undermining the essence of Resolution 435), the other members of the Contact Group

were unwilling to abandon or significantly alter Resolution 435.

In mid-May, South African Foreign Minister Rieff Botha led a delegation to Washington for talks with Secretary of State Alexander Haig and President Reagan. Thus, Botha became the first official from Africa to be received at the White House by the new administration. During this series of talks, the U.S. indicated to the South Africans that, "The political relationship between the U.S. and South Africa has now arrived at a crossroads of perhaps historic significance . . . the possibility may exist for a more positive and reciprocal relationship between the two countries based upon shared strategic concerns in southern Africa."¹² The United States cautioned, however, that the problem of Namibia, which complicates U.S. relations with Europe and Africa, was a primary obstacle to the development of a new relationship with South Africa. Further, it was stated that the United States was willing to work with South Africa toward an internationally acceptable settlement that would not harm Pretoria's interests.¹³

This policy of accommodation became known as "Constructive Engagement." Under this policy, the Reagan administration maintained that it would be far easier to influence South Africa to settle on Namibia and to begin a process of change internally if the United States built a closer friendship with the white minority regime than if the U.S. adopted a confrontational approach. Critics in Africa and elsewhere argued that this new U.S. policy was clearly racially and economically motivated and that it identified U.S. interests with those of white South Africa rather than with the legitimate aspirations of the 1.5 million people of Namibia whose land South Africa illegally occupied, or with the 22 million ruthlessly dominated black people inside South Africa.

During the summer of 1981, the Organization of African Unity denounced the Reagan administration's policy on Namibia, calling the new U.S.-South Africa alliance an extremely dangerous development. The Contact Group continued to meet to discuss the "constitutional guarantees" approach. Canada and the European members of the Contact Group grew more irritated with U.S. attempts to undermine Resolution 435 by proposing detailed constitutional arrangements as part of the ongoing negotiations. These arrangements were, in fact, the responsibility of the constituent assembly under provisions of Resolution 435.

In August 1981, South Africa launched a massive invasion of Angola with widespread air and ground assaults. The international community condemned the invasion and called for the South Africans to withdraw. At the same time, the United States cast the sole veto against a U.N. Security Council Resolution condemning the invasion. The Reagan administration issued a carefully worded statement blaming SWAPO and the Angolan government for the South African raid. This was viewed by observers as further evidence of a growing *de facto* alliance between the United States and South Africa—an alliance euphemistically described as "constructive engagement." Other evidence of growing rapprochement included: the enlarging of the U.S. military attache in Pretoria and South Africa's counterpart in Washington, allowing South Africa to establish more honorary consulates in the United States, changing export controls to permit sales to the South African military and police (later to be relaxed even further), training South African Coast Guard personnel, and training South African nuclear technicians at U.S. government facilities.¹⁴

Finally, in October 1981, the Contact Group traveled to Africa and presented constitutional proposals and a "non-paper" on a proposed non-aggression treaty to South Africa, the internal parties, SWAPO and the Frontline African States. The proposals addressed three areas: the make-up of the constituent assembly, principles designed to

guarantee the rights of the white minority, and the distribution of power among the various branches of a future Namibian government.

SWAPO and the Frontline States (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe) responded by indicating their objections to the idea of amending Resolution 435 in such a manner as to set forth specific items to be included in a constitution. They argued that the proposals would pre-empt the work of the constituent assembly, but refrained from rejecting them as guidelines. In their official response, the Frontline States and SWAPO amended the first section dealing with the constituent assembly by deleting provisions that would entrench racial and ethnic division in Namibia. Their response reiterated the electoral provision of Resolution 435 and reaffirmed the authority of the constituent assembly to determine the governmental structure of a future independent Namibia. No official response was made to the non-paper on a non-aggression treaty between Namibia and South Africa. It was dismissed as a poorly disguised attempt to circumscribe the military and security prerogatives of Namibia before independence was even granted.

At the time these first Contact Group proposals were offered, a timetable was also established for completing the negotiations and moving toward implementation of Resolution 435. The comprehensive offering, essentially the program of the U.S., was a three-phase approach. The constitutional proposals and the electoral system constituted Phase I. Phase II would require the negotiation of issues directly related to the implementation process, such as the question of UN impartiality, the make-up of the UN Transition Assistance Group, and monitoring of the armed forces of the contesting sides during implementation and elections. Phase III consisted of the actual implementation of Resolution 435. The timetable put forward assured that Phase I would be completed no later than March 1982, with Phase II taking only a short time and implementation and possibly elections taking place before the end of 1982.

In December 1981, the Contact Group presented its revised proposal, which incorporated Frontline States/SWAPO amendments. The group simultaneously offered an electoral system, however, that raised further objections. The group proposed a mixed electoral system, with half the members of the constituent assembly to be elected on a national basis by proportional representation and half on the basis of single-member constituencies. The Frontline States and SWAPO found this unacceptable because it was unnecessarily complicated and likely to cause confusion among a largely illiterate populace that had never before been given an opportunity to participate in free and fair elections. They maintained that the elections should either be based on proportional representation or single-member constituencies. Choosing one, they believed, would be practical and easy to administer, ensuring a genuine representation of all the people of Namibia. South Africa, on the other hand, accepted the mixed system and later insisted on it.

For the first six months of 1982, well past the stated cut-off date for Phase I negotiations, the electoral system continued to be a sticking point. SWAPO and the Frontline States argued that the mixed electoral system proposed had created confusion. They also asserted that they were being unfairly accused of stalling, while South Africa used the proposal to claim a willingness to settle. Never, during that period, did the Contact Group take SWAPO's preference for proportional representation to the South Africans for consideration.

This underscored the "uneven diplomacy" of the Contact Group, as criticized increasingly by the Africans. The United States, as the group's leading member, was par-

ticularly cited. Between January and August of 1981, the Contact Group had not contacted the Frontline States' ambassadors and SWAPO representatives at the UN, all of whom had been the chief negotiators since 1978. Nor had there been any contact with the Council for Namibia, the legal authority over the territory. The prevailing UN view was that the Contact Group had taken the whole Namibia settlement question outside the authority of the UN since 1978. Moreover, the advent of the Reagan administration caused the process to become a bilateral affair between the U.S. and South Africa, with comments solicited from SWAPO and the Frontline States occasionally. These criticisms also resulted from procedures the Contact Group had followed since early 1981. For example, private U.S.-South Africa bilateral discussions would precede each Contact Group consultation. These consultations would then be followed by talks with the Frontline States and SWAPO, though sometimes SWAPO would be excluded altogether, as during the first seven months of 1981.

The Collapse Of The Negotiations

Suddenly, in early June 1982, the State Department announced that significant progress had been made in the negotiations and that there was now a basis for optimism that elections could be held in March or April of 1983. This target deadline required that all remaining unresolved issues be settled by the end of the summer in 1982 so that the seven-month implementation process leading up to the election could begin in September.

In a document titled *Informal Summary of Points Presented by Contact Group—June 1982*, the Western Five set forth their claims to progress and an outline for a rapid completion of the negotiations. The document stated that all Phase I issues had been settled with the exception of the choice of the electoral system to be used. The basis for the U.S. optimism at the time rested on an agreement to proceed to Phase II issues by setting aside the electoral question for the time being. The State Department also was encouraged by what it considered a favorable South African disposition toward Phase II as well as an eagerness to move toward elections as soon as possible.

It was hoped that the Phase II talks could be completed in a matter of weeks. The South Africans publicly set August 15, 1982, as a date for a cease-fire. The U.S. described August 15, 1982, as a target date for concluding the negotiations. The Phase II issues included the size and make-up of the military component of UNTAG and the South African's posed question of assuring UN impartiality in its supervisory role in Namibia. The issue of deployment levels was linked closely to a third issue of monitoring of the SWAPO forces. If an agreement could be reached on the monitoring of SWAPO bases in Angola and Zambia, the provisions for a demilitarized zone could be eliminated, thus facilitating a reduction in UNTAG force levels.

Though August 15 passed without a conclusion of the negotiations, there seemed to be general agreement on most Phase II questions. The size and make-up of UNTAG was nearly completed, with four of the seven nations to participate in the military component already named and an upper limit of 7,500 troops confirmed. SWAPO appeared to have accepted UNTAG monitoring in Angola and Zambia, and the impartiality issue had been resolved through language in the draft reports to the Security Council from the secretary general and the Contact Group reaffirming a neutral UN role.

While Phase II appeared near completion, the State Department's optimism continued to be criticized by the Frontline States and SWAPO. They consistently questioned South Africa's willingness to allow elections to be held in Namibia in the foreseeable future. They also pointed out that Phase I had not been completed and further argued that the purported agreement on constitutional principles reached earlier in the year had been misrepresented by the Contact Group to the Security Council. The Contact Group asked the Security Council to circulate a document that ostensibly represented the agreed-upon constitutional principles. According to SWAPO, the document did not reflect the final agreement reached. The document omitted three important revisions related to the relationship between the three branches of government that were to be

defined by the Constituent Assembly, the restructuring of the Public, Police and Defense services and the establishment of local councils or regional administration only by an act of parliament. SWAPO and the Frontline States have not, at this writing, however, objected formally to the document or sought amendments.

For all practical purposes, the formal negotiations were said to be finished, aside from certain details being worked out by the UN Secretariat. All that remained was for the South Africans to choose between the two electoral systems. The Contact Group already had prepared a draft letter calling on the Security Council "to set in motion the implementation of Resolution 435." Yet, the letter, which had stated that "agreement has been reached among all the parties concerned" to begin implementation, was not delivered. Its conveyance became bogged down in the wash of a U.S. concern about the 15,000 to 20,000 Cuban troops in Angola.

In a news release dated June 21, 1982, South African Prime Minister Pieter Botha had stated that, "I have said that we cannot enter into the third phase (actual implementation) of the agreement with the Western Five unless the Cubans are withdrawn from Angola. I stand by this statement."

The matter of Cuban troops in Angola had been raised earlier by the Reagan administration in an attempt to link the issue to a Namibian settlement. Cuban withdrawal from Angola has been one of the primary U.S. objectives in the region—an objective the South Africans have embraced as the most recent in a long list of objections to implementation. This issue, however, is neither part of Resolution 435 nor is it within the mandate of the Contact Group in negotiating the UN settlement plan. The United States remains the only Contact Group member that has been attempting to make it a part of the settlement.

The Angolans have stated consistently that the Cubans would be withdrawn once Namibia was independent and the South African threat was removed. On Feb. 4, 1982, Angola and Cuba issued a joint communique that stated that they were both ready to resume repatriation of Cuban troops as soon as South Africa withdrew its troops from Namibia. The statement recalled that the Cubans were first invited to Angola by the late President Neto in October 1975, after South African troops and mercenaries invaded Angola (with the collaboration of the CIA) and encircled the Angolan capital. A major criticism of the United States' southern Africa policy has been that the Reagan administration has failed to differentiate between the legality of the Cuban presence in Angola and the illegality of the South African presence in Namibia. Critics add that the United States has not been sensitive to Angola's security problems caused by South Africa.

Underscoring Angola's security assistance needs was the third massive invasion, in August 1982, deep into Angolan territory by the South African forces and the continued occupation of parts of southern Angola by South Africa. This invasion fueled charges of U.S. duplicity, for while the United States was involved in on-going bilateral talks with Angola, principally regarding the Cuban troops, the United States had advance knowledge of South African plans for a major assault on Angola. South Africa's military aggression against Angola discredited its own claims that it was seeking a cease-fire. The escalation of its military presence inside Namibia also undermined U.S. diplomacy, which rested on the assumption that South Africa saw a Namibian settlement as desirable and in its own self-interest.

All the statements regarding progress in Phase I or Phase II of the talks diminished in significance when viewed against the intransigent position of Pretoria and Washington

regarding their demand for an immediate Cuban withdrawal. During the summer of 1982, South African officials in Washington frankly stated that they could be flexible on several issues because the United States had given them an assurance that the Cuban issues would be resolved if Namibia was to gain its independence.

The administration used its stepped-up bilateral talks with the Angolan government to assert that there was flexibility on both sides. U.S. officials have stated that "parallel" withdrawal of South African troops from Namibia with Cuban troops from Angola has been discussed and that the talks would continue. However, at the beginning of October 1982, the bilateral talks were characterized as being at their lowest ebb and a meeting between Angolan Foreign Minister Paulo Jorge and U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz on Oct. 5, 1982, failed to produce any new momentum. In early October 1982, Frank Wisner, deputy assistant secretary of state for Africa, visited Luanda but was unable to meet with Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, who met with him on three previous visits. The talks were said to be deteriorating because of the U.S. insistence on a Cuban withdrawal and Angolan skepticism that the United States could guarantee against South African attacks once the Cubans were gone.

There are, of course, great pressures on Angola to agree to one of the Cuban troop withdrawal plans. Angola, more than any other neighboring country, has suffered most during the Namibia conflict because of its unwavering support for SWAPO. Since its independence in 1975, Angola has not been able to rebuild its economy largely because of South African attacks and destabilization attempts aimed at bringing down the government. At a time when economic conditions inside Angola are deteriorating, the United States has held out the promise of diplomatic recognition and bilateral economic assistance should the Cubans be withdrawn. But the U.S. has not provided the needed security guarantees.

