

United Nations Oral History Project

**F.T. Liu
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YUN TAPE
F.T. LIU
MARCH 23, 1990
AT HIS HOME IN BRONXVILLE, N.Y.
INTERVIEWER: SUTTERLIN

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Table of Contents

The Congo Crisis

Initial UN contacts	1-8
Lumumba-Kasavubu rift	8
Attitudes of Western powers	9-10
Bunche-Hammarskjold link	10-12
The arrival of ONUC	13-15
Hammarskjold's use of article 99 of the charter	15-16
Actions of Soviet Ambassador	16-17
Withdrawal of Belgian forces	17-19
First and second Hammarskjold visits	20-26
Andrew Cordier as Acting Special Representative	26-38
The constitutional crisis	29-34
ONUC sources of information	34-35
UN protection of Lumumba	35-36; 41-44; 50-51
Advisory Committee on the Congo	39
Westers suspicions of Dayal	40-41
Attitude of Kennedy Administration	45-46
UN effectiveness	46-47; 57-60
Hammarskjold's objectives in Katanga	47; 55-57
Functioning of conciliation commission	49
Changes in staff	52-54
Stanleyville regime	60-61



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68 f

UN contacts with Mobutu and Adoula

62-63

U Thant's policy

63-64



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JSS Mr. Liu, just for the record I would like to ask you first if you would indicate what your position was when the Congo became independent and subsequently, when the UN operations took place there?

Liu Yes, I was at that time an officer in the trusteeship Department. When the Secretary-General's office was preparing a mission to the Congo, the mission of the personal representative of the Secretary-General, Ralph Bunche, Bunche called me and asked me to accompany him. So I was transferred then to Bunche's office and then after that I remained in that office. So at the time of the Congo operation I was still officially with the Trusteeship Department but I assumed the function of special assistant to Ralph Bunche.

JSS And you accompanied Mr. Bunche then to the Congo before independence, right? Was the purpose to make a kind of survey?

Liu That's right. When Belgian government announced its decision to grant independence to the Congo, and that was in January 1960, Dag Hammarskjold was surprised and worried because he knew that the Congo was not ready for independence and he saw many problems because of this

lack of preparation. So he decided to send his most trusted collaborator, Ralph Bunche, as his personal representative for the independence ceremony. And he asked Bunche to set up after independence a large bureau of technical assistance in order to help the new Congolese government.

JSS At that point did Mr. Bunche and you already have contact with the new leaders of the Congo, or not?

Liu Some contact, yea. We arrived in Leopoldville on the 25th of August. On that day there was still no Congolese government. The Congolese representatives were elected, but there was a split among the leadership, mainly between the two main leaders - Kasavubu and Lumumba. So there were intense negotiations during these days in order to reach an agreement. Finally the agreement was reached on the 26th of August whereby Kasavubu would be made President of the republic and Lumumba would assume the post of Prime Minister. When this was done, Bunche was in contact with Bomboko who was slated to be foreign minister and Thomas Kanza who was to be appointed as the minister for UN affairs. During this period of 5 days, between Bunche's arrival and the Congo independence, we were mainly in contact with the Belgian authorities - namely the Belgian ambassador, who had a special position, he was to be a member of the Congolese cabinet under the treaty which was to be concluded between the

Congo and Belgium, the treaty of assistance and of friendship and cooperation. During this period we were mainly in contact with Bomboko and Kanza, we saw Kasavubu and Lumumba only briefly during the ceremony. but we were later to see them much more, after independence day.

JSS What was the attitude of the Belgian ambassador at that point - he was going to be a member of the cabinet, was he looking forward to UN assistance also?

Liu Oh yes, oh yes. the Belgian government and the Belgian ambassador in particular, Ambassador Borch? was looking forward to cooperating with the UN because they also knew that the new Congo government would need a lot of assistance. Belgium under the treaty of friendship was giving a lot of assistance in terms of personnel, technicians, experts, and money - financial aid - but they wanted the UN the help also.

JSS So at that point there was a congenial relationship. I believe that you had made a stop in Brussels before...

Liu That's right, before arriving in Leopoldville we stopped for half a day in Brussels where we saw the two Belgian ministers in charge of the Congo and we discussed at some length with them about the Congolese problem. Perhaps here I could mention an episode which is quite interesting. Mr. Raymond Chevenne, who was the minister for economic affairs concerning the Congo, gave to us the six main problems which the Congo government must face.

JSS This was in Brussels?

Liu That's right, in Brussels. One was of course the new Congolese army which would be led by a Belgian general; another one is the financial aid, I think the Belgian government was going to give them at the beginning an aid of 2 billion Belgian francs. Then we noted that for the sixth question he mentioned use of the Flemish language, together with the French language in the radio stations and we thought that very strange - that this should be considered as one of the major problems for the new Congo government.

JSS In a sense that was transferring the Belgian problem to the Congo - that's interesting. But that never happened.

Liu That never happened.

JSS Did anyone in the Congo speak Flemish?

Liu No but they hated the Flemish, much more than the Vallons, the French-speaking Belgians.

JSS Why?

Liu I don't know why. Probably they were more active, they were more Flemish businessmen in the Congo.

JSS With independence, I assume that Ralph Bunche and you had rather direct contact with the new leaders of the government.

Liu That's right. In fact two days after independence a long meeting was arranged between Bunche and Lumumba during which Lumumba immediately raised the question of

technical assistance. In particular, Belgium at that time proposed a big project for the Angar Dam because there is a big waterfall south of Leopoldville, there was a project of building a dam and a huge hydroelectric power plant, an aluminum plant. The plan was given to Lumumba but he had some misgivings, he didn't want Belgium to take too much control of this, and he wanted the UN to advise him. And we discussed many other problems. Now here, during that meeting which was extremely important, we realized for the first time, that Lumumba was perhaps not quite ready for the important function, the very important function, of Prime Minister. We were sitting at the conference table in his office, a huge office with a long table. He was the end of the table, Bunche was sitting next to him on the left side, and I was sitting next to Bunche. Suddenly the telephone rang, the telephone was on his desk about 20 yards behind. He said, "Excusez-moi, excusez." He would get up, go to the telephone and they would say, "Qui est la?" (Who's there?) And then he'd say, "Oh no, my femme n'est pas ici. Téléphonez plus tard." (My wife is not here, please call later.) Then he would come to us, and apologize, and resume the conversation. And that happened twice during that very important discussion.

One other time, much later, after the mutiny and when relations with the Belgian representatives soured,

we suddenly received an urgent message from Lumumba asking Bunche to go to his office for a very urgent meeting. So Bunche and I rushed to his office and there he announced to us (and we were sitting the same way at the table) he announced that the Congo government has decided to sever diplomatic relations with the Belgians because of the mutiny, because of the harsh treatment of the Congo government. That was a very serious decision because of the huge assistance the Belgian government was giving the Congo government. But the discussion was not on the economic or military matters, it was on the passport because Lumumba had decided to go to Europe and the United States and he needed a passport. Now that diplomatic relations had been severed, the Congo government will have to issue its own passports, and then they were discussing about the form of the passport, the logo of the Congo government which the government must choose, and in fact, he said that perhaps we should have the lion - the lion is the symbol of power and independence. But then Gizenga, who was called to join us, said, "Oh no, no, no we can't have the lion because the Belgians have the lion." You know, all this seemed to come rather surprisingly and showed that the Congolese leaders were really not ready for independence.

JSS

Did you have any similar meetings with Kasavubu?

Liu

With Kasavubu, yes. We had the meeting later on, later

on you see when we went to Katanga. We tried to arrange for the deployment of UN troops in Katanga. So Bunche met Tshombe first, during the very first trip that was on the 4th of August 1960, and Dag Hammarskjöld met Tshombe later, eight days later, when he himself went there in order to bring about the introduction of the UN troops in Katanga. Now Tshombe gives a different impression. He also was not ready for leadership but he was smoother in his approach. He smiled, he says "no", but he says "no" in smiling whereas Lumumba will say "no" with a very stern face. But like Lumumba he was not ready for the important function of leader in an independent country.

JSS What about Kasavubu?

Liu Kasavubu was, again, different. He doesn't say much, in fact he was like a Buddha, in fact he looked like a Buddha, they even say that he was half Chinese. You know there were some Chinese workers for the railroad which went there early in the century and rumors had it that Kasavubu had some Chinese blood. Anyway, he doesn't talk much so it's very difficult to say whether he knows much but doesn't want to say anything, or he doesn't know anything and therefore he remains silent.

JSS And the other member of the team, so to speak, was Gizenga? What was he like?

Liu Well we didn't see much of Gizenga because he was really following Lumumba. He was a deputy prime minister, but

was really deputy to Lumumba. We understood that he was much more, more to the left than Lumumba himself.

JSS And Thomas Kanza who was, as you have said, the minister for the UN liaison, he was associated with Lumumba or with Kasavubu?

Liu Now, Thomas Kanza and Bomkoko were the only two university graduates of the government. He and Bomkoko were more knowledgeable about political affairs. That was our impression. Kanza immediately came to us, he stayed with us quite often. He was a Lumumbist, in fact he has always been a supporter of Lumumba and he remained faithful to Lumumba after the split of Lumumba with Kasavubu.

JSS Now, things developed very quickly in the Congo at this point, the rift came very quickly between Kasavubu and Lumumba, really. Had you anticipated this? Had you had any indication in advance that the combination was not going to work?

Liu Oh yes. From the very beginning. First the agreement reached on the 26 of August was reached after many long and difficult discussions. It was an uneasy alliance, they were never close together. Very soon when we had our first problem with Lumumba, Kasavubu took a different stand and he has, several times, criticized the position of Lumumba and when Lumumba requested the withdrawal of the UN troops (because he did that at one time) Kasavubu

strongly denounced the decision as irresponsible. So they were never close and they split very fast. That last split, when Kasavubu decided to dismiss Lumumba and Lumumba in turn dismissed Kasavubu, it was an almost inevitable outcome of a very long feud.

JSS And how soon was it evident was it that some of the Western countries were supporting Kasavubu?

Liu Oh yes, there's no doubt about it. Their sympathy went to Kasavubu.

JSS And that was clear from the beginning?

Liu That was clear from the beginning. In fact, there was an incident on Independence Day, during the independence ceremony which, of course, Bunche and I attended. We saw the ceremony was attended on the day by Kasavubu, the President, and Lumumba, the prime minister, and the King of Belgium, Baudouin, who came for this occasion. So Kasavubu first made a speech, a very conciliatory speech, thanking Belgium for its help and for its decision to grant Congo independence and then Lumumba rose and he made a harsh speech, fierce. He started with the history of the Congo; he recalled the very cruel way Leopold, the father of Baudouin, had treated the Congolese. They were cutting their arms sometimes when they didn't pay the tax, and so on. A very harsh speech. At one time the Belgian king, Baudouin, was about to leave the chair, we saw that very clearly, and then his advisor would talk to

him in the ear and finally he resumed the chair. So there was a lot going on during that ceremony which showed very clearly the sympathies, the views, of the main players.

JSS Now I believe the American ambassador in Leopoldville at that point was a man named Clare Timberlake and did the American and the British ambassadors, along with the Belgian ambassador, seek to influence the UN operations so to speak, or for that matter, was it evident they were seeking in some way to direct the policy of the new government?

Liu They certainly tried to influence Bunche, but Bunche being Bunche was not someone you could influence very easily. He was adamantly for the UN, his integrity is steely. They certainly tried to influence but without much success and their sympathy as I said would go to Kasavubu rather than to Lumumba.

JSS Now in these early days Dag Hammarskjold was still in New York, Ralph Bunch was in Leopoldville, was their communication quite close in these days, so that Hammarskjold knew exactly what was taking place?

Liu Oh yes, yes. Bunche reported very regularly, first by cable and later on the communication took place through telephone. Very often. In fact - again, if I may recall an episode which is quite interesting - one of the first problems we had took place before independence when Kanza

told us that they have to choose a new name for the Congo, the former Belgian Congo. They wanted to call it the Republic of the Congo but there was a problem because the neighbor north of the Congo River (which became independent a few months before) had already chosen the name of the Republic of Congo, so they had to choose something else, but they don't know what. Bunche said, "Of course, you're absolutely right. Perhaps it's better to choose something which would avoid confusion." This discussion went on for one day, one day and a half, but then the next day in the evening Kanza came to us, saying that they decided to have the Republic of Congo, even though it could lead to some confusion. But they liked the name. So Bunche cabled Hammarskjöld. It was not an important matter but Bunche always reported on anything, even the least important things, to Hammarskjöld. That was on Friday. Then the next day Bunche asked me to check downstairs, whether there was any cable from New York. I went downstairs, and the hotel said, "No, no cable." In the afternoon, Bunche asked me again to check. Again, the answer was negative. Then Sunday morning Bunche said, "Well, there must be a cable, go and check." I went to the hotel concierge. He said, "No, no, absolutely not," and Bunche said, "Why don't you go to the post office and check." It was a Sunday but there was a service there, a cable service. I went there. The

man in charge was a Belgian. He said, "No, no we didn't have anything for the UN." Then, just at that time, just when I was about to leave, a Congolese messenger came. He said, "Ah there was something, it's called 'UNations'." Now three days ago I went to the post office to register, to put our cable address which was always "Unations". So we choose "Unations, Leopoldville". That was duly registered. So the Congolese messenger said, "Oh yes, there was a cable addressed to Unations but you told me to send it to Palais des Nations, there was a confusion with Palais des Nations, Unations. So the cable went there." So we finally retrieved the cable. The cable just answered Ralph Bunche's first message saying, "Well, it's regrettable to have now the name, the same name, for two countries." That was all, but still it shows that Bunche and Hammarskjöld always informed each other, on various matters, the very important and the less important ones. And they always answer the cable.

JSS So this actually is the reason that the Congo, Leopoldville was known as that for a while, as opposed to the Congo, Brazzaville.

Liu Yes, what was decided at headquarters was to put "Congo, Brazzaville," "Congo, Leopoldville" between brackets.

JSS Now a fairly large number of troops began to arrive very quickly after the security Council passed its first

resolution authorizing the formation of ONUC and Ralph Bunche was technically the commander of the whole operation, is that right, in the beginning?

