

**United Nations**

**Nations Unies**

UNRESTRICTED

**SECURITY  
COUNCIL**

**CONSEIL  
DE SECURITE**

S/649  
10 February 1948

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

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COMMITTEE OF GOOD OFFICES  
ON THE  
INDONESIAN QUESTION

FIRST INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO  
THE SECURITY COUNCIL

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## INTRODUCTION

LETTER FROM THE COMMITTEE OF GOOD OFFICES TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE  
SECURITY COUNCIL, SUBMITTING THE INTERIM REPORT

10 February 1948

Sir:

We have the honour to send you herewith an Interim Report<sup>+</sup>, prepared by the Committee of Good Offices in order to inform fully the Security Council on the endeavours employed and on the results so far obtained, in the settlement of the Indonesian dispute.

The three senior representatives on the Committee have come to New York, in order to present this Report to the Council and eventually to be in a position to answer personally any question or any request for further clarification, which the Security Council might wish to put to them.

The Committee has seized the first practical and convenient opportunity to offer this Interim Report. We would have liked to inform the Security Council earlier, had we found it wise or useful. Actually, we were careful to send to Lake Success copies of all records or documents pertaining to our task. The first chapters of the present Report were drafted approximately two months ago. But the whole situation, through persistent efforts, was kept very fluid. Developments occurred from day to day, sometimes favourable, sometimes not.

After due consideration, we thought that an Interim Report, sent too early, without conclusion as to a definite stage in our work, might easily be out of date the very day it would come to the knowledge of the Council. If so, it would have become confusing instead of enlightening, and consequently, might have harmed the very interest of peace and understanding we were trying to foster between the parties.

But as soon as the first important and double result was obtained, as is the case today, we made haste to present to the Council, under the form we deemed most complete and effective, an interim up-to-date report, as enclosed.

This Report represents the unanimous views of all three members of the Committee.

We take this opportunity also to express our deep appreciation of the high competence, the untiring industry and the unfailing loyalty which were shown by the Secretary and staff provided for us by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

With the renewed expression of our devotion to the task entrusted to us by the Security Council, we beg to remain, Sir,

Sincerely yours,

(signed) Paul van Zeeland

Frank P. Graham

Richard C. Kirby

Representatives on the Committee  
of Good Offices on the Indonesian Question

General the Honourable A. G. L. McNaughton,  
President of the Security Council,  
Lake Success,  
New York.

/CHAPTER I

## CHAPTER I

### PRELIMINARY PHASES OF THE COMMITTEE'S WORK

1. The United Nations Security Council's Committee of Good Offices on the Indonesian Question was established, pursuant to a resolution of the Security Council of 25 August 1947, to assist in the pacific settlement of the dispute between the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia. At an informal meeting of the Committee convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations at Lake Success on 8 October, at which were present the Honourable Dr. Herbert Evatt, representing Australia, the Honourable Mr. Paul van Zeeland, representative of Belgium, and the Honourable Dr. Frank P. Graham, representative of the United States of America, it was decided that the Committee should proceed with its Secretariat, as quickly as arrangements could be completed, to Sydney, Australia, to meet with the Honourable Mr. Justice Kirby and organize its future work. The Committee, thereafter, assembled in Sydney on 19 October. At its first official meeting held on 20 October, it was agreed that the members of the Committee would not represent either of the contending parties, but act as a Committee in the spirit of the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. It was also decided that the chairmanship of the Committee would be held in turn by the three members, each member holding office for a week.
2. The Committee held three official meetings in Sydney and decided, after the receipt of invitations from the Prime Ministers of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia, to proceed to Indonesia as quickly as transportation arrangements could be completed in order to acquaint itself with the situation on the spot and meet with the parties as an essential preliminary to the commencement of its duties. While in Sydney, the Committee adopted the practice of holding informal meetings frequently in order to study the problem and discuss possible methods of approach

/to a settlement

to a settlement of the dispute. Leaving Sydney on 25 October, the Committee arrived in Batavia on 27 October and immediately thereafter met separately with the two parties.

3. First among the problems that faced the Committee was the determination of a site mutually agreeable to the parties for the holding of political discussions. As indicated by the Committee's cablegram of 1 December, this problem was solved by the parties accepting the suggestion of the Committee, which it made on the request of the parties after they had failed to agree on a mutually acceptable site. After exploring several possible sites with the parties, the Committee suggested as a last resort that political discussions be held on board a public ship of the United States. The parties are now meeting with the Committee on board the U.S.S. Renville in Java waters.

4. Soon after its arrival in Java, the Committee found it necessary to state to the parties its views on its responsibilities under the terms of the resolutions of the Security Council on the Indonesian Question and its procedure for assisting the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia in the pacific settlement of the dispute.

5. As regards its responsibilities under the terms of the Security Council's resolutions, the Committee conveyed its views formally to the parties in a document dated 19 November, the substance of which had been conveyed informally on 7 November, to the committee representing the Netherlands Government. In that document the Committee stated that it would render all assistance possible to the parties in reaching a political settlement. In that connection, the Committee would assume any and every task devolving upon it as the result of agreements or requests made by the parties from time to time. Nothing the Committee might do would bind either party, except under circumstances where two conditions were fulfilled, namely (1) that both parties asked the Committee to make recommendations, and (2) that both parties stated in advance that they would regard such recommendations as binding. However, under the terms of paragraph 4 of the Security Council's resolution of 1 November on the Indonesian Question, the Committee considered itself directed by the Council to offer its assistance to the parties, in the absence of any direct agreement between the parties, in reaching agreement on an arrangement which would ensure the observance of the cease fire resolution, without awaiting a request by either party that the Committee offer such assistance.

6. Far from conceiving its assistance as having a binding character, the Committee considered that its duties could be fulfilled only through agreement between the parties themselves. The Committee stated, however,  
/that, should

that, should the parties reject the Committee's assistance, the Committee's responsibility to the Security Council would be acquitted simply by reporting to the Security Council.

7. In reply to a question put to the Committee by the delegation of the Republic of Indonesia regarding its procedure for assisting in the pacific settlement of the dispute, the Committee stated the following on 30 October:

"(1) The Committee of Good Offices on the Indonesian Question considers it, as among its first duties, to take note of all the wishes of the parties and also to take note of any suggestions either party would wish to make.

"(2) The Committee desires to make it clear that it is ready, for its part, to make suggestions to the parties, if and when the Committee is requested to do so by the parties. In particular, the Committee would be prepared, if and when so requested by the parties, to offer its suggestions to the parties on appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment, as well as on such basic matters as are related to procedures for the settlement and terms of settlement.

"(3) As regards the question raised by the Prime Minister of the Republic of Indonesia at the meeting of the Committee with the Republican Government relating to the choice of a suitable place for conducting discussions on substantive matters, the Committee desires to make clear that it is ready to offer its suggestions, if so requested by the parties.

"(4) Finally, the Committee desires to emphasize that it will welcome and consider any suggestion made at any stage by either party, and will be ready to use its good offices to secure the best consideration of such suggestions as may be made."

8. On 31 October, the Chairman of the committee representing the Netherlands Government stated the agreement of his Committee with the interpretation of the functions of the Committee of Good Offices as stated by it in its reply to a question put to it by the delegation of the Republic of Indonesia (see paragraph 7 above). On 8 November, the Chairman of the committee representing the Netherlands Government stated that his committee was very willing to receive suggestions from the Committee of Good Offices on questions of procedure. He stated further that, with regard to "a basis of settlement or possible terms of settlement" which the Committee might be prepared to suggest upon being requested to do so by the parties, it would seem to the Netherlands committee to be premature to discuss that matter at that point. That did

/not mean



not mean that the Netherlands committee rejected the idea. The Chairman of the delegation of the Republic of Indonesia, in a memorandum to the Committee dated 6 November, stated that the Republic of Indonesia undertook to carry out all the resolutions of the United Nations in regard to the settlement of the dispute between the Governments of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia. He further expressed the satisfaction of his delegation with the attitude taken by the Committee of Good Offices and drew the attention of the Committee to the following question put to the Committee earlier by the Indonesian delegation and the Committee's reply to it. The Indonesian delegation asked whether the Committee did not think that it should look to a common basis to be suggested to the Dutch authorities in order to make further talks possible. To this the Committee replied that it could probably best assist the parties if it were invited by both to make suggestions as regards (1) a meeting place, (2) procedures or methods of adjustment, and (3) a basis of settlement or possible terms of settlement. The Indonesian delegation accordingly invited the Committee to take such steps as would render possible and accelerate negotiations and guarantee their smooth progress.

9. The Committee and the parties to the dispute agreed that every effort should be made to bring about as soon as possible a suitable atmosphere in Indonesia in order to increase the chances of a political settlement. To this end, both the parties submitted their respective suggestions.

10. The suggestions of the Committee representing the Netherlands Government dated 1 November, were as follows:

"1. Both parties have stated that it is imperative to create an atmosphere in which discussions can be held which may lead to a peaceful settlement of the present conflict.

"2. In order to create this atmosphere - and thus to enable fruitful discussions to be held in a spirit of goodwill - this committee considers it essential that the following conditions be fulfilled:

- (a) the cessation of inimical action - with the inclusion of deeds of violence to persons and property, acts of destruction, sabotage;
- (b) the cessation of threats directed towards persons and property of such as are not on the side of the Republic, as well as of their relatives;
- (c) the cessation of incitement to the actions referred to sub. (a) and (b).

"3. In the opinion of this committee the following measures should be taken in the near future, as a first step that may lead to the

/fulfilment

fulfilment of the aforesaid conditions.

The parties undertake to present to the Committee of Good Offices as from .....:

- (a) the texts of all broadcasts intended for the public, transmitted by the wireless stations;
- (b) at least two copies of all press publications."

11. The suggestions of the delegation of the Republic of Indonesia, dated 4 November, were as follows:

"To end all hostile actions or incitements to activities which contravene the purpose of the resolution of the Security Council dated 1 November 1947, the Government of the Republic of Indonesia is of the opinion that, apart from military measures, the following measures should be considered and effectively put into operation:

- (a) All activities directly or indirectly aimed at separatism are to cease.
- (b) All measures directly or indirectly taken by the Netherlands to suppress all forms of pro-Republican activities and expression, such as the singing of the national anthem "Indonesia Raya", the hoisting of the red and white flag, the use of the red-white badge, the "Merdeka" salute, etc., are to cease.
- (c) Communications between Republican and Dutch-occupied territories and territories isolated by the Dutch occupation, as well as communications with foreign countries, are to be restored and remain unhampered.
- (d) Republican officials and adherents detained by the Netherlands authorities are to be released.
- (e) Officials and adherents of the Republic not willing to work for the Dutch Government are not to be arrested nor subjected to any form of pressure.
- (f) The Dutch Government should return the goods and the money belonging to the Republic of Indonesia, their officials and adherents.
- (g) Republican central and branch offices, schools and other institutions are to be opened and allowed to continue their activities freely. Related functions, for instance the circulation of money, the provision of materials required for work and the daily necessities of life are to be allowed to function freely.
- (h) The Dutch Government are to abolish all measures and remove such pressures as hamper the circulation of Republican money, and they are to put an end to forcible methods of bringing into circulation Dutch money in Dutch-occupied territories.
- (i) The Dutch Government are to cease all forms of propaganda and other efforts which may be regarded as being in the nature of incitement against or insults to the Government of the Republic of Indonesia."

/12. In accordance

12. In accordance with the terms of the resolution of the Security Council on the Indonesian Question dated 1 November, the Committee prepared to discharge the additional responsibilities placed on it for assisting the parties to reach agreement on an arrangement which would ensure the observance of the cease fire resolution, after it had become obvious that the parties concerned could not agree to consult with each other directly as to the means to be employed to give effect to the Council's cease fire resolution. Pending an agreement between the parties, the Committee called the attention of the parties to the necessity of ceasing any activities, or incitement to activities, which contravened that resolution, and to take appropriate measures for safeguarding life and property.

13. In a memorandum to the Committee dated 4 November, the delegation of the Republic of Indonesia stated its preparedness to comply with the Council's resolution of 1 November. Following are excerpts from its memorandum:

"(1) The Indonesian delegation, on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, herewith expresses its preparedness to abide by the above-mentioned resolution of the Security Council, wishes to call attention to the fact that the Government of the Republic, for its part, has made sufficient efforts to take the necessary measures to implement the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 1 August 1947 calling upon the parties to cease hostilities; however, relations between the parties, as the consequence of Netherlands military action, did not permit the establishment of a contact for negotiations.

"(2) Holding the Security Council's resolution of 1 November 1947 in high esteem, the Indonesian delegation believes that in the present circumstances the most effective means of implementing the resolution calling upon the parties to cease hostilities would be to arrange for negotiations between the parties concerned, guided and actively assisted by the Committee of Good Offices, which would also supervise the execution of the agreement reached.

"(3) To that end, each party should create a Special Committee whose exclusive duty will be to work for the implementation of the resolution calling for a cessation of hostilities to the extent of the resolution of the Security Council of 1 November 1947. It is most desirable that on both sides this Committee has high level authority in order to arrive at quick decisions.

"(4) The Government of the Republic of Indonesia has therefore established a Special Committee for the purpose described above ....

"(5) The Government of the Republic of Indonesia is of the opinion that this Committee should forthwith embark on its duties and function

/at the same

at the same time as, but independently of, the Indonesian delegation to the Committee of Good Offices.

Further, it is the intention of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia that this Committee should plan its own work independently of the work of the Indonesian delegation, so that no time is lost and a solution may be found as quickly as possible."

14. Similar views were conveyed by the Chairman of the committee representing the Netherlands Government, in a memorandum that he submitted informally to the Committee of Good Offices on 9 November and which was placed on record with the Committee on 28 November. The Netherlands committee's memorandum read as follows:

"(1) We gladly accept the assistance of the Committee of Good Offices in reaching agreement on an arrangement which will assure the observance of the cease fire resolution.

"(2) We are furthermore willing to take into consideration suggestions the Committee might be willing to make in this connection.

"(3) The Netherlands Government is prepared to start discussions immediately in order to obtain a better observance of the cease fire resolution than had been possible hitherto, the more so as we are convinced that, unless this resolution is observed to a reasonable extent, discussions on substance, that is to say on political questions, will be of no avail.

"(4) We are willing to start these discussions with the Committee of Good Offices and also with the Republican authorities.

"(5) Details will have to be worked out, for instance concerning the question where these discussions will take place.

"(6) We believe that it would be best to instruct experts to work out these details. We are prepared to appoint these experts forthwith.

"(7) I would finally like to point out that discussion of a political nature should as a rule be excluded from the discussions regarding the implementation of the cease fire resolution."

15. The Committee decided that its primary duties, namely, assisting in the pacific settlement of the dispute and assisting the parties to reach an agreement on an arrangement which would ensure the observance of the cease fire resolution, could best be discharged by getting the parties to meet with each other to undertake political discussions as well as discussions leading to the implementation of the Council's resolution of 1 November. It was the considered opinion of the Committee that the discussions by the parties concerning implementation of the resolutions

/regarding

regarding the cease-fire and the discussions looking toward a political settlement has a bearing on each other. It was further the opinion of the Committee that both discussions should be undertaken with all possible speed, as any measure of agreement reached in either discussion would facilitate the reaching of agreement in the other. It was believed that any insistence that either discussion should have reached a specified stage of agreement before the other discussion was undertaken might easily result in stalemate as to both. The Committee recognized the urgency of reaching an agreement to implement the cease fire resolution, and pending such agreement emphasized the importance of ceasing any activities, or incitement to activities, which contravened that resolution and of taking appropriate measures for safeguarding life and property. This was a matter of days, and in the Committee's view the parties should immediately undertake discussions to that end either directly or through its good offices. Therefore, while the Committee continued its preparations for holding the political discussions between the parties on board the U.S.S. Renville as soon as she arrived, the Committee arranged with the parties that they appoint Special Committees for the implementation of the Council's resolution of 1 November. On 12 November, the Committee appointed six representatives, two from the delegation of each member of the Committee, to assist the Special Committees of the parties. Three of the six representatives of the Committee comprise senior military officers attached to delegations of the representatives on the Committee.

## CHAPTER II

### WORK OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEES ESTABLISHED TO IMPLEMENT THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S RESOLUTION OF 1 NOVEMBER 1947

16. The Special Committees held their first meeting in Batavia on 14 November, electing a civilian representative of the United States delegation as permanent Chairman. After both Special Committees had asked that the Committee of Good Offices make suggestions on the implementation of the Security Council's resolution of 1 November, the representatives of the Committee, on 15 November, submitted eight suggestions. These suggestions were revised through informal discussions with both Special Committees and re-submitted as follows:

- "(a) To refrain from broadcasts or any other form of propaganda aimed at provoking or disturbing troops and civilians;
- (b) To cease immediately the publication of a daily operational communique or any other information about military operations unless by prior mutual agreement in writing, except weekly publication of lists of individuals (giving names, number and home address) who have been killed or have died as a result of injuries received in action;
- (c) to initiate broadcasts and institute other measures to inform all troops and civilians of the delicate situation and the necessity for strict compliance with the cease fire orders to be issued in identical terms by both parties;
- (d) In order to maintain the military status quo, existing military positions will not be altered in any areas from their present locations (in any direction) unless mutually agreed to by the two parties, such agreement to be expressed with particularity in writing at least twenty-four hours before the beginning of the alteration agreed upon;
- (e) Not to engage in any hostile military, naval or air activities including air reconnaissance or air patrolling against or over the areas occupied by the other party; or to engage in naval activities against or over areas controlled by the other party;
- (f) To prohibit sabotage, intimidation and reprisal and other activities of a similar nature against individuals, groups of individuals, and property, including the destruction of property of any kind and by whomsoever owned, and to utilize every means at their command to this end;

(g) To accept the principle of the release of prisoners by each party and to commence discussion with a view to the most rapid and convenient implementation thereof, the release in principle to be without regard to the number of prisoners held by either party;

(h) Full opportunity for observation by military and civil assistants made available to the Committee of Good Offices."

17. The Special Committees also requested the Committee to initiate a series of radio-broadcasts to the inhabitants of Indonesia concerning the tasks and functions of the Committee. In compliance with this request, the three representatives on the Committee have broadcast from Radio-Jogjakarta and Radio-Batavia, to explain the Committee's views on the situation and to make an appeal that killing and destruction cease at once.

18. At the third meeting on 23 November held in Kalioerang, near Jogjakarta, the Special Committees were able to agree in principle to paragraphs (a), (b), (f), (g) and (h) of the Committee's initial suggestions. Both Special Committees considered that final agreement on all the points depended on agreement on paragraph (d), and the Committee's representatives asked each Special Committee to submit a memorandum setting forth its views on this point. The Committee's representatives also submitted further suggestions which were of a military nature and called for agreement on the following points:

"(a) The establishment of a demarcation line;

At this stage, the Committee is not yet in a position to offer suggestions; it has been informed of the views expressed by the military assistants on 10 November 1947, namely, that the opinion expressed by the military assistants on 2 October 1947 should be made to conform to the resolution of 1 November 1947. In addition to other reasons the express reference made by them to the resolution of the Security Council of 1 November 1947 makes it necessary to come to a clear interpretation of the will of the Council as expressed in that resolution. Such an interpretation can best be made by the Committee of Good Offices with the help of the verbatim records of the meetings of the Security Council. In the meantime, considering that the rights and claims of either party could not possibly be prejudiced, modified or jeopardized, it is hoped that the parties will forthwith take steps to come to agreement on any practical solution which might meet their views.

(b) The determination of a demilitarized zone;

This demilitarized zone should be created between the positions  
/of the two

of the two forces along the line. It is suggested the width of the zone not exceed ten (10) kilometres.