Most observers now believe that American officials were being deliberately misleading with their sudden expressions of optimism. The statements have been criticized as an attempt to portray Angola as the uncompromising party and obstacle to independence. Observers argue that the joint U.S.-South African demand for a Cuban withdrawal is being used by South Africa to thwart implementation of the independence plan. Washington and Pretoria now place the responsibility for the failure on Luanda, while seeking to legitimize the South African occupation of southern Angola.

Other observers argue that the Cuban issue could be resolved by bringing greater pressure to bear on Angola and by giving other security assurances to South Africa regarding regional stability after Namibia's independence. In late September and early October 1982, CIA Director William Casey traveled to South Africa and held talks with the prime minister, the foreign minister, defense minister and the chief of military intelligence. The talks reportedly were intended to assess South Africa's stated security needs and to offer possible American responses or guarantees for those needs. Absent has been any consideration of Angola's legitimate security needs, contrasted with the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia and the illegitimacy of the Pretoria regime itself. Also ignored have been the general constraints on Angola in agreeing to this U.S.-South African demand, which infringes on Angolan sovereignty. With a marked increase in South Africa's armed attacks on Lesotho, Mozambique and Zimbabwe as well as Angola, security considerations facing the Angolan government remain severe.

Yet, South Africa's commitment to proceed with elections was not seriously demonstrated, and many observers believe that Pretoria has no such intentions whether or not the Cubans were withdrawn. It is often overlooked that for Pretoria, a Namibia

settlement has always posed two questions that have yet to be answered: Can the National Party government risk the domestic costs of a SWAPO victory in elections in Namibia? Do South Africa's military strategists believe they can better defend the white minority's rule in South Africa by conceding the war in Namibia and Angola? The available evidence suggests that neither the government nor the military believes that now is the time to settle on Namibia.

Using the American insistence on a Cuban withdrawal from Angola, South Africa now is able to block the settlement attempts by continuing to attack Angola, thereby assuring a continued Cuban presence. The Reagan administration, which initially prescribed a Namibia settlement as the necessary vehicle for closer U.S.-South Africa relations, now describes the South Africans as compromising and the Angolans as uncompromising. This characterization also masks an attempt to justify proceeding with the strengthening of bilateral ties with Pretoria though no settlement has been reached.

The failure of the negotiations is, most important, a tragedy for Namibia and its people. The destruction of life that will occur between now and the day of Namibia's independence will no doubt be viewed as the result of the Contact Group's failure to begin the implementation of Resolution 435 in 1982. Undoubtedly, the U.S. will be charged with the largest measure of responsibility.

Conclusion

"Our view is that South Africa is under no early military pressure to leave Namibia. The decision belongs to [the] South African Government, and ways must be found to address its concerns. [The] United States Government assumes Soviet-Cuban presence is one of those concerns, and we are exploring ways to remove it in context of a Namibia settlement."

—Chester Crocker
Assistant Secretary of State
for African Affairs
Pretoria, April 1981
Memorandum of Conversation

South Africa is spending nearly \$600 million a year on the war in Namibia. Reportedly, expenditures will be increased to \$1 billion for 1983. Formerly, it was argued that the war also was costing South Africa the possibility of a closer relationship with the United States. This view can no longer be advanced because of this high level of renewed U.S.-South Africa bilateral ties, despite the failure of the Namibia negotiations.

The basis for the Reagan administration's "constructive engagement" policy toward South Africa has been its perception of "shared strategic concerns" in the region between Washington and Pretoria. It was also founded on the belief that is easier to influence nations with which American maintains good relations and on the assumption that South Africa would acquiesce on Namibian independence as a result of this new relationship.

However, South Africa's foreign minister told a visiting U.S. Congressional delegation in August 1981 that South Africa was not likely to be wooed into accelerating the pace of a Namibia settlement because of the new U.S. policies. The foreign minister said that South Africa was not impressed that the United States had permitted South African Coast Guard personnel to be trained the U.S., upgraded the level of military representation in Pretoria and allowed the South African government to establish several honorary consulates in the United States. In essence, the Foreign Minister was explaining how keenly aware Pretoria is of Washington's limitations. He argued that these actions were motivated by a certain view of U.S. self-interest and were not concessions to South Africa. He also made clear that his government knows that anything the Reagan administration might do that is not grounded in specific legislation could be undone within days or weeks after a new administration assumed office.¹⁵

If the Reagan administration genuinely believes that a friendly approach toward South Africa can affect South Africa's withdrawal from Namibia, then the degree of naivete demonstrated by this policy is a serious cause for concern.

Another possible explanation for the United States' misleading sense of optimism regarding South Africa's intentions to settle the conflict was offered by former U.S.

Ambassador to the UN Donald McHenry. Ambassador McHenry pointed out the significance of the numerous turnovers of the Western Five's foreign ministers during the past five years of negotiations while South Africa's principal negotiators have remained the same. McHenry said, "The South Africans have a very distinct advantage in these negotiations. . . . They have an institutional memory. They know what tricks, or what paths, or what options have already been played, how long ago they have been played, and they have the advantage of knowing that their colleagues across the table do not have this knowledge."¹⁶

Other observers argued that it was a miscalculation of domestic policy factors in Angola and South Africa that allowed the U.S. to suggest that there were enough benefits to be gained for all the participants by a Namibia settlement to encourage optimism.

On the question of the U.S.-South African demand for a withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Angola, many observers and participants believed that the United States thought it could pressure the Angolan government to send the Cubans home through a well-crafted combination of threats and economic incentives. Facing both extreme security problems and dire economic conditions, the Luanda government initially welcomed the bilateral talks with Washington. But, as it became clear that the U.S. sought to intrude on what Angola considered an internal prerogative, the talks quickly chilled.

There exist general theories about why the State Department had taken an optimistic view regarding the possibility of an early settlement and elections in Namibia. The prevailing theory, however, suggests that for the United States the issue was not Namibia's independence at all, but rather East-West rivalry and the maintenance of South African stability and dominance in the region.

"Constructive Engagement" must then be viewed as the diplomatic curtain behind which the United States can help Pretoria provide for its long-term security and maintain the status quo. It is a way of deflecting international criticism of U.S. support for South Africa. In the case of the Namibia talks, the belief is that if the Angolan government can be blamed for the failure of the negotiations, both international criticism and the issue itself can be diffused.

In the final analysis, the Reagan administration's perception of South Africa—as a bulwark against communism, reliable producer of strategic minerals required by the U.S., protector of the Cape sea lanes, and the center of a free enterprise system encompassing the southern region of the continent in a constellation of dependent states—will lead toward counter-productive results. Such perceptions as underpinning for policy will only make U.S. interests in the region hostage to an increasingly unstable and repressive regime, and will alienate the United States government from the majority of the nations of the world.

If the United States continues to be a part of the South African strategy on Namibia, Washington will almost certainly lose all credibility with the nations of Africa as well as with the other members of the Western Contact Group who will seek to distance themselves from the U.S. to reduce their own losses in Africa. France already has become critical of the American insistence on linking the Cuban issue to a Namibian settlement. This loss of stature is likely to lessen the prospects for preventing an escalation of regional conflict in southern Africa and will make U.S. participation in conflict resolution in the region in the future undesirable to the Africans in the region and to other parties that seek a speedy resolution to the region's problems.

During the tenure of the Western-led negotiations on Namibia, the Contact Group has never threatened to impose rigorous economic sanctions against South Africa. The

lack of such pressure has likely contributed significantly to South Africa's intransigence. This opposition to sanctions against South Africa, on the part of the U.S. was seen to be invidious and hypocritical during a recent debate on the application of rigorous sanctions against Poland.

With the collapse of the negotiations, no consideration should be given to any alternative settlement plans such as an externally drafted constitution proposed earlier by the United States. UN Security Council Resolution 435 continues to provide a viable and internationally acceptable settlement plan. Achievement of Namibia's independence based on the implementation of this plan is, in its entirety, in the best interests of legitimate United States interests in the region.

Since South Africa's only remaining objection to beginning the implementation is the issue of Cubans in Angola, the United States must refuse to legitimize this objection and must withdraw its demand that the Cubans leave Angola as a part of the Namibia settlement. This is the only sensible course, particularly when there is every reason to believe that the Angolans will themselves initiate the withdrawal of Cuban troops when Namibia is independent and when the South African threat to Luanda is removed.

Once the U.S. removes this cover for South Africa's intransigence, Pretoria will be given an opportunity to fulfill its stated commitment to allow free elections in Namibia. Failing to do so, the United States should move to a firmer negotiating position by beginning a withdrawal of those "carrots" given South Africa in the spirit of "Constructive Engagement" (i.e., downgrade South Africa's military attache in Washington, reduce the number of South Africa's honorary consulates in the U.S., reimpose the foreign policy export controls that were lifted in June 1981 and February 1982 against South Africa's military and police, cease training of the South African coast guard and nuclear technicians, etc.).

Finally, should South Africa ignore even these serious signals, the United States should initiate consultations with its western allies on the application of multilateral sanctions against South Africa, including the consideration of adopting Chapter VII sanctions under the Charter of the United Nations.

A peacefully negotiated settlement, just months ago said to be near at hand, is rapidly sliding toward an escalation of the protracted and humanly costly military struggle. An administration that is disinclined to pressure the South Africans to accept an independent Namibia resulting from the implementation of Resolution 435 is likely to ensure that chances for a peaceful solution will be lost. Real commitment is absolutely necessary for the successful resolution of any international conflict. The United States must prove its commitment and demonstrate that a resolution of the Namibia conflict does not require an end to the reliance on U.S. leadership in the negotiation process.

Footnotes

Part I: Namibia

- ¹*Namibia: The Facts* (London, England: International Defence and Aid Fund, 1980) p. 1.
- ²W. Nacthwei, quoted in *Namibia: The Facts* (London, England: International Defence and Aid Fund, 1980) p. 7.
- ³*Namibia: The Facts*, op. cit., p. 8.
- ⁴*Namibia in the 1980's* (London, England: Catholic Institute for International Relations and the British Council of Churches, 1981) p. 10.
- ⁵*Ibid.*
- ⁶*Namibia: The Facts* op. cit., p. 10.
- ⁷*Namibia in the 1980's* op. cit., p. 11.
- ⁸*Ibid.*
- ⁹Allan D. Cooper, *U.S. Economic Power and Political Influence in Namibia, 1700-1982* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982) pp. 2-5.
- ¹⁰*U.S. Economic Power and Political Influence in Namibia, 1700-1928*, op. cit., pp. 20-23.
- ¹¹Allan D. Cooper, "An Overview of American Corporate Investments in Namibia," (Paper presented at the International Seminar on the Role of Transnational Corporations in Namibia, Washington, D.C. November 29 - December 2, 1982) p. 5.
- ¹²*Namibia: The Facts*, op. cit., p. 16.
- ¹³Gail Hovey, *Namibia's Stolen Wealth* (New York, New York: The Africa Fund, 1982) p. 11.
- ¹⁴*Namibia: The Facts*, op. cit., p. 20.
- ¹⁵J.H. Mensah, "Review of the Economic Conditions in Namibia and South Africa," United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, TD/B/869, August 26, 1981, p. 9.
- ¹⁶Elizabeth S. Landis, *Namibian Liberation: Self-Determination, Law and Politics* (New York, New York: Episcopal Churchmen for South Africa, 1982) p. 8.
- ¹⁷*Namibia in the 1980's*, op. cit., p. 31.
- ¹⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 31-32.
- ¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 32.
- ²⁰Gillian and Suzanne Cronje, *The Workers of Namibia* (London, England: International Defence and Aid Fund, 1979) p. 76.
- ²¹*Namibia: The Facts*, op. cit., p. 23.
- ²²*Ibid.*, p. 24.
- ²³*Ibid.*, p. 44.
- ²⁴*Ibid.*
- ²⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 44-45.
- ²⁶*Ibid.*
- ²⁷*Namibia, A Unique Responsibility* (New York, New York: United Nations Department of Public Information/631, undated) p. 15.
- ²⁸*Namibian Liberation: Self-Determination, Law and Politics*, op. cit., p. 7.
- ²⁹*Namibia: The Facts*, op. cit., p. 46.
- ³⁰*Windhoek Advertiser*, July 26, 1979.
- ³¹*Rand Daily Mail*, July 25, 1979.
- ³²*U.S. Policy Toward Namibia: Spring 1981* (GPO Washington, DC: House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, July 17, 1981) p. 24.
- ³³*Namibia: The Facts*, op. cit., p. 50.
- ³⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 52-53.
- ³⁵*Namibia in the 1980's*, op. cit., p. 39.
- ³⁶*Ibid.*

³⁷*Ibid.*, p. 43.

³⁸*Namibia: The Facts*, op. cit., p. 54.

³⁹*Ibid.*, p. 58.

Part II: The Negotiations

¹*Namibian Liberation: Self-Determination, Law and Politics*, op. cit., p. 11.