Liu

Yes, well perhaps I should go back a little because as you recall, the mutiny took place on the 4th of July. On the 5th of July - it took place in Thysville, a location south of Leopoldville - on the 5th of July it spread to Leopoldville so we had the first impact. During the night from the 5th to the 6th, the Belgian ambassador came to see Bunche and said that he had very disturbing news, the mutiny was spreading. The Congolese soldiers were attacking Belgian officers, and even worse, he's got the news that two Belgian women had been raped. He was receiving many calls from Belgian residents, asking him to call the troops, the Belgian troops, out of the camps, there were two military camps which the Congo ceded to Belgium. In those camps you have quite a number of Belgian soldiers, and the Belgian ambassador under the treaty of friendship and cooperation, had the right to call these troops to help maintain law and order. So he said, he's under great pressure to call his troops and he was considering doing it. Bunche immediately asked him whether he had an agreement of the Congolese government. The Belgian ambassador said that he had been talking to Lumumba and seeking his agreement but Lumumba adamantly refused. Bunche thereby said that in case you shouldn't

call the Belgian troops because you could only make the situation worse. You might protect some Belgian residents in the big city, but there were many Belgians in the country and their fate would be much worse, they would be more jeopardized with the Belgian intervention. The Belgian ambassador agreed. From then on, that's the 6th of July, until the 10th of July, Bunche and Hammarskjold worked very closely together to get a group of UN military observers and experts to be assigned to the Congolese government in order to control the army and help maintain law and order. In order to get this, the Secretary-General would need an official request from the Congo government and he thought that if he had the request and if the request is worded as a technical assistance of a military nature rather than military assistance, he could take action on his own initiative without going to the Security Council. So that is what we were working on. Finally on the 10th of July Bunche persuaded Kasavubu and Lumumba to send jointly an official request. Unfortunately, one day later, the Belgian government decided to send Belgian troops into the Congo...

JSS Without the permission of Lumumba?

Liu Without the permission of Lumumba. Once this is done of course we have a wholly new situation. So Hammarskjold received on the 10th a request for technical assistance

of military nature and he was working on it, he was in contact with the Tunisian government notable to get a sizable number of Tunisian officers, and also Moroccan officers, and officers from other French-speaking countries. Once the Belgian government decided on a military intervention, this was on the 11th, the Belgian troops arrived in Luluabourg and Elizabethville and shortly after the arrival of the Belgian troops in Elizabethville, Tshombe - no doubt, with the help of the Belgian troops - proclaimed the cessation of Katanga.

With this, as I said, a wholly new situation, Kasavubu and Lumumba on the 12th of July sent another request, but this time protesting the invasion of Belgian troops and requesting UN military assistance in order to bring about the withdrawal of Belgian troops and to help the Congolese government to maintain law and order. So once this happened, Hammarskjöld had to take action on the second request, discard the first request, and bring the matter to the Security Council which he did, invoking Article 99 for the first time in UN history.

JSS

Yes, I wanted to ask about that. Of course you were in the Congo at that point and not in New York, but from your knowledge, why was it necessary for Dag Hammarskjöld to invoke Article 99? Why was no other country prepared to raise the matter in the Council?

Liu

I believe that the Security Council could convene without

Article 99, but I think Dag Hammarskjöld wanted to stress the importance of this problem. He attached a lot of importance to this problem because as you know 1960 was the decolonization year. It was this year that the decolonization process started in full force, and he felt that what happened to the Congo would be extremely important - because of the timing, because the Congo had a unique strategic position and because also the Congo had very great natural resources. And therefore he wanted to do something in order to settle the problem in the Congo.

JSS So in a sense you're suggesting that Hammarskjöld did it in a way to emphasize the importance.

Liu Yes, yes, yes. And also I think there was a real importance from the viewpoint of the maintenance of international peace and security because the Congo was so important that any other power vacuum could lead to the intervention of the two superpowers. In fact, as you know, the two superpowers were very closely involved in these events in the Congo.

JSS Yes, and was that apparent in Leopoldville? I've mentioned the American ambassador and the Belgian ambassador - I'm wondering about the Russian ambassador, was he active at all at this point?

Liu Yes, he was active. We didn't see him but he was active. He was close to Lumumba and Gizenga.

JSS So unlike the American and Belgian and other Western ambassadors, the Soviet ambassador did not deal very much with the UN representatives.

Liu No, not at the time.

JSS The Secretary-General then came to the Congo shortly after this, after the Security Council resolution and could you describe the situation when he arrived in the Congo for the first time?

Liu When he arrived the situation was already tense. At the very beginning, during the first days of independence the relationship between the UN and the Congo was excellent. It was a honeymoon. When the Security Council passed the resolution and when the first UN troops - and the first troops were the Tunisians - arrived there less than 36 hours after the adoption of the Security resolution, the relations became even better. We were immediately deployed in Leopoldville and then suddenly, the situation became quiet. There were before the arrival a lot of incidents and quite a number of casualties and when the UN arrived, everything became quiet and the Congo government welcomed the UN without any misgivings, wholeheartedly. And then we immediately started to work on the withdrawal of the Belgian troops - in fact the resolution contained two main points. It requested the Belgian government to withdraw its troops as soon as possible, then it authorized the Secretary-General to

give military assistance to the Congo government to facilitate the withdrawal of the Belgian troops and to help the government to maintain law and order. The UN plans were to bring about the withdrawal of the Belgian troops by negotiations, that is the usual practice. We are not an enforcement action, we are a peace-keeping force. So immediately Bunche initiated negotiations with the Belgian ambassador in Leopoldville.

The Belgian government's position, which was stated very clearly during the Security Council debate, is that the Belgian government had no aggressive attention at all against the Congo, what they wanted was to protect Belgian nationals, and therefore if the UN force can accomplish that role, they would withdraw immediately.

So in the negotiation it was agreed that the UN was deployed in the various areas as soon as possible, and when they arrived, the Belgian troops would leave. And that would start with Leopoldville. In Leopoldville an agreement was reached, the troops arrived on the evening of the 15th of July, the Belgian troops started to withdraw on the 17th, and they completed the withdrawal on the 23rd. And the same procedure was followed everywhere else, so by the end of July, all the Belgian troops were withdrawn from the Congo except Katanga.

Now when we went, when Bunche got the agreement with the Belgians and saw Lumumba, he thought that Lumumba

would congratulate him, that Lumumba would be very pleased. But not at all - Lumumba's reply was bitter. He told Bunche, "You don't have to negotiate with the Belgians, you have to throw them out - and immediately." Naturally Bunche tried to explain what a peace-keeping operation was but we realized that Lumumba had not a clue of what the UN was, what it could or could not do. He thought that since the Security Council was giving him military assistance, was sending UN troops to help his government, the troops must be at his order and do what he wants. And that was the basic misunderstanding. So from then on the relationship became tense, and as the Belgian troops took some time to withdraw, he became more and more impatient.

JSS So Mr. Bunche had made arrangements with the Belgians for the withdrawal of the Belgian forces. Mr. Lumumba was not happy, but as you were saying, the Belgian forces did for the most part withdraw, is that correct?

Liu That's right. According to the agreement reached between Belgian ambassador and Ralph Bunche the Belgian troops withdrew by stages. As soon as the UN troops arrived in a locality they would withdraw, and that process continued until the end of July when all Belgian troops had been withdrawn except from Katanga. Then we hit the crisis. The Belgians refused to withdraw further. They say that, "Well we will withdraw if you arrive in Katanga

first. Secondly, we cannot withdraw immediately because the Katangese authorities beg us to stay." On the other hand, Lumumba was taking the stand that the UN should go to Katanga by force if necessary, and not only go by force but go with the Congolese. So there we are caught between two very different positions. Thereupon Hammarskjöld decided to go to the Congo himself and direct the operation of introducing UN troops to Katanga because he thought that that was a must. He thought that the UN could not interfere in an internal problem, which was the secession, but what the UN could do was to eliminate the Belgian interference and once the external influence had been eliminated, then the Congolese could achieve a national reconciliation. That was the way he believed the Katangese secession should be resolved. So at the beginning of August he arrived in Leopoldville, and after detailed discussion with Bunche decided to send Bunche there as a vanguard for the later arrival of the UN troops. Bunche's mission was to get from Tshombe an agreement to let the UN troops deploy in Katanga. Secondly to advise the Secretary-General whether the UN troops should be sent right away or at a somewhat later date. So on the 4th of August, Bunche went to Katanga and I accompanied him. We saw a show of force in Katanga. Tshombe was deploying his gendarmes everywhere and he told Bunche in very adamant terms that if the UN

should send troops to Katanga there would be fight and a bloodbath. Bunche also saw the regional chiefs, the tribal chiefs, in Katanga and the Belgian authorities and after thinking over for the whole night, he decided to recommend to Hammarskjold to delay the arrival of the UN troops. So he went immediately back to Leopoldville and Hammarskjold decided to return to New York to get from the Security Council a stronger mandate and then come back to achieve the deployment of UN troops in Katanga.

So around the 11th of August, having secured a stronger security resolution he was back in Leopoldville. This time he decided to go to Katanga himself. On the 12th of August he went to Katanga with a group of his advisors, including myself, and his plane was followed (his plane was a DC-6) by two DC-4's full of Swedish soldiers, 200 Swedish soldiers in all. His plan was to explain to Tshombe that he came with his personal guard; then he would leave the Swedish soldiers there who would be joined by other UN troops after that.

When we arrived in Elizabethville, at the airport of Elizabethville, that was about 1:00 p.m., the airport was full of soldiers, oil drums were placed on the runway, guns were pointing at the UN plane, and Tshombe from the tower said, "You could come, Mr. Secretary-General, alone, without your troops you would be welcome. But you cannot come with your troops." Hammarskjold immediately

replied that he would come with his troops or not at all and during that conversation, with the guns pointing at our plane (which lasted about 15 minutes, we were circling the airport) finally Tshombe yielded and said, "Alright, you can come with your Swedish soldiers." Then we landed. At the airport Hammarskjold was greeted by Tshombe and we proceeded slowly towards the airport terminal, but just on our way (and I'm sure that was a trick of Tshombe) there was an honor guard with the Katangese flag and as Hammarskjold arrived near the honor guard the music struck and everyone stopped - and he had to stop - and he saluted, in a way, the flag. He was criticized for that, but Hammarskjold explained later that by courtesy he had to stop before the honor guard and that his gesture had no political meaning.

JSS

I wanted to ask - while Hammarskjold was in Leopoldville before going on to Katanga, had he had any discussions with the Congolese government about his proposal to go to Katanga?

Liu

Yes, he didn't see Lumumba himself, but Lumumba was informed that he was going to Katanga in order to achieve the deployment of UN troops there and the withdrawal of Belgian Soldiers. Lumumba immediately wanted Hammarskjold to take a Congolese military unit with him. Hammarskjold refused. Then Lumumba said, "At least take some of my ministers with you," and Hammarskjold refused.

Hammarskjold explained that the UN force was there to help maintain peace but it cannot interfere in the internal affairs of the Congo, or support one party against another in their internal struggle. And his plan was to achieve, to eliminate the Belgian influence, so as to pave the way for negotiations between the Congolese leaders for the peaceful resolution of the Katangese secession. Lumumba of course rejected his stand and he strongly protested against the action of the Secretary-General - that is against the decision of the Secretary-General - to go to Katanga alone without the Congolese.

JSS And actually the Secretary-General was able to leave the Swedish troops there, so in a sense this was the beginning of the deployment of UN forces in Katanga...

Liu Absolutely. The plan devised by the Secretary-General was implemented satisfactorily from the UN viewpoint. When Hammarskjold left Elizabethville he left behind not only the 200 Swedish soldiers as a vanguard of the UN contingent in Katanga, but also a political representative of the UN, who was Mr. Ian Berendson.

JSS But when Dag Hammarskjold returned to Leopoldville the reaction of Lumumba at least was extremely negative, is that correct?

Liu Extremely negative, violently negative. There was an exchange of letters between Hammarskjold and Lumumba and Hammarskjold decided to go back to New York to redress

the clarification of the mandate from the Security Council.

JSS And it was at this point that the Soviet representative in New York also became extremely negative toward the efforts of the UN, is that correct?

Liu Yes, in fact they had been already negative when the feud started about deployment of the UN soldiers in the rest of the Congo. They adopted a position in favor of Lumumba, that is, we should throw the Belgians out.

JSS By this time, how many UN forces were in the Congo - quite a few, I assume?

Liu Oh yes, nearly 20,000, we were nearly at the peak at that time.

JSS So in fact, with the deployment of the troops, at least some troops, in Katanga the country was really covered then for the first time...

Liu That's right, it was covered, but the secession problem was not resolved because although the Belgian forces - invading forces - had left, some Belgian military advisors remained with Tshombe.

JSS Mr. Liu, you were with the Secretary-General in this rather critical mission. Could you give your impressions of Hammarskjold's feelings, his attitudes at this point. Was he influenced at all by a sense of disillusionment with Lumumba, that you couldn't work with him? Was his attitude toward the Belgians extremely negative at this

point, how was his general attitude?

Liu

Well his attitude was that he has to implement the Security Council resolution, that was a single-minded attitude. Now Lumumba being opposed to his plan, naturally was a negative factor. Their relationship was not good, but he tried, Hammarskjold tried, very hard all the time to improve that relationship because he knew that he had to work with the Prime Minister of the Congo and that objective never left his mind. With the Belgian government, he adopted the attitude that the Belgian government must withdraw their troops from the whole of the Congo, including Katanga, and then the Belgian government should cease all help to Tshombe and as long as that was not accomplished, he would fight for it. Since Belgium still left some military advisors and probably through the Union Minière was giving financial help to the Tshombe secessionist setup, he would continue to be in a conflictual situation with the Belgian government.

JSS

And he had conversations then with Tshombe during this visit to Elizabethville, what were these conversations like?