It is to be understood that movement of troops of either party which may have to move from the zone in order to demilitarize it may move with arms, equipment and all other warlike stores. It is further to be understood that troops of either party in isolated positions not in the demilitarized zone will be repatriated likewise.

- (c) The period of time granted to each party to evacuate the area agreed upon, the means of carrying out this evacuation, and provision for the observation of these activities by the military assistants;
- (d) Provision for the observation and reporting by the military assistants of conditions prevailing in the demilitarized zone;
- (e) Arrangements for civil administration in evacuated areas;
- (f) Provision for the improvement of communications and transportation between the territories occupied by the parties;
- (g) Provision to allow reciprocal economic intercourse at fixed points through the demarcation line."

19. The Netherlands Special Committee, in its memorandum on paragraph (d) dated 28 November, expressed its opinion that the only way to settle the problem was, (a) to declare the "forward fast" order applicable only to the forward areas where there were indeed "opposing forces"; (b) to evacuate to Republican territory all those Republican fighting groups which were still in the areas occupied by Netherlands forces; (c) to restrict the patrolling activity of the posts of both parties in the "forward areas" to one kilometre in the direction of known posts of the opposing party, with the proviso that this restriction could be maintained only for short successive periods (fourteen days at most), subject to renewal. The Special Committee of the Indonesian Republic, in its memorandum dated 1 December, stated its agreement to the text of paragraph (d), as submitted by the Committee's representatives.

20. At the fourth meeting held in Batavia on 2 December, the Committee's representatives presented the following redraft of paragraph (d) which included a clarification drawn up by the Committee's military representatives:

- "(d) In order to maintain the military status quo in Java, Sumatra, and Madura, existing military positions will not be altered in any areas from their present locations (in any direction) unless mutually agreed to by the two parties, such agreement to be expressed with particularity in writing at least twenty-four hours before the beginning of the alteration agreed upon; present patrolling activities to be continued but restricted to one (1) kilometre."



The new text was not discussed at this meeting and both Special Committees agreed that discussion of the further suggestions of the Committee would not be worth while until agreement had been reached on paragraph (d).

21. At the fifth meeting held in Batavia on 3 December the Netherlands Special Committee pointed out that the redraft of paragraph (d) omitted any reference to forward positions and did not limit the restriction on patrolling activities to these forward positions. The new text was therefore unacceptable to the Netherlands Special Committee because the police duties of the Netherlands Army made it impossible to restrict patrolling activities of all troops to the mere tactical protection of their own encampments. At this same meeting the Special Committee of the Indonesian Republic accepted the redraft of paragraph (d). The Republican Special Committee stated that it could not accept the view of the Netherlands Special Committee that the stand fast order should apply only to the "forward positions" and that such an interpretation would mean that the Security Council's resolution would not be applicable to thousands of Republican troops and officials in vast territories of Java, Sumatra and Madura.

22. When it appeared that an impasse had been reached, the Committee instructed its representatives, on 3 December, to forward to both Special Committees a new plan, the adoption of which the Committee considered would bring about a speedy and effective truce. It was explained that the adoption of this plan was only of a provisional nature and would be without prejudice to the rights, claims or positions of the parties. The new plan read as follows:

"1. That each party should present a map to the representatives of the Committee of Good Offices on which it defines the demilitarized zones that it submits should divide Netherlands-occupied and Republican-occupied areas.

2. That each party should present arguments to the representatives of the Committee in support of its contention that the demilitarized zones should be established as claimed by it.

3. That each party, in addressing its arguments and making its submissions to the representatives of the Committee should have regard to the following factors:

(a) the military positions of the various elements of both forces as of 4 August 1947;

(b) the welfare of local populations;

(c) the administrative areas in existence as at 4 August and 20 November in or near to the demilitarized zones suggested by both parties;

/(d) the geographical

- (d) the geographical and topographical features of the proposed demilitarized zones and surrounding districts;
  - (e) the fact that zones in different areas may vary in width when the matters in (b), (c) and (d) above are taken into account.
4. That the parties should be at liberty to present their arguments and submissions partly by writing and partly orally, and that the written documents in support of a party's arguments and submissions should be delivered without delay to the representatives of the Committee and to the other party; and that the oral arguments and submissions be made to the representatives of the Committee in the presence and hearing of the duly designated representatives of the other party.
5. That in the event the parties do not agree, the representatives of the Committee should propose to the parties delimitations of the demilitarized zones which the parties would be asked to accept.
6. That the representatives of the Committee, in arriving at these proposals, should carefully consider the arguments and submissions of the parties having regard to the matters set out in paragraph 3 above.
7. That on the parties agreeing to this plan, each party should have its troops stand fast and cease fire in their present positions.
8. That the matters agreed upon at that date by the parties through their Special Committees should be incorporated in this agreement and put into immediate effect.
9. That the parties should agree that as soon as the demilitarized zones mentioned above are accepted by the parties:
- (a) there should be an immediate resumption of normal trade and intercourse between the demilitarized zones, all Netherlands-occupied areas, and all Republican-occupied areas; and as far as practicable the parties should endeavour to facilitate such trade and intercourse;
  - (b) all forces of each party in any area accepted as a demilitarized zone or in any area on the other party's side of a demilitarized zone, should under supervision of military assistants of the Committee of Good Offices and with arms and warlike equipment move peacefully to the territory on the party's own side of the demilitarized zone.
10. That the representatives of the Committee should further make suggestions concerning the method of control of, and maintenance of law and order in, the demilitarized zones."
23. By letter dated 6 December, the Special Committee of the Indonesian Republic accepted the new plan. At the sixth meeting held on board the U.S.S. Renville on 9 December, the Netherlands Special Committee stated its  
/willingness

willingness to proceed at full speed with the discussion of the new plan, which it believed contained valuable ideas, based on common sense and on which agreement could be reached, provided always that the present suspicions were allayed. Believing that considerable time would be needed to implement the plan, even if it were agreed to in principle, the Netherlands Special Committee suggested that the military and civilian aspects of the problem be separated and proposed to put into effect immediately the following points of the Committee's initial suggestions as revised (see paragraph 16): (f), (a), (c), (changing the words following "compliance" to read "with provisions sub 1 and 2"); (h), (b), and (g). The Head of the Special Committee of the Indonesian Republic stated that the Republican Special Committee had agreed in principle to all the Committee's initial suggestions (see paragraph 16) and that the Republican Special Committee was also ready to accept the new plan (see paragraph 22).

24. On 10 December, following a request made by the Netherlands Special Committee at the sixth meeting, the military representatives of the Committee of Good Offices met with the Netherlands military representatives, and on 12 December received from them a memorandum containing specific questions concerning the new plan. On the basis of these questions the Committee's representatives on 16 December submitted to both Special Committees the following explanatory annex:

"Paragraph 1 - A demilitarized zone is defined for the purposes set forth in the plan for achieving a speedy and effective truce as a zone from which all personnel of all military units, together with their arms and equipment, have been withdrawn.

The term military units does not apply to civil police.

Suggestions as to the control, type and armament of police charged with the maintenance of law and order in the demilitarized zones would be submitted by the Committee of Good Offices if requested by the parties, as indicated in paragraph 10 of the new plan.

Paragraph 3 (a) - The positions of the troops of the two parties on 20 November 1947 is not a factor to be taken into account by the two parties in their submissions to the Committee of Good Offices with regard to the delineation of demilitarized zones.

Paragraph 3 (b) - Welfare refers not only to law and order but to living conditions of the population. The welfare of the local population is a term to be given a common-sense definition.

Paragraph 4 - It is recognized that each party, in making its submissions and advancing its arguments before the Special Committee of the other party in connection with the delimitation of a demilitarized zone, will

/necessarily

necessarily take into account considerations of military security. The Committee of Good Offices will consider verifying in the field, within the limitations of its available personnel, the data supplied by the parties if the parties so desire.

Paragraph 7 - 'Present positions' means the positions of troops in any area of Java, Sumatra and Madura. This paragraph has for its intention the cessation of all troop movements of a hostile nature calculated to gain a military objective. It is not the intention of this paragraph to preclude the movements of troops for purposes of military administration or supply or the operations of civil police forces in the maintenance of law and order within the territories occupied.

Paragraph 9 (a) - It is recognized that many technical problems are involved in the resumption of normal trade and intercourse among the various areas and that these problems would require solution by agreement between the parties with the assistance of the Committee of Good Offices, if requested.

Paragraph 9 (b) - This paragraph applies to both parties. The question of whether the withdrawal of the troops of only one party or of both would be required could only be answered following the determination of the location of the demilitarized zones."

25. In a letter dated 14 December, the Head of the Special Committee of the Indonesian Republic stated that the Republican Special Committee could not accept as a separate plan the proposal made at the sixth meeting by the Netherlands Special Committee. He pointed out that the suggestions contained in the Netherlands proposal were automatically provided for if both parties accepted the Committee's new plan and that those measures, if detached from the other measures outlined in the Committee's plan, could not effect a general cease hostilities.

26. At the seventh meeting on 18 December, the Head of the Netherlands Special Committee stated that until the facts were established with respect to the pockets of resistance, the existence of which the Republic claimed and the Netherlands denied, his Government was of the opinion that it was useless to carry on the cease fire discussion. On the instructions of his Prime Minister, he formally requested the Committee to investigate these pockets immediately. He considered that the proposal made by the Netherlands Special Committee at the sixth meeting concerning the immediate implementation of those points in the Committee's initial suggestions upon which agreement had been reached in principle would have constituted an important improvement on the present unsatisfactory situation, and he

/requested

requested the Committee of Good Offices to sponsor this proposal.

27. On 21 December the Committee received a memorandum from the Special Committee of the Indonesian Republic concerning the request made by the Netherlands Special Committee at the seventh meeting for an investigation of the pockets of resistance. This memorandum pointed out that the Republican Special Committee had repeatedly suggested that it would be better for the outcome of such investigations if a general cease fire and stand fast order were issued first. If, however, the Committee insisted on this investigation, the Republic would ask that it be consulted on the locations to be visited and be given the guarantee that the situation of Republican troops and officials in these locations would not be aggravated. In the meantime, discussions of the Committee's new plan should proceed.

28. On 21 and 23 December the Committee received memoranda from the Special Committees of the Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic setting forth in detail their views on the Committee's plan for achieving a speedy and effective truce. These memoranda are attached to this report as Appendices I and II.

29. The Committee, on being requested by the parties, offered its suggestions through its representatives with the Special Committees with regard to requests of the parties for investigations into allegations of violations of the Council's cease fire resolution. The Committee's statement of its policy issued on 29 November to the parties read as follows:

- "1. The Committee of Good Offices is of the opinion that requests for investigation into allegations of violations of the cease fire resolution should primarily and, as a rule, come from either or both of the Special Committees of the parties concerned;

2. The Chairman of the representatives of the Committee of Good Offices with the two Special Committees will nevertheless possess discretion to take up allegations of violations of the cease fire resolution on his own initiative with either or both of the Special Committees;

3. In the investigation of such allegations, the representatives of the Committee should be given the right to insist on all facts being made available to them by both parties;

4. The representatives of the Committee and their military assistants should have the right to make observations in the territories of both parties;

5. The parties should co-operate with each other, under the auspices of the representatives of the Committee, in works of rescue and in carrying out other humanitarian activities;

6. In the case of situations which might lead to a violation of the  
/cease fire

cease fire resolution, it is the opinion of the Committee that neither the Committee nor its representatives should be expected to receive information under conditions which bind them to silence. It is clear that the work of the Committee and its representatives in connection with the implementation of the cease fire resolution should be carried on with the full co-operation of both parties and that this co-operation will be possible only if both parties have available to them all the information available to the Committee and its representatives;

7. In order to discharge properly its functions, the Committee is of the opinion that the parties should agree to inform the Committee or its representatives fully and promptly on any situation which either party may consider as necessitating the movement of elements of its armed forces beyond their present advance positions, and that the advice should be given prior to any such movement."

### CHAPTER III

#### OTHER PHASES OF THE COMMITTEE'S WORK

The Committee of Good Offices, in the course of its work, has had to deal with a great number of different questions. In order to report as accurately as possible, the Committee thought useful to mention here, in this short chapter, some of those questions, as a matter of record.

30. On 28 November the Republic of Indonesia submitted a memorandum on the economic situation in the Republic (see Appendix III). The Committee transmitted this memorandum to the other party and on 13 December received a reply from the Head of the Netherlands delegation enclosing copies of a report drawn up on behalf of the Netherlands Indies Government. On 22 December the Committee received a further letter from the Netherlands delegation concerning this memorandum of the Republic. These documents are reproduced in Appendix IV of this report.

31. In a letter addressed to both parties on 11 December 1947, the Committee stated that its limited staff resources had prevented it from studying conditions on the spot as fully as it would have liked and that the Committee now hoped to be able to spare some of the assistants of each of its delegations to acquaint themselves with conditions in Java, Sumatra and Madura, and to report to the Committee. It was explained that the Committee intended to ask its assistants to arrange for observation and enquiries into the specific situations which the parties called to the attention of the Committee, but because of the limitations of the Committee's staff, it might be possible to meet the parties' requests only in some specially selected cases.

32. Pursuant to requests from the parties, the Committee, in accordance with its policy regarding enquiries as set forth in the previous paragraph, sent observation teams to Madura and Rawahgedah. The reports of these observation teams (documents S/AC.10/85, 85/Add.1 and 86) have been submitted to the Committee and are available for inspection in the office of the Department of Security Council Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat.

33. On 21 December 1947 the Committee received a memorandum from the delegation of the Republic of Indonesia concerning political activities in Java, requesting that the matter be referred to the Security Council; and the Committee informed both parties that its general policy was as follows:

" ... the Committee considers that its task of good offices can be best carried out if the parties do not request the Committee to refer particular matters to the Security Council. The Committee is of the

/opinion

opinion that it can be of the most assistance to the parties by following the procedure which it has adopted in the past, namely to discuss those matters brought to its attention by one party with the other party, in order to ascertain where agreement between them is possible.

The Committee will, of course, make reports on the progress of its work to the Security Council and will include in these reports all such matters which it deems appropriate."

Accordingly, on 2 January 1948, with the consent of the Republican delegation, the Committee transmitted the Republican memorandum to the Netherlands delegation, asking that any comments which the Netherlands delegation might wish to make on this memorandum be forwarded to the Committee. The Netherlands reply was handed to the Committee on 29 January 1948. The memorandum from the delegation of the Republic of Indonesia referred to in this paragraph and the reply of the Netherlands delegation to it (documents S/AC.10/73 and S/AC.10/91) are available for inspection in the office of the Department of Security Council Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat.



#### CHAPTER IV

#### NEGOTIATIONS LEADING UP TO THE TRUCE AGREEMENT AND THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE POLITICAL PRINCIPLES

34. The Committee of Good Offices opened the conference with the delegations of the Netherlands\* and of the Republic of Indonesia on board the U.S.S. Benville on 8 December 1947. At the second meeting of the conference on 9 December, the delegations of both the parties accepted the procedural suggestion of the Committee that before the parties opened joint discussions, each delegation should meet separately with the Committee so that the Committee might be able to arrive at a preliminary understanding of the positions of the parties.

35. In a statement presented to the conference at the third meeting on 10 December, before the separate sessions began, the Head of the Netherlands delegation expressed the opinion that the discussions of the measures to be applied to implement the cease-fire resolution would have to be brought to a successful conclusion before political discussions could be of avail. The Head of the delegation of the Indonesian Republic also made a general statement at the third meeting of the conference, taking the position that the implementation of the cease hostilities order and the settlement of the political dispute should be undertaken immediately and concurrently.

36. The Committee held a number of separate meetings with each delegation during the period from 11 to 19 December, examining the Linggadjati Agreement in an effort to ascertain each party's understanding of the various articles. In the meantime, however, the discussions of the Special Committees had not resulted in the adoption of the Committee's plan of 3 December for a speedy and effective truce which the Committee had hoped would be accomplished at an early date (see paragraph 22 above). The Committee, therefore, drafted a message appealing to both parties to reconsider the whole problem. The draft message contained new suggestions for the implementation of the truce, a statement of four principles considered by the Committee to be fundamental to the Linggadjati Agreement, and eight additional principles, political in nature, all of which the Committee believed the parties could accept as a balanced and integrated

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\* The Netherlands Government, by decree of 1 December, appointed a delegation to the Committee of Good Offices replacing the Committee representing the Netherlands Government.

whole forming a basis both for the restoration of peace and security and for a lasting settlement of the political dispute. The draft message was adopted as such by the Committee on Christmas day. In accordance with the procedure the Committee had previously followed, it was given to the parties informally. The parties' replies were also conveyed informally to the Committee. The text of the Committee's Christmas draft message and the replies of the parties are set forth in Appendices V, VI and VII to this report. The Committee of Good Offices is of the view that it could not inform fully the Security Council, consistently with its duty, without including these documents. The Committee draws the attention of the Security Council to the informal character of its Christmas draft message and the replies to it received from both parties, the whole procedure having been informal within the limits of 'good offices'.

37. During the week following the transmission of its Christmas draft message, the Committee held several informal meetings with the Prime Minister of the Netherlands and three of the Netherlands Ministers, who were at that time in Batavia, and other high Netherlands authorities. The Committee held similar meetings in Batavia with several Ministers of the Republic and members of the Republican delegation. On 2 January, the Committee received informally from the Netherlands delegation new proposals for a truce agreement and a statement of eight political principles. Those proposals represented in considerable part an acceptance, in some parts a rejection and in some other parts a modification of the principles presented in the Committee's draft message. The Netherlands delegation stated that these eight principles, together with the four principles of the Linggadjati Agreement as incorporated in the Committee's Christmas draft message, would, upon acceptance, form a basis for the negotiation of a political agreement.

38. The Committee forwarded the Netherlands proposals for a truce agreement and the statement of political principles to the delegation of the Republic on 2 January, the day they were received. In a meeting with some of the Ministers and the delegation of the Republic, the Committee reviewed its informal discussions with the Netherlands authorities, again stressing the responsibility of the parties for reaching an agreement and the extreme importance of avoiding delay. The Republican delegation proceeded to Jogjakarta on 4 January to place the Netherlands proposals for a truce agreement and statement of political principles before the Government of the Republic and expressed their intention to have their reply by 6 January. On the same day, the Netherlands delegation offered alternative versions of several paragraphs of its truce proposal and

/certain

certain additional provisions to its truce proposal for consideration by the Republic, which the Netherlands delegation stated might be preferable from the Republic's point of view. These were immediately telegraphed to the Government of the Republic in Jogjakarta. The delegation of the Republic returned to Batavia on 7 January and met the Committee informally the next day. After an exchange of views with the Committee, the Republican delegation asked whether the Netherlands proposals were to be considered as formal. Pointing out that the decision required of the Republic was an important one, the Republican delegation requested a further opportunity to study the proposals in Jogjakarta with its Government. The Committee informed the Netherlands delegation of the request of the Republican delegation and, on 9 January, the Netherlands delegation informed the Committee that it had no objections to its proposals being considered as formal. The Netherlands delegation informed the Committee for transmission to the Republican delegation that an unequivocal reply as to acceptance or otherwise of these proposals was required by noon, 13 January, and that every qualified acceptance or acceptance with reserves would be considered as a rejection. In the same way the Netherlands delegation made it clear that in the event of rejection it would no longer be bound by the proposals and would then have to ask its Government for further instructions, indicating that there was reason to believe that its Government would decide to resume their freedom of action. The time limit mentioned above was later extended by forty-eight hours.