²*U.S. Policy Toward Namibia: Spring 1981*, op. cit., p. 23.

³*Namibia in the 1980's*, op. cit., p. 19.

⁴*Namibian Liberation: Self Determination, Law and Politics*, op. cit., p. 5.

⁵*Namibia: The Facts*, op. cit., pp. 60-61.

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 61.

⁷*Proposal for a Settlement of the Namibian Situation* (Letter from the representatives of Canada, France, West Germany, Britain and the United States, April 10, 1978).

⁸*Remember Kassinga* (London, England: International Defence and Aid Fund, July 1981) p. 31.

⁹*Namibian Liberation: Self-Determination, Law and Politics*, op. cit., p. 7.

¹⁰CBS News Program, Walter Cronkite interviews President Reagan, March 3, 1981.

¹¹"Memorandum of Conversation" (U.S. Department of State document restating discussion in Pretoria between South African Foreign Minister Roelof Botha, South African Defense Minister Magnus Malan, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Chester Crocker, and Alan Keyes, April 15-16, 1981)

¹²"Scope Paper" (Memorandum from Chester Crocker to Secretary of State Alexander Haig, in preparation of Haig's May 14, 1981 meeting with Roelof Botha.)

¹³*Ibid.*

¹⁴House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa Memorandum on "Changes in U.S. Policy Since the Beginning of Constructive Engagement." July 1982.

¹⁵*Africa: Observations on the Impact of American Foreign Policy and Development Programs in Six African Countries* (GPO Washington, D.C.: Report of a Congressional Study Mission to South Africa and Five other African Countries, August 4-22, 1981. Submitted to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, June 1982) p. 18.

¹⁶*U.S. Policy Toward Namibia: Spring 1981*, op. cit., p. 21.

APPENDIX I

RESOLUTION 385 (1976)

ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT ITS 1880TH MEETING ON 30 JANUARY 1976

The Security Council,

Having heard the statement of the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia,²⁸

Having considered the statement by Mr. Moses M. Garoeb, Administrative Secretary of the South West Africa People's Organization,²⁸

Recalling General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966, by which the Assembly terminated South Africa's Mandate over the Territory of Namibia, and resolution 2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967, by which it established a United Nations Council for Namibia, as well as all other subsequent resolutions on Namibia, in particular resolution 3295 (XXIX) of 13 December 1974 and resolution 3399 (XXX) of 26 November 1975,

Recalling its resolutions 245 (1968) of 25 January and 246 (1968) of 14 March 1968, 264 (1969) of 20 March and 269 (1969) of 12 August 1969, 276 (1970) of 30 January, 282 (1970) of 23 July, 283 (1970) and 284 (1970) of 29 July 1970, 300 (1971) of 12 October and 301 (1971) of 20 October 1971, 310 (1972) of 4 February 1972 and 366 (1974) of 17 December 1974,

Recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971²⁹ that South Africa is under obligation to withdraw its presence from the Territory,

Reaffirming the legal responsibility of the United Nations over Namibia,

Concerned at South Africa's continued illegal occupation of Namibia and its persistent refusal to comply with the resolutions and decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, as well as with the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice,

Gravely concerned at South Africa's brutal repression of the Namibian people and its persistent violation of their human rights, as well as its efforts to destroy the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia, and its aggressive military build-up in the area,

Strongly deploring the militarization of Namibia by the illegal occupation regime of South Africa,

1. *Condemns* the continued illegal occupation of the Territory of Namibia by South Africa;

2. *Condemns* the illegal and arbitrary application by South Africa of racially discriminatory and repressive laws and practices in Namibia;

3. *Condemns* the South African military build-up in Namibia and any utilization of the Territory as a base for attacks on neighbouring countries;

4. *Demands* that South Africa put an end forthwith to its policy of bantustans and the so-called homelands aimed at violating the national unity and the territorial integrity of Namibia;

5. *Further condemns* South Africa's failure to comply with the terms of Security Council resolution 366 (1974);

6. *Further condemns* all attempts by South Africa

calculated to evade the clear demand of the United Nations for the holding of free elections under United Nations supervision and control in Namibia;

7. *Declares* that, in order that the people of Namibia may be enabled freely to determine their own future, it is imperative that free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations be held for the whole of Namibia as one political entity;

8. *Further declares* that, in determining the date, timetable and modalities for the elections in accordance with paragraph 7 above, there shall be adequate time, to be decided upon by the Security Council, for the purpose of enabling the United Nations to establish the necessary machinery within Namibia to supervise and control such elections, as well as to enable the people of Namibia to organize politically for the purpose of such elections;

9. *Demands* that South Africa urgently make a solemn declaration accepting the foregoing provisions for the holding of free elections in Namibia under United Nations supervision and control, undertaking to comply with the resolutions and decisions of the United Nations and with the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971 in regard to Namibia, and recognizing the territorial integrity and unity of Namibia as a nation;

10. *Reiterates its demand* that South Africa take the necessary steps to effect the withdrawal, in accordance with Security Council resolutions 264 (1969), 269 (1969) and 366 (1974), of its illegal administration maintained in Namibia and to transfer power to the people of Namibia with the assistance of the United Nations;

11. *Demands again* that South Africa, pending the transfer of power provided for in paragraph 10 above:

(a) Comply fully in spirit and in practice with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

(b) Release all Namibian political prisoners, including all those imprisoned or detained in connexion with offences under so-called internal security laws, whether such Namibians have been charged or tried or are held without charge and whether held in Namibia or South Africa;

(c) Abolish the application in Namibia of all racially discriminatory and politically repressive laws and practices, particularly bantustans and homelands;

(d) Accord unconditionally to all Namibians currently in exile for political reasons full facilities for return to their country without risk of arrest, detention, intimidation or imprisonment;

12. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter and to meet on or before 31 August 1976 for the purpose of reviewing South Africa's compliance with the terms of the present resolution and, in the event of non-compliance by South Africa, for the purpose of considering the appropriate measures to be taken under the Charter of the United Nations.

APPENDIX II

LETTER DATED 10 APRIL 1978 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVES OF CANADA, FRANCE, GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

On instructions from our Governments we have the honour to transmit to you a proposal for the settlement of the Namibian situation and to request that it be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

The objective of our proposal is the independence of Namibia in accordance with resolution 385 (1976), adopted unanimously by the Security Council on 30 January 1976. We are continuing to work towards the implementation of the proposal.

(signed)

WILLIAM H. BARTON

*Permanent Representative of Canada to the
United Nations*

M. JACQUES LEPRETTE

*Permanent Representative of France to the
United Nations*

RÜDIGER VON WECHMAR

*Permanent Representative of the Federal
Republic of Germany to the United Nations*

JAMES MURRAY

*Deputy Permanent Representative of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland to the United Nations,
Charge d'Affairs, a.i.*

ANDREW YOUNG

*Permanent Representative of the United
States of America to the United Nations*

Proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation

I. Introduction

1. Bearing in mind their responsibilities as members of the Security Council of the United Nations, the Governments of Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States have consulted with the various parties involved with the Namibian situation with a view to encouraging agreement on the transfer of authority in Namibia to an independent government in accordance with resolution 385 (1976), adopted unanimously by the Security Council on 30 January 1976.

2. To this end, our Governments have drawn up a proposal for the settlement of the Namibian question designed to bring about a transition to independence during 1978 within a framework acceptable to the people of Namibia and thus to the international community. While the proposal addresses itself to all elements of resolution 385 (1976), the key to an internationally acceptable transition to independence is free elections for the whole of Namibia as one political entity with an appropriate United Nations role in accordance with resolution 385 (1976). A resolution will be required in the Security Council requesting the Secretary-General to appoint a United Nations Special Representative whose central task will be to make sure that conditions are established which will allow free and fair elections and an impartial electoral process. The Special Representative will be assisted by a United Nations Transition Assistance Group.

3. The purpose of the electoral process is to elect representatives to a Namibian Constituent Assembly which will draw up and adopt the Constitution for an independent and sovereign Namibia. Authority would then be assumed during 1978 by the Government of Namibia.

4. A more detailed description of the proposal is contained below. Our Governments believe that this proposal provides an effective basis for implementing resolution 385 (1976) while taking adequate account of the interests of all parties involved. In carrying out his responsibilities the Special Representative will work together with the official appointed by South Africa (the Administrator

General) to ensure the orderly transition to independence. This working arrangement shall in no way constitute recognition of the legality of the South African presence in and administration of Namibia.

II. The electoral process

5. In accordance with Security Council resolution 385 (1976), free elections will be held, for the whole of Namibia as one political entity, to enable the people of Namibia to freely and fairly determine their own future. The elections will be under the supervision and control of the United Nations in that, as a condition to the conduct of the electoral process, the elections themselves, and the certification of their results, the United Nations Special Representative will have to satisfy himself at each stage as to the fairness and appropriateness of all measures affecting the political process at all levels of administration before such measures take effect. Moreover the Special Representative may himself make proposals in regard to any aspect of the political process. He will have at his disposal a substantial civilian section of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group, sufficient to carry out his duties satisfactorily. He will report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, keeping him informed and making such recommendations as he considers necessary with respect to the discharge of his responsibilities. The Secretary-General, in accordance with the mandate entrusted to him by the Security Council, will keep the Council informed.

6. Elections will be held to select a Constituent Assembly which will adopt a Constitution for an independent Namibia. The Constitution will determine the organization and powers of all levels of government. Every adult Namibian will be eligible, without discrimination or fear of intimidation from any source, to vote, campaign and stand for election to the Constituent Assembly. Voting will be by secret ballot, with provisions made for those who cannot read or write. The date for the beginning of the electoral campaign, the date of elections, the electoral system, the preparation of voters rolls, and other aspects of electoral procedures will be promptly decided upon so as to give all political parties and interested persons, without regard to the political views, a full and fair

opportunity to organise and participate in the electoral process. Full freedom of speech, assembly, movement and press shall be guaranteed. The official electoral campaign shall commence only after the United Nations Special Representative has satisfied himself as to the fairness and appropriateness of the electoral procedures. The implementation of the electoral process, including the proper registration of voters and the proper and timely tabulation and publication of voting results will also have to be conducted to the satisfaction of the Special Representative.

7. The following requirements will be fulfilled to the satisfaction of the United Nations Special Representative in order to meet the objective of free and fair elections:

- a. Prior to the beginning of the electoral campaign, the Administrator General will repeal all remaining discriminatory or restrictive laws, regulations, or administrative measures which might abridge or inhibit that objective.
- b. The Administrator General shall make arrangements for the release, prior to the beginning of the electoral campaign, of all Namibian political prisoners or political detainees held by the South African authorities so that they can participate fully and freely in that process, without risk of arrest, detention, intimidation or imprisonment. Any disputes concerning the release of political prisoners or political detainees shall be resolved to the satisfaction of the Special Representative acting on the independent advice of a jurist of international standing who shall be designated by the Secretary-General to be legal adviser to the Special Representative.
- c. All Namibian refugees or Namibians detained or otherwise outside the territory of Namibia will be permitted to return peacefully and participate fully and freely in the electoral process without risk of arrest, detention, intimidation or imprisonment. Suitable entry points will be designated for these purposes.
- d. The Special Representative with the assistance of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other appropriate international bodies will ensure that Namibians remaining outside of Namibia are given a free and voluntary choice whether to return. Provision will be made to attest to the voluntary nature of decisions made by Namibians who elect not to return to Namibia.

8. A comprehensive cessation of all hostile acts shall be observed by all parties in order to ensure that the electoral process will be free from interference and intimidation. The annex describes provisions for the implementation of the cessation of all hostile acts, military arrangements concerning the United Nations Transition

Assistance Group, the withdrawal of South African forces, and arrangements with respect to other organized forces in Namibia, and with respect to the forces of SWAPO. These provisions call for:

- a. A cessation of all hostile acts by all parties and the restriction of South African and SWAPO armed forces to base.
- b. Thereafter a phased withdrawal from Namibia of all but 1,500 South African troops within 12 weeks and prior to the official start of the political campaign. The remaining South African force would be restricted to Grootfontein or Oshivello or both and would be withdrawn after the certification of the election.
- c. The demobilization of the citizen forces, commandos, and ethnic forces, and the dismantling of their command structures.
- d. Provision will be made for SWAPO personnel outside of the territory to return peacefully to Namibia through designated entry points to participate freely in the political process.
- e. A military section of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group to make sure that the provisions of the agreed solution will be observed by all parties. In establishing the military section of UNTAG, the Secretary-General will keep in mind functional and logistical requirements. The Five Governments, as members of the Security Council, will support the Secretary-General's judgment in his discharge of this responsibility. The Secretary-General will, in the normal manner, include in his consultations all those concerned with the implementation of the agreement. The Special Representative will be required to satisfy himself as to the implementation of all these arrangements and will keep the Secretary-General informed of developments in this regard.

9. Primary responsibility for maintaining law and order in Namibia during the transition period shall rest with the existing police forces. The Administrator General to the satisfaction of the United Nations Special Representative shall ensure the good conduct of the police forces and shall take the necessary action to ensure their suitability for continued employment during the transition period. The Special Representative shall make arrangements when appropriate for United Nations personnel to accompany the police forces in the discharge of their duties. The police forces would be limited to the carrying of small arms in the normal performance of their duties.

