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LETTER DATED 24 JULY 1950 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TRANSMITTING THE FIRST REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ON THE COURSE OF ACTION TAKEN UNDER THE UNIFIED COMMAND (USG) IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF 7 JULY 1950 (S/1568)

I have the honor to refer to the resolution of the Security Council of 7 July 1950 and, in accordance therewith, to submit, for circulation to the members of the Security Council, the "First Report to the Security Council by the United States Government" on the course of action taken under the Unified Command (USG).

I would appreciate the text of this Report not being made public prior to the meeting of the Security Council scheduled for Tuesday, 25 July at 3 p.m.

(Signed) Warren R. AUSTIN

Permanent Representative of the  
United States of America to the  
United Nations

/FIRST REPORT  
S/1626

FIRST REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT,  
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF 7 JULY 1950

At 0400 Korean time on Sunday, 25 June 1950, the North Korean Army launched a completely unprovoked invasion of South Korea. North Korean infantry crossed the 38th parallel, led by Soviet-made tanks in an estimated number of 100. The main attack was down the Pochon-Uijongbu-Seoul corridor. Simultaneously, attacks were launched in the Ongjin Peninsula to the West, against Chunchon in the eastern mountains, and down the east coast road. The North Korean Air Force covered the amphibious landings, and attacked Kimpo Airfield, near Seoul. The size of the attack, the fact that it covered the principal areas along the 38th parallel, and the amount and character of material involved, and the use of amphibious landings, indicated clearly that the invasion had been carefully planned for long in advance.

The character and disposition of the Republic of Korea Army indicated that it did not expect this sudden attack. This fact is supported by a report of an observation team of the United Nations Commission on Korea, made along the 38th parallel and dated 24 June 1950. This report stated that its team of observers "had, in the course of a two-week inspection been left with the impression that the Republican Army was organized entirely for defense and (was) in no condition to carry out a large-scale attack against the forces in the North. The observers found that the Republic of Korea forces were disposed in depth all along the 38th parallel with no concentration of troops at any point, that a large number of Republic of Korea troops were actively engaged in rounding up guerrillas and were, in any case, entirely lacking in the armor, heavy artillery, and air support necessary to carry off an invasion of North Korea." These facts controverted completely the North Korea broadcast from Pyongyang, late in the morning of 25 June, that the Republic of Korea had initiated an attack across the border and that the North Korean Forces had been ordered to repel the attack.

The North Korean invaders were reported to have committed initially 6 divisions of Infantry, 3 Border Constabulary Brigades, supported by approximately 100 Soviet-made T34 and T70 tanks and ample heavy artillery. Their Air Force held complete control of the air, and was at the time estimated to be composed of 100-150 Soviet-made combat planes. The total strength of the North Korean forces was placed at between 90,000 and 100,000, organized in approximately

/7 divisions

7 divisions and 5 brigades, well trained and equipped chiefly with excellent Soviet matériel.

Opposed to this mobile army, Republic of Korea troops were initially deployed along the 38th parallel with elements of 4 divisions, with the remainder in the interior, without tanks or heavy artillery and with only 16 trainers as an air force; an organization assigned primarily for preserving internal security.

With such a discrepancy in character and armament between North and South Korea, the actual date of the assault is immaterial; the potential for it was present for months.

In the light of the above facts, it is apparent that the attack upon South Korea was a carefully-planned, full-scale invasion in force.

From the attack to the fall of Seoul on 28 June, North Korean forces struck southward across the 38th parallel on 25 June, in four major drives:

A. To the west, a Border Constabulary Brigade attacked in the Ongjin Peninsula against approximately one Republic of Korea regiment and was reported on 26 June in control of the area. However, a considerable number of Republic of Korea men escaped by sea.

B. One North Korean division, plus 42-50 tanks captured Kaesong on the afternoon of 25 June, and later pushed south through Hunsan toward Seoul. Another North Korean force of from 3,000 - 10,000 men, plus more than 50 tanks, drove down the Pochon-Uijongbu Corridor toward Seoul.

C. A division of North Korean troops, supported by heavy artillery and tanks, struck south toward Chunchon.

D. Along the east coast, a Border Constabulary Brigade reinforced to approximately 10,000, attacked Kangnung and carried out two amphibious landings further south.

