



*President:* Mr. Imre HOLLAI (Hungary).

*Tribute to the memory of Mr. Tsogtyn Narkhuu, Permanent Representative of the Mongolian People's Republic to the United Nations*

1. The PRESIDENT: It is my sad duty to announce that we have learned with a sense of profound shock of the death of Mr. Tsogtyn Narkhuu, Permanent Representative of the Mongolian People's Republic to the United Nations. On behalf of the General Assembly, I would like to extend to the members of Mr. Narkhuu's family and to the Government and people of Mongolia our heartfelt condolences. I ask members of the Assembly to stand and observe one minute of silence in tribute to the memory of Mr. Narkhuu.

*The members of the General Assembly observed a minute of silence.*

**AGENDA ITEM 37**

**Question of Cyprus: report of the Secretary-General  
(continued)**

2. Mr. CHARLES (Haiti) (*interpretation from French*): It is with deep regret that the delegation of Haiti has learned of the death of the Permanent Representative of the Mongolian People's Republic to the United Nations. We should like to express our sincere condolences to the relatives and family of the deceased, and request you, Mr. President, to convey to them our feeling of deep loss and sympathy.

3. The Assembly's consideration of the question of Cyprus once again brings before the States Members of the United Nations one of the thorniest problems of our time, which private interests constantly use to the detriment of both parts of the population of the island of Cyprus. This leads to a situation the persistence of which prolongs the indescribable sufferings of the people and further endangers international peace and security.

4. The history of peoples offers many examples of ethnic groups to which force of circumstances or geographic chance offers no option but peaceful coexistence. This is rooted in a kind of social contract according to which individual interest is subordinated to the imperious need to find a *modus vivendi* which will guarantee the well-being of all.

5. The case of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities is therefore nothing new. Indeed, they were very naturally called upon, as time passed, to overcome the divergences born of their different cultural experiences and to find the harmony

which is so essential to progress and collective well-being. There can be no doubt that, free from any external constraint, they would finally have understood the need to find this balance, the path that leads to conciliation and reconciliation. Unfortunately, the intervention of an army of occupation, in flagrant violation of fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law, has resulted in the systematic destruction of the efforts undertaken.

6. The tragedy of which the island of Cyprus is the arena touches the people of Haiti particularly, because it has had the harsh experience of foreign occupation in the past. No one can better understand the suffering involved and the deep feelings of frustration than the victims themselves.

7. That is why my delegation deplores the fact that the intercommunal talks have stalled at present, although they still seem to be the best way of finding a solution acceptable to all. We appeal to the parties to demonstrate more flexibility, as well as a spirit of conciliation, and to allow themselves to be guided only by the concern to put an end to the tragedy which afflicts the inhabitants of the island.

8. My delegation believes that the withdrawal of the occupying forces is the most urgent and meaningful step to be taken in order to arrive at a final comprehensive settlement of the question of Cyprus. This would have the dual advantage of effectively getting the process for a peaceful settlement under way and of checking the widely disseminated idea that the invasion troops consider their presence in Cyprus to be an irreversible occupation.

9. Finally, I wish to express the satisfaction of my delegation at some of the measures undertaken by the United Nations, among them the supervision of the cease-fire lines carried out by UNFICYP and other functions of a humanitarian nature, such as the transfer of Greek Cypriots from the north to the south of the island. I appeal for a spirit of co-operation on the part of the parties in supporting the efforts of the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus and to giving that Committee all the necessary assistance in carrying out the mandate entrusted to it.

10. This is my delegation's position on the question of Cyprus. Concerted efforts by all, and in particular the parties concerned, under the auspices of the Secretary-General, are the course my delegation advocates, so that the island of Cyprus, free from any foreign interference, may recover its territorial integrity and its people may regain their outraged dignity. That is the wish of the Government and the people of Haiti, and it is without a doubt the dearest wish of the two communities which have to share in harmony the sovereignty of the island of Cyprus.

11. Mr. SYED ARIFF (Malaysia): It was with a sense of deep regret that my delegation learned of the death of the Permanent Representative of Mongolia. My delegation would like to take this opportunity to extend our deepest condolences to the bereaved family.

12. My delegation has been following the Assembly's debates on the question of Cyprus with a great deal of interest. From statements made thus far it is clear to my delegation that the international community is committed to an early political solution of this problem, to be pursued through the intercommunal talks, taking into account the fundamental and legitimate rights of the two Cypriot communities, which have been clearly endorsed in the Denktas-Makarios and Denktas-Kyprianou agreements.

13. It is now nearly 20 years since the crisis of December 1963 and almost nine years since the convulsion of July 1974. Yet, despite efforts by the Secretary-General and his predecessors, we seem no nearer a solution of the Cyprus problem. The longer it takes to achieve a solution, the more elusive it will become. Meanwhile the chasm dividing the two communities remains unbridged.

14. My delegation is gratified to note, however, the role being actively pursued by the Secretary-General under the mandate entrusted to him by the Security Council. In this regard, it is worthwhile for the Assembly to give due cognizance to the intercommunal talks, which provide a good forum for discussing issues of substance with a view to bridging differences.

15. My delegation is heartened to know that the atmosphere of those talks, as described by the Secretary-General in his report [A/37/805 and Corr.1], has been "co-operative and constructive". We are fully aware that there is no substitute for direct negotiations between the two Cypriot communities if a durable and a mutually acceptable solution is to be found. After all, it is they who will have to make a settlement and it is they who will have to live with it. What is needed is the political will to negotiate a settlement which would take into account the particular characteristics of that magnificent island. Let us therefore focus all our efforts on this, rather than enter into acrimonious debates which will only hamper the intercommunal negotiating process and impede the efforts of the Secretary-General to play a positive role in the search for peace.

16. My delegation has carefully studied draft resolution A/37/L.63. Unfortunately, the draft does not place sufficient emphasis on the urgency to find political breakthroughs within the context of the intercommunal talks. My delegation is of the view that there is no alternative to the intercommunal forums, which should be conducted on the basis of the guidelines upon which the two parties have already agreed. It is therefore most unconstructive to attempt to internationalize the Cyprus question as this will only contribute to the hardening of positions by the two negotiating parties.

17. The Government of Malaysia is firmly committed to the resolution of disputes by peaceful means. In this regard, we support the framework agreed upon by the two parties and carefully negotiated by Mr. Denktas and Archbishop Makarios, who was later succeeded by Mr. Kyprianou. We believe that the

agreement would provide a good basis for a long-term solution based on the fundamental and legitimate rights of the two communities within an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal and bi-zonal federal republic.

18. My delegation welcomed the decision of the General Assembly, taken at its 116th meeting, to invite the Special Political Committee to meet for the purpose of affording representatives of the Cypriot communities an opportunity to express their views. Conversely, my delegation feels that the question of Cyprus can adequately be dealt with in the Special Political Committee and that a general debate on the problem is not likely to be useful. We should refocus our attention on the intercommunal talks and give our unstinting support to them, if a comprehensive, overall settlement is eventually to be achieved.

19. Concerns have been expressed over what some chose to call "an interruption" in the intercommunal talks. But such interruption was inevitable because of the complex nature of the negotiations. However, given the political will on both sides, my delegation is confident that the talks can be resumed. In this connection, my delegation would like to appeal to the two communities to show the necessary determination and good will to achieve a breakthrough which would greatly enhance peace and stability in that region.

20. The international community, if it is to be constructive, should now attempt to bridge the gulf of mistrust and suspicion plaguing the two communities and to adopt an impartial approach, bearing in mind the sensitivities of both communities. The 19 May 1979 agreement<sup>1</sup> provides a good basis upon which to achieve this objective since it calls for direct negotiations between the two communities and goes a step further by calling upon the two parties involved to desist from taking steps which could prejudice the prospects of such negotiations.

21. Bearing in mind our commitment to the intercommunal talks as the only pragmatic avenue to the resolution of the Cyprus question, my delegation regrets it cannot support draft resolution A/37/L.63 because this draft will have the effect of impeding the goal of achieving peace and harmony in Cyprus. The adoption of such a draft resolution would not be conducive to building confidence and trust between the two communities, elements which are indeed prerequisites in the search for a just and lasting settlement of the problem. The draft resolution is also lopsided and partial, for it does not seem to take into account the views of the Turkish Cypriots, one of the principal actors in the Cyprus drama.

22. Mr. ALLAGANY (Saudi Arabia) (*interpretation from Arabic*): I have already expressed, at the beginning of the thirty-seventh session, our congratulations, Sir, on your election as President, and I now avail myself of this opportunity to express to you our good wishes for success in your leadership of this resumed session and my hopes that, under your wise guidance, we may reach just decisions that take into account the interests of the Republic of Cyprus and the legitimate rights of the two communities involved.

23. I would also like to express our heartfelt sympathy to the family of the Permanent Representative of Mongolia, whose sudden death is a great loss.
24. When the State of Cyprus gained its independence and joined the international family of this world Organization, we hoped, for that nation and its people, that continuous peace and progress as well as national unity would enable it to follow an independent policy free from external pressures and trends and that it would be able to play a constructive and effective role on the world scene. We thank God that that country was able to emerge from the era of colonialism as a single entity without the division or partition that occurred in other countries. We hoped that, through its experience of colonialism, unity and endurance, the people of Cyprus could attain the intellectual maturity and political consciousness necessary to rise above sectarianism and take into account the interests of the country as a single entity, regardless of any differences in creed, traditions or origin. We felt, and still feel, great affection for Cyprus both as a people and as a country because of its geographical position as part of the Middle East region. That is why we were deeply pained when the differences between the major communities led to the breakup of the régime and to fighting between the two communities, fighting which gave rise to external intervention.
25. This regrettable situation has existed in Cyprus for quite some time now. This time could have been used to reach a just, comprehensive and lasting settlement upon which could be built a régime of peace, stability, progress and welfare for the people of Cyprus.
26. We do not yet despair of reaching this objective. Quite the contrary, we think that, owing to the negotiations which have taken place between the two groups, supported by the good offices of the Secretary-General under Security Council resolution 367 (1975), there is increasing awareness on the part of both parties of the fact that to dispute is of no use, and of the necessity of reaching a comprehensive and constitutional settlement guaranteeing justice for both groups, as well as the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Cyprus, its national and regional unity and its non-alignment, a settlement that would also prevent any attempt to divide or partition the island.
27. Our hopes have actually been strengthened by what we have seen, and we put our trust in the leaders of Cyprus and their political maturity; we hope that they will make even greater efforts in this direction. We are certain that, with the good offices of the Secretary-General, they will succeed in finding the hoped-for solution and in achieving the national unity of the people of Cyprus including both communities. We are sure that the parties concerned, through the exercise of patience and tolerance, will reach this objective, in their national interest.
28. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia believes that the presence of foreign forces in Cyprus will end as soon as the two communities in Cyprus reach a settlement of the present dispute. Our Government calls for the adoption of a decision that calls upon both parties to resume negotiations at once in order to reach this objective. May God lead them along the right road.
29. Mr. TREIKI (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (*interpretation from Arabic*): My delegation would like, first of all, to express our condolences to the friendly delegation of Mongolia, and to the Government and people of Mongolia on the death of the Permanent Representative of Mongolia to the United Nations. I enjoyed a personal friendship with Mr. Narkhuu and I had experience of his competence and goodwill and his efforts in the interest of peace and security.
30. May I also congratulate you, Mr. President, on presiding over this resumed session of the Assembly and express my appreciation of the competent way you presided over the earlier part of the session. This has enabled us to strengthen further the friendly relations between our two countries.
31. The question of Cyprus is one of the many international issues which have long been before the United Nations and other international bodies and for which just and comprehensive solutions have not been found, despite all the efforts that have been made within and outside the United Nations, and despite the many resolutions, agreements and political declarations which provide a basis for a just and lasting settlement of this problem. These include, in particular, resolution 3212 (XXIX), which was unanimously adopted by the General Assembly and endorsed by Security Council resolution 365 (1974); the important agreement between the leaders of the two Cypriot communities in 1979;<sup>1</sup> and the declarations of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, the latest of which was the political declaration of the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi from 7 to 12 March 1983.<sup>2</sup> All these stress the need to settle the Cyprus issue by peaceful means and to maintain the sovereignty, independence, territorial unity and non-alignment of Cyprus.
32. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has always felt that the intercommunal talks represent the best way of reaching a settlement of the problem. Accordingly, my country made efforts, with the approval of the two parties, to find a solution to the problem. It called, in 1980, for the convening of a summit conference in Tripoli, under the auspices of the Secretary-General, with the participation of the leaders of the two communities and all the non-aligned countries of the Mediterranean, in order to consider this issue.
33. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, as a neighbouring country of Cyprus and its friend, is always ready to help find a solution that is satisfactory and just to both parties, and we think that the non-aligned countries in the Mediterranean region should play a part in this. My country reaffirms its readiness to host a conference of the two parties, under the auspices of the Secretary-General, and with the participation of the non-aligned countries of the Mediterranean.
34. Our interest in this issue is based on the following considerations: first, the friendship between our country and the interested parties and the fact that the security situation in Cyprus affects the security of the Arab homeland; secondly, our concern at the continuance of this problem, which threatens not only the peace and security of Cyprus and its people but also the security of the Mediterranean region, because of the increasing tension brought about especially by the presence of foreign fleets and foreign military bases, in particular the United States Sixth Fleet,

which is increasing its presence in the eastern Mediterranean in the vicinity of certain coastal States near Cyprus and other neighbouring States. The presence of United States aircraft carriers off the Libyan coast, and the constant violation of our airspace, threaten the peace and security of that area. This peace is also threatened by the strategic alliance between the United States and Israel against the Arab nations, which are the victims of Israel's constant acts of aggression. The third consideration is our support for the independence, territorial unity and non-alignment of Cyprus.

35. My country believes that the difficulties facing the intercommunal talks can be overcome if we can provide the necessary conditions to overcome the fears of the past and if there is the necessary trust and the political will on the part of both parties. The fact that this issue remains unresolved disturbs us greatly, and this leads us to affirm that international efforts should be redoubled. We should enable the United Nations to play a major role in encouraging the parties to the problem to press ahead with negotiations.

36. My delegation wishes to express its appreciation for the efforts made by the Secretary-General to mediate between the parties and for his intention, expressed in his report, that he will strengthen his personal involvement and encourage discussion between the two communities with a view to settling some of the major unresolved issues.

37. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya urges the two parties to continue the negotiations and to adopt a forward-looking attitude, taking into account the higher interests of the Cypriot people in both communities within the framework of the sovereignty, independence, unity and non-alignment of Cyprus.

38. In conclusion, the continuance of this problem creates an opportunity for the colonial Powers to interfere in Cyprus and maintain their military presence there, which increases tension and threatens peace and security in the region.

39. Mr. SAHNOUN (Algeria) (*interpretation from French*): Together with all the members of the Assembly, we have learned of the sudden death of our eminent colleague, the Permanent Representative of the Mongolian People's Republic. At this sad moment, I would like to convey to the family of the deceased and to the delegation of Mongolia the sincere condolences of the delegation of Algeria.

40. I have the honour to speak on behalf of the Contact Group of the non-aligned countries entrusted with following the question of Cyprus. This group, which consists of Cuba, Guyana, India, Mali, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia, with Algeria in the Chair, is the same group which is sponsoring draft resolution A/37/L.63.

