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**Special Political and Decolonization Committee  
(Fourth Committee)**

**Summary record of the 22nd meeting**

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 21 November 2001, at 3 p.m.

*Chairman:* Mr. Hasmy. . . . . (Malaysia)

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*The meeting was called to order at 3.05 p.m.*

**Agenda item 89: Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects** (*continued*) (A/55/1024 and Corr.1; A/C.5/55/46 and Add.1; A/56/478)

1. **Mr. Bozay** (Turkey) said that his delegation fully supported the statement made on behalf of the European Union at the Committee's 20th meeting. At the fifty-fifth session of the General Assembly, Member States had had the opportunity to consider in detail the recommendations of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305-S/2000/809). Those recommendations on which there had been agreement should be implemented without delay, recent events having proved that the requirement for a multidimensional peacekeeping operation could emerge at any time. In particular, there was a need to increase the capacity of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) for rapid deployment, to improve its organizational structure and staffing, and to establish a system-wide capacity for information and analysis.

2. His delegation supported the efforts of the Secretariat to strengthen the United Nations Standby Arrangements System, of which Turkey was a member, and welcomed the proposals for the creation of an on-call list of military officers and the formation of coherent brigade-size forces. Such brigades, if composed of troops from countries of the same geographical region, could be deployed rapidly, efficiently and cost-effectively to deal with regional crises. In that connection, he drew attention to the Multinational Peace Force for South-Eastern Europe, formed in September 1998, the headquarters of which were located in Plovdiv, Bulgaria.

3. The enhancement of the Organization's rapid deployment capacity could be realized only if there were sufficient financial resources. His delegation therefore supported the concept of a strategic reserve at the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi and welcomed the efforts made by the Secretariat to prepare the related budget proposal in consultation with Member States.

4. The sample rules of engagement responded to a vital need of United Nations peacekeeping forces on the ground. His delegation had submitted to the Secretariat the comments of the competent Turkish

authorities regarding the sample rules and looked forward to the resubmission of the sample rules to Member States prior to their finalization.

5. Civilian police were of critical importance to peacekeeping operations; Turkey had deployed 177 civilian police to different peacekeeping missions.

6. His delegation shared the view that DPKO required additional staff. However, it was important to ensure that the contributions of Member States taking part in peacekeeping operations were adequately reflected. Security Council resolution 1353 (2001) had paved the way for the strengthening of cooperation between the Council and troop-contributing countries. Such cooperation, however, needed to be further improved, and proposals in that regard, particularly those supported by troop-contributing countries, should be accorded greater attention.

7. There was a need for improved training for troops that were to participate in peacekeeping operations, and his delegation supported the efforts of the Secretariat in that regard. He noted, in that connection, that his Government had established a fully fledged training centre in Ankara in 1998. Lastly, he paid tribute to the more than 1,500 United Nations peacekeepers who had paid the ultimate price for serving the cause of peace.

8. **Mr. Chaudhry** (Pakistan) said that his delegation wished to associate itself with the statement made by the representative of Jordan at the Committee's 20th meeting on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement. Pakistan regarded itself as a stakeholder in United Nations peacekeeping operations for it was one of the oldest, largest and most consistent contributors to such operations. Its commitment to and involvement in United Nations peacekeeping efforts were based on its fundamental belief in the maintenance of international peace and security, as envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations.

9. While his delegation appreciated the efforts made by DPKO to improve the support for peacekeeping operations and acknowledged the comprehensive review undertaken by the Secretariat, it continued to have concerns about a number of issues. In filling the new posts established pursuant to the recommendations of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, the Secretariat had not taken fully into account the political guidance given by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations in early 2001. Also, some of the posts requested were not commensurate with the

Department's requirements. Above all, the major troop-contributing countries had not been appropriately accommodated in the first tranche of posts. It was not a question of allocating some of the top posts to those countries but of ensuring that they were proportionately represented. The Secretariat's failure to do so would seriously affect his delegation's position on the second tranche of posts.

10. Regarding on-call lists, his delegation had always believed that a list of expertise should be provided, rather than a list of names, since it was not always possible to guarantee that the same persons would be available beyond a finite period of time.

11. With respect to rapid deployment, his delegation fully supported the recommendation on the Panel of United Nations Peace Operations regarding the need for 30- and 90-day deployment timelines. Delegations had already been provided with sufficient information on strategic reserve options on which to base a decision. Any request for additional information would delay the establishment of rapid-deployment facilities, which were crucial for peacekeeping operations, and he therefore urged Member States to allow the process to go forward expeditiously.