39. Following the submission by the Netherlands delegation of the statement of political principles on the basis of which the Netherlands stated it would be prepared to work out a settlement with the Republic, the Committee formulated six additional political principles which, in its opinion, should also form part of the Renville agreement and which, among other principles, should constitute a basis for the negotiation of a political settlement. The Committee adopted the additional principles on 10 January and subsequently handed them to the parties (see Appendix VIII).

40. The Netherlands delegation on 12 January authorized the Committee to inform the delegation of the Republic that the Netherlands Government would be willing to consider favourably the Committee's six additional political principles with the following understanding:

- (a) point 2 would become operative after the signing of the political agreement envisaged in the document;
- (b) the reference to Article 4 in point 6 (Article 4 of the Linggadjati Agreement) did not prejudice the number of component states to be within the future United States of Indonesia;

/(c) the six

(c) the six principles would be presented formally and publicly to both parties following the signing of the truce agreement and the issuance by both parties of the requisite identical cease-fire orders;

(d) the Committee upon its presentation of these principles formally and publicly to both parties would request both parties to state their replies not later than forth-eight hours thereafter.

41. On 13 January the Committee held several meetings with members of the Republican Government and members of the Republican Delegation in Jogjakarta and Kalioerang, a nearby town. The Committee stressing and completing the information already given by it on 2 January conveyed to the Republican authorities the information as to the time limit and other matters set out in the third sentence of paragraph 37 of this Report. At these meetings, at the request of the Republican Government, the representatives on the Committee answered certain questions regarding the Netherlands proposals for a truce agreement, the Netherlands statement of political principles and the Committee's six additional political principles. In order to make clear its own understanding of the points at issue with respect to these three documents, the Committee drafted as a clarification a concerted statement containing five points (see Appendix IX to this Report). Some misunderstanding having later on arisen concerning that document, the Committee made clear what its position had been by another statement (see Appendix X to this Report). The five points contained in that document were communicated to the Republican authorities in the course of the exchanges of views. As soon as possible they were unofficially communicated to a member of the Netherlands delegation as a matter of information, it being understood that these points involved only the responsibility of the Committee of Good Offices, could not bind the parties and did not require their agreement.

42. On 14 January, the Republican delegation informally stated that it was willing to accept the proposals for a truce agreement submitted by the Netherlands delegation subject to:

(a) the simultaneous acceptance and publication of the eight political principles submitted by the Netherlands delegation and the four principles of the Linggadjati Agreement taken from the Committee's Christmas draft message;

(b) the Netherlands delegation agreeing to certain clarifications of the truce agreement.

Having been immediately informed of the Republican delegation's position with respect to its acceptance of the truce agreement, the Netherlands

/delegation

delegation agreed to make the clarifications requested by the Republican delegation. These clarifications appear as an annex to the truce agreement (see Appendix XI to this Report).

43. The Republican delegation on 15 January stated in a letter to the Committee that it was willing to accept the Committee's six additional political principles, attaching no conditions and using identical terms as those used by the Netherlands delegation. (See Appendix XII to this Report)

44. At a formal ceremony, held as the fourth meeting of the conference, on board the U.S.S. Renville on 17 January, the signatures of the parties, together with the signatures of the Committee as witnesses, were subscribed to the truce agreement and to the statement of eight political principles and four Linggadjati principles. The texts of these documents are set forth in Appendices XI and XIII to this Report. At the same meeting the Committee formally presented its six additional political principles to both delegations and requested their replies within forty-eight hours. The Committee at the same time formally issued first its statement containing five points as mentioned in paragraph 41 above (see Appendix IX to this Report) and an additional statement containing two paragraphs relating to the truce agreement (see Appendix XIV to this Report). Both delegations also agreed to a preliminary cease hostilities order and to thirty-one general regulations under the truce agreement which were issued in identical terms by the military commanders of both parties; as a first application of the documents so signed, the Republican delegation handed to the Netherlands delegation a letter notifying its desire to have the time for the implementation of the obligations under the truce agreement extended to the maximum period provided.

45. On 19 January, at the fifth meeting, both delegations presented letters concerning the Committee's six additional political principles. The Netherlands delegation stated that its Government accepted the six additional principles as forming, together with the twelve principles already agreed upon, and among others, a basis for reaching a political settlement. The Netherlands delegation also stated that it intended to comment on those six additional principles in a subsequent letter. The delegation of the Republic of Indonesia stated that it agreed to the six additional principles on the strength of the conceptions and clarifications given by the Committee of Good Offices. At the request of the Committee, the Republican Government later clarified its position in a letter dated 25 January, pointing out that the Government of the Republic had accepted the six political principles unconditionally as stated in its letter of

/15 January.

15 January. The letter added that the Government of the Republic, as had the Netherlands Government, reserved its right to comment subsequently on any of the principles and also to refer to any matters connected with these principles which it considered appropriate.

46. At the same meeting an ad hoc committee on procedure was established to make recommendations on the organization of future work.

47. This Interim Report of the Committee of Good Offices so concludes covering the activities of the Committee up to the end of January 1948.

Needless to say, the work is going on day after day on the basis of fundamental principles and definite agreements.

We feel that the important work which still lies ahead of the Committee will require more time and more effort.

Yet we express our hope - and maybe our confidence - that if the parties concerned show, with the help of the Committee of Good Offices, the same good will in the future, a just and lasting settlement of the dispute will be obtained in conformity with the principles solemnly accepted on the U.S.S. Renville and which are themselves in conformity with the principles of the United Nations.

APPENDIX I

LETTER RECEIVED BY THE COMMITTEE'S REPRESENTATIVES WITH THE SPECIAL  
COMMITTEES OF THE PARTIES ON 21 DECEMBER 1947 FROM THE NETHERLANDS  
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ENCLOSING A MEMORANDUM CONCERNING THE  
COMMITTEE'S PLAN FOR ACHIEVING A SPEEDY AND EFFECTIVE  
TRUCE

Batavia, 20 December 1947

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit herewith a memorandum of the Netherlands Special Committee regarding the "plan for achieving a speedy and effective truce" submitted to the Special Committees by the representatives of the Committee of Good Offices.

As is stated in this memorandum, the Netherlands Special Committee will gladly consider the above-mentioned plan as a working base for carrying the truce into effect. The observations submitted are therefore to be regarded as general principles, the elaboration and adaptation of which should be the subject of further discussions with the military experts of your Committee.

It will thus be clear that the proposal which I had the honour to make at the meeting of the Special Committees on 9 December and which aimed at an immediate effectuation of part of the entire truce plan, was not intended to serve as a substitute for the plan for achieving a speedy truce; on the contrary, this Committee wishes to continue the current discussions on the plan as a whole. Consequently, the proposal of the Netherlands Special Committee has been made only with the intention to reach agreement on a certain number of practical measures which could be effectuated immediately, pending the outcome and execution of the plan for a speedy truce in its entirety.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

/s/

H. van Vredenburg,  
Chairman of the Netherlands  
Special Committee

Mr. Glenn Abbey,  
Chairman of the Conference  
of the Special Committees

1. The Netherlands Special Committee has carefully studied and considered the "Plan for achieving a speedy and effective truce".

It has come to the conclusion that the principles embodied therein, upon which are to be based the regulations for the technical implementation of a truce can be accepted in general terms as a working base. This standpoint was already made known during the sixth meeting of the Special Committees on board the U.S.S. Renville on 9 December 1947.

It seems evident, furthermore, that the plan concerned can be only of a provisional nature and that its adoption would be without prejudice to the rights, claims or positions of the parties, as stated in the fifth paragraph of the letter of the Committee of Good Offices of 3 December 1947.

2. The Netherlands Special Committee is, however, of the opinion that an agreement on the basis of the plan referred to sub 1 can only be carried out adequately if agreement has previously been reached as regards the term "occupied territories". By occupied territory the Netherlands Special Committee understands territory which is actually under control of the occupying forces.

3. Furthermore, the Netherlands Special Committee is of the opinion that agreement should first be reached as regards the extent and delimitation of the areas occupied in JAVA and SUMATRA, as it will otherwise not be possible strictly to define the rights and duties of each party ensuing from any such agreement and see that they are fulfilled.

4. The Netherlands Special Committee wishes it to be noted in this connection that,

(a) the Netherlands Indies Government at the conclusion of the police action on 4 August 1947 at 2400 hours at once assumed responsibility for law and order in the areas at that moment occupied by its forces;

(b) The Netherlands Indies Government still maintains this responsibility in its entirety;

(c) the standpoint of the Netherlands Indies Government is that the areas described in the proclamation of the Lt.-Governor General of 29 August 1947 must be regarded as territories occupied by the Netherlands troops (vide memorandum of the Netherlands Special Committee of 27 November 1947), with the inclusion of the whole of the island of Madura, vide paragraphs 15 and 16 of the memorandum submitted by the Netherlands Delegation concerning the political developments in Madura which led to the occupation of the entire island (Secretariat issue Nr 31 Ag. Nr. 425/min).

5. The Netherlands Special Committee is therefore of the opinion that the line usually referred to as the "van Mook Line" will in principle have to be the line of demarcation between the territories occupied and controlled by either party, and that on either side of that line a demilitarized zone will have to be established, within which authority is exercised by the party concerned and in which the maintenance, or restoration of order, law and security will in principle have to be in the hands of a police force.

6. In view of the fact that in the territories occupied by them the Netherlands forces are performing police duties which are rendered more

/difficult



difficult by the present terrorization and sabotage on the part of Republicans, the transfer of these responsibilities to the police in the areas to be demilitarized can only take place gradually, as the requisite concentration of police forces in these areas makes heavy demands on the available police personnel.

7. Therefore the police duties in the Netherlands areas to be demilitarized will for the time being have to be discharged also by Netherlands troops.

8. Regulations will have to be passed restricting strength and arms, which shall unambiguously make clear the police function of the Netherlands military police units within the Netherlands areas to be demilitarized.

9. The moment when the said restrictive regulations shall become operative, will have to be determined at a later date, dependent on the general situation.

10. The Netherlands Special Committee proposes that the said restrictive regulations shall in the first intent be considered binding for a period of at most fourteen days. If during that period the truce regulations are strictly observed, this period will be extended, each time for fourteen days. If during such a period of fourteen days it should be established that the truce regulations are not strictly observed, the restrictive regulations are automatically annulled. It will be greatly appreciated if the military assistants of the Committee of Good Offices will undertake to observe the manner in which the truce regulations are being carried out by both parties.

11. The police duties will gradually be transferred from the army to the civil police, according as conditions in the Netherlands areas to be demilitarized, or in parts of these areas, admit of such measures.

12. In the first intent those Netherlands areas will be demilitarized which are situated between,

(a) the demarcation line mentioned in paragraph 5 above,

(b) the line connecting the Netherlands forward positions.

The Netherlands areas to be demilitarized have been indicated as "areas controlled by Dutch patrols" on the maps which have lately been transmitted by the Netherlands Special Committee to the Representatives of the Committee of Good Offices.

13. The Netherlands demilitarized zone (vide paragraph 12) may as a matter of course be further extended, in the event that the general situation should continue to develop favourably.

14. The remnants of Republican forces which at the moment when a cease fire and stand fast order is issued are still inside the territories occupied by the Netherlands troops, will have to be evacuated to areas controlled by Republican troops with their arms, equipment and military stores.

15. There is no objection to the establishment and maintenance of goods and passenger traffic between the Netherlands and Republican held territories, provided that,

(a) routes of communication are determined beforehand in mutual

/consultation,

consultation, along which this traffic will be conducted and outside which traffic will not be permitted;

(b) both the commercial and the passenger traffic are subject to regulations passed, or at a later date to be passed by the Netherlands Indies Government, regarding foreign exchange, imports, exports and transit of goods, etc., adequate measures for control of which shall be taken on the Netherlands side of the demarcation line.

16. The Netherlands Special Committee will be glad on the basis of the above considerations to continue discussions on points of detail of the plan for achieving a speedy and effective truce, so that complete agreement shall be reached on the cease fire and stand fast orders to be issued.

17. Meanwhile the Netherlands Special Committee wishes once again with the utmost emphasis to draw attention to its proposal made in the meeting of 9 December. To the Netherlands Special Committee agreement on the said proposal appears to be essential for a smooth and favourable progress of the discussions on the implementation of the plan for achieving a speedy and effective truce.

APPENDIX II

MEMORANDUM RECEIVED BY THE COMMITTEE'S REPRESENTATIVES WITH THE SPECIAL  
COMMITTEES OF THE PARTIES ON 23 DECEMBER 1947 FROM THE SPECIAL  
COMMITTEE OF THE INDONESIAN REPUBLIC CONCERNING THE  
COMMITTEE'S PLAN FOR ACHIEVING A SPEEDY  
AND EFFECTIVE TRUCE

1. After the plan for achieving a speedy and effective truce (S/AC.10/CONF.1/9) was submitted to the Special Committees of the Republic of Indonesia and of the Netherlands on 3 December 1947, our Special Committee stated on 6 December 1947 that it agreed to this plan and expressed the hope that discussions thereon could forthwith be advanced to a further stage.

The Special Committee of the Republic of Indonesia has with pleasure taken cognizance of the fact that the Special Committee of the Netherlands has accepted this plan as a working base, so that discussions in relation to it can be furthered to a more advanced phase.

In this connection our Special Committee wishes to put forward the following matters which should be taken into consideration in the immediate implementation of this plan.

2. It is the opinion of our Special Committee that sub 7 and sub 8 of this plan have bearing on measures, which should be discussed and carried out without delay. These measures are:

(a) A general cease fire and stand fast order issued to all troops in their present positions in any area in Java, Sumatra and Madura;

(b) To refrain from broadcasts or any other form of propaganda aimed at provoking or disturbing troops and civilians;

(c) To cease immediately the publication of a daily operational communique or any other information about military operations unless by prior mutual agreement in writing, except weekly publication of lists of individuals (giving names, number and home-address) who have been killed or have died as a result of injuries received in action;

(d) To initiate broadcasts and institute other measures to inform all troops and civilians of the delicate situation and the necessity for strict compliance with the cease fire orders to be issued in identical terms by both parties;

(e) To prohibit sabotage, intimidation and reprisal and other activities of a similar nature against individuals, groups of individuals, and property, including the destruction of property of any kind and by whomsoever owned, and to utilize every means at their command to this end;

(f) To accept the principle of the release of prisoners by each party and to commence discussion with a view to the most rapid and convenient implementation thereof, the release in principle to be without regard to the number of prisoners held by either party;

(g) Full opportunity for observation by military and civil assistants made available to the Committee of Good Offices.

/In carrying

In carrying out these two articles (sub 7 and sub 8) in its entirety, a general cease fire and improvement of atmosphere can be achieved so that the other articles of the plan can also be immediately implemented.

3. The Special Committee of the Republic of Indonesia wishes to bring to notice the following points, which are related to sub 7 and sub 8 referred to:

(a) On 4 August 1947 the Government of the Republic ordered its forces and its people, who were fighting shoulder to shoulder with the Republican Army, to stand fast at their respective locations and to cease all hostilities.

All Republican organs, wherever their positions might be, were directed to continue maintaining peace and order. If at that very moment the Dutch Military Command had issued identical orders, the present situation would not have been so difficult.

(b) As a consequence of the continuation of Dutch military actions after 4 August 1947 the difficulties did not cease to occur but rather increased.

(c) The Special Committee of the Republic of Indonesia has accepted in whole the suggestions of phase 1 as submitted by the Committee of Good Offices which among others urged to "cease fire orders to be issued in identical terms by both parties", and in doing so this Committee hoped to put an end to all difficulties as previously mentioned.

(d) Whereas the Special Committee of the Netherlands could not accept the suggestions of phase 1 in their entirety, no actual steps could have been taken and no difficulties could be overcome. The ensuing situation resulted in many casualties as among others has been evinced by incidents as published in a statement of the Ministry of Information of the Republic of Indonesia on 21 December 1947 (vide attached statement).

(e) These incidents can only be avoided if both parties agree to refrain from attacking the other party's positions, wherever these positions may be located in Java, Sumatra and Madura.

4. In the plan of the Committee of Good Offices under sub 1, 2 and 3 the main factor in the delimitation of the demilitarized zones must be the positions as of 4 August 1947, brought into line with the factors as mentioned in sub 3 (b), 3 (c), 3 (d). The positions as of 4 August 1947 are in the opinion of the Special Committee of the Republic of Indonesia those places which on that date were actually occupied by troops. The extension of territory after this date acquired by force of arms and whatsoever termed as a matter of course cannot serve for an argument in determining the areas which are to be demilitarized.

5. The Special Committee of the Republic of Indonesia realizes that in this respect a difference of opinion may arise between both delegations and our Special Committee will highly appreciate it if the Committee of Good Offices would take this matter into consideration.

6. In the opinion of our Special Committee, demilitarized zones are areas which must be evacuated by all military troops. This is the best guarantee to avoid new incidents which may aggravate the situation.

In these areas civil police forces should be charged with maintaining peace and order.

/The assistance

The assistance of the representatives of the Committee of Good Offices in these zones will be highly valued.

7. Our Special Committee is of the opinion that the public traffic between the demilitarized areas and the territories occupied by the parties should be reestablished and maintained on the largest scale possible in the interest of the population.

Restrictions and other regulations will be determined by mutual agreement and with the assistance of the Committee of Good Offices.

8. Our Special Committee is of the opinion that the withdrawal of troops by both sides (sub 9 (b)) must be carried out after having reached an agreement on its procedure and time, so that peace and order may be secured during and after this withdrawal.

The assistance of the Committee of Good Offices in this matter will be highly valued.

9. The Special Committee of the Republic of Indonesia wishes to express the hope that based on these principles all hostilities and other difficulties may end forthwith.

Our Special Committee wishes also to bring to notice that it will do its utmost in this matter in co-operation with the Committee of Good Offices and the Special Committee of the Netherlands.

/s/

Dr. J. Leimena,  
Chairman of the Special Committee  
of the Republic of Indonesia for  
the implementation of the Security  
Council's Resolution of  
1 November 1947

APPENDIX III

MEMORANDUM RECEIVED BY THE COMMITTEE ON 27 NOVEMBER 1947  
FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA  
CONCERNING THE ECONOMIC SITUATION  
IN THE REPUBLIC

Jakarta, November 26th 1947

The Prime Minister of the Republic of Indonesia has asked me to submit on behalf of the Government a memorandum to the Committee of Good Offices regarding the present situation in Indonesia.

The Government of the Republic of Indonesia would be grateful if the Committee would give its earnest consideration to the requests set out in paragraph 9, including the suggestion that the issues raised be referred to the Security Council.

I am convinced that the attempts of the United Nations' Security Council through the Committee of Good Offices will yield good results in reaching a peaceful settlement in Indonesia, provided that all factors necessary for conducting the negotiations between both parties will be met with in the most satisfactory way.

This memorandum presents the Republican viewpoint on important economic matters. Since the Netherlands Government is issuing statements which present their side of the picture, we wish to publish this document without delay. We shall, however, refrain from doing so until 15.00 hours today so as to give the Committee the opportunity of considering it first.

The Vice Premier of the  
Republic of Indonesia.

/s/

(Setiadjit).

The Chairman  
of the Committee of Good Offices  
on the Indonesian Question.  
Jakarta.