Liu

The conversations with Tshombe were on the deployment of the UN troops. He assured Tshombe that the UN was impartial and that their goal was to help the Congolese government to maintain law and order, and that the

secession must end because this is a negative element in the pursuit of law and order in the Congo. And I believe that he maintained this position to the end. In fact before he left for Elizabethville on the 12th of August, he sent a memo, both to Lumumba and Tshombe, on the policy of the UN which was the UN will do everything possible to achieve the withdrawal of Belgian forces and will help the Congo in maintaining law and order, and therefore in helping to the extent possible in the national reconciliation effort (which according to him is the only way to resolve the secession in Katanga).

JSS Which is a question which was with him the rest of his life...

Liu That's right, in fact he died trying to achieve his objective.

JSS So Mr. Liu, if we can continue now. I believe that it was just about at this point that Mr. Bunche returned to New York and was replaced as the Secretary-General's representative in the Congo, temporarily I believe, by Andrew Cordier, is that right?

Liu Yes, Bunche was returning to New York on or about the 27th of August. I think he returned to New York because he had a number of important commitments there and also because he was in poor health. The Secretary-General decided to replace him by Ambassador Dayal of India, but Dayal was not available as yet and Dayal would be

available around the 5th of September, so in the intervening time they needed an acting special representative and Dag Hammarskjöld decided to appoint Andrew Cordier to that Post.

JSS Now by that time had an agreement been reached by the Congolese government on the status of the UN forces?

Liu Oh well, at the very beginning we had an outline of the agreement (the status of forces agreement) signed. That was done just a few days after the arrival of the first troops. It was signed by Ralph Bunche for the UN and by Gizenga who was the Vice Prime Minister and Bomboko the Foreign Minister.

JSS So that that had been arranged...

Liu That's right. It was the outline of an agreement and it was decided a fuller agreement would be concluded later on. So I think that question was settled.

JSS Could you describe what you recall as the situation in the Congo at this point when Cordier arrived?

Liu Well the situation was quite tense. The relationship between the UN and the Congolese government as led by Lumumba was tense, was not good. There were a number of incidents, I mentioned earlier the incident at the airport when a Canadian logistic staff was beaten up, roughed up, by Congolese soldiers. And we had a number of these incidents. During the months of July, around the 20th of July, Lumumba sent the ANC, that is the Armée

Nationale Congolaise to Kasai to put down a kind of uprising by the Balubas. There was a massacre of more than 1,000 civilians in the village which Dag Hammarskjöld qualified as genocide. So the situation is quite tense. On this Bunche left and Andrew Cordier arrived to take over, temporarily, the direction of ONUC.

JSS And you mentioned that the Congolese army had been sent to the Kasai. Most of the troops that were loyal to Lumumba, then, were outside of Leopoldville, at that time?

Liu Yes, they were fighting against the Kasai, there were also some troops in North Katanga.

JSS Now at this point the UN staff in Leopoldville, presumably in contact with the Secretary-General, considered one of its major responsibilities to be the maintenance of some kind of public order.

Liu Well yes, that was very much in the mandate of the UN. We were to assist the government in maintaining law and order. And we did, with the troops and also with an important body of policemen, civilian police, from Ghana.

JSS Who functioned as civilian peace-keepers, then?

Liu That's right. They were policemen, you see, and they were working in cooperation with Congolese police.

JSS And was it at this point then that the question arose about the airport in Leopoldville?

Liu Not yet, not yet. That came when the constitutional

crisis started. That crisis broke out on the 5th of September. In the afternoon of that day around 6:00 President Kasavubu went to the radio station of Leopoldville and broadcast a statement during which he said that the government was ineffective, was not fulfilling its responsibility and therefore he decided to dismiss Prime Minister Lumumba in accordance with an article of the Loi Fundamentale, the Basic law, which serves as the constitution for the new Republic of the Congo. Then two hours later we heard on the radio station a statement by Lumumba who said that he rejected the decision of Kasavubu as illegal and he, in turn, dismissed the President. And then these two statements set off what we called the constitutional crisis. Lumumba on the same day made two other speeches on the radio - very violent ones - calling the population of Leopoldville to rise and to fight with the government against the subversive elements. And at the same time there was a lot of unrest in Leopoldville because there were pro-Lumumba and pro-Kasavubu elements fighting against each other.

JSS And if I could go back just a minute, before Mr. Kasavubu made his announcement on the radio, had he consulted with the UN representatives there in Leopoldville?

Liu Yes, well he saw Cordier; he was not telling Cordier that he was going to dismiss Lumumba and so on but he was

going to do something in order to put things right, as he said and Cordier cautioned him to act very prudently and not to go beyond the constitutional law, the Loi Fundamentale.

JSS Was there a general feeling among the UN people there at this point that actually it would be easier for the UN to achieve its mandate of restoring some kind of order and civility if Lumumba were no longer around?

Liu I guess so, I guess so. There is a sense, a certain feeling, that if Lumumba could change his policy or someone more amenable to more cooperation with the UN were taking over it would be better, but that was only a thought some dealing with ONUC you see.

JSS Did the President Kasavubu make any suggestion with regard to the airport or the radio station before taking any action?

Liu No, no. After the beginning of the constitutional crisis we didn't see any leaders for the time being. We received many calls for protection, and so on, and we told them we would do whatever we could to help. On the other hand our personnel, our force, was limited and naturally we couldn't give special protection to everyone. Now during that same night, among rumors and information of unrest and rioting, within the UN Cordier met with his principal advisors. I recall there was a very tense meeting - were were about 20. In addition to

Cordier we had Linnér who was a special representative. The deputy force commander, General Kattani of Morocco, the chief of staff of the UN force, General Yasu of Ethiopia, we had General Rikhye who, as I said before, was the military advisor of the Secretary-General who was sent to the Congo to help. I was there - there were quite a number of people. And we were discussing how we could help maintain law and order and ensure the protection of the civilian population and in particular, of the political leaders, and it was a very hard decision. You see when we discuss, as we do now in the serenity of the room in Bronxville or in New York when everything is alright, there is no problem, things look different. But here we were amid pandemonium, you see. There were constantly telephone calls asking for our help, informing us of incidents, of fighting, and we thought, "We have to do something about it." The danger of a bloodbath was very real. So at that time we thought it was difficult to remember who made the suggestion before - we thought that we should close the airport to prevent Congolese armies stranded outside Leopoldville to come in Leopoldville to fight against the pro-Lumumba or pro-Kasavubu elements of the army. We should also do something about the very inflammatory statements being broadcast from the radio station, and we thought the best way to do it is to close it. And finally, after lots of

hesitation, Andrew Cordier decided both to close the airport and the radio station. In hindsight, it was a mistake, but at that time in Leopoldville we thought that was the only way to prevent the bloodbath in Leopoldville.

JSS And was there an immediate reaction from the various diplomatic representatives at that point?

Liu Yes, the next day. A number of African diplomatic representatives - I think diplomats from Ghana, Guinea, Tunisia, who came and said that they were against this decision.

JSS And I presume Mr. Lumumba was very unhappy?

Liu Yes of course he was very unhappy.

JSS And did he make his unhappiness known, or were relations already broken between...

Liu Relations were already bad but they became worse.

JSS And in effect at this point, in the view of the UN representatives there was not a constitutional government, is that correct?

Liu There was no constitutional government, no, no. The situation was very confused, very confused. So the President was not operative, the Prime Minister was also not operative, the Parliament theoretically was still there but they couldn't meet, you see. So the situation was very confused. On the other hand, when I say the relationship between the UN and the Prime Minister became

worse, that was true, and yet on the other hand Lumumba asked protection from the UN as did the President Kasavubu and many other political leaders.

JSS And this protection was in fact given to Lumumba?

Liu That's right. We decided - or Cordier decided - to give special protection to Kasavubu and Lumumba because they were very special, not only because of their high positions but also because we considered these two leaders were essential for the UN effort which we were going to start to achieve national reconciliation.

JSS And these then were the only two who were given protection?

Liu Well, what we did is this. We said The UN force is too small to give special protection to all political leaders so what we did is, I received all the calls from them. We told them that we would take their addresses, where they are, and we will ask the UN patrols - and we are going to increase the patrols - to go near their places and give a check from time to time. This is the protection we gave to the normal political leaders, and we make two exceptions and those were the guards which were put at the disposal, or for the protection of Kasavubu and Lumumba.

JSS And at this point had you come into contact yet with Mr. Mobutu?

Liu In fact, Mr. Mobutu came to see us and he was very

worried, he was scared even, and he wanted to go back to his village and we told him, "No, you should stay here and you are the Army, you are the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Army must be impartial and keep an impartial and neutral position during the crisis. But you are very important because the Army in this case would be a sort of guarantee of the state." And then he agreed to stay. At that point that was the only thing we told him. But I got the information later on that after seeing us he went to see Lumumba because he was a protégé of Lumumba, he became Secretary of State in Lumumba's government, for information. He went to Lumumba but Lumumba didn't see him; Lumumba was too busy and he waited, waited for a long time and finally he left. Then he went to see Kasavubu. Kasavubu received him immediately, was very friendly to him. I think these two meetings shaped his policy later on.

JSS But at this point you didn't recognize him as the person who was going to lead a coup...

Liu Oh not at all, I think he was the person who wanted to leave, he wanted to go back to his village.

JSS In this connection I wanted to ask, what were the major sources of information for the UN staff there concerning political developments within the Congolese community?

Liu Well our major sources were the two ministers with whom we had close relations, that's Bomboko and Ianza. They

informed us of what's happened and they told us of the positions of the various governments. Naturally we saw Kasavubu and Lumumba and we discussed with them and we advised restraint.

JSS But you did not have any information flowing to you from the diplomatic missions, for example?

Liu Yes, yes, well we were also in close contact with various ambassadors, particularly Ambassador Timberlake of the United States and Ambassador Scott of the UK.

JSS How would you characterize Ambassador Timberlake, by the way?

Liu Well I knew him, I did not know him too well you see, I knew him because I attended the meetings he had with Dr. Bunche, with Cordier. He of course followed US policy and therefore he was in favor of Kasavubu and rather hostile to Lumumba.

JSS Was there any effort made on his part or on the part of the Belgians or others to influence the UN to be more supportive of Kasavubu, or was this simply a natural course of events?

Liu No, I don't think so. I think after the outbreak of the constitutional crisis they didn't give any advice there.

JSS So we come now to the situation where Mr. Lumumba is in his house being protected by UN guards and he decides to leave. What was your position in the UN on that, that there was no responsibility to keep him there, or what...

Liu

Yes, when we agreed to give him a measure of protection, like assigning a small unit of UN soldiers, the mandate of the UN force was to be stationed around his residence. We were to prevent any attack from outside against the residence with purpose of harming the Prime Minister. But they were also instructed not to restrict in any way the freedom of movement of the Prime Minister because it was important that the Prime Minister was not the prisoner of the UN, we were there only to protect him. Now soon after the arrival of the UN soldiers around the residence of the Prime Minister, Kasavubu with his now ally Mobutu, sent a group of Congolese soldiers to arrest Lumumba and then when they were prevented from doing so by the UN soldiers they surrounded the UN soldiers. So around the residence we have two rings - residence, then the first ring of UN soldiers and then a second ring of Congolese soldiers. But it's not tight, some people came and went from the residence outside - in fact Lumumba went outside his residence on several occasions. But on one occasion he went to the Congolese army camp in order to rally the Congolese soldiers who wanted to kill him because of the recent massacre of their tribesman in Kasai. Lumumba was saved only by the Ghanaian soldiers who were at the camp. In fact there was a very tense meeting, the special representative, now Ambassador Dayal and myself went there and we saw him and Lumumba was very

mad at the Ghanaians because the Ghanaians didn't want him to leave.

JSS Because they were afraid for his safety?

Liu Because they were afraid for his safety, and he was mad at Colonel Ankwa who was the commander of the Ghanaian contingent who later became the President of Ghana. Colonel Ankwa was trying to protect him and he was being criticized by Lumumba. Anyway, after a rather long talk, Lumumba agreed to leave and to return to his residence and the UN protection.

JSS Going back just for a minute, at this point, Ambassador Dayal has replaced Mr. Cordier as the special representative?

Liu Yes.

JSS But before that when Mr. Cordier took the decision to close the airport and shut down the radio, was there consultation with New York, close consultation with New York?

Liu Well there were constant exchanges of cables. In the cables nothing was said but Cordier told me that he had a special code with the Secretary-General and that he was reporting regularly to the Secretary-General and he said that the decision had the endorsement of Dag Hammarskjold. But that is very difficult to prove because we don't have any cables raising this question since everything seemingly was in secret code which no

one knew except Hammarskjold and Cordier.

JSS And what was Dayal's attitude when he got there and took over under these circumstances?

Liu Oh he was extremely unhappy, he was mad at the circumstances. He said that if he had known the problems of the Congo and the relationship between the UN and the Congolese government he would not have accepted the job.

JSS And basically he did not approve of what Mr. Cordier had done?

Liu No, no.

JSS By this time, if we go back to New York for a moment now, the situation in New York was also extremely difficult, very difficult to get any agreement out through the Council I think, or even the General Assembly. Were there repercussions among the staff in the Congo from the political dissension in New York because of the fact the Secretary-General couldn't really get guidance from the Security Council?

Liu I think we were a little bit lost, actually, but we have our chief who is the Secretary-General; therefore we relied on him. The Secretary-General of course was very unhappy about the decision concerning the airport and the radio station, but, Hammarskjold being Hammarskjold, never accused publicly Cordier because he accepted the responsibility.

JSS And at this point, I think again in New York a committee

was formed (at I suppose the Secretary-General's suggestion) composed of the representatives of the troops' donor countries. Was this a useful undertaking as far as the field operations were concerned, the fact there was at least somebody that the Secretary-General could work with and get some guidance from.

Liu Oh yes, it's very useful, in fact - you're referring to the Advisory Committee on the Congo. In fact, the ACC has a precedent: when Hammarskjold created UNEF I, the first UN Emergency Force, which was the first UN peacekeeping force, he had established an ACC composed of representatives of contributing countries. In this case, as soon as the UN force was back in the Congo, he had a similar ACC and that committee met quite often to advise the Secretary-General on what to do. It was a very useful organization because it shared responsibility with the Secretary-General for this extremely complex and important operation.