41. The very fact of the establishment of this group reflects the profound concern felt by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries over what has come to be called the "question of Cyprus" and, at the same time, reflects its steadfast desire to see an end put to this crisis, that is, to see Cyprus as an independent, non-aligned State recovering the peace and harmony so necessary for the development and well-being of its people. This concern and preoccupation have been

repeatedly expressed by the Movement over recent years in declarations adopted at different ministerial and summit meetings.

42. Barely two months ago, at New Delhi, the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries reaffirmed its respect for that country's independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity, and non-alignment. The political declaration adopted by the Conference also stated:

"While hailing the intensification of the efforts made by the United Nations Secretary-General and the accelerated continuation of intercommunal talks, the Conference noted with concern the lack of progress in those talks and expressed the hope that they would be carried out meaningfully and constructively so as to lead to a speedy, mutually acceptable solution of the problem, in accordance with the relevant United Nations resolutions, starting with General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), endorsed by Security Council resolution 365 (1974), the decisions and declarations of the Non-Aligned Movement, which it reaffirmed, and the High-Level Agreements of 12 February 1977 and of 19 May 1979".<sup>3</sup>

43. It was in response to an invitation of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus that the Contact Group of the non-aligned countries went to Nicosia after the New Delhi Conference. On that occasion, we met President Kyprianou and held talks with the Foreign Minister and his close associates. We also met Mr. Denktas, the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community, and his close associates. Lastly, we were in touch with families of missing persons and groups of refugees of the two communities.

44. The mission concentrated its attention on the possibility of creating better conditions for the intercommunal talks to continue so that a solution acceptable to all the parties could be found promptly under the auspices of the Secretary-General. In this respect, we are pleased to note the renewed willingness of the Secretary-General to participate in this endeavour, as stated in his report:

"It is my intention to strengthen my personal involvement within the framework of my mission of good offices. In particular, I shall make every effort to give fresh impetus to the negotiating process, following up the work done during the current phase of the negotiations. As I have reported on this subject to the Security Council, my efforts will seek to encourage the parties to develop an overall synthesis covering the remaining major unresolved issues, and I and my Special Representative shall do our utmost to assist them in this endeavour."  
[*Ibid.*, para. 5.]

45. This is precisely one of the essential components of draft resolution A/37/L.63, submitted by the seven members of the Contact Group and co-sponsored by some thirty delegations.

46. The Contact Group, in preparing this draft resolution, was guided by two basic and equally indispensable considerations. The first lies in the intangible principles which must be recalled and which constitute the basis of the position of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries on the question. These



principles are taken in their virtual totality from resolution 34/30, adopted by the General Assembly on 20 November 1979, and the declaration of the New Delhi Conference. I refer to the fourth preambular paragraph, which reaffirms "the principle of the inadmissibility of occupation and acquisition of territories by force" and to the eleventh preambular paragraph, which reaffirms "the need to settle the question of Cyprus without further delay by peaceful means in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant United Nations resolutions".

47. The second basic consideration motivating the Contact Group was the desire to promote and encourage all possibilities for a definitive settlement of the question. The emphasis was thus laid on the intercommunal talks, which we firmly believe in and which seem to us clearly the best way to end the crisis once and for all. This is the purpose of paragraph 10 of draft resolution A/37/L.63, which recapitulates paragraph 8 of resolution 34/30 but also refers to relevant United Nations resolutions and to the high-level agreements adopted in 1977 and 1979. In paragraph 10, the General Assembly:

*"Calls for meaningful, result-oriented, constructive and substantive negotiations between the representatives of the two communities, under the auspices of the Secretary-General, to be conducted freely and on an equal footing, on the basis of relevant United Nations resolutions and the high-level agreements, with a view to reaching as early as possible a mutually acceptable agreement based on the fundamental and legitimate rights of the two communities."*

48. Similarly, we have emphasized the crucial role that the Secretary-General could play. In paragraph 16 of the draft resolution, the General Assembly:

*"Welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General, as expressed in his report, to pursue a renewed personal involvement in the quest for a solution of the Cyprus problem and, in view of this, requests the Secretary-General to undertake such actions or initiatives as he may consider appropriate within the framework of the mission of good offices entrusted to him by the Security Council for promoting a just and lasting solution of the problem and to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session on the results of his efforts."*

49. The group of sponsors on whose behalf I have the honour to speak hopes that this draft resolution, which, while recalling the fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter and of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, attempts to strike a balance, will enjoy broad support in this Assembly.

50. Mr. KIRCA (Turkey): We have just learned with sadness of the sudden death of the Permanent Representative of the Mongolian People's Republic. We extend our condolences to Mr. Narkhuu's family, to the members of the Permanent Mission of Mongolia, to his Government and to his country, with which, once, Turks shared a common and glorious history.

51. The Government of Turkey approaches the present debate on the question of Cyprus with some misgivings. What concerns us is the damage this ill-conceived exercise could do to the prospects of the

ongoing search for a just and lasting settlement in Cyprus. It is our considered view that the future of the negotiations between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities should not be jeopardized by ill-advised initiatives that envisage the imposition of unacceptable conditions or priorities and of unnecessary mechanisms.

52. We believe that intercommunal negotiations—that is, direct and uninterrupted talks between the two principal sides, with the good offices of the Secretary-General—continue to offer the greatest hope of finding a just and lasting solution to the problem of Cyprus. Those talks still represent the best means of pursuing an agreed settlement in Cyprus. Only with the achievement of a mutually acceptable solution would it be possible, on a durable basis, for the two national communities to live side by side in peace and security. In our view, therefore, any effort that might have a detrimental effect on those negotiations is inconsistent with the objective of a peaceful settlement of the Cyprus question. On the other hand, support and encouragement in favour of intercommunal negotiations should enhance their chances of success.

53. The overriding objective of this debate must be to make a constructive contribution to the cause of peace and promote the peace-making process in Cyprus. The General Assembly should not be used to exacerbate existing differences or abort the ongoing dialogue between the two communities.

54. We must all augment the desire and the capacity of the two communities to negotiate. Unless the outcome of the present exercise is balanced and positive, however, it will be rather difficult to avoid a set-back in the current effort to resolve the question of Cyprus.

55. This, then, is our general understanding of this debate on the question of Cyprus. I should first like to dwell on how the Greek side views the Cyprus problem and to offer an analysis of some of the principal elements of the Greek point of view. I shall then present the Turkish position on the subject.

56. First, let us see what the main theses of the Greek side are. The foundation of the Greek posture is that the problem of Cyprus came into being because Turkey committed aggression against the Republic of Cyprus in 1974 and that the question exists today because Turkish troops still occupy part of its territory.

57. For the Greeks, the Turkish Cypriots, numbering more than 150,000 in a total population of slightly more than half a million, are but one of several ethnic minority groups in Cyprus, such as the Maronites and the Armenians. The Greeks seem to feel, therefore, that the Turkish Cypriot community should be treated only as a minority and accorded only those rights which are appropriate to that status.

58. Secondly, let us examine what, according to the Greek side, is impeding a solution. To begin with, the Greeks suggest that the negotiations between the two communities have produced no results and that no progress has been achieved, all as the result of Turkish intransigence. The Greek side also asserts that, unless the Turkish troops are withdrawn first, the intercommunal negotiations cannot succeed and are doomed to failure. Hence, the Greek side advocates the constant internationalization of the Cyprus issue

and calls for international pressure to be put on Turkey so that the current negotiating effort may be supplanted by something else.

59. Thirdly, let us understand what the objective of the Greek side is concerning Cyprus. The pre-eminent fact about the Greek attitude is that Greece regards Cyprus as Greek in character and views it as an integral part of the Greek motherland. This posture is very much in conformity with the sinister precepts of the Megali idea—that is, the dream of regaining the lands of the Byzantine Empire at its zenith. Thus, even the Greek Cypriot struggle against the British was originally intended and conceived of as a fight not for independence but rather for the union of Cyprus with mainland Greece—that is, enosis.

60. Lastly, let us look at what the Greek side is proposing as a solution for Cyprus. The Greeks call for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the island and the restoration of its sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity. They propose the complete demilitarization of the island. In order to achieve these results, they ask that the resolutions of the United Nations and the decisions of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries be implemented. Turkey, according to the Greeks, must be made to abide by them.

61. These then are the principal components of the Greek and Greek Cypriot position on the question of Cyprus. While there might have been differences between Greek leaders in Athens and Greek Cypriot leaders in Nicosia on given aspects of the Cyprus issue in the past and there might still be some now and in the future, these differences are never fundamental, nor are they long-lasting. There is, for all practical purposes, a single Greek position on this matter.

62. Now let us examine together the foundations and the verity of the elements of the Greek position on Cyprus as we have just identified them. Can the island of Cyprus be regarded as Greek in character by virtue of its history, or, indeed, by any other pertinent criterion? To answer this question, it might be useful first to establish the facts about Cyprus and delineate the milestones of its evolution.

63. I shall begin with the most elemental historical fact about Cyprus. The island has never in its history come under the direct rule of Greece or the Greeks. In the early stages of its history, Cyprus was dominated by a variety of races and cultures. In more recent history, Cyprus successively formed part of the Persian and Roman Empires.

64. Before the island was conquered by the Turks in 1571 to be made part of the Ottoman Empire, it had been a Venetian dependency. The Venetian influence had, in turn, been preceded by the French Lusignan Knights in the 13th, 14th and 15th centuries until 1489. The Ottoman rule in Cyprus lasted for more than 300 years, until the administration of the island was transferred to Great Britain in 1878. The island was recognized as a British colony in 1923 and remained so until 1960, when independence arrived and the Republic of Cyprus came into being. Historically, then, Cyprus was never part of Greece, nor was it ever ruled directly by the Greeks. This is the first truth about Cyprus.

65. The second truth about Cyprus is that there has never been a "Cypriot" nation in the island throughout its history. During the period of Latin supremacy, which lasted for more than three centuries, the Cypriots, whose majority spoke Greek since the Byzantine days, were treated as no more than serfs with no specific identity or the means to sustain such an identity. When, therefore, the Turks arrived on the island in 1571, they were welcomed by the Greeks as liberators. The Ottomans, in consonance with their tradition of tolerance and system of government, allowed them to thrive as a cultural and religious entity alongside the Turkish population that had then settled in Cyprus.

66. Following the arrival of the Turks, the preponderant majority of the population of Cyprus was always composed of two culturally, ethnically and religiously different and distinct peoples—the Muslim Turks and the Orthodox Christian Greeks. There never has been and there is not now in Cyprus a single "Cypriot" nation. There have always been two separate communities, Turks and Greeks, that are but microcosms of the two mother nations. Each community has more in common with its respective national entity than it does with the other, in spite of the fact that they have lived together in this small island for almost half a millenium.

67. Indeed, the story of Cyprus is ultimately the story of the interplay of these two communities, and the evolution of the island's history cannot be understood fully and properly except in terms of this relationship between the Turks and Greeks and the consequences of this relationship over time. The emergence of Cyprus as an independent State must also be viewed in its proper context, that is, within the framework of the status of the Turks and Greeks *vis-à-vis* each other in Cyprus.

68. According to the *Cyprus Mail* of 28 March 1963, it was none other than this truth to which Archbishop Makarios was attesting when he revealed with surprising candor his conception of the newly independent Cyprus: "No Greek who knows me can ever believe that I would wish to work for the creation of a Cypriot national awareness. The Agreements have created a State, but not a nation".

69. Herein lies the paradox. The Greeks have never relinquished their misconceived dream that Cyprus is Greek and that it should belong to Greece. Yet Cyprus has never been Greek nor has it ever belonged to Greece. Let us take one more glimpse at history.

70. The agitation and the armed struggle waged by the Greek Cypriots against the British was, according to well-publicized statements of their leaders, aimed at uniting the island with Greece. In order to attain this openly declared objective, the underground Greek Cypriot organization EOKA murdered more than 800 Greek, British and Turkish opponents of enosis between 1955 and 1958 alone.

71. The Greek campaign to achieve enosis was, however, not confined to Cyprus alone: Greece further engaged in more insidious schemes for the realization of the same objective in an effort to use the United Nations as a stepping-stone to claim the island. Greece first brought the question of Cyprus to the United

Nations in 1954, asking for a straightforward application of the principle of self-determination.

72. Greece expected that, with the application of the self-determination principle, the Turkish community would be effectively barred from any say in the future of the island. The Greek request was designed to bypass the existence of two national communities so that self-determination would be exercised solely in favour of the Greeks at the expense of the Turkish Cypriots. Fortunately, however, the United Nations saw through this Greek ploy when, on 5 December 1958, after having debated the issue over several sessions, the General Assembly unanimously adopted resolution 1287 (XIII) calling for negotiations between the interested parties, in recognition of the unique character of Cyprus, that is, its bi-nationality.

73. But did the Greeks abandon enosis at that point or, for that matter, since then? The answer is no. The Greek side regrettably clings to this veritably misplaced notion.

74. As an endemic infirmity, the idea of enosis never ceases to inflame the sentimental chauvinism and embedded anti-Turkish feelings of the Greeks. This is the case today. The Greek leaders rarely resist the temptation to reassert their desire to incorporate Cyprus into Greece. While undoubtedly there are countless such examples, I shall cite only two instances. We think their message is unmistakably clear.

75. The first belongs to Archbishop Makarios, who is regarded in world public opinion as the leader and architect of the independence of Cyprus. Let us witness the inner thoughts of that leader on the matter. In an interview with *Le Point*, the French magazine, on 19 February 1973, 13 years after independence, Archbishop Makarios said:

“I have struggled for union of Cyprus with Greece, and enosis will always be my deep national aspiration, as it is the aspiration of all Greek Cypriots. My national creed has never changed and my career as a national leader has shown no inconsistency or contradiction. I have accepted independence instead of enosis because certain external conditions and factors have not allowed a free choice.”

For Archbishop Makarios, then, who in his lifetime never rescinded his holy oath to unite the island with Greece, independence was only the next best thing to enosis.

76. That was 10 years ago, and it was a Greek Cypriot leader. Today it is Mr. Karamanlis, the President of Greece, who only a month ago recited the same theme on the occasion of an official dinner for Mr. Kyprianou, when he pointed out that:

“Cyprus should have been given its independence in 1960 to develop into an exemplary east Mediterranean State without dismissing the hope for enosis”—that is, union with Greece—“under certain prerequisites.”

That was in the *Athens News Agency Bulletin* of 7 April 1983.

77. The words of President Karamanlis speak for themselves. The irony is that it was the same Mr. Kara-

manlis who had placed his signature on behalf of the Government of Greece some 23 years earlier on those agreements that gave birth to the independent Republic of Cyprus and banned enosis for ever.

78. However, to this psycho-historical dimension there is a very practical corollary that further explains the persistence of Greek leaders in their pursuit of enosis. According to the warped logic of enosis, Cyprus is a Greek island, and the presence of a Turkish community is therefore an incidental fact of secondary importance, at worst an obstacle that must be overcome or removed, if necessary, no matter what the cost. That is why, in the period prior to the gaining of statehood and independence by Cyprus in 1960, the Greek Cypriots, in their endeavours to achieve enosis, ran into opposition not only from the British but also from the Turks. For the Turkish Cypriots, enosis meant the replacement of the British by the unpredictable and hostile Greeks. Enosis would have meant for the Turks being deprived of their human rights and would have subjected their lives and security to the whims of the Greek majority. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Turkish Cypriots resisted all Greek designs and attempts at enosis. This is why the Turkish Cypriots became victims of EOKA, with hundreds of them losing their lives, 6,000 of them being turned into refugees and 33 of their villages being completely destroyed by the Greeks between 1955 and 1958. The Turkish Cypriots knew that, in order to preserve their status as a national community equal to that of the Greek Cypriot community, the union of Cyprus with Greece had to be rigorously opposed and prevented. The Turkish resistance to enosis was consequently one of the main factors contributing to the eventual establishment of a new and independent Republic based on the equal partnership of the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities.

