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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/ . . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements of the Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

SEVENTEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FIFTH MEETING

Held in New York on Friday, 30 August 1974, at 10.30 a.m.

President: Mr. Yakov A. MALIK
(Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Australia, Austria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Costa Rica, France, Indonesia, Iraq, Kenya, Mauritania, Peru, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon and United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1795/Rev.1)

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. The situation in Cyprus:

- (a) Letter dated 16 July 1974 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council (S/11334);
- (b) Letter dated 16 July 1974 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11335);
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- (g) Letter dated 27 August 1974 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11471)

The meeting was called to order at 11.15 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Cyprus:

- (a) Letter dated 16 July 1974 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council (S/11334);

- (b) Letter dated 16 July 1974 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11335);
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- (g) Letter dated 27 August 1974 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11471)

1. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): In accordance with the decisions previously taken by the Security Council [1779th-1781st and 1793rd meetings], I intend, with the consent of the Council, to invite the representatives of Cyprus, Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, Romania, India, Mauritius and Algeria to take part, without the right to vote, in the discussion of the question.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Rossides (Cyprus), Mr. Olcay (Turkey) and Mr. Carayannis (Greece) took places at the Council table.

2. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): In view of the limited number of places at the Council table, I invite the representatives of Yugoslavia, Romania, India, Mauritius and Algeria to take the seats reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber, on the understanding that they will be invited to take a place at the Council table when they are called upon to speak.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Job (Yugoslavia), Mr. Gheorghe (Romania), Mr. Budhiraja (India), Mr. Ramphul (Mauritius) and Mr. Taleb-Bendiab (Algeria) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

3. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): As the members of the Council know, this meeting has been called at the request of the representative of Cyprus in a letter circulated as document S/11471. I wish to draw the attention of the members of the Council to the fact that the latest reports of the Secretary-General also relate directly to today's meeting: first, a report on developments in Cyprus for the period 20 to 25 August [S/11468], and, secondly, a report on the Secretary-General's recent visit to Cyprus, Greece and Turkey [S/11473]. Furthermore, the Council has before it a draft resolution contained which has been submitted by Austria, the United Kingdom and France [S/11479].

4. The first speaker is the representative of Cyprus, on whom I now call.

5. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): The continuing deterioration of the critical situation in Cyprus, in circumstances that are unprecedented and unthinkable for our times and have led to the present state of affairs, is a tragedy that should be unacceptable to the world community. In their history of over 3,000 years the people of Cyprus have gone through many vicissitudes and tests. Repeatedly they have been invaded. Repeatedly they have lost and regained their freedom, yet they have never faced the kind of aggressive catastrophe from a strong Power that they are now facing in these times of the United Nations, unprecedented in nature and in the methods adopted.

6. The territorial integrity of the island of Cyprus had never in its history been threatened; the distinct identity and historic character of Cyprus had never been challenged; its continuity has been unbroken from age to age, from the Mycenaean and the Bronze Age down to this day, and has been for this reason the subject of study by eminent ethnologists and historians. Stanley Cusson, in his book regarding ancient and modern Cyprus, writes:

"The cultural development of Cyprus was never broken, for no expedition and no invasion set out with the set and main object of destroying Cypriot civilization."

But that is what is happening today. The invader is there with a set purpose, not merely to use the island for strategic purposes, not merely to use it for some other understandable purpose that has been sought in the past, but for something new.

7. The Turkish aggression and invasion of Cyprus in its unfolding goes far beyond the concept of "the scourge of war" spoken of in the Charter. It is a pre-planned and long-prepared attempt to use overwhelming military force in order to tear asunder the very heart of Cyprus in an all-engulfing effort to deface and destroy the island, to break up its physical, economic and cultural continuity and its development. The objective is the dismemberment of the

country through the virtual deracination of the Greek Cypriot people, who form the large majority of its population.

8. The world has thus witnessed, from the very first moment of the invasion, the ruthless shelling and intensive napalm bombing of undefended towns and villages, indiscriminately and wantonly spreading death and destruction, for the purpose of death and destruction. Special targets appear to have been hospitals, educational and other public institutions, public and private buildings, all having nothing to do with military targets. Priceless ancient monuments were also the targets, like the ancient city of Salamis, an isolated city in an area where there was nothing else but that ancient city, which was deliberately destroyed. So were the forests, through fires from incendiary bombs.

9. Now, in this orgy of destruction, what is remarkable? There are many things that are remarkable. One is that, from the very start, from the very first moment of the invasion—that is, at the very time that the Prime Minister of Turkey was broadcasting to Cyprus and to the world, "Our mission is peaceful. Turkish forces have begun landing in Cyprus ..."—which shows that it was just at that time—"We are not going for war but to bring peace to the island, not only to the Turks but to the Greeks as well". While these pronouncements were being made, the wanton catastrophe I have just mentioned had just started and was going on.

10. The tragic irony of the situation, which is both a tragedy and a travesty, is that Turkey pretends to do all this as a guarantor and protector of the independence, territorial integrity and security of Cyprus under the so-called Treaty of Guarantee of 1960. The guarantee of what independence? That of subjugation to a nascent Turkish imperialism? Guarantee of what security? The security of the grave? Of what territorial integrity? That of a deliberately dismembered Cyprus under that Treaty of Guarantee and its auspices?

11. This is the picture that has been unfolding for over six weeks now before a stunned world and an ineffective Security Council for reasons we all know. What is, however, important at this juncture is that now—for the first time since the Second World War, and perhaps I should say since even before it—a course of action which is rare in all of world history is taking place. The invaders are deliberately proceeding with a determined policy of expelling Cypriots from their ancestral homes in order to make room for other illicit and unavowed purposes.

12. Although this plan may not have been clear enough from the outset to all, it nevertheless rapidly became unmistakable to all that the invader had entered with a set purpose—that of expulsion by blood and iron, by whatever means were at hand, of the rightful

and historic owners from their homes and lands. And that is the problem we are facing today in the Security Council.

13. From the very start, a reign of terror and a policy of expulsion was initiated to carry out this illegal and immoral process, a process that amounts to geographic and demographic dismemberment. The invader, with unchallenged command of the sea and air, and with an overwhelming force and weaponry in its possession—we know under what circumstances—has consistently and continuously increased its force in Cyprus, in violation of all the cease-fires called for by the Security Council, which it had accepted, and in violation of the cease-fire which it had signed and agreed to in Geneva.

14. For instance, as a result, over 400 modern tanks, brought ashore after the cease-fire, were pitted against nine old tanks and other primitive weapons, mercilessly attacking and wreaking mass destruction to create the movement of civilian populations from the areas desired by the invader. Able-bodied men were transported to unknown destinations; women and children and old people were driven out of such areas and forcibly expelled. Over 200,000 persons from among the small population of Cyprus have been forced out of the area, leaving their livestock and their personal belongings, and taking with them only the shirts on their backs. Those who were allowed to escape with their lives were not allowed to take anything else with them.

15. The question everyone must ask himself is whether this is the century of the United Nations or a century of at least an elementary international lawful community, or whether this is a new age, with a new wave of barbarism beginning recently—or not so recently—no different from that of past centuries except for the more sophisticated weapons and the increased number of the means of destruction in the service of those policies.

16. Therefore, a new era of barbarism is setting in, with greater repercussions because this is a technologically advanced age, and this is a matter of thought for everyone. Are there any other considerations to be put before the immediate restitution of the legal and moral rights of the countless persons displaced from their lands and homes for no valid reason whatever, other than the fact that they happened to be the inhabitants of that area and must thus be moved out to make room for illicit and unavowed purposes—for no other reason than that the invading Power wants to create a State of its own, on its own terms, in total defiance of every aspect of international law and order, including scornful defiance of this very body?

17. What considerations could be put ahead of the rectification of this great wrong done to innocent and helpless people in total defiance of international

legality and morality—a wrong consciously intended to change the very character of a sovereign Member State, a wrong which is destroying its very economy?

18. Is it necessary to remind ourselves of our solemn obligations under the Charter? If so, then by all means let us do so.

19. Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Charter speaks of the principle of the sovereign equality of all Members. Article 2, paragraph 3, says Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means. Article 2, paragraph 4, says that

“Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.”

Now, this situation in Cyprus begins with a violation of every one of those principles. Needless to say, the Charter makes equally clear the responsibilities of the Security Council where those Articles are not observed.

20. In the watershed year of 1970, the twenty-fifth anniversary of the world Organization, a number of steps were solemnly taken by the General Assembly to strengthen precisely the lawful obligations between States and the responsibility of the United Nations. Thus I need only briefly remind members of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security [*resolution 2734 (XXV)*], which solemnly reaffirms that:

“the territory of a State shall not be the object of military occupation resulting from the use of force”—as the territory of Cyprus under Turkish military occupation now is—“in contravention of the provisions of the Charter, ... the territory of a State shall not be the object of acquisition by another State resulting from the threat or use of force, ... no territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognized as legal”.

Equally, on the situation in the Middle East, it was declared that the acquisition of territory by force was inadmissible. Also, the Declaration that I have just quoted and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Corporation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations [*resolution 2625 (XXV)*].

21. Now, why is there such difficulty in ending the military occupation of Cyprus by a foreign State? The resolutions of the Security Council provide for the immediate cessation of military intervention in the island and for the withdrawal without delay of the foreign military forces. Turkey has an obligation to comply with the resolution that was adopted without its objection and countersigned, and thus reaffirmed,

with its consent, in the Geneva Declaration [see S/11398]. And yet, instead of withdrawing its forces, and not content with merely not withdrawing them, it ejects the indigenous population and maintains its position there. The aggressor stays there in disrespect of the resolutions of the Security Council. Not only that: it ejects the population by force—by blood and iron, as I have said before.

22. That is the situation the world is facing today with equanimity, and the Security Council in a mood of ineffectiveness. That is the picture that has now been unfolding for more than six weeks before a stunned world. However, what is important is that this is the first time the question of forcible expulsion has appeared. In no other case in that area of the world has there been open and blatant expulsion of the population of a territory, the completely unabashed expulsion of the population.

23. Thus the problem transcends Cyprus. It is a problem of all small countries, and, more properly, a problem of the world. It is a direct challenge to the very concept of the maintenance of international peace and security with which this august body is specifically charged, and a challenge to elementary human rights in our world. All the solemn declarations of the United Nations and of the Charter itself are now in question.

24. It is obvious that until the present time the invader has continued to work his sinister will unopposed—virtually and effectively unopposed. What he has actually done during this period is to bring destruction—destruction of a community, destruction of land and property, destruction of livestock and other resources, destruction of homes and families and towns and villages. And he is now pushing forward with the destruction of the economy and the character of the island also.

25. I believe I heard voices of jubilation from that source over the “victory”. What victory? Victory against the United Nations? Victory against the Charter? Victory against any remaining concept of international security and international order and international law? That is the victory that has been promoted, that has been protected, that is looked upon with pride.

26. I am afraid that this little case of this little country of Cyprus—I have said this before but I cannot refrain from saying it again, because I feel it so strongly and am persuaded it is true—is going to be the symbol of what will happen to the world in the years ahead. Not only that. There are so many other things concurrent with it. But this is a symbol of one of its aspects. The downfall of morality in an age of gigantic technological progress in which there should be comparable progress in moral aspects, so that man, having become powerful enough through technology to destroy himself and the whole world,

would have the moral concepts that would restrain him. The wholesale collapse of moral concepts is symbolic of what is coming to humanity.

27. Now all that is happening in Cyprus is on the conscience of the world community and is focused in the United Nations. It is the implementation of that conscience by the Organization which is now on trial. Where shall the small, the defenceless, the helpless turn if not to the United Nations and, more specifically, the Security Council? And if the Council is so blissfully ineffective, what can be the hope of mankind? But, leaving all these considerations aside for the moment, let me turn to the immediate problem of the inhumanity and unacceptability of the expulsion of the population of Cyprus by the hundreds of thousands from their ancestral homes.

28. I must go into certain details. Aside from the 200,000 persons that have been so displaced—this population represents about 40 per cent of the entire Greek population of the island; over 50,000 households which have been broken up and the properties of their owners left behind, subject to further looting and to the destruction of time—Cyprus is now losing about £2 million worth of production every day that passes. Virtually the entire labour force is unemployed as compared with the state of full employment before the invasion. As reported in my letter to the Secretary-General of 23 August [S/11467], many thousands of animals are dying because of the lack of food, water and care. They are dying because their owners have been thrown out of their houses and off their land. Permission to feed and water the livestock has been denied to the Greek Cypriots when it was asked twice by the Government of Cyprus. I want to be accurate—it was not actually denied. There was no response, which in effect was negative. Twice application was made for permission for the people to return to tend their land and farms for the sake of the economy, and twice there was no response. The last time was on 17 August. These requests were made formally and effectively through the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), but also, formally and effectively, there was no response. Furthermore, persons who attempted to go back in spite of that refusal, persons who felt that their own livelihoods were disappearing and that they had to go back to water their dying cattle were all killed on two occasions. I do not have the details now, but I shall produce them shortly. In addition, the orange plantations of the north region will perish in a few more days if they are not irrigated—a system created by many years of laborious work and at very considerable expense.

29. It is important to note that—as is also pointed out in my letter of 23 August—the Turkish occupation already covers far more than one third of the Cypriot territory, 40 per cent, which, however, corresponds to 70 per cent of the economic life of the country. The economy now runs the risk of being destroyed.

All this depends upon the return of the refugees to their homes and all this depends upon what resolution the Council will adopt today, on how far it will be effective in its drafting and on how effective the Council will be in its implementation. The economic survival of the country is now at stake, and we must view the draft resolution to be adopted in the light of these considerations.

30. There are three main aspects to this problem that have to be taken into account in their order of importance.

31. First and most immediate and most consequential is the threatening effect of this expelling of the population on the economy of the island. Never before has there been such a situation for the reason that never before has there been such a pounding by a comparatively enormous Power of a small undefended and unprotected country. Never before has such an attack been made for the set purpose of destruction and deracination. That is the first problem, the problem of the economy of the island which is daily being eroded and destroyed as a result of the situation.

32. The second main aspect is the humanitarian one.

33. The third and, I would say more vitally important aspect in a broader sense, is its effect upon the solution of the problem. In this respect, resolution 353 (1974), reaffirmed by subsequent resolutions and by the Geneva Declaration, states—I have said this before but I must say it again in the present context—that foreign military intervention should be ended immediately, that foreign military personnel should without delay be withdrawn from the Republic of Cyprus. These are made preconditions for the solution of the problem through free negotiations. We have seen how the negotiations in Geneva were vitiated by the presence of the army. The presence of the army was abused in order to carry out negotiations at gun-point, vitiating the negotiations, vitiating and destroying their forum. So it is not constructive to take an attitude of indifference to the conduct of Turkey in this respect.