JSS And in the Congo itself by this time a number of Soviet transport plans had arrived and other equipment. Was the UN able in any way to influence the way this equipment was utilized?

Liu No, no. As I said earlier, when Dag Hammarskjold set up the assistance, the civilian assistance operation, his idea was that all assistance must be channeled through the UN but when the split developed between the UN and

Lumumba, Lumumba requested Soviet help. The Soviets sent some help, not all the help requested by Lumumba but they sent a large number of trucks. They were used by Lumumba. We were not able to influence the use of those vehicles.

JSS Now, there were still at this point Belgian forces in Katanga, is that right?

Liu Yes, now Belgian troops were leaving faster - we are in September now?

JSS Right, right.

Liu No, no, all the Belgian troops left, even Katanga, but the Belgian government assigned a number of Belgian military officers as military advisors for Tshombe. So there are a number of military advisors, there were no Belgian troops...

JSS Dag Hammarskjöld
EIDBRARI
No troops as such, because Mr. Dayal at one point I believe in November issued a report criticizing the continued presence of Belgian technicians and advisors. They were in Katanga, right?

Liu They were advisors in Katanga, but the Belgian technicians were coming back to Leopoldville and I think the criticism of Dayal included those also.

JSS Now I judge that Mr. Dayal was viewed with some suspicion by some of the Western missions in the Congo?

Liu Yes, definitely, particularly by the US and UK embassies.

JSS Why was that?

Liu Well I really don't know but I believe that Dayal as an Indian diplomat and statesman and his stand was rather in favor of the Lumumba group although later on his relations with Lumumba would deteriorate. When he came I think that his stand was very similar to the stand adopted by the Indian government, I think this might be a reason.

JSS Which was in fact sympathetic to Lumumba.

Liu It was sympathetic to Lumumba, and in fact Dayal wanted to be impartial but I think his sympathy went to the Lumumba side of the government.

JSS Now we've reached the point I think in November when Lumumba left his house. And didn't come back. Was there an appreciation on the part of the UN staff that this was a serious development?

Liu Yes, oh yes. A very serious development. I was at that time in New York, back in New York. When this happened we received a very urgent cable and we were all worried. The UN in Leopoldville was worried and the UN in New York was extremely worried. It was at that point that Dag Hammarskjöld suggested the establishment of a UN Conciliation Commission composed of the African and Asian representatives of troop-contributing countries.

JSS You think that was inspired then by Lumumba's departure...

Liu Yes, the arrest of Lumumba, the detention of Lumumba.

JSS Now could you comment a little bit on the whereabouts of the UN forces at this point? The UN guards were aware when Lumuba left but did you know where he was going, which direction he went in?

Liu Yes, well he left very early one morning. We were aware that he was leaving but as I said, the UN soldiers were not to restrict his freedom of movement in any way. We didn't know where he was leaving - only later did we learn that he was proceeding towards Stanleyville where his followers (including Gizenga, the Deputy Prime Minister in his government) had established a provisional government. So he was going there apparently to take over the new de facto government.

JSS Was there also the question of the death of his daughter at this point?

Liu Oh yes, yes, absolutely. His daughter had died, and one of the reasons he gave was to attend the funeral of the daughter. Now he was arrested somewhere in the Kasai near Port Francqui. I understand that when he went into a village he was making a speech, and then he was discovered, and there were a strong ANC, pro-Mobutu group who went there and arrested him.

JSS And how soon were you aware in Leopoldville that this arrest had taken place?

Liu Oh just one or two days later.

JSS And then he ended up in Elizabethville....

Liu No, in Thysville. In Thysville there is a big ANC camp and he was detained in Thysville.

JSS Right. Were there UN soldiers there who saw his arrival?

Liu I'm not sure. But we know that he was detained in Thysville and I know that in particular because I was the secretary to the Conciliation Commission which was sent to achieve conciliation but also with the immediate goal to try to see Lumumba and try to get him liberated.

JSS What was the real purpose of the Conciliation Commission? Was it conciliation between the two factions, that is between...

Liu But more than two factions - it was to achieve a national conciliation. Now at that time the Congo was divided into four de facto governments - you have the Tshombe secessionists in Elizabethville in Katanga, we had another secession in Kasai led by Kalonji; as I said earlier, the Lumumbists with Gizenga had a de facto government in Stanleyville, and finally in Leopoldville we have the Kasavubu-Mobutu group. By that time Mobutu has already established a College des Commissaires, a College of Commissioners; he had decided to take over and he had appointed a government composed of university graduates - that was called the College of Commissioners. So you have four de facto governments at that time. The aim of the conciliation Commission is to conciliate the various leaders and help reestablish the national unity

government in Leopoldville.

JSS And you tried to see Lumumba at that point?

Liu As soon as we arrived in Leopoldville at the very beginning of 1961 we went to see President Kasavubu and we told him in no uncertain terms that he must see Lumumba.

JSS But this did not succeed.

Liu No, well Kasavubu hedged, he said, well he'd do whatever he could to arrange a meeting. But it was very difficult, there were many problems. He needed some time. So we told him almost every day, every day we urged him to arrange the meeting but he never did. He always hedged and said some problem had to be resolved before he could arrange for a meeting. And then finally we learned that Lumumba escaped from his camp and, as you know, later on it was found that he was murdered in Katanga.

JSS Did you also try to see Tshombe at this point?

Liu Well, it was the Commission's aim to seek all the leaders. While we were in Leopoldville we saw naturally Kasavubu because he was still the President, and as you know, the General Assembly recognized the delegation sent by Kasavubu as the legitimate delegation. Kasavubu was the President, he was the only political leader generally recognized. We saw Kasavubu and we saw a number of other leaders, including Adoula. Adoula, who was a senator,

was one of the best; he was reasonable, he was intelligent, and he very much wanted to save the Congo and we gave him a lot of time and attention.

JSS Now it was just about this time if I'm not mistaken that the administration changed in Washington, that President Kennedy became the president and Adlai Stevenson became the Permanent Representative. Did you in the Congo, or for that matter in New York, detect fairly soon a change in the US policy towards the Congo?

Liu Yes, yes. There was no doubt that we detected a change for the better and also more help for the UN operation in the Congo.

JSS So that it was a more positive attitude...but still strong support, well at this point was it for Kasavubu or for Mobutu?

Liu They were for Kasavubu. Of course there is a good reason because Kasavubu is the President recognized by the General Assembly. But that certainly the sympathy went to them.

JSS And on the question of Katanga, was a difference in attitude seen there, or was the American attitude already in favor of the reintegration of the Congo?

Liu Yes, a change here too. But the US was never for the secession, the policy was also against the secession; but there was a degree in the support given to the UN in its effort to fight secession. Certainly after Kennedy took

over we received much more support, moral and material.

JSS Now for a more general question. As you mentioned earlier, the UN civilian operation played a very important part in the administration of the Congo at this time after they departure of many Belgians. How effective was that, how effective did you think the UN performance was?

Liu I think it was quite effective, particularly in light of the very difficult situation prevailing there. At that everything collapsed, ministries were not functioning, electricity, the water companies were not functioning, the essential services were badly neglected. So when we went in we sent in technicians for the most important organizations and bodies. We appointed a very distinguished economist, financier, from Switzerland, Victor Umbricht to be the chief economic advisor. He was appointed by the Congolese government as the head of the monetary council which is a kind of central bank he therefore was directing the economy of the Congo and the monetary council. In fact, thanks to his efforts the Congolese currency had its value during the first phase of the UN operation. Then we had advisors in every main ministry to advise the ministers and we had technicians for the electricity company, the water company, the transport, inaudible in fact, everywhere. And this was essential to keep the country from collapsing.

JSS The UN did well then, in your opinion.

Liu I believe that it was essential, you see, we enabled the country to continue.

JSS Now, I'd like to move because the tape is almost over to one really final question. This had to do with the Secretary-General Hammarskjöld's determination to see Tshombe, presumably in pursuit of the same objective as the Conciliation Commission, that it should somehow bring an end to the secession...

Liu Yes, well Hammarskjöld's plan, well he said that I'm here to help the Congo. The Un force can do much directly to facilitate or bring about a withdrawal of the Belgian troops. But the UN cannot deal with the secession, the problem of secession because it's an internal question. But the Un can help in two ways. Since the secession was brought about with the help of Belgium - Belgian advisors, the Belgian military, after all secession was declared on the very day when the Belgian troops invaded the Congo and Katanga - by eliminating the Belgian influence, military and political, I prepare the ground for national conciliation and then we can push the national conciliation - that is, get Tshombe to reconcile, to change his position toward the government.

JSS In January 1961 you were back in the Congo, is that correct, with the Conciliation Commission?

Liu That's right, in fact at that time our objective was to

see Lumumba and find a way to have him liberated.

JSS Because you didn't know exactly where he was, at that point?

Liu Well we knew at the beginning that he was in the Thysville army camp - we knew that . In fact in our many meetings with President Kasavubu we wanted Kasavubu to arrange for a meeting between Lumumba and the Conciliation Commission - either in Leopoldville or at the Thysville camp.

JSS I see. Now at this point, given the situation with Lumumba, a number of countries had threatened to withdraw their forces, is that correct?

Liu Yes, and they did it mainly after the death of Lumumba.

JSS And did this seriously weaken the UN operation?

Liu Well at the beginning it did because the strength the force was brought down dramatically, but Hammarskjold got new troops, mainly from India.

JSS Financial problems began about the same time also, is that correct?

Liu That's right, yes.

JSS So that on the whole it was a discouraging time in terms of the operation?

Liu Yes, it was very discouraging time because immediately after Lumumba when our force was brought down dramatically, the situation in the Congo got worse. In fact there was a very real danger of a flareup of the

civil war between the four de facto governments that existed in the Congo. So much so that the Security Council passed a resolution in which for the first time it authorized the UN force to use force in order to prevent civil war.

JSS Could you describe a bit the function of the Conciliation Commission as it was deployed in the Congo?

Liu Well the Conciliation Commission has as mandate to see all the leaders of the Congo, including Katanga actually, and to facilitate their reconciliation with as aim the establishment of a national reconciliation and national unity government.

JSS And this is why you were interested in trying to see Mr. Lumumba at this point?

Liu Yes, we have always thought that in order to achieve the conciliation among the Congolese leaders we must achieve conciliation between the two main leaders of the time, that is Kasavubu and Lumumba. In order to achieve that conciliation we must get Lumumba liberated.

JSS But this failed, you were unable to see Lumumba...

Liu We were unable, Kasavubu hedged, gave all kinds of pretexts every time we saw him, and finally we learned - first, that he was transferred to Katanga and later on, that he died there.

JSS They's one thing I want to be clear about. When the Commission arrived it was known that Lumumba was at this

Thysville camp, right? And were they UN forces there, or not?

Liu Nearby, but not too near the camp, you see.

JSS So they were not in the immediate vicinity..

Liu No. You know, we had at the peak about 20,000 soldiers and that's not too many soldiers for a big country like the Congo, so our deployment was rather thin.

JSS So, just to return a moment, while Lumumba was still in Leopoldville, he was afforded some protection by the UN forces.

Liu That's right. We sent two military units, one to protect the residence of Lumumba and the other to protect the residence of Kasavubu.

JSS But in Thysville, this was not the case, he was not receiving UN protection at that point...

Liu No, he was a prisoner, he was a detainee - we had some soldiers nearby but we couldn't protect him, no, we had no control, we had no access to him.

JSS So there was nothing you could do, nothing that the UN forces could do, when he was taken from there to Elizabethville.

Liu No, what the UN could do and what the UN did was to try to get Lumumba protected, and later on if possible liberated through negotiation, and you have three series of negotiations going on. Hammarskjold at Headquarters was negotiating with the delegations, the special

representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Dayal, was negotiating with Kasavubu and Mobutu, and the Conciliation Commission had a third set of negotiations, also with Kasavubu and Mobutu mainly in Leopoldville at that time.

JSS Meanwhile in New York the situation had become more critical because of the increasingly hostile attitude of the Soviet Union toward the Secretary-General.

Liu That's right, and immediately after the death of Lumumba the Soviet Union demanded the dismissal of Hammarskjöld and refused to have any dealings with the Secretary-General.

JSS Could you describe then the situation as you perceived it at that point on the spot in the Congo?

Liu Well at that time there was a real danger of a flareup of a civil war, and in fact there was quite a lot of fighting here and there. So the UN policy was to prevent the civil war and this time there was a resolution of the Security Council authorizing it to use force. Naturally still, authorization or no authorization, we must be very careful because you can use force, really, if you have enough force to use and you have always to be careful once you use force, you know how to start but you never know how to stop.

JSS Now it was at this point I believe that Dag Hammarskjöld decided to make changes in his immediate staff, both in

New York and also in the Congo, partly because of criticism of the over-representation of Americans. Can you say anything about the new person who was assigned in the Congo was Mr. Khiary and in New York Cordier's job was changed - what was the atmosphere at this point, how was this interpreted by you and by others dealing with the Congo?

Liu

Well, first at Headquarters, Hammarskjold did decide to remove Cordier from his cabinet. Cordier was given the new function of Under-Secretary for General Assembly Affairs. Cordier had been dealing with the General Assembly anyway for a long time so that was really not a new function for him. But he left the cabinet in order to concentrate on the General Assembly affairs. The post of chef de cabinet was given to Narasimhan immediately. That was a change. Bunche remained the same. Dag Hammarskjold would not change Ralph Bunche for any reason. Now in the Congo, the special representative was still Ambassador Dayal, but Dayal had expressed a desire to withdraw, to retire, because he said that he could no longer carry out his functions because of the bad relationship between him and Kasavubu. So later on, soon Dag Hammarskjold appointed Mekki Abbas as special representative and when Mekki Abbas left at his request, the post was given to Linnér, but with a new title. Instead of special representative his title was Officer-

in-Charge in the Congo. I believe that this was done because Hammarskjöld wanted to lower the responsibility of the post. Then when Linnér was switched from Chief of Civilian Operations to the post of Officer-in-Charge, Khiary was appointed as Chief of Civilian Operations, therefore the number two to Linnér.

JSS Now at this point just to bring your personal participation into perspective, did you return to New York or did you stay in the Congo?