79. It is to the last two decades that I now wish to turn. The Republic of Cyprus came into being in 1960 after protracted negotiations between the Turkish and Greek communities of the island, as well as among Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom.

80. If we are to name the defining feature of the new Cypriot State, taking into account its Constitution and the international treaties that brought it into being, we must without a doubt refer to its bi-national character. It was the fact of the existence of two national communities that determined the conduct, the substance and the final outcome of the negotiations in London and in Zurich in 1959, resulting in the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus.

81. It was this same reality that had determined all relations on the island for centuries. This parameter dominated all the important facets of the Constitution of the new State and all major arrangements for the internal and external life of the Republic. The executive, legislative, judicial and administrative organs of the State were all based on the principle of the status of equality between the two communities. The Turkish Cypriots were assured the same power as the Greek Cypriots in the realms of foreign relations, defence and security and were given autonomy in managing their communal affairs in cities, towns and villages. Thus, the principle of bi-communality cut through all layers of life in Cyprus, and the constitutional

arrangements in reality provided for a functionally federative system of government.

82. The Republic of Cyprus was established in accordance with international agreements signed at Nicosia on 16 August 1960. Those agreements identified some provisions of the Constitution as the "Basic Articles". Why was this considered to be necessary? By stipulating that the Basic Articles could not in any way be the subject of amendments, its founders sought to stress and ensure the bi-communal character of the new State.

83. That obligation was accepted by the Republic of Cyprus not only in article 182 of its own Constitution but also in the Treaty of Guarantee of 16 August 1960,<sup>4</sup> to which Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom were also parties as guaranteeing Powers. This unique arrangement gave the Basic Articles of the Constitution the validity and force of contractual rules of international law above and beyond their status as domestic constitutional law.

84. It is essential to keep in mind that the Greek Cypriots began to agitate against the state of affairs created by the 1960 agreements, regarding them as contrary to their national aspirations from the very start. The aim of the Greek Cypriots was to subjugate the Turkish Cypriots, while constantly challenging and trying to change the basic constitutional order of the Republic of Cyprus. Consequently, it was the failure of the Greek Cypriot leaders to abide by their obligations under their own Constitution and under the Treaty of Guarantee that eventually and ultimately led to the emergence of the problem of Cyprus as we know it today, not the Turkish intervention of 1974, as is alleged.

85. On 30 November 1963, Archbishop Makarios made sweeping proposals, consisting of 13 different points, for amendment of the Constitution, including the proposal to eliminate the powers of the Turkish Vice-President, as well as the abolition of separate municipalities and of the Communal Chambers. When the Turkish side rejected those proposals, to no one's surprise, since their acceptance would also have entailed the amending of some of the Basic Articles and thus the restructuring of the foundations of government, Archbishop Makarios retaliated by proceeding to apply them unilaterally. This was nothing other than a *coup* against the Constitution and the total disruption of the established state of affairs, and thus rendered Archbishop Makarios and all his successors in government henceforth illegal and illegitimate.

86. This pursuit of the destruction of the bi-communal nature of the Republic became acute and especially dangerous after 21 December 1963, threatening the very existence and survival of the Turkish Cypriots. On that day, the Greeks launched the infamous Akritas Plan, which was designed to accomplish nothing less than the overthrow of the existing constitutional order through the complete elimination of Turkish resistance by all means, including the use of force, as it represented an impediment to their goals. Details of that plan may be found in the official records of the Security Council.<sup>5</sup> Again, in 1967, the Turkish Cypriot community was threatened very gravely and its very survival was at stake.

87. From 1963 until 1974, then, the Turkish Cypriots suffered greatly at the hands of their Greek tormentors: 103 Turkish villages were destroyed during this period; more than 25,000 of their inhabitants became refugees; and many people, including women, children and the elderly, met horrible deaths at the hands of their Greek executioners. The Greek persecution was ruthless and relentless and the Turkish resistance indomitable. That resulted in a great deal of human suffering.

88. The deterioration in Cyprus, particularly after the relatively calm period during the first three years of the new Republic's life, began inevitably to involve the three guaranteeing Powers—Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom. First in early 1964, then in 1967 and on later occasions, there were contacts and consultations among the guarantors in accordance with their obligations under the Treaty of Guarantee, since on all those occasions the Greek Cypriot leadership was manifestly in violation of the Basic Articles of the Constitution and, consequently, of the Treaty of Guarantee. From the very inception of the Republic's foundation, therefore, the Treaty of Guarantee was brought to bear on the situation in Cyprus, though the attempts at evolving a common course of action proved futile, owing to the intransigence of the Greek Cypriot leadership and the deliberate avoidance on the part of Greece of compliance with its obligations under international treaties.

89. It was this mechanism provided by the Treaty of Guarantee that Turkey resorted to again in 1974 before carrying out its obligations under international treaties and law. But I shall come to that historic event in a short while.

90. The misery and the suffering of the members of the Turkish Cypriot community, especially between 1963 and 1974, are too painful and their inventory is too long to recall here in this Assembly. But it must never be forgotten that the Turks of Cyprus were murdered, persecuted, deprived of their fundamental human rights and property and denied, in a capricious and arbitrary manner, even the basic necessities of life for more than a decade.

91. The world at that time looked on and remained impervious to the tragedy being staged on that small island, wrongly believing that what was happening there was purely an internal matter and of no concern to outsiders. While it provided some temporary and limited relief, even the introduction in 1964 of UNFICYP could not put an end to the oppression and persecution of the Turkish Cypriot community by the Greek Cypriot community. The *New York Tribune* reported on 16 September 1964 "degrading subhuman standards of life" in Cyprus for the Turks, a fact even more forcefully corroborated by the Secretary-General himself in his report to the Security Council of 10 September 1964:

"The conclusion seems warranted that the economic restrictions being imposed against the Turkish communities in Cyprus, which in some instances have been so severe as to amount to a veritable siege, indicate that the Government of Cyprus"—I mean the Greek Cypriot Government, of course—"seeks to force a potential solution by economic pressure as a substitute for military action."<sup>6</sup>



92. We ask for all this to be remembered, not out of vengeance or enmity, but rather as a lesson of history. We recall the mistakes and the tragedy of the past only in order to avoid their recurrence in the future.

93. The suffering and the turmoil turned out to be not all in vain, because the Turkish Cypriot resistance progressively assumed the characteristics of a national liberation movement and the Turks became better organized politically with the passing of time, gaining a considerable degree of administrative autonomy. After the disruption in 1963 of the constitutional order by the Greek Cypriot leadership, virtually all ties of government and administration between the two communities became severed, resulting in the emergence of two separate and self-governing entities from the start. Indeed, in the aftermath of the events in July 1974, in what is now known as the Geneva Declaration of 30 July 1974, the Foreign Ministers of Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom "noted the existence in practice in the Republic of Cyprus of two autonomous administrations, that of the Greek Cypriot community and that of the Turkish Cypriot community."<sup>7</sup> Later, the Turkish Cypriot administration reorganized itself as the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

94. Pending an overall solution of the Cyprus question and until such time as the new structures of the Republic are agreed upon by the two communities within a federal framework, the Turkish Cypriot community, by having already created one of the two pillars of the future federal structures of the Republic, is in reality demonstrating its commitment to the existence and independence of the Republic of Cyprus.

95. The reality of the Turkish Federated State furthermore invokes the question of whether there exists today a legitimate Government of Cyprus. The question may be asked: Why does Turkey not recognize Mr. Kyprianou and his Ministers as the Government of Cyprus? This is an important question. In this regard, we have been meticulously consistent in our position from the very inception of this question. What then is the Turkish position on this issue?

96. To begin with, we should like to reaffirm that Turkey respects the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus. We thus recognize the legal existence of the Republic of Cyprus as an entity of international law. So does the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. But we recognize no existing organ that legally or legitimately represents this State in international relations; nor does the Turkish Cypriot community. In our view, there currently exists no legitimate body which can be validly recognized as the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.

97. The Greek Cypriot leaders have, since late 1963, continued to usurp this title, even through they sabotaged the constitutional régime at that time and completely destroyed its foundations by challenging and violating its Basic Articles. What today presents itself as the Government of Cyprus is, therefore, in fact the administration of the Greek Cypriots and represents only the Greek Cypriot community. The affairs of the Turkish Cypriot community are managed by the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus and only

their own leaders are competent to represent them. The Greek Cypriot leaders, through their own actions, stripped themselves of all legality and legitimacy by failing to abide by the Constitution and the Treaty of Guarantee and by destroying the main institutions of the Republic.

98. The very fact that Turkey continues to respect the legal existence of the Republic of Cyprus as an entity of international law precludes its recognition, as the Government of that State, of a team which continues to usurp this title, in flagrant violation of the bi-communal base of the Cypriot State, a base established by contractual rules of international law.

99. Perhaps the principal and most frequently heard bizarre argument of the Greek side is that the question of Cyprus is the product of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 and of the continued occupation of part of its territory by Turkish troops. Of all the Greek allegations about Cyprus this one is the least tenable. Why? First, it was not the Turkish Army that invaded Cyprus in 1974; it was the Greek Army that did so. None other than Archbishop Makarios himself told the Security Council the story of the 15 July *coup* inspired by Athens against his régime and, at a meeting of the Security Council on 19 July 1974, declared:

"As I have already stated, the events in Cyprus do not constitute an internal matter of the Greeks of Cyprus. The Turks of Cyprus are also affected. The *coup* of the Greek junta is an invasion, and from its consequences the whole people of Cyprus suffers, both Greeks and Turks."<sup>8</sup>

100. Turkey's intervention in 1974, after the *coup* spearheaded by the notorious Nicos Sampson, was therefore the result, not the cause, of the problem of Cyprus. Turkey's action did not create the question of Cyprus but was designed to help solve it according to the terms of those international arrangements that originally gave birth to the Republic of Cyprus as an independent State.

101. We come now to the question of whether Turkey had the right to send its troops to Cyprus. The answer is unequivocally clear. Turkey intervened in Cyprus under the provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee, to which not only were Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom parties but also to which the Republic of Cyprus itself was a signatory. Turkey's action was undertaken specifically under article IV of that Treaty, which I shall quote in its entirety:

"In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions.

"In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty."<sup>4</sup>

102. The peace operation by Turkey consequently had as its primary objective "re-establishing the state of affairs" created by the Treaty of Guarantee, including those conditions created by the Basic Articles of the Constitution. Simply put, Turkey sought to restore the independence of Cyprus and a legal con-

stitutional order, which must now be founded anew on sounder conditions, so that in the re-established "state of affairs" the bi-communality of the Cypriot State would be assured and guaranteed effectively against any violation in the future.

103. Whereas the United Kingdom was consulted under the terms of article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee, before action was taken, Turkey did not hold consultations with Greece, because, very simply, that country by staging the Sampson *coup*, had attempted to annex the Republic and was thus the main transgressor.

104. Turkey's operation was at the same time designed to avert further disasters, to assure the survival of the Turkish Cypriots and to provide them with security on an uninterrupted basis. The Greek Cypriots had left no doubt that they were dissatisfied with the way things were in Cyprus; in fact, they were unhappy with the very existence of the Republic of Cyprus itself as an independent State in which they had to share power and authority with the Turkish Cypriots. Even the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives, the highest institution of their parliamentary régime, violating its own Constitution with impunity, on 26 June 1967 passed a resolution declaring that: "it would not suspend the struggle... until this struggle ends in success through the union of the whole and undivided Cyprus with the motherland, without any intermediary stage".

105. The current leader of the Greek Cypriot community, Mr. Kyprianou, was more explicit when, on 1 April 1967, he said that the question of Cyprus was:

"neither a political nor a party nor a personal matter. It is a national issue for both Cyprus and Greece and the solution cannot be anything else than enosis"—that is, union with Greece. "At this critical stage through which the Cyprus struggle is passing there is a great advantage which did not exist in 1955 and that is the fact that Cyprus now has a voice of its own in the international field. In spite of a large number of disadvantages, Cyprus is now an independent and sovereign State and, therefore, its struggle for union with Greece is easier and shorter than before."

This was quoted from Official Press Release No. 4, of 1 April 1967, issued by the Greek Cypriot Public Information Office.

106. It was in reaction to this insidious scheme of employing Cypriot independence and sovereignty merely as a means to achieve enosis, against a background of the gross injustice and intolerable suffering being inflicted upon the Turkish Cypriots and in compliance with its obligations under international treaties, that Turkey exercised its prerogative as a guaranteeing Power. In 1974, therefore, Turkey's action was entirely in conformity with international law and the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular the principle of legitimate self-defence.

107. Even if the background and reasons for Turkey's peace operation in 1974 are properly appreciated, some might still wonder, in the light of Greek assertions on the matter, why it is that after nine years Turkish troops are still in Cyprus. I shall answer that question too with candour, in spite of the fact that we feel

the reasons for the presence of Turkish troops are self-evident.

108. First, Turkey wishes to ensure the safety and security of the Turkish Cypriot community and not allow a repetition of the bitter experiences and injustices of the past, in particular the degrading oppression and the massacres to which the Turks were subjected by the Greeks during the period 1963 to 1974.

109. The Turkish community of Cyprus, numbering more than 150,000, are there to stay, and they want to live in peace, security and dignity on terms of equality with their Greek counterparts. Since 1974, in stark contrast to the preceding 11 years, Cyprus has known unparalleled tranquillity and has been virtually free of violence. No blood has been shed and the two communities have lived side by side in security, in their respective zones and under their own administrations, managing their own affairs.

110. It was in those conditions that the major milestones of intercommunal accord and co-operation were reached. What are those achievements? There is the population exchange agreement of 1975.<sup>9</sup> There is also the Denktas-Makarios agreement of 12 February 1977,<sup>10</sup> endorsed by the high-level agreement of 19 May 1979,<sup>11</sup> that time between Denktas and Kyprianou, setting the foundations of a future settlement.

111. Since 1974, there have been seven different rounds of intercommunal negotiations, each one resulting in a better understanding of the problem and of the possibilities of a solution. The current, eighth, round of negotiations, therefore, has the benefit of all the accumulated experience of past efforts. Thus, both the opening statement of the Secretary-General of 9 August 1980<sup>11</sup> and the United Nations "evaluation" paper, which have brought a comprehensive framework to the negotiations, reflect and develop further the lessons of the previous rounds.

112. It is quite simple. The Turkish Cypriots will not again be abandoned to the malice and vagaries of the Greeks. Until such time as a lasting political settlement is achieved, with the necessary guarantees, and the security of the Turkish Cypriot community is ensured, the Turkish troops will remain there. But let me hasten to add that we also believe that a political settlement envisaging a federal, bi-communal and bi-zonal structure would lead, as the natural corollary, to the withdrawal of troops from the Republic of Cyprus on the basis of security arrangements to be agreed upon by the parties concerned.

113. We have recently heard calls from Athens, repeated also by the Greek Cypriot leaders, for the withdrawal of Turkish troops and the expansion of UNFICYP—the cost of which, we are told, would be financed by Greece, according to Mr. Papandreou, the Prime Minister of Greece. We believe that such unrealistic and flippant suggestions do not do justice to the serious problems we have in Cyprus and that they make a mockery of the peace-finding process. It should not be forgotten that during the decade preceding 1974, whenever they wanted to harass the Turkish Cypriots the Greek Cypriots always rendered UNFICYP completely powerless. The Greek Cypriots simply ignored the United Nations troops as they chose, and the Turks remained as vulnerable as ever.