1. The Republic of Indonesia is grateful to the Security Council for its intervention in the Indonesian dispute and in particular for the measures which it has taken, by the Resolutions of August 1, 25, 26 and November 1, to prevent an aggravation of the situation.
2. The Republic is also highly appreciative of the work of the Committee of Good Offices and the efforts which it is making to ensure a peaceful settlement of the dispute. We take this opportunity of restating that both the Committee and the Security Council may rest assured that the Republic will do whatever it can and is required of it to assist in that result.
3. It is our understanding that the measures taken by the Security Council to cease hostilities have been provisional measures taken without prejudice to the rights, claims or positions of the parties, and have been directed to the breach of the peace initiated by the Netherlands Government on July 21st.
4. While we fully understand the difficulties facing the Committee and the Security Council in their intervention in the dispute, we would be failing in our duty if we did not at the outset draw the attention of the Committee to the fact that, notwithstanding the actions of the Security Council and of the Committee, the position of the Republic has in fact been most seriously prejudiced since July 21st.
5. It will already be apparent to the Committee, from its own observations, the Security Council proceedings, and the report of the Consular Commission, that the so-called "police action" was initiated with the aim of crushing the resistance of the Republic. As such, its first objective was to cut off from the Republic the main food-producing areas of Java and Sumatra.
6. Because of the timely action of the Security Council, the Netherlands Government was unable to accomplish the military domination of the Islands. It did succeed, however, in gaining control of the main economic areas before August 4th. Consequently, any delay in reaching an overall political settlement, and the implementation of the cease-fire, will enable the Netherlands Government to consolidate its economic gains, and must therefore inevitably weaken the position of the Republic. We feel that the economic blockade which the Netherlands is now imposing will not only create dire distress within the areas under the control of the Republic, but will also prejudice a proper appreciation of the political situation in the islands and seriously hamper a proper and impartial judgment of the situation.
7. Even before July 21st, the Netherlands Government was seeking by naval blockade to impose an economic stranglehold on the Republic. The

Republic was cut off from supplies by sea and unable to repair and maintain essential transport which had seriously deteriorated during the Japanese occupation and which was needed for internal distribution. In occupying some areas the Dutch have consequently been able to distribute supplies to alleviate shortages for which they themselves were responsible. Thus have they sought to cloak aggression in the guise of liberation, to appear to the people and the world as benefactors instead of aggressors. Madura, an island far from self-sufficient and, therefore, particularly vulnerable to economic blockade, provides the outstanding illustration of this technique. Food and clothing shortages created by the Japanese were intensified by Dutch blockade until the people were ready to welcome anyone bringing the means to exist.

8. In short, the Republic has not only been stripped by aggression of its richest areas necessary for feeding its people, but is suffering the complete interruption of economic relations and communications contemplated under Article 41 of the United Nations Charter only as a sanction to be imposed against the guilty party with respect to "threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression". We feel sure that it was not the intention of the Security Council that the rights and interests of one party should be prejudiced by the acts of aggression of the other party.

9. Since an overall political settlement will take some time, and so that the Republic will not be at a serious disadvantage in the discussions shortly to begin, we earnestly seek the good offices of the Committee in directing its immediate attention to the economic position of the Republic as affected by the unwarranted military action of the Netherlands. So as to prevent the rights, claims and position of the Republic from being prejudiced, and so as to prevent serious distress among the people of Sumatra, Java and Madura, we urge that the Committee consider as soon as possible

- (1) measures to provide an equitable distribution of food and commodities throughout the areas in which the de facto authority of the Republic was recognized by the Netherlands before their military action of July 21st;
- (2) measures to relieve the interruption of the economic relations and of the communications of the Republic, imposed by force by the Netherlands.

We stress again that we shall do everything possible to carry out the wishes of the Security Council and the Committee of Good Offices in bringing an end to hostilities, in creating a better atmosphere and in seeking an early and just settlement of the dispute. Accordingly we hope that the Committee

/will see



will see its way clear to incorporate a consideration of these issues in any report it may make.

We believe, however, that the issues raised in this memorandum are of such basic importance that they should be brought to the attention of the Security Council at the first opportunity.

Jogjakarta, November 25, 1947.

The Prime Minister,

/s/

(Dr. Amir Sjarifuddin)

# ANNEX I TO APPENDIX III

## OBJECTIVE AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DUTCH "POLICE ACTION" IN ITS ECONOMIC REALM

1. The Dutch action begun on July 21st, 1947 was primarily designed to subdue the Republic economically. This is substantiated by the following:

### A. Segregation from the rice-producing areas.

Insofar as food production is concerned, Java and Madura are self-sufficient, having even a small surplus.

It must, however, be taken into consideration that there are regions with large surpluses and regions with considerable deficiencies. In the event of the deficient regions becoming isolated from the surplus regions, the former will be overcome with shortages.

Knowing this, the Dutch directed their initial drives against the large surplus-regions, viz. the Krawang-Indramaju plains and the East Java peninsula, both regions with abundant rice production but relatively thinly populated.

The territory now left to the Republic produces adequate food, provided that a direct and rigorous switch is made to a different diet and provided that no transport problems exist. Under the prevailing circumstances, the food question presents a major problem to the Republic.

Regions	Rice production in quintals	Population x 1,000	Per capita production in kilogrammes
a. Cut off by the Dutch.....	26,288,276	30,600	85.9
b. Not cut off by the Dutch.....	12,027,968	19,200	62.6
Total.....	38,316,244	49,800	76.9

The food problem assumes graver proportions if it is appreciated that the free territory of the Republic must feed the hundreds of thousands that have fled from the areas cut off by the Dutch. The Dutch are making circumstances still more difficult for the population by laying every sort of impediment in the way of overseas transport.

### B. Segregation from the sea.

The character of the Dutch attack is also revealed by the fact that all

/serviceable

serviceable ports have been occupied, even though these ports are situated in Central Java (Tjirebon, Tegal, Pekalongan, Tjilatjap). Import and export are thus rendered impossible, not only with regard to foreign countries, but also with regard to the maintenance of supplies from one isolated area to the other.

C. Segregation from the salt-stores.

The character of the attack is further revealed by the military occupation of the salt stores of Madura which ordinarily supply the whole of Java. Since the production and the stores in the areas outside Madura are relatively small, it is obvious that this is a potent economic weapon. Madura was assaulted after the United Nations Security Council's decision, and at this time the Dutch are attempting to cut off the island completely from the other parts of the Republic.

D. Segregation from the estate products.

The Dutch put the Republic in the position of no longer being able to meet her own demand for tea and coffee. Before the aggression, the monthly production of tea was 700 tons, whereas the consumption was but 350 tons, leaving a surplus of 350 tons; after the aggression, the production amounted to a mere 60 tons as against a consumption of 120 tons - a deficit of 60 tons. Before the aggression, the annual production of coffee was 16,000 tons, the consumption 12,000 tons, leaving a surplus balance of 4,000 tons. The aggression reduced production to 3,000 tons with a consumption of 4,500 tons, creating a deficit of 1,500 tons.

E. The existing stocks of estate products at the disposal of the Republic.

The attack resulted in the falling into Dutch hands of a considerable part of the stocks:

Product	(in tons)			
	Foreign Property		Republican Property	
	Captured	Free	Captured	Free
sugar	389,950	573,989	---	88,259
rubber	14,288	2,023	788	149
quinine	4,568	192	1,255	---
chocolate	46	24	---	---
Kapok	1,226	155	---	---
sisalfibre	1,765	247	---	197
coca	15	2	---	---
derris	39	4	1	19
guttapercha	---	---	116	49

/It can be

It can be seen that the greater part of sugar is still in our hands. The fact that the Dutch did not push through their drives to reach the sugar regions is accounted for by our tactics of destroying the mills and the stocks wherever and whenever the Dutch penetrated. Greater advances would result in greater damage. Owing to the sudden character of the attack, these tactics were not too successful at the outset, but after some time exceedingly effective results were obtained. That the Dutch have not advanced on the sugar regions may be attributed to the application of this policy.

Region	Sugar estates		Other estates		Total	
	Number Destroyed		Number Destroyed		Number Destroyed	
a. Dutch occupied	31	15	525	96	556	111
b. Not occupied						
by the Dutch	30	--	124	20	154	20
Total	61	15	649	116	710	131

(The heading "Number" in the above record refers to the number of estates before the launching of the attacks)

It is also due to these tactics that the colonial forces did not march towards Tjepu, Java's oil centre, with its extensive wells, huge refineries and other installations.

It is obvious, however, that the Dutch now intend to pursue a policy of isolation from a distance, by small advances in various places and at various times whereby they hope to reach their objective without having Tjepu blown up.

2. It can be gathered from all indications that the Dutch are continuing their military actions.

3. The destruction of investments worth many billions would be the consequence of the resumption of the Dutch military drives.

The following account gives a rough representation of the value of these investments:

(Capital paid x 1,000 (in guilders))

INVESTMENTS IN	JAVA	SUMATRA	TOTAL
Agriculture....	598,183	444,484	1,042,447
Commerce.....	258,260	181,710	439,970
Industry.....	315,968	162,612	478,598
Banking.....	224,760	238,185	462,945
Insurance.....	28,584	11,831	40,413
Mining.....	1,069,169	930,696	1,999,865
Other			
investments	130,447	47,548	177,995
TOTAL	2,625,387	2,017,066	4,642,453

4. The Republic is fully aware that these destructions will result in enormous losses to herself, that they will greatly impede her rehabilitation programme and that the owners will become enraged with the Republic. However, these destructions are her one and only means to check the Dutch advance towards the re-colonization of this country.

5. As far as foreign capital and investments are concerned, there is no reason whatever for the world to reproach the Republic. Many factories and estates were taken over from the Japanese in a desperate state of repair. The Republic thoroughly reconditioned them after having curbed the strong anarcho-syndicalistic tendencies of the labour. At the cost of millions of rupiahs these factories, plants and estates were kept in operation, although the Dutch naval blockade prevented the export of the products.

The estates (with the exception of sugar estates) present the following figures:

Harvest	Extent of areas cultivated (in hectares)	
	July 1945 (Japanese Administration)	July 1947 (Republican)
Rubber	146,048	192,734
Tea	54,634	78,146
Quinine	10,449	10,449
Coffee	41,735	58,000
Cocoa	6,668	6,697
Kapok	12,288	13,362
Tobacco	---	8,450

With regard to sugar, the following was planned and partially carried out (the ground for the cultivation of sugar must be rented from 1 to 2 years in advance)

<u>Production Programme of Sugar</u>	
1947	25,000 tons
1948	360,000 tons
1949	1,396,000 tons

The reasonable chances for the successful execution of this programme were confirmed by the opinion of the Sugar Investigation Commission of the International Emergency Food Council which, led by Mr. Lawrence Myers, came to Indonesia to obtain a personal view on the situation.

The present conditions, however, veil the prospects in a gloomy haze. If the Dutch resume their drives, the Republic sees no sense in renting

/ground

ground, etc. on behalf of the foreign owners, only to wreck the installations within the several days, weeks or months.

6. It is imperative, in the interest of the world, that the Dutch abandon the way of force. To the Republic, it is of critical importance to regain free and unhindered communication with the regions cut off by the Dutch, in the sense that the occupied cities are restored to Republican administration.

ANNEX II TO APPENDIX III

1. We have noted a Washington announcement reporting that the International Emergency Food Council has recommended an allocation of 1,449,600 metric tons of rice for the first six months of 1948, including an allocation of 141,000 tons for Indonesia.
2. We feel that this announcement is particularly opportune in view of the memorandum submitted to the Committee of Good Offices on November 25, setting out the economic position of the Republic. With this memorandum in mind, we should be glad to know whether the Committee would support an application from the Republic for a just share of the recommended allocation for Indonesia.
3. We submit that such support would be justified in view of the serious food shortages in the Republic, the extent and cause of which we have outlined to you in our memorandum, and because of the importance of economic assistance to the Republic so as to avoid a distorted picture of the political situation. In addition, we believe that the recognition which has already been given to our Government justifies favourable consideration of our request.
4. We feel that the Committee, as part of the good offices it is rendering in the Indonesian dispute, may feel disposed to assist us in the manner suggested in paragraph 2.

/s/

Amir Sjarifuddin

Jogjakarta, November 28th, 1947.

APPENDIX IV

COMMUNICATIONS RECEIVED BY THE COMMITTEE ON 13 AND 22 DECEMBER 1947  
FROM THE NETHERLANDS DELEGATION IN REPLY TO THE MEMORANDUM OF THE  
REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA ON THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN THE REPUBLIC

Batavia, December 13th, 1947.

Sir,

Reverting to your letter of 29th November 1947, I have the honour to present to you the enclosed fifteen copies of a report drawn up in compliance with the request in your letter referred to by the competent authorities of the Netherlands Indies Government. For brevity, may I refer you to the contents of this memorandum?

I regret that it has taken some time to draw up, and more especially to translate this memorandum, so that it was not possible to transmit this document to you in the course of last week.

Seeing that your letter of 29th November last has already been the subject of an informal discussion with some gentlemen connected with the Committee of Good Offices, I do not think I need go into particulars here, but I should like to make the following observation on this point.

In the opinion of the Netherlands Delegation it would be preferable if the Committee of Good Offices, before expressing an opinion on any document submitted to it by either party, should first give the other party the opportunity to give its opinion on it. The Netherlands Delegation feels that it would facilitate the making of suggestions by the Committee of Good Offices if this procedure were followed.

I am, Sir,

Your Obedient Servant,

In the absence of

Abdulkadir Widjojcatmodjo.

/s/

H. van Vredenburg.

To the Chairman  
of the Security Council's  
Committee of Good Offices  
on the Indonesian Question.

/1. The Committee



1. The Committee of Good Offices' missive of 29th November 1947 is based on the assumption that the Republican Government's relevant request to receive economic support is founded entirely and solely on humanitarian grounds.

Viewed in the light of actual facts, the correctness of this assumption would, however, seem open to doubt. For, these facts bring one to the conclusion that the Republican Government is on the one hand trying to obstruct and retard by its request the negotiations to be held and, on the other, it is endeavouring to strengthen its economic position with the object of developing its resistance to the pacifying measures applied on the part of the Netherlands.

2. The request submitted by the Republican Government to receive economic aid concerns the following three subjects:

- A. the application of measures to promote equitable distribution of food and consumer goods in all parts of Java, Sumatra and Madura.
- B. the speedy resumption of normal trade relations between the territories of the "Republic" and the other parts of Indonesia.
- C. the allowance of free trade relations with parts of the "Republic" cut off "by force".

Each of these subjects will be dealt with in the following with reference to the actual facts.

Re A. (Economic policy as regards food supplies).

Refusal of the Republican Government to co-operate in supplying food for areas under Netherlands control (Republican food blockade).

3. Before the police action only parts of Java and Sumatra with a large rice deficit were under Netherlands control. As it was an imperative necessity that sufficient rice - the staple food of the Indonesian - should become available, the Netherlands Indies Government repeatedly called upon the Republican Government, which at that time controlled the rice-surplus areas in West and East Java, to supply rice for the Indonesian population of areas under Netherlands control.

These negotiations relating to the supply of rice by the Republican Government led - in the first instance - to an agreement according to which the Republican Government was to deliver daily between 11 and 20 railway trucks of

/rice

rice - for the population of Batavia - to the Allied Military Administration, up to a total of at least 20,000 tons of rice.

On their part the Netherlands Indies Department of Economic Affairs (the Nigiso) was to supply to the Republican Government 39,000 yards of textiles and various other commodities.

Although the Netherlands Indies Government anticipated this arrangement, for instance by the allocation of textiles, this agreement was not honoured by the Republican Government.

The Republican Government, which was repeatedly urged to fulfil the obligations it had undertaken, pleaded that it was not able to lay hands on sufficient rice in the interior.

Approximately at the same time - i.e. early in April of 1946 - Mr. Soetan Sjahrir, the then Premier of the "Republic", undertook to supply 500,000 tons of rice or 700,000 tons of gabah (unhusked rice) to India, however. As it was known that there was a grave shortage of rice in the areas under Netherlands control, this promise in itself was not only directed against us, but was also highly detrimental to the whole of Indonesia.

The propagandistic nature of this promise is evident from the fact that such a large quantity of rice was offered to India, obviously with the intention of impressing upon foreign countries that there was an abundance of food in Republican areas - in particular in Java. This "policy" is even more evident if it is remembered that Dr. Gani, the Republican Minister of Economic Affairs, some months later published at Malang the following pessimistic figures on the Java and Madura food crops, for purposes of home propaganda and with the object of refusing to supply rice and/or any other food to Netherlands-controlled areas.

	<u>in tons</u>			
	<u>Average</u> <u>1937/1941</u>	<u>1945</u>	<u>1946</u>	<u>1947</u> <u>(estimated)</u>
Rice (husked)	4,255,000	2,813,000	2,641,000	3,300,000
Maize	2,056,000	930,000	686,000	1,300,000
Cassave	8,250,000	3,119,000	3,521,000	5,632,000
Bataten	1,310,000	1,402,000	955,000	1,243,000

/Lieut.-General

Lieut.-General Sir Montague Stopford, Commander-in-Chief of the "Allied Forces N.E.I.", had meanwhile written a letter on this subject, on 16th April 1946, to Mr. Sjahrir (a copy of this letter is appended), urging the Republican Government as yet to co-operate in supplying food for the distressed areas.

On 29th April and 1st May 1946 discussions followed between the Netherlands and Republican authorities, in the presence of Allied Officers.

The Republican Government finally promised to co-operate, undertaking to supply from Probolinggo and Banjoewangi, where 17,600 tons of padi was said to be waiting in the harbours, large quantities of food to the towns in Java under Netherlands control. The Republican Government also undertook to draw rice from the rice centres of West Java.

In order to facilitate the transport of all this food the Allied authorities offered to supply coal and also fifty trucks, while the Netherlands authorities undertook to deliver in return textiles, nails, bicycles, soap, petroleum, etc., to the Republican Government.

Again, however, none of the Republican promises were kept. On the contrary, the Republican army (Tentara Repoeblik Indonesia, which later became the Tentara Nasional Indonesia), instituted a food blockade directed against the areas under Netherlands control. Thus, the demarcation line along the river Bekasi was strongly fortified in order to prevent any rice from getting through to Batavia from the rich plains of Krawang. The trucks made available by the British were, moreover, misused for military purposes.

4. After the signing of the Linggadjati Agreement the problem of the supply of rice was at once raised by the competent Netherlands authorities, who trusted that the Republican Government would now be willing to co-operate. When this subject was referred to in the discussions on the institution of a joint food-stocks fund aiming at better distribution of essential foodstuffs to all parts of Indonesia, it was pointed out to the Republican Government that it was its duty to give up its surplus rice to the deficit areas of Indonesia. This Government

/indeed

indeed acknowledged this duty in principle, but wished first and foremost - apparently for political reasons - to fulfil on all points its rice contract with India, regardless of the needs of Indonesia itself.

Meanwhile the T.R.I. maintained the food blockade. Batavia, Semarang and Sourabaya could only be fed because rice was imported (from abroad). The same applied to the already mentioned towns of Sumatra. When in May 1947 the Chinese consul at Medan paid an official visit to the Republican headquarters at Pematang Siantar, to ask for assistance on this point for the Chinese inhabitants of Medan, the Republican Governor Hasan informed him that no rice would be provided unless a "tribute" was first paid to the "Republic". The T.R.I. went even further, demanding fire-arms in exchange for rice.

In the interests of the population, which was gravely afflicted by these food difficulties (prices in Java had risen to f.4.- and f.5.- per kg., and in Sumatra to f.8.- to f.10.- per kg.) the Netherlands Indies Government with utmost patience continued the negotiations.

In the latter part of May 1947 the Netherlands Indies Government at last seemed to be successful. In connection with the negotiations on the lifting of the Australian shipping ban the Republican Minister of Food, Dr. Soedarsono, said he was prepared at once to deliver 70,000 tons of rice - in exchange for part of the goods waiting in Australia to be shipped to Indonesia - to the Netherlands Indies Government, for the areas under its control.