10. The United Nations Special Representative will take steps to guarantee against the possibility of intimidation or interference with the electoral process from whatever quarter.

APPENDIX III

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 2 OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 431 (1978) CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN NAMIBIA

Introduction

1. At its 2082nd meeting on 27 July 1978, the Security Council adopted resolution 431 (1978). By that resolution, the Council, recalling its resolution 385 (1976) and taking note of the proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation contained in document S/12636 of 10 April 1978, requested me to appoint a Special Representative

for Namibia in order to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations. The full text of resolution 431 (1978) reads as follows:

The Security Council,
Recalling its resolution 385 (1976) of 30 January 1976, taking note of the proposal for a settlement of the

Namibian situation contained in document S/12636 of 10 April 1978.

1. *Requests* the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative for Namibia in order to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations.

2. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to submit at the earliest possible date a report containing his recommendations for the implementation of the proposal in accordance with Security Council resolution 385 (1976);

3. *Urges* all concerned to exert their best efforts towards the achievement of independence by Namibia at the earliest possible date.

2. Immediately following the decision of the Security Council, I appointed Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia, as my Special Representative for the purposes of the resolution.

3. Mindful of the Council's further request contained in paragraph 2, I requested my Special Representative to undertake, at the earliest possible date, a survey mission to Namibia for the purpose of gathering for me all the information necessary for the preparation of the present report. To assist him in this task, I placed at his disposal a team of United Nations officials and military advisers.

4. This report, which is based on the survey of my Special Representative, is submitted to the Security Council in accordance with paragraph 2 of resolution 431 (1978), in which the Council requested the Secretary-General "to submit at the earliest possible date a report containing recommendations for the implementation of the proposal in accordance with Security Council resolution 385 (1976)"

I. The survey mission

5. As stated above, my Special Representative, accompanied by a staff of United Nations officials and military advisers, visited Namibia from 6 to 22 August for the purpose of carrying out a survey of all matters relative to the implementation of resolution 431 (1978).

6. In addition to meetings with the Administrator-General of the Territory and his staff, as well as with the South African military and police commanders and local authorities, the Special Representative had the opportunity to consult extensively with representatives of political parties, churches, the business community and individuals. His consultations in this regard covered a wide spectrum of public opinion within the Territory. In this connexion, the Special Representative and his staff, by travelling extensively within the Territory, were able to familiarize themselves with local conditions which would have relevance to the effective organisation and operation of a United Nations Transition Assistance Group entrusted with the tasks set out in the proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation contained in document S/12636.

7. In the course of his meetings and consultations, the Special Representative was able to obtain the view of not only the Administrator-General and his staff but the representatives of the Namibian people on a broad range of important topics relating to the necessary conditions for the holding of free and fair elections and to the role of the United Nations. Among the principal subjects discussed were the repeal of all the remaining discriminatory or restrictive laws, regulations or administrative measures which might abridge or inhibit the objective of free and fair elections; arrangements for ensuring the release of

political prisoners and detainees, as well as the voluntary return of Namibians; the arrangements and dispositions required to ensure the cessation of all hostile acts; the electoral process; the composition and work of the Constituent Assembly; and the time-table for the accomplishment of the above stages. The military aspects of the operation, with special reference to the introduction and functioning of the military component of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group, were also fully discussed. In addition, the Special Representative also discussed with the Administrator-General the manner of ensuring the good conduct of the police and the arrangements necessary to assure the free and unrestricted discharge by the United Nations staff of the tasks assigned to them.

II. General guidelines

8. The implementation of the proposal in paragraph 2 of resolution 431 (1978) will require the establishment of a United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in the Territory, consisting of a civilian component and a military component. Because of the unique character of the operation and the need for close co-operation between them, both components will be under the over-all direction of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

9. The Special Representative will report to me, keeping me informed and making such recommendations as he considers necessary with respect to the discharge of his responsibilities. The Secretary-General, in accordance with the mandate entrusted to him by the Security Council, will keep the Council fully informed of developments relating to the implementation of the proposal and to the functioning of UNTAG. All matters which might affect the nature or the continued effective functioning of UNTAG will be referred to the Council for its decision.

10. The deployment of both components of UNTAG must take into account the specific geographic, demographic, economic and social conditions prevailing in Namibia. These include, in particular, the vast distances and varied nature of topography and vegetation; the broad ranges of climatic conditions; the scarcity of water; the population distribution and existing communication network; the distribution and concentration of ethnic groups; and the lack of an adequate infrastructure in the north, such as roads and other communications and facilities. All these factors, when analysed, make it evident that sizeable resources, both military and civilian, will be required to provide the close monitoring called for in document S/12636.

11. In performing its functions, UNTAG will act with complete impartiality. In order that the proposal may be effectively implemented, it is expected that the Administrator-General and all other officials from within the Territory will exhibit the same impartiality.

12. For UNTAG to carry out all its tasks effectively, three essential conditions must be met. First, it must, at all times, have the full support and backing of the Security Council. Second, it must operate with the full co-operation of all the parties concerned, particularly with regard to the comprehensive cessation of all hostile acts. Third, it must be able to operate as a combined United Nations operation, of which the military component will constitute an integrated, efficient formation within the wider framework of UNTAG.

13. To monitor the cessation of hostilities effectively, to maintain surveillance of the Territory's vast borders

and to monitor the restriction to base of the armed forces of the parties concerned, the co-operation and support of the neighbouring countries will be necessary. Such co-operation will be most important, particularly during the early stages.

14. Implementation of the proposal, and thus the work of UNTAG, will have to proceed in successive stages. These stages, which are detailed in the annex to document S/12636, can be grouped as follows:

- a. Cessation of all hostile acts by all parties and the withdrawal, restriction or demobilization of the various armed forces;
- b. Conduct of free and fair elections to the Constituent Assembly, for which the pre-conditions include the repeal of discriminatory or restrictive laws, regulations or administrative measures, the release of political prisoners and detainees and voluntary return of exiles, the establishment of effective monitoring by the United Nations and an adequate period for electoral campaigning;
- c. The formulation and adoption of a constitution for Namibia by the Constituent Assembly;
- d. The entry into force of the constitution and the consequent achievement of independence of Namibia.

15. The length of time required for these stages is directly related to the complexity of the tasks to be performed and to the overriding consideration that certain steps are necessary before it can be said that elections have been held under free and fair conditions. It will be recalled that the proposal envisaged a series of successive stages, spaced so as to provide a sufficient lapse of time before the holding of the elections. This should permit, among other things, the release of political prisoners and detainees, the return and registration of all Namibians outside the Territory who may wish to participate in the electoral process, the deployment of United Nations military and civilian personnel and electoral campaigning by all parties in an atmosphere of tranquility. The time-table set out in the proposal called for the lapse of approximately seven months from the date of the approval of the present report by the Security Council to the holding of the elections.

16. In his discussions with the Special Representative, the Administrator-General said that the South African authorities, having previously established 31 December 1978 as the date of independence, felt that they were committed thereto and that, consequently, the elections should take place as scheduled, regardless of the fact that it would necessitate substantially reducing the time-table necessary for completion of the preparatory plans. A majority of the political parties was of the opinion, however, that it was essential to maintain the orderly phasing of the preparatory stages and to allow sufficient time for electoral campaigning in order to ensure free and fair elections. Further, it was pointed out that the actual date of independence would fall within the competence of the Constituent Assembly.

17. It will be recalled, however, that at the time the proposal was first formulated, the date of 31 December 1978 was consistent with completion of these steps. The delay in reaching agreement among the parties now makes completion by this date impossible. It is therefore recommended that the transitional period begin on the date of approval of the present report by the Security Council and proceed in accordance with the steps outlined in document S/12636. Using the same time-table that earlier provided the 31 December 1978 date, an appropriate date for elections would be approximately seven months from the date of the approval of the present report.

18. Estimates of the periods of time required for completion of stages (a) and (b) of paragraph 14 above are included in the annex to document S/12636. In view of the fact that the periods required for stages (c) and (d) of paragraph 14 would be determined by the Constituent Assembly, it is expected that the duration of UNTAG would be one year, depending on the date of independence to be decided by the Constituent Assembly.

19. UNTAG will have to enjoy the freedom of movement and communication and other facilities that are necessary for the performance of its tasks. For this purpose UNTAG and its personnel must necessarily have all the relevant privileges and immunities provided by the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, as well as those especially required for the proposed operation.

20. The military component of UNTAG will not use force except in self-defence. Self-defence will include resistance to attempts to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council. UNTAG will proceed on the assumption that all the parties concerned will co-operate with it and take all the necessary steps for compliance with the decisions of the Security Council.

III. Establishment of UNTAG

A. Military component

21. The functions which will be performed by the military component of UNTAG are set out in paragraph 8 of document S/12636 and in the annex thereto. These include, in particular:

- a. Monitoring the cessation of hostile acts by all parties, the restriction of South African and SWAPO armed forces to base, the phased withdrawal of all except the specified number of South African forces and the restriction of the remainder to specified locations;
- b. Prevention of infiltration as well as surveillance of the borders of the Territory;
- c. Monitoring the demobilization of citizen forces, commandos and ethnic forces, and the dismantling of their command structure.

22. The military component will assist and support the civilian component of UNTAG in the discharge of its tasks.

23. The military component of UNTAG will be under the command of the United Nations, vested in the Secretary-General, under the Authority of the Security Council. The command in the field will be exercised by a Commander appointed by the Secretary-General with the consent of the Security Council. The Commander will report through the Special Representative to the Secretary-General on all matters concerning the functioning of the military component of UNTAG.

24. The military component will be comprised of a number of contingents to be provided by member countries upon the request of the Secretary-General. The contingents will be selected in consultation with the Security Council and with the parties concerned, bearing in mind the accepted principle of equitable geographical representation. In addition, a body of selected officers to act as monitors will form an integral part of the military component.

25. The military component, including the monitors, will be provided with weapons of a defensive character consistent with the guidelines set out in paragraph 20 above.

26. In order that the military component might fulfil

its responsibilities, it is considered that it should have a strength of the order of seven infantry battalions, totalling approximately 5,000, plus 200 monitors and in addition, command, communications, engineer, logistic and air support elements totalling approximately 2,300. The infantry battalions should be fully self-sufficient.

27. It will be essential to establish an adequate logistic and command system at the very outset of the operation. It will therefore be necessary to obtain urgently from Governments the elements of such a system. In this connexion, it may well be necessary to use also the services of civilian contractors for some logistic functions, as appropriate. In the nature of the physical circumstances pertaining to this operation, UNTAG may have to rely to a considerable extent on existing military facilities and installations in Namibia.

B. Civilian component

28. The civilian component will consist of two elements. One of these elements will be the civil police, whose function will be to assist the Special Representative in implementing the tasks set out in paragraphs 9 and 10 of document S/12636.

29. The duties of the civil police element of UNTAG will include taking measures against any intimidation or interference with the electoral process from whatever quarter, accompanying the existing police forces, when appropriate, in the discharge of their duties and assisting in the realization of the function to be discharged by the Administrator-General to the satisfaction of the Special Representative of ensuring the good conduct of the existing police forces.

30. In order that the UNTAG police may fulfill their responsibilities, as described above, it is considered, as a preliminary estimate, that approximately 360 experienced police officers will be required. It is hoped that police officers will be made available by Governments on a secondment basis, bearing in mind the accepted principle of equitable geographical representation, as well as the language and other requirements of the assignment.

31. The non-police element of the civilian component of UNTAG will have the function of assisting the Special Representative in implementing paragraphs 5 to 7 of document S/12636 and the relevant sections of the annex thereto. These tasks will consist, in particular, of the following:

- a. Supervising and controlling all aspects of the electoral process, considering the fairness and appropriateness of the electoral procedures, monitoring the balloting and the counting of votes, in order to ensure that all procedures are strictly complied with, and receiving and investigating complaints of fraud or challenges relating to the electoral process;
- b. Advising the Special Representative as to the repeal of discriminatory or restrictive laws, regulations of administrative measures which may abridge or inhibit the objective of free and fair elections;
- c. Ensuring the absence of, or investigating complaints of, intimidation, coercion or restrictions on freedom of speech, movement or peaceful political assembly which may impede the objective of free and fair elections;
- d. Assisting in the arrangements for the release of all Namibian political prisoners or detainees and for the peaceful, voluntary return of Namibian refugees or Namibians detained or otherwise outside the Territory;
- e. Assisting in any arrangements which may be proposed by the Special Representative to the Administrator-General and implemented by the Administrator-General

eral to the Special Representative's satisfaction intended to inform and instruct the electorate as to the significance of the election and the procedures for voting.

32. Bearing in mind the vast size of the Territory, the dispersal of the population and the lack of adequate communications, it is considered, as a preliminary estimate, that approximately 300 Professional officers, as well as the necessary supporting staff, will be required initially until the cessation of hostile acts has been achieved. Thereafter about 1,000 Professional and 200 field service and General Service staff will be required during the electoral campaign and the period of balloting in order to cover all the polling stations. The staff will, among other duties, be required for 24 regional centres and more than 400 polling stations.

