

REPORT DATED 1 MARCH 1949 FROM THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION
FOR INDONESIA IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S
RESOLUTION OF 28 JANUARY 1949

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REPORT DATED 1 MARCH 1949 FROM THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR
INDONESIA IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S RESOLUTION
OF 28 JANUARY 1949

A. Compliance

1. The resolution of the Security Council of 28 January 1949 requires that the United Nations Commission for Indonesia report to the Security Council and make recommendations for a solution of the difficulties if the parties have not reached agreement on an interim federal government by 15 February. On 15 February, the Commission recommended that the reporting date be postponed to 1 March "in light of the recent developments in the Hague" (Report of 15 February, S/1258). The Security Council assented on 16 February.
2. The terms of the resolution and the realities of the situation require that the first steps in compliance with the resolution must be taken by the Government of the Netherlands. Only after the Government of the Netherlands has released the Republican political leaders and facilitated their return to Jogjakarta to perform their functions as a Government in full freedom, can the Government of the Republic be called upon to discharge its responsibilities under the resolution.
3. On 31 January, the Commission reported to the Security Council that the Acting Chairman of the Netherlands delegation had undertaken to inform the Commission as soon as he received instructions from his Government with reference to the resolution of 28 January (Report of 31 January, S/1235).
4. In a letter to the Netherlands delegation dated 2 February, the Commission expressed its concern that no steps had yet been taken to comply with the resolution.

The letter urged compliance with the resolution at the earliest possible moment and stated that "as the representative of the Security Council in Indonesia, the Commission would be failing in its duty if it did not press for the action on which depends the welfare, perhaps even the lives, of a great number of people" (Appendix A).

5. In acknowledgement of the recommendation by the Commission that the reporting date be postponed to 1 March, the Netherlands delegation in a letter dated 17 February expressed the appreciation of the Netherlands

/Government

Government for the Commission's decision. The letter added, "The Netherland Government, on its part, will make every possible effort in order that by March 1 the discussions will have made satisfactory progress."

6. The Commission reports that, despite the additional time thus provided for the Government of the Netherlands to adjust itself politically and otherwise to the requirements of the resolution, not only have the parties reached no agreement on an interim federal government, but there have been no negotiations under the resolution. The Commission finds that the Netherlands Government has not complied with the basic prerequisites of further action under the resolution. However, on 26 February, the Commission was informed by the Netherlands delegation of a counter proposal by the Netherlands Government which is set forth in paragraph 14 below.

B. Other Political Activities

7. In the meantime, there have been political moves in Indonesia directed towards the formation of an interim federal government based upon the states already delineated and organized under Netherlands authority. These moves are independent of the 28 January resolution or any other resolution of the Security Council. The BFO (Assembly for Federal Consultation), which has developed out of the Bandung Conference (Report of 4 June 1948, S/842), has held a series of meetings in Batavia.

8. Although the Commission has not been officially informed by the Netherlands delegation of the results of these meetings, the Republican delegation has forwarded a copy of an invitation which was sent to the Republican leaders to participate in a conference with representatives of the BFO for the purpose of discussions leading to the formation of an interim federal government. The invitation, which was intended to meet the conditions stipulated by the Republican leaders (Report of 25 January, S/1224, paragraph 8), was telegraphed in the following terms on 3 February:

With reference to letter Prapat January 22 and nota Menuumbing 23 January 1949 we inform, that your Excellency's conditions on your Excellency's and other members of Republican Government liberation has been discussed by us with representative of the Crown and representative of the Crown has stated as follows: "With reference to the telephone conversation between you and the Director of my Cabinet I have the honour to inform your Highness, that the Government of Indonesia is willing to allow Messers Sukarno and his associates in full freedom to hold consultations among themselves at a place to be determined later. The Government is, as I have informed you earlier verbally, also willing to cooperate to create an opportunity for a free exchange of views between the representatives of the Federal

/Consultations

Consultations Conference or the whole BFO as one party and the gentlemen mentioned in the first alinea of this letter as the other party, as far as they may or are invited by you. If this conference yields such results so that within a short period a Federal Interim Government can be formed, then it would be possible basically to consider the question of full freedom of movement for them, upon whom at the moment are imposed certain limitations of freedom of movement, considered in the light of the new situation. The High Representative of the Crown."

We hope that your Excellency may find ways to accept this reply for our common interests, so that we may be able to hold consultations as soon as possible in order that we may achieve concrete results. Your Excellency can act as President and members of the government of the Republic of Indonesia. (Sic) After the BFO discussed the question, we have been able to agree basically with the letter of the High Representative of the Crown to the Chairman of the BFO dated 31 January 1949 and which reads as follows: "I have hereby the honour to inform Your Highness, that the Netherlands Government has authorized me to inform Your Highness, that the Netherlands Government regards the Republican leaders approached by your Council as authorities of a republic, the status and form of which will be determined by the will of the people, in observance of the principle of equal member states within the framework of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia. The High Representative of the Crown."

In connection herewith, we hope if Your Excellency could find ways to accept this invitation to inform the Chairman of the BFO Djakarta, in order that we could make preparations for the intended conference. To comply with the condition set by Hatta as we hope your Excellency will telegraph first to the persons concerned, if our assistance is wanted for a meeting at Menumbing and we hold ourselves at Your Excellency's service to take care of transport. We hope for a speedy reply. The same telegram as this is also sent to His Excellency Sukarno as Parapat, Sumatra Timur.

(Chairman)

Ketua BFO Djakarta

9. Prime Minister Hatta replied in the following terms on 3 February:
Menumbing, 3 February 1949

"From Your Excellency's (Chairman of the Federal Consultations Conference) telegram, which I received today, I conclude that the Netherlands Government according to the contents of the letter from the representative of the Crown to Your Excellency, is not ready to recognize President Sukarno and the other Republican leaders as the President and members of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia. The letter says that we 'are regarded as authorities of a Republic, the status and form of which would be determined by the will of the people', in short 'authorities' from a state, which is not yet in existence.

"Meanwhile I wish to state that the resolution adopted by the Security Council on January 28 also demands the restoration of the authority of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, so that the Netherlands Government, on this question, too refuses to comply with the Security Council's resolution.

"I further conclude from the contents of the letter of the High Representative of the Crown to Your Excellency on January 31, that the Netherlands Indies Government is not ready to free President Sukarno and the other Republican leaders from the present political confinement, because the letter says that freedom of movement for us will be taken into consideration when the consultations between the B.F.O. (the Federal Consultations Conference) yield results so that within a short period a federal interim government could be formed.