114. Even today, the prevailing conditions notwithstanding, the Greek Cypriot community is trying systematically to strangle the Turkish Cypriot community by means of a complex web of measures best described as a ruthless total economic blockade. The Greek Cypriot community, contrary to the letter and spirit of the high-level agreements of 1977 and 1979, tries methodically to prohibit and prevent the Turkish Cypriots from exporting and importing, from using port facilities in Cyprus and from receiving their share of international aid, to mention only a few cases in point. As before, the Turkish Cypriots are putting up a heroic and dignified resistance. It is difficult, therefore, to understand why, every time the Turkish Cypriot community takes a measure solely and specifically to counter the effects of the Greek Cypriot economic embargo, the Greek side accuses it of separatism and illegality. Does the inhuman economic embargo it has imposed on the Turkish Cypriots have even a modicum of legitimacy about it?
115. What, we ask, is the Turkish Cypriot community to do in response to a determined, relentless and continual Greek Cypriot effort aimed at depriving its members of their means of livelihood and at subjugating it through economic pressure? The Turkish Cypriot community, as any self-respecting people would do in such circumstances, is trying to ensure its economic survival and well-being, in dignity, and with the limited resources available to it. The Turkish Cypriots will not succumb to the economic embargo imposed on them by the Greek Cypriots and sustained through their unabashed abuse of the self-styled title of "Government of Cyprus". The Greek Cypriots should desist from hostile acts against the Turkish Cypriots and cultivate instead ties of friendship and co-operation.
116. There is, in this context, one other aspect of the Greek Cypriot allegations which, for the benefit only of this body, might be worth answering. The Greek Cypriots claim that the territory of the Turkish Cypriot community belongs not to the Turkish Cypriots but to the Greek Cypriots. The more contrived formulation of this same point is that, and I quote from a document, "the Government of Cyprus should be enabled to exercise its authority throughout its entire territory and to enjoy fully its resources". What does this mean as far as north Cyprus is concerned? It means that as soon as they regain control of north Cyprus the Greek Cypriot armed forces, headed by a Greek general and Greek officers from Greece, will enter and occupy the area—that is, north Cyprus—and the Turkish Cypriots would be under the rule and occupation of Greek Cypriot troops, who in turn would be commanded by mainland Greek army officers. Why, for any reason, should Turkey or the Turkish Cypriot community ever allow such a thing to happen? Naturally, this will never happen.
117. In Cyprus today, the two national communities live in their respective zones, the Turkish in the north and the Greek in the south. With the population exchange agreement of 1975 concluded in Vienna between the two communities and its implementation under the supervision of the United Nations, perhaps the primary source of intercommunal tension and conflict, namely, the obligation to live in mixed areas or in enclaves surrounded by the other community, has been removed. Except for a few hundred Turkish Cypriots still in south Cyprus and slightly fewer than 1,000 Greek Cypriots in the north, all Turkish Cypriots and all Greek Cypriots live in their own areas and under their respective administrations. Consequently, the preposterous Greek Cypriot claim concerning the existence of more than 200,000 refugees in Cyprus does not correspond to reality and is a denial of a solemn agreement entered into freely with the Turkish Cypriots in Vienna eight years ago. There is no refugee problem in Cyprus today. There is no longer human suffering in Cyprus today emanating from intercommunal conflict. No amount of concerted propaganda could change these well-known facts.
118. If there are some economic difficulties, these are in the north, and not in south Cyprus, where Greek Cypriots seem to be prospering since they are, per capita, one of the highest recipients of foreign and international aid in the world and since they continue to exploit the Turkish Cypriots through the imposition of an economic embargo.
119. Whatever specific problems of displacement may still exist are, of course, being taken care of by the two communities, in the context of negotiations, through mutually acceptable arrangements. Similarly, we hope that the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus will find it possible to carry out its mandate within its established terms of reference. It will be recalled that the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities agreed to form this Committee to resolve the question of missing persons in Cyprus. Were the Greek Cypriot side to desist from exploiting this humanitarian issue for political propaganda purposes, the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus would surely have a better chance of success.
120. In conjunction with their claims under the rubric of the so-called issue of refugees, the Greek Cypriots also allege that Turkey has attempted to change the demographic structure of Cyprus. I will put it as simply as I can. Turkey has not attempted to change the demographic structure of Cyprus. Needless to say, if there were any truth at all in this ludicrous allegation it certainly would have surfaced somewhere, since, clearly, no one can settle permanently, yet hide and keep hidden, large numbers of people without being immediately detected. We do not find lip-service being paid to such baseless allegations at all useful.
121. The bi-zonal split of the Republic's population, reflecting its bi-communal make-up, has been a vital factor in increasing the safety of the Turkish Cypriots. This geographic bi-zonality should also significantly facilitate the setting up of the federal structure on the principle of which the two communities have already agreed.
122. Cyprus is an issue that has been on the agenda of the United Nations since 1954. It is most instructive to note that it is the only such issue with regard to which the principal sides are engaged in direct, comprehensive and substantive negotiations with a view to reaching an overall political settlement. The same cannot be said for many of the other issues now before the international community.
123. The Greek side protests that the intercommunal negotiations are useless since they have not resulted in concrete progress. The Greeks then proceed to the

position that the problem of Cyprus must be further internationalized—that is, everybody and every conceivable international forum is asked to apply pressure on Turkey for it to leave the island, to forsake more than 150,000 of its compatriots without security and without the means to protect their honour, lives and dignity and to abandon them to the mercy of the Greek community. That will not happen.

124. The Greek attitude towards the intercommunal talks is, however, characterized by ambivalence. They do not like the ongoing negotiations because they look at the bargaining process, not as give and take, but only as a vehicle for obtaining unilateral concessions from the Turkish side. Even then, they are never satisfied with what the Turkish Cypriots offer or even with the ideas the Secretary-General brings to the negotiating table. On the other hand, while turning these negotiations into a protracted and frustrating exercise, they do not fully break away from the intercommunal talks. Why, then, this essentially negative ambivalence on the part of the Greeks? Is it that the Greek Cypriots do not genuinely desire to find a negotiated settlement to the problem of Cyprus at all?

125. We should like to point out that the bleak Greek assessment about lack of progress in the negotiations is not shared by the Secretary-General. With the mission of good offices entrusted to him by the Security Council, the Secretary-General is, in addition to the two communities, the third principal party engaged in the enterprise of finding a solution. In his report to the Security Council of 15 June 1982, the Secretary-General states:

“The interlocutors have succeeded in arriving at common formulations of the ‘points of coincidence’ in a number of cases. In addition, there has been a significant narrowing of differences as regards many of the general provisions of the Constitution as well as of the articles concerning fundamental rights and liberties and certain organs of the federal government. The atmosphere has been cooperative and constructive throughout, as acknowledged by both interlocutors. The process is continuing at a deliberate but reasonable pace, which moreover has now been accelerated to two meetings a week.”<sup>12</sup>

126. At the risk of stating the obvious, I should like to say that, on the subject of Cyprus, we prefer the objectivity of the Secretary-General to other quarters.

127. In the past year, the Greek Cypriots have been requesting either the slowing down of the pace of intercommunal negotiations or their temporary suspension, for a different reason each time. First, it was the Greek Cypriot presidential election that led to a significant diminution in the intensity of the negotiations during the summer of 1982. Then the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi last March, was presented by the Greek Cypriot side as grounds for suspending the talks in February and March. The last occasion on which the Greek Cypriot side requested an intermission in the talks was at the last meeting of the intercommunal negotiations, on 14 April 1983, when the Greek Cypriot interlocutor referred to such a need in view of the forthcoming debate in the General Assembly.

128. The Secretary-General's report [A/37/805 and Corr.1] has put the facts very clearly in this regard. The Turkish side objected every time, asking for the uninterrupted continuation of the negotiations at the accelerated pace and in a substantive manner, but had to consent to the suspensions with reluctance since there was no other choice. As a result of these Greek Cypriot demands, and the consequent delays, no substantive discussion has been possible at the negotiating table in recent months.

129. Since 16 September 1982, there have been only 10 meetings and these were all devoted to an inconsequential general exchange of views. Once again, and at the request of the Greek Cypriot interlocutor, the intercommunal talks have been suspended until 31 May. Yet the Greek Cypriot leaders, in open defiance of the facts of the case, have the temerity then to go on to complain about lack of progress in the negotiations due to Turkish intransigence. We do not regard such behaviour as serious or responsible.

130. Why are the Greek Cypriots procrastinating and resorting to dilatory tactics? The answer to this question is of crucial importance. The Greek Cypriots are trying to render ineffectual the process of intercommunal negotiations so as to be able to accuse the Turkish Cypriot side and the Government of Turkey of obstructing progress and, much more significantly, to evade the prospect of having to continue to negotiate on the basis of the suggestions of the Secretary-General. The Greek Cypriots continue to give all indications of being most unhappy with the Secretary-General's ideas aimed at bringing about a just and lasting solution to the question of Cyprus. At the present stage it is the United Nations “evaluation” paper that the Greek Cypriot side wishes to do away with and to have placed on the shelf.

131. No, whatever the tactics, whatever the provocations, the Turkish Cypriot side will not be a party to this dangerous and destructive game. Turks are capable of living with the unwarranted Greek accusation about their being intransigent since they know they are not. But Turks will not help the Greek side to ruin the prospect and the possibility of a peaceful and just settlement in Cyprus. It is the view of the Turkish Cypriot community that the ongoing negotiations can be based only on the high-level agreements, the opening statement of the Secretary-General of 9 August 1980 and the United Nations “evaluation” paper of 18 November 1981. The Government of Turkey supports this position of the Turkish Cypriot community.

132. The process of negotiations between representatives of the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities has been accepted as a viable and effective method to use in the search for a settlement of the Cyprus question. Intercommunal talks have also been widely regarded by third parties as the best means to an agreed solution. But, most significantly, it is the Secretary-General, entrusted since 1975 by the Security Council with a mission of good offices, who has been most consistent in his support for the process of intercommunal negotiations. Both the present Secretary-General and his predecessor, after being intimately involved with the question of Cyprus from its very inception, have always emphasized the impor-



tance of maintaining and preserving the process of intercommunal negotiations.

133. The Secretary-General reiterated this point of view in his report of 1 December 1982 to the Security Council:

“The intercommunal talks, in my opinion, still represent the best available means of pursuing a concrete and effective negotiating process with the object of achieving an agreed, just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus question.”<sup>13</sup>

134. Is there any virtue in rejecting and abandoning the process of intercommunal negotiations for not having produced, so far, the desired outcome? Is it the method that is at fault or is it the lack of the necessary political will on the part of the Greek side? Is there a better way? Even if we hypothetically assumed that, in lieu of intercommunal negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General, some other method or means should be tried, ultimately and invariably it would again be the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities that, in the end, must give their consent to a mutually acceptable solution. We expect that, having learned a lesson from history, not even the Greek Cypriots are contemplating any longer the imposition of a settlement on the Turkish Cypriots which is unacceptable to them. This the Turkish Cypriots will resist, whatever the method or means used by the Greek side.

135. In the last part of my statement, I should like to recapitulate our position on the question of Cyprus. I have been officially informed by the authorities of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus that the views I am about to express also conform to the position of the Turkish Cypriot community.

136. The Greeks have in the past repeatedly and with impunity denied, challenged or violated solemn international agreements whenever they thought it was in their interest to do so. This unfortunate habit appears to be ingrained in the Greek mind. This is why, until the most firm guarantees are obtained for the future well-being of the Turkish Cypriot community and adequate security arrangements are made, Turkey will continue to provide protection to the Turkish Cypriot community in accordance with the request of that community.

137. We desire and actively encourage the peaceful settlement of the question of Cyprus in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

138. We believe that the intercommunal talks offer the greatest hope for achieving a just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus problem and represent the best means of pursuing an effective and sustained negotiating process.

139. We are of the view that the intercommunal talks currently being conducted within the framework of the ideas formally submitted on behalf of the Secretary-General on 18 November 1981, ideas known as the United Nations “evaluation” paper, are conducive to a political settlement. The Turkish Cypriot community has accepted the set of ideas and modalities contained in this “evaluation” paper as a basis and framework for negotiations. In this regard, we also note with satisfaction that the Turkish Cypriot community presented, on 5 August 1981, a set of comprehensive

proposals on all aspects of the Cyprus question, including a map containing concrete details about territory. We urge the Greek Cypriot side to reciprocate by bringing similarly comprehensive and substantive proposals to the negotiating table.

140. We believe that the search for peace must be conducted in the light of the guidelines already agreed upon by the leaders of the two communities, the first between Denktaş and Makarios on 12 February 1977, and the second between Denktaş and Kyprianou on 19 May 1979. These principles have also been reiterated by the Secretary-General in his opening statement of 9 August 1980, which specifically declares that “Both parties have reaffirmed their support for a federal solution of the constitutional aspect and a bi-zonal solution of the territorial aspect of the Cyprus problem.”<sup>11</sup> In conformity with the provisions of those high-level agreements and in line with the opening statement of the Secretary-General, the Turkish Cypriot community remains committed to the objective of a bi-communal, bi-zonal and federal solution on the basis of the equality and the partnership of the two national communities, ensuring the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus.

141. It is clear that perhaps the most crucial condition for the success of the negotiations is for the Greek Cypriot side to renounce its perception of its relationship with the Turkish community as one between a majority and minority, and acknowledge the equality of the two communities. It is this understanding and principle that has been underlying the intercommunal talks, and it is high time for the Greek side to accept this elementary fact and act accordingly. This is imperative for the success of the negotiations.

142. We express appreciation and gratitude to the Secretary-General and to his Special Representative in Cyprus for their unceasing and dedicated efforts to help the two communities in finding a solution. We support the Secretary-General in his mission of good offices, and we pledge our full co-operation to him and to his Special Representative.

143. The question of Cyprus is extremely complex and has many attributes that resemble or recall elements and aspects of other problems in different parts of the world. This is why most of us find something familiar and of specific interest as soon as we take a surface look at the problem of Cyprus.

144. The issue, however, has political, economic, social, ethnic, religious and historical dimensions which are all intricately interrelated and which, while they are capable of individual identification, are inextricable. The different and numerous elements that total up to the question of Cyprus constitute, however, a unique whole. Cyprus is unlike any other problem. It is this unique and complex nature of the Cyprus issue that makes it very difficult to be judged in terms of simple and familiar criteria. We emphasize the necessity to evaluate the Cyprus question in all its complexity and on the sole basis of its own particulars, keeping always in mind the most fundamental and permanent characteristic of Cyprus—its bi-nationality.

145. The Turkish nation sustains a special relationship with the Turkish community of Cyprus. This spe-

cial bond has its roots firmly anchored in history; its content consists of common moral and spiritual values and common language and civilization. This spiritual identity is immune to the vicissitudes of time or circumstance.

146. It is also true that the Greek community of the island maintains an equally special relationship with the Greek nation.

147. Any settlement of the Cypriot problem which ignored this fundamental dual fact would be doomed to failure. Any political solution based on this fact would have a chance of success and would have our support.

148. We call upon Greece to urge and persuade the Greek Cypriot community to stay at the negotiating table and to negotiate in earnest. We ask Greece to abandon the destructive and short-sighted path it has been pursuing, particularly since October 1981. We know that Greece could make a critical contribution to peace and stability in Cyprus.