12. One major unresolved problem was the non-payment or delays in the payment of the amounts owed to troop-contributing countries, which had adversely affected the capacity, and perhaps the will, of those countries to participate in peacekeeping operations. Regrettably, that problem had yet to receive the priority attention it warranted. His delegation also regretted that no progress had been made with respect to the sample rules of engagement. Unclear and non-uniform rules of engagement could make the difference between a successful and an unsuccessful mission, and between life and death.

13. His delegation's proposal regarding cooperation between the Security Council and troop-contributing countries did not differentiate between major and minor troop contributors, nor was it an attempt to gain back-door entry to the Council for troop contributors as non-elected members. Indeed, the proposal drew a clear line between the privileges and the prerogatives of the Security Council and the largely advisory role of the troop-contributing countries, and it did not seek to limit the scope of the Council to address any issue before it. The effect of the proposal would be to

increase, rather than to diminish, the Secretariat's ability to plan and implement peacekeeping operations.

14. His delegation had welcomed Security Council resolution 1327 (2000), which had called for the strengthening of cooperation with troop-contributing countries. Resolution 1353 (2001), though a step in the right direction, did not go far enough. Troop-contributing countries wished to participate fully in all matters pertaining to the operational role of their troops in peacekeeping missions. Pakistan, as a country that had lost its servicemen in the line of duty in peacekeeping operations, knew what it meant to put its soldiers in harm's way. As a country that had seen peacekeeping operations fail because of advice not taken, it also knew the price that innocent people had to pay.

15. His delegation appreciated the efforts of the majority of the members of the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations to improve cooperation with troop-contributing countries and looked forward to working with the Council and the Secretariat to strengthen mutual cooperation.

16. **Mr. Dauth** (Australia) said that the events of 11 September 2001 had served as a reminder that the struggle for peace and security remained central to the work of the United Nations. In pursuing that objective, it was vital that the Organization should have the ability to mount responsive, well-planned and well-executed peacekeeping operations. His delegation therefore welcomed the efforts of the Secretariat to implement the recommendations of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations and the subsequent recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations in a timely and effective manner. There was a need to continue strengthening the planning, management and mission-support functions in DPKO and to pursue efforts to ensure that communication and coordination between the field and Headquarters were as good as they could be. Logistical support for peacekeeping operations should be continuously improved. The establishment of Integrated Mission Task Forces should become a standard response to complex crises, and such task forces should work in a transparent and open way. The deployment of peacekeepers should be genuinely rapid and effective in order to maximize the benefits that early insertion of forces could bring. Everything possible should be done to ensure the safety of peacekeepers and associated personnel.

17. There was a need to continue improving the quality of consultation between the Security Council, troop-contributing countries and the Secretariat. With the implementation of resolution 1353 (2001), significant improvements had been made, while the habits of consultation that had developed in connection with the peacekeeping operation in East Timor were worthy of emulation. As further improvements were made, it would be important to ensure that consultation processes were streamlined: mechanisms that created barriers to quick, effective responses to crises would be a backward step.

18. Peacekeeping was only one of a range of responses to threats to peace and security. The necessary and justified response in self-defence to the appalling attacks of 11 September 2001 was a reminder of the need for States to remain vigilant and to be prepared to respond firmly. At the same time, it was necessary for the international community to be more proactive in addressing the roots of conflict and to work harder to stop conflicts at the earliest opportunity.

19. Peacekeeping could only be fully effective if it was part of a comprehensive strategy that also encompassed disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants (DDR), as well as reconciliation and institutional and economic development. No matter how good a peacekeeping operation was, the task was not complete until functioning institutions able to cope with political and developmental challenges had been established.

20. Lastly, he stressed the need for coherence in implementing the recommendations of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations and the subsequent recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. It was necessary for delegations to work as cooperatively and effectively on the financial and resource aspects as they had on setting reform goals and priorities. Among those, he wished to emphasize the need to establish policy-support capacities in the Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit in relation to DDR, humanitarian affairs, and gender and peacekeeping.

*The meeting was suspended at 3.25 p.m. and resumed at 5 p.m.*

21. **Mr. Are** (Nigeria) said that his delegation wished to associate itself with the statement made by the representative of Jordan on behalf of the Non-Aligned

Movement. There was a need to adapt traditional peacekeeping strategies in the light of the new threats to international peace and security posed by terrorism and the use of biological and other weapons of mass destruction. The situation also called for prompt action by the Security Council to adopt resolutions providing United Nations peacekeeping missions with clear and robust mandates. In addition, those missions must have the necessary resources to realize the objectives set.