"In connection with the above I wish also to reiterate that this position of the Netherlands Indies Government is also at variance with the Security Council's resolution which demands that the Republican leaders arrested and detained since December 19, 1948, should be released immediately and unconditionally.

"It can therefore be understood - with reference to the contents of the letters of the Representative of the Crown - that I and the other Republican leaders cannot accept the invitation of the B.F.O. (The Federal Consultations Conference) to hold joint consultations, despite our earnest wish to exchange views between us, concerning the fate of our country. Especially after the Security Council and, as Your Excellency knows - the Asian Conference in New Delhi, in short the majority of world opinion - have accepted the conditions we put forward as their own.

/According

"According to my opinion, the quickest and best way to solve the Indonesian question is that both the Netherlands and Republican Governments state clearly that they are willing to accept the decision of the Security Council. It is obvious of course, that to be able to declare its readiness to accept the Security Council's resolution, the Republican Government must be given opportunity to assemble and hold consultations.

"The declaration of the acceptance of the Security Council's resolution by the Netherlands and Republican Governments must be followed as soon as possible by a joint conference between the representatives of the Netherlands Government, the B.F.O. (the Federal Consultations Conference) and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia under the auspices of United Nations Commission for Indonesia, to discuss several problems, especially:

1. The formation of a federal interim government on March 15 next.
2. The implementation of the resolution adopted by the Security Council concerning the cessation of military action, the restoration of the Republic and the return of the Republican Government to Jogjakarta.

"I think it is not necessary for me to state here exhaustively that the Government of the Republic of Indonesia aims at the formation of a free and sovereign Republic of the United States of Indonesia, and in which the Republic of Indonesia occupies an equal position, not more and not less, with the other member states. However, the Republic of Indonesia takes the stand, that the form and organization of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia must be determined by the Indonesian people themselves through a Constituent Assembly elected democratically by the whole adult Indonesian people and by secret ballot, and not made by the Dutch themselves.

Mohamad Hatta

Vice President and Prime Minister of the
Republic of Indonesia"

10. On 6 and 7 February, the BFO sent two of its members to Bangka to give further information to the Republican leaders. The latter were informed that the High Representative of the Crown had no objection to deleting the sentence in the invitation of 3 February which stated that full freedom of movement for Republican leaders would be considered if the conference resulted in the early formation of an interim federal government. The Republican leaders reaffirmed their position as set out in the Prime Minister's

/letter.

letter. They were willing to meet the BFO contact committee but only for "informal talks and orientation". They stressed that such a meeting could be held only with the cognizance of the Commission and that there was no possibility of negotiations in the present circumstances. On 1 March the BFO announced that its contact committee would visit the Republican leaders in Bangka the following day.

11. In reporting to the Commission on the informal talks, the Chairman of the Republican delegation emphasized the statement in Dr. Hatta's letter that "a speedy and satisfactory solution of the Indonesian dispute could be reached if both parties clearly declare their acceptance of the recent resolution of the Security Council" (Appendix B).

12. In a letter to the Commission, dated 20 February, the Republican delegation complained of steps taken by Netherlands authorities to create a political unit "in those parts of Middle Java which after the first military action came under the control of the Netherlands". The Republican delegation's letter, which has been transmitted to the Netherlands delegation for comment, is attached as Appendix C.

13. There were also reports of a proposal for an early transfer of sovereignty. Therefore on February 8, the Commission informed the Netherlands delegation that it had received unofficial information that a plan of official origin for the solution of the Indonesian problem had been presented to the BFO, to its officers or to its members, and asked for particulars of any such plan. In reply, the Netherlands delegation informed the Commission that "proposals of official origin, if any, will be announced by or on behalf of the Netherlands Government at the time considered appropriate by the Netherlands Government".

14. On 26 February, the Chairman of the Netherlands delegation gave to the members of the Commission the following letter:

Batavia

February 26, 1949

"Sir,

"The Netherlands Government has decided to take the initiative to convene as soon as possible a round table conference, which should start on March 12, 1949 at The Hague.

"To this conference all parties concerned with the Indonesian question will be invited. It is the intention of the Government to consider at the conference in particular the conditions and the modalities by which an accelerated transfer of sovereignty over Indonesia by the Netherlands to a representative Federal Indonesian Government will take place. As a consequence of this proposed transfer of sovereignty consultations will be necessary concerning the provisions for the interim period including the institution of a Federal Interim Government.

"The Netherlands Government has been guided by the conception that a last solution of the pending problems cannot be arrived at until sovereignty has actually been transferred. Experience has shown that the arrangements for a rather prolonged interim period lead to insoluble differences of opinion.

"Therefore the Netherlands Government have invited the President of the Republic and the Chairman of the BFO to appoint delegations for this conference. Your Commission will find enclosed copies of these invitations to which I beg to refer.

/"Moreover,

"Moreover, it is intended that also representatives of the provisional Federal Government and of minorities of the population will take part in this conference.

"The Netherlands Government have requested me to inform your Commission that they will highly appreciate it if your Commission would attend this Conference, so that it can render assistance to achieve positive results.

"I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you, Sir, the assurances of my high consideration.

Dr. L. J. M. BEEL

High Representative of the Crown"

Chairman

United Nations Commission for Indonesia

Batavia

The texts of the invitations to the President of the Republic and the Chairman of the BFO are attached as Appendix D.

The same day the Chairman of the Netherlands delegation handed the Members of the Commission the following announcement, which is identical with a press release given out the same day:

"February 26, 1949.

In a communique of Wednesday, 23 February 1949, the Netherlands Government announced that important conclusions had been reached between this Government and the High Representative of the Crown at Batavia concerning the policy to be pursued with regard to Indonesia.

The Netherlands Government is convinced that in order to reach a satisfactory solution of the pending problems, an accelerated transfer of its sovereignty over Indonesia to a representative Federal Government is indicated.

The Netherlands Government has therefore decided to endeavour to effectuate this transfer considerably earlier than at the date of July 1, 1950, which in accordance with the previous plans of the Netherlands Government has been laid down in the resolution of the Security Council of January 28, 1949 as the ultimate date for the transfer of sovereignty.

It is clear that the achievement of this endeavour along the most desirable lines requires the sincere and energetic co-operation of all parties concerned. The Netherlands Government is of the opinion that the common purpose eagerly aimed at justifies the confidence that all parties will show their readiness to co-operate.