This, again, was a promise that was never effectuated.

This resulted  
in there being  
no rice  
reserves in the  
areas under  
Netherlands  
control  
when the police  
action was  
started.

5. What has been said above sub 3 and 4 clearly shows that the Republican Government - all the efforts of the Netherlands Government notwithstanding - continued obstinately to refuse to supply any food at all to deficit areas under Netherlands control.

The rice imported by the Netherlands authorities therefore had to be distributed for consumption immediately, so that when the police action started there were no rice reserves at all in the Netherlands controlled areas.

Also after  
pol. action food  
position in  
Indonesia was  
precarious.

6. After the police action several important rice centres of Java, to wit:

in West Java: Krawang, Tjikampek, Pamanoekan and Tjiasem lands and Cheribon;

in East Java: Besoeki, Probolinggo, Pasoercean and Loemadjang, were brought under Netherlands control.

Before the war (1942) these rice centres yielded a surplus of about 450,000 tons of rice per annum. An excess of this magnitude was not expected for 1947, as it was known that under Republican management the rice crops greatly diminished (vide Dr. Gani's figures quoted above) as a result of the following factors:

- negligence and sometimes even destruction of irrigation works, canals, selection of seed, etc.).
- absence of effective agricultural instruction (improvement of methods, selection of seed, etc.).
- the occurrence of pests (rats), due to omission of the necessary preventive measures.
- the shortage of oxen needed for the cultivation of the rice fields.
- availability of fewer workers.
- erosion due to reckless deforestation.

Besides by these factors, the situation was also affected by the shortage of expert technical staff for responsible posts in the "Republic" and the considerable decrease in the acreage of land under cultivation for producing food crops.

The following figures are derived from data published by the Republican Government with reference to Central and East Java.

<u>Central Java (in hectares)</u>				
Year	Rice	Maize	Cassava	Soya beans
1937/41	1,432,550	685,067	409,390	122,895
1942	1,435,495	764,112	426,167	137,620
1944	1,180,660	489,235	366,293	68,122
1945	1,043,588	562,630	276,651	52,098
1946	1,050,046	400,707	277,428	70,054

<u>East Java not including Madura (in hectares)</u>				
Year	Rice	Maize	Cassava	Soya beans
1937/41	1,130,229	983,403	319,042	262,604
1942	1,108,152	1,044,067	307,382	324,895
1944	1,070,276	561,294	225,758	104,838
1945	914,166	626,670	109,794	80,304
1946	939,119	509,931	171,338	163,204

/This serious

This serious decrease in the area of cultivated land, therefore, continued - with the exception of that planted with soya beans - after the Japanese capitulation. The reasons for this continuation are suggested to be the following:

- (a) the unrest prevailing in agricultural areas.
- (b) enforced delivery by the producer of part of his crop to official Republican bodies (as for collection of rice for India) and to Republican authorities.
- (c) shortage of labour owing to recruiting for official and semi-official Republican fighting organizations.

These factors account for the fact that in the year 1946 the Republican Government, notwithstanding all the facilities placed at its disposal by India in the shape of means of transport, lighters and also experts, proved unable to supply 55,000 tons of rice (gabah) to India. Mr. Sjahrir's statement recently made during an interview with the press in India, to the effect that 300,000 tons of rice were in the harbours awaiting shipment to India, which rice was stated to have been unlawfully confiscated by the Netherlands authorities, is therefore manifestly incorrect. The facts are that, after the police action, not more than 5,000 tons of rice (including gabah, calculated on rice equivalent) was found, while there was about 45,000 tons of rice in the various rice-hulling mills.

In this connection we may cite a letter written by the representative of the Government of India's Ministry of Food, dated 27th June 1947 to the Ministry of Economic Affairs, from which it appears that early in June about 6,000 tons of padi and rice was held in readiness in the harbours of Cheribon, Probolinggo and Banjcewangi for shipment to India.

(Note: a unit of padi is equivalent to about 55/100 unit of rice).

One of the effects of the combination of factors referred to sub 6 above, was that when the various rice centres in Java came under Netherlands control the prospects of being able to collect sufficient surpluses to relieve the deficit areas were dubious. After the police action the Netherlands authorities accordingly at

/once set

Deterioration  
of food  
position after  
the police  
action as a  
result of  
terrorization,  
destruction,  
etc.

once set about purchasing all available stocks so as to be able to improve the distribution of food for the so difficult "patjeklik" months (the months preceding the rice harvest).

7. Therefore, though the outlook when the West and East Java rice-producing country was brought under Netherlands control was none too favourable, it deteriorated as a result of the arson, terrorization, etc. organized, or at least encouraged, by the Republican Government during and after the police action.

To this end the bands - operating under instructions from Djokja - concentrated on the food stocks and rice-hulling mills. Thus, in West Java near Tjikampek, Pegaden Baroe, Djatibarang and Indramajoe thousands of tons of rice of the population or in the rice-hulling mills, were lost through arson. In East Java the damage to food stocks was even greater: in the district of Banjoewangi 18,000 tons of rice was destroyed and 5,000 tons of rice carried off by T.N.I. gangs.

Innumerable rice-hulling mills were destroyed or burnt down. The extent of this damage is evident in the following survey.

	Total number of rice hulling mills before the war	Number destroyed or damaged during the war and <u>before</u> police action	Destroyed or damaged during and <u>after</u> police action	Condition unknown	In working order
West Java	238	38	102	33	65
Central Java	80	9	29	18	24
East Java	126	12	46	38	30

To these destructions must be added the measures of intimidation towards the Indonesian population applied by the band. For, the result of these was not only a shortage of labour for harvesting and transporting rice (thus it is not possible at present to dispatch about 17,500 tons of gabah in Djember awaiting shipment), but, moreover, the planting of rice for the new crop is held up. In areas where law and order have not yet been entirely restored, the "tani" is repeatedly driven off his fields, or threatened with death if he cultivates

/them.

them. The danger that the decreased acreage of rice land diminishes still more, is by no means imaginary. In illustration a statement follows of the acreage planted in the regency of Krawang.

Regency of Krawang (78.139 hectares).

	<u>Area in hectares</u>	<u>Planted</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Golongan I and II (section)	36.667	21.800	60
" III	11.486	3.380	30
" IV	15.574	--	--
V	14.412	--	--

It is impossible to say what object the Republicans think is served by this senseless terrorization, which so greatly damages the interests of the whole of Indonesia. For its action as referred to above is not in the first place directed against the Netherlanders, but against the Indonesian population, the Indonesian being almost entirely dependant on his rice, his staple food, while he is the first to suffer when the crop is not harvested or the rice not sown at the right time or in insufficient quantities.

Besides the Indonesian population, the Chinese are affected, as the great majority of the rice-hulling mills are Chinese property.

Importation of rice  
only partly solves  
the problem

8. While the Netherlands Indies Food Stocks Fund continues the purchase of all available rice, the Netherlands Indies Government - at the same time - endeavours to obtain as much rice as possible from abroad.

In this respect it is mainly dependant on the allocations of the International Emergency Food Council. As, however, there is a world shortage of rice, these allocations are not sufficient. Thus the Netherlands Indies Government, upon application for 255,000 tons of rice for the first six months of 1948 for the areas under its control (allowance was made for the home production of these areas and the calculation based on a low ration), received an allocation of only 140,000 tons.

Accordingly, in the interests of the Indonesian people and disregarding the high expenditure of foreign exchange involved, the Netherlands Indies Government

/exerted



Conclusion:  
economic aid to  
Republican  
Government at  
present impossible.

exerted every effort to buy rice obtained on I.E.F.C. allocation in other countries. Although after great trouble it has succeeded in obtaining at high prices a few small shipments of rice in the Philippines, the U.S.A. and Brazil, the total quantity received from abroad will be barely sufficient to maintain the target ration of 200 grammes per day per head until the next harvest in May-August 1948.

9. Apart from the fact that there is no reason to assume that the Republican areas have a greater need of rice than those under Netherlands control, it will be apparent from the above that - also as a result of Republican action - it is at present impossible to help out the Republicans by supplying rice from Netherlands-held areas. What has been stated here with regard to rice applies equally to other food crops, such as maize, kedeleh (beans), cassava, etc.

The International Emergency Food Council will not be able to give this assistance either, considering the world shortage of rice, while the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East does not concern itself with providing food supplies.

Assistance by providing other commodities only obtainable by import is made impossible by the precarious foreign exchange position of the Netherlands Indies Government and by the extent of the needs of the ransacked Indonesian population in the areas taken over since the police action.

The behaviour of the Republican Government even before the police action has greatly retarded Indonesia's economic recovery; its illegal trade with other countries has cost many millions in precious foreign exchange to Indonesia (vide Re C); now again it is the cause of large sums of foreign exchange being expended on the import of rice, which would have been unnecessary if the Republican Government had from the outset co-operated in improving the food situation, instead of giving free rein to its destructive tendencies - mainly at the expense of the Indonesian population - upon food stocks and food producing centres.

Re B. (Resumption of normal trade between the Republican areas and the other parts of Indonesia.)

/Before

Before the police action trade by land was encouraged by the Netherlands Government.

10. In considering "commercial intercourse of the Republic with the rest of Indonesia" a distinction must be made between trade by land (with geographically adjacent parts of Java and Sumatra), and trade by sea, with the other islands of the archipelago. This inter-insular trade will be dealt with sub C.

Commercial intercourse between Republican areas of Java and Sumatra and those under Netherlands control was seriously hampered by the food blockade referred to sub A. Already before the conclusion of the Linggadjati Agreement the Netherlands Government tried to change this state of affairs by granting facilities as regards examination and transport. These efforts were at last in so far successful that goods trains regularly ran between Batavia and the Republican interior. These trains carried from Republican areas charcoal, wood, tobacco, kedeleh and other inland products to Batavia, returning with textiles, medicine, manufactured goods, etc.

This gradually developed into a fairly lively trade. During the last months before the police action the trains concerned shipped - in both directions - upwards of nine million guilders worth of goods per month.

Besides this trade by train there was some bartering "from hand to hand" of goods across the demarcation line at several places (e.g. at Mojokerto in East Java).

Stoppage of this trade by the Republican Government.

11. When, however, towards the end of May 1947 the Netherlands Indies Government urged the Republican Government abide by and implement the Linggadjati Agreement, the latter began to "squeeze" this trade, bringing the traffic by the goods-trains almost to a standstill even before the police action. With the police action the local exchange of goods came to an end.

Resumption of this traffic is impossible because of terrorization etc. on the part of the Republic.

12. Resumption of this traffic by land is impossible in the present stage.

As long as the Republican Government continues to encourage its policy of terrorization and intimidation, the development of normal trade relations between the various districts of Java and Sumatra must be considered out of the question.

/Moreover

Moreover such traffic would provide an opportunity to the Republicans of conveying extremist elements to the Netherlands controlled areas in order to increase the economic resistance of the roving bands operating in these areas.

In the interests of the various groups of the population established in its territories, including Indonesians, Chinese and Europeans etc., the Netherlands Indies Government is bound not to take any risks of this nature.

The extent of the terrorization of citizens still prevailing in the Netherlands controlled areas can be best illustrated by some recent instances.

In the month of October 1957 alone in the neighbourhood of Soekaboemi ten Soendanese leaders were murdered, while fifty-two Soendanese were abducted. Besides during this same month one hundred and twenty-one houses of Indonesians were looted or set fire to in the neighbourhood of Soemedang.

During the same month in the neighbourhood of Tasikmalaja six Chinese were brutally murdered, while in the Krawang district fourteen rice-hulling mills were set fire to.

Quite recently a circular letter of the Republic, dated 11 November 1947 (Djocja), was distributed in Poerwakarta, in which it was stated that the Dutch were going to withdraw, and in which the people were incited to further sabotage; estates, plantations etc. should be prevented from operating and anyone working for or with the Dutch should be done away with.

On 22 October ult. the planters Artz and Van Gent were murdered on the Gambeng plantation near Bandoeng; early in November the manager of the Bodjong-Gedeh plantation near Buitenzorg, van den Akker was abducted and killed.

These cases were followed by the murders of the planters Sieberg of Pasir Angin near Buitenzorg; Romswinkel of Tjikopo Zuid near Buitenzorg and Ruhaak of the Nijkerk plantation near Medan.

/Meanwhile

Meanwhile during the month of November 1947 numerous attacks and cases of arson took place, in West Java alone on no fewer than ten plantations:

Pasir Karet	near Buitenzorg	attack
Tjikopo Zuid	" "	"
Goenoeng Geulis	" "	arson
Djaja Negara	" Paroeng Koeda	attack
Goenoeng Anaga	" Poerwakarta	arson
Maswati	" "	"
Goenoeng Soesoetoe	" "	"
Bajabang	" "	"
Kembang Koening	" "	"
Tjibening	" "	attack

Between 4 and 19 November 1947 the plantations in the Pamanoekan and Tjiasem lands were attacked as many as eleven times (vide attached annex)

Re C. (Decontrol of foreign and inter-insular commerce of the Republic).

Regulations and restrictions regarding sea traffic before the police action (regulations of 28/1 '47)

13. In elucidation of the regulations of January 1947 regarding commercial traffic by sea - regulations which the Republican Government, with complete disregard for the actual facts, has repeatedly attempted to represent as an economic blockade - it seems advisable to outline the situation as it had developed in Indonesia before the war.

The inter-insular goods traffic in Indonesia and the goods traffic between Indonesia and foreign countries were subject to various restrictions. The most important relevant regulations are: the Crisis Export Ordinance (Crisis Uitvoer Ordonnantie) of 1939, Government Gazette (Staatsblad) No. 658 and the Crisis Export Regulation (Crisis Export Verordening) of the same year, Government Gazette (Staatsblad) No. 660, and the pursuant executive regulations, together with the Exchange Ordinance (Deviezen Ordonnantie) of 1940, Government Gazette (Staatsblad) No. 205, and the Exchange Regulation (Deviezen Verordening) of 1940, Government Gazette (Staatsblad) No. 211.

/The aim of

The aim of these regulations was to bring about a system which made it possible in the interests of the community (e.g. with regard to food supplies) to impose restrictions on the commercial intercourse between the various islands of the Indian Archipelago, the purpose of exchange control being in the interest of purchases necessary for the community, to make the best possible use, through an exchange fund, of currencies obtained in foreign countries by the export of goods.

While post-war conditions of scarcity of commodities and acute shortage of foreign exchange made it imperative that these regulations should be most rigidly enforced, the Republican Government made use of these conditions apparently for political reasons by conveying, to the detriment of the inhabitants of certain localities, scarce products to other parts of the Netherlands Indies, and by exporting commodities to foreign countries which were urgently needed in the country itself. This may be illustrated by the considerable Republican exports of rice, sugar, coconut oil and copra, all articles which were needed by the Indonesian community.

This illegal trade, which is counter to the interests of the community, moreover misused the circumstance that long after the Japanese occupation considerable quantities of arms and ammunition were stored in various places in the Netherlands Indies, by supplying arms and other articles of this nature to other districts, where these supplies in conjunction with the infiltration of Republican fighting groups increased public insecurity.

In this connection we may point to military infiltrations in Bali, Celebes, South and East Borneo. Repeatedly Republican proas, heavily laden with machine-guns, carbines and hand-grenades attempted to cross from Cheribon, Toeban and Probolinggo to Borneo and Celebes.

In addition the T.R.I. regularly planned raids on Bali from Sanjoewangi, of which occasionally Balinese in kampongs (Tabanan) were the victims.

Adjacent foreign countries, which in many cases insufficiently controlled their exports, unfortunately added to the impairment of public security by the import, in exchange for commodities exported by the Republicans, of military and semi-military articles.

Finally it should be pointed out that a state of economic disorganization existed in the Netherlands Indies after the Japanese occupation, because many owners of Western concerns and plantations had been expelled from their properties by the Japanese and the majority interned, these owners being unable to return after the Japanese surrender owing to the unsettled conditions prevailing at the time. As a result large quantities of plantation products had accumulated in the interior, whence they could easily be removed by unauthorized traders.

In spite of numerous protests from the Netherlands Indies Government, the Republican Government has not only countenanced this illicit trade, but even encouraged it, so that vast quantities of these products were smuggled to foreign countries where, as a rule, they were sold far below their real value. Apart from its illegitimate character this export trade is to be condemned, because it has seriously injured the exchange position, at the expense of the entire population, who received inadequate supplies in exchange for valuable Indonesian products. Moreover these imported supplies mostly consisted of commodities which were either unfit for use or not of primary importance.

In order to put a stop to these intolerable conditions, the Netherlands Indies Government, after several earnest but vain attempts to arrive at a solution in consultation with the Republican Government, on 28 January 1947 put into operation a complete import, export and transport system.

The regulations of 28 January 1947, which maintain the exchange control system are based on the following principles:

/(a) the import

- (a) the import, export and transport system must never hinder the distribution of food supplies; on the contrary, wherever possible it should be conducive to a better delivery of primary food supplies;
- (b) the transport of scarce native products must be made subject to a system of permits;
- (c) transport and export of military and semi-military goods, as well as of goods required for the industrial rehabilitation must be partly prohibited, partly be possible only with permission from the competent military and civil authorities;
- (d) the transportation and export of estate produce cannot be permitted in those cases where the interests of the rightful owners are prejudiced because the latter have no say in the transactions concerned;
- (e) importation of military and semi-military goods is either to be prohibited or to be made subject to a permit.

When these measures - which are entirely in keeping with the sovereign rights over Indian waters exercised by the Netherlands - are viewed in the light of existing pre-war regulations and the most serious economic plight of Indonesia at the end of the war, the absolute necessity of these measures is at once evident, the more so as apparently the Republican Government began to make use of the prevalent chaotic conditions to take "economico-political" steps at the expense of the seriously impoverished Indonesian community.

That this further impoverishment of the Indonesian community for the sake of a "fighting fund" in foreign exchange, and mostly for the good of a small group of privileged officials (both civil and military) is no empty phrase, may be illustrated by the figures of the calculated extent of trade outside Netherlands control between the Republican areas and Malaya and Singapore. In the period from the Japanese capitulation to the end of November 1947 this "trade" resulted in a net loss of foreign exchange to Indonesia of roughly Straits dollars 265,000,000. The illicit exports, i.e. the unlawful exportation of goods at the expense of rightful owners, amounted during the same period to not less than Straits dollars 115,000,000.

/Measures

Measures of  
28/1 '47 always  
applied in the  
most lenient  
possible manner.

14. In order to interfere as little as possible with the commercial relations between the Republicans and foreign countries, a regulation was issued by the Director of Economic Affairs, on the same date as the above-mentioned measures, stating that, in so far as Republican controlled areas were concerned, in deviation from the regulations affecting foreign exchange, the export of all goods, with the exception of estate products and goods destined for industrial rehabilitation, was permitted.

It should be remarked that this general permission involved a considerable loss to Indonesia of foreign exchange. For in this way a continuous flow of goods was withdrawn from the Indies currency system, while as a result of the very disadvantageous basis of exchange immoderate profits fell to foreign traders.

That consequently this commerce between the Republican areas and the Malayan peninsula remained considerable, will appear from the following figures:

(in millions of Str.\$)	Exports to <u>peninsula</u>	Imports from <u>peninsula</u>
2nd half of 1946	167	19
1st half of 1947	132	43

As appears from the principles mentioned above, sub (a) - (e), the importation of all goods to Republican areas is entirely unrestricted in so far, of course, as it does not involve military or semi-military goods.

The above-mentioned import and export system therefore does not in any way interfere with the economical machinery of the Republican Government, in so far as it is on a legitimate basis. The same applies to the inter-insular traffic.