34. Following the repeated violations of the cease-fire and the illegal occupation by military force of a far greater area by the invader, the Security Council adopted resolution 360 (1974) which emphasized that “the acquisition of advantages resulting from military operations” should not in any way impede or prejudice the negotiations and their outcome.

35. The return of the displaced persons to their homes and land is imperative and urgent for all these three reasons: to save the economy, for humanitarian reasons and to make negotiations for the solution of the problem possible. The reason why there is objection to their return is that the other side wants to create *faits accomplis* by bringing in other people to rob the

land and the property and the houses of those people who were there, thereby destroying the very concept of negotiation and the solution of the problem. Therefore, from the point of view of the economy, of human rights and of the solution of the problem, there must be a resolution which directly and emphatically points to the return of the refugees to their homes and their lands. A resolution to that effect, duly implemented, can save the present critical situation for Cyprus and, no less I repeat, for the United Nations and the world.

36. If the Security Council has so far been ineffective in carrying out its responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and security and protecting the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity which every Member State, according to the resolutions, is supporting, but yet so easily neglecting; if, with respect to one small non-aligned country Member of the United Nations, the Council is unable effectively to insist upon the implementation of its cease-fire and its own resolutions, it should at least respond effectively to the present aspect of saving the economy, the life, the existence of Cyprus and making a positive solution of the problem possible. We shall see what type of draft resolution the Council will adopt along these lines. It is its responsibility; we have no vote in the adoption of the resolution. But I give this as a warning: this resolution has to be effective if the situation is not to deteriorate further, with unknown consequences and repercussions for the world.

37. In the long run the dire effects for the international community and the United Nations itself of not taking proper and effective action will be incalculably greater and graver than any short-term parochial considerations and interests that may prompt the failure of this resolution, and, in my humble submission, that would be unworthy of the gravity of the situation and of the over-all interests of the United Nations.

38. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): I now call on the next speaker, the representative of Greece.

39. Mr. CARAYANNIS (Greece): The refugee problem in Cyprus has, I think, two aspects. One is humanitarian. The number of those who became refugees in the span of several days was such that available means and organizations could not cope with the emergency. It was the Secretary-General's good idea to call on the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and entrust him with the co-ordination of the effort. Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan spent several days in Cyprus. I understand that he has now gone back to Geneva, and that we shall soon have a report enabling us to have a clear picture of what could be done to alleviate the human suffering. The High Commissioner cannot, however, solve the problem. He knows it and we know it. He is not even entitled to try, because it is a political problem, and it is our problem.

40. So the second aspect is, in effect, political. It is estimated that 200,000 refugees have fled from the occupied northern part of the island and have sought refuge in the south. Why have they fled? Presumably because they were afraid of the invading army. Everybody is afraid of an invading army; and, in any case, the experiences of the first days of invasion were not reassuring. In most cases they left their homes without taking anything with them, or very little. And they had to leave behind livestock and crops. When the cease-fire became almost effective—something which seems unbelievable, and it already appears precarious—those people asked to be allowed to go back to their homes in the occupied territory. The reason was that the cattle were dying of thirst, the crops would be ruined. Hope, you see, never abandons a human being. The Turkish answer to this request was “No”, and it is still “No”.

41. One Turkish argument is that the return of the refugees to their homes should be dealt with in an over-all settlement. And we are asked to go to negotiations in order to have those people go back to their homes and feed their livestock. We have already experienced gun-point negotiations; we are now asked to experience “refugee-point” negotiations—if I may so put it. The whole thing amounts to being told “either you accept this or the refugees stay where they are”. I do not think that this is the proper approach if we want to find a lasting solution acceptable to all and, more than everybody else, to the people of Cyprus, a solution which will be good and workable not only today but for the years to come—years in which Turkey and Greece will eventually be interested in more constructive endeavours.

42. Another Turkish argument is that Turkish Cypriots have been refugees in the island for the last 10 years. We have heard the Turkish representative advancing this argument in this room, and in many instances he insisted on the hardships suffered by the Turkish community. I think that I have always been sincere in whatever I said in this Council and I am not the one who will pretend that Turks have been happy in Cyprus for the last decade. The question is to know why they have been unhappy. Turks and Greeks have lived for centuries in Cyprus in close friendship, even when Greeks on the mainland were fighting against the Turks for their independence. Even in today's turmoil, there are instances of Greeks fleeing the Turkish army and leaving the keys of their homes to Turkish friends, and vice versa in the south. A large proportion of Turks have been on their own decision—or, rather, on the decision of Turkey—confined for the last 10 years in enclaves. But in the same period many other Turks have been living outside with Greeks without any hardship at all and without any incident. Those in the enclaves had to get permission from the Turks to go out, and they actually were doing so. But they did not have to get permission from the Greeks. They were free and welcome to go anywhere they liked. The Greeks, on the other hand

and at the same time, were not allowed to enter the Turkish enclaves, and they were not entering them.

43. The Turks in the enclaves have suffered economically and otherwise by their seclusion. But it was not a suffering imposed by the Greeks; it was a suffering imposed by the Turkish Government across the sea, for obvious reasons—in order to create a status of separation which was to be exploited at the first available opportunity. This opportunity came.

44. The Turkish representative said the other day that he was entitled to remind members of the Council that he had told them so. But I am also entitled to remind members of the Council that I had told them so, or, at any rate, Greece had told them so. The whole question was a real estate question right from the beginning: how Turkey would secure a part of the island and how the Turkish population could be used to that end. There is a cataract of documents circulated on questionable Greek Cypriot atrocities, which I refrain as much as possible from replying to—and not for lack of material. But I have never said around this table that Greek Cypriots are angels. Greeks have their fanatics, as other countries have kidnappers. But how can one expect not to arouse fanaticism in a country one invades and devastates, spreading around human misery? One thing remains true: there were no incidents in times in which there were no provocations, and the United Nations Force has been there for many years to testify to this.

45. I shall be told that all this is past history, and I would agree. Let us be realistic. The question is: where do we go now? And the big question is: shall we go in the direction of this Council's resolutions or shall we choose another way? The basic principles constantly repeated in every single resolution of the Council are: first, withdrawal of armed forces; second, independence, sovereignty and integrity for Cyprus. As far as withdrawal is concerned, all we could get in Geneva was a “phased reduction”. It must be agreed that that was not much, even on paper. It was a very elaborated phrase which possibly could never lead to withdrawal.

46. But I prefer to elaborate more on the principle of independence, sovereignty and integrity. The representative of the United States said in one of our previous meetings that he was in favour of greater autonomy for the Turks in Cyprus. Well, I am also in favour of it. Nobody wants the Turks in Cyprus not to be as free as possible and live the life they want to live and do the things they like to do and express the ideas they like to express. But does that mean that the island should be partitioned into a Greek sector and a Turkish sector and that Greeks and Turks should be concentrated with determination and patience in a Greek sector and a Turkish sector with a nominal head of State who will not know whom he represents, just for us to be able to say that we have violated the Security Council resolutions

99 per cent but not 100 per cent? Is this a practical proposition? If this were to happen—and anything may happen—the Turkish sector will inevitably be linked in every respect with Turkey and the Greek sector with Greece, and you will very soon find yourselves wondering in the Council why the two sectors are not formally attached to and annexed by the two countries. Turkey, by not allowing the return of the 200,000 refugees to their homes, is aiming precisely at creating this situation. Two hundred thousand refugees represent almost the total of the Greek population of the areas occupied after the second Geneva conference. The Turkish authorities have even announced that for any deal concerning the refugees, the Turks in the south should first be allowed to move to the north. But the Turks in the south belong to the south. If they were to be allowed to go north there would be no place for the Greeks who have left, and the consequences I foresaw in the earlier part of this statement would have already become a *fait accompli*. I have even heard reports from the news media of this country that a number of Turks from the mainland have been settled in the north of Cyprus. I am not in a position to verify that, but everybody will realize the seriousness of such an eventuality. I humbly submit that those who think in terms of dividing the island one way or another should never have voted for Security Council resolution 353 (1974) or any other resolution on this item.

47. I should like to end my statement by commenting on the question of negotiations, which is of obvious interest to all members of the Council.

48. We are not against negotiations. We know that if we want a settlement—and we do want one—we have to negotiate. But the Council has to realize that the positions of Greece and Turkey are very far apart on matters of substance, and that the position of Greece is very, very close to resolution 353 (1974). I know the difficulty created for the Council by the fact that its resolution is almost identical with the position of one of the parties. It is always more convenient for the Council to be in the middle of a dispute. But we have to see things as they are. After six resolutions of the Council, Turkey has not given any indication thus far of any change in its position. More than that, the reaction of the representative of Turkey to the last resolution adopted by the Council pointed clearly to the contrary. Not even in the refugee question does Turkey seem to offer any indication of goodwill or comprehension. The Turkish Government is clearly not prepared for negotiations. All it is prepared for is to have us accept a premeditated and prearranged plan. The Vice-President, Mr. Denktas, who is representing the Turkish community but has to speak for Turkey, is very clear on this point: either you accept two federated States or we shall create an independent one. We are not concerned with the form future negotiations may take. We are concerned with the prospect they

may offer. Obviously, if the resumption of the Geneva conference is in deadlock we are open to any other suggestions. We are ready to try. But if one agrees with what I have said, Turkey has first to be persuaded that we are not completely wrong. It does not amount to anything to negotiate if the will to negotiate does not exist and the Security Council resolutions are not even considered. It does not amount to anything to concede the surplus territory occupied for this precise purpose. With the Turkish troops at present in Cyprus Turkey can occupy more territory if it wants, in order to be able to concede more. If we are to be offered the same proposals we were offered in Geneva, as we have already honestly explained, we are not prepared to accept them. We have to agree that, no matter what the consequences, there is a big difference between something one cannot prevent and something one agrees to.

49. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): I call on the representative of Turkey.

50. Mr. OLCAY (Turkey): I remember that after the adoption of resolution 360 (1974), to which my colleague from Greece has just referred, I said that my Government had declared its readiness to take part in the negotiations aimed at establishing the future framework of the Constitution for an independent and sovereign State of Cyprus, but that that should not be on the basis of what I then described as an unbalanced, biased, unequal, unfair and unrealistic resolution. I said, further, that if the Council adopted, as I hoped it would do very soon, any other resolution that did not bear all those stigmas, my Government would be ready to reconsider its attitude in that respect, and would do so gladly.

51. I would have hoped that this meeting of the Council could mark a step forward in that direction. But, having heard the representative of Greece and the speaker who preceded him, Mr. Rossides, I must say that we seem to be back where we started. I have the feeling that if this Council adopts today the draft resolution now before it, members of the Council will find, if they examine their conscience, that after all the consultations that have taken place, after all the many, tiring hours they have spent, they have actually done nothing to lessen the suffering of Cypriots, both Turkish and Greek, but, instead, have satisfied the political ambitions of only one side. If there had been any doubts about this in the mind of any Council member, I am sure that Mr. Rossides's ample references to preconditions for the peace talks have dispelled them.

52. Today's meeting—whose utility I am still at a loss to understand—is being held in rather strange circumstances. Allow me to explain what I mean.

53. As is known, this meeting was convened at the request of Mr. Rossides. For the record I should like to read out what Mr. Rauf Denktas, Vice-

President of the Republic of Cyprus, has to say on the subject—I know that Mr. Denktas's letter has been distributed as a document, but I should like to take one minute of the Council's time to read it out now:

[The speaker read out the text of the letter contained in document S/11477.]

54. I do not want at this stage to open up the whole delicate subject of legitimacy in Cyprus. The original Constitution has been violated, even desecrated, so often by the Greek Cypriot side that it is hardly worth referring to it. Suffice it for me to say that Mr. Rossides seems to be the only diplomat of Cyprus duly nominated. Nevertheless, he has been in the course of these years, and certainly now is, merely the representative of his own ethnic group's administration. I reserve my Government's right to come back to this whole subject more formally at the appropriate time—and certainly this is not the appropriate time.

55. With regard to the more substantive subject-matter of today's meeting, that is, the problem of the refugees—a problem that seems to have been selected from the many problems of Cyprus because of its dramatic potential for public presentation—I would say this.

56. I would start by quoting Mr. Rossides's favourite author—indeed the favourite author of all the Greek representatives, whether of the mainland or of the island. I am referring to the man whom Mr. Rossides has quoted more than any other during the two years I have appeared before the Council: Mr. Galo Plaza.

57. Mr. Galo Plaza, who explicitly states that he is in favour of enosis, proposed in fact a transitional solution, envisaging a unitary State in Cyprus in which the Turkish community would be reduced to the status of a simple minority without any effective guarantees. He admitted that a large number of Turkish Cypriots would find it impossible to live in such a State and that they would want to leave the island and emigrate to Turkey. He was so certain in his own mind that that would be the outcome that he suggested, very generously indeed, that compensation should be paid to Turks who preferred to leave Cyprus. It was when the majority of Turks would have left the island that, in Mr. Galo Plaza's view, the time would be ripe for enosis.

58. I should like now to quote from Mr. Galo Plaza's report dated 26 March 1965. It is an old document, but the facts do not seem to have changed much despite the passage of time. In that report Mr. Galo Plaza stated:

"In addition [to the foregoing], it would be just and fair to recognize that however effective the safeguards that can be devised, any Turkish Cypriot who fails to find in them a basis for reasonable confidence in the new order of things"

—and I must say that that phrase "the new order" reminds me of so many things—

"would have the right to resettle in Turkey, and should be assisted to do so, with adequate compensation and help in starting a new life." [S/6253, para. 161]

Mr. Galo Plaza went on to say:

"I have therefore been pleased to be able to record the assurances which Archbishop Makarios has given of his concern for these aspects of the problem and the specific measures which he has expressed his willingness to apply. ... They include ... certain exceptional and transitional provisions." [Ibid., para. 164.]

And Mr. Galo Plaza stated that the need for such measures had been conceded in principle.

59. When the report is read in its entirety, the real discrepancy in Mr. Plaza's reasoning becomes more obvious. He discards the idea of federation, because he abhors the idea of a movement of population within a few miles on the tiny island of Cyprus, but he sees nothing wrong with the idea of a mass emigration of Turkish Cypriots to Turkey. In fact, I know that this has been the policy also of the Greek Cypriot Administration for the past 10 years, during which Turks were always encouraged to emigrate to England, to Australia, to wherever they wanted to go—just so long as they did not stay on the island. This is proved by the fact that when a Turkish Cypriot applied for a passport, if it was for emigration purposes he was granted it immediately but if it was for any other purpose he had to wait indefinitely.