In the desire to facilitate a prompt beginning of the discussions

/for a

for a speedy creation of the sovereign United States of Indonesia and in order to fulfil the terms of the resolution of the Security Council on this point, the Netherlands Government has decided to lift the remaining restrictions on the liberty of movement of the Republican leaders and to consult with them concerning their wishes as to their future residence and the arrangements which will have to be made in this respect.

For the furtherance of effective discussions, the Netherlands Government has decided to take the initiative for the convocation of a round table conference at the Hague at the earliest date, that is on March 12, 1949. The purpose of this conference will be to discuss the conditions for and the ways along which the earliest possible transfer of sovereignty as indicated above could be effectuated, the simultaneous establishment of the Netherlands Indonesian Union and the arrangements for the intermediary period, including the creation of a federal interim government, these provisions being considered in their relation to the accelerated transfer of sovereignty.

The Netherlands Government is prepared to consider together with the parties concerned the merits of any proposed solution put forward at the conference by any of the parties and to examine in how far it is compatible with its responsibility. In accordance with this purpose the Netherlands Government has extended invitations for the round table conference to all parties concerned. The United Nations Commission for Indonesia has been informed that the Netherlands Government will welcome the Committee's presence at this conference in order to enable it to render its assistance."

15. On 27 February, the High Representative of the Crown gave certain oral and informal explanations to the members of the Commission. During the meeting and later the same day, the members of the Commission were given three further documents, the texts of which appear in Appendix E. These consist of (a) an amplification of some parts of the documents found in Paragraph 14 above; (b) a supplementary statement regarding the Netherlands refusal to permit the return of the Republican Government to Djokjakarta; and (c) certain background material given to Netherlands representatives as a basis for press releases.

16. On 28 February, the following telegram was received from the Chairman of the Republican delegation:

Latest decision of Netherlands Government as in Beel's letter, handed Saturday night to President Soekarno in Muntok by Gieben, inviting Republican leaders join Round Table Conference in Hague with

other Representatives of Indonesia on March 12, cuts across Security Council's Resolution and moreover explicitly rejects said Resolution. In verbal elucidation Gieben made perfectly clear that on no account Netherlands Government will comply with condition to restore actual Government of the Republic in its power over any part of its territory. In particular Gieben explained that, contrary to wordings of His Government's statement on abrogation of remaining restrictions concerning liberty of movement of the Republican leaders, we shall in no case be allowed to return to Djokjakarta. This new move of the Netherlands, as so often before, gives expression to their denial of the legality of Security Council's intervention and substitutes a different proposal of their own authority. Our Government will, however, never co-operate in any action evading implementation of Security Council's Resolution. We particularly deem it urgent to counteract any confusion which this move is apt to create in international circles.

17. On 1 March the Netherlands delegation forwarded to the Commission a copy of the following letter dated 1 March and signed by the Chairman of the BFO addressed to the High Representative of the Crown:

"In reply to your letter of February 26, 1949, I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that the Assembly for Federal Consultation has with great satisfaction taken cognizance of the plan announced therein to accelerate the transfer of sovereignty as much as possible.

The initiative of the Netherlands Government to convocate a 'Round Table' conference, in order to reach agreement as soon as possible concerning the problems connected with the transfer of sovereignty, has been hailed with approval by the Assembly for Federal Consultation.

The various delegations, therefore, unanimously declared to be willing to accept the invitation from the Netherlands Government to participate in a conference on the basis of the government statement of February 26, 1949.

(signed) Hamid II

Chairman of the Assembly for
Federal Consultation."

18. It will be apparent that a basic factor in the present political deadlock in Indonesia is the refusal of the Netherlands Government to permit the reestablishment of the Republican Government at Djokjakarta. In informal discussions the Republican leaders have stressed the practicability of their return if the Netherlands Government renders economic help and provides other
/facilities

facilities as required by the resolution. Some Republican leaders have informally suggested what they regard as a workable arrangement for the reestablishment of the Republican Government at Djokjakarta. The Commission is ready to examine this and any other suggestions with the technical assistance of its Military Observers.

C. Interim Activities

19. So far as possible, the Commission has sought to utilize the period in which it has been awaiting a decision by the Government of the Netherlands by recommending interim action which, already called for by preceding resolutions of the Security Council, would facilitate the implementation of the 28 January resolution.

20. Thus, on 7 February, the Commission again urged the release of political prisoners called for by the resolution of 24 and 28 December, as well as by that of 28 January. It suggested a beginning might be made by restoring, as an immediate minimum, the freedom of movement and political activity of the President, the members of the Republican cabinet and the Chairman of the Republican delegation. The Commission noted that "this restoration of freedom should not be conditioned upon acceptance by those released of any commitments which would require them to adhere to any political program, attend any particular meetings, or otherwise accept any settlement other than one in the formulation of which they themselves have participated". (Appendix F.) No reply has been received.

21. In accordance with the procedure outlined in the Security Council meeting of 17 January, application was made to the Netherlands delegation on 24 January to permit the dispatch of two designated republican leaders to Lake Success as a special Republican mission. On 4 February, the Netherlands delegation was reminded that the Commission had not yet been informed of any decision by the Government of the Netherlands to whom the problem has been referred. On 7 February, the following reply was received:

"With reference to my letter of 25 January, 1949, number 464, I have the honour to inform you that the Netherlands Government is prepared in principle to grant the necessary clearances for the possible departure of Republican representatives to Lake Success.

"It would seem desirable that no persons are designated whose presence in Indonesia might be indispensable in view of the proposed discussions regarding the interim period.

"You and your colleagues will no doubt agree that the success of these conversations should not be prejudiced by the departure of such persons."

In transmitting the Netherlands letter of 7 February to the Republican delegation, the Commission made the following comment:

"With reference to the last paragraph of the attached letter, the Commission has replied to the Acting Chairman of the Netherlands delegation that the Commission prefers to express no opinion on the choice of representatives as a matter within the sole competence of the Republican Government."

22. In order to obtain information that would enable the Commission's military observers to discharge more effectively their duties under the 24 December resolution, as well as that of 28 January, the following questions were put to the Netherlands authorities:

"1. Will it be possible for the Military Executive Board to see the Netherlands army situation map in order to decide the further deployment of the military observers?"

"2. Can the Netherlands authorities give the Military Executive Board any information regarding present guerrilla activities in all areas of Java, Sumatra and Madura occupied?"

"3. What military action is being taken against such guerrilla activities, if any?"