22. At the same time, it was essential that, even in the face of new threats, the time-tested principles of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-intervention should be upheld. No less important were the basic principles of peacekeeping, namely, the consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force, except in self-defence. Maintaining such a balance would require consummate skill. He therefore wished to reiterate the need for restructuring of DPKO to enable it to cope with the new challenges. The recommendations of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations and the subsequent recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations provided a way forward and should be implemented expeditiously.

23. He noted with concern that the majority of the Headquarters staff of DPKO still came from only two regions and that, although developing countries contributed the bulk of United Nations peacekeepers, they were not adequately represented in the Department. Regrettably, the recruitment of new staff to fill the posts established pursuant to the recommendations of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations had done little to redress the balance. Further efforts were also needed to mainstream a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations, as called for in Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) and General Assembly resolution 55/71. He noted with appreciation, however, that DPKO had achieved an overall female representation rate of 32.1 per cent. It should now strive to achieve a 50:50 ratio.

24. Regarding the selection of mission leadership, all candidates must be considered, regardless of the existence of the on-call list. Appointments to senior positions in the field should reflect the respective level of troop contributions to the mission in question. The leadership of a mission should be appointed in sufficient time to allow for their participation in the early stages of the mission-planning process.

25. Member States must pay their assessed contributions to the peacekeeping budget on time and without conditions. In order to bridge the current commitment gap, they must make their troops available for peacekeeping operations and assist other countries willing to do so. As a major troop contributor, Nigeria was deeply concerned about the delays in reimbursement for contingent-owned equipment, which had created avoidable hardship for troop- and equipment-contributing countries and had significantly impaired their ability to participate in peacekeeping operations. In that connection, his delegation was seeking a review of the current wet-lease arrangements.

26. He welcomed the increased level of consultation between the Secretariat, the Security Council and troop-contributing countries and the cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations, particularly the Organization of African Unity. In pursuing such cooperation, however, there was a need to respect the spirit and the letter of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. With respect to the African region, cooperation should be aimed at enhancing the capacity of African countries to participate in peacekeeping operations through the provision of technical and financial assistance. In that connection, he called on Member States to contribute to the Organization of African Unity/African Union (OAU/AU) peace fund. United Nations assistance, too, would be invaluable in enhancing the institutional capacity of OAU/AU and, in particular, of its mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution.

27. The safety and welfare of United Nations peacekeepers was of major concern to his delegation. It therefore supported pre-deployment training and immunization of mission personnel. It looked forward to the Secretary-General's proposal regarding the reimbursement of troop contributors who undertook to vaccinate their troops before their arrival in the mission area. The development of a standard vaccination package and the identification of mission-specific vaccines would further enhance the safety of both military and civilian personnel of peacekeeping operations.

28. It was unacceptable that, while the majority of peacekeeping missions were located in developing countries and those countries were major troop contributors, procurement contracts were generally awarded to companies in developed countries, even

when goods could be procured locally. There was thus an urgent need for a review of procurement procedures. The awarding of contracts to companies from mission areas would strengthen identification with and support for peacekeeping troops in those areas.

29. Lastly, it was clear that, in order to have successful peacekeeping operations, there was a need for an effective and properly focused DPKO. The Department must have effective lessons-learned and best practices capabilities, an efficient operational structure and enhanced capacity to respond promptly to operational exigencies.

30. **Mr. Pitso** (Botswana) said that his delegation attached special importance to the item under consideration. Peacekeeping was one of the core functions of the United Nations, and the maintenance of peace and security was one of the eight priority areas identified in the Organization's Medium-Term Plan. The work of DPKO was imperative in achieving the objective of peace and security in a world of continuing conflict. Despite a decline in the number of conflicts and an increase in the number of peacekeeping operations, civilians, women, children and humanitarian workers had become more vulnerable in conflict situations, and in some cases mutilation and rape were being used as instruments of terror and control. Such threats were compelling reasons for the international community to react strongly.

31. In conflict situations, where the most basic principles of humanity were eroded, no functioning institutions were in place to ensure the smooth conduct of affairs. Thus, human rights violations and the destabilization of economies had a severe impact on social and economic development. Therefore the management of conflict areas was a complex process that required closer coordination and assistance from departments and agencies of the United Nations besides DPKO. Such cooperation needed to emerge between all actors involved in disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, electoral assistance and the promotion of reconciliation, in order to support efforts to build a sustainable peace.