60. What Mr. Rossides said on the plight of the refugees was, of course, moving. I recognize that there is a tragedy. But I must say that what he said had a familiar ring. I wonder if he was reading from some speeches made a decade ago by Turkish representatives describing the plight of Turkish Cypriots. This is the essence of the Cypriot question: refusal to recognize the equality of the Turkish Cypriots, equality even in their suffering and plight. And today we are faced with just another example of this mentality.

61. Since 1963, when the Greek onslaught on the Turks occurred, 103 villages have had to be evacuated by Turkish Cypriots, who have fled to safer areas. Despite the fact that every time they have appeared in this chamber since then Turkish representatives have drawn the attention of the Council to this intolerable situation, the Council has remained silent. Twenty-four thousand Turkish Cypriots have been living as displaced persons in temporary refugee accommodation for 11 years. It is not possible for us to forget that during this decade everyone has

been telling Turkey that this problem could be resolved after a political solution of the Cyprus question was reached.

62. In spite of the assurances given by Archbishop Makarios to the Secretary-General in September and November 1964 that he would repair or reconstruct all damaged properties and financially assist the refugees to rehabilitate themselves, the illegal Greek Cypriot Administration has done everything to prevent this from actually taking place, and instead has made it subject to prior Turkish recognition of its unconstitutional authority.

63. At the 1771st meeting of the Security Council, held as recently as 29 May 1974, I stated—and I apologize for having to quote so much of what I said:

“...The Greek Cypriot Administration continues to reject the Turkish proposal to set up a joint committee under United Nations chairmanship to arrange the rehabilitation of the Turkish Cypriot refugees, free from all political motivation and bias.”—That was two months ago.—“The Greek Cypriot side is doing everything possible to impede the return of the Turkish Cypriot refugees to their villages by creating artificial difficulties such as the refusal to supply their homes with drinking water, electricity and other facilities and claiming a variety of accumulated prohibitive sums as taxes or dues for water, rule constable fees and so on, in respect of which the refugees have had no benefit for the last 11 years.

“Some of the Turkish Cypriots who have returned to their villages with the help of the Turkish Cypriot Administration are being harassed by the Greek Cypriots and their Administration. This is the case in three of the four villages mentioned in paragraph 51 [of the report of the Secretary-General]. The prohibition of the return of the Turkish Cypriot refugees to six major villages is still in full force. The Turkish inhabitants of these particular villages are also being denied access to their properties, even for agricultural purposes.” [1771st meeting, paras. 42 and 43.]

Even schoolchildren were used in demonstrations where they were made to carry placards asking the Greek Cypriot Administration to expel the Turkish Cypriots from Cyprus. That was two months ago, and there was no war or military occupation then. That was the treatment by the Cypriot Greek Administration. And may I say here that I beg to differ from what the representative of Greece just said when he depicted the idyllic life of the Turks under Greek Administration.

64. Throughout the period of what I am sorry to have to call the indifference of the Security Council and the international community to this intolerable

and immoral situation, all the lands of Turkish Cypriots situated in Greek-controlled areas were cultivated, without any payment, by the Greeks, while the Greek Cypriot Administration looked on without taking any steps to prevent this continuing usurpation of rights and properties. For 11 years we have lived with the knowledge of this reality and Mr. Rossides and his kin have lived with the inevitable, yet apparently surmountable, burden of the knowledge of this reality on their conscience.

65. Now what do we see after these 11 years? We see that it is now about 11 days since some parts of the Greek Cypriot population became displaced, and Mr. Rossides deems it fit to come here and ask the Security Council to deal with this humanitarian problem—and I underline that we do recognize the existence of a humanitarian problem; there is a tragedy in Cyprus—as a matter of priority. But I cannot refrain from asking: what nationalities, in the opinion of this Council, have to be displaced before one can speak of the existence of a humanitarian problem which merits the attention of this august body? I ask: is it at all compatible with the principles of equity to consider that a humanitarian problem exists only after some Greek Cypriots too have become displaced?

66. Why does a home become—to use Mr. Rossides’ word—“ancestral” when it belongs to a Greek? Is it because the island has been—and again I use his words—“Greek for 3,000 years”? Does this mean that all non-Greeks are, for all eternity, to be branded as “barbarians”—again using his term? What kind of racial and religious hatred does this reflect? I hope it does not reflect any, but the doubt is there.

67. Can anyone in the Council explain to me just what “the return of the displaced persons to their homes” means? Does it encompass the Turkish Cypriots who were displaced 11 years ago? Who can make a reasonable offer to compensate for the loss of life, loss of homes, loss of land and loss of income by the Turkish Cypriots for the past 11 years? How is their security to be safeguarded? I admit that these are hard questions, perhaps beyond the competence of the Council. However, they are the real questions which will have to be addressed in order to reach a solution of the Cyprus problem.

68. I agree with my Greek colleague when he said that there is a political question involved. In fact, what has been brought here today with humanitarian consideration is also, and perhaps foremost, a political question. The problem of displaced persons can be settled only within the framework of a political solution of the Cyprus problem. It is intricately related to the over-all settlement. In the light of the deplorable past of Cyprus, it has now become both a moral and a humanitarian requirement for everyone to recognize the need for a federal solution, with two geographically separated, autonomous administrations that will enable the two communities to live side by

side in peace and security, and without further bloodshed, within the framework of a single State. No amount of pretension and rhetoric can disguise this pressing reality. Such a solution has become a necessity, and I do not think I am exaggerating when I say that it is a necessity for world peace.

69. Now, at a time when once more all segments of the Greek community, including the Greek Cypriot Administration, are threatening guerrilla warfare, it is, to say the least, unrealistic to expect that the question of the displaced persons can be dealt with separately from the over-all solution of the Cyprus question.

70. I must emphasize that the proponents of guerrilla warfare have already clearly defined its purpose—and I quote the local press—as “fighting to the death until the union of Cyprus with Greece is realized”. Turkey will not, in any circumstances, permit the creation of conditions which would facilitate such guerrilla activity.

71. Today, more than one third of the Turkish Cypriots have become refugees. Practically one half of the Turkish Cypriots outside the areas liberated from the Greek terror still continue to live under the threat of Greek armed bands and the so-called EOKA-B, which even the Greek Cypriot Administration cannot control. One half, therefore, of the Turkish community are practically hostages in the hands of these Greek hooligans, who gave proof, a few days ago, of their sense of values in front of a foreign embassy. Today we again received news of what Greeks may do to Greeks when one of their leaders again barely escaped assassination.

72. I did not come here to make an exposé of the life of the Turkish refugees. I know that the problem is much wider today, and we sympathize fully with the plight of the innocent Turkish and Greek Cypriot displaced and otherwise affected persons. We support activities to alleviate their hardships by providing food, shelter and medicine. But the satisfactory solution to their problem can be found only within the context of an over-all solution. This is all the more reason to resume political negotiations without delay; and again I beg to differ with what my Greek colleague has said about the negotiations. I can assure all members of this Council that Turkey believes so much in negotiations that it is ready to sit with representatives of the Greek Government, despite what was said today by my colleague.

73. In this connexion, finally, I should like to remind the Council that my Government has welcomed the appointment of Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan as the co-ordinator of the United Nations relief activities in Cyprus. My Government and the Turkish Cypriot Administration are fully co-operating with the International Committee of the Red Cross, which has undertaken the humanitarian activities with respect to both communities.

74. Moreover, my Government has welcomed the initiation of contacts between Mr. Denktas and Mr. Clerides, the respective leaders of the two communities, on the humanitarian question. And here I should like also to express my Government's appreciation for the tireless efforts of the Secretary-General. I hope that adoption of unrealistic resolutions will not undo what he has so painstakingly achieved.

75. Mr. JANKOWITSCH (Austria): Now that the weapons are silent in Cyprus, even though violence in many forms continues to ravage the island, the immense tragedy and human suffering of the population of the island manifests itself in frightening dimensions. A great number of men, women and children, belonging to both communities, have lost their lives, many more are wounded, and a third of the entire population, Greek and Turkish, have been displaced from their homes and turned into refugees who live under the most miserable conditions. This is without speaking about the enormous amount of destruction and the devastating blow to the economy of a small nation. The tragedy of Cyprus has also claimed victims from those who came to keep the peace. Rudolf Kirschlaeger, the Federal President of Austria, speaking at a ceremony of mourning at Vienna airport a few days ago to commemorate the dead of the Austrian contingent, said, in words which reflect the sacrifice of all, that those men had died “in trying to bring peace and maintain peace for the people of a country friendly to Europe”.

76. Death has also struck the diplomatic community of Nicosia. We deplore the tragic death of the Ambassador of the United States in Nicosia, and I want to take this opportunity to offer condolences to the delegation of the United States on that sad event.

77. All this once more demonstrates the extreme consequences of the use of force in the solution of political conflicts.

78. The Security Council has repeatedly addressed itself to the political and military aspects of the situation. It is now imperative for the Council also as a matter of urgency to deal with the immense humanitarian problems which have arisen. In saying that, we fully recognize that that aspect cannot be separated from the over-all situation. Thus the urgent need for the parties to resume negotiations becomes even more evident since the humanitarian side of the problem will have to rank prominently among the questions to be solved. The present debate of this Council has to be seen in the light of the urgency of the situation, particularly in humanitarian terms, and it is thus consistent with the Council's continued preoccupation with events in Cyprus.

79. In his report which is now before the Council, the Secretary-General has therefore rightly focused particular attention on the humanitarian problems.

The untiring and enormous efforts of the Secretary-General personally and his staff here and on the island and the efforts of the United Nations Force and of the Red Cross, as well as those of other international organizations, deserve our highest praise. In that context we welcome the appointment of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as co-ordinator of United Nations humanitarian assistance for Cyprus.

80. My country was among those which responded to an urgent appeal of the President of the Republic of Cyprus for emergency aid for the population of Cyprus, and at its session of 20 August the Austrian Government decided to provide such aid, particularly medicine and medical equipment, in the amount of 1 million schillings, to the people of Cyprus.

81. In the light of the most difficult problems with which Cyprus is confronted, it is the duty of the Council immediately to call upon all parties to do everything in their power to alleviate human suffering and to ensure respect for the fundamental human rights of every person on the island. It is the duty of the Council to call upon all parties to deal immediately with the plight of refugees and displaced persons in the area of their control in accordance with relevant international agreements concerning refugees. It would also only be logical for the Council to reiterate its call for the co-operation of all sides with the United Nations Force in Cyprus in carrying out its tasks, including its humanitarian functions, as requested in resolution 359 (1974).

82. My delegation is convinced, and has said so on many previous occasions, that one of the most urgent demands of the hour is the return of all sides to the negotiating table. The recent meeting of the Acting President of the Republic of Cyprus and the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus in the presence of the Secretary-General may well be regarded as a propitious starting-point for further direct talks between the island's two communities. There can be no doubt, therefore, that the solution of humanitarian problems will have to be linked with the solution of other problems in order to ensure political stability and personal safety through a satisfactory general settlement.

83. It was in view of all those considerations, and after the representative of Cyprus, Mr. Rossides, had called for the present meeting—a call we welcomed in view of the urgency of the situation—that my delegation tried to respond to the situation and yesterday prepared a working paper for the consideration of the members of the Council. We were, furthermore, Mr. President, happy to respond to your suggestion to pool our efforts with those of other delegations and representatives of the parties who had prepared concurrent working papers and try to prepare a draft resolution for the consideration of the Council. The resultant draft, sponsored by my delegation and the

delegations of France and the United Kingdom, is now before the Council in document S/11479. It is the result of long and serious consultations with all members of the Council and the parties concerned, and it is a serious and honest effort to achieve a wide measure of agreement, not to say consensus, between members of the Council on an extremely urgent matters. In view of what I said earlier, I do not think I should give a more detailed explanation concerning the draft now before the Council. Let me only add that, following consultations with the sponsors and the parties concerned, we wish to add, at the end of operative paragraph 4, the words "in safety", so that the text reads, "to permit persons who wish to do so to return to their homes in safety".

84. The draft resolution is thus before the Council, and we hope and believe that it will effectively address itself to one of the most dramatic aspects of the humanitarian problems of the island, the problem of refugees, which, as we have heard this morning, has had the gravest consequences for both communities on the island. We hope and believe that the draft will address itself also to a new start in the negotiating process, beginning with the necessary dialogue between the representatives of the Greek and Turkish communities on the island. It is primarily humanitarian draft, and it has been conceived in a spirit of impartiality. It does not serve any one side. It should serve only suffering human beings.

85. The draft resolution also tries to strengthen the involvement of the United Nations in the management and solution of the crisis. It stresses the role of the Secretary-General in the dialogue between the communities; it stresses the necessary role of the United Nations in humanitarian assistance; and it points to the indispensable character of the contribution of UNFICYP, whose role needs our continued support. But I also believe that the draft does not lose sight of the wider aspects of the problem. It recalls all the previous resolutions this Council has adopted since the beginning of the present crisis, resolutions the complete implementation of which remains an urgent necessity, resolutions on the basis of which the Council is deliberating today.

86. In adopting the draft resolution, the Council will, of course, have dealt only with some of the most urgent problems of the island. A huge task lies ahead of the Council, a task intimately linked with our over-all target: the protection and maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus. It remains the duty of the Council to further the accomplishment of that task and also to address itself to the grave problems existing between two Member States whose conflict over Cyprus has more than once brought them to the brink of war and whose relations continue to be clouded by severe tensions and strains because of these problems.

87. Many serious and constructive proposals to put the political process in motion have been made lately. Those proposals will need very close and attentive study on our part but particularly on the part of the parties in whose interests they have been conceived.

88. In putting this draft resolution before the Council, we hope to be able to make a contribution to the furthering of the solution of one particularly urgent problem. We hope the members of the Council can strongly support this draft resolution, and we ask you, Mr. President, to put it to the vote at the earliest possible moment.

89. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): I now intend to speak in my capacity as representative of the UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS on the question of refugees and on the three-Power draft resolution submitted to the Council by the representatives of Austria, the United Kingdom and France.