"4. May the Military Executive Board send military observers to those areas in order to report on these activities and the resulting conditions?"

"5. Will the Netherlands authorities keep the Military Executive Board currently informed regarding disposition of forces as it is known and what military action is taking place?"

These questions were first presented to the representative of the Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Netherlands Indonesian Army by the Commission's Military Executive Board on 25 January, and subsequently by the Commission to the Netherlands delegation on 29 January. Reminders were given to the Netherlands delegation on 4 and 7 February. No reply has been received.

23. The most recent report of the Commission's Military Executive Board, dated 26 February, prepared on the basis of reports by the military observers in February, draws attention to paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Report to the Security Council of 24 January which states the various factors limiting the military observers in their work. The Board emphasizes that the Netherlands policy of refusing information to military observers and of denying them opportunity to observe areas on the Netherlands side of the former status quo line in which unrest is said to continue, severely handicaps them in reporting fully on conditions throughout Indonesia. Subject to these limitations, the Board concludes:

A. That, at this time, more than two months after the Security Council's Resolution of 24 December 1948, there has been neither actual nor complete cessation of hostilities in Indonesia.

B. That, on the contrary, active warfare both guerrilla and on a more generally organized basis is continuing to a variable extent in different areas.

/C. That,

C. That, although sections of the population of Indonesia have welcomed the return of Netherlands control, in other sections there continues a condition of unrest and uncertainty.

D. That, despite improvement in economic conditions in certain areas which the Netherlands are able to control, large areas of the country still remain in generally chaotic economic condition.

24. Several complaints by the Republican delegation concerning alleged violations of civil liberties have been referred to the Netherlands delegation for comment or investigations. These deal with the arrest of those concerned with the publication of the Republican Review of the Indonesian press, who were held for four weeks and then released with the note that no prosecution would be instituted against them; the suppression of Pedoman, the second of three republican dailies, in Batavia, to be suspended; and the confinement of an allegedly large number of political prisoners in Java, including many said to be held without formal charges or trial. The Commission recognizes the great importance of the questions presented by these complaints and will give them attention as subjects of report and recommendation. At this time, however, they must be considered as subsidiary to the basic problem, that of achieving compliance with the resolution.

D. Conclusion

25. The Commission is obliged to report that as of 1 March, there has been failure of the parties to the Indonesian question to reach agreement on the establishment of an interim federal government. This situation results from the failure of the Netherlands Government to accept the procedures of the resolution of 28 January, and not from a mere difference of viewpoint on details of governmental structure and functions. If the latter were the case, the Commission would be prepared to recommend a structure for an interim federal government. The resolution contemplates that the establishment of an interim federal government will be the product of negotiations between the parties. That Government, if it is to be an effective one, must reflect the interchange of ideas of both parties, the give and take of bona fide negotiations.

26. There have been no negotiations under the resolution between the Netherlands Government and the Republic. The Commission has performed the function of reporting assigned to it by the resolution of 28 January, in spite of the difficulties described in this report. In the exercise of this function it has had contact with the Netherlands delegation. The Commission has visited the Republican leaders informally at Bangka. They have had informal contact with members of the Republican delegation who

/are resident

are resident in Batavia. Individual members of the Commission occasionally have informal contact with members of the B.F.O. There has not, however, been opportunity for the Commission to function helpfully in the manner envisaged by the resolution, except to the limited extent herein described.

27. The Commission itself has no authority under the terms of the resolution of 28 January to accept the invitation received by it to attend a "round table conference" at the Hague. The procedures to be adopted preliminary to the transfer of sovereignty, irrespective of the ultimate objective of the Netherlands proposals announced on 26 February, are not those contemplated by the resolution. There is no indication in the announcements or in the invitation to the Commission that the role which it is being asked to assume is that which it is authorized to perform under the resolution of 28 January. The Commission views the invitation and the related documents, therefore, as comprising a counter-proposal or substitute for the provisions of the 28 January resolution (and submits this information)* to the Security Council for the latter's consideration, with the request that the Commission be instructed as to what its position should be toward the invitation under reference.

28. The Commission will forward to the Security Council promptly any further information that may become known to it with respect to the suggested round table conference or any other proposals that may be advanced. The Commission has interpreted its duty to be that of assisting with the implementation of the Security Council's resolution and of reporting facts pertinent to the situation which this resolution was intended to resolve. It will not interfere with any efforts of the parties to arrive freely at agreements, and it is available to all parties for consultation. At the same time, the Commission regrets that it has not been possible to proceed with the implementation of the resolution. It is also conscious of the progressive deterioration of the situation in Indonesia and of the augmented danger to world stability which must result.

Cochran, United States, Chairman
Herremans, Belgium
Critchley, Australia

* Cable text incomplete and is subject to correction.

APPENDIX A

LETTER DATED 2 FEBRUARY 1949 FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION TO
THE ACTING CHAIRMAN OF THE NETHERLANDS DELEGATION CONCERNING THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S RESOLUTION OF 28 JANUARY

No. UNCI/238

Hotel des Indes,
Batavia, Java,
2 February 1949

Sir,

The United Nations Commission for Indonesia note with concern that, as a result of the failure of the Government of the Netherlands to give the appropriate instructions, it is not possible for the Netherlands delegation or other authorities in Indonesia to take any steps in compliance with the Resolution of the Security Council of 28 January.

The Resolution of the Security Council contemplates a number of measures designed to make possible the achievement of a lasting settlement in Indonesia. As you know, these include the discontinuance of military operations; the restoration of the Republican Government to Jogjakarta; the negotiations for a settlement based on the re-creation of the Republic as a party in a position to negotiate freely and independently; the participation in such negotiations of representatives of areas in Indonesia other than the Republic; the progressive transfer of areas outside Jogjakarta, as defined by the Resolution, to Republican administration, and the withdrawal of Netherlands troops from such areas to the extent consistent with the maintenance of order. The parties and the Commission will be unable to take these measures until the Government of the Netherlands has indicated its willingness to comply with the Resolution and, as a beginning, make possible a meeting of the Republican Cabinet.

As the representative of the Security Council in Indonesia, the Commission would be failing in its duty if it did not press for the action on which depends the welfare, perhaps even the lives, of a great number of people. In urging compliance with the Resolution at the earliest possible moment, the Commission draws attention to the mandate given it by the Resolution which requires that, unless the parties have reached agreement on an interim federal government by 15 February, the Commission itself must report to the Security Council and make recommendations for a solution of the difficulties.