149. In our considered opinion, Greece has nothing to gain in undermining the process of intercommunal negotiations, and it would be constructive if Greece were to refrain from further internationalizing this issue, an attempt fraught with unforeseeable consequences.

150. The problem of Cyprus can only be solved through the mutual efforts of the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities. They are destined to live side by side. If we all encourage them and support their negotiations, it will so be.

151. I would now like briefly to expound some of our observations on draft resolution A/37/L.63. First of all, I wish to point out that the draft resolution grossly distorts the realities of the Cyprus problem. Secondly, it is based on erroneous judgements and contains, even if implicitly, one-sided and unjustified accusations. Thirdly, it is full of serious contradictions. Fourthly, it opens the door to the Greek Cypriot side to avoid substantive negotiations and to employ further delaying tactics. Fifthly, it contains provisions which make the reaching of a settlement more difficult.

152. We would like to make one point absolutely clear: the Cyprus problem can be solved neither by the condemnation or the victimization of the Turkish side, nor can it be solved by giving purely verbal satisfaction to the Greek side. The only way to solve the Cyprus problem is by serious and realistic negotiations on the basis and within the framework of the main documents to which I have already referred.

153. Now let us examine more concretely the contents of draft resolution A/37/L.63.

154. The principle referred to in the fourth preambular paragraph of the draft resolution has long been translated into a slogan that is being abused to accuse the Turkish side unjustly. Turkey has no territorial ambitions in Cyprus or anywhere else. As for the allegation of "occupation", I have already amply explained the reasons for the Turkish presence in north Cyprus. After all, in north Cyprus there are 150,000 Turkish Cypriots. Cyprus has been their homeland for over four centuries. The Turkish military presence in Cyprus is merely intended to serve as a force of protection and certainly not as one of occupation.

The Turkish presence will have to continue in Cyprus until the security of the Turkish Cypriot community is fully guaranteed in the context of a final political settlement.

155. If the enumeration of the basic principles that purportedly relate to this matter is to be correct, we must instead refer to the principles properly pertaining to this case, namely the principles of the superiority of the rule of law and of inviolability of treaties and of legitimate self-defence.

156. Not the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey but Greek Cypriots and Greece have flouted and destroyed the constitutional order of Cyprus. Turkey merely acted in accordance with its obligations under international treaties and in exercise of the right of legitimate self-defence upon the request of the Turkish Cypriot Community.

157. In the light of the above explanations, it should be evident that the *de facto* situation, referred to in paragraph 12 of the draft resolution, can be none other than the *de facto* situation created by the Greek Cypriots at the end of 1963 when they completely destroyed the constitutional order by force of arms.

158. The eighth preambular paragraph of the draft resolution is, to say the least, contrary to the facts. Those armed forces in Cyprus, commanded by a Greek general and by Greek officers, assigned from Greece by the Greek Government, are certainly as "foreign" as the Turkish troops.

159. The tenth preambular paragraph of the draft resolution is superfluous, because there is no question of changing the demographic structure of the island.

160. In paragraph 2 of the draft resolution, all States are called upon to support and help the so-called Government of Cyprus to exercise the right of full and effective sovereignty and control over the entire territory of Cyprus. As I have explained earlier, we recognize the existence of the Republic of Cyprus as a legal entity at the international level, but the Greek Cypriot administration is not the legal and legitimate Government of that State. For those who give credence to that false interpretation of this paragraph, its meaning is a call upon all States to support and help the Greek Cypriots to reoccupy the lands inhabited by the Turkish Cypriot community and to dominate and subjugate them again. I need not explain how unrealistic and imaginary this approach is. Needless to say, if this foolish attempt were to succeed, then the situation would revert to the pre-July 1974 position, and in such an event it would no longer be necessary to try to find a solution through the intercommunal talks.

161. Paragraph 5 of the draft resolution expresses support for the high-level agreements of 12 February 1977 and 19 May 1979. This paragraph, though positive, is incomplete. These are not the only elements on the basis of which the intercommunal talks are being held. There are also the opening statement of the Secretary-General of 9 August 1980 and the United Nations "evaluation" paper. Moreover, many of the operative paragraphs of the draft resolution are inconsistent with the provisions of the high-level agreements. Paragraph 4 is a case in point. There is in the high-level agreements clear provision concerning

demilitarization. By the same token, paragraph 11 is incompatible with and disregards point 3 of the Denktas-Makarios agreement of 12 February 1977, which stipulates:

“Questions of principle, like freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, the right of property and other specific matters, are open for discussion, taking into consideration the fundamental basis of a bi-communal system and certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot community.”<sup>10</sup>

162. “Titles of ownership of property”, referred to in paragraph 3 of the draft resolution, are not in fact what is being issued by the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. The Federated State is issuing only “provisional certificates” pending a final, mutually agreed settlement. On the other hand, there are countless Turkish Cypriot properties which have been seized without compensation by the Greek Cypriot administration and the Greek Cypriots since the end of 1963. There is no doubt that this matter can only be resolved through negotiations between the parties and not through rigid postulations such as those found in the draft resolution.

163. Reference is made in the ninth preambular paragraph and in paragraph 9 of the draft resolution to “lack of progress” in the intercommunal talks. This categorical description is inconsistent with the assessment made by the Secretary-General in his various reports.

164. The wording of paragraph 16 of the draft resolution differs from the wording used by the Secretary-General in paragraph 5 of his report [*ibid.*]. The formulation of this paragraph, rather than supporting the “personal involvement” of the Secretary-General within the framework of his mission of good offices, opens the way for the Greek Cypriot side to try to evade the United Nations “evaluation” paper and to resort to new delaying tactics.

165. Needless to say, there are other provisions in the draft resolution which are clearly out of context, such as the reference in operative paragraph 15 to the Security Council and the reference in the seventh preambular paragraph to an international conference.

166. These are our main observations on this one-sided and unbalanced draft resolution. These views are also the views of the Turkish Cypriot community. The draft resolution contains other paragraphs with which the Turkish Cypriot community and Turkey are not in agreement.

167. The two speakers from the Greek side who preceded me levelled various accusations. Unfortunately, in the course of this debate the Turkish Cypriot community has not been accorded the opportunity to participate even at a minimum level in the proceedings on an equal footing with the Greek Cypriot community. I must also confess that, in their statements, many of the speakers clearly demonstrated the need for a detailed exposition on our part of this complex and unique problem of Cyprus. It fell to me to answer the allegations directed at the Turkish side and to present to the Assembly not only the views of the Government of Turkey but also, at its request, those of the Turkish Cypriot community. It is for this reason that, contrary to our tradition of never misusing

the time of the General Assembly, we had this time to speak at length on the question of Cyprus. We hope, however, that this will be compensated for by a better understanding of the Cyprus issue.

168. The Turkish Federated State of Cyprus has decided to reassess its position if this gravely defective draft resolution is passed, and the Federated State has requested me to convey this decision to the General Assembly. When the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus has completed its assessment, it will appropriately communicate its views.

169. The Turkish Cypriot community possesses the necessary political will to co-operate in finding a reasonable, just and realistic solution to the Cyprus problem through intercommunal negotiations on an equal footing. Turkey supports this endeavour. However, it should be made abundantly clear that the Turkish Cypriot community will never in the future be subjugated or dominated by the Greek Cypriots or by Greece. Furthermore, Cyprus will never become a Greek island. I would advise those who, owing to the traditional fertility of their imagination, have such fallacious dreams to come down to earth, to realize as soon as possible that the mythical objectives of their so-called long-term struggle is an absolutely unattainable and puerile mirage, and to accept the existing and eternally unalterable reality before them. That reality is this: since the dawn of history, Turks have always been free and independent; Turkey will never collapse; likewise, the Turkish Cypriots will never collapse.

170. Mr. PELLETIER (Canada): At the outset I should like to express my condolences to the bereaved family and to the Permanent Mission of Mongolia on the death of Mr. Narkhuu.

171. Mr. President, I should like to join my colleagues who have welcomed you back to our midst and express my pleasure at having you to guide our proceedings once again.

172. My Government regrets that circumstances again make it necessary to participate in a debate on the question of Cyprus. The history of the intercommunal conflict that has beset the island for so many years requires no elaboration before this Assembly. All of us are well aware of the facts. It is the view of my Government that we should now concentrate on the future and make every effort to achieve a permanent solution to the problem that is just and equitable for all Cypriots.

173. Canada's interest in and concern about the Cyprus situation grew out of our close ties and friendship with all the parties involved and our faith and conviction concerning the role of the United Nations in preserving peace. We have expressed our deep distress at the sufferings of displaced and missing persons of both communities, recognizing the agony and misery that have affected all Cypriots. It was for all these reasons that, when requested by the Secretary-General, the Canadian Government dispatched the first contingent of troops to arrive on the island when UNFICYP was established in March 1964. I would remind this Assembly that our troops have been an essential part of this peace-keeping operation for more than 19 years. Over 25,000 Canadians have

served in Cyprus, some of whom have given their lives in the cause of peace.

174. My Government considers that the Cyprus problem, like any other, can only be solved by those closely associated with it, free from undue external influences and pressures. Canada has consistently supported the intercommunal talks under the auspices of the Secretary-General, which, we believe, offer the best chance for a just, negotiated settlement. In that respect I should like to pay a particular tribute to Mr. Gobbi, the Secretary-General's Special Representative, for his skill and application in conducting the intercommunal talks. We therefore urge both parties to renew their commitment to the negotiations in a spirit of goodwill and compromise, and encourage them to make the political concessions on both sides necessary for a solution. Canada also welcomes the Secretary-General's report and in particular his intention to intensify his personal efforts to facilitate an early settlement of this problem.

175. My British colleague, in his address to you on 11 May [117th meeting], referred to the unsatisfactory financial state of UNFICYP. My Government fully shares the sentiments of the United Kingdom and commends the Secretary-General's efforts to improve the situation. We urge all States Members to contribute financially to this United Nations operation, commensurate with their capabilities. If the present system of voluntary financing is allowed to fail, there are bound to be serious consequences, either for the method of financing or for the Force itself.

176. As members are aware, the last time we met to consider the question of Cyprus was almost four years ago, at the thirty-fourth session. The statement made then by my predecessor [71st meeting] could, with only minor adjustments, be repeated today. The lack of progress in this dispute is both disappointing and disheartening. As a charter member of UNFICYP, Canada has, over the years, provided military personnel and financial and other resources to maintain peace on the island. We therefore believe we have a special interest in a successful solution to this problem.

177. The United Nations can justly be proud of the achievements of its forces and missions in many peace-keeping operations, but it may be asked whether, after 19 years, the presence of peace-keeping forces is advancing or delaying a settlement. As my Austrian colleague so correctly pointed out yesterday [117th meeting], peace-keeping operations should not be used as a means to perpetuate a particular *status quo*. Canada regrets that the collective efforts of peace-making have not met with success—a fact which reflects unhappily on the credibility of the United Nations in its role as catalyst for settling disputes. The willingness of Governments to continue to draw on their resources—which are not, after all, unlimited—in order to participate in such operations is bound to weaken if there is no progress towards a settlement. We call on the parties involved to cooperate in a serious effort towards seeking a solution to the Cyprus problem.

178. In conclusion, when considering its vote on any draft resolution, Canada will be guided by its require-

ment, as a troop contributor to UNFICYP, to maintain strict impartiality.

179. Mr. WEEDY (Afghanistan): At the outset, I should like to present my condolences to the family and to the members of the Permanent Mission of Mongolia on the death of Mr. Narkhuu.

180. I should like to congratulate you, Mr. President, on the effective manner in which you have conducted the work of the thirty-seventh session of the Assembly. Your personal qualities and diplomatic skill assure us that the deliberations of this resumed session will prove fruitful.

181. The Assembly has gathered once again to consider the question of Cyprus, an issue that has attracted the attention not only of the Assembly, but also of peace-loving humanity at large. We note with regret that efforts towards achieving a just and lasting settlement of the problem have been in vain. To date, a large part of the territory of Cyprus remains under foreign occupation. Tens of thousands of people are displaced and are living as refugees in their own country. The two Cypriot communities are kept apart, and efforts are under way to widen the breach between them even further.

182. The continuation of the situation in Cyprus has serious repercussions for the peace and security of the region, which has already become vulnerable as the result of the escalation of tension and conflict stirred by the activities of imperialist circles.

183. The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan attaches great importance to the fate of the people and Government of Cyprus. At the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi last March, the Prime Minister and head of the delegation of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan emphasized the position of principle of Afghanistan, as follows:

“In Cyprus, in spite of all international efforts, a considerable part of the territory is still being occupied by foreign forces. We demand full respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and non-aligned status of the Republic of Cyprus.”

184. My delegation supports the speedy implementation of General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), of 1 November 1974. We believe that the intercommunal talks constitute one of the major instruments of negotiation. The process of dialogue between the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots can effectively bridge the gap between those two communities, which is further complicated by the occupation of foreign troops.

185. While the intercommunal talks, in our opinion, provide the most appropriate means for the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities to settle their problems, we urge both communities to set aside their mistrust and animosities and to start negotiating with the sole purpose of achieving a just and long-lasting settlement. Such a settlement should take into account the legitimate interests and rights of both communities—the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots. For foreign forces to resort to putting pressure on Cyprus under any pretext would complicate the issue even further.