33. It is anticipated that some of these officials will be provided from among existing United Nations staff and that some will be persons appointed especially for this operation. In addition, it is my hope that a significant number of officials can be seconded or loaned by Governments. All such seconded or loaned personnel will be required to assume the responsibilities incumbent on United Nations officials.

34. It is also my intention to conduct consultations concerning the designation of a jurist of international standing whose appointment as legal adviser to the Special Representative is provided for in paragraph 7B of document S/12636.

IV. Proposed plan of action

35. Subject to the approval of the present report by the Security Council, it is my intention to initiate the operation as quickly as possible.

36. It is my intention to appoint as Commander of the military component of UNTAG Major-General Hannes Philipp, who has extensive experience of United Nations peace-keeping operations and is already familiar with the situation in Namibia.

37. Immediately following such a decision by the Security Council, the Special Representative, accompanied by the Commander of the military component, the key elements of their staffs together with essential command and logistic elements, will proceed to Namibia in order to establish the headquarters of UNTAG and begin operations as quickly as possible.

38. A number of Governments have already expressed their interest in providing military contingents for UNTAG. Immediately upon the approval of the present report by the Security Council, it is my intention to consult the Council and the parties concerned on the composition of the military component, bearing in mind the principle of equitable geographical representation, on the one hand, and the necessity of obtaining self-sufficient units, on the other. Every effort will be made to begin the deployment of the military component within 3 weeks and to bring it to its full strength within 12 weeks. For this to be achieved, it will be necessary to determine the composition of the military component at the earliest possible time.

39. It is also my intention to approach Governments to provide military personnel to serve as monitors. In the initial stages, given the urgency of deploying at least some of the monitors, it may be possible to draw upon officers already serving with other existing United Nations operations. This may also apply to key staff positions.

40. As regards civilian personnel, it is likewise my intention, as stated in paragraphs 30 and 33 above, to ap-

proach Governments to make available on secondment or loan experienced police officers to serve as police monitors and other experienced officials to serve in the civilian component of UNTAG. In recruiting civilian staff for UNTAG, I shall bear in mind both the accepted principle of equitable geographical representation and the urgent need to deploy a large number of experienced staff within the shortest possible time.

V. Financial implications

41. At present there are too many unknown factors to permit an accurate assessment of the cost of UNTAG. Based on the numbers of personnel specified in this report and the envisaged duration of 12 months, and taking into account the magnitudes and elements of the financial requirements experienced in other peace-keeping opera-

tions, the indications are that the financial requirements for UNTAG could be as high as \$300 million. Of this, approximately \$33 million will be required to finance the return of refugees and exiles. In view of the nature of the operation, due regard should be given to the fact that some elements of the operation might be phased out before the end of the mandate and that alternative arrangements might be possible which could result in lower costs.

42. The costs of UNTAG shall be considered expenses of the Organization to be borne by the Member States in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter.

United Nations Security Council S/12827, 29 August 1978.

APPENDIX IV

RESOLUTION 435 (1978)

ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT ITS 2037TH MEETING ON 29 SEPTEMBER 1978

The Security Council

Recalling its resolutions 385 (1976) and 431 (1978), and 432 (1978),

Having considered the report submitted by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 2 of resolution 431 (1978) (S/12827) and his explanatory statement made in the Security Council on 29 September 1978 (S/12869),

Taking note of the relevant communications from the Government of South Africa addressed to the Secretary-General,

Taking note also of the letter dated 8 September 1978 from the President of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) addressed to the Secretary-General (S/12841),

Reaffirming the legal responsibility of the United Nations over Namibia.

1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General (S/12827) for the implementation of the proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation (S/12636) and his explanatory statement (S/12869);

2. Reiterates that its objective is the withdrawal of South Africa's illegal administration of Namibia and the transfer of power to the people of Namibia with the assistance of the United Nations in accordance with resolution 385 (1976);

3. Decides to establish under its authority a United Na-

tions Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in accordance with the above-mentioned report of the Secretary-General for a period of up to 12 months in order to assist his Special Representative to carry out the mandate conferred upon him by paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 431 (1978), namely, to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations;

4. Welcomes SWAPO's preparedness to co-operate in the implementation of the Secretary-General's report, including its expressed readiness to sign and observe the cease-fire provisions as manifested in the letter from the President of SWAPO dated 8 September 1978 (S/12841);

5. Calls on South Africa forthwith to co-operate with the Secretary-General in the implementation of this resolution;

6. Declares that all unilateral measures taken by the illegal administration in Namibia in relation to the electoral process, including unilateral registration of voters, or transfer of power, in contravention of Security Council resolutions 385 (1976), 431 (1978) and this resolution are null and void;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council no later than 23 October 1978 on the implementation of this resolution.

APPENDIX V

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 435 (1978) AND 439 (1978) ON THE QUESTION OF NAMIBIA

1. Pursuant to paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 439 (1978) concerning the situation in Namibia, I held meetings in New York with the Secretary for Foreign Affairs of South Africa and the Foreign Minister of South Africa from 23 to 24 November (S/12938) and from 27 to 29 November (S/12950). The meetings focused on paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 435 (1978), by which the Security Council called on South Africa forthwith to co-operate with the Secretary-General in the implementation of that resolution; as well as on paragraphs

4 and 5 of Security Council resolution 439 (1978) by which the Security Council called upon South Africa immediately to cancel the elections it had planned in Namibia in December 1978; and demanded once again that South Africa co-operate with the Security Council and the Secretary-General in the implementation of its resolutions 385 (1976), 431 (1978) and 435 (1978).

2. In a letter dated 22 December 1978 (S/12983, Annex I), the Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Africa in-

formed me that the Government of South Africa had decided to co-operate in the expeditious implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978), and invited me to arrange for my Special Representative to "proceed to South Africa and South West Africa" as soon as possible for the purpose of completing consultations on outstanding issues. By letter dated 1 January 1979 (S/13002), I informed the Foreign Minister of South Africa that, following his Government's decision to co-operate in the expeditious implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978), I intended to request Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, my Special Representative, to visit South Africa and Namibia in January to complete consultations on operational requirements for the deployment of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG).

3. My Special Representative, accompanied by the Commander of the Military Component of UNTAG and a staff of United Nations officials, visited South Africa and Namibia from 13-22 January for the purpose of completing consultations on the transitional arrangements called for in the Proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation (S/12636) and the operational requirements for the deployment of UNTAG.

4. At a subsequent stage, after reporting to me in New York, my Special Representative visited Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana and Angola from 28 January to 10 February to consult with them on the current situation relating to Namibia. At the invitation of the Government of Nigeria, he also had talks in Lagos from 11-12 February.

5. My Special Representative held consultations with Mr. Sam Nujoma, President of SWAPO, at Luanda on 9 and 10 February. Their discussions covered the implementation of the settlement Proposal and practical arrangements to be made for the transitional period.

6. My Special Representative has now reported to me on his discussions with the South African authorities, SWAPO and the Governments mentioned above. He informed me of the willingness of both South Africa and SWAPO to co-operate in the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). However, during the meetings between my Special Representative and the representatives of South Africa and SWAPO, it became apparent that the two parties concerned had differing interpretations and perceptions regarding the implementation of certain provisions of the settlement Proposal. With a view to resolving these differences, I considered it necessary to consult further with the five Western Powers, which had worked out the Proposal with South Africa and SWAPO, as well as with the Front Line States.

7. In the light of all the information I have been able to obtain, and after hearing the views of the parties directly concerned, I have concluded that, in the circumstances and as a practical matter, the outstanding issues referred to in the paragraphs below should be resolved among the following lines.

A. Return of Namibians

8. The settlement Proposal (S/12636), in paragraph 7 (c), states that "all Namibian refugees or Namibians detained or otherwise outside the Territory of Namibia will be permitted to return peacefully and participate fully and freely in the electoral process without risk of arrest, detention,

intimidation or imprisonment. Suitable entry points will be designated for these purposes." The South African Government has confirmed to my Special Representative its acceptance of this provision in its entirety and I shall take all measures to ensure that it is scrupulously observed.

9. In order to facilitate the peaceful return of Namibians to the Territory, provisions have been made by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for the establishment of entry points and facilities to assist these returning Namibians. In accordance with normal UNHCR practice, reception centres will provide transit facilities for those returning Namibians who want them. These centres will be operated under the close supervision of the UNHCR to ensure that all returning Namibians will be free to locate where they wish; any other arrangements would be contrary to the guarantee of full freedom of movement in paragraph 6 of the settlement Proposal.

10. The provision made in paragraph 8 (d) of the settlement Proposal for SWAPO personnel outside of the Territory to return peacefully to Namibia through designated entry points to participate fully in the political process means that such return should take place without arms or other military equipment. Should any personnel seek to return bearing arms or equipment, such items would be placed under United Nations control.

B. Restriction to base

11. According to the settlement Proposal, coincidental with a cessation of all hostile acts the South African Defence Forces (SADF) and SWAPO armed forces will be restricted to base. This would involve the restriction to base of all SADF forces within Namibia and their subsequent phased withdrawal as outlined in the Proposal. Any SWAPO armed forces in Namibia at the time of the cease-fire will likewise be restricted to base at designated locations inside Namibia to be specified by the Special Representative after necessary consultation. The monitored move of these SWAPO armed forces to base cannot be considered as a tactical move in terms of the cease-fire.

12. All SWAPO armed forces in neighbouring countries will, on the commencement of the cease-fire, be restricted to base in these countries. While the Proposal makes no specific provision for the monitoring by UNTAG of SWAPO bases in neighbouring countries, nevertheless, paragraph 12 of the Proposal states that: "Neighbouring countries shall be requested to ensure to the best of their abilities that the provisions of the transitional arrangements, and the outcome of the election, are respected. They shall also be requested to afford the necessary facilities to the United Nations Special Representative and all United Nations personnel to carry out their assigned functions and to facilitate such measures as may be desirable for ensuring tranquility in the border areas."

13. I attach special importance to the repeated assurances which I have received from the neighbouring States to the effect that they will ensure to the best of their abilities that the provisions of the settlement are adhered to. In this connexion, in order to facilitate further this co-operation, I have sought the agreement of the Governments of Angola, Botswana and Zambia for the establishment of UNTAG offices in their countries to co-operate

with them in the implementation of the relevant provisions of the Proposal.

C. Cease-fire arrangements

14. The settlement Proposal calls for "a comprehensive cessation of all hostile acts". As previously indicated by me (see S/12869 and S/12938) it is my intention to propose a procedure for the commencement of the cease-fire. Thereafter, the various steps indicated in the Proposal for a settlement, as reflected in resolution 435 (1978), would take place. I intend to send identical letters to South Africa and SWAPO proposing a specific hour and date for the cease-fire to begin. In that letter I would also request both parties to inform me in writing of their agreement to abide by the terms of the cease-fire. I would require that they advise me of their agreement by a specific date which would be ten days before the beginning of the cease-fire. This period is necessary for both parties to have adequate time to inform their troops of the exact date and time for the commencement of the cease-fire and for UNTAG to deploy. The text of the proposed letter is attached as an annex to this report.

D. Composition of the military component

15. Aside from the outstanding issues concerning the implementation of the settlement Proposal mentioned above, the question of the composition of the military component of UNTAG remains to be finalized. In the course of my consultations with the parties, I have communicated to them a list of possible troop-contributing countries which, in the circumstances, I consider can best meet the requirements of UNTAG. Before the commencement of the United Nations operation in Namibia, I shall submit to the Security Council, in accordance with established practice, the proposed composition of the military component. In drawing up the list of contributing countries, I shall take into due account the views of the parties while seeking to balance those factors I consider essential in the case, such as the principle of equitable geographical representation, the willingness of the troop-contributing countries to participate and, in the case of logistics, the capacity to perform the required tasks.

E. Agreement on the status of UNTAG

16. A draft agreement on the status of UNTAG was first presented to the South African authorities in August 1978. Agreement has now been reached with those authorities in respect of most of its provisions. As stated in my report of 29 August 1978 (S/12827) UNTAG and its personnel must necessarily have all the relevant privileges and immunities provided for by the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, as well as those especially required for the proposed operation.

Concluding remarks

17. The settlement Proposal requires that all its provisions be completed to the satisfaction of the Special

Representative. In agreeing to the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978), the parties have agreed to abide by those provisions. The United Nations has the responsibility of assessing the implementation of the various military provisions of the Proposal. Similarly, the Special Representative is to be satisfied about the various provisions regarding the creation of conditions for and the conduct of elections. There is no basis for unilateral determinations or for unilateral actions by any party. At the same time it is recognized that the effective implementation of the Proposal is dependent upon the continued co-operation of the parties. Should the implementation of the Proposal be jeopardized as a result of failure of any party to carry out its provisions, I would bring the matter immediately to the attention of the Security Council.