Mr. T. Elink Schuurman,
Acting Chairman,
Delegation of the Kingdom
of the Netherlands,
B A T A V I A.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,
Sd/ R. Herremans
Chairman

APPENDIX B

LETTER DATED 8 FEBRUARY 1949 FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
REPUBLICAN DELEGATION, CONCERNING FEDERALIST APPROACH
TO REPUBLICAN OFFICIALS

Delegasi Republik Indonesia
No. 23

Menumbing
8 February 1949

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose copies of the correspondence between the Vice-President of the Republic of Indonesia and the Chairman of the Federal Consultations Conference (B.F.O.), and a report on the conversation between members and officials of the Republican Government and the Republican Delegation on the one hand and a Delegation of said conference on the other hand held in the presence of President Sukarno on 7 February 1949 at Menumbing (Bangka), for the purpose of establishing direct contact with the Government of the Republic.

It has been emphasized, as explicitly stated in the letter of Vice-President Mohamad Hatta on 3 February, that a speedy and satisfactory solution of the Indonesia-Dutch dispute could be reached if both parties clearly declare their acceptance of the recent resolution of the Security Council.

Further it has been made absolutely clear, that the Government of the Republic is only willing to enter into conversations with the Federal Consultations Conference with the cognizance of your Commission, and that if a stage of official formal talks should be reached, these could only take place under the auspices of your Commission.

This question will be brought forward at the first opportunity when your Commission comes to Bangka.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

S/d - Mohammad Roem

Chairman

Delegation of the
Republic of Indonesia.

The Chairman
United Nations
Commission for Indonesia
BATAVIA

ANNEX I TO APPENDIX B

BERIKUTNYA DARI SUDUT PEMERINTAH RI
KE WILAYAH DAERAH MERANGAS BATA

Batavia, 3 February 1949

With reference to letter Prapat January 22 and nota Menumbing 23 January 1949 we inform, that Your Excellency's conditions on Your Excellency's and other members of Republican Government liberation has been discussed by us with representative of the Crown and representative of the Crown has stated as follows: "With reference to the telephone conversation between you and the Director of my cabinet I have the honour to inform Your Highness, that the Government of Indonesia is willing to allow Messers Sukarno and his group in full freedom to hold consultations among themselves at a place to be determined later. The Government is, as I have informed you earlier verbally, also willing to cooperate to create an opportunity for a free exchange of views between the representatives of the Federal Consultations Conference or the whole BFO as one party and the gentlemen mentioned in the first alinea of this letter as the other party, as far as they may or are invited by you. If this conference yields such results so that within a short period a Federal Interim Government can be formed, then it would be possible basically to consider the question of full freedom of movement for them, upon whom at the moment are imposed certain limitations of freedom of movement, considered in the light of the new situation. The High Representative of the Crown."

We hope that Your Excellency may find ways to accept this reply for our common interests, so that we may be able to hold consultations as soon as possible in order that we may achieve concrete results. Your Excellency can act as President and members of the government of the Republic of Indonesia. (sic) After the BFO discussed the question, we have been able to agree basically with the letter of the High Representative of the Crown to the Chairman of the BFO dated 31 January 1949 and which reads as follows: "I have hereby the honour to inform Your Highness, that the Netherlands Government has authorized me to inform Your Highness, that the Netherlands Government regards the Republican leaders approached by your Council as authorities of a republic, the status and form of which will be determined by the will of the people, in observance of the principle of equal member states within the framework of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia. The High Representative of the Crown."

In connection herewith, we hope if Your Excellency could find ways to accept this invitation to inform the Chairman of the BFO Djakarta, in order that we could make preparations for the intended conference. To comply with the condition set by Hatta as we hope Your Excellency will telegraph first to the persons concerned, if our assistance is wanted for a meeting at Menumbing and we hold ourselves at Your Excellency's service to take care of transport. We hope for a speedy reply. The same telegram as this is also sent to His Excellency Sukarno as Parapat, Sumatra Timur.

(Chairman)
Ketua BFO Djakarta

ANNEX II TO APPENDIX B

LETTER FROM VICE-PRESIDENT HATTA TO THE CHAIRMAN OF BFO

Vice-President
The Republic of Indonesia

Menumbing
3 February 1949

From Your Excellency's (Chairman of the Federal Consultations Conference) telegram, which I received today, I conclude that the Netherlands Government, according to the contents of the letter from the Representative of the Crown to Your Excellency, is not ready to recognize President Sukarno and the other Republican leaders as the President and members of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia. The letter says that we "are regarded as authorities of a republic, the status and form of which would be determined by the will of the people", in short "authorities" from a state, which is not yet in existence.

Meanwhile I wish to state that the Resolution adopted by the Security Council on January 28 also demands the restoration of the authority of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, so that the Netherlands Government, on this question too refuses to comply with the Security Council's resolution.

I further conclude from the contents of the letter of the High Representative of the Crown to Your Excellency on January 31, that the Netherlands Indies Government is not ready to free President Sukarno and the other Republican leaders from the present political confinement, because the letter says that freedom of movement for us will be taken into consideration when the consultations between the B.F.O. (the Federal Consultations Conference) yield results so that within a short period a federal interim government could be formed.

In connection with the above I wish also to reiterate that this position of the Netherlands Indies Government is also at variance with the Security Council's Resolution, which demands that the Republican leaders arrested and detained since December 19, 1948, should be released immediately and unconditionally.

It can therefore be understood - with reference to the contents of the letters of the Representative of the Crown - that I and the other Republican leaders cannot accept the invitation of the B.F.O. (the Federal Consultations Conference) to hold joint consultations, despite our earnest wish to exchange views between us, concerning the fate of our country. Especially after the Security Council and, as Your Excellency knows - the Asian Conference in New Delhi, in short

/the majority

the majority of world opinion - have accepted the conditions we have put forward as their own.

According to my opinion, the quickest and best way to solve the Indonesian Question is, that both the Netherlands and Republican Governments state clearly that they are willing to accept the decision of the Security Council. It is obvious of course, that to be able to declare its readiness to accept the Security Council's resolution, the Republican Government must be given opportunity to assembly and hold consultations.

The declaration of the acceptance of the Security Council's Resolution by the Netherlands and Republican Governments must be followed as soon as possible by a joint conference between the representatives of the Netherlands Government, the B.F.O. (the Federation Consultations Conference) and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia under the auspices of United Nations Commission for Indonesia, to discuss several problems, especially:

1. The formation of a federal interim government on March 15 next.
2. The implementation of the Resolution adopted by the Security Council concerning ~~the cessation~~ of military action, the restoration of the Republic and the return of the Republican Government to Jogjakarta.