186. The continued occupation of a large part of Cyprus by foreign military forces and their unilateral action create further misunderstanding and suspicion among the two Cypriot communities. Those actions are open threats to the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and non-aligned status of Cyprus.
187. We condemn the efforts to alter the demographic character of Cyprus. Every effort should be made to pave the way for the return of the refugees to their homes and property.
188. My delegation supports the efforts made by the Secretary-General in pursuing his mission of good offices. We hope that a new impetus will be given those efforts, in order to bring the two Cypriot communities closer together through dialogue and negotiation.
189. We also support draft resolution A/37/L.63, submitted by the Contact Group of the non-aligned countries.
190. Once again, my delegation would like to express its solidarity with the people and Government of Cyprus and further support the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and non-aligned status of the Republic of Cyprus.
191. Mr. ERDENECHULUUN (Mongolia) (*interpretation from Russian*): Before making my statement, I should like, on behalf of the Mongolian People's Republic, to express to you, Mr. President, and to all representatives the gratitude of my delegation for the condolences expressed on the occasion of the untimely death of the Permanent Representative of the Mongolian People's Republic to the United Nations, Mr. Narkhuu. Your condolences and those of the General Assembly will be transmitted to our Government and to the family of the deceased.
192. The question of Cyprus is once again before the General Assembly and this is perfectly understandable. The question is still unresolved. The resolutions of the United Nations adopted on the question of Cyprus remain unimplemented to this day. The situation in that country and in the surrounding region continues to be complicated and tense. Such a situation can hardly fail to arouse legitimate anxiety in the world community. The principal reason for this problem remaining unsolved is seen by us to lie in the continuing attempt by certain circles to convert this island into a military and strategic beach-head for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] in the eastern Mediterranean. These manoeuvres are leading to the intensification of tension in that area, creating a threat to the existence of the Cyprus State.
193. As is known, the General Assembly has adopted numerous resolutions defining the bases for a settlement of the Cyprus problem. We need only mention here Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), which was endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 365 (1974).
194. A decision on the question of Cyprus must, in particular, ensure respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and of its policy of non-alignment, as well as the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territory of Cyprus and non-interference in its internal affairs.
195. At the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi last March, full solidarity and support was expressed for the people and Government of Cyprus. The Conference called for a settlement of the problem in accordance with the relevant United Nations resolutions, the decisions and declarations of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the high-level agreements of 12 February 1977<sup>10</sup> and 19 May 1979.<sup>11</sup>
196. The Government of the Mongolian People's Republic believes that the internal problems of Cyprus must be solved taking into account the interests of both communities. The first priority, in order to create the conditions necessary for intercommunal negotiations and a lasting settlement of the Cyprus problem as a whole, is the withdrawal of all foreign troops and the elimination of the military bases in Cyprus.
197. We note that the proposal for complete demilitarization of the island, made by the President of Cyprus at the tenth special session of the General Assembly [2nd meeting, para. 145], aims at this and we welcome and support it. We hope that the strengthening of the involvement of the Secretary-General within the framework of his good offices mission will lead to progress in the solution of the problem of Cyprus.
198. The nature of the present situation in Cyprus confirms the need to convene a representative international conference under United Nations auspices to examine the Cyprus problem, in accordance with the proposal of the Soviet Union.<sup>14</sup> The Mongolian delegation supports that proposal, which would respond to the interests and aspirations of the people of Cyprus and ensure respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.
- Mr. Abulhassan (Kuwait), Vice-President, took the Chair.
199. Mr. SINCLAIR (Guyana): It was with profound regret that my delegation learned this afternoon of the death of the Permanent Representative of the Mongolian People's Republic to the United Nations. On behalf of my delegation, I ask that the condolences of Guyana be communicated to the relatives of the deceased and to his Government.
200. Mr. President, as the Assembly resumes to take up the unfinished business of its thirty-seventh session, it is appropriate for my delegation to record its appreciation of the efficient manner in which you have so far guided and organized our affairs. On the basis of your performance so far, I am confident that the remaining business of this session will be brought to a successful and speedy conclusion.
201. The fact that the Assembly has had to meet in resumed session is a reflection, in part, of the complexity of the current world situation. The question of Cyprus is one aspect of that complexity.
202. The delegation of Guyana has always taken a special and keen interest in this question, for more than one reason. We see at stake here a number of basic, time-honoured principles of the United Nations Charter and the Organization, such as respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of States, non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States, and the non-use of force in the

settlement of disputes, to name but a few. My delegation believes that the positions adopted by the General Assembly on the question of Cyprus are instructive for small States, particularly those which are victims of or are threatened with aggression by larger and more powerful States, or whose territory is under military occupation, or whose territory or integrity is in any other way under threat. Small States such as my own naturally seek in the United Nations a bulwark for the defence of their sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.

203. In addition, the Government and people of Cyprus are linked with the Government and people of Guyana by bonds of great friendship and solidarity. Guyana recognizes an obligation to give all possible assistance to the Government and people of friendly, non-aligned Cyprus in their efforts to defend the sovereignty, independence, unity, territorial integrity and non-alignment of their island home. Accordingly, Guyana has always been an active participant in any forum in which the question of Cyprus is discussed. It is also our privilege to be a member of the Contact Group on Cyprus of the non-aligned countries.

204. My delegation sincerely regrets the fact that the problem of Cyprus is still before us. While that problem remains unsettled, a part of the territory of Cyprus continues under foreign military occupation and a human tragedy is perpetuated as a refugee problem continues to take its toll of human suffering.

205. Ironically, this lack of forward movement in efforts to find a solution to the question of Cyprus comes nine years after the unanimous adoption by the Assembly of resolution 3212 (XXIX), which calls, among other things, for a process of dialogue between the two communities on an equal footing.

206. That resolution was followed by the high-level agreements of 12 February 1977<sup>10</sup> and 19 May 1979.<sup>1</sup> Together these instruments constituted the framework, agreed upon by the parties concerned, within which a lasting solution of all aspects of the problem of Cyprus was to be sought by means of constructive dialogue between the two communities.

207. Unfortunately the expectations aroused by the establishment of that framework have not been fulfilled. My delegation sincerely regrets that the momentum generated in the intercommunal talks has not been sustained. This is neither the place nor the opportunity to seek to apportion blame for the lack of more real progress in those talks. My delegation would merely like to stress that it is now more urgent than ever that the talks be renewed in a more positive and determined spirit. Each day that this problem drags on could move us gradually farther away from the kind of solution envisaged in resolution 3212 (XXIX). Attitudes harden with the passage of time. The generation for which the physical contact and coexistence of the two communities of Cyprus was a reality is slowly being succeeded by another generation to which such contact is unknown and for whom the people on the other side of the dividing line are aliens. It is essential that the Assembly exert its moral authority to prevent a hardening of positions and to facilitate the resumption of the talks in a spirit and a manner consistent with the attainment of the objectives set out in resolution 3212 (XXIX) and in the high-level agreements of 1977 and 1979.

208. My delegation calls for a resumption of the intercommunal talks in a positive, flexible and result-oriented manner. This requires that suspicion and mistrust be overcome and that both communities look towards the future instead of back to the past. A conscious effort needs to be made to ensure that the memory of the past does not condition the approach to solutions or become a judge of present intentions. While the talks are in progress, it is essential, of course, that both sides refrain from seeking to create any *faits accomplis*, whether by force of arms or in any other manner, for this could prejudice the climate for a favourable outcome of the talks. The unity, sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, identity and non-aligned character of Cyprus are sacrosanct and must be preserved.

209. Guyana would like to express sincere appreciation to the Secretary-General for his consistent and untiring efforts to assist the two communities in finding a solution to the problem of Cyprus. My delegation's gratitude also goes to the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Mr. Gobbi, for his own indefatigable efforts in this regard.

210. We have given due attention to the Secretary-General's report [A/37/805 and Corr.1], from which we have noted that the atmosphere of the talks has remained co-operative and instructive.

211. The Secretary-General is particularly well placed to play a role in the search for a solution to the question of Cyprus. In addition to his personal skill and prestige and the prestige of his office, he brings to bear a detailed knowledge of and experience in the intricacies of the relations between the two communities in Cyprus, having been himself the Special Representative of his predecessor in the matter of Cyprus. The Guyana delegation is pleased at the Secretary-General's offer to continue to place his abilities and his experience at the service of the international community in respect of Cyprus. We are confident that his would be a contribution which would make for the reinvigoration of the process of the intercommunal talks with a view to finding a just and lasting settlement, the framework for which already exists and enjoys the overwhelming support of the international community.

212. The Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, in considering the question of Cyprus, at New Delhi last March, paid tribute to the intensification of efforts by the Secretary-General in the question of Cyprus. While noting with concern the lack of progress in those talks, the Conference expressed the hope that they would be carried out

“meaningfully and constructively so as to lead to a speedy, mutually acceptable solution of the problem, in accordance with the relevant United Nations resolutions, starting with General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), endorsed by Security Council resolution 365 (1974), the decisions and declarations of the Non-Aligned Movement, which it reaffirmed, and the High-Level Agreements of 12 February 1977 and of 19 May 1979.”<sup>3</sup>

213. At the New Delhi Conference, the Heads of State or Government also reiterated their full solidarity and support for the people and Government of the

Republic of Cyprus and reaffirmed their respect for that country's independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and non-alignment. They expressed their deep concern over the fact that part of the Republic of Cyprus continues under foreign occupation and demanded the immediate withdrawal of all occupation forces as an essential basis for the solution of the Cyprus problem. They welcomed the proposal made by the President of the Republic of Cyprus for the total demilitarization of Cyprus.

214. They also stressed the urgent need for the voluntary return of the refugees to their homes in safety, respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all Cypriots and the speedy tracing of and accounting for those missing, and they condemned all efforts or actions aimed at altering the demographic structure of Cyprus. They considered that the *de facto* situation created by force of arms and unilateral actions should not in any way affect the solution of the problem.

215. I would like to conclude my statement with an appeal to all outside forces to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of Cyprus and thus complicating the process of seeking a just and lasting solution for all aspects of the problem. I should like to reiterate the need for an early resumption of the intercommunal talks in a positive and constructive spirit. My delegation, for its part, remains dedicated to continuing and redoubling its efforts, both within the Contact Group of the non-aligned countries and elsewhere, in order to ensure the speedy implementation of General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) and a peaceful and lasting solution of the problem of Cyprus.

216. Mr. TRAORÉ (Mali) (*interpretation from French*): We have just learned of the untimely death of the Permanent Representative of the Mongolian People's Republic. On behalf of the delegation of Mali, I would like to convey our deepest condolences to his family and to his mission.

217. At its thirty-fifth and thirty-sixth sessions, the General Assembly deferred consideration of the question of Cyprus in order to make it possible for normal intercommunal negotiations to be carried out and thus to succeed in restoring to all Cypriots their full rights within a united and indivisible Republic.

218. That objective has not been attained. On the contrary, the events now continuing in Cyprus still give rise to concern. In accordance with its powers and functions under the Charter of the United Nations to discuss any matter pertaining to the safeguarding and maintenance of international peace and security, the General Assembly thus decided, as is its right, to consider the course of those events at this resumed session. In fact, it is becoming increasingly apparent that there is an urgent need to find a just and definitive solution to the disputes between the Cypriot communities, whose unity was a determining factor in the struggle for national liberation but which, unfortunately, was not consolidated in the wake of their independence.

219. There is no doubt that the tensions which shake Cyprus today derive from its division—the division of a people over problems which should have been solved through a common vision of the survival of the nation and the perpetuation of the State, a *de facto*

division of a territory which nevertheless has a common destiny.

220. This situation of a nation divided and torn led the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Cairo from 5 to 10 October 1964, to state that:

“one of the causes of international tension lies in the problem of divided nations. ... It considers that the resort to threat or force can lead to no satisfactory settlement, cannot do otherwise than jeopardize international security.”<sup>15</sup>

221. After considering the situation prevailing in Cyprus and referring to paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the Charter, that Conference called upon all countries

“to respect the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus and to refrain from any threat or use of force or intervention directed against Cyprus and from any efforts to impose upon Cyprus unjust solutions unacceptable to the people of Cyprus.”<sup>15</sup>

222. Despite that wise and far-sighted appeal for a peaceful settlement of the Cyprus crisis, in conformity with the principles of the Charter, the principles of non-alignment and the rules of international law, the situation in Cyprus remains a source of international tension. The people of Cyprus are still hungering for a solution acceptable to all, a solution which would enable them, in a restored spirit of trust and guaranteed security, to turn all their efforts to the building of their nation.

223. The question of Cyprus, because it remains unresolved and perhaps because it is encumbered by the weight of the troubled history of relations between the two Cypriot communities, Greek and Turkish, therefore continues to be one of the major concerns of the United Nations.

224. As we are aware, the United Nations has been seized of this question since 1963. There is no need here to recall the resolutions adopted on this question, both by the General Assembly and the Security Council. In substance, and as reaffirmed in particular by General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) and Security Council resolution 353 (1974), the international Organization, committed to the quest for peaceful and final solutions to the Cypriot crisis, has laid down the guidelines that should enable such a result to be achieved.

225. In this quest for solutions, the General Assembly first recognized that the persistence of the situation in Cyprus was prejudicial to international security. The United Nations, in taking this view, was thus concurring in the view taken by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, supported by a solemn warning repeated several times by that Movement, to the effect that peace remains precarious, even if challenged only in countries that have no military ambitions.

226. Secondly, the territorial integrity of Cyprus and respect for its sovereignty, its independence and its status as a non-aligned country must be maintained.

227. In other words, the Republic of Cyprus, established as such in 1960, must remain the Republic of Cyprus, without any attempt to force upon it a fate contrary to the free choice of its people, who have

undertaken commitments with the international community to be citizens, enjoying equal rights, of an indivisible republic, free to extend its horizon of international co-operation in conformity with Articles 2 and 3 of the Charter.

228. Thirdly, the General Assembly and the Security Council have sought to put an end to fratricidal conflicts by interposing between the communities—fated by their turbulent history to be pitted against each other, sometimes with terrible violence—an international force bearing the emblem of the United Nations, the sign of peace among peoples.

229. Fourthly, I should like to refer to the implementation of machinery that may facilitate dialogue between two communities which, as a result of exceptional circumstances and even if they agreed with United Nations resolutions, could not easily and by themselves have dispelled the climate of mistrust burdening their previous relations. The role entrusted to the Secretary-General in this respect has proved constructive.

230. Finally, it was left entirely to the intelligence of the Cypriot communities themselves to find solutions to their common fate, through frank negotiations, supported by the three Powers which signed the Treaty of Guarantee<sup>4</sup> and, generally speaking, by the international Organization as a whole.

231. These negotiations, as recommended by the Third Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Lusaka from 8 to 10 September 1970, should take place

“on the basis of ... internationally accepted principles including the safeguarding of the legitimate rights of the Cypriot Turkish community and the criteria laid down in their Declaration of 9th October, 1964, in Cairo and in conformity with the Charter and the resolutions of the United Nations.”

232. The voice of the Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries apparently was not fully heeded. The General Assembly is holding this session because its resolutions and those of the Security Council on Cyprus have certainly not been implemented as they should have been.

233. Still, hope remains that the Cypriots can be helped to continue to pursue the only avenue that can lead to preservation of their own identity, which, if changed, would only bring about greater suffering and disturbances in the present international order, which itself gives cause for concern.

234. It is to the credit of the Cypriots that they should have succeeded in concluding the high-level agreements of 12 February 1977<sup>10</sup> and 19 May 1979,<sup>1</sup> defining the framework and the modalities for pursuing intercommunal negotiations. The solution to the Cypriot crisis thus broke through the twilight that seemed to make it so illusory. Solution of the crisis should no longer be blocked by the persistence of certain disputes nor by the persistence of certain fears relating to the partition of the island or to its disappearance as a State. It is difficult for a people to ignore its own history. But the history of the Cypriots is inscribed in Cyprus and all Cypriots should recall their history and join together in order to enrich that history with their own sufferings and hopes.

235. The United Nations has the imperative duty to help them do so. The specific measures it should take to achieve that objective, in conformity with its ideals, should necessarily address the following essential concerns: first, reaffirmation of the independence of Cyprus, as consecrated by its Constitution of 1960 as a sovereign State and a State Member of the United Nations; secondly, respect for the territorial integrity of the island, which cannot be altered by any temporary situation or any impossible dream; thirdly, the deployment, with the agreement of the Cypriot communities, of international forces which can truly guarantee the security of all Cypriot citizens; fourthly, the pursuit and the strengthening of negotiations between the two Cypriot communities, in particular on the basis of the 10-point agreement that they reached on 19 May 1979 under the good offices of the Secretary-General; fifthly, the gradual search for solutions to the military status that the Cypriots wish to adopt; sixthly, the ending of the abnormal situation of Cypriots who are refugees in their own homeland; and, seventhly, the gradual establishment of a climate of confidence between the Cypriot communities, with the active and disinterested co-operation of the international community, in particular of the Powers that have established specific links with all the parties presently involved in the Cypriot crisis.

236. The delegation of Mali is convinced that these concerns are those of the international community as a whole. We are convinced that they are, in any event, those of Cyprus, which is a member of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, whose first Conference of Heads of State or Government, held at Belgrade from 1 to 6 September 1961, underscored, in particular, “the need for a great sense of responsibility and realism when undertaking the solution of various problems resulting from differences ...”.