The only restriction of any importance, which applies not only to the Republican Government, but also to the territories under Netherlands control, is that the transport of agricultural food produce such as rice and maize, is subject to a system of permits in order to ensure the best possible distribution of food supplies in the interests of the Indonesian population, who mainly depend on these products.

/When



When therefore the Republican Government wishes to export from the territories under its control, rice and maize to other localities in the Archipelago, a permit is required from the Netherlands Indies Government (Department of Economic Affairs); in so far as normal, and not "political", supplies of food are concerned, this permit is always granted.

When in May 1947 the Republican Government wished to export rice and maize from East Java to areas where there was a shortage, and objected to the delay expected from the permit-system, the Netherlands Indies Government immediately took steps to prevent delay by ordering the Royal Netherlands Navy not to deflect the transport ships to some port for examination, but to conduct a superficial examination at sea so that the ships could continue towards their destination.

The standpoint adopted by the Netherlands Indies Government with regard to food supplies, and to which it still adheres, appears from a telegram sent in this connection by the Department of Economic Affairs to its representative at Soerabaja on 22 March 1947, which reads:

"338 In consequence our regulation 28 January transport rice maize unoccupied Java to Madura subject permits BUZ (i.e. export office) however unintended hinder traffic stop Decided following procedure colon Navy stops proas, Commander wires Navy Commander Soerabaja, latter each case telephones for your permission stop Request your co-operation permission always grant readily enable Navy Commander promptly order release of stopped proas".

On this point no more complaints have been made by the Republican Government.

For a correct appreciation of the position at that time - i.e. before the police action - one should bear in mind the strong contrast existing between the attitude of the Netherlands Indies Government with regard to food supplies, and the attitude adopted by the Republican Government.

/Although

Although the Netherlands Indies Government had abundant reason to suspect that the Republican Government made an improper use of the shipments of rice permitted, by allotting this rice exclusively to the T.R.I. (T.N.I.) instead of distributing it to the population, or by smuggling this rice - e.g. from Madura - to foreign countries, the Netherlands Indies Government, as explained above, tried to meet the Republican Government's wishes as much as possible.

The Republican Government, on the contrary, maintained the food blockade by land (vide Re A.), while furthermore Republican publications which fell into the hands of Netherlands authorities, show that before the police action the Republican Government also attempted to prevent, with all the means at its disposal, the transportation of rice by sea to the areas under Netherlands control. Thus in the course of 1946 the coast of Japara was closed by the Republican Government to prevent the existing smuggling trade from selling food stuffs to the "opponents". The Republican Government further ordered a "policy of restriction" to be carried out in the Residency of Pekalongan with regard to the export of goods (read, food stuffs) to "enemy occupied territories".

Same leniency  
applied by Royal  
Navy in its  
control.

15. The Royal Navy during its control at sea - for its duties included the enforcement of the regulations of 28 January 1947 - was equally mindful of the interests of the freighters and owners concerned.

The ships stopped for control were therefore examined as quickly as possible and immediately released when no infringements were found.

In some cases (vide above, food shipments) the examination was even reduced to a minimum, and permission was granted telegraphically.

Although the rights of the Navy to exercise police control at sea are fully acknowledged in International Law, and although according to international rules the extra expenses incurred by the exercise of these rights (detour expenses, anchorage fees, loading costs etc.) are charged entirely to the ship's account, the Netherlands Indies Government has gone so far as to charge to their account the unloading and stowing  
/expenses

Australian  
"shipping-ban"

expenses resulting from the examination of the cargo when no infringements were committed.

16. In spite of the facilities described above, the regulations of 28 January 1947 remained objectionable in the eyes of Republicans who apparently feared to lose their profitable smuggling trade.

As a result, even after the Linggadjati Agreement had been concluded, the Republican Government stipulated that it would only request the Australian Government, or at least the "Union" concerned, to lift the "ban", when beforehand the regulations of 28 January 1947 had been withdrawn.

When, however, the Australian Government sent representatives to Indonesia (Batavia) to settle the matter, the Republican Government could not but relinquish this standpoint. The following facts, however, will show that this was only an apparent change.

After discussions had been held on 10 and 12 May between representatives of the Netherlands Indies Government and the Republican Government concerning the lifting of the Australian shipping ban, an agreement was concluded on 24 May 1947 between Mr. van Hoogstraten, Director of Economic Affairs, and Dr. Gani. The purport of the agreement was that - immediately after the ban had been lifted, to which effect a request had been made both by the Netherlands Indies Government and the Republican Government - the goods ready for shipment in Australia would be conveyed to Indonesia in ships that were at the disposal of the Netherlands Indies Government.

The goods would then be divided, the part destined for the "Republican territory" to be unloaded at a Republican-held port, in exchange for an equivalent quantity of rice to be delivered by the Republican Government.

On the part of the Netherlands the agreement was strictly observed, complete lists of the goods in question having been transmitted to the Republican Government to facilitate their selection; two ships were also immediately directed to Australia for freightage.

/On the part

On the part of the Republican Government the Agreement was acted upon in so far that on 31 May 1947 Dr. Soedarsono offered 70,000 tons of rice in exchange for the goods assigned to the Republican Government. However, no further developments took place. Already in June 1947 at the Sobsi congress at Malang the Republican Government urged the reinstitution of the "ban". Immediately after the police action had begun, the Republican Government even declared in an official radio message to Australia that it was not desirous to have the goods in question shipped, this in spite of the fact that the Netherlands Indies Government in its Notes of 20 and 22 July 1947 had expressly undertaken fully to honour the agreement of 24 May 1947.

Situation at sea  
after police action  
(shipping ban)

17. From what has been stated above it must be concluded that before the police action the Republican Government had almost complete freedom with regard to legal commerce and that it has continually made or attempted to ~~make~~ the worst possible use of this freedom.

In view of this attitude on the part of the Republican Government, and in view of the fact that the coastal waters were rendered unsafe by brigandage, while in addition it was necessary to prevent arms etc. being put ashore, the Royal Netherlands Navy was compelled - simultaneously with the police action - temporarily to close to shipping the North coast of Java and the greater part of the East coast of Sumatra.

Mitigation of  
this shipping  
ban.

18. At the earliest possible moment, however, the Netherlands Indies Government mitigated these measures by once again allowing shipping to proceed to certain regions where the population came to feel detrimental effects of these measures, though a mild system of control continued to be imposed.

In this way various ports on the North and East coasts of Java have successively been opened to shipping (for other ports this measure depends i.e. on the sweeping of old minefields), while as early as 13 September 1947 the import, under certain conditions, of foodstuffs, textiles, medical supplies and salt was permitted to Bengkalis and Bagansiapiapi, as well as the export of timber and salted fish respectively.

/On 25 September

On 25 September shipping was also permitted via Batavia to Telok Betong, and on 1 November, restricted to certain goods, between Bagansiapiapi and Medan.

Further mitigation of the measures taken is, however, seriously impeded by continuous attempts on the part of the Republican Government to frustrate legitimate commerce, notably by repeated attempts to smuggle arms into the territory under their control by way of the waters re-opened to shipping.

Annexes: three

ANNEX I TO APPENDIX IV

"INCIDENTS" ON THE PARANOEKAN AND TJIASSEM LANDS

4-19 NOVEMBER 1947

Date:

- 4 Nov. All mandoers returned to Soebang from Tjigaroeckgak, where they were afraid to remain, owing to intimidation and threatening letters (said to be from T.R.I.)  
Some 500 T.R.I. reported to be in neighbourhood of Serangsari.  
Estate: military guard sent there.  
Assistant's house Tjipeundeuj Estate burned out, and Indonesian assistant tied up (but otherwise not hurt).  
Cupwashing shed on same estate burned.
- 5 Nov. Road Poerwadarta/Segalaherang closed for reasons of security.  
Kampoeng house Tjipeundeuj burned out.  
Indonesian Assistant's house (Tjihamboeloe division) burned out.  
Kapok and rice destroyed.
- 7 Nov. Mandoer, Loerah, wakil-loerah kidnapped at Manjingsal: 1 bag rice stolen.  
No labour on Soemcerbarang.
- 8 Nov. 18 bales Kina, f.360 and 100 sarongs stolen at Boekanagara and godown burned down.  
Watchman at Soekamantri (7 Km. N. Tjipeundeuj) murdered (he had acted as guide to Dutch soldiers when pig shooting).
- 9 Nov. Head mandoer and watchman at Tjipeundeuj reported missing; 2 bodies reported found in river. Note found on post warning people not to work for the "Blanda" - No labour on estate.
- 10 Nov. At Poerwadadi, action between Chinese guard and T.R.I.: 2 Chinese, 1 Jap, 1 T.R.I. killed.  
Tjipeundeuj (Gandaria) office stores, patjols, saws, sacks, rice, etc., looted and office burned. No labour in gardens. On Eastern Block (Manjingsal, Soemoerbarang and Tjigaroeckgak), work in gardens stopped because of looting, arson and intimidation.
- 14 Nov. Wangoenradja state office broken open: one old typewriter destroyed.
- 15 Nov. 2 kampoeng houses near Pasirboengoer (Pamblengan) burnt down.
- 17 Nov. Two kapok sheds at Tjikacem set on fire (reported to be Indonesian with petrol bottle): 35 tons kapok destroyed, 1 shed seriously damaged.

/18 Nov.

- 18 Nov. 8 corpses reported to have been found in river near Majasoeta with "doorgesneden hals". (throats cut).
- 19 Nov. Tandjoengan kampoeng (near Soekamandi) set on fire: 3 houses, 1 shed destroyed, 2 sheds damaged; inhabitants had all fled. Work in gardens practically stopped, Gandaria/Tjiomas (Tjipeundeuj): no work-people.

"INCIDENTS" ON THE PAMANOEKAN AND TJIASEM LANDS

2-6 DECEMBER 1947

- 2 Dec. Pasirboengoer Estate. In the estate kampoeng of Kajasoeta division, 1 Assistant's house, 6 mandoer houses, 4 coolie houses, 2 warcengs, 1 godown were burnt down by a band of about 50 terrorists, armed with big knives, and using a Petromax lamp. Three typewritten warnings against collaboration with the "Blanda", signed "Tentara Siloeman", were left behind. All estate work in the adjoining gardens (Tandjoengan/Waladin) was stopped through lack of labour.
- 3 Dec. A Pamanoekan and Tjiasem train on the 60 cm. steam line between Manjingsal and Tjigaroekeak estate was ambushed by a party armed with rifles and hand-grenades. Three Indonesian passengers had flesh wounds from bullets, two were hit by grenade splinters, two were hurt when jumping off the train. The attack was from both sides of the track.
- 3/4 Dec. Pasirboengoer Estate. The 3 Kampoeng houses at Pablengan which had remained intact after the attack on 15 November, were destroyed by fire. About 800 sisal plants in the neighbouring field were also destroyed, by slashing.
- 4/5 Dec. Pasirmoentjeng Estate. The Assistant's house, 1 godown with rice and cocoa, 2 other godowns, the estate office were destroyed by fire (Full report not yet received). It was reported that the firing heard in Soebang during the night started with two shots into the P.M.C.'s room.
- 5/6 Dec. Pasirboengoer Estate. The Assistant's house and two kampoeng houses on Koemendoeng division were burnt.



ANNEX II TO APPENDIX IV

From: Lt. Gen. Sir Montagu Stopford  
KBE, CB., DSO., MC.

H.Q. Allied Forces, N.E.I.  
No. 2009/29/Q.  
Dated 16 April 1946.

Dear Sir,

Your attention has in the past been drawn to the food situation in Java and especially how it affects the Indonesian population of those areas occupied by the Allied Forces. Your liability to provide food for these Indonesians has already been given public recognition by you and, while promising to send in supplies you have in fact unfortunately so far failed to send in supplies in any rice into any of these areas. As a result the population has been fed from Allied resources, and mainly from rice stocks bought and imported by the Dutch Authorities. These supplies, as you are well aware, have been distributed equally without regard to nationality.

At the same time the World food situation is now so grave that it is impossible to expect other countries to send rice to the N.E.I., especially as I understand you have stated recently that you have 500,000 tons of rice surplus and available for export to India.

Therefore invite your co-operation to ensure an adequate and immediate distribution of this surplus rice in Soerabaja, Semarang, Bandoeng, Buitenzorg and Batavia areas. If you should require any assistance to transport the rice, either by sea or land, I shall be very willing to help you. I suggest the only arrangements required are those to enable the rice to be brought from the present dumps to the areas mentioned. There, the rice can be handed over to my food committees which, as you are aware, are responsible for the equal distribution of all supplies.

In view of the urgency of the situation, will you please let me have a reply at your very earliest convenience.

Yours sincerely,

To: Dr. Soetan Sjahrir.

ANNEX III TO APPENDIX IV

Batavia, December 18th, 1947.

Sir,

In reply to your letter of 29 November 1947 concerning the memorandum S/AC.10/46 of the Republican Government on the economic situation, a report was drawn up by the competent authorities of the Netherlands Indies Government and forwarded to you on December 13th last.

In this letter your Committee suggested that the intent of the commercial agreement between the Governments of the Netherlands Indies and the Republic of Indonesia with regard to the distribution of certain goods and materials at present in Australia should be carried out.

In this connection I would like to draw the attention of your Committee to an interview which Dr. Sjahrir accorded to the Australian press upon his arrival in Sydney a few days ago and in which Dr. Sjahrir declared i.a.:

"Before I left Java I took the view that the ban imposed by Australian Unions does injure only the Dutch. That is certainly the view generally held in Java".

I remain Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

/s/ Abdulkadir Widjojcatmodjo.

To the Chairman  
of the Security Council's  
Committee of Good Offices  
on the Indonesian Question.

APPENDIX V

NOTE: THE COMMITTEE OF GOOD OFFICES DRAWS THE ATTENTION OF  
THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO THE INFORMAL CHARACTER OF THIS  
DOCUMENT

CHRISTMAS DRAFT MESSAGE ADDRESSED INFORMALLY  
TO THE PARTIES BY THE COMMITTEE ON 26 DECEMBER

The four resolutions of the Security Council which directly concern the work of the Committee of Good Offices on the Indonesian Question are those of 1, 25, and 26 August and 1 November 1947.

The Committee of Good Offices started its work with a first unofficial meeting in New York on 8 October. It has been at work in Indonesia since 27 October. Today, 24 December, on the eve of Christmas, the symbol of peace on earth, no concrete solution has been given by the parties either to the overall problems, or to the immediate problems of effecting a cease-fire.

The Committee of Good Offices thinks its duty is to call again, in a most emphatic way, the attention of the parties to the following points:

1. The mission, the responsibilities, and the possibilities of this Committee are restricted within the limits of "good offices". The main responsibility - the primary and the final responsibility - is and must remain with the parties concerned. That responsibility covers the decisions which the parties think fit to make, but it covers equally, the lack of decisions, which should have been made, as well as excessive delays in applying the recommendations of the Security Council. Such responsibilities should not and cannot be shifted to the Committee of Good Offices.

This Committee is conscious of having done everything that could be done so far to break the deadlock; to bring the parties together; to offer them definite and constructive suggestions at their first request; and to have used every opportunity to help, induce and advise the parties on the basis of strict impartiality.

2. Under such circumstances, faced by the disappointing delay in arriving at an agreement, the Committee wishes to remind the parties, in a solemn way, of the paramount importance for them, for the world, and for the ideals of the United Nations, of a prompt and generous implementation of the resolutions of the Security Council on the Indonesian question.

The Committee must in good faith warn the parties that a longer delay, however supported by different or divergent argumentation, would certainly be against the spirit of the resolutions, and in particular of the resolution of 1 November.

The Committee now invites the parties again to reconsider, immediately, the whole problem with greater realism, with reciprocal toleration, and with renewed emphasis on all the human aspects of the dispute.

3. In this spirit, and in consideration of the information and many statements at its disposal, the Committee is transmitting herewith, as Annex I, supplementary suggestions for an immediate truce. It recommends to the parties that they:

/(a) Sign immediately

(a) Sign immediately and implement forthwith the several measures contained in the documents herewith transmitted, together with those at present before the Special Committees.

At this point, the Committee reminds the parties of the text of the third paragraph of the resolution of 1 November, which, after the passage concerning the implementation of a truce, reads as follows: "and pending agreement to cease any activities or incitement to activities which contravene that resolution and to take appropriate measures for safeguarding life and property".

To this end, the Committee suggests that precise orders be issued or confirmed by the competent authorities of both parties. It further suggests that all methods for the dissemination of such orders be utilized, including radio broadcasts.

(b) Immediately following the issuance of the foregoing instructions, conclude a truce agreement which will implement the following part of the third paragraph of the resolution of 1 November, which "calls upon the parties concerned forthwith to consult with each other directly or through the Committee of Good Offices as to the means to be employed in order to give effect to the cease-fire resolution." The Committee suggests that the parties accept, without delay, the proposals previously submitted by the Committee to the parties, at their request, together with the proposals transmitted herewith as Annex I. All documents submitted by the parties to the representatives of the Committee of Good Offices with the Special Committees, either spontaneously or in implementation of the truce plan, should be considered again, in order firstly, to take stock of all points on which an agreement has been obtained or is within reach, and secondly, to limit and define the points on which a compromise between still conflicting views should be looked for. As part of this agreement, both parties should fully inform their soldiers still in the territory actually under the authority of the other of the practical measures devised to effectuate their transport, with arms and equipment, to the territory of their own party. They should be instructed to comply immediately. The co-operation of the Committee's military assistants is hereby offered to help insure a safe and smooth execution of these movements.

The Committee believes that both of the foregoing agreements should be an accomplished fact before the end of this month and should not wait on the settlement of the political issues. Yet let the Committee make it clear that in its opinion the several suggestions made in all three parts of this statement, including Annexes I and II, constitute one integrated, balanced whole which the Committee considers essential to the lasting settlement of the dispute.

4. The Committee is confident that following the truce, there will be a marked improvement in the atmosphere in which the substantive discussions are to be held.

Here again, the Committee will call upon the parties, with renewed confidence, to approach the political negotiations in a spirit of deeper understanding, co-operation, and realism.

The Committee will suggest that each party state in a new memorandum, and in the most moderate terms, its views concerning the practical steps to be taken in the very near future, to insure a lasting settlement of the political dispute.

/Both parties

Both parties have repeatedly stated that they still hold to the principles underlying Linggadjati. According to the statements and explanations the Committee has received from both parties, the Committee believes that the principles of this Agreement may be summarized as follows:

- (a) Independence of the Indonesian peoples;
- (b) Co-operation between the peoples of the Netherlands and Indonesia;
- (c) A sovereign State on a federal basis, under a constitution which will be arrived at by democratic processes;
- (d) A union between the United States of Indonesia and other parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands under the Crown.

What the Committee thinks desirable is a concrete elaboration of those principles, conceived and drafted by each of the parties, with the care and the hope to meet half-way the known or putative views of the other.

The Committee puts itself once more at the disposal of the parties in the belief that its intervention can help bring their points of view closer and more quickly together. The Committee is transmitting herewith, as Annex II, supplementary suggestions regarding a programme based upon principles which it believes essential to the attainment of a just and lasting settlement.

As the Committee has already stated, the time has come for it to send a report to the Security Council on the progress of the developments of the Indonesian question. It fervently hopes that the answer of the parties to this communication will provide a favourable conclusion for that report.