32. It had been encouraging to learn from the statement of the Under-Secretary-General of the implementation of the first stage of the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305-S/2000/809). He welcomed the fact that of the 93 posts recommended in the report 88 appointments had been

made and expressed satisfaction with the efforts to improve gender balance at all levels of DPKO, which had resulted in an overall representation rate of 32 per cent for female professional staff. His Government hoped that the ongoing discussions in the Fifth Committee would culminate in the launching of the next phase in the implementation of the recommendations of the Panel. It also hoped that the recommendation of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) to add 92 posts to the staff of DPKO would be approved by the General Assembly, for that would mean that, for the first time, DPKO would have a capability to build managerial capacities. The Secretary-General's report on the implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/977) confirmed the need to enhance the manner in which the Organization planned, deployed, conducted and supported peacekeeping operations, as well as the need to strengthen management practices within DPKO. He fully agreed with the Under-Secretary-General on the necessity of ensuring rapid deployment, since it not only averted human catastrophes but helped save resources in the long term.

33. **Mr. Monjane** (Mozambique), said that the report of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (A/55/305-S/2000/809) would make a decisive contribution to enhancing the credibility of United Nations peacekeeping operations. He also expressed his full support for the statement made by the Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement. Conflicts still affected millions of people in many regions of the world, particularly in Africa. Their increasingly complex nature meant that the traditional peacekeeping mandate of monitoring and reporting needed to be replaced by operations with a broader scope. For the United Nations to continue to maintain peace and security in an effective manner, DPKO required assistance to enhance its management, strategic planning and policy development structures, as well as its capacity for rapid deployment. In that regard, his delegation appreciated the efforts of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping, and supported its establishment of an open-ended working group to examine the recommendations of the Panel.

34. Peacekeeping operations could not be a substitute for addressing the root causes of conflict. Efforts should be directed towards preventive measures designed to combat, inter alia, poverty, hunger, epidemic diseases and underdevelopment. He called upon all major international financial and economic institutions and other development partners to reinvigorate their commitments to eradicate poverty, eliminate foreign debt, increase levels of foreign direct investment and development assistance and allow market access to products from developing countries. In that way, all international and national actors would be encouraged to work together in a spirit of peace and dialogue, creating the conditions for a culture of prevention to replace the prevailing culture of reaction. Sound strategies for conflict management and resolution were equally important, and the recommendations of the Panel's report were particularly useful in that regard. It was encouraging to note that, on the basis of the report of ACABQ (A/55/676), the General Assembly, in resolution 55/238, had authorized additional resources under the support account for peacekeeping. Moreover, in view of the need for rapid and timely deployment of peacekeeping forces on the ground, identified in the Panel's report, his delegation urged the need to address the problem of double standards when tackling conflicts in different regions, with particular reference to Africa. Peacekeeping missions must be provided with adequate mandates and the required levels of human, material, financial and political support. The successful implementation of the recommendations of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, as well as those of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping, would require a closer sense of partnership, besides a significant display of political will, from all Member States. He welcomed the development of cooperation between the Security Council, the Secretariat and troop-contributing countries, and called for those countries to be involved more fully in the strategic planning of future peacekeeping missions.

35. In an effort to bring stability to the continent, African countries had pursued their attempts to develop their own capacity for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. To that end, the first meeting of the African Ministerial Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa, held in Abuja, Nigeria, in May 2000, had proposed a Plan of Action and an Implementation Mechanism. The Southern African Development Community, which his

country was currently chairing, was also seeking more effective ways of meeting its preventive action and peacekeeping objectives. Mozambique, which had recently emerged from the scourge of war, was engaged in the peace-building process, including activities relating to disarmament, demining, demobilization and the reintegration of former combatants. A project to limit the spread of small arms had been successfully carried out as a result of a partnership of Government, non-governmental organizations and religious organizations. That and other initiatives currently under way were an indication of his country's commitment to lasting peace and development.

36. **Mr. Kasoulides** (Cyprus) said that, as an associate State of the European Union, his country had aligned itself with the statement made by the representative of Belgium on behalf of the Union. His additional comments would be restricted to matters connected with Cyprus' unique perspective as a host country to a long-standing United Nations peacekeeping operation, the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). As the latest dramatic events unfolded in Afghanistan, there was no doubt that peacekeeping operations had taken on a new dimension, becoming crucial instruments in peacemaking and post-conflict peace-building. The comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects was therefore particularly welcome. Regrettably, his country continued to constitute a very relevant case in assessing the merits of peacekeeping and demonstrating the need to combine peacemaking and peace-building to avoid stalemate and stagnation.