90. The USSR delegation expresses serious concern at the continuing tense situation in and around Cyprus, a situation which involves further sufferings and sacrifices for the Cypriot people, both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots; it renders the attainment of a just settlement of the Cypriot problem more difficult and creates a threat to international peace and security. In the statement by the Soviet Government concerning Cyprus of 22 August [S/11465], a full and accurate assessment was once again given of the situation that has developed in Cyprus which is so tragic for the Cypriot people.

91. As the Soviet delegation has repeatedly stressed, responsibility for the current dangerous developments in Cyprus and the further deterioration of the situation in the region is borne by the well-known NATO circles which, because of their selfish military and strategic objectives in the eastern Mediterranean, are trying to achieve the liquidation of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus—the dismemberment of that State. For that purpose, the military intervention in Cyprus is continuing with the obvious connivance of those who could really oppose it.

92. The resolutions of the Security Council on the immediate ending of the foreign military intervention against the Republic of Cyprus, the withdrawal of foreign troops from its territory and the restoration of constitutional order in Cyprus have not been implemented. Foreign troops have not been withdrawn from Cyprus. Repeated statements by Government officials of countries directly responsible for the events in Cyprus about their intention to implement the Council's decisions are not being followed up by specific deeds. Official statements have been made about a willingness to withdraw troops from Cyprus. However, in fact, not only have the troops not been

withdrawn but, on the contrary, military forces and military personnel are increasing in numbers.

93. Attempts to justify the continued presence of foreign troops in Cyprus by statements to the effect that the other side should withdraw its troops and military personnel first are without foundation and at variance with the decisions of the Council. As a result, a closed circle is formed from which there is no visible way out. Such an approach in fact only leads to a build-up in the military forces on the island, to a spreading of the conflict and, in the last analysis, to a delay in normalizing the situation in Cyprus. The Council must intensify its efforts to move the question of the withdrawal of foreign troops from dead centre. The only way to resolve this key question is the immediate and simultaneous withdrawal of all foreign troops and military personnel.

94. The events of the last few days in Cyprus cannot but be of concern to those who cherish peace and international security. As a result of outside interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, there has been continuing bloodshed on the island. The cease-fire continues to be violated, as the Secretary-General has informed us in his latest report. The situation in Cyprus continues to be explosive; it is creating a real danger and further extending the area of tension, constituting a threat to peace.

95. For more than a month, Cyprus has been an area of armed conflict. The Republic's economy has suffered catastrophic losses and is in a state of virtual chaos as a result of the hostilities. Activity has come to a standstill in the ports through which Cyprus imports 70 per cent of its food, equipment and raw materials. The export of agricultural produce and industrial goods has been blocked. Transport and the water supply system have been disrupted.

96. According to official Cypriot data, the damage to this small State, even on a preliminary basis, is calculated to be many hundreds of millions of dollars, and the restoration of its economy, disrupted by the intervention and war, will take years.

97. As a result of the foreign military intervention and war, a considerable part of the population of Cyprus, nearly one third—a figure of more than 200,000 is being mentioned—have become refugees, deprived of shelter and driven from their homes.

98. The enormous displacement of the population of the island has created the serious problem of displaced persons and there is a real threat of an outbreak of epidemics among the refugees. The Soviet people are particularly able to realize the sufferings of the Cypriot people, for they will never forget the tragedy and sufferings they endured when tens of millions of people were forced, during the years of the Second World War of 1941-1945, to leave their

homes in the western part of the Soviet Union and to be evacuated to the east, to the regions of the Volga, the Urals and Siberia. Those who have not suffered such hardships find it hard to understand and appreciate the full extent of a nation's sufferings in time of war.

99. As was pointed out to us today by the distinguished representative of Austria, the tragedy of the Cypriot people has also had a direct effect on the United Nations troops in Cyprus and on some members of the diplomatic corps in Nicosia. The tragic death of an experienced career diplomat, the United States Ambassador, Mr. Davies, cannot but be a cause of deep regret. According to recent statements in the United States press, he had informed his superiors in good time that the Greek junta in Cyprus was preparing a revolt against the legitimate Government of that country. The Ambassador himself paid with his life as a result of the events in Cyprus about which he had warned.

100. The development of events in and around Cyprus runs counter to the process of the easing of international tension and consequently affects the vital interests of all peoples, of the entire world. It is common knowledge that the tragedy of Cyprus is causing particular concern to the small and weak States Members of the United Nations.

101. The Soviet Union reaffirms its position of principle, which is that the Republic of Cyprus should remain a single, independent and sovereign State. The Soviet Union has consistently and invariably defended and defends the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. It has consistently and firmly taken this line both in the United Nations and in bilateral contacts with the parties concerned as well as with members of the Security Council and other States.

102. The Soviet delegation considers that to secure full implementation of the Security Council's decisions on the question of Cyprus would be in keeping with the task of normalizing the situation in Cyprus and restoring constitutional order and the legal Government of the Republic.

103. The key points for a settlement of the Cyprus crisis are the complete cessation of foreign military intervention against the Republic of Cyprus; the simultaneous withdrawal of all foreign troops from its territory; the preservation of the territorial integrity of the Cypriot State; and the restoration of constitutional order and of the authority of the legal constitutional Government.

104. In expressing serious concern at the tense situation which continues to exist in and around Cyprus in spite of the cease-fire declaration, the Soviet Union steadfastly considers, as in the past, that the first and foremost task to be accomplished

at the present time is the cessation of the foreign military intervention in Cyprus and the immediate withdrawal without exception of all foreign troops and military personnel in Cyprus. This would ensure the creation of the conditions necessary to enable the Cypriot people—both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots—to decide the destiny of their homeland, the sovereign Republic of Cyprus, in conditions of peace and tranquillity without outside pressure.

105. The Soviet side understands the need and importance of ensuring the safety of both communities of the population of Cyprus. However, this cannot be achieved by outside pressure, particularly by the use or threat of force. The use of force in Cyprus cannot lead to a settlement of the Cyprus problem, but can only make the situation more strained and acute and create a serious threat to international peace and security. The security of the population and the normalization of the relations between the communities cannot be achieved by outside pressure.

106. The Soviet delegation considers that the United Nations must, primarily through the Security Council, intensify its efforts to achieve a settlement of the Cyprus crisis in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter. The task of the United Nations, the Security Council and all Members of the Organization is to ensure the adoption of effective measures aimed at preserving Cyprus as an independent and sovereign State.

107. Attempts to settle the problem of Cyprus within the narrow circle of NATO member States, by bypassing the United Nations, the Security Council and its decisions, have failed completely and led only to a resumption of hostilities in Cyprus. Once again, and this time fully, it has been possible to see the groundless and bankrupt nature of the "guarantees" imposed on Cyprus by the Zurich-London agreements. The Council has been informed, in an official statement by the representative of Cyprus, Mr. Rossides, of the fact that these "guarantees" were imposed on Cyprus. Not only have these "guarantees" failed to ensure peace and quiet for the Cypriot people, but they are virtually being used for interests alien to it. There can hardly be anyone today who doubts that the entire system of the Zurich-London agreements has proved a complete failure and can no longer be applied. It has died because it has not withstood the test of time.

108. There is no doubt that in order to ensure the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus, new guarantees must be provided which must be really sound, reliable and effective, and genuinely international.

109. As indicated in the statement of the Soviet Government of 22 August,

"... the time has come for a representative forum of States, mirroring the political image of the

modern world, to take up the discussion of the Cyprus problem. With this aim in view, it has become urgent to convene an international conference within the framework of the United Nations, with the participation of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and all States members of the Security Council. Of course, other countries could also be involved in the conference, specifically, from among the non-aligned countries. It is at such a representative international conference that it will be possible, jointly and with the direct participation of representatives from the Republic of Cyprus, to work out decisions that would effectively ensure the existence of Cyprus as an independent, sovereign and territorially integral State and would meet the interests of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots."

110. The convening of such a conference and its success would undoubtedly be enhanced if all the members of the Security Council supported the idea of holding it. The conference would create a genuine organizational basis for the solution of the Cyprus problem, particularly if it is borne in mind that the machinery of the negotiations in Geneva, as is now clear to all, has shown itself to be truly powerless and bankrupt. The Geneva three-Power Declaration of 30 July has proved to be ineffective and inconsistent with resolution 353 (1974), and the Soviet delegation has already stated its negative view of that declaration in the Council. Now the main participant in that system of negotiations and "guarantees" on Cyprus—the United Kingdom—is apparently rejecting it, as indicated by the proposals made recently in the Council by the United representative.

111. It is now clear to all that the Geneva negotiations are a thing of the past and constitute a regrettable phase in the development of the Cyprus crisis. A just and lasting settlement of the Cypriot problem in accordance with the decisions of the Security Council and the lofty purposes and principles of the Charter can be achieved only in a broad-based international forum within the framework of the United Nations.

112. In this connexion, we cannot but reject with deep indignation the slanderous fabrications of some officials and certain organs of the press to the effect that the Soviet proposal for an international conference on Cyprus is allegedly nothing more than propaganda and an attempt to prolong the conflict and impede the reaching of an agreement on a settlement in Cyprus. Those who so distort reality even dare in their unbridled and fantastic slander to attack the United Nations and the Security Council, alleging that an international conference on Cyprus within the framework of the United Nations would be "interference by the United Nations". They forget that the Security Council has now been dealing with the problem of Cyprus for more than 10 years.

113. What can one say about such fabrications? It is very difficult to say which they contain in greater degree: slander or cynicism. Or is it a clear indication of the attempt of certain NATO forces to resolve the Cyprus problem as was done before: within the narrow confines of this military bloc, bypassing the Security Council and the United Nations in order to serve military and strategic interests at the expense of the fundamental interests of the people of Cyprus and in violation of the purposes and principles of the Charter.

114. The proposal of the Soviet Union to convene an international conference on Cyprus within the framework of the United Nations was dictated by the sincere desire of the Soviet Government to arrive as soon as possible at a just and lasting settlement of the Cypriot crisis, in accordance with the resolutions of the Security Council, which would ensure the cessation of foreign military intervention against the Republic of Cyprus, the immediate and simultaneous withdrawal of all foreign troops and military personnel from the territory of this island, the restoration of constitutional order and the authority of the legal Government, and would also effectively guarantee the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus as a non-aligned State, a Member of the United Nations, through the creation of a new system of effective international guarantees.

115. The proposal of the Soviet Union to convene a conference on Cyprus enjoys broad support among the States Members of the United Nations, in particular the non-aligned countries. It is actively supported by two of the three parties involved in the conflict on Cyprus: Greece and the Republic of Cyprus. Not one State—not even one of those which, because of their narrow motives of self-interest, dislike this proposal—decided openly to reject it. Manœuvres are being invented and attempts are being made to do this through the hands and mouths of others.

116. The situation in Cyprus urgently requires that the United Nations and, in particular, the Security Council immediately take effective measures in order to implement the decisions of the Council on Cyprus.

117. Since 22 August, the members of the Council have held two consultations on the Soviet proposal. Today the Soviet delegation is entitled to appeal directly to the members of the Council, to the representatives of the Member States and, in particular, to the non-aligned countries, of which group the Republic of Cyprus is an active member, to support the proposal of the Soviet Union for the urgent convening of an international conference on Cyprus in order to defend the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and to save that sovereign State, which is now threatened with dismemberment and with disappearance as an independent, non-aligned State.

118. This proposal of the Soviet Union is a historical necessity. The Security Council as a whole, and the members of the Council individually, would make a serious mistake if they failed to support this proposal of the Soviet Union. The members of the Council have been aware of it since 22 August. There was time enough to make the most thorough study of it and to receive instructions. The time has come for each one of us to say "yes" or "no" to the proposal to convene an international conference on Cyprus. We should like to have an answer to this question today, at the present meeting of the Council.

119. Life itself and the development of events have also confirmed the correctness of the other Soviet proposal [S/11391] regarding Cyprus, namely the dispatch of a special Security Council mission to Cyprus. The need for such a measure was confirmed by the fact that the Secretary-General himself, on his own initiative and without the authorization of the Council, decided to take upon himself the functions of a Council mission and went to Cyprus himself. However, this is not enough.

120. In this context, one can only express regret that in the latest report of the Secretary-General [S/11473] there are no details of the substance of his discussions with the representatives of the two communities. Yet it is known that the Government of Cyprus agrees with the proposal of the Soviet Union to convene an international conference on the problem of Cyprus. It would welcome the adoption of this Soviet proposal by all the interested parties and, of course, by the members of the Council.

121. From press reports we know also that on 26 August the Secretary-General, after having met with the Acting President of Cyprus, Mr. Clerides, and with the leader of the Turkish community, Mr. Denktas, stated to journalists that the participants in that meeting had discussed the proposal of the Soviet Government regarding the convening of an international conference on Cyprus. In the view of the Soviet delegation, information from the Secretary-General on this important matter would promote an all-round discussion of ways and means of solving the Cyprus problem and would be very helpful to the work of the Council today.

122. We express our regret over the illness of the Secretary-General and his absence from the meeting of the Council today, and we sincerely hope that he will very soon be restored to health.

123. It is important to send a Security Council mission to Cyprus urgently, and the delegation of the Soviet Union again draws the attention of the Council to the expediency of sending such a mission. This would be an important step by the Council which would be aimed at settling the Cyprus crisis in accordance with its resolutions and the lofty purposes and principles of the Charter.

124. The mission of the Council, in addition to the main task of verifying on the spot how far the decisions of the Council are being implemented and submitting a report to the Council with appropriate recommendations, would also play yet another positive and very important role: the very fact of the presence of a Council mission in Cyprus would deter the parties from unnecessary emotionalism and extremism and from acts of violence in Cyprus and might facilitate the establishment of contacts between the communities.

125. The tragic situation of the refugees in Cyprus, their sufferings and the discussion on this matter in the Council constitute yet another very important reason which dictates the urgent sending of a Council mission to Cyprus to investigate the situation on the spot and to present objective information to the Council on the conditions in the island as a whole and on the situation of the refugees in particular.

126. We repeat again that the United Nations, and above all the Security Council, must take a direct and very active part in the settlement of the Cyprus question so that the obsolete and bankrupt system of "international guarantees" based on the Zurich-London agreements, which were imposed on Cyprus in 1959-1960 for the purpose of preserving the possibility of interference by NATO in the domestic affairs of Cyprus and the use of its territory for military and strategic purposes, will be replaced by an effective and reliable system of genuine international guarantees of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. Such a system must safeguard the inalienable right of the Cypriot people to decide their fate and settle their domestic affairs themselves, without any outside interference.