I think it is not necessary for me to state here exhaustively that the Government of the Republic of Indonesia aims at the formation of a free and sovereign Republic of the United States of Indonesia, and in which the Republic of Indonesia occupies an equal position, not more and not less, with the other member states. However, the Republic of Indonesia takes the stand, that the form and organization of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia must be determined by the Indonesian people themselves through a Constituent Assembly elected democratically by the whole adult Indonesian people and by secret ballot, and not made by the Dutch themselves.

S/d - Mohamad Hatta
Vice-President and
Prime Minister of the
Republic of Indonesia

To
His Excellency, Chairman
of the B.F.O.
Djakarta.

ANNEX III TO APPENDIX B

REPORT ON THE CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN REPUBLICAN
AND FEDERALIST LEADERS HELD ON 7 FEBRUARY 1949
AT BANGKA

1. The Vice President Mohammad Hatta has replied to the telegram of the Chairman of the Federal Consultation Conference (B.F.O.), dated 3 February 1949 in a letter of the same date sent by airmail on February 4 to Djakarta. This letter has not yet been received by the B.F.O.
2. The B.F.O. delegation explained the standpoint of the High Representative of the Crown as conveyed to the B.F.O. The High Representative of the Crown is willing to repeal the last paragraph of his letter dated February 1st, which reads: "If this consultation would lead to such results which could facilitate the formation of the Interim Government, then it would be as a matter of fact possible to reconsider the question of complete freedom of movement of those who are subjected to certain limitations in the light of new prevailing circumstances."
3. Taking into account this clarification, the Government of the Republic is still of the opinion that the conditions put forward by the President and further explained by the Vice President are not fulfilled. Accordingly the position of the Government of the Republic as stated in the letter of the Vice President of February 3rd remains unchanged.
4. Meanwhile President Sukarno and Vice President Mohammad Hatta are willing to meet the contact committee of the B.F.O. for informal talks and orientation on Bangka on a date to be agreed upon by the Government of the Republic and the B.F.O.

Menumbing, 7 February 1949

APPENDIX C

LETTER DATED 20 FEBRUARY 1949 FROM THE REPUBLICAN DELEGATION
CONCERNING ELECTIONS BEING HELD IN MIDDLE JAVA BY THE
NETHERLANDS-INDIES GOVERNMENT

Sir,

I have the honour to inform the Commission that the Netherlands-Indies Government is at present holding elections in those parts of Middle Java which after the first military action came under control of the Netherlands.

This action is calculated to create a political unit in Middle Java to be formally established on February 23, 1949, which will be granted a separate existence and vote in the Netherlands sponsored conference for federal consultation.

This fact constitutes a continuance of the Dutch policy to create unilaterally new political units of their own making in territories, the status of which, under the Renville Agreement, are to be determined in a democratic manner after negotiations between the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia under the auspices of the Committee of Good Offices.

The Republican Delegation feels it to be of the utmost urgency to call the special attention of the Commission to this matter.

I have the honour to be etc.

Subjono

APPENDIX D

LETTERS DATED 26 FEBRUARY 1949 FROM THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE CROWN ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
AND TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR FEDERAL CONSULTATION CONCERNING
A ROUND TABLE CONFERENCE ON THE INDONESIAN QUESTION

(A) To the President of the
Republic of Indonesia

Batavia

February 26, 1949

"Prompted by the conviction that the highest interests of Indonesia demand that all concerned should contribute to the fullest measure of their ability to a speedy and complete solution of the pending problems, the Netherlands Government has again considered the way in which this goal can soonest be attained.

"It is of the opinion that a situation should be created as soon as possible, in which the conflicts and mistrust of today give way to mutual co-operation and appreciation. Such a state of affairs would, in the opinion of the Netherlands Government, not fully be reached until sovereignty has been transferred by the Netherlands to a Federal Government representative of the whole of Indonesia.

"The Netherlands Government is convinced that this situation which the resolution of the Security Council of 28 January 1949, has set as a goal to be reached by 1 July 1950 at the latest, can be created at a considerably earlier moment by the sincere and energetic co-operation of all interested parties.

"In view of this the Netherlands Government has conceived the idea to take the initiative for a round table conference of all parties concerned in the Indonesian question, which could commence at the Hague as soon as possible - preferably on 12 March 1949. At the conference the conditions and modalities will have to be discussed under which the aforementioned accelerated transfer of sovereignty can be effected as well as provisions for the intermediary period, including the institution of a Federal interim government.

"The Netherlands Government is prepared to examine at the conference on its merits every proposed solution submitted by one of the parties in free consultation with these parties, and to examine to what extent these proposed solutions are compatible with its responsibility. Consequently I have the honour on behalf of the Government of the Netherlands to invite Your Excellency to appoint a delegation to participate in this conference.

"I wish to add that a similar invitation has been sent to the Chairman of the Assembly for Federal Consultation requesting his co-operation for the appointment of the delegations for the territories affiliated to the BFO.

"Furthermore, the Netherlands Government will invite to the conference representatives of the Provisional Federal Government and of the minorities.

"Finally, I inform Your Excellency that the United Nations Commission for Indonesia has been invited to attend the Conference, in order to assist the parties."

(B) To the Chairman of the
Assembly for Federal
Consultation

Batavia

February 26, 1949

"Prompted by the conviction that the highest interests of Indonesia demand that all concerned should contribute to the fullest measure of their ability to a speedy and complete solution of the pending problems, the Netherlands Government has again considered the way in which this goal can soonest be attained.

"It is of the opinion that a situation should be created as soon as possible, in which the conflicts and mistrust of today give way to mutual co-operation and appreciation. Such a state of affairs would, in the opinion of the Netherlands Government, not fully be reached until sovereignty has been transferred by the Netherlands to a Federal Government representative of the whole of Indonesia.

"The Netherlands Government is convinced that this situation which the resolution of the Security Council of 28 January 1949, has set as a goal to be reached by 1 July 1950 at the latest, can be created at a considerably earlier moment by the sincere and energetic co-operation of all interested parties.

"In view of this the Netherlands Government has conceived the idea to take the initiative for a round table conference of all parties concerned in the Indonesian question, which could commence at the Hague as soon as possible -- preferably on 12 March 1949. At the conference the conditions and modalities will have to be discussed under which the aforementioned accelerated transfer of sovereignty can be effected as well as provisions for the intermediary period, including the institution of a Federal interim government.