ANNEX I

PLAN FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TRUCE

THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDS

1. That a standfast and cease-fire order be issued separately and simultaneously by both parties. This order will apply to the troops of both parties along the boundary lines of the areas described in the proclamation of the NRI Government on 29 August 1947 and in the areas specified in the following paragraph.
2. That in the first instance and for the time being, demilitarized zones be established in general conformity with the above-mentioned boundary lines; these zones as a rule will comprise the territories between these boundary lines and, on one side, the line of the Netherlands forward positions and, on the other side, the line of the Republican forward positions, the average width of each of the zones being approximately the same. The Committee has not at this time sufficient data for it to determine where the demilitarized zones should be drawn in relation to Western Java. For this reason, the Committee reserves its attitude regarding the delineation of such zones until its assistants have had an opportunity to make enquiries in the areas concerned. In these areas a standfast and cease-fire will apply to the troops of both parties in their present positions. The Committee will, if so required, instruct its military assistants to make the appropriate enquiries as soon as the truce plan is agreed upon.
3. That the establishment of the demilitarized zones in no way prejudices the rights, claims or position of the parties under the resolutions of the Security Council of 1, 25 and 26 August and 1 November 1947.
4. That upon acceptance of the foregoing by both parties, the Committee will place at the disposal of both parties its military assistants who will be instructed to assume, in the first instance, responsibility for determining whether any incident requires enquiry by the higher authorities of either or both parties.
5. That, pending a political settlement, the responsibility for the maintenance of law and order and of security of life and property in the demilitarized zones will remain vested in the civil police \* forces of the respective parties. The Committee's military advisers will be available to advise the appropriate authorities of the parties and to serve in such other proper capacities as may be requested. Among others, they should,
  - (a) call upon pools of police officers of both sides to be accompanied and helped in their endeavours and moves all over the demilitarized zones;
  - (b) promote co-operation between the two police forces.

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\* The term civil police does not exclude the temporary use of military personnel in the capacity of civil police, it being understood that the police forces will be under civil control.

6. That trade and intercourse between all areas should be permitted as far as possible; such restrictions as may be necessary will be agreed upon by the parties with the assistance of the Committee and its representatives if required.
7. That this agreement shall include all the points already agreed to in principle by the parties.
8. That, on the acceptance of the foregoing, the Committee's military assistants, accompanied by representatives of the two parties, will immediately conduct enquiries to establish whether elements of the Republican forces continue to offer resistance behind the present forward positions of the Netherlands forces. If the enquiry establishes the existence of such forces, these would withdraw as set out in the following paragraph.
9. That all forces of each party in any area accepted as a demilitarized zone or in any area on the other party's side of a demilitarized zone, with the exception given in paragraph 2, will under the observation of the military assistants of the Committee and with arms and warlike equipment move peacefully to the territory on the party's own side of demilitarized zones.

ANNEX II

On the basis of views presented by the parties and considered by the Committee of Good Offices, the Committee suggests to the parties that they accept the following principles as a basis for reaching a political settlement:

1. That the assistance of the Committee of Good Offices be used in the working out and signing of an agreement on the U.S.S. Renville for the settlement of the political dispute, in the Islands of Java, Sumatra and Madura between the Government of the Republic and the Government of the Netherlands under the auspices of the Committee.
2. That there be meanwhile a cessation of all activities by either Government relating directly or indirectly to the organization of states or to the determination of political relationship to the United States of Indonesia of territories in Java, Sumatra and Madura which comprise the area involved in the dispute between the Government of the Netherlands and the Government of the Republic.
3. That on the signing of the political agreement the civil administration which were functioning on 20 July 1947 be restored within a period of not more than three months and that within a similar period Netherlands armed forces be withdrawn to territories occupied by them on 20 July 1947.
4. That on the signing of the political agreement provision be made for the gradual reduction of the Armed Forces of both parties.
5. That after the signing of the agreement, free economic activity, trade, transportation and communications be completely restored.
6. That provision be made for a suitable period of not less than six months not more than one year after the signing of the agreement, during which time uncoerced and free discussion and consideration of vital issues will proceed. At the end of this period, free elections will be held for self-determination by the people of their political relationship to the Republic and to the United States of Indonesia.
7. That a constitutional convention be chosen according to democratic procedure to draft a constitution for the United States of Indonesia.
8. That an agency of the United Nations be asked to observe the conditions during this period and the final formation of the United States of Indonesia.



## APPENDIX VI

NOTE: THE COMMITTEE OF GOOD OFFICES DRAWS THE ATTENTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO THE INFORMAL CHARACTER OF THIS DOCUMENT

MEMORANDUM RECEIVED INFORMALLY ON 28 DECEMBER 1947 FROM THE NETHERLANDS DELEGATION CONCERNING THE COMMITTEE'S CHRISTMAS DRAFT MESSAGE OF 26 DECEMBER - REPRODUCED AS APPENDIX III TO THIS REPORT.

The Netherlands delegation has the honour to submit the following considerations with regard to the draft message received from the Security Council's Committee of Good Offices on the Indonesian Question on 26 December.

Concerning the parts of the draft message relative to the implementation of the truce, a few remarks may suffice.

With reference to point 3(a):

- (1) It is not quite clear what is meant by documents "together with those at present before our representatives with the Special Committee". To avoid any possibility of a misunderstanding elucidation of this point would be much appreciated.
- (2) In order to safeguard life and property the Netherlands troops carry out their police task. The Netherlands Government is therefore gratified that orders are to be issued, or confirmed, to achieve this pre-eminently humanitarian aim.

Dissemination of such orders by all possible means, including frequently repeated radio broadcasts, appears essential. The way in which these orders are to be disseminated should have the continuous attention of the Committee of Good Offices.

With regard to point 3(b) specific information will be appreciated as to what proposals are referred to, while it should be noted that if the "plan for achieving a speedy and effective truce" be intended, this plan has already been accepted by the Netherlands Special Committee as a working basis for carrying the truce into effect (vide document S/AC.10/Conf.1/17; letter dated 20 December 1947)\*.

With the contents of paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of point B the Netherlands delegation is glad to be in complete agreement.

The contents of the last paragraph of point B will be dealt with below.

With respect to Annex I the Netherlands delegation has the honour to observe the following.

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\* Appendix I to this report.

Re 1.

The Netherlands delegation expects that a standfast and cease-fire order be issued separately and simultaneously by both parties. This order will apply to the troops of both parties along the line of the areas described in the proclamation of 29 August, issued by the Lieutenant Governor-General of the Netherlands Indies. The orders to be issued should be identically worded. A draft of such an order is hereby submitted.

Re 2.

The Netherlands delegation agrees that in the first instance and for the time being, demilitarized zones be established in general conformity with the line of the areas described in the proclamation of 29 August; it is suggested that this line be called the status quo line. These zones as a rule will comprise the territories between these demarcation lines and on one side the line of the Dutch forward positions and on the other side the line of the Republican forward positions, the average width being approximately the same.

The Netherlands delegation regrets that the Committee has not at this time sufficient data before it to determine where in its opinion the demilitarized zones should be drawn in relation to Western Java. The Netherlands delegation wishes to point out that it can accept no responsibility whatsoever for this state of affairs. It may be recalled that from 23 November on the Netherlands Special Committee has repeatedly and with increasing emphasis urged that immediate enquiries be carried out in order to establish whether, in the territories occupied by Netherlands forces, Republican pockets of resistance still existed, and whether the Republican Government be right in claiming that there still existed organized Republican civil and military authorities in these areas; or whether the Netherlands were right in saying that there were mainly lawless elements roaming the countryside, and a small number of troops who act in a similar way.

In spite of repeated requests to do so, the Republican Government has never specified precisely where these pockets of resistance are supposed to be. The only area ever mentioned in Western Java is the S.E. Preanger. The Netherlands delegation therefore understands that "areas concerned" in paragraph 2 mean the alleged pockets of resistance in the S.E. Preanger. This area may be described as indicated on the appended map.

In this connection the Netherlands delegation would wish to make

/the following

the following suggestions:

(a) That the Republican Government should report to the Committee of Good Offices with some degree of exactitude where these alleged pockets of resistance are to be found.

(b) That 24 hours after receipt of this memorandum the Committee of Good Offices send one or more teams of military assistants to these areas to ascertain the actual situation there.

(c) That the Netherlands Command is then prepared to issue in these areas a standfast order for 48 hours, regardless of whether a truce has been concluded or not. As stated above this delegation is prepared, for the purposes of this enquiry, to issue in this area one day - this period could be extended to two or three days at the utmost after receipt of our memorandum - a standfast order for 48 hours, regardless of whether a truce has been concluded or not. It must, however, be made clear that the offer to issue a standfast order for 48 hours in this area could not possibly be extended.

With due observance of the above the Netherlands delegation can accept paragraph 2 of Annex I, it being understood that in view of the performance of police duties by Netherlands forces behind the Netherlands forward areas to be demilitarized, including Western Java, there shall be no restriction of patrol activities for the maintenance of law and order.

In this connection it should be pointed out:

that the population of Western Java amounts to over twelve million people;

that acts of terrorization have of late rather increased than decreased;

that a restriction of patrol activities for the maintenance of law and order would therefore be wholly and totally

unwarrantable in view of assuring the safety of the population.

Re 3.

The Netherlands delegation agrees to paragraph 3 of Annex I.

Re 4.

The Netherlands delegation agrees to paragraph 4 of Annex I.

Re 5.

With respect to paragraph 5 the Netherlands delegation is in agreement that

"pending a political settlement, the responsibility for the maintenance of law and order and of security of life and  
/property

property in the demilitarized zones will remain vested in the civil police forces of the respective parties", it being understood that for reasons repeatedly stated, the term civil police force will not exclude the temporary use of military personnel. It is furthermore understood that the transfer of the above-mentioned responsibility can only take place gradually, and that this point must be worked out in further detail. In this connection reference is made to points 6 - 11 inclusive of the Netherlands Special Committee's document S/AC.10/Conf.1/17 of 20 December 1947.\* It will be appreciated if the Committee's military assistants will be available to advise the appropriate authorities of the parties and to serve in such other proper capacities as may be requested by the parties.

The Netherlands delegation wholeheartedly endorses the suggestion to promote co-operation between the two police forces (paragraph 5(b)).

With reference to paragraph 5 (a) it may be observed that this appears to be in contradiction with the first sentence of paragraph 5, where it is stated that the responsibility for the maintenance of law and order etc. will remain vested in the civil police forces of the respective parties. This point therefore requires further elucidation. In any case it would appear to the Netherlands delegation that, in order to avoid incidents in particular immediately after the conclusion of the truce, it would be advisable to restrict the movements of either Netherlands or Republican officials in the respective demilitarized zones, and only to effect any such movements in the presence of representatives of the Committee of Good Offices.

Re 6.

The Netherlands delegation agrees to paragraph 6 of Annex I.

Re 7.

The Netherlands delegation agrees to paragraph 7 of Annex I, it being understood that the points already agreed to in principle by the parties are the following:

- (1) To prohibit sabotage, intimidation and reprisals and other activities of a similar nature against individuals, groups of individuals, and property, including destruction of property of any kind and by whomsoever owned, and to utilize every means at their

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\* Appendix I to this Report.

command to this end.

(2) To refrain from broadcasts or any other form of propaganda aimed at provoking or disturbing troops and civilians.

(3) To initiate broadcasts and institute other measures to inform all troops and civilians of the delicate situation and the necessity for strict compliance with the provisions sub (1) and (2).

(4) Full opportunity for observation by military and civil assistants made available to the Committee of Good Offices.

(5) To cease immediately the publication of a daily operational communique or any other information about military operations unless by prior mutual agreement in writing except weekly publication of lists of individuals (giving names, numbers and home addresses) who have been killed or have died as a result of injuries received in action.

(6) To accept the principle of the release of prisoners by each party and to commence discussions with a view to the most rapid and convenient implementation thereof, the release in principle to be without regard to the number of prisoners held by either party.

Re 8.

The Netherlands delegation agrees that the Committee's military assistants will immediately conduct enquiries to establish whether elements of the Republican military forces continue to offer resistance behind the present forward positions of the Netherlands forces.

As no application has as yet been made on the part of the Netherlands to visit territory controlled by Republican military forces and as, moreover, the objections to the admission of Republican officials into territory occupied by Netherlands military forces still apply (vide in this matter the letter of the Netherlands delegation of 12 December) there seems as yet no sufficient reason, to admit Republican officials at the proposed enquiries.

It is understood that if the enquiry establishes the existence of such forces, these shall withdraw with arms and warlike equipment and be evacuated under the observation of military assistants of the Committee and move peacefully with arms and warlike equipment to the territory on the party's own side of demilitarized zones.

The Netherlands delegation proposes that these evacuations take place forthwith, and be terminated within a period of 14 days after the issue of the cease fire and standfast orders concerned.

Re 9.

It is understood that according to the Netherlands point of view  
/the evacuation

the evacuations mentioned in paragraph 9 of Annex I would also apply to Republican forces in the South East Preanger, for the reasons set forth under paragraph 2 above.

The Netherlands delegation finally draws attention to the following:

- (1) The Netherlands delegation is prepared, in the event of agreement being reached in accordance with the above, to issue the cease-fire and standfast orders, and to effectuate these within at most 48 hours after the signing of the truce.
- (2) The Netherlands Command is prepared in the first instance to consider the truce binding for a period of at most 14 days. If during that period the truce regulations are observed this period will be extended each time for 14 days. If during such a period of 14 days it should be established that the truce regulations are not observed, these may be automatically annulled.
- (3) It is suggested that the specification of the armament to be used by the police forces in the demilitarized zones should be based upon the armament of the **Philippine constabulary**, whose duties may be considered to be of a similar nature to the tasks assigned to the police forces.

With regard to the part of the draft message concerning the political discussions the Netherlands delegation begs to submit the following considerations.

The delegation fully agrees that an effective truce will cause a marked improvement in the atmosphere and consequently will materially further the possibility of a successful treatment of the political issues. It must point out that substantive discussions on these issues have not yet taken place as a result of the absence of a real cease-fire and that, therefore, the agreement on the cease-fire should not await a political agreement. This point of view is in complete accordance with the wording of the resolution of 1 November, quoted in the draft message under 3(a).

The delegation fully concurs with the suggestion that each party state in a new memorandum its views concerning the practical steps to be taken in the very near future, to ensure a lasting settlement of the political dispute. It has made a similar suggestion as early as 7 November which was repeated on 15 December in the forty-first meeting of the Committee. It notes with satisfaction that the Republican delegation has apparently stated to the Committee of Good Offices its adherence to the principles underlying the

Linggadjati agreement.

The summary given in the draft message is correct though incomplete, but in order to complete the enumeration of those principles the delegation herewith submits the gist of a statement concerning them by the Minister for Overseas Territories in the States General on 17 December last (see Annex I).

A further elaboration of those principles, as requested by the Committee, can be provided in a few days.

It will be clear from the foregoing that the delegation will gladly avail itself of the good offices of the Committee in the treatment of the political issues. It has understood that the urgency of these issues has prompted the Committee to offer, in Annex II to the draft message, a number of suggestions even before the memoranda, suggested in the message itself, have been obtained. It must, however, regretfully differ with the Committee in its belief that these suggestions are all based on principles essential to the attainment of a just and lasting settlement.

In order to clarify its position with regard to those principles and to show that, in a number of cases, they cannot be based on views presented by the Netherlands delegation, it seems appropriate to remind the Committee of certain facts and statements.

It is essential to realize that the dispute with the Republic took its origin in two facts:

- (1) the unwillingness of the Republican Government to recognize the sovereignty of the Kingdom of the Netherlands during the transition period, not only in obedience to our constitutional law but also in view of the intended transfer to the United States of Indonesia (articles 2, 12, 13 and 15 of the Linggadjati agreement);
- (2) and the continuation of hostilities on the Republican side and the rejection by the Republican Government of the proposed joint measures to end these hostilities and to ensure law and order in the whole territory under its factual control.

The limited police action was undertaken on 21 July to put an end to a situation, which had become intolerable. On 23 July the Netherlands Government stated publicly that by so doing they intended to create the conditions for the implementation of the principles underlying the Linggadjati agreement, if necessary without the co-operation of the Republic. They stated at the same time that a resumption of the co-operation with the Republic would become possible as soon as its Government would appear ready and able to resume such

/co-operation

co-operation as a prospective member of the future United States of Indonesia on the basis of the principles underlying the Linggadjati agreement and on an equal footing with the other prospective members.

Although initially the Netherlands Government intended to maintain the Republican civil administration in the occupied areas, the Republican Government expected to employ its civil servants to co-operate. As a consequence the Netherlands Government had to assume full control and responsibility in those areas, which was proclaimed on 29 August.

Meanwhile in several of those areas popular movements for the implementation of the Linggadjati principles in co-operation with the Netherlands Government arose and gained an ever-widening popular support. In accordance with their declared purpose and with the principles contained in articles 3 and 4 of the Linggadjati agreement the Netherlands Government had to recognize those demands of the local population and to assist in the organization of these territories in such a way that an expression of political aims and purposes, by democratic process, would become possible. As, at the same time, the Republic followed a policy of organized violence against all those who wanted to co-operate with the Netherlands Government,\* the establishment and maintenance of law and order by the Netherlands Government remained an essential requisite for the free expression of political opinion in those areas.

The Netherlands Government is not primarily interested in the way in which Indonesia shall be built up as a federation; this has to be decided, in the first place, by the population itself. But they are vitally concerned in the guarantees for a free decision and the elimination of coercion by violence or threat, this being essential for the stability of the future United States of Indonesia. They must stress that the inhabitants of every area have the fundamental right to demand protection against such coercion and to decide themselves about the status of their territory within the framework of the United States of Indonesia. They cannot stop the political organization of these territories if the inhabitants decide otherwise. They have not and never have had any intention of artificially creating new political structures but neither can they, nor do they, wish to prevent popular movements from expressing themselves freely. And neither can they withdraw the protection of their forces until law and order and freedom

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\* Not only in the newly occupied territories in Java, Madura and Sumatra, but also in South Borneo, Bali and South Celebes.



from coercion can be guaranteed by an adequate, non-political police force to the satisfaction of those inhabitants and of the Netherlands Government.

Finally, before commenting on the separate suggestions contained in Annex II, the Netherlands delegation must emphasize that from long experience it has the conviction that publication of Annex II in its present form would result in a deterioration of the situation, instead of an improvement of the atmosphere. It must be clear that the fear and unrest created by the policy of coercion of the Republic would be greatly increased if points 2 and 3 were put forward, at this juncture, as essential to the attainment of a just and lasting settlement. Whatever may be the ultimate decision in those areas when the stage envisaged under point 6 has been reached, the announcement of even a proposed return of the Republican administration, combined with a withdrawal of the Netherlands forces would go far in creating distress and consternation among the numberless people who have wholeheartedly accepted co-operation with the Netherlands Government for the realization of their Indonesian national aspirations.

Concerning the separate items the Netherlands delegation offers the following remarks:

Ad.1.

The Netherlands Government will gladly avail themselves of the assistance of the Committee of Good Offices and of the U.S.S. Renville, which has been put at the disposal of the parties, for the settlement of the political dispute.

Ad.2.

The Netherlands Government does not wish to prevent popular movements towards political organization, on the basis of the principles of the Linggadjati agreement, from expressing themselves freely.

Ad.3.

It would seem that, generally speaking, such points as are contained under this item should form the substance of the political agreement itself and not be decided beforehand. The Netherlands Government is not prepared to change the administration or to withdraw the protection of their forces in these territories until these decisions can be taken with the full and free consent of their population.

As already stated on 11 August the Netherlands Government is prepared to transfer to the Interim Government the administration of  
/those areas

those areas now under control of the Netherlands Indies Government which have not as yet a political structure of their own.

Ad.4

A gradual reduction of the armed forces of both parties must certainly be one of the aims of a political agreement. It may even become possible already after the full implementation of the truce.