127. The alarming events in Cyprus require an urgent political settlement of the Cyprus problem. It is essential to put an end to the deliberate procrastination and delays on this matter. The task of eliminating the hotbed of military tension in the eastern Mediterranean and of safeguarding the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus requires responsible actions on the part of all States which are really interested in intensifying the process of international détente. That is precisely the aim of the Soviet Government's proposal for the convening of an international conference on Cyprus.

128. The Soviet delegation is prepared to give the most careful consideration to any other proposals designed to achieve those objectives. It is prepared to co-operate with other members of the Security Council and of the United Nations as a whole in order to achieve a just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus problem in accordance with the aspirations of the Cypriot people and on the basis of the lofty principles of the Charter and the decisions of the Council regarding Cyprus.

129. Should the Security Council fail to act, it will rightly be subjected to serious criticism at the forthcoming twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly. The responsibility for the fate of Cyprus is borne not only by the members of the Council but by all the Members of the United Nations, and above all by the group of non-aligned countries, since the Republic of Cyprus is an active member of that group.

130. With regard to the draft resolution before the Council, the delegation of the USSR does not intend to oppose it, even though it regards it as obviously inadequate. Unfortunately, there is no reflection in that text of the main questions relating to the settlement of the Cyprus question: the need for a cessation of foreign military intervention, the withdrawal of foreign troops and military personnel, the restoration of constitutional order and the authority of the legal constitutional Government, and the safeguarding of the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.

131. The Soviet delegation would have preferred the draft contained in a working paper submitted by the representative of Cyprus, since that text dealt with the basic questions and aspects of the Cyprus crisis.

132. In this connexion, we feel it necessary to state that the question of refugees, although it is a very serious, acute, tragic and urgent question, is not the basic issue in the Cyprus crisis and in the settlement of that crisis. It is an outgrowth, a consequence of the uprising against the legal constitutional Government and of the foreign interference in the internal affairs of Cyprus; it is a result of the presence and military activities of foreign troops and military personnel on that island.

133. The Soviet delegation would like to make the following statement with regard to operative paragraph 7 of the draft resolution. It is well known that attempts to settle the Cyprus problem within the narrow circle of the member States of NATO have met with complete failure and that there are no grounds to expect a settlement of the problem by such methods. The Soviet delegation understands operative paragraph 7 of the resolution to be an appeal to find effective means to implement the main provisions of the Security Council decisions on the Cyprus problem and effectively safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State of Cyprus. As the delegation of the USSR has already said today, those are precisely the aims of the USSR proposal for the convening as soon as possible, within the framework of the United Nations, of a representative international conference to consider the question of Cyprus.

134. The adoption of the draft resolution on refugees should not divert the attention or efforts of the Council from solving the key problems connected with a settlement in Cyprus. The Council, as the principal

organ of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace and international security, must concentrate its efforts on ensuring measures designed to achieve those noble purposes. The Council as a whole and each member of the Council individually must make every effort to ensure the immediate implementation of the Council's decisions on the Cyprus problem, which constitute the basis for a just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus crisis in accordance with the lofty principles and purposes of the Charter—that is, a settlement that will safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, a State Member of the United Nations and a non-aligned country.

135. As PRESIDENT of the Council, I should like to say that no other representatives have asked to be allowed to speak before the vote on the three-Power draft resolution on the question of refugees. I shall now put to the vote draft resolution S/11479 as revised orally.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

The draft resolution was adopted unanimously.¹

136. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): I shall now call on those representatives who have asked to be allowed to speak after the vote.

137. Mr. RICHARD (United Kingdom): Up until the time you took the floor, Mr. President, this had been a helpful and constructive debate. Having attacked my country in the way you did, you will no doubt not be surprised if I retaliate in kind.

138. You saw fit in your position as President of the Security Council first of all to attack the United Kingdom for forcing an agreement upon Archbishop Makarios. I would point out to you that the Archbishop lived with that agreement perfectly contentedly for 14 years. Your country voted in favour of the restoration of the constitutional arrangements contained in that agreement of 1960. Indeed, even in your speech today, you referred to restoring the constitutional Government in Cyprus—which, in the next breath, you said was forced upon an unwilling Cyprus administration by my country in 1960. You then attacked our motive in the negotiations that have taken place so far. You said that the purpose was to preserve a hotbed of military tension in the eastern Mediterranean.

139. If you will forgive me for saying so, Mr. President, your speech was unrealistic, it was irrelevant, it was unhelpful and it was mischievous. As I said, until the moment you took the floor we had had a debate that was addressing itself to the realities of the situation.

¹ See resolution 361 (1974).

140. In your speech, Mr. President, you said that the non-aligned nations in the United Nations were in favour of the Soviet proposal for a conference. But you do not speak for the non-aligned nations. With respect I must say that you represent one of the most aligned nations in this whole Organization. The non-aligned group of nations has not in fact said that it is in favour of the proposed conference. The Security Council has not said that it is in favour of the conference. The representatives of the non-aligned nations sitting round this table have not said that they are in favour of the conference. Mr. President, if you thought there was a genuine opinion in favour of that proposal for a conference, you would no doubt have had the forensic courage to have presented a draft resolution on the subject for the Council to consider. You have not done that. You are a man of great experience in the Organization. I believe that the reason you have not presented a draft resolution calling for a conference on the lines you suggest is very simply that you know there are not sufficient votes in favour of it round this table.

141. You have also talked about a mission and you have said that people are in favour of a mission. I put the same point to you: if in fact there was a groundswell of opinion in favour of a Security Council mission to Cyprus I would have expected you, Mr. President, to have moved an amendment to the draft resolution which we are considering today; you have not done so. And again, with respect, that leads me to believe that in fact you know—and as President of the Council you would of course be in a very strong position to know—what the reality of opinion round this table is.

142. Nobody could have failed to be struck by the depth of feeling and by the sincerity that both sides, the main protagonists in this dispute, exhibited in the debate this morning. From both of them we had an exposition of their positions in this case which was at times moving, obviously sincere, obviously deeply felt, and it seems to me that there is a great deal to be said for both sides of the argument. That is precisely why our function today should be to try and isolate the common points of agreement between the two sides, rather than to try and isolate the points of discord. Both of them today said they would be prepared to enter into negotiations once more, and although the terms upon which they said they would be prepared to do so differed, that fact on its own is encouraging and, we hope, it gives us something to build upon in the future.

143. May I, Mr. President, since you raised it yet again, deal with the United Kingdom's role in this affair. Our role has been and will remain to be able to do everything we can in the Council, in capitals and on the ground in Cyprus to promote a just settlement which is in the interests of the people of Cyprus as a whole, and we will do everything we can to alleviate the plight of the refugees.

144. This resolution—of which we were one of the sponsors—has those broad objectives. Unlike you, Mr. President, we are grateful to the Secretary-General for his recent visit to Cyprus. Unlike you, we welcome the fact that representatives of the two communities in Cyprus have talked and will, we hope, go on talking. The United Kingdom is very happy to see these talks taking place. We are entirely content that they should take place between the representatives of the two communities alone. May I say that that is a very peculiar position for a country which, according to you, is trying to force a pro-NATO settlement on a non-aligned nation like Cyprus. We are quite content that these discussions should take place between the representatives of the communities alone. We stand ready to help them in any way that we can, and I think both communities know that.

145. Our hope is that while concentrating initially on the most urgent humanitarian problems, these talks will broaden in scope to cover questions of political substance. For in fact, Mr. President, it is difficult to separate humanitarian and political issues. Our main concern is that the parties should be talking about the future of their island. We do not mind where they talk; we do not mind who chairs the meeting nor, indeed, who decides the agenda—and they, Mr. President, certainly do not need any mission to find out the facts in Cyprus; they are the facts in Cyprus—but we do want the talks to succeed.

146. All of us in the Council are, I think, gravely concerned about the desperate plight of the refugees on the island. And, with respect, I would say to the representative of Turkey that it is not just a matter, as far as we are concerned, of dramatic presentation—to use his phrase. I am not sure whether what he said was directed at the United Kingdom or at others, but may I say to him that we take that problem very seriously and we are deeply concerned about it. We welcome the fact that the Secretary-General has sent the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to the island. We understand that he is very shortly to make his report and, for our part, the United Kingdom has already taken urgent measures to give some humanitarian relief to the refugees, several thousands of whom are at present being cared for in our sovereign base areas on the island.

147. What is the scope of the refugee problem as we know it? It is very difficult to get accurate estimates, but the Cyprus Red Cross is working on a refugee population of about 200,000 people, approximately one third of the total population of the island. We are told that will mean an expenditure per month of 2.3 million Cyprus pounds on food. We are told that there is a need for 30,000 five-man tents, which is an ominous figure and a sombre one. We are told that there is a need for 11 million Cyprus pounds for the establishment of 70 to 90 camp sites and a need for household furniture for no less than 40,000 family units. Those are sombre estimates and they present a

very grave picture, particularly as we believe it is very important that the situation should not get frozen. We surely do not wish to create yet another group of semi-permanent refugees, with all the bitterness and hatred that this may entail. We would hope very strongly that any settlement would enshrine the principle that any law-abiding Cypriot should be able to live wherever he or she wishes. And that, Mr. President, is a principle to which, again, we attach importance.

148. The United Kingdom's main concern today has been quite simply that the actions of this Council should help to bring the parties together, not to drive them further apart. To bring them together is an achievement which will require courage and good faith. We regard as not the least important part of the resolution that paragraph which:

"Calls upon all parties, as a demonstration of good faith, to take, both individually and in co-operation with each other, all steps which may promote ... successful negotiations".

We are indeed asking for restraint, for moderation and, if I may say so, for magnanimity, for, as I have said in the Council before, only a settlement which is acceptable to all the people of Cyprus can be a lasting one. And I do not think, either, that we or the world should forget that the majority in Cyprus have rights as well.

149. I am sure, too, that all members of the Council would wish to pay a tribute to the skill and patience with which UNFICYP has conducted itself on the ground during these difficult days. It has had a hard time and I, like other members of the Council, would wish to pay a tribute to those who have died or been wounded in carrying out that task. I note that the Secretary-General will aim to make recommendations to the Council on UNFICYP's future role. This will of course have to be determined in the light of whatever settlement is negotiated.

150. I do not think this is a time for bitter argument—certainly not as far as Cyprus is concerned. All of us round this table, I hope, want to see a settlement in Cyprus which will enable all the people of that island to live as they would wish—in peace and security, with honour and with freedom, and a freedom to decide their own future. That is the principle upon which my Government has approached this dispute from the beginning and it is a travesty to describe it in the terms which you, Mr. President, have used today. I hope therefore that this resolution—adopted, I am happy to say, unanimously—may serve to promote that result.

151. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): Speaking as the representative of the UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, I should like to say that the very fact that the representative of the

United Kingdom did not understand that I spoke as such and not as President of the Council indicates that, to put it mildly, he is ignoring the facts. How can we talk about a realistic approach to assessing the situation in the eastern Mediterranean if we cannot even determine what the situation is here at the Council table? The United Kingdom representative is obviously inaccurate and he is misrepresenting the facts. I was speaking about the failure of the guarantees imposed on Cyprus, not about the Constitution of Cyprus; and that the guarantees were imposed on Cyprus is something we have heard in an official statement made here at this table by the Cyprus representative.

152. The contacts I have with the representatives of the non-aligned countries in my capacity as President of the Security Council and also in my capacity as Soviet representative are very close and friendly, and I am better acquainted with their views on the matter under consideration and on the USSR proposal concerning a conference on Cyprus than the representative of the United Kingdom is.

153. As to the introduction of draft resolutions and amendments, each delegation is entitled to decide for itself when such action should be taken.

154. The reaction of the United Kingdom representative to the statement by the Soviet representative is the most convincing evidence that the United Kingdom representative is still obsessed by the *idée fixe* of deciding the fate of the people of Cyprus within the narrow circle of the NATO countries rather than against a broad international background within the framework of the United Nations and that he is trying to push things backward instead of helping them to move forward.

155. Mr. LECOMPT (France) (*interpretation from French*): Since we met last, nearly two weeks ago, a number of new events have taken place in the development of the crisis in Cyprus and in the procedures in accordance with which a settlement should be brought about. We cannot separate either aspect of the problem from the other; we will take up each in turn. But, first, let me say that I am very pleased that this Council, which has constantly had the Cyprus question before it, can today exchange views on this matter which, in so many ways, is a tragic one.

156. Let me begin with the questions of procedure which have just been much discussed. The French Government has considered very carefully a number of recent ideas, including, of course, the one the Soviet Government officially transmitted to it last Friday. We thought it only appropriate that one of the permanent members of the Security Council should ask the Council to consider what procedures should be followed to help settle the crisis and to stress the fact that some of the present difficulties

are the result of the fact that the negotiations called for in resolutions 353 (1974), 357 (1974) and 360 (1974) have not resumed.

157. We are all well aware of the fact that questions of procedure are of primary importance and very delicate. Here we might wonder whether the negotiations required by the resolutions that I have just mentioned have been compromised once and for all. Some say they have; others deny it. Perhaps the best thing to do would be to hear what the parties to the negotiations have to say on the subject; and since there is no unanimous view that the ways and means recommended by existing international treaties and the Council have failed, perhaps there is some reason to continue to believe that it is still necessary and useful for talks to resume—talks in which the primary role would be played by the parties: to begin with, perhaps, between the representatives of the two Cypriot communities, whom the Secretary-General has recently been successful in bringing together at the same table.

158. Of course, that is no reason why we ourselves should not take an over-all view of the entire problem. The French Government would make the point, however, that it is very much attached to the primary role which in matters of peace-keeping should be played by the Security Council. The Council can have no better defenders than its members. It is up to the Council members to shoulder their responsibilities and ask whether they might not perform more useful work in a framework other than that of the Security Council. The French delegation has never hesitated to express its opinions very clearly and to put forward constructive proposals in that capacity.

159. However, may I repeat that I think the parties concerned should say what they think about any proposal that might help them to bring about a peaceful settlement of their dispute. They should be heard. For example, do they prefer to remain alone, or would they like to be assisted by an intermediary, by several intermediaries, or by a group of States? Would they like to have a meeting soon, or are they resigned to letting valuable time pass? It is clear that we cannot impose any answers to these questions, even if it is up to us to express encouragement and to consider certain appropriate frameworks for negotiations.

160. Let me now turn to matters of substance. Our opinion on the situation in Cyprus is very simple: there is every reason why people should live in peace on the island; but there is a confrontation between exacerbated nationalisms which both seek support from abroad and thus facilitate or provoke intervention by other States. Our problem is to deal with those forms of nationalism, which may also be found elsewhere in the world.