37. UNFICYP had been established in 1964 following the first attempt by Turkey to interfere in Cyprus. Hopes that a mandate of three months would be sufficient to resolve the problem had proved unfounded, and the 1974 invasion by Turkey had forced UNFICYP to make significant readjustments. Its mandate now included humanitarian issues and the alleviation of human suffering that resulted from the continuing military occupation of part of the island. The finding of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations that United Nations peacekeeping forces "must be prepared to confront the lingering forces of war and violence, with the ability and determination to defeat them" had particular relevance for the situation in his country. UNFICYP had failed to receive the necessary mandate and backing to prevent 27 years of

continuing occupation. The latest threatening statements from the Prime Minister of Turkey, and the Turkish refusal to resume negotiations at the request of the Secretary-General, did not bode well for the prospects for peace. His delegation hoped that the Turkish negotiators, and in particular their leader, Mr. Denktash, would approach the forthcoming meeting with the Cypriot President, Mr. Clerides, in a spirit which might enable a fair and lasting settlement to be found, in accordance with the parameters of Security Council resolutions, international law, human rights and the *acquis communautaire*.

38. He drew attention to the Panel's finding that "no failure did more to damage the standing credibility of United Nations peacekeeping in the 1990s than its reluctance to distinguish victim from aggressor". Security Council resolutions 1331 (2000) and 1354 (2001) had recognized the fact that advances by Turkish forces constituted a violation of the military status quo. However, the refusal of the Turkish authorities to conform to those resolutions demonstrated the inability of UNFICYP to intervene on the ground in an effective manner.

39. Effective peacekeeping operations must rest on a sure and stable financial footing. His delegation reiterated the need for the prompt payment of contributions, without the attachment of conditions. He recalled that the Government of Cyprus voluntarily contributed one third of the cost of financing UNFICYP, as well as providing many facilities and services on the ground. As a further reflection of its commitment to United Nations peacekeeping, Cyprus also contributed around 30 per cent more than its assessed contribution to peacekeeping operations in general. He expressed his Government's gratitude for the contributions of other Member States to UNFICYP, and for their lasting support of the Force in its task of maintaining peace on the island. Nevertheless, it was time to move forward with the process of peace-building, and to transform UNFICYP from a deterrent into an instrument of healing.

40. **Mr. Yap** (Singapore) said that the context in which United Nations peacekeeping operations took place was evolving rapidly towards an increasing number of intra-State conflicts, the origins of which were very different from those of inter-State wars. The growing complexity of those conflicts meant that peace was more difficult to attain and that, when attained, it was fragile and difficult to sustain. Failure to develop

new strategies to deal with such scenarios could lead to a repetition of some of the glaring failures of the previous decade, including Somalia and Haiti. Three points needed to be addressed: the value of deploying robust and credible peacekeeping forces; the importance of peace-building and the financing of such efforts; and, lastly, the importance of avoiding premature withdrawal from a peacekeeping operation.

41. The current situation in Afghanistan presented unique challenges. Notwithstanding their retreat, elements of the Taliban and al Qa'idah would continue to remain in the area. As attempts were made by the United Nations to establish a broad-based, multi-ethnic, fully representative transitional administration, the need to deploy some form of multinational force in Afghanistan had become more urgent. Such a peace enforcement mission must be prepared to face a potentially hostile environment, against a background of humanitarian crisis. Some useful lessons could be learnt from experiences in East Timor. The success of the International Force in East Timor and the subsequent establishment of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) highlighted the importance of deploying a robust and credible force to act as a strong deterrent, especially in potentially hostile territory. Equally, the rules of engagement of the mission were simplified and strengthened, which allowed for decisive action when any threat arose.

42. Nevertheless, more thought and analysis were required to respond to dilemmas such as whether the use of force was consistent with the "principle of content" and whether operations that differentiated between aggressors and victims were compatible with humanitarian law. The East Timor experience provided a successful example that could lead to a more complete solution whereas, in contrast, the inability of peacekeepers to protect themselves or those under their charge in Lebanon, Rwanda and Congo had led to the subsequent tragedies there.