The North Korean attack was initially opposed by five Republic of Korea divisions located in or north of Seoul. They were armed with rifles, machine guns, and other light infantry weapons. Taken completely by surprise, and facing greatly superior equipment, they fought desperately, but were forced to withdraw gradually. Another Republic of Korea division, hastily brought up from the south, was badly mauled in the fighting of 26 June. An official report on 30 June indicated that the Republic of Korea forces had suffered a high percentage of casualties and had lost much equipment in the hurried withdrawal.

/On 28 June,

On 28 June, aircraft of the United States Air Force, operating pursuant to the resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations, began air operations against the North Korean invaders in support of Republic of Korea forces and later struck at military targets north of the 38th parallel with a view to disrupting the lines of communications and supply of the invading forces.

The badly decimated Republic of Korea forces reformed south of the Nan River, and with U.S.A.F. assistance, sought to delay the North Korean advance. By sheer weight of numbers and material they were forced back step by step until, on 2 July (Korean time) the town of Suwon, 20 miles south of Seoul, was reported in North Korean hands.

Meanwhile, in pursuance of United Nations recommendations, United States ground forces were committed to the area for stabilization of the front. On 5 July, a very small United States force made contact with the invaders, south of Suwon. On 7 July, upon the recommendation of the Security Council, the Unified Command was established and General Douglas MacArthur was designated by the President of the United States as the Commanding General of the forces of the members of the United Nations.

The first United States troops were small in number and were committed as a holding force only. They were followed by additional supporting forces as rapidly as these could be transported to the battle line. Facing odds at times as high as 20 to one, "Our Army troops, ably supported by tactical aircraft of the United States Air Force and Navy and our Australian friends, flying under most adverse conditions of weather . . . distinguished themselves in the most difficult of military operations - a delaying action".

Under the protection of this delaying action Unified Command forces have steadily been strengthened. Under the combined impact of ground, air and naval forces, the progress of the invasion has been slowed, while the enemy has suffered severe losses on sea and land which are curtailing his supply and transportation capabilities.

At the outset of the North Korean invasion, naval forces available to oppose the aggression consisted of a small Republic of Korea Coast Guard. United States and other forces proceeded to the operational areas and by virtue of overwhelming superiority established a patrol of both coasts of Korea. These forces took the necessary action to prevent movement by sea of forces and

/supplies

supplies for use in operations against the Republic of Korea, including ingress and egress to and from Korean ports of merchant vessels furnishing or likely to furnish assistance to the North Korean authorities. United Nations Naval Forces covered some of the initial necessary evacuations, rendered logistic support, and by operating against North Korean waterborne forces denied the Communist invaders the logistic support of its forces by sea.

Naval units proceeded to accomplish the waterlift of troops and supplies to Korea, patrol by naval aircraft of water and coastal areas, escort duties and coastal patrol functions. Harassing fire from naval units on both coasts shelled targets susceptible to naval gunfire, breached roads, and generally interfered with enemy communications. Naval units have attacked North Korean water traffic where found, and have already destroyed approximately one-third of the vessels originally available to North Korean naval forces.

A new phase of naval operations commenced on 3 July with the first aircraft carrier air strike. They struck on the west coast of North Korea. Subsequent carrier strikes on the east coast of Korea have been made by the British and United States units. The first amphibious landing by United Nations Forces was accomplished on the east coast of Korea on 18 July 1950.

The present naval situation finds both coasts of Korea covered by naval forces of the Unified Command. Harassing fire and fire support missions are being carried out by these forces. Patrols and reconnaissances are being conducted by naval patrol planes over coastal and water areas. Logistic support of men, equipment, and supplies by transport continues with escort.

It has been inspiring to witness the rapidity with which various Member States have contributed to the naval forces assisting in the restoration of peace in Korea. The United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the Netherlands have dispatched vessels to support the United Nations' effort to cut off supplies for the invading hordes from north of the 38th parallel. In carrying out this work, shore bombardments have been conducted where and as necessary to interdict the supply of Communist troops which have moved into that portion of Korea governed by the Republic of Korea under the aegis of the United Nations. Valuable service has also been rendered by a British naval unit in the rescue from the water of airmen who had been compelled to abandon their airplane. The Coast Guard of the Republic of Korea has been rendering

/invaluable

invaluable service in providing for the security of the shorelines. Naval air provided by the United Kingdom has contributed in a major way in the support of landing operations at P'Ohangdong.