161. If this analysis is correct—and I doubt that anyone would deny that it is—our first duty is to

make our consideration of the crisis as unemotional as possible. There is little to gain from over-dramatizing the situation or by changing procedures when the interested parties remain deaf to appeals to reason in one framework or another. Let us face things squarely; let us see what the root causes of the situation are and what the Council has already suggested on the subject. I would say this in that connexion. It is true—and the French delegation was the first to point it out here in this very chamber—that on 15 July a régime which has fortunately been replaced disrupted the very delicate balance which existed in Cyprus. I might recall that the nine countries of the European Community, on 16 July, expressed their opposition to any intervention or interference which would call into question the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus, and on 17 July they declared to the Government in Ankara that they understood its concern about the plight of the Turkish Cypriot community.

162. It is true that the constitutional structure, or, rather, the good-neighbourliness which was provided for in international agreements, functioned to the disadvantage of the Turkish minority in Cyprus. It is equally true, however, that the inhabitants of the island were not massacring one another and that the situation had not been serious for several years.

163. It is true, too, that for the past seven weeks a violent situation has been imposed on Cyprus, transforming the independent and sovereign Republic which is part of the Organization into an arena for an unequal confrontation between two countries and two communities growing increasingly hostile.

164. The mere mention of those facts, which are well-known to everyone, leads to the conclusion that force alone cannot be the solution. The foundations of a just peace and a safer order must be defined. The Council did that in its resolution 353 (1974), a basic resolution that poses a number of fundamental principles: non-interference, cease-fire, withdrawal of military forces having no right to be in Cyprus, constitutional order, tripartite negotiations. Subsequently, in view of the fact that the problem had worsened, my delegation recalled and supplemented the principles of resolution 353 (1974) by encouraging the adoption of Security Council resolution 360 (1974), a resolution which to my regret has once again been attacked by one of the parties.

165. Since that resolution was adopted, or, rather—because we should not confuse cause with effect—since the events of 14 August, a new emergency has arisen. The fact that the refugees in Cyprus are so numerous and so sorely tried poses problems that are truly tragic and particularly serious in view of the fact that the failure to negotiate of the parties who might try to settle those problems compromises the effectiveness of whatever action our Organization might take. What can we do other than improvise?

What can we offer in any case other than means that are inadequate to relieve the distress of the victims and bind their wounds? In the circumstances, it is necessary and useful for the Council to have before it a humanitarian and political resolution especially dealing with the problems of the refugees.

166. The resolution just adopted unanimously does have that dual nature. Taking up an idea very appropriately expressed by several non-aligned countries in the Council, the resolution takes note of the outstanding job done by the Secretary-General, who has promoted a resumption of contacts among the qualified representatives of the two communities. Our resolution encourages the Secretary-General to pursue his efforts in that direction. The essential role of UNFICYP is noted. But since the goodwill and great skill of the Secretary-General cannot do everything, the resolution lays stress on the role of the authorities on both sides: of the nine operative paragraphs, five make urgent appeals to the parties concerned. Those appeals are each and every one different, but they are all aimed at the same thing: to bring about a *détente* on Cyprus, in particular through direct intercommunal talks, to which I referred at the beginning of this statement. It was particularly necessary to recall that even, and above all, in troubled times the fundamental rights of human beings should be respected. That is mentioned in paragraph 3. Quite rightly, one of the paragraphs of our resolution, paragraph 4, urges the parties to permit refugees who wish to do so to return to their homes in peaceful circumstances such as to guarantee the safety of the persons concerned. The text is designed to be practical, but paragraphs 7 and 9 are more political in nature. Our aim is to establish a certain link between the concrete appeals in the preceding paragraphs and the appeals we are making to ensure that on the basis of these first signs of goodwill there will be an expansion of direct negotiations encompassing larger, more decisive questions. Paragraph 9 draws a kind of conclusion. It contains a further implicit appeal, expressing our conviction that the speedy implementation of the resolution will assist the achievement of a satisfactory settlement.

167. In listing, as I have just done, the reasons why my delegation co-sponsored this resolution, I have not been afraid to repeat what has already been said by previous speakers. I was not afraid to do so because my delegation very willingly took part in the preparation of the text, which encourages all forms of proper behaviour, as far as possible removed from any temptation to use force. We are well aware of the fact that not all the provisions of previous resolutions have been put into effect. This is something to be deplored. I fully appreciate, Mr. President, the sentiments which you, as representative of the Soviet Union, have just expressed in connexion with this failure on the part of the Council to implement its resolutions. The French delegation can only agree with those who are alarmed over the continuation

of this state of affairs, which is at variance with the decisions adopted here.

168. Now, concerning something else we should not forget, my delegation would say that maintenance of the integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus is among the necessary preconditions of a settlement. The binationalism of a State, a legal form to be determined in negotiations, is not a rare or difficult thing to set in motion, provided men who must live together feel they are neither oppressed nor oppressors. I recognize that the island of Cyprus, occupied by what have delicately been called foreign troops, is further than ever from giving a feeling of tranquillity and equity to the refugees and others who see it undergoing this hour of trial. We hear all too many disturbing statements those days, some about the threat of guerrilla warfare and others about the creation of a Turkish Cypriot republic, the unilateral declaration of which would force the other side to negotiate.

169. While admitting that we have today touched upon only upon part of the problem, I would in conclusion like to say that mutual understanding, restraint in the defence of the interests at issue, a spirit of political justice and a real willingness to succeed are necessary if we wish to prevent a dangerous conflict between the nations and the feelings of nationalism I have already mentioned. It is no accident that the urgent appeals of the resolution we have just adopted have been made by three European countries which on their own continent have already had cruel experience of how harmful nationalism can be. Nor is it accidental that France, a member of the European Community, has co-sponsored this resolution with the United Kingdom, another country in the Community which was one of those that took the initiative in discharging its special responsibilities in Cyprus. I must assure the Council that the French Government, like the Governments of the Nine, remains basically open-minded about any useful undertaking in this difficult matter which once again confronts us.

170. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): Speaking as the representative of the UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, I should like to thank the representative of France for saying that he shares the concern expressed by the Soviet delegation with regard to the situation in Cyprus and that he is willing to make every effort to speed up a political settlement of the problem.

171. Mr. SCALI (United States of America): First I should like to express to the Secretary-General the thanks of my delegation and my Government for his recent visits to Cyprus, Greece and Turkey to discuss the situation on Cyprus. In particular, we commend him for his statesmanlike role in bringing about a meeting on humanitarian questions in which Acting President Clerides, Vice-President Denktas and the

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees participated.

172. The value of such talks between the leaders of the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities cannot be over-emphasized. For the sake of all of the people of Cyprus, we urge the international community to make every effort to help create a negotiating climate which can produce constructive solutions, particularly of humanitarian questions.

173. We have heard at length today from one representative of a special formula for peace which his Government is trying to sell. To persuade others to accept it, we have heard some fairy tales from another era—vague charges of mysterious machinations by unidentified members of NATO. These stories might amuse or titillate the readers of summertime fiction on the beaches of the Crimea, but such fairy tales will not help us solve the real problems of Cyprus. I think in this regard we can all agree that an absolute prerequisite for solving the critical humanitarian problems on Cyprus is strict compliance with the cease-fire, as called for in previous Security Council resolutions.

174. The United States shares the concern of the Secretary-General and the parties for the plight of the refugees from both communities who have been made homeless. We commend the International Committee of the Red Cross and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as well as other humanitarian organizations for their outstanding efforts to give emergency assistance, particularly to those whose lives have been dislocated. We urge all of the parties concerned to adhere scrupulously to international agreements concerning the human rights of civilians during times of conflict.

175. Upon the recommendation of the late United States Ambassador to Cyprus, Roger Davies, the United States has responded to appeals from the International Committee of the Red Cross for emergency humanitarian assistance. We have donated \$3.1 million as of now. This sum includes a cash contribution of \$725,000, plus air-lifts of relief supplies and emergency equipment such as tents, blankets and other provisions. The United States stands ready to provide additional assistance based on recommendations from the International Red Cross and the High Commissioner. It is our view that such assistance goes to the heart of the issues before the Council today. We therefore appeal to the international community to join with us in responding to this humanitarian effort.

176. The United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus has performed courageously in assisting the parties and international relief agencies to carry out their crucial humanitarian responsibilities. The United States underscores its support for resolution 359 (1974), which demands that all parties co-operate with UNFICYP in "carrying out its tasks, including

humanitarian functions, in all areas of Cyprus and in regard to all sections of the population".

177. The effort to render assistance to the people of Cyprus is a necessary emergency measure. However, the imperative and urgent need is to resume negotiations. A negotiated settlement of the Cyprus dispute offers the best hope for all of the people on the island to live in peace and security.

178. The United States delegation supports the resolution just adopted by the Council and commends the spirit of compromise with which various points of view converged to produce it. Perhaps each delegation—and I would not exclude my own—would have preferred some variations in the text. None the less, in our view the adoption of this resolution can make positive contributions to easing the plight of the refugees and should pave the way for further efforts to get broader negotiations under way again.

179. In closing, may I say a simple but no less heartfelt "thank you" to those who have spoken words of condolence on the death of Ambassador Roger Davies.

180. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): Speaking as the representative of the UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, I should like to say that I do not think the Security Council is the proper place for business jargon and such expressions as "sell", which was used by the United States representative here. The Soviet Union is not selling its proposal for the convening of an international conference on Cyprus but is seriously and sincerely proposing a broad international forum to consider the problem of Cyprus, to consider how to settle that problem with the participation of all members of the Council and under United Nations auspices and how to replace the obsolete system of "guarantees" for Cyprus, which has been a complete failure and fiasco, with a broad international guarantee. The word "sell" is thus inappropriate, to say the least.

181. As to the beaches of the Crimea, they are magnificent and the Soviet Union's proposal for convening a conference was read with satisfaction and approval on those beaches—and not only on the beaches of the Crimea, but on other beaches too, and throughout the territory of the Soviet Union. The Soviet people fully support this proposal by the Government of the USSR.

182. While on the subject of beaches, I think we could say quite definitely that on the beaches of Miami—and not only on beaches in the United States of America—an article on the question of Cyprus by the journalist M. Berlin in the *New York Post* of 28 August was read with great interest.

183. Mr. HUANG Hua (China) (*translation from Chinese*): At the meeting on 1 August [1789th meeting],

the Chinese delegation made a comprehensive statement of our position concerning the Cyprus question. Based on this position, we decided to vote in favour of the draft resolution contained in document S/11479. Meanwhile, on the basis of our consistent position, we wish to state our reservation in regard to paragraph 8, which deals with UNFICYP.

184. The Soviet representative has been repeatedly peddling the so-called new proposal of the Soviet Government on what it calls the permanent members of the Security Council jointly or in parallel providing international guarantees for Cyprus and on convening an international conference with the participation of all States members of the Council plus the parties concerned.

185. We deem it necessary to point out that this so-called new proposal of the Soviet Union is nothing new. As everyone is aware, the Soviet Union has long harboured aggressive designs on the Mediterranean.

186. In the recent tense situation in Cyprus, it has taken great pains to exploit the contradictions, fan the flames, sow discord and create confusion so as to gain profit thereby. While making a show of its force in rivalry with the other super-Power, it has made a host of declarations both within and outside the United Nations. Recently, it put forward a so-called new proposal on convening an international conference; it has stressed time and again its proposal for dispatching a so-called United Nations special mission and it talks about the establishment of a so-called "international guarantee" by the five permanent members, as though it was so much concerned about the interests of the Cypriot people and the peace in this area. As a matter of fact, its sole aim is, to put it bluntly, to subject Cyprus with great haste to the over-all intervention and guarantee of this super-Power under the cover of hypocritical words, so that it can further expand its influence in this area and contend with the other super-Power for control and hegemony over the eastern Mediterranean. As the Chinese saying goes, "The trick is all too evident to every man in the street".

187. Consequently, in order to uphold the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus, it is imperative to guard against and oppose any schemes of all outside forces, particularly the two super-Powers.

188. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): Speaking as the representative of the UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, I should like to say that we have just heard an astounding example of how reality can be distorted.

189. Mr. ANWAR SANI (Indonesia): My delegation would like to express its appreciation to the Secretary-General for his report and pay a tribute to his efforts to alleviate the sufferings of the civilian population caught in the fighting in Cyprus.

190. We have listened with great attention to the statements made by the representatives of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. The situation of the refugees, of people uprooted from their homes—whether of Greek or Turkish origin—is very grim indeed. Their exact number is not yet available to us, but it greatly shocks us that around one third of the population of Cyprus have fled their homes in search of a safe haven, leaving behind their possessions. My delegation must express its deep regret that the major cause of the sufferings has been the failure of the parties concerned in the fighting fully to implement the resolutions of the Security Council.

191. In the spirit of today's meeting, we should like to refer especially to resolution 359 (1974), paragraph 4 of which

"*Demands... that all parties co-operate with the United Nations Force in Cyprus in carrying out its tasks, including humanitarian functions, in all areas of Cyprus and in regard to all sections of the population on Cyprus*".

192. My delegation finds it increasingly difficult to understand a situation where the parties concerned seem to have chosen to ignore the relevant Security Council resolutions. We know the Cyprus problem is very complex, but it is going to become even more so if parties continue to disregard the Council resolutions.

193. My delegation would like to appeal to the parties to ensure the full implementation of the Council resolutions and help facilitate the efforts undertaken by UNFICYP to lessen the suffering and hardship of the population of Cyprus, be it of Turkish or Greek origin. UNFICYP should be enabled to continue to undertake its humanitarian and relief measures, a task that its officers and men have carried out with great devotion and in an exemplary fashion. We must ensure that no obstacles will be placed in the way of UNFICYP in carrying out these activities.

194. My delegation is happy to note that the Secretary-General has succeeded in bringing the leaders of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities together, in his efforts to overcome the difficulties concerning the humanitarian aspects of the problem. We hope that he will be able to find a solution for the problem of refugees which will include the possibility of those among them who wish to do so returning to their homes and possessions. The efforts of the Secretary-General with respect to the talks between the two communities should, in the view of my delegation, be continued and eventually be enlarged in scope in order that he may assist the parties concerned in their endeavours to reach a negotiated settlement regarding the future of the island.