43. A growing problem in peacekeeping operations over the past decade had been the unhealthy division of labour between developed countries, which provided finances, and developing countries, which provided the troops. The Permanent Representative of Namibia had made precisely that point in his statement to the General Assembly on "The Follow-up to the Outcome of the Millennium Summit", and one scholar had said in private that the situation amounted to "peacekeeping

apartheid". Although the use of that term was not fully defensible, it drew attention to a clearly untenable situation if a tradition of shared responsibility was to be developed. Efforts should also be made to avoid the troubling trend of a reliance on regional arrangements or countries from particular regions to carry out peacekeeping operations. That practice risked undermining the whole concept of "collective security" on which the Charter was based, and could even lead to manifest injustice. While affluent regions such as Europe could afford to deploy a large number of troops for a peacekeeping mission, other regions only had the capacity for inadequate forces. The United Nations had been created to ensure that rich and poor regions were treated fairly and equitably. While some regional peacekeeping efforts had been relatively successful, it was imperative that they should be carried out in accordance with the principles of the Charter, in close cooperation with the United Nations and under the supervision of the Security Council. In essence, the United Nations must retain primary responsibility for the preservation of international peace and security.

44. While the causes of intra-State conflicts were varied, a common theme was the absence of a satisfactory framework for national participation. Consequently, political or economic grievances had few outlets for expression, leading eventually into civil conflict. Any peacekeeping strategy to bring lasting peace to such situations could not avoid addressing the root cause of conflict. Integrating peace-building components into a peacekeeping mission was therefore a critical part of the strategy to deal with such intra-State conflicts. That included the strengthening of State institutions, the growth of political participation and promotion of the rule of law, as well as judicial reform, the creation of a credible police force, disarmament, demobilization and the reintegration of combatants. The role of the local population was central to those processes, although United Nations involvement was critical in facilitating that role. Operations should aspire to build sustainable peace and development, which prevented the recurrence of conflicts.

45. Some Security Council members had called for the delineation of responsibilities between the Security Council and the General Assembly and for the latter to be fully responsible for some peace-building activities. Some members, at times, wanted to make a fundamental distinction between peace-building and nation-building activities, with the latter being within



the ambit of the General Assembly. However, such a distinction was not always clear in peacekeeping operations, for instance in Timor and Kosovo. Independence should not determine when a peace-building activity became a nation-building one. Peace-building was a necessary post-conflict (or post-independence) activity, and core activities which helped a country from regressing into yet another conflict should be considered part of the peace-building effort. Furthermore, the General Assembly was not an operational body, and its resolutions were non-binding. Several key Member States were insisting that there should be zero nominal growth for the regular budget. Coordination between the Security Council and the General Assembly was essential. Currently, assessed funding from the peacekeeping budget must continue to finance crucial peace-building activities. The Secretary-General had noted that it was the weak link of voluntary funding to support programmes which were not part of the peacekeeping operation per se but on which the ultimate success of the mission might depend. Such contributions often materialized late or not at all. That could impede a mission just when success appeared within reach. For example, in East Timor, it was regrettable that there was waning interest in establishing a follow-up mission now that the romance of independence had passed. Progress must not be undone by a premature withdrawal of a United Nations presence, for any subsequent efforts to rectify the situation would be costly and more difficult. It was important to apply the lessons of the past. Drawing attention to a series of conferences on peacekeeping that had recently been held in his country, he reaffirmed Singapore's strong commitment to United Nations peacekeeping.

46. **Mr. Osei** (Ghana) said that his delegation shared the views expressed by the representative of Jordan on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement. In recent years, United Nations peacekeeping operations had come under greater scrutiny as the Organization's resources had been stretched to cope with evolving new dimensions of international peacekeeping. The new demands had led to an urgent examination of the institutional mechanisms for the effective and efficient management of peacekeeping operations. His delegation welcomed the comprehensive report by the Secretary-General on the progress made in the implementation of the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/502). The review by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of its

structural processes and procedures augured well for the effective management of peace operations. The five strategic goals that had been identified to underpin the reform efforts were basic to the Department's ability to perform its role as the Organization's main institutional support for managing peace operations.

47. The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its working group had played a valuable role in assisting the General Assembly to review various aspects of international peacekeeping.

48. Under the Charter, primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security was borne by the Security Council. However, as recent experience had demonstrated, there had been serious flaws in the Council's decision-making process on mandates for peacekeeping which justified a closer examination of existing practices and processes which were no longer adequate to cater for complex operations.

49. The overall objective of the mandate of a peacekeeping mission should be to ensure that the peacekeepers could carry out their tasks professionally and successfully. In order to enable the Council to have the benefit of the best advice in defining the mandates for peacekeeping operations it was essential to strengthen the partnership between the Security Council, troop contributors and the Secretariat. Member States that had committed troops to an operation should be invited to consult with the members of the Security Council during the formulation of the mandate, a process that might be institutionalized through the establishment of an ad hoc subsidiary organ of the Council as provided for in Article 29 of the Charter. The Council itself, in its resolution 1353 (2001), had emphasized that consultations between itself, the Secretariat and troop-contributing countries should enhance the ability of the Council to make appropriate, effective and timely decisions in fulfilling its responsibilities.