Upon the request by the Security Council of the United Nations for assistance to defend the Republic of Korea against the North Korean aggressors, the only forces in the area immediately available were those United States and British Commonwealth occupation forces under the command of General MacArthur in the occupation of the Japanese Islands. The size and nature of these forces were sufficient only to perform the occupation duties in Japan.

Before committing the forces, in response to the Security Council resolutions, they had to be regrouped and re-equipped from standards for peacetime occupation of Japan to standards suitable for combat in Korea. This also involved moving these troops, with their equipment and supplies, from their various occupation stations in Japan, by combinations of motor, rail, water and air transportation, to Korea. Even so, all the materials for sustained combat were not immediately available to General MacArthur and therefore had to be rushed to Korea from the United States - a distance of one-third of the way around the globe. Future assistance for the defense of the Republic of Korea, both men and materials, must be transported over corresponding distances from the Member nations of the United Nations rendering such assistance. The well-planned attack by the North Korean regime, the size of their force, their logistical support and their ability to continue to press the attack, account for the degree of initiative enjoyed by the aggressor. The defenders of the Republic of Korea have been forced to submit to the time and place selected by the aggressor, and now must depend upon assistance from nations peacefully disposed and lying not merely hundreds, but thousands of miles away.

From the continuing appearance on the battlefield of large numbers of enemy personnel and equipment, it is now apparent that the North Korean aggressors have available to them resources far in excess of their internal capabilities. This, with the initial advantage of the aggressor, combines to give the enemy a strength that cannot be overcome until the United Nations forces achieve the effect of superiority in weapons and manpower. The task is not a small one when viewed in comparison with the potential resources of the aggressor force. Until forces of the Unified Command are increased further in strength, the rapidity with which

success will be achieved cannot be predicted. However, with the combined efforts of the United Nations, the full effect of the contribution from each member nation will be felt in the ultimate defeat of the aggressors from north of the 38 degree parallel.

In conclusion, it is believed appropriate to quote the Unified Commander's latest estimate of the Korean operations.

"With the deployment in Korea of major elements of the Eighth Army now accomplished the first phase of the campaign has ended and with it the chance for victory by the North Korean Forces. The enemy's plan and great opportunity depended upon the speed with which he could overrun South Korea once he had breached the Han River line and with overwhelming numbers and superior weapons temporarily shattered South Korean resistance. This chance he has now lost through the extraordinary speed with which the Eighth Army has been deployed from Japan to stem his rush. When he crashed the Han Line the way seemed entirely open and victory was within his grasp. The desperate decision to throw in piecemeal American elements as they arrived by every available means of transport from Japan was the only hope to save the situation. The skill and valor thereafter displayed in successive holding actions by the ground forces in accordance with this concept, brilliantly supported in complete co-ordination by air and naval elements, forced the enemy into continued deployments, costly frontal attacks and confused logistics which so slowed his advance and blunted his drive that we have bought the precious time necessary to build a secure base.

"I do not repeat not believe that history records a comparable operation which excelled the speed and precision with which the Eighth Army, the Far East Air Force and the Seventh Fleet have been deployed to a distant land for immediate commitment to major operations. It merits highest commendation for the commanders, staffs and units concerned and attests to their superior training and high state of readiness to meet any eventuality; This finds added emphasis in the fact that the Far East Command, until the President's great pronouncement to support the epochal action of the United Nations, had no repeat no slightest responsibility for the defense of the Free Republic of Korea. With the President's decision it assumed a completely new and added mission.

"It is, of course, impossible to predict with any degree of accuracy future incidents of a military campaign. Over a broad front involving continuous local

/struggles,

struggles, there are bound to be ups and downs, losses as well as successes. Our final stabilization line will unquestionably be rectified and tactical improvement will involve planned withdrawals as well as local advances. But the issue of battle is now fully joined and will proceed along lines of action in which we will not repeat not be without choice. Our hold upon the southern part of Korea represents a secure base. Our casualties despite overwhelming odds have been relatively light. Our strength will continually increase while that of the enemy will relatively decrease. His supply line is insecure. He has had his great chance but failed to exploit it. We are now in Korea in force, and with God's help we are there to stay until the constitutional authority of the Republic is fully restored. MacArthur."