195. With regard to negotiations aiming at the restoration of peace, normality and constitutional order in Cyprus, my delegation is of the view that

the two communities of the island—the Greek Cypriot community and the Turkish Cypriot community—which will be primarily and directly affected by the future constitutional and political order, and whose lives are going to be vitally influenced by it, should indeed be the parties which must come together and talk. The United Nations should be able actively to assist the two communities in their talks in order to achieve an agreed solution for the problem of the future political order in Cyprus. Of course, we do realize that from a realistic point of view Greece and Turkey will certainly exercise great influence on the talks. It seems to my delegation, however, that the future of Cyprus as a sovereign and independent country should be discussed and agreed upon by the people of Cyprus themselves. No outsiders, however closely involved, should do it for them.

196. My delegation has listened with great interest to the proposals made by the representative of the Soviet Union with regard to the convening of an international conference on Cyprus within the framework of the United Nations and the sending of a special mission of the Security Council to Cyprus. We think that these ideas merit serious study, especially if the Geneva talks do not seem to succeed in bringing the Cyprus problem nearer to a solution. My delegation hopes in due time to be able to give its views on those ideas.

197. Indonesia's view continues to be that Cyprus should remain a sovereign, independent and non-aligned country if the solution of the problem of Cyprus is going to contribute to peace and security in the area and in the world. It was with those considerations in mind that my delegation voted for draft resolution S/11479.

198. Mr. AL-KHUDHAIRY (Iraq): My delegation voted in favour of draft resolution S/11479 as Iraq, like all other non-aligned countries, is deeply concerned at the tragic human misery and sufferings which the Cypriot people in its two communities are enduring. A peaceful solution to this humanitarian problem becomes an urgent matter.

199. However, we believe that efforts leading to such a solution must include efforts to solve the political and fundamental aspects of the whole question. It is somewhat impractical and unrealistic to attempt to separate the two aspects of the problem—that is, the humanitarian and the political. The interested parties therefore—as, indeed, paragraph 7 of the resolution which the Council has just unanimously adopted stresses—must enter into negotiations so that peaceful and permanent settlement of the problem of Cyprus may be achieved in an atmosphere of understanding and mutual good faith. Every effort must be made by all parties to encourage the process of negotiations between them and to see to it that all obstacles to these negotiations, be they real or imagined, are surmounted and removed, so that the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of

Cyprus as a non-aligned State are preserved and guaranteed.

200. Before ending I should like to put it on record that our affirmative vote on the resolution just adopted does not in any way compromise or prejudice our position on resolution 360 (1974).

201. Mr. MVOGO-ENAMA (United Republic of Cameroon) (*interpretation from French*): We wish to express the hope that the Secretary-General will have a speedy recovery, and at the same time we would like to express to him our profound gratitude for the important report contained in document S/11473, which he prepared after his recent trip to Cyprus and to the capitals of the Powers which are guarantors of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus. The report gives us a glimmer of hope about the future of Cyprus. It is encouraging to note that, as the Secretary-General says, all the parties profoundly wish to reach a negotiated settlement in spite of the many obstacles which are still delaying a solution.

202. In voting for the resolution just adopted by the Council my delegation wished to express its profound concern over the serious humanitarian problems of the entire population of Cyprus. My delegation wishes to support all the initiatives our Secretary-General has taken to try to find a solution to this problem.

203. All the inhabitants of Cyprus have the right to remain where they have always lived. This is perfectly in keeping with a generally accepted principle, a principle contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: the right of every one to freedom of movement, and especially to remain where he is. Every inhabitant of Cyprus has the right, then, to remain where he has always lived—in his home.

204. My delegation hopes that the parties concerned, whose great respect for human rights cannot be doubted in any way, will not allow themselves to be forced to violate one of the basic principles of this Declaration. The Cypriots who are now away from their homes because of the course of events should be allowed to return home without further let or hindrance.

205. With regard to the future of the island my delegation has the hope that the talks envisaged in paragraph 2 of the resolution just adopted by the Council will not be confined to humanitarian problems. We believe that those talks should relate primarily to the elements which can serve as a basis for a settlement of the problem in Cyprus which respects the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.

206. Mr. CAMPBELL (Australia): The Australian Foreign Minister has announced a Government grant

of 50,000 Australian dollars to the International Committee of the Red Cross to assist its relief work in Cyprus. My Government shares with others the deepest concern for the welfare of those unfortunate persons whose lives and livelihoods have been disturbed as a consequence of recent events on the island. This contribution, which corresponds to approximately \$US 75,000, is a partial national response to the appeal which has been launched by the Committee to finance extended Red Cross activities on Cyprus over the next few months because, as Senator Willesee stated, it was hoped that Australians who were concerned about the distress of refugee Cypriots would supplement the Government's grant by making their own individual contributions to the Red Cross appeal.

207. In this connexion it is of course relevant that, as the representative of Turkey mentioned this afternoon, Australia has provided a welcome for a number of settlers from Cyprus and has been enriched by their contributions to our community.

208. The proportions of the refugee problem provide the most stark and tragic demonstration of the fact that it is the plight of the people of Cyprus with which we are confronted and to which we must give our first consideration. No other State Member of the United Nations can advance any interest in this situation to which we should give greater priority.

209. The problem of Cyprus is now taking on a different and perhaps a truer shape. When perhaps a quarter of the population become refugees in their own small land it is high time to approach the Cypriots as people and not as a prize. The people of a Member State cannot continue to alternate between the status of hostage and that of refugee. They must be made free to settle their own future. Their problem has now assumed its own momentum and its own imperatives, and these, we should like to hope, are being responded to by the community leaders of Cyprus in the interests of their common homeland. My delegation's support has therefore been placed behind the talks between Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktas as a starting point for developing settlement proposals for the problem over-all.

210. Obviously, these leaders will place first things first as they see them; and the first thing would be co-operation to relieve the humanitarian plight of the members of their own communities.

211. We very much regret the absence of the Secretary-General. His presence and his continued efforts are much needed. We wish him a speedy and comfortable recovery. His report in document S/11473 is most modest. It was an accomplishment and a considerable contribution to assist in bringing about talks between the community leaders.

212. There is a larger role yet to be played by the United Nations in general and by the Secretary-

General in particular, in the exclusive interests of Cyprus and its people. We should like to think that such simple terms of reference will continue to guide the Council's deliberations and thus assist the Cypriots to settle their future for themselves. We feel that the Council has today adopted a fresh and constructive approach in this direction. The United Kingdom delegation, representing one of the guarantor Powers, has played a straight forward part in this approach, together with the other two sponsors—Austria and France. From today's statements we can hope for a similar spirit on the part of the other two guarantors and, above all, that new promise for Cyprus will flow from the talks between the leaders of the Cypriot communities.

213. Mr. TCHERNOUCHTENKO (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translation from Russian*): The Byelorussian delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution submitted by Austria, France and the United Kingdom in spite of its limitations and inadequacy and in spite of the fact that it does not, unfortunately, touch upon the basic problems on the solution of which the settlement of the Cyprus problem as a whole depends. In that context, our delegation feels it must state its position of principle with regard to that problem.

214. For a month and a half the question of Cyprus has been on the agenda of the Security Council. It would seem that during that time some progress might have been achieved. However, the fact is that the situation in Cyprus continues to be disturbing. The internal political problems in that country are still acute. The international problems related to events in Cyprus are cause for serious concern. As the Secretary-General noted in his report, "The situation in Cyprus is still a matter of deep concern as far as international peace and security is concerned" [S/11473, para. 9].

215. The course of events itself and their development show convincingly that the reasons for the critical situation in Cyprus are to be found in the open outside military interference in the internal affairs of that country. The dramatic events on the island are the result of action by certain circles in NATO which are planning to transform Cyprus into an advance post in the Eastern Mediterranean from which to combat the national liberation movement in that area. In addition, they would like to divide the island, as that would make it easier to turn Cyprus into a NATO military bridge-head. All this is directed not only against the Cypriot people but also against international détente. It constitutes a threat to the general peace and security of peoples. Unquestionably the dangerous development of events around Cyprus could have been prevented if, immediately following the outbreak of the military rebellion on the island, all interested countries and all members of the Security Council had taken the swift and effective measures called for by the situation: if they had secured the immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces

and military personnel and the restoration of the legitimate constitutional Government in Cyprus and all its agencies. But that is not what happened. It would not have suited those forces and those circles which disliked the previous course followed by the Government of Cyprus and its independent and constructive foreign policy as a non-aligned country.

216. Our delegation remains deeply convinced that one of the first tasks to be dealt with in overcoming the dangerous crisis in Cyprus is the full and immediate implementation of the basic provisions of resolutions 353 (1974) and 357 (1974). The adoption of those resolutions was welcomed by the Member States but it was not followed by any practical measures to implement them, in particular to implement the provisions for putting an end to foreign military intervention and effecting the immediate withdrawal from the territory of Cyprus of all foreign troops and the restoration of the legitimate constitutional Government. No measures were taken to ensure strict respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus.

217. Many facts, already referred to by numerous representatives, indicate that the most varied aspects of the life of the people of Cyprus are undergoing a serious crisis. The economy has been seriously damaged. Hundreds of thousands of Cypriots, both Greek and Turkish, are suffering privation, particularly refugees who have been uprooted from their native soil and find themselves without homes or means of subsistence. The problem of refugees in Cyprus has unquestionably become an acute one. But the reasons for it are clear. They are related to outside intervention in the internal affairs of Cyprus and to the delay in finding a political settlement to the Cyprus problem, to the detriment of the interests of the country's population, its two communities, Greek and Turkish. This in turn is aggravating the already difficult internal economic and social problems, the problems involved in normalizing life on the island.

218. Our delegation is in favour of alleviating the suffering of the people of Cyprus, the thousands and thousands of refugees. It voted in favour of the draft resolution submitted by Austria, France and the United Kingdom in spite of the fact that it is limited in scope. It should be noted that this text says nothing about the immediate implementation of the basic provisions of resolutions 353 (1974) and 357 (1974), which provide for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territory of Cyprus, the restoration of constitutional order and the legitimate constitutional Government, and respect for and strict observance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of that State. This all naturally weakens the resolution that has been adopted. We are deeply convinced that, without a political settlement in Cyprus, there can be no definitive and satisfactory solution of the problems that have arisen there.

219. Finally, our delegation wishes to state that our understanding of paragraph 7 of the resolution is that that paragraph creates an opportunity for trying to find ways of resolving the Cyprus problem in the interests of the people of Cyprus and with full respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. We feel, however, that this question should not be resolved within the narrow framework of the NATO countries. It is our deep conviction that the most positive solution, the one offering a real prospect of settling the Cyprus problem, is the Soviet proposal for an international conference within the framework of the United Nations. The Byelorussian delegation fully and totally agrees with the assessment of the situation in and around Cyprus given in the statement by the Soviet Government of 22 August [S/11465]. Our delegation supports the concrete proposals contained in that statement which are addressed to the settlement of the Cyprus problem.

220. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR has already had an opportunity at one of the earlier meetings to express its views on the Geneva negotiations between the guarantor countries and on their outcome as reflected in the well-known Declaration. Subsequent events have confirmed the correctness of the view that the Declaration is not in the interests of the speedy implementation of resolution 353 (1974) and that the existing London-Zurich system of guarantees has no sound basis and has become bankrupt. The reasons for its failure lie in the fact that the system is essentially a continuation of the policy of colonialism, against which the people of Cyprus waged a long and stubborn war. Accordingly, the efforts being made supposedly to solve the Cyprus problem on the basis of the Zurich-London agreements are without any foundation and cannot defuse the explosive situation around Cyprus.

221. The approach proposed by the Soviet Union is essentially a new one and reflects the interests of the people of Cyprus. It calls for the convening, within the framework of the United Nations, of a new international conference reflecting the political situation of the world today and provides that the permanent members of the Security Council should give effective guarantees of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus—guarantees that the decisions taken at the international conference will be implemented.

222. We also think it would be appropriate to consider the Soviet proposal to send a special mission of the Security Council to Cyprus. We think that the timeliness of this proposal has become even more evident. The Byelorussian delegation feels that sending the mission would be a practical and positive step by the Council. It would help to enhance and make more active the role of the United Nations and, in particular, of the Council. As the representative of

Indonesia noted earlier in this meeting, these proposals merit serious attention and study. As for today's attempts by some representatives to distort the substance and the nature of these proposals, they simply do not stand up to criticism. The futility of these attempts is obvious. The arguments on which they are based are like soap bubbles—no matter how big you make them, they still burst.

223. The task of settling the Cyprus problem continues to be an urgent one and it must be completed without delay. A great many countries, expressing concern over the critical situation in Cyprus, are turning to the United Nations and the Security Council with an appeal that they should take effective measures in the interest of the people of Cyprus. Public non-governmental organizations are addressing themselves to the Council with similar appeals. Let me cite as an example a letter addressed to the members of the Security Council by the World Peace Council and signed by Ramesh Chandra, an Indian citizen who is an outstanding public figure and winner of the Lenin Peace Prize. The letter states:

"World opinion will never forget and will never find justification for the toll of human victims, the agony suffered by so many people and the extensive material damage inflicted upon this beautiful island... The World Peace Council supports the struggle of the people of Cyprus, both Greek and Turkish, for the right to live and prosper in an indivisible, sovereign and independent State possessing full territorial integrity and free from any foreign intervention and from all foreign troops and bases."

224. The special conference in support of the struggle of the people of Cyprus for their freedom and independence held recently in Cairo on the initiative of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization bluntly warned against turning the island into an object of collective neo-colonial domination under cover of NATO; it also expressed the intention of helping Cyprus to remain a sovereign, independent and neutral State.

225. In conclusion, our delegation feels it must once again stress that what is needed is a new genuinely international system that would be capable of protecting Cyprus against any infringement from without of its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and creating conditions that would enable the people of Cyprus themselves, both Greek and Turkish, to decide their fate independently and to determine the future of their country in peace and tranquillity. We feel that this is what would be achieved by implementation of the concrete proposal of the Soviet Union, and our delegation appeals for support for the Soviet proposal, support for the efforts of the Soviet Union to settle the problem of Cyprus.

226. The Byelorussian delegation will also give due attention to other proposals aimed at settling the

Cyprus problem in the interests of the people of that country and defending the status of Cyprus as a non-aligned State.

227. World public opinion expects the Security Council to take urgent and effective measures to protect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and to strengthen peace and security in that area.

228. Mr. OULD MOULOUD (Mauritania) (*interpretation from French*): My delegation has on a number of occasions during this debate said how devoted it is to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and to the preservation of peace in that part of the world. Today we can only reiterate that position very firmly.