50. In that context, a number of troop-contributing countries, including his own, had submitted proposals to the Council outlining mechanisms for strengthening that tripartite partnership. His delegation commended the open-mindedness on many of the proposals that had been displayed by many members of the Council in the Council's working group on peacekeeping, and looked forward to further constructive engagement on that matter.

51. The impression had been created earlier that day by the statement made to the Committee by one permanent member of the Council that the proposals that had been made to the working group by some major troop-contributing countries were to the exclusion of smaller troop-contributing countries, or to the exclusion of nations that provided other forms of support. His delegation wished to correct that impression and to point out that clarifications had been provided to the Security Council working group on related issues which had been raised by some members of the Council, including the representative of the permanent member of the Council to which he had referred. The purpose of the proposals was to ask for mechanisms that would identify and meet the concerns of troop contributors. That process had been endorsed by the Council itself in its resolution 1353 (2001) which envisaged various forms of consultation, both formal and informal; what his delegation had proposed was a form of consultation that did not in any way exclude consultation by smaller troop contributors. The President of the Council had underscored the need to foster a spirit of partnership, cooperation, confidence and mutual trust between the Secretariat, troop contributors and the Council. The only way of ensuring the safety of peacekeepers and other United Nations personnel in the field, and the successful implementation of peacekeeping operations, was to create an environment in which cooperation between the parties concerned could be nurtured.

52. In conclusion, he reiterated his delegation's continued commitment to United Nations peacekeeping operations and looked forward to continuing the dialogue with the Council on how best to enhance and formalize the process of consultations.

53. **Ms. Thomas** (Jamaica) said that her delegation associated itself with the statement made by the representative of Jordan on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and fully subscribed to the recommendations made in the report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (A/55/1024).

54. During the period of almost two years since the election of her country as a member of the Security Council, it had become keenly aware of the critical need for the reform of United Nations peacekeeping. The success of peacekeeping operations depended on the will of the parties involved, realistic mandates based on a well-understood and common overall strategy and the readiness to support those mandates

through the provision of appropriate human and material resources.

55. Since the adoption the previous year of the report of the Panel on United Nations peace operations (A/55/305-S/2000/809) United Nations peacekeeping had entered a new phase of reform, a process in which her delegation had been actively involved both through the Security Council working group on peacekeeping operations and through the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.

56. Her delegation took note of the five strategic goals that would underpin the ongoing reform of DPKO, namely reforming the Department's management culture, reorienting its relationship with field missions, enhancing its rapid and effective deployment capabilities and strengthening its relationship with Member States and with other parts of the United Nations system, and looked forward to working with the Department to further those goals. Her delegation welcomed the fact that over the past year more focused attention had been given to improving the management of peacekeeping operations, beginning with the recruitment of additional staff for the Department but pointed out that close attention should be paid to ensuring regional balance within the Department, especially among developing countries.

57. Her delegation appreciated the positive steps that had been taken to improve gender balance in the Department but remained convinced of the need to mainstream a gender perspective in peacekeeping operations. While welcoming some positive steps taken by the Department to include a gender perspective in the field as well as at Headquarters, her delegation considered that more should be done to implement the provisions of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security. It was disappointing that the recommendation of the Secretary-General to appoint gender experts in the Best Practices Unit of the DPKO had not been approved by ACABQ. It was to be hoped that further discussion, in particular in the Fifth Committee, would provide a workable solution in that connection.

58. The success of United Nations peacekeeping operations could be greatly enhanced by strengthening cooperation between troop-contributing countries, the Security Council and the Secretariat as outlined in Security Council resolution 1353 (2001). Since the

adoption of that resolution, some positive steps had been taken by the Council to give effect to a more transparent relationship between the three parties involved. The resulting consultations, which had provided a basis for input from the troop-contributing countries, had proved productive and should be continued.

59. The ability of the United Nations to deploy rapidly to areas of conflict was one of the measures of the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations. Unfortunately, the required level of readiness had not yet been achieved and the political will of Member States, particularly those with the capability to provide troops, was therefore critical to bridging the commitment gap which was so evident in United Nations peacekeeping. The proposals made by the Secretary-General in his report on the implementation of the report of the Panel on United Nations peace operations (A/55/502) were therefore to be welcomed.

