

UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY
COUNCIL



ORIGINAL

S/2377
16 October 1951

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE DATED 15 OCTOBER 1951 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES
ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TRANSMITTING THE TWENTY-SEVENTH
REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND OPERATIONS IN KOREA
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION
OF 7 JULY 1950 (S/1588)

The Representative of the United States to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honor to refer to Paragraph 6 of the Resolution of the Security Council of July 7, 1950, requesting the United States to provide the Security Council with reports, as appropriate, on the course of action taken under the United Nations Command.

In compliance with this Resolution, there is enclosed herewith, for circulation to the members of the Security Council, the Twenty-seventh Report of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period August 1 through 15, 1951, inclusive.

27th REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND OPERATIONS IN KOREA
FOR THE PERIOD 1 - 15 AUGUST 1951

I herewith submit report number 27 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 1 - 15 August, inclusive. United Nations Command Communiqués numbers 962-976, inclusive, provide detailed accounts of these operations.

It is with extreme regret that I report there has been no progress in the armistice negotiations during the period. Item Number two of the agenda, "Fixing of military demarcation line between both sides so as to establish a demilitarized zone as a basic condition for the cessation of hostilities in Korea", has remained under discussion without any suggestion that the Communist delegates will depart from their arbitrary insistence upon the 38th Parallel as the sole line of demarcation which they would consider. The enemy's delegates have refused to discuss in detail the United Nations Command proposals relating to this item and have even rejected the United Nations Command recommendation that other items on the agenda be explored in the interest of producing some progress in the conference.

The Chinese and North Korean negotiators have made repeated vehement statements in support of a military line of demarcation on the 38th Parallel. Furthermore, the arguments of General Nam Il give rise to the belief that the Chinese and North Korean Communists have undertaken the negotiations only to give needed respite to their defeated forces and to provide one more outlet for their propaganda. In the twenty-five sessions to date, there has unfortunately been little evidence which indicates the enemy has honest intentions of arriving at honorable terms of an armistice.

The Communist negotiators remain adamant in opposition to the position taken by the United Nations Command Delegation on item 2 of the agenda. The United Nations Command position is that the zone of neutrality and the line of demarcation between the opposing forces during the armistice period must be premised upon military realities, the most significant of which are the geographical location of the present front lines and the necessity of retaining defensible terrain. The United Nations Command has continued to reiterate its refusal to

abandon the strong defensive position it has won by throwing back the aggressors.

Incidents attendant upon the negotiations prove the validity of the concern felt at dependence upon the words or guarantees of the Communist leaders. On 4 August approximately one company of Communist infantry armed with grenades, mortars and machine guns in addition to small arms, traversed the neutral zone, passing not over one hundred yards from the conference house. Subsequent to my protest and suspension of negotiations pending receipt of satisfactory explanation, this action was admitted by Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh Hwai to be in violation of their solemn pledge and assurances of 14 July, but the whole matter was passed off by them as "minor" and "trivial". This indifference to the violation of their guarantee displayed by the North Korean and Chinese Communist leaders commends to the United Nations Command great prudence in the grave enterprise of insuring that the minimum required security arrangements for the Republic of Korea and United Nations Forces precede a cessation of hostilities.

The above incident was followed by completely unsupported counter charges that the United Nations Command was guilty of violations of the neutrality agreements. On 9 August, General Nam Il, through his Liaison Officer, claimed that the United Nations Command had violated its guarantees by attacking a Communist vehicle plainly marked with white cloth and carrying a white flag. The sole guarantee ever given by United Nations Command Liaison Officers with regard to aircraft refraining from the attack of the Communist delegations' vehicles was contingent upon their being properly marked and upon prior notification being given of the time and route of their movement. The latter specification had not been complied with and United Nations aircraft did machine gun the truck. The United Nations Command cannot accept the risk of its forces entailed in refraining from attacks on any vehicles observed in rear of the battle zone except those reported by the Communist delegation as being in the service of the delegation. On 14 August, the Communists complained of a like incident. They have been informed again that the United Nations Command provides no immunity for vehicles unless the time and route of movement have been communicated to the United Nations Command.