18. I have already communicated to the Government of South Africa and SWAPO the basic elements of the proposals contained in this report. In the light of the above proposals, and if the co-operation of the parties concerned is forthcoming, I intend to designate the date of 15 March 1979 for the commencement of the emplacement of UNTAG and the entry into force of the cease-fire. The letter on the cease-fire will be transmitted accordingly. In the interim, I appeal to all parties to exercise restraint and to refrain from actions which might jeopardize the settlement.

19. I should like to draw attention to paragraph 18 of my report of 29 August 1978 (S/12827) in which I stated that "it is expected that the duration of UNTAG would be for one year, depending on the date of independence to be decided by the Constituent Assembly".

ANNEX

Cease-fire letter to be sent by the Secretary-General to both the South African Government and SWAPO

"In accordance with the Proposal for a Settlement of the Namibian situation as approved by Security Council resolution 435 (1978), I propose that a cease-fire take place beginning at 0000 hours on 15 March 1979. At that time comprehensive cessation of all hostile acts is to take effect.

"I request you to assure me in writing no later than 5 March 1979 that you have accepted the terms of the cease-fire and that you have taken all necessary measures to cease all warlike acts and operations. These include tactical moves, cross-border movements and all acts of violence and intimidation in, or having effect in Namibia."

APPENDIX VI

JOINT STATEMENT OF THE MINISTERS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA AND THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA ON THE 21ST ANNIVERSARY OF THE HEROIC 4TH OF FEBRUARY MARKING THE LAUNCHING OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE THAT IN 1975 BROUGHT INDEPENDENCE TO ANGOLA.

LUANDA, 4TH FEBRUARY 1982

As we commemorate the 21st Anniversary of the heroic 4th of February marking the launching of the armed struggle that in 1975 brought Independence to Angola, the Foreign Ministers of the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba, in Luanda, on behalf of and representing their respective Governments wish to make the following

STATEMENT

The presence of Cuban Forces in Angola has been the target of slanderous and ill-intentioned imperialist propaganda, particularly by the U.S., which has shamelessly made every effort to link this presence to the process of Namibia's Independence, as a means of preventing implementation of the resolutions previously adopted by the United Nations.

In response to this situation, the Governments of Angola and Cuba consider it their duty fully to clarify international public opinion upon the reasons for the Cuban forces continuing presence in Angola.

We recall that the reason for the Cuban Forces' arrival in Angola, at the request of President Agostinho Neto, and the reason for their continuing presence at the request of Angolan Government, is in order to cooperate with the Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola, FAPLA, in their training, and in the defence of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the People's Republic of Angola, threatened and under aggression from the South African racists, imperialism, its mercenaries and puppets.

On October 14th 1975, the Government of the U.S.A. launched the South African Defence Force against Angola, in order to implement its plan of wiping out the Angolan revolutionary movement, and taking advantage of the fact that the South African racists were illegally occupying the territory of Namibia, as they continue to do, today.

In less than 20 days, the South African troops advanced over 700 kms into Angolan territory. Meanwhile, in the North, regular foreign troops and mercenaries were approaching and threatening the capital. It was then that President Agostinho Neto called on Cuba for military assistance.

The heroic resistance of the Angolan People, supported by the friendly internationalist forces, made it possible not only to contain the advance of the racist South African troops some 200 kms from Luanda, but also created conditions forcing them to abandon Angolan soil in March 1976.

The occupation by South Africa of Angola would have constituted a grave danger to States in the region, and in fact to the whole of Independent Africa.

Cuba's internationalist aid to the Angolan people in their resistance against the South African invaders is therefore a valiant contribution to the struggle of the African peoples against colonialism, racism and apartheid.

Because these events constituted an application of the principles and objectives of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, the Fifth Summit held in Sri Lanka in August

1976 "congratulated the Government and the People of Angola for their heroic and victorious struggle against racist South African invaders and their allies, and hailed the Republic of Cuba and other states which came to the assistance of the Angolan People and frustrated the expansionist and colonialist strategy of the South African regime and its allies".

Accordingly, the Governments of Angola and Cuba declare:

1—The presence and the withdrawal of the Cuban Forces stationed in Angola constitute a bilateral question between two sovereign states, the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

2—The Governments of Angola and Cuba, only one month after the expulsion of the racist South African troops, agreed on a programme of progressive reduction of these forces on April 22nd 1976. In less than one year the Cuban military contingent was reduced by more than a third, however the process was interrupted due to fresh external threats against Angola.

3—The extent and depth of South African aggression against Kassinga, in May 1978, and the threatening presence of paratroopers from NATO Member countries on the North East frontier constituted a serious danger to Angola and made the continuing presence of Cuban military forces essential, together with the necessary means to guarantee Angola's security and territorial integrity.

4—In mid-1979, the Governments of Angola and Cuba again agreed to embark upon a fresh programme of gradual reduction of Cuban forces. Almost immediately afterwards, in September of the same year, the South African carried out a series of widespread major attacks against the provinces of Cunene and Huila.

5—In August 1981, a major act of aggression was carried out with the invasion of Cunene province by contingents of regular South African troops supported by heavy weapons, artillery, armoured vehicles and dozens of warplanes, and which culminated in the occupation of the provincial capital and other localities for several weeks. In spite of condemnation by the international community of this criminal act of aggression, expressed furthermore in a United Nations Security Council Resolution, which was then vetoed by the U.S. administration, the South African troops continued to occupy considerable areas of the provinces of Cunene and Kuando Kubango.

6—It is thus clear that the carrying out of the programme of gradual reduction of Cuban forces in the People's Republic of Angola has been interrupted several times by the constant and criminal acts of aggression perpetrated against Angola.

7—Over the course of these years, the U.S.A. and South Africa have increased their utilisation, as an instrument of aggression against Angola, of bands of counter-revolutionaries with their Headquarters, training camps, arsenals of military equipment and communications centres in Namibia. At the same time, the present U.S. Administration is increasing its political, economic

and military aid to South Africa, its gendarme against the peoples of Southern Africa, in flagrant disregard for the resolutions of the U.N., the O.U.A., the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and of international public opinion. The danger to Angola and to the other Front-line countries is today greater than ever.

8—Faced with this hypocritical intention of making the question of Namibia's Independence conditional upon the withdrawal of Cuba's force, the Angolan and Cuban Governments reiterate that the presence of these forces, prompted by external aggression perpetrated by the racist and fascist South African troops, in close alliance with the United States of America, constitutes an absolute sovereign and legitimate act by both countries and consequently is no way linked to the problem of Namibia.

9—If the selfless struggle of SWAPO, the only legitimate representative of the Namibian people, and the demands of the international community, succeed in winning a true solution to the problem of Namibia, based on strict implementation of Resolution 435/78 of the

United Nations Security Council, and leading to a genuinely independent government and to the total withdrawal of South Africa's occupying troops to beyond the Orange River, which would considerably lessen the danger of aggression against Angola, then the Angolan and Cuban Governments would analyze renewal of execution of a programme of gradual withdrawals of the Cuban forces, over a period of time agreed upon by both Governments.

10—It follows that, as and when the Angolan and Cuban Governments may so intend, the withdrawal of the Cuban forces stationed in Angolan territory would be carried out by sovereign decision of the Government of the People's Republic of Angola, once each and every eventuality of acts of aggression or armed invasion cease to exist. The Government of Cuba, therefore, reiterates that it shall implement without hesitation any decision adopted by the sovereign Government of the People's Republic of Angola on the withdrawal of these same Forces.

Paulo T. Jorge
Foreign Minister
People's Republic of Angola

Isidoro Malmierca
Foreign Minister
Republic of Cuba

APPENDIX VII

STATE DEPARTMENT MEMORANDUM ON PRETORIA MEETING MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

South Africa:
Foreign Minister Pik Botha
Defense Minister Magnus
Malan

U.S.
Assistant Secretary-designate
Chester Crocker
Alan Keyes, S/P

DATE & PLACE: April 15/16, 1981, Pretoria

SUBJECT: Discussions with SAG

COPIES TO: AF, IO-McElhaney, S/P-
Keyes, AF/S

US-Africa Relations:

Botha opened first day's discussion by expressing unhappiness over what SAG perceives as backsliding by Administration from view of South Africa taken during U.S. presidential campaign. Reagan campaign statements produced high expectations in South Africa. But, administration, in response to views of allies, such as UK and Germany, and to influence State Department professionals, has disappointed SAG expectations. USG handling of visit by military officers example of this. Botha raised issue of trust, referring to earlier "McHenry" duplicity on issue of SWAPO bases.

However, he affirmed that it means a great deal to SAG to have good relations with U.S. and that SAG understands U.S. problems in maintaining friendly relations with black African states. To begin second day's discussion, Crocker noted that, though he hadn't come to discuss South Africa's internal affairs, it was clear that positive movement domestically would make it easier for the U.S. to work with SAG. U.S. ability to develop full relations with SAG depends on success of Prime Minister Botha's program and extent to which it is seen as broadening SAG's domestic support. "Pik" Botha cautioned against making success of P.W. Botha's program a condition of U.S./South African relations. Crocker responded

with view that this is not a condition but reflects U.S. desire to support positive trends. In response Pik Botha went more fully into reasons for deep SAG distrust of U.S. Botha reiterated view that, as result of pressure from African states in UN, and influence of State Department, USG has backed away from initial recognition of importance of its interests in southern Africa (read South Africa). He doubted whether, given domestic pressures and views of such African states as Nigeria, U.S. could continue any policy favorable to South Africa, which would not provoke constant criticism.

In response, Crocker replied that present Administration would have more backbone in face of pressure than previous one. U.S. has many diverse interests and responsibilities, but will stand up for what we think right. Our objective is to increase SAG confidence.

Toward end of discussion, in context of Angola issue, Botha again came back to question of trust. He said he is suspicious of U.S. because of way U.S. dropped SAG in Angola in 1975. He argued that SAG went into Angola with USG support, then U.S. voted to condemn in UN. Cited many examples of past USG decisions that didn't inspire confidence—Vietnam, Iran, USG failure to support moderate governments in Africa, while aiding those with leftist rhetoric. Alluding to Chad, Botha asserted that

African leaders became so desperate for help against Qadafi that one even approached SAG privately, as last resort, to ask for help. Botha admitted that SAG can't yet pass judgement on present Administration. He pleaded for consistency, "When we say something, let's stick to it."

Crocker addressed trust issue, saying that new Administration is tired of double think and double talk. Despite rocky start in US/SAG relations, improvement is possible. Reagan election victory represents enormous change in US public opinion on foreign policy reversing trend of post-Vietnam years.

SAG View of Regional Situation:

During first day's session Botha discussed at length situation in southern Africa and Africa at large. He cited economic, food and population problems to support view that Africa is a dying continent because Africans have made a mess of their independence. Botha asserted belief that cause isn't race, but fact that new nations lack experience, cultural background, technical training.

Referring to South African past experience in helping and training blacks in neighbouring states, Botha discussed the need for peaceful co-existence between South Africa and its neighbors. Until they recognize they're making a mess of their independence, South Africa can't help them. South Africa is willing to help those who admit they need its help.

On this basis Botha presented vision of southern Africa's future, in context of "Constellation of States" concept. He appealed for USG support for South Africa's view of region's future, involving a confederation of states, each independent, but linked by a centralizing secretariat. SAG doesn't expect U.S. support for apartheid, but it hopes there will be no repeat of Mondale's "One man, One Vote" statement. SAG goal is survival of white values, not white privileges.

Botha argued that central issue in southern Africa is subversion. Noting that what ANC does, South Africa can do better, Botha stressed need for agreement on non-use of force. If regions start to collapse, fire will spread, there will be no winners. This is not meant as threat, but simply stating facts. Botha emphasized view that if you kill the part of Africa containing people who can do things, you kill whole of Africa.

Asked about U.S. view of the importance of southern Africa, Crocker summarized U.S. regional interests in context of its global responsibilities. He emphasized U.S. desire to deal with destabilization threats worldwide by going to their sources, using means tailored to each source and region involved. Crocker made clear that in Africa we distinguish between countries where Soviets and Cubans have a combat presence, and those whose governments espousing Marxism for their own practical purposes. He stressed that top U.S. priority is to stop Soviet encroachment in Africa. U.S. wants to work with SAG, but ability to deal with Soviet presence severely impeded by Namibia. Crocker alluded to black African view that South Africa contributes to instability in region. Said he agrees with this view to extent SAG goes beyond reprisal. Putting fears in minds of inferior powers makes them irrational.

Namibia/Angola Issue

Malan raised topic of Angola during first session. He asked about a supposed U.S. plan for an all-African force to replace the Cubans in Angola. Crocker responded that he was aware of no such plan, except perhaps as a sym-

bolic gesture, views were exchanged on the character of the MPLA Government, with the South Africans firmly asserting its domination by Moscow, while Crocker suggested a more nuanced view, allowing for several factions within the MPLA varying in ideological commitment and character. Discussion touched briefly on the nature of SWAPO. Botha alluded to the view that Nujoma is a "Bloody Thug".