60. In reforming United Nations peacekeeping operations, the need for support at the field level in the formulation and implementation of coherent peace-building, and for effective strategies for conflict prevention and post-conflict peace-building should be borne in mind. In that connection, her delegation believed that effective coordination between all components of the United Nations system, as well as the Bretton Woods institutions, was therefore critical; the inclusion of those elements in peacekeeping mandates had, indeed, been recognized as essential for an appropriate exit strategy in peacekeeping operations.

61. **Mr. Heller** (Observer for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)) said that during the past year the United Nations had continued to carry out operations to contribute to peace and security throughout the world in sometimes difficult conditions, and peacekeeping forces had endeavoured to carry out tasks such as supervision of ceasefire agreements, maintaining order and peace-building. ICRC had frequently engaged in dialogue with members of United Nations missions in the interest of effective collaboration on behalf of the victims of violence.

62. At the operational level, such cooperation has taken the form of direct bilateral talks with those responsible for the United Nations peacekeepers. For example, ICRC had provided legal and practical support to the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and

Eritrea in connection with the recovery of the remains of soldiers who had been killed between the front lines, and it had also acted as a neutral intermediary for the repatriation of prisoners of war and civilians across the border zone.

63. In East Timor, cooperation had enabled ICRC to take over the central hospital at Dili before the transfer of that responsibility to UNTAET.

64. While constructive dialogue was necessary, it must, in order to be effective, respect the fundamental differences between political-military initiatives and humanitarian action. The mission of ICRC depended on the consent of all parties involved, and it was therefore essential that it should be clearly perceived as a neutral, independent and strictly impartial entity in relation to the victims of violence. Otherwise, the safety of its staff and its access to populations in need was likely to be seriously compromised.

65. Cooperation between the United Nations and ICRC had largely developed in order to promote respect for international humanitarian law. That was particularly important since United Nations operations were sometimes deployed in countries beset by conflict and United Nations troops had on occasion been involved in armed conflict. In order to ensure that the rules of international humanitarian law were well known and scrupulously respected, ICRC had arranged a number of briefing sessions on humanitarian law for peacekeeping troops prior to their departure or once they were already deployed in the field. Such seminars had frequently been repeated when that was necessitated by the rotation of troop contingents.

66. ICRC delegates would also be taking part in the new training project devised by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research and DPKO on the needs of women and children affected by armed conflicts.

67. Such meetings provided an opportunity to recall the basic rules of humanitarian law and to explain the fundamental principles of ICRC action: humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence. They also afforded a means of giving publicity to the mandate and activities of national Red Cross or Red Crescent societies which existed in almost all the countries in which United Nations forces were deployed.

68. In conclusion, he said that ICRC had been very pleased to be invited to comment on the draft sample rules of engagement and hoped to be able to contribute to greater respect for humanitarian law in the future.

69. **Mr. Bozay** (Turkey), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that he totally rejected the references to his country and its authorities made earlier by the representative of Cyprus, which he regarded as yet another attempt to distort the realities of the situation in Cyprus. A formal reply to the delegation of Cyprus would be made in due course by the representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. He pointed out that UNFICYP had been set up in 1964 following attacks on Turkish Cypriots by Greek Cypriots, a fact that was amply documented in United Nations records.

70. **Mr. Christofides** (Cyprus), speaking in exercise of the right of reply and referring to the events of 1963, said that the opinion of the Secretary-General at that time had been that the policy of the Turkish Cypriot leaders was to avoid situations in which members of the two communities would have to work and live together and that, as the Turkish Cypriot leadership was committed to a physical and geographical separation of the communities as a political goal, it was unlikely to encourage activities by Turkish Cypriots which might be interpreted as demonstrating the merits of a policy of integration.

71. He pointed out that the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was an illegal entity created by Turkey to further its expansionist aims in Cyprus and that its creation of which had been strongly condemned by the Security Council in its resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984). Turkey was the only country that had recognized the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The repeated practice of Turkey of circulating letters from the representative of the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as United Nations documents was an abuse of Turkey's prerogative as a member of the United Nations and a violation of those resolutions. The fact that Turkey continued its military occupation of part of Cyprus in flagrant violation of international law and of a large number of resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council did not create rights. There was only one State in Cyprus, the Republic of Cyprus, which was recognized by all Members of the United Nations. Turkey would do well to heed the call of the international community and of the United Nations and

accept that fact, withdraw its occupation forces from the territory of Cyprus and allow its people, both Turkish and Greek Cypriots, to live in peace and prosperity.

*The meeting rose at 6.20 p.m.*