/"The

"The Netherlands Government is prepared to examine at the conference on its merits every proposed solution submitted by one of the parties in free consultation with these parties, and to examine to what extent these proposed solutions are compatible with its responsibility.

"In view of the above I have the honour at the request of the Netherlands Government to invite your Highness to make the necessary arrangements so that through the intermediary of the BFO, the member states represented in this body send delegations to the above-mentioned Conference.

"I may further point out that the President of the Republic has also been invited to appoint a delegation. The Netherlands Government will also invite representatives of the Provisional Federal Government and of the minorities to attend the Conference.

"In conclusion I may inform Your Highness that the United Nations Commission for Indonesia also has been invited to attend the Conference to assist parties."

APPENDIX E

MEMORANDA HANDED TO THE COMMISSION ON 27 FEBRUARY 1949 BY
DR. L. J. M. BEEL, HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE CROWN IN
INDONESIA, CONCERNING THE POLICY OF THE NETHERLANDS
GOVERNMENT WITH REGARD TO INDONESIA

MEMORANDUM I

After consultations with the High Representative of the Crown and in order to realize the plans announced in Parliament, the Netherlands Government has reached certain conclusions concerning the policy it wishes to pursue with regard to Indonesia.

1. The Netherlands Government is convinced that no essential differences exist between the Netherlands aims and the aims of the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 28 January 1949 which embodies the Netherlands programme.
2. The differences of opinion relate to the best methods to arrive at the establishment of the United States of Indonesia and to bridge the period which will necessarily elapse before the United States of Indonesia and the Netherlands Indonesian Union are established.
3. The Netherlands Government maintains the pledges made by its representative in the Security Council that the Netherlands would carry out the resolution to the extent to which it is compatible with the responsibility of the Netherlands, for the maintenance of freedom and order in Indonesia, meanwhile maintaining its fundamental objections to some parts of the resolution as formulated on its instruction by Doctor van Royen.
4. The Netherlands Government is willing to co-operate with the United Nations Commission for Indonesia in the same manner as it has co-operated with the Committee of Good Offices to promote discussions to attain as quickly as possible the goal which is common to all parties.
5. The Netherlands Government is convinced that all parties concerned should first of all endeavour to resume discussions on the basis of mutual appreciation and confidence.
6. In order to facilitate a prompt beginning of the discussions for the creation of the sovereignty of Indonesia, the Netherlands Government has decided to lift the existing restrictions on the liberty of movement of the Republican leaders, to consult with them concerning their wishes as to their future residence and to invite them to participate in the discussions.

7. The Netherlands Government is convinced that the interests of all parties concerned require that they make sincere and strenuous efforts to reach a speedy and prompt solution of pending problems. The Netherlands Government is of the opinion that a firm basis for co-operation and mutual respect can only be completely established when sovereignty over Indonesia can be transferred by the Netherlands to a federal Indonesian government which is truly representative for the whole of Indonesia.
8. On the basis of this conviction, the Netherlands Government has decided to take the initiative for the convocation at the Hague of a round table conference of all parties concerned with the Indonesian question. This conference will have as objective to devise the necessary arrangements for a considerably accelerated transfer of sovereignty, taking advantage of the basic principles on which agreement between parties exists and also prepare arrangements for the intermediary period, including the creation of a federal interim government.
9. The convocation of this conference which should start on March 12 if possible, should be considered as an effort of the Netherlands Government to contribute to the conclusion of a speedy and definite agreement. The Netherlands Government is fully prepared to consider the merits of all proposals put forward by any of the parties during the conference and to determine in how far these are compatible with its responsibility.
10. The Netherlands Government feels that all efforts should be made to terminate the negotiations for an unconditional transfer of sovereignty on May 1, 1949 and to further the ratification immediately afterwards. By that date, agreement should be reached concerning the Union Statute and the financial, economic and military agreements. The Netherlands Government sincerely hopes to establish this future relationship on the basis of what both parties voluntarily will accept as joint interests and purposes. In as much as on certain points no agreement can be reached on the proposed date, special transitional arrangements will have to be made for such subjects as well as for the adaptation of the civil service, the withdrawal of military forces and other problems. These transitional arrangements will remain in force for a short time to be agreed upon by mutual consultation, after the transfer of sovereignty has taken place.
11. The provisions to be made for the interim period, particularly the establishment of a federal interim government, should be considered in
/their

their relation to the proposed accelerated transfer of sovereignty. The significance of these provisions will diminish in as much as this transfer of sovereignty can be accelerated.

27 February 1949

MEMORANDUM II

The re-establishment of the Republican Government in Jogjakarta would give a fatal blow to the confidence of certain persons and political organizations in the possibility of co-operation with the Netherlands. It would mean encouragement of the unconciliatory elements of the Republic to abide by their inflexible attitude. Every social rehabilitation would be retarded, the lives of the Chinese population would be endangered, Tan Malaka would be stimulated to greater activity, guerrilla warfare and terrorism would flare up to an unknown extent, it would be impossible to maintain any authority in Jogjakarta and co-operation of the Netherlands forces in the maintenance of law and order would be extremely difficult if not impossible. The new demarcation line would recreate a chaos in the field of economics, finance and communications, internal security would disappear completely and terrorism would prevail. The Republican Government which already in the past was unable to suppress this terrorism to any extent, would now be at the mercy of the extremists.

Information contained in the selections of documents submitted to you on infiltrations and subversive activities from Republican controlled territory has now been confirmed by documentary evidence from the Republican archives; a comprehensive note on this matter will be completed shortly. The absolute certitude that every possibility of reaching agreement and of successfully conducting negotiations would be frustrated by the terrorism, infiltrations and subversive activities from Jogjakarta, does not permit the Netherlands Government, in view of its responsibility, to allow a return of the Republican Government to Jogjakarta, since this would be tantamount to barring in advance the possibility of achieving a speedy transfer of sovereignty, as envisaged, under regular conditions.

MEMORANDUM III

1. The meaning of the provisions calling for consultations with the Republicans as regards their residence is that at this moment it is not yet possible to travel and reside everywhere in Indonesia, so that certain restrictions, which are in force for everybody, will be observed also by the Republican leaders. Their release, however, does not depend /on their

on their participation in the conference.