Liu No, I returned to New York with the Conciliation Commission and then I stayed in Bunche's office. I was officially transferred to his office. I stayed in that office and dealt with the Congo operations from New York.

JSS I wanted to ask you in this connection, and the changes in the Congo and in New York to a certain extent, was the same close liaison and communication maintained as in the case earlier or was there less satisfactory communication between Leopoldville and headquarters in New York?

Liu Well I think the relationship in theory was the same. We were dealing with the Congo from New York in the same way, but of course the personality of the chief of mission is important. Certainly there is less close relationship between Linnér and the Secretary-General than between Bunche and Dayal with the Secretary-General.

JSS Would you say then that a point was arriving where the Secretary-General did not have the close rapport, with

the UN representative in Leopoldville and also in the Congo because this is the point where Mr. Cruise O'Brien was designated for the Katanga.

Liu Yes, yes, that's correct. But again, it's not a question of posts, it's rather a question of persons. I think Linnér and Conor Cruise O'Brien were not the right persons for the job so therefore there were some problems, difficulties.

JSS Do you think this affected the UN operations?

Liu Yes, it did affect the operations and in fact it caused the death of Hammarskjöld. There was at that time a very deep misunderstanding and I think it was this misunderstanding which led to the fighting in Katanga in August-September, 1961 which led the Secretary-General to agree to see Tshombe. He would not have seen Tshombe otherwise but he thought that there was a misunderstanding which had to be clarified and he was willing to take the extraordinary step of seeing Tshombe in the Ndola, that is outside the territory of the Congo, because of this misunderstanding and because he thought that the fighting had to be stopped anyhow.

JSS Now were you with the Secretary-General at that point in the Congo.

Liu No, I was at headquarters and when the Secretary-General decided to go to the Congo to resolve the problem he took Wieschhoff with him who was his advisor for African

affairs. And Bunche and I remained at Headquarters.

JSS You were in fairly close contact with the Secretary-General as he reached Leopoldville because he was reporting back, I believe.

Liu Yes, yes, constant contact, very close contact. In fact, just before arriving in Leopoldville he sent a cable to Bunche in which he expressed sadness over what happened in the Congo and we had the impressions that he learned at that time that something had gone wrong in the Congo, that his instructions had not been carried out. In fact that he had been betrayed by the leadership of ONYC in the Congo. That was an impression, he never said that, but Bunche told me that cable was very strange. He was a bit bitter and he said he was rushing to Leopoldville in order to go deeper into this problem. I believe what happens is, you know the fighting which started in August, 1961 was started by the UN, in fact. Khiary went to Elizabethville with some warrant for the arrest of the Congolese leaders, we never knew that.

JSS With the Katangese....

Liu With Kantangese leaders, we never knew that. Khiary had that from the Congo government warrant arrest, therefore he went there determined to use force and then fighting started. As you know, Conor Cruise O'Brien wrote a book later on and in his book he thought that Dag Hammarskjold had ordered the use of force which led to the start of

this new round of fighting and then he tried to carry out that mandate and then after the fighting, when Dag Hammarskjold denied that he had given such order Conor Cruise O'Brien believed that he was betrayed. He thought that Dag Hammarskjold changed his mind because of the events in Katanga. But Dag Hammarskjold I'm quite sure never changed his mind because he never gave this order. That order was given by Linnér, or rather by Khiary acting on behalf of Linnér.

JSS But it is your impression that Conor Cruise O'Brien felt that the order had been given by somebody?

Liu Yes, he was convinced, I think, that Dag Hammarskjold himself gave the order and changed the policy after the fighting went the wrong way.

JSS Now you and Bunche in New York, what was your impression from that distance (New York) of the steps that Conor Cruise O'Brien was taking in Katanga? I assume there was fairly continuous reporting from Elizabethville.

Liu Yes, well Hammarskjold was appalled by what happened; that's why he decided to go to the Congo to look into the matter. As I said, I believe that on the way, even before he reached Leopoldville, he received some information which led him to believe that the UN was at fault, that some mandate was given without his authorization. That is my distinct impression.

JSS And then the next event really was the death of

Hammarskjold.

Liu That's right. After arriving in Leopoldville, he decided to meet with Tshombe in Ndola in order to discuss these problems and arrange for a ceasefire. And as you know his plane crashed just before he arrived in Ndola.

JSS Now I want to stop at this point to ask you some rather general questions, Mr. Liu, about your conclusions, if I can put it that way, relative to the overall UN operation in the Congo and its ultimate result. There were of course after the death of Hammarskjold further disturbances and it was a while before the Katanga secession ceased. But one can say I think that this was in fact a turning point. After that it came to a climax, a denouement, in the Congo. How would you assess the whole operation that you were so close to from the beginning to the end?

Liu Well, the UN operation in the Congo was certainly the largest, the most difficult, the most controversial operation in UN history. But I believe that in the end it was a great success. We have to remember that in the beginning when the crisis started, the Congo was in a terrible state - it was total chaos. The country had collapsed and if nothing was done, there would be a power vacuum which could very well lead to a major world crisis involving the direct intervention of the two superpowers. So the situation was extremely serious. We went there,

we had many problems, including the death of Lumumba and the death of the Secretary-General. But in the end we achieved the main purposes - the Belgian troops were withdrawn, the mercenaries were withdrawn. When the UN left the Congo in June 1964, there was a national reconciliation of all Congolese leaders; the national unity government was set up in Leopoldville, the capital - the secession had ended without the bloodbath. The essential services have been maintained, and perhaps most important of all, we have avoided a direct military confrontation between the two superpowers on the problem of the Congo. So it was a great success - but the operation was criticized and I think the main traumatic event was the death of Lumumba. To this day some Africans still blame the UN for the death of Lumumba and the Soviet Union as you know broke its relations completely with the Secretary-General. But I think the criticisms leveled against Dag Hammarskjöld were unfair because when the constitutional crisis broke out we did everything possible to protect Lumumba. We sent a unit especially to protect him, and when he left, he left on his own will, he wanted to go, we could not stop him, he was not our prisoner, and he was caught. After he was caught Dag Hammarskjöld did everything possible, made every effort, first, to insure that he be treated humanely and secondly, to try to secure his release. We

couldn't do it because mainly of the negative attitude of Kasavubu and Mobutu. We did everything possible, short, of course, of using force.

JSS What would you say the weaknesses were on the side of the UN, weaknesses which perhaps have some lessons in it for the future?

Liu Well, I believe that the UN was not ready at that time for an operation as involved, as complex as the Congo. 20,000 troops - that is the largest force ever in UN history - were not enough to maintain law and order. And the main problem, the main problem which the UN couldn't remedy was the lack of preparation for the independence of the Congo - the Congo was not ready for independence, there was not enough administrators, military officers, engineers, doctors. At the time of independence there were only 17 university graduates for the whole of the Congo.

JSS Let me go to the military side for just a moment. You say there were more than 20,000 troops which is a very large force for the UN. In some cases the troops were not well disciplined, I believe, or at least did not know exactly how troops should conduct themselves under these circumstances. My question is, would it have been helpful if these troops had some advance training in peace-keeping?

Liu Oh, certainly, certainly, you're absolutely right. I

believe that the training of UN troops is a major question even now. I believe a UN force could be more efficient if the troops were better trained, there is also the question of logistics. You see, we didn't have enough logistic facilities. So all these things could be remedied in time and I believe in the UN now some thought is given to the necessity of training troops, of having earmarked troops, and having of course adequate logistic and financial support.

JSS Now if I may I would like to go back for a minute because there is one area that we have left uncovered, which is of interest. In addition to Katanga there was for a while a separate administration in Stanleyville where Mr. Gizenga was, but that was not considered a secession, I believe. Can you comment on this, how was that quasi government looked on by the UN?

Liu Gizenga's government was a de facto government based in Stanleyville. They wanted to be the government of the whole of the Congo, not to have the Oriental Province secede from the Congo.

JSS So it was an alternative government, then.

Liu It was an alternative government, it was a civilian struggle. They were fighting for the political power with the de facto government in Leopoldville and in Kasai. It's not a formal secession. In Kasai is half and half, but they never declared official secession,

that is taking part of the territory of the national territory of the Congo.

JSS How did the UN representative deal with the Gizenga regime in Stanleyville if at all? Or did you have no contact?

Liu No, no, we had some contact because we have some troops there. And also during this various series of conciliation efforts we, of course, tried to get all the leaders together.

JSS At that point I suppose there was actually no constitutional government to recognize?

Liu That's right, from the 5th of September on there were no constitutional governments, there were four de facto governments. The aim of the UN was to facilitate the national reconciliation of the leaders and the establishment of a national unity government. That has to be done with the reopening of the parliament and that objective was achieved in October 1961. In October 1961 all the leaders agreed to reopen parliament under UN protection. We got all the leaders except Katanga, Katanga leaders at the last moment refused to come. So we had the parliament, we open with all the leaders, all the representatives except the Katangese. They unanimously approved a new government headed by Prime Minister Adoula. With this we considered the constitutional crisis as settled. From then on the aim

of the UN was to end the secession of Katanga through negotiation and through the elimination of foreign influence. And this led to a series of fighting and finally to an agreement by Tshombe to come back.

JSS Now that leads me to the second question I wanted to catch up on. Mr. Adoula was named Prime Minister at that point and I know that there was major contact between the UN representatives and Adoula. What was the relationship with Mr. Mobutu at this point because he was still very much in the picture.

Liu Yes, but he, he was very much in the picture but officially he was the head of the Congolese army and as the head of the Congolese army, of course, he was under Adoula's control. The control was very loose but we didn't go into that. But anyway after the establishment, the election of the Adoula government, our position was quite simple. We deal with Adoula.

JSS And only with Mobutu on military matters, if at all?

Liu Yes, if at all.

JSS And that posed no problems?

Liu No, no, at that time it was Adoula you see.

JSS And did that last then throughout the whole period of ONUC, that is until 1964? The dealings were with Adoula and not with Mobutu?

Liu That's right, in fact it was Adoula who encouraged us to take those various actions in Katanga and I said at one

point that in August 1961 Khiary exceeded the mandate given by the Secretary-General since he accepted from Adoula some warrants for arrest of Katangese leaders.

JSS Was there a sense that Mobutu was already actually in control?

Liu No, I don't think so, I think so long as Adoula was Prime Minister he was in fairly firm control of Mobutu, Mobutu was under him. There was no problem.

JSS So that this was a period of consolidation and it was a real consolidation of governmental power in the Congo.

Liu Yes, yes. In fact immediately after the establishment of the Adoula government, U Thant, then the Secretary-General, sent a letter which promised all help from the UN to go through Adoula.

JSS Now, I said this was the last question - but one more question because you mentioned that U Thant had become the Secretary-General and the rest of the Congo story was during his tenure as Secretary-General. Was the communication, the rapport, close between U Thant and the representatives in the Congo?

Liu Oh yes, quite close, quite close. There was no problem.

JSS U Thant was in effect following through the same policy that Dag Hammarskjold had sought to follow.

Liu Oh yes, I think so, I have no doubt about it. It was Dag Hammarskjold's policy; he was just following it and carrying it through.

JSS So there was no real break then in terms of the UN's policy and the UN's implementation of policy with the change from Hammarskjold to U Thant?

Liu That's my firm belief, and I believe that if Hammarskjold had remained he would have done exactly the same thing - that is, try to resolve the secession of Katanga through negotiations and conciliation.

JSS And Ralph Bunche remained an important figure in New York during this period also?

Liu Absolutely.

JSS So that U Thant was relying on Ralph Bunche very much the way Hammarskjold did.

Liu Oh yes, absolutely. Policy in the Congo was directed by Ralph Bunche.

JSS And you continued to be with Ralph Bunche so you were able to observe the relationship between U Thant and Ralph Bunche?

Liu Oh yes, it was a very close relationship.

JSS Very good, thank you very much.

Name Index

Abbas, Mekki	53
Adoula, Cyrille	1, 45, 62-64
Baudouin, (King)	10
Berendson, Ian	24
Bomboko, Justin	3, 4, 28, 35
Bunche, Ralph	3, 5-8, 10-15, 19-22, 27-29, 36, 53, 54, 56, 57, 65
Chevenne, Raymond	4
Dayal, Rajeshwar	1, 27, 37-39, 41, 42, 52-54
Gizenga, Antoine	7, 8, 17, 28, 43, 44, 61, 62
Hammarskjold, Dag	1, 2, 8, 11-13, 15-17, 21-26, 28, 29, 38-40, 42, 48, 49, 51-59, 64, 65
Kalonji, Albert	44
Kanza, Thomas	3, 4, 9, 11, 12
Kasavubu, Joseph	4, 7-11, 15, 16, 30-32, 34-37, 44-46, 49-53, 60
Kattani, (General)	32
Kennedy, John F.	1, 46
Leopold, (King)	10
Linnér, Sture	32, 53-55, 57
Lumumba, Patrice	1, 14-17, 19-21, 23-38, 41, 42, 44, 45, 49-52, 59
Mobutu, Joseph-Désiré (Sese Sélé)	37, 43, 44, 46, 52, 60, 63, 64
Narasimhan, C.V.	53
O'Brien, Conor Cruise	55-57
Rikhye, Indar Jit	32
Stevenson, Adlai	46



Dag Hammarskjöld
LIBRARY

Thant, U	1, 64, 65
Tshombe, Moise	8, 16, 21-23, 25-27, 41, 44, 45, 48, 55, 58, 63
Umbricht, Victor	47
Wieschhoff, Heinz	55
Yasu, (General)	32



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Table of Contents

The Middle East Wars

I.	UN organization for peace-keeping	1-5; 40-41
II.	The 1967 Middle East War	
	--Tension on the Israeli-Syrian border	16-22
	--Egyptian request for the withdrawal of UNEF	22-24
	--UNTSO assessment of Egyptian and Israeli military strength	25-25
	--Role of UNTSO after UNEF withdrawal	26-28
	--U Thant's meeting with Nasser	28-30
	--Resolution 242	30-32
	--The Jarring mission	32-33
III.	The 1973 Middle East War	
	--Kissinger relations with the UN Secretariat	34-35
	--Kilometer 101 negotiations and the negotiations with Syria	35-37
IV.	Quality of UN Force Commanders	38-40

448

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BRONXVILLE, NEW YORK
SEPTEMBER 22, 1990
SUTTERLIN, INTERVIEWER

JSS Mr. Liu I want to thank you for agreeing to participate in a further session and today I would like to begin by questioning you first about the way in which the organization of the Secretariat under the Secretary-General developed to deal with both the political and the peace-keeping problems in the Middle East that were at the heart of the wars that took place there.