237. We have had opportunities to hear the arguments of representatives of the two Cypriot communities regarding the situation in their country. We have had opportunities to draw, from our direct contacts, instructive lessons regarding their wish to be full citizens in a peaceful republic facing its future with faith in justice and equality for all its citizens. We have been dealing with great patriots. We have been speaking with men who have a great sense of responsibility and a realistic frame of mind. Such men will find solutions to their differences. It is with that conviction that the delegation of Mali has come to speak at this rostrum on behalf of the people and Government of Mali.

238. Mr. KRAVETS (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*interpretation from Russian*): It was with a feeling of profound sadness that we learned of the untimely death of Mr. Tsogtyn Narkhuu, our comrade and close friend. The delegation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic would like to express its sincere condolences to the members of the Permanent Mission of the Mongolian People's Republic to the United Nations, to the family of the deceased and to his friends.

239. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR shares the profound concern that has been so clearly expressed here by the world community in connection with the ongoing crisis on the island of Cyprus, which is such a serious threat to peace and security in the Mediter-



anean. In conditions of increasing tension in the world and of the extreme tension in the Middle East, the absence of any progress in the peaceful settlement of the Cyprus problem is increasingly dangerous, as was quite correctly indicated at the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi last March.

240. There is no doubt that the United Nations must once again use all its political authority and all its powers under the Charter to get the question of Cyprus and the Cypriot people out of the present impasse.

241. The Ukrainian people, like all peoples of the Soviet, socialist and other countries, sympathize with the people of Cyprus and understand to what severe trials they have been subjected in recent years. We are convinced that a peaceful, just and lasting settlement of the problem of Cyprus is possible. The people of Cyprus, like all other peoples, have a right to live in peace without any interference from outside and without foreign troops or foreign military bases. Of course, much depends on mutual understanding between the two national communities whose home and refuge Cyprus is. Each has its own interests which must be taken into consideration, but they cannot be allowed to obscure the overall interest of the Republic of Cyprus as a whole in maintaining its integrity, independence and sovereignty.

242. We do not doubt that if matters had depended only on the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots the problem would long since have been resolved to the benefit and in the interest of all the people of Cyprus. Unfortunately, there are other rather powerful forces which do not want a settlement in that region and are governed by their own selfish and unworthy interests. They are the United States and its partners in NATO, which attribute the absence of any notable progress in the intercommunal talks to a lack of desire for such progress by the two parties. That, of course, is not the real reason.

243. The NATO leaders attach growing strategic significance to Cyprus, particularly in conditions of increasing tension in the Near East. It is in NATO's interest to maintain the problem as it is at present and maintain the *de facto* division of the island. Those in NATO circles see in this situation twofold benefits for themselves: they can use the existing military bases in the southern part of the island and acquire new bases in the north.

244. The United States is increasingly covetous of that island and is hatching plans for transforming Cyprus into its own strategic stronghold on the approaches to Arabian oil.

245. As President Kyprianou said recently: "the Cyprus problem, which basically is the result of foreign intrigue and interference, could be resolved very quickly if it related only to ensuring the harmonious coexistence of the two communities of the island". Enabling the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to live together in peace and friendship in a unified, independent, sovereign State and enabling them to enjoy independence, without any unsolicited advice or instructions from outside—that is what is needed to settle the Cyprus problem.

246. Speaking in the general debate at the current session, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR said:

"The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR would like to reaffirm its position of principle in support of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus ... Demilitarization of the island, providing for the withdrawal of all foreign forces and the elimination of all foreign military bases, is an important condition for a credible settlement in Cyprus." [20th meeting, para. 40.]

247. We are in favour of the speediest possible settlement of the Cyprus problem on the basis of unconditional respect for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and non-aligned status of the Republic of Cyprus, as well as the immediate and complete implementation of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. We advocate the withdrawal of all foreign forces.

248. We feel that a just solution of the Cyprus question would be facilitated by convening a representative international conference on Cyprus within the framework of the United Nations. The work of such a conference could be an important contribution to reducing tension in the region of Cyprus and establishing there a climate of confidence and co-operation. The conversion of the Mediterranean into a zone of stable peace and fruitful co-operation would lead, on the whole, to a better international climate. We are convinced that that would lead to increased confidence in the military area, the reduction of arms, the withdrawal from the Mediterranean of ships carrying nuclear weapons and no further emplacement of nuclear weapons on the territory of non-nuclear-weapon States in the Mediterranean area.

249. We are convinced of the benefit of bilateral and multilateral negotiations on the issues of peace and security in the Mediterranean. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR considers that this is the path that must be followed to arrive at a just solution of the Cyprus question; the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-aligned status of the Republic of Cyprus would be strengthened.

*Mr. Charles (Haiti), Vice-President, took the Chair.*

250. Mr. HOANG BICH SON (Viet Nam) (*interpretation from French*): At the outset, I wish to convey, on behalf of the delegation of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, our heartfelt condolences to the delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic on the recent death of our comrade, Mr. Tsogtyn Narkhuu, Permanent Representative of the Mongolian People's Republic to the United Nations.

251. Nine years have elapsed without the implementation of the relevant resolutions repeatedly adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council since 1974 that provide the essential basis for a lasting solution of the question of Cyprus. Hence, in this important area of the eastern Mediterranean there remains a grave threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus and to peace and security throughout the world.

252. Ever since Cyprus became a victim of foreign aggression, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries has, on repeated occasions, unequivocally expressed

its position of full solidarity with the people and Government of Cyprus and support for their just struggle to preserve the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and non-alignment of their country. The Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, meeting at New Delhi last March, once again expressed its deep concern over the fact that part of the Republic of Cyprus continues under foreign occupation, and it demanded the immediate withdrawal of all occupation forces as an essential basis for the solution of the Cyprus problem. The Heads of State or Government also welcomed the proposal of the President of the Republic of Cyprus for the total demilitarization of Cyprus.

253. Hence, during these past nine years, the international community has shown patience and entertained the hope of seeing the implementation of United Nations resolutions and those of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries relating to Cyprus and has followed the course of the intercommunal talks, for we deeply wished those negotiations to lead rapidly to substantial results, so that the two Cypriot communities could live harmoniously in peace and stability in a sovereign, independent, united and non-aligned Republic on that island with its admirable natural setting and ancient civilization.

254. It is indeed regrettable that the legitimate aspirations of the people of Cyprus, unanimously supported by peace and justice-loving international opinion, have not yet been realized.

255. Thirty-seven per cent of the territory of Cyprus remains occupied by foreign forces; human rights and fundamental freedoms are not respected; and the refugees have not been able to return to their homes.

256. Since Viet Nam itself in the recent past fell victim to a cruel, artificial division as a result of colonialist and imperialist aggression and occupation, the Vietnamese people wish to express their understanding of and deep sympathy with the just aspirations and sacred struggle of the people of Cyprus in defending their fundamental national rights.

257. Based on their position of principle and the lessons drawn from their long struggle, the people and the Government of Viet Nam have always given consistent and total support to the difficult, but ultimately victorious, struggle of the people and Government of Cyprus. Throughout their contemporary history, the Vietnamese people, strengthened by the rightness of their cause, have always aspired to a negotiated and peaceful settlement of the problems concerning them, with a view to ensuring respect for their national rights. The experience of our people is that a negotiated and peaceful solution, in keeping with their legitimate interests, has always required vigorous struggle, but that sooner or later we have always managed to reach that goal through our own successes and international support.

258. We are therefore firmly convinced that today any people, including that of Cyprus, holding fast to its own fate and determined to defend its inalienable rights to the last, and enjoying the unshakeable support of the peace and justice-loving forces throughout the world, will inevitably achieve its fundamental objectives.

259. In declaring its support for draft resolution A/37/L.63, submitted by non-aligned countries, the delegation of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam earnestly hopes that the Secretary-General will, in the context of his mission of good offices, take every step or initiative likely to promote a just and lasting solution of the problem of Cyprus, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter and the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, thereby responding to the legitimate aspirations and fundamental national rights of the people and Government of Cyprus and actively contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security in this important region of the eastern Mediterranean.

260. Mr. SOGLO (Benin) (*interpretation from French*): Let me begin by saying how pleased the delegation of Benin is to have had Mr. Hollai as President of the General Assembly since last September; he has continued throughout to give proof of his outstanding qualities. Everyone fully appreciates his efforts to make this session a success, and we are confident that the present debate on the situation that the people of Cyprus have been living with since 1974 will not be a pointless exercise in rhetoric, an exercise the General Assembly and the Security Council have engaged in in the past.

261. Nevertheless, previous debates have served a purpose: that of clarifying a complex problem by pondering its dual aspects—internal and international—and of having put forward appropriate solutions which, had they been carried out, would already have restored national cohesion, sovereignty and independence to the people of Cyprus.

262. Like the majority of countries in this Assembly, the Republic of Cyprus is a small country that has suffered as a result of colonialism whose cynical strategy was to exacerbate ethnic or cultural differences in its population and oppress it, and is having difficulties in forming a single nation and a unitary State.

263. Having been subjected to the influence of various civilizations, Cyprus, which is at the crossroads of three continents—Europe, Asia and Africa—is today seeking its unity. A fruitful dialogue of civilizations has, unfortunately, given way to a fratricidal struggle.

264. The blow struck by the Turkish army in July 1974 brought to an already deplorable situation a totally new dimension, which has been unanimously condemned. This blow had as its aim a repetition of the policy of Hitler *vis-à-vis* the Sudetan Germans, which, as everyone knows, was one of the causes of the Second World War.

265. Regrettable though it may be, the difficulty experienced by two communities living on the same strip of ground and attempting to forge a common destiny and to benefit from their differences is not and can never be a pretext for reviving the frustrated dreams of an expansionism which has disappeared for ever.

266. The foreign occupation of more than one third of the country, which contains about 70 per cent of the economic potential of the island, has meant the displacement of thousands of persons, who have sadly become refugees in their own country, and

thousands of civilians have been killed or maltreated or have disappeared. What is worse, Turkey has adopted measures to modify the age-old demographic character of Cyprus.

267. Peace in that country and in the region is thus jeopardized, and this has had its effect on the States Members of the United Nations, which, in General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), of 1 November 1974, not only described the Turkish invasion as a violation of the sovereignty, integrity and independence of Cyprus but also expressed their support and sympathy for that country. In resolution 34/30, of 20 November 1979, the General Assembly deplored "the continued presence of foreign armed forces and foreign military personnel on the territory of the Republic of Cyprus and the fact that part of its territory is still occupied by foreign forces". It affirmed "the right of the Republic of Cyprus and its people to full and effective sovereignty and control over the entire territory of Cyprus and its natural and other resources".

268. Meeting in Havana in September 1979, the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries reaffirmed its solidarity with the Government of Cyprus; it deplored the occupation by foreign troops of a part of Cyprus; and it expressed its support for the 10-point agreement concluded in Nicosia on 19 May 1979 between the President of Cyprus, Mr. Kyprianou, and the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, Mr. Denktaş,<sup>1</sup> under the auspices of the Secretary-General. That position was reaffirmed at the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi last March, as follows:

"The Heads of State or Government also expressed their deep concern over the fact that part of the Republic of Cyprus continues under foreign occupation and demanded the immediate withdrawal of all occupation forces as an essential basis for the solution of the Cyprus problem."<sup>16</sup>

269. The People's Republic of Benin cannot fail to be affected by the tragedy of a people which sees its territory occupied in flagrant violation of the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force, in contravention of paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, which states that:

"All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."

270. The continuing presence of foreign troops and the unilateral decision of 13 February 1975 to transform the occupied part into a "Federated Turkish State"—a decision which was denounced by the Security Council in its resolution 367 (1975) of 12 March 1975—are serious infringements of the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus and a threat to peace and security not only in this region but in the world as a whole. Failure to respect human rights in the occupied part, which is dealt with in General Assembly resolution 3450 (XXX), of 9 December 1975, concerning missing persons in Cyprus, is again a cause of serious concern.

271. Thus, it is desirable and, indeed, necessary that the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes, and scrupulous respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus, as called for by the General Assembly and the Security Council in various resolutions, are observed by the parties involved. It is regrettable that the intercommunal talks have so far not produced any substantial result.

272. My delegation hopes that this session of the Assembly will produce new recommendations, supplementing and strengthening those which have been adopted in the past, and that the parties concerned, in particular Turkey, will finally heed the voice of the international community and of reason itself, which, among other things, calls for the continuance of the dialogue between the two communities, action in accordance with the 10-point agreement of 19 May 1979 and the withdrawal of all foreign troops, in order that peace may be restored in the interest of all.

273. Ready for the revolution—the struggle continues.

274. Mr. LA ROCCA (Italy): I would like to convey the condolences of the Italian delegation to the family of Ambassador Narkhuu and the Permanent Mission of Mongolia.

275. For nearly 20 years now the United Nations has devoted its efforts and its resources to the search for a solution to the problems which affect Cyprus.

276. My delegation wishes, first of all, to commend the action carried out with coherence and continuity since 1964 by the Secretaries-General and their Special Representatives in assisting the parties in the negotiations, as well as the important contribution made by UNFICYP and the countries participating in it.

277. This acknowledgement cannot be made without an expression of deep disappointment and concern that, despite all the efforts in this direction, no real progress seems to have been achieved towards the solution of the problems of the island.

278. In view of the close historical, political, cultural and economic relations and the deep friendship and co-operation linking us to Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, Italy has always followed this problem with the utmost concern and is anxious to see the quick achievement of an acceptable settlement.

279. In his statement in the general debate at the current session, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Mr. Emilio Colombo, referring to the Cyprus crisis as a source of serious concern, recalled that the visit he had made to the island in July 1982 in order to contribute to the search for a viable solution had allowed him to "reiterate Italy's readiness to assist the Secretary-General and his representative in Nicosia in their difficult task of mediation in the negotiations between the two Cypriot communities". [9th meeting, para. 146.]

280. The Secretary-General's report [A/37/805 and Corr.1], in its references to the various stages of the intercommunal talks, notes that they were held in a constructive and co-operative atmosphere. We consider this an encouraging indication and, in the same spirit, we welcome the readiness expressed by the parties to continue the negotiations in a meaningful

way and the prospect of a renewed, vigorous commitment by the Secretary-General, to whom Italy wishes to reaffirm its full support.

281. Difficult and frustrating as they may sometimes appear, the intercommunal talks represent, in our view, the only realistic way to a settlement of the Cyprus problem in accordance with the fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

282. We believe that the two Cypriot communities, beyond their diversity and differences, share an interest in organizing their common structures, so as to ensure lasting stability, peace and progress for the country to which both of them belong and in which they are destined to live together.

283. In our view, the bases for a negotiation, in accordance with the language of reason, do exist, and in this connection we have taken note with deep appreciation of the renewed support which has emerged for the high-level agreements of 12 February 1977<sup>10</sup> and 19 May 1979<sup>1</sup> which, in our view, contain significant elements for a settlement.

284. While assuring the parties of all the assistance they may require, the United Nations has the duty to stress to them the need to proceed along the path of negotiation earnestly, patiently and in a spirit of good faith.

285. Only the Cypriots themselves can eventually find a just and lasting settlement through the harmonious accommodation of the needs of both communities. What seems important to us, at this stage, is to keep open the possibility of a dialogue between the parties and to avoid trying to determine from outside a solution which should be rooted in the responsible commitments of the two communities.

286. Italy hopes that this debate will produce a clear message, focused not on what divides but on what unites the people of Cyprus: support for the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus; a call addressed to both parties to solve their differences through a meaningful dialogue; and the renewed commitment of the Secretary-General to assist the parties along this path. This is the only way to contribute effectively to the re-establishment of an atmosphere conducive to constructive negotiations and, thus, to real progress in the quest for a settlement of the Cyprus problem.