2. The invitation to all parties to participate in the conference is not further specified, so that parties are completely free to decide on the size and composition of their delegations. Neither have any provisions been made regarding voting procedure, although the Government is of the opinion that no settlement can be reached unless agreed upon by all parties present.

3. It is said in the communique that the Netherlands Government is prepared to consider the merits of all proposed solutions put forward during the conference, in joint consultation with parties concerned. This means *inter alia* that the Netherlands Government does not intend to put forward a plan at the conference which should only be "to take or to leave". This applies equally to the contents of the Statute of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union. In voluntary joint consultation this will have to be drawn up so as to reflect the interests of both members of the Union. The contents of those sections of the constitution which embody the results of previous consultations form the only limitation for the Netherlands.

4. A federal government for the whole of Indonesia which has sufficient authority to take over the sovereignty from the Netherlands will have to be established. Indonesia itself must answer the question how this Government will be constituted. Care will have to be taken that the important political currents in Indonesia will be represented in proportion to their significance. The proposals regarding this matter, contained in Mr. Cochran's plan could be a starting point. In addition, the most important minority groups of the population of the country will have to be suitably represented.

5. The Netherlands Government, by being prepared to transfer sovereignty over Indonesia on a date more than a year prior to the moment envisaged in the Security Council's resolution, is meeting the desires of the Indonesian nationalists to a greater extent than is requested by the Security Council. The Netherlands Government feels that, by leaving it to Indonesia itself to regulate its own political life subsequent to the transfer of sovereignty, it has made an important contribution to precluding the possibility of friction. So long as the Netherlands Government bears the responsibility for the course of events in Indonesia, it will necessarily have to retain extensive powers and the exercise of these powers would lead to friction. This can be avoided if the Netherlands plan is accepted.

6. The date of the transfer of sovereignty cannot be fixed unilaterally by the Netherlands Government, since this is also dependent upon the wishes of the other parties. The Netherlands Government trusts that the discussions will have resulted in agreement on May 1 next. Subsequent to the reaching of agreement, the Netherlands Government will need a period of approximately six weeks to follow the procedure provided in the Netherlands Constitution. Since the transfer of sovereignty will take place prior to the holding of elections - as was the case in many other Asiatic countries - it is necessary that the Government of the Federated States of Indonesia is sufficiently representative to commit Indonesia to the implementation of the agreements concluded.

7. It is certainly not the intention of the Netherlands untimely to dispose of its responsibility for the administration of Indonesia. Therefore, if the newly formed state would request assistance for a short period after the transfer of sovereignty, the Netherlands are prepared to render this assistance. The initiative to such a request would, however, have to be taken by Indonesia; the Netherlands will not thrust its assistance upon Indonesia. The future relationship will have to be based on real common interests, recognized voluntarily by the parties. It is not necessary that all details will be arranged at the moment sovereignty is transferred. It is essential, however, that at that moment agreement on the main points exists to an extent which ensures that the remaining points will be settled after the transfer without insurmountable difficulties.

8. The necessity of more or less detailed provisions for the transfer of sovereignty will decrease to the extent the parties succeed in shortening this period. For the very reason that it has been so difficult to make arrangements for the interim period, agreeable to both parties, it is of great importance to shorten this interim period as far as possible, in order to establish the ultimate relationship at the earliest possible date.

Batavia, February 27, 1949.

APPENDIX F

LETTER DATED 7 FEBRUARY FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION
ADDRESSED TO THE ACTING CHAIRMAN OF THE NETHERLANDS DELEGATION
IN CONFIRMATION OF THE POINTS MADE IN THE CONVERSATION ON
4 FEBRUARY BETWEEN THE LATTER AND THE COMMISSION'S CHAIRMAN
OF THE WEEK

No: UNCI/267

Hotel des Indes,
Batavia, Java,
7 February 1949

Sir,

I have the honour to submit the following in confirmation and amplification of the points made in the conversation on 4 February between you and the Commission's Chairman of the week. These points reflected the desire of the United Nations Commission for Indonesia to make whatever progress might be possible in the period pending a decision by the Government of the Netherlands with regard to its attitude towards the Security Council's Resolution of 28 January.

The question of the Republican mission to Lake Success was taken up originally with you on 21 January in accordance with the procedure outlined in the Security Council meeting of 17 January. At that time, the Committee of Good Offices was informed that the matter had been referred to your Government at The Hague. Although no formal reply has been received from you, the Commission understands that your Government at this time has no objection in principle, and that the necessary authorization and facilities will be granted as soon as you are informed of the composition of the mission and the proposed time of departure.

The Commission again urges the release of political prisoners called for by the Security Council's Resolutions of 24 and 28 December as well as by that of 28 January. As you know, the more important Republican leaders at present are exiled at Prapat and Bangka, confined to former Republican Secretariat quarters in Batavia, or, for the time being, resident in Batavia and Djogjakarta. If, as an immediate minimum, your Government should restore the freedom of movement and political activity of the President, the members of the Republican Cabinet and the Chairman of the Republican delegation, it would be possible to make considerable progress in preparation for the implementation of the 28 January Resolution. It is recommended therefore, as a first step, that these Republican political leaders be given the opportunity to come together in Batavia or some other place where there would be convenient opportunity for consultation with

/the Commission.

the Commission. You will recognize that the restoration of freedom to the political prisoners as called for by the Resolution should not be conditioned upon acceptance by those released of any commitments which would require them to adhere to any political programme, attend any particular meeting or otherwise accept any settlement other than one in the formulation of which they themselves have participated.

The Commission understands you will reply shortly to the following questions first presented to the representative of the Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Netherlands Indonesian Army by our Military Executive Board on 25 January and subsequently referred to you in the Commission's letter of 29 January:

1. Will it be possible for the Military Executive Board to see the Netherlands army situation map in order to decide the further deployment of Military Observers?
2. Can the Netherlands authorities give the Military Executive Board any information regarding present guerilla activities in all areas of Java, Sumatra and Madura occupied?
3. What military action is being taken against such guerilla activities, if any?
4. May the Military Executive Board send Military Observers to those areas in order to report on these activities and the resulting conditions?
5. Will the Netherlands authorities keep the Military Executive Board currently informed regarding disposition of forces as it is known and what military action is taking place?

You will appreciate that these questions are designed to elicit information needed for the effective discharge by the Military Observers of their duties under the 24 December Resolution as well as under that of 28 January.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,

(signed) Raymond E. Lisle
Chairman

Mr. T. Elink Schuurman,
Acting Chairman,
Delegation of the Kingdom
of the Netherlands,

B A T A V I A