Liu First let me say that it is a pleasure to participate in this project. Under the organization of Secretariat offices dealing with peace-keeping operations, at the very beginning there were of course no peace-keeping operations and then in 1948 and 1949 the two first peace-keeping operations were created in the form of observer missions, UNTSO first, and UNMOGIP in Kashmir later. At that time matters concerning the peace-keeping operations were dealt with by the Executive Office of the Secretary-General. As you know the chief of this Executive Office was Andrew Cordier, but the responsibility was quite minor. The mandates of the observer missions were well-defined by agreements concluded by the parties. The observers were supposed to assist the parties. The role of the Secretary-General was mainly administrative. Only later with the arrival of Dag Hammarskjöld were the peace-keeping operations expanded with the creation of

the first peace-keeping force, UNEF I, in the Mideast and later with the creation of more observer missions. When Dag Hammarskjold assumed office at the beginning of 1953 he immediately created an office, a special office on the 38th floor, composed of two Under-Secretaries (at that time it was called Under-Secretary and not Under-Secretary General), one, an American, and one a citizen of the Soviet Union, to deal with special political problems. The title of the office was first called the Office of the Under-Secretaries Without Portfolio (OUSWP). Later on it was changed to the Office of the Under-Secretaries for Special Political Affairs. The first Soviet Under-Secretary Without Portfolio was Tchernychev and the second one was Dobrynin, who later became Ambassador of the Soviet Union to the United States. The American was Ralph Bunche who was transferred from his previous post in the Trusteeship Department. Hammarskjold and Bunche worked extremely well together but the relationship between Hammarskjold and the Soviet Under-Secretary Without Portfolio was quite strained. So, later on, the Soviet Union requested that their Under-Secretary should resume the functions as head of the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, and the post was taken over first by Trevelyan, a British Ambassador, and later on by a member of the non-aligned countries, Loutfi first, an Egyptian, and

later on Narasimhan of India. After Narasimhan, a Latin American was appointed to the post, Rolz-Bennett, and when Rolz-Bennett died, another Latin American succeeded him and the post became a Latin American post. In the office of the Under-Secretaries for Special Political Affairs, Bunche was dealing with all peace-keeping operations and related political problems. At that time the main the main peace-keeping operations were deployed in the Mideast and Cyprus, so he was in charge of Mideast conflict and of the Cyprus problem.

JSS As well as the peace-keeping operations?

Liu And of course the peace-keeping operations, in their various forms. As he didn't want to have a large office the office was composed of a few members. Therefore he didn't want to take on the complex and time-consuming administrative matters relating to the UN peacekeeping operations. These matters were dealt with by an office called Field Operations Service which belonged to the Department of General Services. But there was a very close relationship between the head of Field Service and the office of Bunche.

Now Bunche was dealing first with the two observer missions, UNTSO and UNMOGIP. In 1956 during the Suez crisis, Dag Hammarskjöld created the first peace-keeping force with thousands of soldiers. Bunche was in charge of this very important and complex operation. The force

in the field was commanded by a force commander, generally a major general. He reported directly to Bunche and if there was anything extremely important he would send a cable to the Secretary-General. But normally the cables would be sent to Bunche and dealt with by Bunche, and since there was a very close relationship between Bunche and the Secretary-General, there was really no problem in the direction.

JSS Could I just ask you to pause there a minute and ask specifically, would you say that in these cases the Secretary-General and Bunche in his place acted really as the commander-in-chief, if you will, of the operation that was taking place in the field?

Liu Yes. Most peace-keeping operations are directed by the Secretary-General under the authority of the Security Council. In the case of UNEF, because it was created by a resolution of the General Assembly, it was under the authority of the Assembly. But the Secretary-General is the commander-in-chief while the command in the field is entrusted to the force commander. In fact, in order to have a better control of the force commander, he decided to make the force commander a member of the staff. So the force commander was not only a general seconded by a government but he was also a member of the Secretariat, a member of the United Nations Secretariat staff, generally with the rank of Assistant Secretary-General.

JSS That is an interesting point and that practice has been maintained as far as you know up to the present, that the field commander is in fact a member of the Secretariat.

Liu That's right. All the military personnel of peace-keeping operations are seconded by governments except one, the head of the operation.

JSS Now this involves really a trilateral relationship in a sense, that is between the field commander, the Secretary-General or his deputy and the Security Council or the General Assembly. Did this create problems in your experience in dealing specifically with the 1967 events, that is the peace-keeping operation leading up to 1967?

Liu If I may I will go back to the beginning. At the very beginning, as I said, the two first peace-keeping operations were military observer missions, UNTSO and UNMOGIP. Those two missions in the beginning were not controlled, were not directed by the Secretary-General, they were directed by the mediator. For instance, the origin of UNTSO was a resolution of the Security Council adopted soon after the eruption of the first war between Israel and the Arabs. In that resolution the Security Council called for a truce and asked the United Nations mediator for Palestine, Count Bernadotte, to supervise the truce with the assistance, of military observers. So, when the military observers came, they were under the

mediator. They were in fact an adjunct of the mediator. Bunche, who was the deputy to Count Bernadotte and who became mediator himself after the assassination of Bernadotte in September 1948, organized the first operation and laid down its various principles and rules. And in order to direct the observers, the mediator appointed a chief-of-staff, a Swedish officer for Bernadotte and an American officer when Bunche took over. He was the chief-of-staff of the mediator, not the chief-of-staff of UNTSO, you see. When Bunche drafted the four 1949 Mixed Armistice Agreements, he gave a very important role to the chief of staff and the observers of UNTSO. And in August 1949 when everything was concluded he advised the Secretary-General and the Security Council that the remaining task of mediation could be taken over by the Palestine Conciliation Commission, which was composed of France, Turkey and the United States. They would deal with the political problems, but UNTSO should be maintained because of the tasks given to UNTSO and the chief of staff of UNTSO by the general armistice agreements that were approved by the Security Council.

After that the functions of the mediator were terminated. But the chief of staff retained that title because it was mentioned not only in the General Armistice Agreements but also in the Security Council resolution. That's why UNTSO is the only peace-keeping

operation with a chief of staff as its head (because normally the chief of staff is number two, the chief of staff of the commander). Now since the mediator no longer existed, something had to be done to administer and direct the observer missions and that function was taken over by the Secretary-General as a practical arrangement. This change did not cause any political controversy because the responsibility involved was not very great. As I said, the functions of UNTSO are well defined by agreement between the parties and the role of the Secretary-General in directing the military observer missions was mainly administrative. But when the third United Nations peace-keeping operation was created, it was a different matter, it was no longer a military observer mission but a peace-keeping force with thousands of soldiers, and here we have to recall briefly the creation of that first UN peacekeeping force. When the Suez crisis erupted, which came with the invasion of Egyptian territories by Israel and two major powers - France and Great Britain. The Security Council immediately met to consider the matter, but it was paralyzed by the veto from France and the UK. So the matter was referred to the General Assembly in accordance with the provisions of the Uniting-for-Peace resolution adopted by the General Assembly after the Korean crisis. The General Assembly wanted to settle this matter and it

was able to do so because both the United States and the USSR wanted the withdrawal of the invading forces. Eisenhower, as you know, took a very strong stand on this issue. 1956 was an election year in the US. His advisors told him he shouldn't do it because "you might lose the election" and Eisenhower said, "well a principle is a principle for foe or friends", Israel and France and UK must withdraw their troops. So the General Assembly called for the withdrawal of their troops under the supervision of a peacekeeping operation. It was realized that a military observer mission like UNTSO would not be enough. The French and British governments said that they had sent their troops to Egypt to maintain law and order. If the United Nations could do that, they would withdraw. But to maintain law and order you need more than a few military observers. It was Lester Pearson of Canada, not Hammarskjold, who had first the idea of a kind of police force to do the job. The General Assembly agreed and adopted the draft resolution proposed by Canada. But once the resolution was passed, it was Dag Hammarskjold who took all the necessary practical measures to set up the force and make it a success.

That was the history. Because the General Assembly had no executive capability - it was a big body with many members, they meet regularly once a year and couldn't possibly handle the complex task of organizing and

directing a peace-keeping force - because Dag Hammarskjold had demonstrated his extraordinary ability, the Assembly gave him a free hand to carry out this task. He did everything, he decided on the form and shape of the force. He decided that it should be commanded by a force commander and should be composed of national contingents, borrowed from the various member states. He decided that the major powers should not participate in it; that the force should be provided with light defensive weapons but should not use force except in self-defense. That force called UNEF was a big success. Within a few months the invading forces were withdrawn, and after the withdrawal of Israeli forces, UNEF was positioned along the border between Israel and Egypt - on the Egyptian side only, because Israel refused to accept it on its side. And once deployed there, it maintained an effective peace in this very dangerous and strategic area for 10 years. Because of this success, when the Congo crisis erupted, the Security Council decided to have a force very much like UNEF and to give the Secretary-General a free hand to organize it. So the Secretary-General came, by force of circumstance, to assume very important powers, to organize and direct the force, under the authority of the Security Council or the General Assembly but with only a modicum of supervision from them.

That is how it was done. But perhaps, with hindsight, we realize that the Secretary-General assumed too much power. The power assumed by the Secretary-General became excessive in relation to the nature of his office. Some problems arose in the Congo when the Congo operation became sour. And also with UNEF I when the head of the Egyptian government, President Nasser, requested its withdrawal. U Thant had to assume responsibility for this very important move. So in 1973 - when the October War between Egypt and Israel nearly led to a direct confrontation between the two superpowers, the situation was saved by the Security Council when it decided to establish UNEF II on the night of 24 to October 25. When the Security Council decided this, it asked the Secretary-General to submit a report within 24 hours on the implementation of its resolution. At that time the Israeli forces were pushing towards the Suez Canal, and they could take Suez City any day. If the Suez City should fall, the Egyptian Third Army, which was the elite army of Sadat would be trapped in the Sinai and would have to surrender. That was a very very crucial matter for Sadat. So Sadat addressed a direct appeal to the United States and the USSR and asked them to send troops to Egypt to enforce the ceasefire. The United States refused because it was its policy not to have superpower involvement in the area. But the Soviet Union, which

wanted to play a more important role in the Middle East, accepted and was preparing to send troops there. There upon, Nixon addressed an ultimatum to the Soviet Union and placed the United States forces on general alert. At that time we were very near a Third World War and a nuclear holocaust. That was the most dangerous situation since the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.

The Secretary-General was aware of the importance of having a UN force there immediately, but he also knew that the Soviet Union might hesitate to accept such a force. So in his report, and we prepared it in the Office of Special Political Affairs, he voluntarily surrendered some of the Secretary-General's prerogatives to the Security Council. In the report, he said that the Force commander should be appointed by the Secretary-General, with the consent of the Security Council. Before, the Secretary-General, and particularly Dag Hammarskjold, could appoint anyone he wanted without consultation with the Security Council. He also said that the national contingents would be chosen by him in consultation with the parties and with the Security Council. And more important, he said that any important matter which might affect the future functioning of the force would be reported to the Security Council by the Secretary-General immediately for the Council's decision. We included that clause in the report because we

remembered the agony, the dilemma of U Thant concerning the withdrawal of UNEF I. Now if the Secretary-General has a crisis like this, he will simply refer the matter to the Security Council.

UNEF II was a big success. But we had a major crisis with UNEF II after the conclusion of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel under the auspices of President Carter. That peace treaty provided for the deployment of a United Nations force along the border. In the mind of the authors of the treaty, it was UNEF II which would be deployed there. But since the Soviet Union was opposed to the treaty, we knew that it would veto the extension of UNEF II. The treaty was concluded in March '79 and UNEF II's mandate was coming to expiration in late July '79. During the whole month of July, we tried to persuade the Soviet Union - when we say we, it means the Secretary-General and various concerned governments, including Egypt - not to veto an extension of the Force. But when we became certain they were going to veto it, the Secretary-General referred the matter to the Security Council. The Security Council held a number of informal meetings. When the deadlock persisted on the last day of the mandate, the Council decided to let UNEF II lapse. But there was no crisis, and the Secretary-General was not accused of destroying UNEF II. So I think it works better now.

JSS So you think this procedure works better now,....

Liu I think so. Particularly now, with the new situation, with more cooperation between the Permanent Members, I think that the Security Council and for that matter, the newly created peace-keeping operations, are functioning much more according to the spirit of the Charter.

JSS And actually, with hindsight, if this had been in effect in 1967 then U Thant would have had to consult the Security Council.

Liu That's right, he would have automatically referred the matter to the Security Council.

JSS Now, what you're saying, I believe, is that with the establishment of UNEF I, Hammarskjold established a kind of guideline for how peace-keeping operations should be organized and how they should be managed. Now at somewhat later as a result of the Congo situation, the special committee was established under the General Assembly which became known as the Peace-keeping Committee. And while its first concerns were financial, it later had the task of drafting guidelines which would be applicable to peace-keeping operations. My question is, did the Secretary-General or the Secretariat seek to influence the way in which those guidelines (which were never agreed) were drafted?

Liu No, no. We very carefully, scrupulously, stayed out of it. We let the special committee do it - in fact the

responsibility for serving the special committee belonged to the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs and not to the Office of Special Political Affairs because we wanted to stay away from it. As you know, for a long time there was a deadlock in the Special Committee on the question of command, direction and control and on the question of finances. So there were never any guidelines, they submitted reports, very short reports, saying that they couldn't agree. Only recently did the special committee make definite recommendations.

JSS Do you think that the operations have suffered because of a lack of such guidelines?