Another charge, trumped up by the Communists, was levelled at United Nations ground forces. They alleged that a United Nations contingent on seven August

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fired into the town of Pan Mun Jom on the eastern edge of the neutral zone from a position two hundred meters away. A thorough investigation made at the direction of General Van Fleet proves this to have been pure fabrication, an impossibility in consideration of the relative location of forces on that particular day.

As a result of the Communist violation, the sessions were suspended from 5 August until 10 August; sessions were held on all other days of the period. There is unfortunately little ground for optimism at this time, that satisfactory agreements will derive from the Kaesong meetings. However, it is the intention of the United Nations Command Delegation to continue to work for just and honorable terms which are based upon the present military situation and which will provide for adequate guarantees against a renewal of Communist aggression in Korea.

The front was only moderately active throughout the period. The enemy stiffened his counter reconnaissance screen and undertook extensive small patrol reconnaissance of United Nations positions. On the central and eastern fronts from Kumhwa to Pohang, he conformed to his previous pattern of firm resistance to all United Nations advances; and in the twenty-mile sector of the western front from Tuilchang to Pangye, he has increased noticeably the vigor of his reactions. On the extreme western front, in the Korangpo-Changdan sector, he resisted all United Nations patrols operating more than three thousand yards in advance of the main United Nations line.

Increased strength in hostile artillery and mortars is in evidence along the entire front, except on the extreme flanks, and in several instances the enemy has delivered relatively heavy concentrations of medium caliber artillery fire. The volume of fire suggests that he has succeeded in accumulating considerable stocks of ammunition in forward areas.

Both ground operations and air reconnaissance were hampered by poor visibility and heavy rains. Despite swollen streams, United Nations patrols maintained steady pressure on enemy positions. The most intense fighting of the period took place three miles to the south and southeast of Changjong on the eastern front where United Nations Forces overcame bitter resistance to seize high ground to their immediate front and successfully repulsed numerous sharp counterattacks by forces up to battalion strength. Attempts to advance into Otan Amhyon, Chuktong, Hoegok,

and Pia sectors continued to encounter resolute opposition.

Front lines remained generally unchanged except on a twelve-mile front in the vicinity of Chungdong where United Nations patrols controlled ground about five miles in front of the United Nations main forces. At the close of the period, the line of contact ran generally northeast from Changdan to Chorwon, eastward to Pia, thence northeast to the vicinity of Pohang.

Hostile guerrilla forces operating in the United Nations rear areas have maintained a limited potential for harassing action even though exposed to relatively heavy attrition by United Nations security forces. Guerrilla activities, however, have been almost entirely confined to foraging and defense.

As in previous periods, the enemy has taken full advantage of the respite from major combat operations. His stocks of military supplies in forward areas have been increased significantly in the past two weeks under the cover of bad weather and poor visibility. Simultaneously, he has filled and bridged many of the anti-tank ditches which he had earlier installed on the western and central fronts. There is considerable evidence of increased tank and vehicle activity in forward areas. Prisoners of war continue to report plans for a "sixth phase offensive." Amid growing indications that the enemy has the means to resume the offensive, it must be presumed he will do so if that suits his purpose.

UN Naval Forces conducted constant patrol and reconnaissance operations which continued to deny to the enemy the waters surrounding Korea and to safeguard the movement of United Nations shipping in those waters.

Flying conditions were generally poor over Korea during much of this period due to the prevalence of low flying clouds. Despite these unfavorable conditions, United Nations carrier-based and Marine land-based aircraft flew substantial numbers of effective sorties in close air support of United Nations Ground Forces and in interdiction of enemy lines of communication.