229. My delegation has also stated that it welcomes the fact that weapons have fallen silent on Cyprus, and we have the firm hope that negotiations will resume very soon to make it possible to find an, appropriate and constructive solution to all of the many problems that so acutely beset that Republic.

230. The Mauritanian delegation is pleased with the results of the Secretary-General's recent trip to Cyprus. We are particularly pleased that the leaders of the Republic of Cyprus have agreed to meet at regular intervals to discuss current problems and find appropriate solutions.

231. Once again we should like to offer our thanks to the Secretary-General for his efforts and to say how much we admire his action and welcome everything he has done recently in the humanitarian sphere. We regret that he is not able to be with us today, and we wish him a speedy recovery.

232. The Mauritanian delegation sympathizes with the inhabitants of the Republic of Cyprus, and we feel for the people of Cyprus in their present sufferings. That is why we joined in previous initiatives of certain members of the Council aimed at attenuating that suffering and at putting an end to it once and for all. That is also why we voted today in favour of the draft resolution submitted by the delegations of Austria, France and the United Kingdom.

233. My delegation, as in the past, continues to believe that it is a matter of urgency for the Cypriots themselves to resume talks with a view to settling their problems. Above and beyond the immediate humanitarian tasks, which in the opinion of my delegation are of paramount importance, as hardly needs emphasis, my delegation believes that the Council should devote its efforts to the search for new ways and means of promoting such a meeting of Cypriots, which cannot be replaced by anything, in order to ensure the maintenance and consolidation of the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus.

234. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): I shall now give the floor to those representatives who have asked to speak in exercise of the right of reply. I call upon the representative of Greece.

235. Mr. CARAYANNIS (Greece): I just wish to say that on the morning of the day on which the news of Ambassador Davies' death arrived in New York I paid a visit to Mr. Scali to offer my condolences. Since there is an assumption that those who committed the crime were of Greek descent, I should like to tell the representative of the United States and the Council that, perhaps with the sole exception of the two children of Ambassador Davies, nobody in this world felt more grief or more strongly condemned that crime than did the people of Greece.

236. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): I call upon the representative of Cyprus.

237. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): Following the lead of my colleague from Greece, I would say that I had the honour of sending a letter of condolence on the occasion of the most regretted death of a great ambassador, Ambassador Davies. In that letter I expressed my condemnation of the act, particularly since I personally am against any kind of violence, but more so if it originates with my people in a case such as the death of Ambassador Davies. But of course, as has been mentioned, one cannot prevent extremist crimes, and we have seen similar things in the United States and in other countries.

238. Now allow me to give some necessary answers to the representative of Turkey, particularly with regard to his attempt to present the situation of the Turks in Cyprus as one in which they have for 10 or 11 years been forced to be refugees, deprived of their residences, enclosed in places where they could not circulate—in all seriousness and earnestness, as though he believed in those stories, without realizing that there is a sheaf of reports of the Secretary-General covering the entire period showing exactly the reverse.

239. During this critical period, I have never wanted to answer the Turkish representative on this point because I thought it would be a waste of time. But, since I have today realized that there are some at least who believe that, or partly believe it, or want to appear to believe it, thus equating the two sides, I must say a few things on this score, because this cannot go on. It reminds us of a period during which it was a doctrine that the bigger the lie the more it was believed. And this is a big lie. I must quote from the Secretary-General's reports.

240. The representative of Turkey says the Turkish Cypriots were deprived of their homes. What is the reality? I shall read actual quotations. He has not quoted any of the Secretary-General's reports. The reality is that the Turkish Cypriots were forced by

their leadership—and this appears in the reports of the Secretary-General I am going to quote—to be segregated against their will. There were some, such as those along the green line, who left to save themselves from the fighting in certain small suburbs in that area such as Omorphita where there was fighting—but they went in the early period of 1964. The leadership, accompanied by officers of the Turkish army, went into various Turkish villages and collected villagers, taking them against their will. They frightened some of the inhabitants of mixed villages by saying the Turkish air force was going to bomb those villages and they had better leave to save themselves. They told others that the Greeks were going to do something to them. They collected these people in the enclave in order to make a separate, big enclave such as the one they created outside Nicosia. And the reports of the Secretary-General record cases in which those who wanted to leave and tried to do so were shot by their leadership. So they were never prisoners or hostages or were enclosed by the Greek Cypriots or by the Government. On the contrary, there Turkish Cypriots were segregated to prevent them from associating with the Greeks in the hope of maintaining enmity and division for the purpose of partition.

241. The following is from the report of the Secretary-General dated 8 December 1966:

“the Turkish Cypriot leadership does not favour the return of refugees to their homes and deters them from going back to their villages” [S/7611, para. 139].

Force had been used to prevent them. Many had been shot while escaping.

I now quote the report of the Secretary-General of 10 March 1966:

“some steps should be taken by the Turkish Cypriot leadership towards relaxing its policy of discouraging Turkish Cypriots from circulating freely in places outside its control” [S/7191, par. 94].

The Secretary-General's report of 10 June 1965 states:

“The Turkish Cypriot leaders have adhered to a rigid stand against any measures which might involve having members of the two communities live and work together... The result has been the seemingly deliberate policy of self-segregation by the Turkish Cypriots.” [S/6426, para. 106.]

242. So I wish to put an end to this story because it is a wholly fictitious story. The Secretary-General, in his report of 8 December 1966, in referring to the Turkish prohibition of freedom of movement in their areas, states:

“This ban appears to be enforced as a matter of political principle”—they present them from

going out of the enclaves and from associating with the Greeks—"with little attempt at justification on practical grounds" [S/7611, para. 109].

It is a political policy to keep the Turks away, to put them in enclaves and not allow them to go out. And now we hear Mr. Olcay, with his suave voice and manner, speak about the poor Turks who for 11 years have been enclosed in enclaves as prisoners of the Greeks, and he hopes that members of the Council may believe that story.

243. The Secretary-General, in his report of 13 June 1967, states:

"The Turkish Cypriot leadership denies Greek Cypriots access to the Turkish Cypriot enclaves and to most Turkish Cypriot villages at all times,"

wherever the Turkish Cypriots were in control, no Greek could enter those enclaves, whereas the Turkish Cypriots had full freedom of movement everywhere and anywhere as long as they were allowed by their oppressive leadership and the TMT underground organization of Turkish officers to go out without being killed by them—

"... even if accompanied by UNFICYP personnel, while it keeps to a minimum the number of Turkish Cypriots allowed to leave those enclaves to visit Government-controlled areas. ... The Government, for its part, maintains that there is complete freedom of movement for all in the areas under its control." [S/7969, para. 105.]

244. That brings me to another relevant point. Admittedly, during the fighting in early 1964 there was, of course, some killing, and when houses were left they were destroyed by time and perhaps by the interference by others. I have here a letter addressed to Mr. Denktas by Mr. Clerides in February 1971 giving a list of houses that were repaired and a list of houses that were going to be repaired. Mr. Clerides said:

"You will no doubt appreciate that repaired buildings if unoccupied deteriorate, both due to natural causes as well as due to the unfortunate practice of the furtive removal of building material from houses long deserted."

That shows that the experience of Mr. Clerides was that, although the Turks were given houses, they were not allowed to return, and therefore the houses deteriorated.

245. Again, we have statements of the Secretary-General to this effect. The Turks do not return to the houses built for them. A report of 8 December 1966 shows that 343 houses were built, but unfortunately in most cases the Turkish Cypriot owners have not been allowed to return by their

leadership. This is the situation which Mr. Olcay wants to present as being parallel to the situation of the Greek Cypriots, who today are thrown out of their houses, have their properties taken away and are subjected to mass massacres.

246. I did not want to bring all this up in the Council, but I shall have to. This is the analogy. I am referring to the policy of the Turkish army in the area it has occupied of throwing out the population and of not allowing any Greek to enter. Those who do try to enter are killed. I promised that I was going to give details in this connexion, and I shall do so now:

"17 August 1974: at the village of Gaidhouras (Famagusta), villagers trying to get in to feed and water their animals were arrested and executed. One out of 12 survived. The rest were shot down merely for going there to water their animals which were dying."

247. Mr. Olcay balances this off with what was happening with the Turkish Cypriots in the enclaves, where houses were being built for them and they were not allowed to go back.

248. The Secretary-General in his report of 8 December 1967, states:

"For a considerable time, the Government has urged the refugees to return to their homes ... it has repaired or rebuilt abandoned Turkish Cypriot houses. ... It is known that the Turkish Cypriot leadership does not favour the return of the refugees to their former homes located in Government-controlled areas at present. To justify this position, the Turkish Cypriot leadership stresses considerations of security and safety of the refugees, although there can be little doubt that one of the major reasons for its attitude"—it is not security—"is a political, one ... the maximum possible number of Turkish Cypriots must remain outside the Government's authority." [S/8286, para. 127.]

249. Now what was the reason for all this? It was to prepare for what is happening now—for the forcible dismemberment and partition of Cyprus, which could not be achieved unless the Turks forcibly kept up hatred between the Greeks and the Turks of Cyprus. And I have said repeatedly in the Security Council that the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus lived in harmony over the years before and after independence, and that it was only by force that their relations were broken.

250. I do not want to take too much more of the time of the Council, but I have considerable material here. The reports of the Secretary-General are there—sometimes they were twice sometimes four times in a year—from 1964 until today. They can be consulted and it can be verified that even more than I have said is true. Not only has there not been

any oppression of the Turkish Cypriots, but, on the contrary, every effort has been made on their behalf. That was done not only from humanitarian considerations but also in the interest of the Greek Cypriots and the Government, which desired to achieve a unitary State by accommodation, friendship and co-operation, and not by hatred.

251. Mr. Olcay hates the Galo Plaza report merely because Galo Plaza provided a solution of workable independence, and independence is anathema to the Turkish Government. Anybody who proposed any kind of workable independence was anathema to the Turks, although they use the word "independence", and are so happy that the idea of enosis can be used in order to destroy independence. Galo Plaza said that the question of enosis must be put aside. Although the right of self-determination clearly belongs to the people of Cyprus, they must put it aside. He said that, since there were Turks who do not like that idea and wanted to go away they should be compensated. Can that be equated with the forcible moving of populations? Mr. Olcay compares the suggestion by Galo Plaza that those who wanted to go away should be compensated with the forcible movement of populations that the Turkish Government is now trying to carry out on Cyprus.

252. Pursuing this trend about the enosis movement, and the implication that everything Greek should be barred, Mr. Olcay said that in my statement today I had spoken about things Greek, historically and ethnically, emphasizing in a very nationalistic way the Greek character of Cyprus. In my statement I did not use the word "Greek" at all in reference to the historic part of Cyprus. On the contrary, I spoke about the particular historic identity and character of Cyprus. I did not speak in any nationalistic spirit.

253. Also, the representative of Turkey tried to interpret what I had said about the acts of barbarism committed by the Turks in Cyprus as a reference to their nationality. The connexion between barbarism and Turkey is not mine; it is Mr. Olcay's. I spoke about the acts and not about the nationality of those committing them. Barbaric acts can be committed by persons of any nationality and they are no less barbaric when they are committed by persons who are not Turkish.

254. Reporting on the situation in Cyprus, the well-known newspaper *The Sun* of London wrote the following:

"A horrifying story of atrocities by the Turkish invaders of Cyprus emerged today. It was told by weeping Greek Cypriot villagers rescued by United Nations soldiers. They told of watching their loved ones tortured and shot. They told of barbaric rape at gunpoint ... and threats of instant execution if they struggled". [See S/11461.]

The reference in that article was undoubtedly to Turks, but the word "barbaric" was used not because they were Turks but because the actions were barbaric. That is precisely the way in which I myself used the word today, and Mr. Olcay took objection. The article in *The Sun* spoke of barbaric acts at gunpoint. That is the same kind of "gunpoint" at which Turkey tried to impose its conditions on the Geneva negotiations. The article in *The Sun* goes on:

"The villagers are from Trimithi, Karmi and Ayios Yeoryios, three farming communities west of the holiday town of Kyrenia. They had been trapped since the fighting began two weeks ago and were only evacuated to Nicosia by the United Nations forces on Saturday. And today at a Nicosia orphanage, they told their tales ... simply and without any prompting.

"A 20-year old girl ... described how she was raped and watched horrified as her fiancé and six other men were shot dead in cold blood ... a few minutes after they had been promised that they would not be harmed.

"She said: 'After the shooting, a Turkish soldier grabbed me and pulled me into a ditch. I struggled and tried to escape but he pushed me to the ground. Another Turkish soldier who was watching us had a nine-month-old baby in his arms and I, trying to save myself, called out that the child was mine. They laughed at me and threw the baby to the ground. I was then raped and fainted soon after'." [Ibid.]

Those are barbaric acts, not because those who committed them were Turks, but because the acts are barbaric in themselves. I would not have gone into this if Mr. Olcay had not taken objection to my using the words "barbaric acts".

255. There is another point to which I must refer. It has been said here that the Turkish Cypriots are being used as hostages, that they, too, are in a difficult position and are suffering. I have before me the report of the Secretary-General, which clearly shows that UNFICYP maintains a total of 35 observation posts in Turkish Cypriot villages under Government control and in mixed villages. The report contains a long list of those villages. UNFICYP is there watching and observing, and it has not reported any crimes in those villages. But UNFICYP is not allowed to enter the area occupied by Turkish forces; if it does, its movements are interfered with. Thus, the report states:

"The United Nations Force has encountered some problems of freedom of movement in the area of Turkish control. These problems are now under discussion." [S/11468, para. 3.]

The discussions go on, but UNFICYP is not allowed to enter the area and see for itself. However

cannot be hidden; the facts about the crimes happening there do come out.

256. This sort of comparison between what happened in one area and what happened in another is ludicrous; it should be stopped. I do not say that there are no excesses. Surely there have been excesses, because there is a kind of frenzy that grips some men when they find themselves in a climate of massive destruction such as that being experienced in Cyprus now. But we condemn such acts wherever they occur. I would say that those who commit these acts are the enemies of the cause of Cyprus. For the cause of Cyprus is based on moral grounds, it has all the moral values and the principles of the Charter behind it

and it does not depend on force and crimes. Therefore, I would say that anyone on the Greek Cypriot side who commits such crimes in an enemy of the Greek Cypriot cause and actually serves the cause of Turkey by emulating Turkish conduct.

257. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): I call upon the representative of Turkey.

258. Mr. OLCAY (Turkey): I should like the record to show that I do not propose to answer the representative of the Greek Cypriot community.

The meeting rose at 3.20 p.m.