Liu No. I think that the guidelines worked out by Dag Hammarskjöld and modified in 1973 work very well because they were flexible. We followed the guidelines in a very flexible way according to the political circumstances. In fact, as you know, over the years the nature of the operations has changed and UNTSO, for instance, which was created in 1948 to supervise the truce, later had its mandate changed several times.

JSS Now, to continue, Mr. Liu, I want to ask where you were, if I'm correct you were actually in Mr. Bunche's office, that is the Under-Secretary's office, during most of this period. But you were sent to Jerusalem in 1967 - is that correct description of your position at that time, and what is the background of your move to Jerusalem?

Liu

Yes, I was sent to Jerusalem in January, '67. Now when we talk about the Six Day war in June '67, we have to go back at least to 1966. In 1966 tension rose again in the Mideast. This time not in the Egypt-Israel sector, which remained perfectly quiet thanks to the presence of UNEF I, but in the Israel-Syria sector. The relations then between Israel and Syria were governed by the 1949 General Armistice Agreement. Under the Agreement all violations of the Agreement could be brought before the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission, or ISMAC. They were brought in the form of complaints from one or the other of the two parties. The Commission would examine them in the order of their submission - one by one. The decisions of the Commission were taken by simple majority but since almost always the two parties would vote in the opposing direction, the decision was in fact taken by the chairman of the Commission, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO or his representative. Soon after the establishment of the Commission, there were so many complaints that the Commission could no longer examine them in the order of their submission and was completely bogged down. It was decided that the most urgent complaints would be dealt with by the Commission in emergency meetings. But soon Israel boycotted these emergency meetings as not in conformity with the spirit of the armistice agreement. So since the mid '50s, there were no meetings of ISMAC at

all. The function of ISMAC was mainly to have observers monitor the general situation and report any breaches of the armistice. In 1966 there were many incidents in the Israel-Syria sector, mainly because of the disputed land in the demilitarized zone. At the conclusion of the '49 general armistice agreement, the Syrian soldiers occupied one pocket in Galilee, in the Israeli-controlled territory. They agreed to withdraw from the pocket but that area was made into a demilitarized zone in which Israel was prohibited from maintaining troops. But they could maintain some security police. In that area all the land had originally belonged to Arabs but slowly, after 1949, the Israelis bought as much land as they could through various devices - for instance, by creating a company in Iran, which would buy any available land and then turn it over to the Israelis. And when the Israelis got the land, they would prevent the Arab farmers from coming near and even harass the Arab farmers to force them to sell their land.

In 1966 there were quite a number of disputed lands, claimed both by Arabs and Israelis. The Arab farmers could not get into those lands because they were prevented from doing so by the Israeli security police. When the Israeli farmers went into the land to till it, the Syrian soldiers positioned on the Golan Heights would fire at them. The Syrian shelling would invariably be

followed by air attacks by Israeli war planes. In 1966 there were many of those incidents and the situation became increasingly dangerous. In January 1967 the then Secretary-General, U Thant, issued an appeal to both sides for restraint. He proposed that the two parties try to settle their differences on the disputed land in what he called special emergency meetings of ISMAC. He chose the title of special emergency meetings since regular meetings couldn't be held and Israel had already boycotted the emergency meetings. Syria immediately accepted. A few days later, under pressure from the United States, Israel also agreed. So the first meeting took place around mid-January, but they couldn't agree on the agenda. The second meeting was scheduled for the end of January.

In the meanwhile the principal political advisor to the chief of staff fell sick. This principal political advisor was Henri Vigier. He was 80 years old. He had worked with the League of Nations and he had been the deputy to Bunche in the negotiations in Rhodes, which led to the conclusion of the 1949 General Armistice Agreements. When someone 80 years old has pneumonia it may become very dangerous. Vigier was completely incapacitated and Bunche sent me there to replace him. This is how I went to Jerusalem in January 1967. One day after my arrival I attend the second meeting of the Mixed

Armistice Commission. I realized that the two parties were hopelessly split on the question of the agenda. Apparently at the beginning of the first meeting the Syrian delegate made a speech in which he said that Syria wanted peace, so the Israelis seized this to propose that the special emergency meetings should discuss not only the specific problem of the disputed land in the demilitarized zone, but also the broader question of peace between the two countries. Syria adamantly opposed. They didn't want to talk about peace with Israel, they wanted to discuss the specific problem of the disputed land in the military zone, and only that problem. So the second meeting was also inconclusive. We scheduled the third meeting for the beginning of February but before the meeting could take place Syria sent word to say that they would not attend.

So we spent the whole months of February and March and the beginning of April trying to persuade Syria to come back to the Mixed Armistice Commission, but to no avail. But the situation at that time was quiet. Spring was late in coming that year and so the weather was too inclement for sowing. But on the 7th of April, the weather was better and the Israelis sent two tractors into the disputed land. Immediately the Syrian soldiers on the Golan Heights fired at them, and that was immediately followed by air attacks by Israeli war planes

against the Syrian position on the Golan Heights and against many villages. Some Israeli planes went even to Damascus. There was a dogfight over Damascus in which six Syrian MIGs were downed. There were no Israeli losses. We immediately reported the incident to the Secretary-General and in fact, I drafted a cable and I said that the incident created a new dangerous situation which could lead to war.

So from that day on Syria approached President Nasser. For many years the Syrians had accused Nasser of shielding himself behind UNEF and of not participating in the common struggle against Israel. But this time with this very serious incident, Nasser acceded to the Syrian request. There were troop movements on both sides and tension rose very rapidly. A joint command was created on the Arab side, a joint command of Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian troops, led by an Egyptian general. There were cries of "holy war" everywhere in the neighboring Arab lands.

JSS Now you mentioned the fact that there were troop movements at the time. I want to ask about UNTSO, and that is the military observers, because they were able to move along the borders between Israel and Syria at that time, as well as in the south of course there was UNEF. They followed - or did they follow - closely the movement of Israeli troops at that point?

Liu Yes, we followed. There were troop movements. According to the General Armistice Agreement, IMTSO monitored the limitation of troops around certain zones along the Armistice Demarcation zones. But beyond that zone we had no control. They could deploy their troops as they wished. The deployment of troops was visible mainly on the Arab side where troops and heavy artillery were positioned beyond the zone of limitation of armament. On the Israeli side the deployment was much less tangible because the Israelis had a different system. They could call in reservists by, I think, a secret signal through the radio and they could do that very quickly. So the movement of troops was more visible on the Arab side, and particularly in the Sinai when Nasser started to mass a very large number of troops.

JSS Now it has been said, and I think it's now known, that the Soviet Union passed information to the Egyptians, both in Moscow - in fact, to Mr. Sadat who happened to have been in Moscow at that time, and to Nasser in Cairo - that the Israelis were massing troops on the Syrian border, evidently intending an invasion of Syria. The United Nations military observers did not confirm that, is that correct?

Liu That's right. Now, as I said, you have a zone of limitation of armament in the border area. Beyond that, they could have any number of troops. The United

Nations's responsibility was to check that the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement were respected. When that complaint was aired, the chief of staff of UNTSO, as was his right, asked Israel to admit the military observers in that area. In the area at the border where the limitation of armament applied, there was no excessive deployment. And we could not check on the area beyond, but we did check in a special inspection according to the procedure defined by the standing operation procedure of UNTSO. We reported that there was no excessive deployment and armament.

JSS And that was reported to New York.

Liu To the Secretary-General, and the Secretary-General made it public as a means of lessening tension. But tension continued nevertheless. Then on the evening of 16 May 1967, General Rikhye, the commander of UNEF I, received a message from the Egyptian local commander asking him to withdraw the UN troops from two positions. That was the start of the crisis.

JSS Right. Now, being in Jerusalem at the time, how did the UNTSO office interpret this Egyptian move?

Liu Oh, we took it very seriously, very very seriously, in fact we were the first to know about the crisis because all the cables went through Jerusalem. We were a relay center. We told the Secretary-General of course that we were here, that we would do anything he instructed us to

do but the next day the Secretary-General sent a cable to General Rikhye and to General Bull in UNTSO saying that he was going to handle the matter in New York.

JSS So that the advice from Jerusalem was not requested then by the Secretary-General on what to do...

Liu No. So we just followed. We followed the very tense negotiations which lasted two days, from the evening of the 16th to the 18th when the Egyptian government, President Nasser, formally submitted the request for the withdrawal of UNEF I and U Thant decided to accede to the request. Many events took place during these 48 hours in New York, but of course we knew them, because we were kept informed.

JSS Now this initial Egyptian message has been interpreted in various ways, but as you say, it only asked for the withdrawal of UNEF soldiers from the observation posts...

Liu Two positions.

JSS What would have been the result if simply that had been done and nothing more? What would the result have been for UNEF I?

Liu Well, if nothing more, I think the crisis could be contained but there was no assurance there would be nothing more. And also, during those crucial 48 hours the Egyptians, the Egyptian army, had already pushed our soldiers from their positions and also they were trying to push our position from Sharm el Sheikh. And that was

very important because Sharm el Sheikh controlled the access to the Gulf of Acaba.

JSS I wanted to ask that specific point. How important was that post in terms of maintaining freedom of access to the Gulf of Acaba?

Liu Essential. Because the Strait of Tiran is very narrow and it can be controlled only from the Sinai side. From the Saudi Arabia side you can't because of the configuration of the coast. A small position there could close completely the Strait of Tiran. That's why in 1957 Dag Hammarskjold was so keen on getting control of that position because that was essential for his peace plan. Naturally we didn't know on the evening of 16 May what was the intention of Egypt except that this was a big crisis.

JSS Now, had UNTSO made any assessment of the relative military strengths at this time, given the likelihood of war?

Liu We didn't have the exact knowledge of the military strength, but we knew more or less. Egypt seemed very strong; it had massed in the Sinai close to 100,000 troops with many tanks. As you know, quite recently the war in Yemen had ended and Egypt withdrew their troops from that country. Israel forces were also very strong and extremely efficient. Syria was less of a factor. The Jordanian Arab legion had lost much of its power

since the departure of Glubb Pasha; so the Jordanians also were not a major factor.

JSS So actually then the United Nations observers were as surprised as many others by the total defeat of the Egyptian army so quickly.

Liu Yes, that was a surprise not only to the United Nations but to many people. Now, the defeat of the Egyptian army was caused mainly by the defeat of the air force, the destruction of the air force during the first 12 hours.

JSS Yes, it clearly illustrated the importance of air power at that point. Now how long did you stay in Jerusalem?

Liu I was sent there really for two months but because of the rising tension I was asked to stay on and I stayed until I arranged for the ceasefire operation in the Golan Heights. Then I came back to New York.

JSS So you were still in Jerusalem at the time when Resolution 242 was being drafted in New York...Now we'll continue a minute on the outcome of the '67 war...You were still in Jerusalem then when the Egyptian army collapsed. What did UNTSO do at that point where clearly a new military situation had been created in the area?

Liu As I said, during the very tense period from the 16 to the 18 May, the negotiations, the efforts of the Secretariat were carried out by the Secretary-General and Ralph Bunche at United Nations headquarters. We were told not to do anything, in fact. So we just followed

the events. But when on the 18th of May U Thant acceded to the request of Nasser and ordered the withdrawal of the United Nations troops, we tried to be helpful. When UNEF I was deployed along the border between Egypt and Israel, UNTSO still maintained a small group of observers in Gaza. Israel had denounced the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Egypt and no longer recognized the Mixed Armistice Commission. But U Thant's position was that the General Armistice Agreement was concluded by two parties. And the agreement could be ended from the United Nations viewpoint, only if both parties agreed, or if the Security Council so decided. Since Egypt insisted on the maintenance of the Agreement and the matter was not taken up by the Security Council, we decided to maintain the Mixed Armistice Commission in Gaza, in Egyptian territory, and with only the Egyptian members. It was a symbolic presence and we maintained six observers there. These observers carried out periodic patrols along the border. All that was symbolic, but now it became useful because we thought that if UNEF I should be withdrawn, if the United Nations soldiers should be withdrawn, some of their functions could be performed by the military observers. We could in that way still have a United Nations presence. Egypt had always agreed on the presence of the observers, but we had to deal with the Israeli government. We went to

the Israeli government and we told them that peace was important. The withdrawal of UNEF did not mean war, we had to maintain peace at all cost. We should maintain a presence of the United Nations for that purpose. We proposed to increase the number of observers in Gaza from 6 to 20 as a first step. The Israelis agreed. They said, "we'll continue not to recognize the Commission but we will cooperate with you." And with their cooperation, additional military observers were sent from Jerusalem to Gaza through the Israeli checkpoint.

JSS Now were they limited to the Gaza area or did they go across into the Sinai?

Liu They were in Gaza, but I think their presence was useful. Anyway, we had not considered going to Sinai because with 20 observers we couldn't do very much. What we wanted was a presence, made as visible as possible. So we increased the patrolling, and so on. So with this the UNTSO presence was increased and became more active. During our meeting with the Director-General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, he said that Israel would exercise restraint and would, to the extent possible, avoid a war. He also said however that there were two matters which would be considered as *casus belli*. One was an increase of terrorist activities by the Palestinians from Gaza and secondly, the Gulf of Acaba should not be closed to Israeli shipping. So we

immediately cabled this information to the Secretary-General and I think that it was this message which caused the Secretary-General to go to Cairo on 22 May. He was to visit Cairo much later but he advanced the date in order to get Nasser not to close the Gulf of Acaba. We received a cable from the Secretary-General asking us and General Rikhye go to Cairo to meet him on the 22nd, and on the 21st of May we were there, waiting for him. But during the night of 21 to 22 of May, while the Secretary-General stopped over in London on his way to Cairo, President Nasser proclaimed the closure of the Gulf of Acaba to Israeli shipping. And that sealed the fate.

When U Thant came, he immediately saw Nasser and asked him, "why did you do it? I came here to ask you, to beg you, not to close the Gulf of Agaba. Now this is war." And Nasser said, "I didn't want to say no to you, therefore I did it before you arrived."

JSS Yes, to go ahead now with what you were saying. You were in Cairo then when the Secretary-General came to meet with Nasser and to make this appeal for a moratorium. What was your impression of U Thant's mood and attitude at this particular point?