United Nations surface units continued a daily program of interdiction by Naval gunfire against enemy railroads, highways, supply and troop concentrations and moving transport. On the east coast, these operations were concentrated in the Wonsan, Songjin and Chongjin areas.

On the west coast, the Han and Taedong River estuaries and the Hoeju areas received primary attention. Good results were achieved in these operations.

Active and effective naval gunfire support of United Nations Ground Forces was furnished by United Nations cruisers and destroyers along the east coast of Korea.

Check minesweeping operations continued on both coasts of Korea, particularly in the Wonsan area. The usual number of drifting mines were sighted and destroyed by United Nations Forces during the period of this report.

The power of the Far East Air Forces land-based planes was concentrated on the disruption of enemy main supply routes as the relatively static ground situation lessened the demand for close air support sorties. Generally poor flying weather over Korea, however, required a considerable proportion of the missions to be flown through clouds and rain.

B-29 medium bombers attacked more than a dozen marshalling yards in addition to enemy supply dumps, troop concentrations and airfields. Anti-aircraft fire was frequently experienced, some damage resulting; but no enemy aircraft were encountered.

Fighters and fighter-bombers, both jet and propeller types, flew larger formations and deeper into enemy territory to bomb out lengthy sections of railroad track and to hit bridges and other supply route targets. Many sorties were flown against anti-aircraft gun positions on flak neutralization strikes to pave the way for bomber attacks. Fighter and Fighter-bombers, including the South African Air Force mustangs, furnished requested close air support of United Nations Ground Forces undertaking limited offensive operations.

B-26 light bombers and shore-based United States Marine Corps aircraft, attacking flare-illuminated targets, destroyed or damaged more than 1,000 Communist vehicles as the heavy southward flow of enemy supply trucks continued. Enemy airfields were hit almost nightly and kept inoperable by B-26's. No effective threat has developed from North Korean airfields.

Royal Australian Air Force pilots in British-made meteor jet fighters joined the United States F-86's in escort and fighter sweep missions deep into Northwest Korea. Enemy aircraft were sighted but they generally declined to fight. On 9 August enemy MIG's jumped F-80's on a bridge-bombing run but no damage was suffered by either side. Later that day, a reconnaissance F-80 was slightly damaged by four MIGs.

A flood swollen Korean river set the stage for the largest air rescue of the war when ninety-five United Nations troops threatened with drowning were evacuated by USAF helicopters. The last sixteen troops were hauled aboard by "hoist lines." The United Nations Command negotiators continue to depend upon the helicopters for transportation to Kaesong from their base camp.

Cargo aircraft, including the Royal Hellenic and Royal Thailand transports, airlifted more than 6,500 tons of military supplies and equipment from Japan to Korea and air dropped some 130 tons to advanced friendly forces whose ground resupply had been jeopardized by flood waters. More than 14,000 soldiers and airmen of all participating nations were flown between Japan and Korea in furtherance of the rest and recuperation program.

In an attempt to minimize the harm to North Korean civilians, a series of leaflets were dropped over enemy territory pointing out the various types of military targets that the North Korean and Communist Chinese have established in population centers and warning them to remain as far away from these attacks as possible.

A large proportion of the enemy prisoners of war detained by the United Nations have been transferred from the Pusan area to the island of Joje (Koje-Do). The enemy prisoners of war population of Koje-Do as of midnight, 8 August 1951, was 14,690 and the population at prisoner of war enclosure No. 1 at Pusan was 16,168.

United Nations Command leaflets, loudspeaker and radio broadcasts are making the widest possible dissemination of news reports on the discussion of substantive items at the Kaesong armistice negotiations. These media have made it clear that the scope of the Kaesong conferences is solely military and that political questions cannot be considered at this time. Radio broadcasts for front line troops, and additional leaflets air dropped far to the north of the ground battle line, have explained, to soldier and civilian alike, the United Nations Command proposal for an armistice based upon the actual military situation. They have exposed the Communist attempt to revive the militarily irrelevant 38th Parallel as a demarcation line.