Malan flatly declared that the SAG can't accept prospects of a SWAPO victory which brings Soviet/Cuban forces to Walvis Bay. This would result from any election which left SWAPO in a dominant position. Therefore a SWAPO victory would be unacceptable in the context of a Westminster-type political system. Namibia needs a federal system. SAG does not rule out an internationally acceptable settlement, but could not live with a SWAPO victory that left SWAPO unchecked power. Botha asserted that Ovambo dominance after the election would lead to civil war.

Crocker addressed these concerns saying USG recognized need to build South African confidence and security. Malan interposed with the view that it is the local people in Namibia who need security, and SAG could accept SWAPO victory only if their security is provided for. SAG can't dictate to local parties. Crocker remarked upon need to negotiate with governments, which ultimately means that parties can't have veto power. In response Botha gave eloquent rendition of SAG's problem in dealing with the internal parties. These parties fear secret plot to install SWAPO government. SAG doesn't wish to entrench white privileges but some confidence-building measures needed. Discussion briefly explored constitutional issues. South Africans asked who would write a constitution. Crocker alluded to idea of expert panel.

SAG sees Savimbi in Angola as buffer for Namibia. SAG believes Savimbi wants southern Angola. Having supported him this far, it would damage SAG honor if Savimbi is harmed.

Second round of discussions went into greater detail on Namibia/Angola questions. Malan declared SAG view that Angola/Namibia situation is number one problem in southern Africa. Angola is one place where U.S. can roll back Soviet/Cuban presence in Africa. Need to get rid of Cubans, and support UNITA. UNITA is going from strength to strength, while SWAPO grows militarily weaker.

In his response Crocker agreed on relation of Angola to Namibia. USG believes it would be possible to improve US/South African relations if Namibia were no longer an issue. We seek a settlement, but one in our interest, based on democratic principles. Our view is that South Africa is under no early military pressure to leave Namibia. The decision belongs to SAG, and ways must be found to address its concerns. USG assumes Soviet/Cuban presence is one of those concerns, and we are exploring ways to remove it in context of Namibia settlement. We agree that UNITA is an important factor in the Angolan situation. We believe there can be no peace in Angola without reconciliation between UNITA and MPLA. We see no prospect of military victory for UNITA. Must achieve movement toward reconciliation by playing on divisions in MPLA. With regard to Namibia, USG assumes that constitution is an important issue, which must be resolved before elections. The constitution would include guarantees for minority rights and democratic processes. We have said we believe SCR 435 is a basis for transition to independence for Namibia, but not for a full settlement. We wish to meet SAG concerns, while taking account of views on other side. We cannot

scrap 435 without great difficulty. We wish to supplement rather than discard it.

Milan took up Namibian question, observing that internationalization of the issue posed greatest difficulty. He alluded to tremendous distrust of UN in South Africa. He questioned inclusion of South Africa and Front Line states in the quest for a settlement, asserting that SWAPO and the internal parties should conclude it. He agreed on the need for a constitution. But 435 can't work. The longer it takes to solve the Namibia question, the less South African presence will be required there. We will reach a stage where internal forces in Namibia can militarily defeat SWAPO.

Milan's remarks set stage for Botha to discuss SAG view of SWAPO. Botha noted that SAG thought it was important to U.S. to stop Soviet gains. But if you say SWAPO not Marxist, you move in same direction as previous administration. SWAPO's people are indoctrinated in Marxism every day. Savimbi considers SWAPO universally Marxist. SAG's bottom line is no Moscow flag in Windhoek. If U.S. disagrees, let sanctions go on, and get out of the situation. South Africa can survive sanctions. Eventually South Africa can get support of moderate black African states. Better to start US/SAG relations with lower expectations, than to disagree angrily later. At moment, U.S. doesn't believe SAG view of SWAPO; you're soft on SWAPO. SAG appreciates U.S. firmness against Soviets, Botha continued. Even Africans now see you assuming leadership. But SAG worried that USG is moving toward Namibia plan SAG cannot understand. As with Kissinger attempt on Rhodesia, it will be difficult to get consensus, especially with so many parties involved. SAG tried one-on-one approach with Angolans, but Geneva meetings sidetracked effort. SAG has tried Angolans several times. Each time there is progress, but then something intervenes. We're convinced Moscow controls present government in Angola. We're convinced SWAPO is Marxist. Nujoma will nationalize the whole place, and cause upheaval and civil war, involving countries as well. We are pleading for you to see the dangers of a wrong solution in Namibia. It would be better to have a low-level conflict there indefinitely, than to have a civil war escalating to a general conflagration. If Nujoma governs as an Ovambo, the Hereros will fight. Also, Nujoma made promises to the Soviets. Defectors from SWAPO have revealed their plan to SAG—first Namibia, then Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, followed by the final attack on South Africa. SAG can't ignore this reality. We wouldn't justify that to our people. South Africa is a democracy as far as white voters are concerned. Even black leaders can criticize the government. South Africa has freedom, and can have more, but survival is the prerequisite. The BLS leaders agree with us. Even some Front Line leaders see the danger. We have twice saved Kaunda's life.

The situation is not what you think. You think in global terms; we're not a global power. We must safeguard our interests here. Not just white interests. We see the necessity of avoiding black-white polarization. But we see it as an ideological struggle. Developed moderate blacks are not communists. They will engage with us in common effort against communism. When whites see blacks as allies, whites will move away from discrimination. With more distribution of economic goods, more blacks will join us. But if we all come under Moscow's domination, that's the end.

Crocker addressed Botha's expressed fears and concerns

by first accepting the premise that Soviet domination is the danger. But U.S. believes best way to avoid that danger is to get Namibia issue behind us. As long as issue subsists, we cannot reach a situation where U.S. can engage with South Africa in security, and include South Africa in our general security framework. If Namibia continues, it will open South/Central Africa to the Soviets. Simmering conflict in Namibia is not acceptable. The ideas U.S. has in mind don't include Soviets in Windhoek. We believe we can get the Soviets out of Angola, and provide a guarantee of security whether Nujoma wins or not.

Botha said this is the nitty-gritty. Without Soviet support, others won't accept Nujoma's rule. To satisfy others we need a political solution. Crocker agreed that a political solution is needed. Botha stressed the need to consult with leaders in Namibia. If U.S. can gain their confidence, and SWAPO's, and talk about minority rights, progress is possible. People in Namibia are concerned about property, an independent judiciary, freedom of religion, the preservation of their language and the quality of education under the present system, discrimination has been abolished by law, though it continues in practice. There is also the problem of the white ethnic Legislature vs. the black majority Council of Ministers.

Crocker said that U.S. understands concern with constitutional rights. U.S. has inherited a situation with many parties but we must build a consensus in Africa that we are serious and not just delaying. We believe a Lancaster type conference won't work. We see a panel of experts, consulting all parties, writing a constitution, and then selling it through the Contact Group. With SAG's help, we could sell it to the internal parties. Botha referred to reports of a French constitutional plan. He said that he's against multiple plans. Botha stressed need for U.S. leadership, and emphasized need for U.S. to consult with internal parties in Namibia. He discussed SAG relations with internal leaders, and need to avoid leaving them in lurch in order not to be discredited with other moderate leaders in Africa. He tied this to possibility of SAG cooperating with moderate African states to deal with economic development problems. Botha concluded by saying that SAG doesn't want to let Namibia go the wrong way; that's why South Africa is willing to pay the price of the war. We pray and hope for a government favorably disposed to us. The internal parties don't want us to let go until they have sufficient power to control the situation. We want an anti-Soviet black government.

Following the substantive discussion, Botha conveyed to Crocker written communications from the heads of Bophuthatswana and Venda. He explained that their ambassadors wanted to deliver the messages in person, but Botha decided to convey them to avoid appearance of trying to force U.S. hand. Then question of invitation to Botha to visit U.S. in May was discussed. Crocker stressed need for SAG to decide cooperation with U.S. was worth it before accepting invitation. Botha resisted setting any conditions for visit, and said he would prefer not to come if conditions are set. Crocker said there were no conditions, just a question of clarifying the spirit in which the visit would take place. Botha ended the discussion by noting that he would inform internal parties about discussion immediately. He said he would tell Prime Minister Botha that SAG should explore question of constitution before an election in Namibia. He noted that a referendum on the constitution rather than constituent assembly elections, would make matters easier.

APPENDIX VIII

STATEMENT BY SAM NUJOMA, PRESIDENT OF THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA PEOPLE'S ORGANIZATION (SWAPO) OF NAMIBIA, TO A MEETING OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY PARLIAMENTARY GROUP, AT BRUSSELS, 28TH SEPTEMBER 1982

Mr. Chairman,
Honourable Members of the European Parliament,
Distinguished Guests,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

Allow me, first of all, to express, on behalf of SWAPO and the embattled Namibian people, deep gratitude for this unique opportunity which you Honourable members of the European Parliament have accorded me to be here today in order to brief you about the plight, the hopes and the aspirations of the oppressed Namibian people.

Mr. Chairman, I would also like to seize this opportunity to register, on behalf of SWAPO, sincere thanks to the EEC member countries for humanitarian and educational assistance rendered to the Namibian people, through our movement. Your governments and your peoples have bilaterally made considerable medical, food and clothing donations to our movement in order to enable us to alleviate the health, social and educational problems of thousands of Namibian refugees and exiles who have fled their country, Namibia, in order to escape the brutal and racist repression and colonial domination in our country.

Collectively also, your governments have made educational funds and other humanitarian assistance available to our displaced people through the EEC channels. Various educational projects for Namibian refugees are being implemented with contribution of funds by the EEC. In this connection, I would like to mention the EEC funding of the vocational training project in Denmark where several Namibian refugees are now undergoing training. The EEC has also contributed to the funding of the United Nations Institute for Namibia and to the Distance Education Programme for Namibia, both of which are located in Lusaka, the capital of the Republic of Zambia.

Humanitarian assistance to the Namibian refugees from your governments has also reached our refugee centres in the Front-line countries through the various non-governmental organisations of your countries. For all this, SWAPO is truly grateful. And we believe that this valuable humanitarian and educational assistance represents a positive beginning of important links between the EEC and Namibia whose long-delayed independence is but a matter of time.

Mr. Chairman, while SWAPO is convinced that Namibia's independence cannot be delayed indefinitely, I consider it appropriate to point out the fact that I address you here today at a time when the prospects for an early implementation of the UN Plan for the decolonisation of Namibia are, once again, looking bleak. After five years of intensive and sustained diplomatic efforts to bring about a negotiated settlement of the problem of South African illegal and colonial occupation of our country, the Namibian people are still suffering under the yoke of apartheid oppression.

In utter disregard of the wishes of the Namibian people and resolutions of the international community, apartheid South Africa is bent on the imposition of its own Bantustan version of independence on our people.

The racist regime in Pretoria has, since 1978, been and continues to create one excuse after another in an attempt to block the implementation of the UN Plan for the independence of Namibia; and while pretending to negotiate in good faith, the regime is, in actual fact, doing every-

thing within its power to deny the Namibian people the right to elect a government of their choice. South Africa is doing all this because it is very much afraid that under free, fair and democratic elections, the Namibian people will definitely repudiate its Bantustan puppets whom it has created and sought to impose on us over the last seven years of the Turnhalle puppet show.

The fundamental contradiction in Namibia is, therefore, our people's demand for free and democratic elections under UN supervision, on one hand, and South Africa's attempt to deny the Namibian people that democratic choice, on the other. The apartheid regime has not yet given up its intention to impose on our people puppet leaders chosen by Pretoria to serve the interest of South Africa in Namibia.

The pattern has become very familiar that at every point when the negotiations on Namibia are about to reach the implementation stage of UN Security Council Resolution 435, South Africa would come up with one excuse behind which to hide and thus to avoid the implementation of the resolution.

It can, for instance, be recalled that after she had accepted that resolution in 1978, Pretoria refused to allow its implementation by claiming that the number of 7,500 UN military personnel proposed by the Secretary-General to monitor the transitional process in Namibia was too large.

By 1979, the excuse behind which Pretoria was hiding was the South African complaint about the provision in the UN Plan that SWAPO armed forces, who will be found inside Namibia at the time of the cease-fire, would be confined to assembly points or bases within the Namibian territory.

By 1980, South Africa had come up with something else, i.e., the so-called UN lack of impartiality. Today, the excuse is the presence of the Cubans in Angola. This endless fabrication of excuses testifies to our conviction that the apartheid state is not yet ready to allow the Namibian people to exercise their democratic and national right to independence and self-determination.

It is important to note, however, that in the present impasse it was not Pretoria but Washington which has invented the issue of a linkage between the independence of Namibia and the presence of the Cubans in Angola. South Africa has merely found the American insistence on this issue to be yet another convenient excuse behind which to hide further in order to avoid free, fair and democratic elections in Namibia.

It is, indeed, a sad and tragic development of international politics that a leading world power, which claims to be the citadel of democracy, should choose to use the sufferings and agony of our unfortunate and small nation as a bargaining card in pursuit of its own global objectives.