Liu He was extremely depressed, extremely sad. I believe that, of course you know, U Thant was a very religious man, a very peaceful man, a very kind man and he agreed to the withdrawal of UNEF I in good faith, thinking that

somehow peace might be maintained. Now with his conversation with Nasser, he realized that war was almost inevitable but he didn't want to believe in war. He went to see Nasser with General Rikhye because Rikhye was the force commander of UNEF I. Then he met with Bull and at 11:00 when I was going to bed, suddenly he called me. He said, "F. T., come into my room." I saw him alone and he was very sad, in a confiding mood. He was hoping that peace could be preserved, now he was less sure. But he still wanted to hope that peace could be preserved. He said, "well, I think I want to call for a moratorium." Moratorium might not be the right word for this situation but for him it was. It's like a debt, and you could extend the moment of truce so that he could find some way of making an agreement.

JSS And this concept of moratorium that he had, that was simply in a sense a standstill on all fronts?

Liu That's right, for them not to take any action which would lead to actual war, to active war...

JSS Which would have meant not stopping any Israeli ship going through the Strait of Tiran.

Liu Yes, and not to increase the troop movement at the border, not to make irresponsible statements - something, but at that time he wanted to gain time.

JSS And when he left Cairo did you have the impression that he felt that he had succeeded to some extent?

Liu No, he knew because the main thing, quite simply, it was the closure of the Gulf of Acaba, and when Nasser took the decision and refused to reverse it, it became hopeless. But he still hoped that something might happen, a **deus ex machina**.

JSS But you had to anticipate at that point that there would be war and the Israelis would not stand back.

Liu Yes, at that time the Israelis made it quite clear. They used the word, the latin expression, **casus belli** to emphasize the point.

JSS And of course we know the outcome of that. Now going ahead to the outcome, were you still in Jerusalem or were you back in New York at the time when the SC was meeting and when Resolution 242 was eventually adopted?

Liu Yes, I was in New York, and in fact I saw Lord Caradon discussing with his staff about changing some words to get the resolution adopted. And I was in the SC chamber when the resolution was adopted. The whole room broke into loud applause, it never happened before - well, not in my memory. It was as if all the members of the Council, all the persons in the Council room thought that finally we could have a peace agreement, of course that hope was to be frustrated.

JSS Now, this is known of course as the British draft - was there any input from the Secretariat that you know of?

Liu No, no. Normally, on this very crucial question, the

Secretariat would not want to put in any input, unless asked. That resolution was prepared by the British delegation. In fact I was near Lord Caradon when he told his staff, "try to reword the resolution to have it adopted unanimously."

JSS Now, to your knowledge, was the resolution subjected to what I would call a legal examination by the Legal Department of the Secretariat? The reason I ask this question is, was the significance of the word "the" recognized at that point in front of the Occupied Territories?

Liu At that time I don't think that was recognized, it was recognized later when Jarring started his negotiations.

JSS So that the subtlety of that, if that was the intention of the British draft and I suppose it was, was not recognized immediately..

Liu I don't think so, and also when you consider a resolution and so on, each delegation considered the resolution in one language. I don't think that many delegations would compare the English and French texts. It was assumed that the translation was correct, so the resolution read - the original was in the English text, "withdraw from occupied territory," (without the "the") but, the French considered the text in their language with the "le," "des territoires." In fact the problem is that you can't translate this phrase exactly in French because this

would be bad French and therefore you need to add something. You need either "from **the** territories" or "from **certain** territories." The "the" would be too much, "certain" would be not enough. But the French didn't realize that, the French text was drafted in very good French, and the English text was equally good, and the translation sections didn't pay much attention to the _ . The problem came later. In fact, it became an issue because the political will was absent, otherwise it didn't really matter. But when the political will is not there, then you look for reasons to disagree.

JSS I want to go ahead now to Mr. Jarring and his mission. Could you give a personal assessment of Mr. Jarring and of his efforts to bring about a peace settlement?

JSS Well, Jarring is a very [good] diplomat, very hard-working, very thorough. He tried everything possible and he was helped by the major powers. At one time the four major powers (except China) met regularly in order to foster his efforts. He was helped by the Africans, there was a high-level African mission, a mission of four African presidents, led by Senghor. He went to the area to help him. So he had many assets, and at the end he arrived at the right conclusion, which was that the problem had to be dealt with **seriatim**, first in the Egyptian sector and later going on into the Jordanian sector and the Syrian sector. So he started with the

Egyptian sector and he proposed, as you know, an exchange of territory for recognition. Also, in order to make the problem less complicated he dealt only with Sinai, not with Gaza which was part of Palestine. So he proposed the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Sinai in exchange for recognition. The Egyptians accepted, but Israel rejected it and that was the end of the Jarring effort. But that was the same proposal that was later taken up by Carter and led to the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. The problem with Jarring was that he didn't have the clout of a major power.

JSS Right. Now I wanted to ask in this connection again the relationship between a negotiator like that, a mediator, Jarring, and Headquarters in New York. Was he being given continuing guidance from the Secretary-General, or was he largely independent?

Liu Well he was not guided daily. But he himself consulted the Secretary-General and Bunche very often. He came to New York and they worked very closely.

JSS Now in the course of time when it came to 1970 there had been the war of attrition on the Egyptian-Israeli front. Jarring was able to arrange a ceasefire at this point, is that his personal ...

Liu I think that really the US arranged a ceasefire in order to facilitate the Jarring mission, the resumption of the Jarring mission. I think that the main role was played

by the US.

JSS So that in fact you needed a major power to do it.

Liu But this ceasefire did hold for a while. It held until October, 1973. In fact the biggest surprise, the eruption of the October war, the October war was a big surprise for everyone because the situation was very quiet, almost normal. You had some exchange of fire, but that was very normal. The situation was extremely quiet and the Israeli authorities didn't believe there would be a war at that time. For the first time they were surprised. They were taken aback.

JSS Now, in the process of trying to achieve a ceasefire and eventually a disengagement, Henry Kissinger was in touch with the Secretary-General. How would you describe the relationship between Kissinger as the major negotiator at that point and the Secretariat of the United Nations and Waldheim?

Liu It was good, it was good. I believe that in the beginning he didn't believe too much in the United Nations. But with the October war, he came to see the usefulness of the United Nations and he used the United Nations in a very skillful way.

JSS In particular, are you referring to the talks at km 101?

Liu First, 101. The talks at 101 were under United Nations auspices. They were chaired by Siilasvuo, that was the United Nations. Only later you had the second

negotiation dealing with the partial disengagement, that led by Kissinger. What he did was to conduct indirect negotiations between the parties in his shuttle diplomacy. You could really not go into great detail in such negotiations. So he would seek an agreement in broad terms and then pass it to the United Nations. The United Nations would then discuss the detailed arrangements in direct negotiations between the two parties.

JSS Right. Now in his memoirs Kissinger stressed the importance of the talks at km 101, but he said that he never knew quite what was happening because he got different reports from the United Nations, from the Israelis and from the American observer there. What was the reporting procedure on the United Nations side from km 101?

Liu You mentioned the American observer, you mean the American observers of UNTSO?

JSS Well I think, weren't there also American observers actually at the talks?

Liu Oh, I see. Yes, yes.

JSS Not the military observer but the...

Liu Yes, yes. Well you see, the same thing is seen by different people in a slightly different light. That is normal because the perspectives are different for each. But, I would say that on the talks at km 101, the main

source, the original source was the United Nations. We organized it, we chaired it.

JSS And James Jonah was there ...

Liu James Jonah was sent there to advise Siilasvuo.

JSS Yes, he was a kind of a political advisor,

Liu That's right, he was the political advisor, in the same way as I was advisor to Bull in 1967.

JSS And so Jonah was really responsible for reporting back what happened?

Liu Yes. I'm sure that Siilasvuo and Jonah thought in the same way.

JSS In fact when the so-called peace conference was then organized in Geneva, the Secretary-General, who by now is Mr. Waldheim, opened the conference, but that was his only role, is that your impression?

Liu That's right. The Geneva conference was sponsored by the United States and the USSR, but the Secretary-General was asked to invite the parties and to open the negotiations. And of course the United Nations was there.

JSS Now was it your impression from the perspective of Headquarters that General Siilasvuo and his staff were able actually to contribute to the successful achievement of the implementation of the ceasefire, and ultimately the disengagement agreement. Was there a substantive United Nations contribution to this?

Liu Oh yes, yes. His role was very important. You see I know

that Kissinger had an agreement in broad terms. Let's take the more difficult of the two agreements, that between Israel and Syria. Syria was the enemy, you see. After Kissinger got an agreement on broad terms that was very important, direct negotiations took place within the military commission of the Geneva Conference. In fact they used this channel as an umbrella. When the peace conference was opened in Geneva in December, 1973, they held just a few meetings and then they adjourned. But the military committee, that is the military committee with Israeli and Egyptian representatives and chaired by Siilasvuo, remained in function. And the matter was dealt with by the military committee, with the Israeli, Egyptian and of course Syrian representatives sent there especially for the purpose. And chaired by Siilasvuo with Jonah as advisor. And they pinpointed all the problems to be resolved and made the detailed arrangements.

JSS Including the geographic pinpointing, I believe.

Liu Yes, that's right.

JSS And in effect the United Nations then could assist in the technical aspects of the agreement which was under negotiation but you're suggesting that they also could provide a substantive input by ideas of how difficulties could be overcome.

Liu Yes.

JSS And General Siilasvuo was quite expert in this area by that time, is that right?

Liu Yes, he was then commander of UNEF II, and he was very good.

JSS I was going to ask if you could give your impression of the effectiveness of General Siilasvuo at this point because he was in a very crucial role.

Liu That's right, he played a very crucial role and he was a general with a political mind too, which is important. He played a very important role.

JSS Because I want to depart a little bit here from the '73 war on this question of the military commanders because in the recent study you did for the International Peace Academy you've pointed to the fact that the quality of the force commanders varied in the history of peace-keeping. Some were good and some were not so good. Are there instances in this history that we've been talking about where the quality of the force commander made a real difference?

Liu I think so. I must say that all the very successful operations were led by very good generals. UNEF I owed much to General Burns who was the force commander and UNEF II owed very much to Siilasvuo. A good force commander is essential in time of crisis. It is not important when there is no crisis. UNTSO, for instance, for many years was just a presence and the role was not

too significant. So if you have a less good general there, it doesn't matter that much. In fact, too active a general would be a handicap sometimes and I know that Israel doesn't want that; they just want a presence with a general whom they could handle easily. Of course we need a general who would not let the parties handle him. I mentioned Burns for UNEF I, Sillasvuo for UNEF II. I should mention Prem Chand. In Cyprus there was a big crisis when the Turkish army entered (I don't want to use "invaded" because the Turkish government doesn't like the word), took military action against Cyprus. They of course immediately took over quite a lot of land and next they wanted to take the airport of Nicosia, that was very important because Nicosia was the capital and if they took the airport the balance would be changed drastically. He got from the British, (we had a British battalion), some heavy equipment, I think including Stinger missiles, and he positioned them with an internationally composed unit at the airport to resist the Turkish forces and the Turks never took the airport.

JSS And this was General Prem Chand who was there at that point, who had been in Katanga..

Liu And also in Katanga without Prem Chand and his troops. We might not have resolved the Katanga secession.

JSS So you would say that the UN has been fortunate in the quality of its force commanders in the major peace-

keeping operations except for perhaps partly in the Congo.

Liu Yes, in the Congo, that's right. From time to time you have had less-good generals - as I said in my booklet. I really don't want to name names. But that happens everywhere but in the UN we need very good generals, particularly for crucial operations.

JSS I want to return now to the question of the military observers in UNTSO. And I wanted to ask whether you felt from the perspective again of Headquarters the presence and US and Soviet observers when that occurred, made any difference - was it an advantage or a disadvantage or simply made no difference at all?

Liu It didn't make much difference but there is a political advantage obviously. It was a proposal, a joint proposal, by the US and the USSR to have that. It was imposed on the Secretary-General and the Secretary-General had to accept it. But I think it's a small price to pay to get the support of the two superpowers. The continuous support of the US and the new support of the USSR. In fact, the USSR changed its position at that time which later led to Gorbachev's dramatic change in '86.

JSS Which would take me back to a question about a much earlier period which you mentioned a little earlier and, which is, why did Hammarskjold take the position that US

and Soviet forces should not be included in peace-keeping operations?

Liu

I can only guess. First I think that the peacekeeping force would be in his mind very different from the force under Chapter 7. Chapter 7 envisaged a force mainly based on the support and the participation of the major powers. During the Suez crisis he wanted a force without the major powers. Since that conflict involved two major powers, he thought it would be good not to have any major powers in the force. In one of his first reports on the subject, he said that there were three ways of planning the force: copying the Korean method (that is, give the task to one country, probably one major power) and he didn't think that was advisable. Or give it to the two major powers already there since they said that they went there to maintain law and order, and he thought that that too was not a good option. So he proposed a new force which would rely on the small and medium powers without major powers involvement.

INDEX OF NAMES

Bernadotte, Count	6, 7
Bull, Odd	23, 29, 36
Bunche, Ralph	3-5, 7, 15, 18, 25, 33
Burns, General	38, 39
Caradon, Lord	30, 31
Carter, Jimmy	13, 33
Cordier, Andrew	2
Dobrynin, Anntoly	3
Eisenhower, Dwight D.	9
Hammarskjöld, Dag	2-4, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 24, 40
Jarring, Gunnar V.	1, 31-33
Jonah, James	36, 37
Kissinger, Henry	1, 34, 35, 37
Loutfi, Omar	3
Narasimhan, C.V.	4
Nasser, Gammal Abdel	1, 11, 20, 21, 23, 26, 28-30
Pasha, Glubb	25
Pearson, Lester B.	9
Prem Chand,	39
Rikhye, Indar Jit	22, 23, 28, 29
Rolz-Bennett,	4
Sadat, Anwar	11, 21
Senghor, Léopold Sédar	32
Tchernychev, Ilya S.	3
Thant, U	1, 11, 13, 14, 18, 23, 26, 28



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LIBRARY

Trevelyan, Humphrey	3
Vigier, Henri	18
Waldheim, Kurt	34, 36



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