287. Mr. AMEGA (Togo) (*interpretation from French*): At the outset, I should like to express the sincere condolences of my delegation to the delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic and to the bereaved family of our late colleague, Mr. Narkhuu, the Permanent Representative of Mongolia to the United Nations.

288. The delegation of Togo has been most pleased to see Mr. Hollai presiding over the work of this resumed session. The skill with which he conducted the work of the first part of this session augurs well for the success of our present deliberations.

289. My delegation is also pleased to pay special tribute, once again, to the Secretary-General for his tireless efforts to settle the various conflicts that are shaking the world, in particular the question of Cyprus, to which he has always paid special attention. There is hardly any need to recall the role that he played

in January 1977 for the resumption of contacts between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities with a view to a settlement of the painful Cypriot problem whose essential elements are worth recalling.

290. The root of the question of Cyprus resides in the difficulties of two peoples destined by history to live together in the same territory. In acceding to independence on 16 August 1960, the island of Cyprus became a bi-national republic in conformity with the Zurich and London agreements of February 1959 among the parties—namely, the Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriots, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. At that time, there were two distinct communities—Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots—whose interests were guaranteed by the Constitution of 1960, adopted when the island gained independence. The 1960 Treaty of Guarantee,<sup>4</sup> signed by Greece, the United Kingdom and Turkey, guaranteed the fundamental principles of the Constitution, the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of the new Cypriot State, and provided for a balance between the interests of the two communities.

291. Recognition of the existence of the two communities in the Constitution and in existing treaties is very significant and very clearly expresses the refusal of both sides to constitute a nation. The roots of the Cypriot problem therefore lie in the lack of this national conscience which bolsters the will of the people of a State to live together and to seek to protect and defend their common interests.

292. In addition to the political reasons, there are religious differences between the two communities.

293. As a result of this situation, each Cypriot community feels itself closer to its nation of origin, either Greece or Turkey, countries which do not remain indifferent to the fate of the populations of Cyprus which are engaged in political and religious struggles against each other.

294. In December 1963, the Greek and Turkish Governments were thus directly involved in the intercommunal hostilities that led to the adoption of Security Council resolution 186 (1964) and the deployment of a peace-keeping force with headquarters in Nicosia.

295. It should be noted that, in that resolution, the Council requested the Cypriot Government, which is responsible for maintaining and restoring public order, to take all further steps necessary to put an end to the acts of violence and bloodshed in Cyprus.

296. That resolution was not complied with despite the promptings and intervention of the United Nations and of certain States to induce the parties to negotiate with a view to restoring peace. It was only on 6 June 1968 that the intercommunal talks began in Beirut, to be continued in Nicosia a week later. Those talks, which were pursued intermittently until 1973, permitted a glimmer of hope to be seen for an overall settlement of the question, when the events of 1974 occurred, namely, the *coup d'état* of July of that year, followed by the intervention and occupation of Turkish forces. Those events, which once again emphasized the roles of Greece and Turkey in the life of the Cypriot State, constitute acts violating the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. This is why the General Assembly, in resolution 3212 (XXIX),



called upon all States to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence and non-alignment of Cyprus, and also called for the withdrawal of foreign armed forces and the cessation of all foreign interference in Cyprus.

297. Reaffirming the constitutional character of the Turkish and Greek communities, the resolution calls upon both communities to pursue negotiations under the aegis of the Secretary-General with a view to reaching freely a mutually acceptable settlement based on the fundamental and legitimate rights of those two communities.

298. Unfortunately, the wise advice of the General Assembly was not followed. The parties did not resume negotiations. Worse still, one of them decided to constitute itself as a federated State. The Security Council, in resolution 367 (1975), deplored that decision and asked the Secretary-General to attempt to arrange for the resumption of the negotiations. Those negotiations, resumed in 1977, were suspended and resumed again in 1979, without significant progress. In 1980, the negotiations began again and have been continued intermittently since then, without much hope of a solution.

299. This situation seems likely to prolong indefinitely the presence of UNFICYP in Nicosia and to remain a permanent source of tension in the region. This is a matter of deep concern to the Government of Togo, which wishes to pay a tribute to the Secretary-General for his dedicated efforts to settle this crisis, efforts which should be encouraged.

300. In the view of my delegation, any settlement must necessarily be based on strict respect for the Constitution and the treaties that were signed when Cyprus became independent. The two communities must show solidarity in the building of Cyprus. Neither of them should make use of certain *de facto* situations to modify unilaterally conditions embodied in treaties guaranteeing the rights of each community. In this respect, the States that are parties to those treaties and are directly concerned—Greece and Turkey—must show great moderation and do everything possible to avoid intervening in the affairs of the sovereign State of Cyprus. The troops of those two countries should therefore be withdrawn from the island as soon as possible.

301. My delegation remains convinced that the desire for peace still exists among all of the parties. The holding of the present debate is clear proof of that. It is therefore necessary that the parties return speedily to the negotiating table, under the auspices of the Secretary-General, in order to arrive at a satisfactory solution of this problem, which has already lasted too long.

302. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I shall now call on representatives who have asked to speak in exercise of the right of reply.

303. Mr. ROLANDIS (Cyprus): First of all, I would like to join those who have expressed deep sympathy at the death of the Permanent Representative of Mongolia to the United Nations.

304. I listened with care to the speech of the representative of Turkey. First of all, I would like to point out that his statement was to some extent

a misuse of the time of the Assembly, because a good part of the statement should have been made in the Special Political Committee by the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community, instead of being imposed on this Assembly.

305. Secondly, I must say that I was really amazed at the content of that statement. It is the first time in my life that I have heard so many inaccuracies, false statements and fallacious positions condensed into an hour-long speech. I do not think that in the course of these 10 minutes I shall be in a position to negate the various points made by the representative of Turkey, so I propose later on, probably in the course of the next week, to circulate a memorandum answering the various points raised, although Cyprus has in the past answered all these points in detail.

306. I was really aghast at this speech, and at times I wondered whether it was Cyprus that had invaded Turkey, the way the representative of Turkey was speaking. The speech was an amalgam of threats and fallacious statements, and there was an aggressiveness which I do not think will prove conducive to deliberations in this forum or be beneficial in the future development of the Cyprus problem.

307. I will take up at random some of the salient points of the speech of the representative of Turkey. First of all, we have heard a very bizarre theory regarding aggression, a theory which nobody in this Assembly accepts. I was reminded by the representative of Benin a few minutes ago that this theory of aggression was also used by Hitler when he invaded Czechoslovakia. The representative of Turkey alleged that, in accordance with the Treaty of Guarantee he was entitled to invade Cyprus. I would like to remind him that, under this Treaty, Turkey was entitled to take action for the purpose of restoring the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus. The word "action" must not be interpreted to mean military action, because, according to paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, all Members shall refrain from the threat or use of force, and according to Article 103, if there is any provision in any other international agreement that conflicts with the articles of the Charter, such provision is null and void.

308. Thus, Turkey could never have the right to invade Cyprus. We know that the concept of invasion, of aggression, is anathema to the international community and, even if pretexts are somehow contrived, aggression is never permissible under the rules of the international community.

309. The representative of Turkey then referred to the union of Cyprus with Greece, so-called enosis. He wasted a good deal of your time by saying that Cyprus would never be a Greek island, and so on. We do not want Cyprus to be a Greek island. There is no holy oath about Cyprus becoming a Greek island. Cyprus is an independent sovereign State, and this is what we are fighting for. This is the content of the resolutions we are following. This was contained in the high-level agreements. This is what the Republic of Cyprus is pursuing, and I can state it categorically.

310. Of course, in the historical evolution of nations there may have been various phases in which speeches may have been made to serve certain expedients,

but it is very well known that the objective of the Government of Cyprus has always been independence, sovereignty. That is what that country is fighting for. If any country is trying to deny Cyprus the right to sovereignty and independence, it is not Greece. It is Turkey that has converted the occupied part of Cyprus into a Turkish district and is trying to annex that part of Cyprus.

311. We have heard it said here that we are trying to usurp the title of the Government of Cyprus. I really do not know who is usurping what. The title of government, president or minister is given by this Assembly, by the Governments belonging to this Organization. If anybody is trying to arrogate to himself the rights of the nations in this Assembly and tell them what to approve and what not to approve, it is the representative of Turkey. He is the only one who does not recognize Cyprus and who wants to impose this position upon everybody else in this Assembly.

312. The representative of Turkey referred also to the so-called embargo; he said that we are stopping the Turkish Cypriots from trading, from working, indeed from living. What is this embargo? The Turkish army has occupied by force the properties of the Greeks in the northern part of Cyprus. Those properties are now utilized. They try to use them, to use the hotels, to steal the fruit, to export the fruit, and we rightfully try to stop it. Every sensible man on this earth would try to stop the stealing of his own property, which was created throughout centuries, throughout lifetimes, throughout generations. Everyone would do that; it is a duty. This is what the Greeks are doing in Cyprus, the Greeks who were ousted from their homes to live in deprivation and destitution outside their own land. Is this an embargo?

313. We have heard of another grotesque notion that we have to accept equality between the 82 per cent of the Greeks of Cyprus and the 18 per cent of the Turks. We accept equality for every living person on Cyprus. All persons are equal, but if the 82 per cent become equal to the 18 per cent, we are not creating equality. This can be proved easily by mathematics—82 per cent can never be equal to 18 per cent.

314. We have also noted that threats were catapulted against this Assembly. This Assembly heard that if it adopts a resolution, the Turkish Cypriots may adopt another attitude in the intercommunal negotiations. Very well veiled threats were heard in this Assembly, and on top of that we heard evidence of a contemptuous attitude towards this forum. Indeed, it was stated here that Turkey would view with contempt the resolutions of this Organization. We heard that there might be a resolution calling for the withdrawal of foreign troops but that Turkey would not respect it. Representatives heard that in this Hall.

315. Cyprus is not against the process of negotiations, as the representative of Turkey tried to lead this Assembly to believe. I stated very clearly in my speech [*116th meeting*] that we are for negotiations, for meaningful negotiations, for result-oriented negotiations. We want to find a solution through these negotiations. We do not want to subjugate either the Turkish Cypriots or anybody else in Cyprus. We are working for a balanced and fair solution for all Cypriots. This is the objective of the Government of Cyprus

for an independent, sovereign nation where all Cypriots will have equal, fair, and well-balanced rights.

316. Mr. DOUNTAS (Greece): I wish at the outset to offer my condolences to the delegation of Mongolia upon the sad news of the death of Mr. Narkhuu.

317. It is rather late and it took the representative of Turkey 90 minutes—one hour and a half—of rather pompous oratory to try in a futile effort to blur the sheer and flagrant fact that the Turkish Army invaded the Republic of Cyprus in 1974, and has ever since continued to occupy part of the Republic, against all rules of international law and against the will of 80 per cent of its population and its legal Government. The representative of Turkey indulged in a rather colourful diatribe of history in which little attention was paid to such basic elements as facts, truth and accuracy. I am confident that all members of the Assembly, in their experience and knowledge, are fully aware of what has really happened in this plagued Republic of Cyprus.

318. The Foreign Minister of Cyprus, Mr. Rolandis, has just dealt with certain salient points of that monumental speech. I am certain that the memorandum to be distributed by the delegation of Cyprus will restore truth.

319. I should like, however, to touch upon one point of more particular interest to my Government. Mr. Kirca referred to part of a statement made by the President of the Republic of Greece, Mr. Karamanlis, concerning enosis, or the struggle for union of Cyprus with Greece. Consistent with well-known habits of quoting out of context, the Turkish representative failed to mention that the President's speech consisted of two parts.

320. In the first part, the President gave a historical background of the Cyprus question, of what happened about 25 years ago. As everybody in this Assembly knows, that part of history is the struggle of the 80 per cent of the population of Cyprus, namely, the Greek Cypriots, for self-determination. So, why this surprise and why this fuss?

321. The President of Greece, in the second part of his speech, which dealt with present realities and the future, offered a vision of peace for the Republic of Cyprus, a vision of peaceful co-operation between Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, a vision of a State where all the inhabitants will live in peace and love. I will have that text distributed so that all Members of the Assembly will clearly understand that the quotation of this historical reference misinterprets the main political thrust of the speech of the President of the Hellenic Republic.

322. I am indeed flabbergasted and I am tempted to ask in this context: Why is the Turkish representative so sensitive about the political goals of the Greek Cypriots 25 years ago, which did not materialize? Why does he tend so meticulously to forget that it is his country that, by invading and occupying a great part of the Republic of Cyprus, has, for all practical purposes, annexed the northern sector of the island? Mr. Karamanlis spoke about history, Mr. Kirca failed to refer to the present realities for a simple reason—because the present sad realities are the product of Turkey's illegal aggression against Cyprus.

323. As to the question posed by Mr. Kirca—whether Turkey invaded the island or not—apart from the thorough reply given by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, I would make an appeal to your common sense and pose a very simple question: When a government orders 30,000 of its troops—its army—with 250 tanks, and its air force and its navy to cross the border of a sovereign, independent State Member of the United Nations against the will of 80 per cent of its population, what do you call such an action? We call it, simply, invasion. If you have a better term to describe the situation, I am ready to accept it.

324. But Mr. Kirca added mockery to insult. He said to us that in Cyprus everything is going well: “Since 1974,”—the year of the invasion—“in stark contrast to the preceding 11 years, Cyprus has known unparalleled tranquillity and been virtually free of violence”.

325. The best tranquillity is the tranquillity of the tomb; this apparently evades Mr. Kirca. He continues: “No blood has been shed and the two communities have lived side by side in security, in their respective zones and under their own administrations, managing their own affairs”—a paradise.

326. Some 2,000 years ago, an order was established in the world by force of arms: it was called the *Pax Romana*. Apparently, today the population of Cyprus enjoys the benefit of the “*Pax Turcica*”.

327. Mr. KIRCA (Turkey) (*interpretation from French*): I will be very brief, since I am taking the floor to say that I do not intend to reply to the previous speakers. I have already said everything in my statement. They may find there everything needed to refute their own allegations.

328. In fact, everything we have just heard is the usual literature of lying propaganda. I do not find it worthy of

a reply. I simply wish to say that to characterize Turkey as Hitlerite is but one more example of the sophistry in which the purveyors of such mischief specialize.

329. I also note with consternation that neither the Greek Cypriot administration nor Greece has, unfortunately, learned the lessons of history.

*The meeting rose at 7.45 p.m.*

#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-fourth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1979*, document S/13369 and Add.1, para. 51.

<sup>2</sup> A/38/132, annex.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, chap. I, para. 131.

<sup>4</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 382, No. 5475.

<sup>5</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-third Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1978*, document S/12722, annex.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, *Nineteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1964*, document S/5950 and Add.1 and 2, para. 222.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, *Twenty-ninth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1974*, document S/11398, para. 5.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, *Twenty-ninth Year*, 1780th meeting, para. 32.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, *Thirtieth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1975*, document S/11789, annex.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, *Thirty-second Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1977*, document S/12323, para. 5.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, *Thirty-fifth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1980*, document S/14100, annex.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, *Thirty-seventh Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1982*, document S/15149 and Add.1, para. 56.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, *Supplement for October, November and December 1982*, document S/15502 and Add.1, para. 58.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, *Twenty-ninth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1974*, document S/11465.

<sup>15</sup> See A/5763.

<sup>16</sup> A/38/132, annex, chap. I, para. 129.