Because of the decision by the Reagan Administration to hold up Namibia's independence and to use our people's agony and sufferings as a bargain card, the process of bringing Namibia to independence through a negotiated settlement has now come to a virtual stand-still; and, in

the meantime, Pretoria is daily intensifying its cold-blooded murder of our people, torturing them, burning down their villages and destroying their property in an attempt to force them to accept its own puppet arrangements in Namibia.

The catalogue of cases of atrocities that are being perpetrated against our people by the South African troops in Namibia is becoming extremely long and horrifying. It was in this light that the British Council of Churches sent a fact-finding mission, led by the Bishop of Manchester, the Rt. Rev. Stanley Booth-Clibborn, and the Rt. Rev. John Johansen-Berg, to Namibia.

The delegation of the British Council of Churches visited Namibia from the 16th to 28th November, 1981, and it was able to confirm what our movement has been telling the world—that a very brutal reign of terror exists in Namibia today. At the conclusion of their mission, the British religious leaders had the following to say:

We have . . . been deeply saddened by many of the things we have heard and seen of the grave hardships faced by so many people . . . Our delegation leaves Namibia conscious of the great sufferings, caused by the war, to many people, especially in the northern areas. We heard accounts of deaths, torture, beatings and seizure of property . . . through arbitrary actions of the (South African) security forces . . . We experienced at first hand the deep desire of the great majority of the people of Namibia for independence under a government elected fairly and freely . . . Only in this way can the terrible sufferings brought about by the war be ended.'

The delegation of the British church people was followed by another one from the South African Council of Churches, led by Bisho Desmond Tutu and the Reverend Peter Storey, who visited our country in February this year. Like their British counterparts, the South African spiritual leaders came back from Namibia fully convinced that the South African army of occupation in Namibia is actually engaged in brutal mass repression and cold-blooded murder, rape and destruction of peasant crops and livestock. At a press conference in Windhoek before their return to South Africa, Bishop Tutu and the Rev. Storey also called for the immediate implementation of the UN Plan for the decolonisation of Namibia in order to end the sufferings of the Namibian people at the hands of the South African army of occupation.

The accounts of widespread atrocities in our country have, furthermore, been documented in great detail by the delegation of the South African Conference of Catholic Bishops which visited Namibia during the early months of this year. This delegation, too, has confirmed that electric torture, beating up of people suspected of being sympathetic to SWAPO, shooting of people, breaking into their homes, stealing and killing of peasant cattle, pillaging of shops and raping of women are the commonly accepted procedures used by the South African soldiers in Namibia to force the people to give information about SWAPO and its activities.

The Council of Churches in Namibia, representing the Anglican, the African Methodist Episcopal, the Lutheran and the Catholic Churches in our country, has also added its voice to this general outcry against the South African oppression and inhuman brutality against the Namibian people. For example, on the 26th February 1982, representatives of the Namibian church community presented an open letter to the South African Premier, P.W. Botha. In that letter they said, among other things, the following:

With respect, Mr. Prime Minister, we would like to

state that when the proposals of the Western Five were presented in 1978, on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 385 of 1976, the churches in Namibia supported those proposals believing that they provided a solid ground for a peaceful solution to the problems of our country and its people. This position is still held by the churches, and we are convinced that this represents the will and the right of the majority of the people of this country today to determine their own future.

When your government called for an election in this country in 1978, without the participation of the UN and other parties, the churches warned against such a procedure because we believed that such a development would prolong the bloodshed and suffering of the people of this country, nor would it have commanded international recognition.

The people whom we represent had high hopes and expectations at the time of the Geneva negotiations in January 1981; but great disappointment came when your government stated that it was premature to sign a ceasefire agreement, thus delaying the implementation of the said resolution. And this made the failure of the negotiations even harder to understand. We would again, earnestly, and with respect, appeal to the South African Government, which still controls this country, to agree to the immediate signing of a cease-fire so that an atmosphere of trust and confidence may be created in the negotiations, that the ongoing suffering may cease, and that peace may return to this land.

Mr. Prime Minister, since there are questions today of UN impartiality and other claims as to who truly represents the Namibian people, we believe that the time, now long overdue, has come for the Namibian people to be given the opportunity to decide through a democratic and free election, controlled and supervised by the UN. We plead with you, Sir, let the Namibian people now be the judge of these questions so that all counter-claims of representation may be settled.'

Mr. Chairman, I have cited but a few examples about the moral outcry and indignation by people of conscience and good will, from different parts of the world, who are very concerned about the repression and brutal atrocities to which the Namibian people are condemned.

I wish to point out here further examples of the nature and scope of the more recent crimes which the South African army of occupation has been perpetrating against our people.

On the 10th of March, 1982, at a traditional homestead (kraal) near the Oshikuku Roman Catholic Mission, ten innocent Namibian men, women and children were cold-bloodedly massacred by soldiers belonging to the so-called Ovambo Home-guard, which forms part of the South African army of repression and colonial occupation in Namibia. The soldiers came to the afore-mentioned homestead, brandishing automatic weapons with fixed bayonets. They then ordered all twelve members of the extended family to line up. Minutes thereafter, they started spraying their victims with bullets. Only two of the twelve members of that family survived by feinting to be also dead.

The two survivors of the massacre have unmistakably identified the soldiers. They recognised a certain Nakale whom they described as an infamous and brutal commander of a task force of the South African army known as "Koevoet".

Horrible photos of that unspeakable atrocity are available in this building for the Honourable members of the European Parliament to see for themselves what the Namibian people are experiencing at the hands of the

apartheid army of occupation in our country.

I have earlier cited the position of the religious community in Namibia regarding the continued and brutal South African occupation of Namibia. I would like to mention here that the church community in Namibia as well as its property have also become the favourite targets of the South African reign of terror in our country.

For instance, a printshop of the Lutheran Church at Oniipa, in the northern part of Namibia, had been blown up twice by the South African Army. First, it was destroyed on the 12th of May 1973, and for the second time on the 19th November 1980, after it had been rebuilt with the financial assistance of the World Council of Churches. On the 22nd of August this year, it was, again, fired at by South African soldiers with a 40mm shell fitted with a high explosive device. The shell smashed through a part of the roof of the printshop building, but failed to hit its intended target, i.e., the printshop.

The reason for this repeated attempt to strike at the heart of the spiritual foundation of the Lutheran Church in Namibia is that the religious newspaper of this church, "Omukwetu", has courageously dared to publicize cases of atrocities committed by the South African army in our country.

In a continuous campaign of harassment and intimidation of the Namibian church community, a South African military plane dropped explosives on hospital buildings belonging to another Lutheran missionary station at Elim, about 45 km northwest of Oniipa. The fire gutted one of the two buildings to the ground, a building which contained medical supplies and equipment, valued at 28,000 rands, for the hospital; all these were completely destroyed. The second building was saved from being gutted down by the missionary students and local people who rushed to the scene and helped to put out the fire.

The following day, Commandant T.A. Nell and Captain D. Atkinson of the South African army went to Elim to admit and apologize that their military plane dropped the fire on the hospital buildings by "mistake".

Such incidents have, however, become too numerous to be accidental. It is a well known fact that nowadays the South African troops in Namibia take pleasure in desecrating church property and religious congregations as a way of intimidating the population.

For instance, on May 16th this year, South African soldiers interrupted, at the same time, two Sunday worship services at Elombe parish, 48 km east of Ondangwa and at Onayena parish, approximately 15 km west of Elombe. At both places, the racist soldiers got into the church and stopped the worship service under the pretext of looking for SWAPO activists. They turned the two church services into total confusion as they surrounded the two churches and ordered all the people to leave the two church buildings. They also threatened to shoot anyone refusing to leave the church or trying to run away. All the men were assembled, interrogated and some beaten up.

One can go on endlessly listing cases of mass brutality and terrorism to which our people are daily subjected.

It is against this background, Mr. Chairman, that the Namibian people and SWAPO are extremely outraged by the position of the Reagan Administration that the agony and sufferings of our people must continue in order to serve as a trump card for Washington to achieve its own imperialist interest in Southern Africa.

We reject with indignation and strongly denounce as callous and, indeed, inhuman the American efforts to prolong the agony of our people on account of the Cubans in Angola.

Namibia is surely not Angola. The question of Namibia is a question of pure and simple colonial and illegal occupation by South Africa. The presence of Cubans in Angola is an entirely separate issue. It is an arrangement between two independent and sovereign states—Cuba and Angola. It does not have anything to do with the decolonization of Namibia.

Furthermore, when the USA, Britain, France, Canada and the Federal Republic of Germany asked for UN mandate to mediate between SWAPO and apartheid South Africa concerning Namibia's independence, they did not ask that such mandate should include the Cuban troops in Angola. It is, therefore, outrageous in the extreme that the Reagan administration should try to force a linkage between these two entirely separate issues.

The American gang-up with the murderous and oppressive racists of Pretoria does not give the Namibian people a positive impression of the moral strength of American democracy. Washington's holding-up of our country's independence on the grounds of the presence of Cubans in Angola has, moreover, the effect of not only giving comfort to the racist regime of Pretoria, but also of conferring legitimacy upon South Africa's illegal occupation of our country.

The American attempt to link these two separate issues is as unjust as its demand that the EEC countries should not build a pipeline in order to obtain the supply of gas, which they need, from the Soviet Union. We know from the mass media that many of your countries are opposed to this unjust and imperialistic dictate. The people of Namibia, like those of your countries, recognize the fact that the United States of America is a leading world power. But we do not agree that the United States has the right to bully smaller nations in such a crude way as the Reagan administration is trying to do regarding the decolonization of Namibia.

The cardinal problem in Southern Africa is, in actual fact, not the presence of the Cuban troops in Angola but the racist policy of apartheid pursued by the regime in Pretoria. It is the policies of this regime which pose a threat to the security of the people and nations of Southern Africa; and it is, let the truth be told, the aggressive policy of this regime which has occasioned the presence of the Cuban troops in Angola.

Mr. Chairman, with open support and encouragement of the Reagan administration, the South African government is blocking even the conclusion of the negotiations on Namibia. The July talks in New York failed to bring the negotiations to a conclusion because South Africa refused with contempt to take part in them. Therefore, the three outstanding issues, namely, the choice of the electoral system, the composition of the UNTAG military component and the modalities and date of the ceasefire agreement could not be agreed upon. Pretoria has up to now refused to announce its choice of the electoral system to be used in Namibia. SWAPO, as Honourable members of the European Parliament are aware, has stated that we prefer proportional representation. Our preference for this system is governed by the fact that the time given to the UN to implement Resolution 435 is very limited. We have also said that we can accept single-member constituency system, provided that all the requirements concerning the application of this electoral procedure are met.

SWAPO strongly believes that if there are going to be UN supervised elections the people of Namibia must know the method of election which will be followed. There is no justification whatsoever for Pretoria to hide from the Namibian people the method of election to be used. The parties which will participate in the UN supervised elec-

tions must know what procedure is to be followed so that they can prepare themselves better.

Mr. Chairman, on its part, SWAPO is ready to participate in free, fair and democratic elections under UN supervision and control. In other words, we are ready to submit ourselves to the verdict of the Namibian people. We are confident that the Namibian people know that it is SWAPO alone which has championed their cause over the last two decades; and, as such, we believe that the Namibian people will choose a SWAPO leadership to form a national government in our country.

A SWAPO government will jealously pursue a policy of true democracy. It will promote and respect human rights and fundamental freedom for all those who live in Namibia. We will, however, not support any idea of having privileged minority sections of the Namibian population to the detriment of the majority of our people. Therefore, for us, human rights and fundamental freedom would entail an emphasis on socio-economic justice and fundamental narrowing of the gap between those who have enjoyed privileges and those who have been dispossessed.

With regard to foreign policy, a SWAPO government will follow a policy of non-alignment and will seek to develop friendly relations with other peace-loving states, irrespective of their social and political systems.

Mr. Chairman, Namibia's economy is essentially based on the production of primary products, mainly minerals, which it does not consume. Therefore, independent Namibia, under a SWAPO government, will give priority to the development of close relationship in economic, commercial and industrial fields with the EEC countries

since your countries are among those whose industries need our primary products.

SWAPO is very well aware that no country on this planet can do without commercial links with other countries. Even the biggest countries, such as the USSR and the USA, do need to conduct foreign trade. Our little Namibia could not be an exception to this rule. Therefore, our country will, under a SWAPO government, develop diplomatic and commercial relations with all those countries that are friendly to her, including the EEC countries.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman and Honourable members of the European Parliament, I wish to appeal to you to use the good offices of all your governments, your political parties and popular organisations in your countries to actively dissuade the Reagan administration from outrageous and unjust position towards the oppressed Namibian people.

We earnestly ask your governments to publicly reject the American linkage of Namibia's independence to the presence of the Cuban forces in Angola.

Once again, I wish to thank you most sincerely for this unique opportunity you have accorded me in order for me to state before you, Honourable members of the European Parliament, the plight, hopes and aspirations of the Namibian people.

I must also state here, Mr. Chairman, the Namibian people, led by SWAPO, will not, I repeat, will not accept the imposition of a South African puppet regime in our country. They will resist to the last drop of their blood Pretoria's genocidal attempt to compel our people, by force of arms, to accept puppet leaders.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.