Ad.5

The restoration of free economic activity, trade, transportation and communications must also be an integral part of a political agreement. The interests of Indonesia as a whole demand, however, that these economic activities are organized in full co-operation between all the constituent parts of Indonesia, in such a way that further injury to the general interests of the country and the particular interests of the producers can be prevented.

Ad.6

The Netherlands Government fully concur with the necessity of an uncoerced and free discussion and consideration of vital issues and of free elections for self-determination by the people of their political relationship to the Republic and to the United States of Indonesia. They must, however, stress in this respect as in others the necessary prerequisite of the establishment and maintenance of such a state of law and order, in all parts of Indonesia, that the danger of coercion can be wholly eliminated.

Ad.7

This point is completely in accordance with the principle contained in article 5 of the Linggadjati agreement.

Ad.8

The advisability of international observation should be decided upon in the light of the measure of agreement reached in the political issues and the state of peace and order to be achieved by the implementation of the truce.

In conclusion the Netherlands delegation begs to offer the following suggestions. In their opinion Annex II mentions a number of problems which should, without doubt, be included in a preliminary political agreement. There are other problems, of similar importance, which it does not mention. As an agreement on the solution offered in these suggestions seems impossible, the Annex should be withdrawn and the memoranda requested of both parties should be taken as a starting point for the political discussions. However divergent they may be, they will have the advantage of clearly expressing the point of view of the two governments. In the meanwhile the conclusions and implementation  
/of the truce

of the truce, in accordance with the resolution of the Security Council of 1 November, should clear the ground for a better understanding, as without a cessation of hostilities substantive political discussions will be of little or no avail. By concluding and implementing a truce neither party will lose any advantage; on the contrary such a truce would equally enhance the position of both and contribute more to the restoration of confidence than anything else.

ANNEX I

PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING THE LINGGADJATI  
AGREEMENT

GIST OF A STATEMENT OF THE MINISTER FOR  
OVERSEAS TERRITORIES OF 17 DECEMBER 1947

1. Continued voluntary co-operation between the peoples of the Netherlands and Indonesia offers the best guarantee of a sound and strong development of both countries and peoples.
2. The peoples of Indonesia have the right to choose the form of government under which they will live, and the right of self-government.
3. The fundamental human rights and freedoms referred to in the Charter of the United Nations must be ~~ensured~~ **ensured**.
4. The rights of minorities must be guaranteed.
5. The continued relationship between the Netherlands and Indonesia shall be embodied in a Netherlands-Indonesian Union to promote the joint interests of the Netherlands and Indonesia.
6. At the head of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union shall be the House of Orange. The King can do no wrong. Acting in the name of the King the organs of the Union are responsible to the respective parliaments.
7. The members of the Union are equal, sovereign states and members of the United Nations.
8. The political constitution shall be
  - (a) federative,
  - (b) democratic,
  - (c) and based on the rule of law.
9. The constitution shall be determined in further consultation.
10. The re-organization shall be effected gradually and as rapidly as possible. During the period of transition the ultimate constitution shall be realized to the greatest possible extent in the institution of provisional organs.
11. Both the re-organization and the institution of a new political constitution require that adequate executives shall be at the disposal of the authorities. In consequence the territories under Netherlands control can be transferred to other authorities only when the peace, order and security necessary for the preparation and realization of the new political constitution are ensured.
12. The Netherlands will assist Indonesia according to its requirements.
13. The Netherlands interests in Indonesia must be assured.
14. The new political organization must rest on a sound financial and economic basis.

## ANNEX II

### DRAFT CEASE-FIRE AND STANDFAST ORDER

#### A. General Regulations

1. This instruction becomes operative for both parties on D-day at 00.00 hours. At this moment hostilities in the forward areas (see paragraphs 8 - 10 below) will be ceased, with due observance of the regulations and directives of this instruction. D-day will be announced by the Chief of General Staff.
2. An identically worded instruction will be simultaneously issued by the Netherlands and Republican authorities to subordinate commanding officers.

#### B. Delineation of Occupied Areas

3. In JAVA and SUMATRA the territory occupied by Netherlands troops comprises the areas described in the Proclamation of the Lt.-Governor General of 29 August 1947 as indicated in the annex to this instruction.
4. All areas in JAVA and SUMATRA not specified in the above proclamation will be considered as controlled by Republican troops.
5. The line dividing the territories mentioned in paragraphs 3 and 4 will be named "status quo line" and is indicated in the annex to this instruction.
6. Commanding Officers will ensure that the above-mentioned line be clearly indicated in the field as soon as possible. Further instructions will be issued by the Chief of General Staff after consultation with the military representatives of the Committee of Good Offices and the Netherlands and Republican military authorities.
7. Members of the military forces and police units of both parties are not allowed to cross the status quo line. For other traffic across this line see paragraph 20 below.

#### C. Forward Areas

8. The forward areas are the areas situated on either side of the status quo line and delimited by the lines connecting the advance positions (inclusive) (see annex).
9. In the forward areas it is not allowed:
  - (a) to establish new military positions and/or detachments;
  - (b) to move or to reinforce military positions and/or detachments or to extend existing defences;
  - (c) to prepare or to carry out measures of an offensive nature.
10. Movements of troops in the forward areas will be restricted to a minimum, e.g. for the maintenance and relief of advance positions.

Commanding officers will inform the Chief of General Staff at least 36 hours before the effectuation of planned reliefs.

#### /D. Demilitarized Zone

#### D. Demilitarized Zone

11. The forward areas will be demilitarized.
12. In the demilitarized zones the maintenance of law, order and security will in principle be carried out by civil police forces.
13. For the time being the police duties in the Netherlands demilitarized zones will be carried out by military personnel who will be wearing an orange band with the letters VP (Veiligheidspolitie - Security Police) on the left upper arm.
14. In principle the military VP mentioned in paragraph 13 will be armed in such a way that their police function shall be unambiguously clear.

Further instructions to this effect will be issued by the Chief of General Staff.

15. Commanding officers will issue written instructions to military VP units in the demilitarized zones after consultation with civil authorities.
16. As conditions in the Netherlands demilitarized zones or in parts thereof permit, the VP referred to in paragraph 13 will be gradually replaced by civil police.

#### E. Evacuation

17. Elements of Republican military forces which, at the moment at which this instruction becomes operative, are still in areas occupied by Netherlands troops, will be evacuated to their own territory with arms, equipment and warlike stores.
18. These evacuations will be effectuated with the assistance and under the supervision of the military representatives of the Committee of Good Offices.

Further instructions will be issued by the Chief of General Staff after consultation with these representatives and with authorities of the other party (see also paragraph 19).

19. The evacuations have to be concluded latest on D-day plus thirteen at 24.00 hours.

#### F. Civil Traffic Across the Status Quo Line

20. Civil traffic across the status quo line is permitted in principle with due observation of the following:

(a) Traffic will be confined to routes of communication designated and agreed upon by the military commanders of both parties (see paragraphs 24 and 25 below).

(b) No traffic will be allowed outside the routes mentioned under (a).

(c) Detailed instructions concerning goods and monetary traffic will be issued.

(d) Persons, goods, etc., crossing or being conveyed across the

/status quo

status quo line will be subject to control and search; this will be carried out in such a way as to cause minimum inconvenience and distress.

#### G. Air Forces

21. The use of respective air forces will be confined to the areas occupied or controlled by the parties.

Air transport flights are not included in the above.

22. Further detailed regulations will be worked out in consultation with the aviation experts of the Committee of Good Offices and the two parties.

#### H. Naval Forces

23. Naval bombardments, landings and other offensive operations against land objectives are prohibited.

#### I. Meetings of Local Military Commanders of the Two Parties

24. Meetings of local military commanders of the two parties to discuss the measures required for the detailed implementation of this instruction must take place on D-day plus three 12.00 hours latest.

They may be accompanied by civil authorities.

25. The places on or near the status quo line where these meetings will take place will be announced by the Chief of General Staff, after consultation with the military representatives of the Committee of Good Offices and of the other party.

Names, ranks and functions of the local commanders concerned will be announced at the same time.

#### J. Final Regulations

26. Both parties will give full co-operation to the military assistants of the Committee of Good Offices in observing the effectuation of truce regulations.

27. To that effect they will be informed of local detailed regulations whereas they also will be consulted if the parties cannot reach agreement.

28. Infringements of the terms of the truce will immediately be reported by the parties, through their own channels, to

(a) The Chief of General Staff.

(b) The local military observers of the Committee of Good Offices.

29. Infringements will also be recorded in writing as accurately and completely as possible and substantiated by proper evidence and submitted to the Chief of General Staff, who will take appropriate further measures.

30. No military action against infringements of the truce by one of the parties will be taken by any local commanders of the other party, without

/my previous

my previous orders, unless such an infringement should cause a serious and acute danger to the safety of troops or the civil population, in which case this should be reported immediately to the Chief of General Staff and to the local military observers of the Committee of Good Offices (see paragraph 28).



APPENDIX VII

NOTE: THE COMMITTEE OF GOOD OFFICES DRAWS THE ATTENTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO THE INFORMAL CHARACTER OF THIS DOCUMENT

MEMORANDUM RECEIVED INFORMALLY ON 30 DECEMBER 1947 FROM THE DELEGATION OF THE INDONESIAN REPUBLIC CONCERNING THE COMMITTEE'S CHRISTMAS DRAFT MESSAGE OF 26 DECEMBER - REPRODUCED AS APPENDIX III TO THIS REPORT

1. The Indonesian delegation acknowledges the Christmas Draft message of the Committee of Good Offices received on 26 December 1947.

2. The Indonesian delegation has accepted previous suggestions of the Committee of Good Offices for prompt implementation of the cease-fire resolution and thus to stop killing, mopping up, destruction and incitement, but up till now no satisfactory agreement has been reached.

On 15 November 1947, a list of suggestions was submitted to both Special Committees (S/AC.10/CONF.1/1) which was entirely agreed to by the Special Committee of the Republic. On 24 November 1947, a revised list of suggestions was submitted to both Special Committees (S/AC.10/CONF.1/1/Rev.1) which was entirely agreed to by the Special Committee of the Republic.

On 3 December 1947, a plan for achieving a speedy and effective truce was submitted to both Special Committees (S/AC.10/CONF.1/9) which was accepted by the Special Committee of the Republic in its letter of 6 December 1947. The above-mentioned suggestions could, however, not be executed on account of the attitude of the Netherlands Special Committee.

3. The delegation takes the opportunity to express its deep appreciation of the efforts of the Committee of Good Offices to bring the Indonesian question to a satisfactory settlement. As the delegation has already pointed out the Republic is prepared to co-operate fully with the Committee of Good Offices and the Security Council. Although the most recent proposals of the Committee of Good Offices involve considerable sacrifices on the part of the Republic and although they are not strictly in accordance with the Republic's own understanding of the Security Council's resolutions, the Indonesian delegation accepts them as an integrated and balanced whole for the settlement. So doing the Indonesian delegation hopes that the acceptance of the proposals as a whole by both parties will ensure not only a prompt end of fighting and killing and destruction but also an early political agreement on just principles which will restore understanding and trust. Such an agreement we feel sure will work to the lasting benefit of the peoples of the Netherlands and of Indonesia and for the prestige of the United Nations and the peace of the world.

4. In this spirit the delegation has refrained from rejecting any specific proposals of the Committee of Good Offices. Nevertheless it feels obliged to stress that it has been difficult to accept some parts of the suggestions and is seriously concerned lest some parts of the proposals work to the Republic's disadvantage. The Indonesian delegation also considers it desirable to make a number of observations on aspects of the proposals which it considers particularly important.

/(a) The dispute

(a) The dispute in Indonesia is basically political in character. It follows that there can be no settlement of the dispute until a political agreement has been reached. The Indonesian delegation stresses that if the present efforts of the Committee of Good Offices are successful in obtaining a truce it is essential that all possible efforts be made by all concerned to bring about the political agreement within a few weeks. It also follows that we would stress most urgently the inter-relation between the political proposals and the principles outlined in the message in Annex II and the proposals for an immediate truce as Annex I. These principles provide a safeguard that the political agreement will be just and fair and consequently provide a favourable atmosphere for a prompt and increasingly effective truce.

(b) The political agreement should be worked out under the auspices of the United Nations Security Council's Committee of Good Offices on board the U.S.S. Renville, which is put at the disposal of the United Nations by the United States of America especially for that purpose.

(c) The Indonesian delegation considers the truce being based in general on the line as described in the proclamation of the N.E.I. Government on 29 August 1947, as unjust and disappointing and as being detrimental to the interests of the Republic, since this line gives the Netherlands control over large areas which they did not occupy on 4 August 1947, when at the latest the first cease-fire resolution of the Security Council should have been made effective. It accepts, however, the proposal as the Committee of Good Offices has explained, as a purely provisional settlement conducive to an early political settlement. It also expects that should there be any delay in reaching a political agreement, the Security Council will take early appropriate steps to ensure that its resolution of 1 November be more strictly enforced.

(d) In view of the considerations set out in (a) above the Indonesian delegation is particularly anxious that the demilitarized zones should be strictly demilitarized and that the Committee itself make every effort to co-operate with all concerned and to ensure against any incident. The withdrawal of the Netherlands armed forces as stipulated under 3 in Annex II must not be made conditional otherwise than there mentioned, i.e. the restoration of the civil administration, of course with its organs within a time limit of three months.

The Indonesian delegation repeats that the Government of the Republic will do everything in its power to prevent incidents.

2. Deeply convinced that the suggestions of the Committee of Good Offices form a decisive step towards an equitable settlement of the Indonesian question the Indonesian delegation declares herewith that it will do everything in its power to realize, with the assistance of the Committee of Good Offices and the co-operation of the Netherlands Government, the proposals contained in the message of the Committee of Good Offices as soon as possible and as effectively as possible.

The Indonesian delegation will forward to the Committee of Good Offices a memorandum containing its views concerning the practical steps to be

/taken

taken in the very near future as has been suggested by the Committee of Good Offices in due time.

On behalf of the Indonesian  
Delegation.

/s/ Dr. Ali Sastroamidjojo,  
Vice-Chairman.

Jakarta, 30 December 1947.

3. Furthermore, the Indonesian delegation fully agrees to the proposal that an agency of the United Nations shall observe the progress of the situation as it progresses from the present moment until the formation of the United States of Indonesia is completed, as mentioned in paragraph 8 of Annex II of the Committee's Christmas draft message of 26 December, in the sense that this observation implies supervision.

/s/ Ali Sastroamidjojo.

APPENDIX VIII

SIX ADDITIONAL PRINCIPLES FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS TOWARDS A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT  
SUBMITTED BY THE COMMITTEE OF GOOD OFFICES AT THE FOURTH MEETING OF THE  
COMMITTEE OF GOOD OFFICES WITH THE PARTIES ON 17 JANUARY 1948 AND  
ACCEPTED AT THE FIFTH MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE WITH THE  
PARTIES ON 19 JANUARY 1948

The Committee of Good Offices is of the opinion that the following principles, among others, form a basis for the negotiations towards a political settlement:

1. Sovereignty throughout the Netherlands Indies is and shall remain with the Kingdom of the Netherlands until, after a stated interval, the Kingdom of the Netherlands transfers its sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia. Prior to the termination of such stated interval, the Kingdom of the Netherlands may confer appropriate rights, duties and responsibilities on a provisional federal government of the territories of the future United States of Indonesia. The United States of Indonesia, when created, will be a sovereign and independent State in equal partnership with the Kingdom of the Netherlands in a Netherlands-Indonesian Union at the head of which shall be the King of the Netherlands. The status of the Republic of Indonesia will be that of a state within the United States of Indonesia.
2. In any provisional federal government created prior to the ratification of the constitution of the future United States of Indonesia, all states will be offered fair representation.
3. Prior to the dissolution of the Committee of Good Offices, either party may request that the services of the Committee be continued to assist in adjusting differences between the parties which relate to the political agreement and which may arise during the interim period. The other party will interpose no objection to such a request; this request would be brought to the attention of the Security Council of the United Nations by the Government of the Netherlands.
4. Within a period of not less than six months or more than one year from the signing of this agreement, a plebescite will be held to determine whether the populations of the various territories of Java, Madura and Sumatra wish their territory to form part of the Republic of Indonesia or of another state within the United States of Indonesia, such plebescite to be conducted under observation by the Committee of Good Offices should either party, in accordance with the procedure set forth in paragraph 3 above, request the services of the Committee in this capacity. The parties may agree that another method for ascertaining the will of the populations may be employed in place of a plebescite.
5. Following the delineation of the states in accordance with the procedure set forth in paragraph 4 above, a constitutional convention will be convened, through democratic procedures, to draft a constitution for the United States of Indonesia. The representation of the various states in the convention will be in proportion to their populations.
6. Should any state decide not to ratify the constitution and desire, in accordance with the principles of articles 3 and 4 of the Linggadjati Agreement, to negotiate a special relationship with the United States of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, neither party will object.

APPENDIX IX

STATEMENT MADE BY THE COMMITTEE OF GOOD OFFICES AT ITS FOURTH  
MEETING WITH THE PARTIES ON 17 JANUARY 1948

1. Referring to the relation between the Netherlands truce proposals (S/AC.10/CCNF.2/2) and statement of political principles (S/AC.10/CCNF.2/3), the Committee of Good Offices understands that the parties, while reserving fully their legal interpretations of the stipulations of the resolutions of the Security Council, shall be committed to the twelve political principles, at the very moment the truce agreement is signed, so that in fact the very signature of the truce agreement will have created de facto an integrating link between the truce agreement and these political principles.

2. It is the understanding of the Committee of Good Offices that the eventual acceptance by the parties of the six political principles (S/AC.10/CCNF.2/4) presented by the Committee at the fourth plenary meeting on 17 January, can in no way change or modify the status of the parties, particularly in relation to the Security Council.

3. The Committee of Good Offices, being mindful of the necessity for the establishment and maintenance of a good atmosphere for the continuance of substantive discussions, and being mindful also of the necessity for a full understanding by the Indonesian peoples of the steps taken by the parties and the Committee of Good Offices in relation to the Indonesian question, earnestly suggests to the parties:

That the Committee of Good Offices assist the parties and the peoples of Indonesia by using all available means, such as radio, newspapers, speeches and the like, to inform and keep informed these peoples, whether in Republican-controlled or Netherlands-controlled territories or the demilitarized zones, of all matters relating to a favourable settlement of the Indonesian question, and in particular of:

(a) the terms and purport of the truce agreement;

(b) the political principles now, or from time to time agreed upon.

4. It is the understanding of the Committee that provision 7 (e) of the truce agreement, prohibiting inter alia, reprisals and violences against individuals or groups of individuals, is a fundamental one for both parties. As such, it should not only cover the period of the political discussions, but also lead to a clause in the political agreement. As such, it should include a general political amnesty which would apply to all citizens, in particular to soldiers and ex-soldiers, or civil servants and ex-civil servants of both parties.

5. Among other points to be raised in the political discussions following the implementation of the truce, the Committee wishes to bring to the earnest attention of the parties two points which should in its opinion be examined forthwith:

(a) provision concerning the status and the eventual employment of civil servants of both parties, who are at the present time in or out of service; and live in territories of which the organization will be discussed between the parties;

/(b) provisions

(b) provisions of a practical character intended to implement paragraph 6 of the truce agreement and paragraph 5 of the political principles, concerned with the restoration of normal economic intercourse.

APPENDIX X

STATEMENT ADOPTED BY THE COMMITTEE OF GOOD OFFICES  
AT ITS MEETING IN NEW YORK, 2 FEBRUARY 1948

As a Committee of Good Offices, we think it is our duty, at any time we are requested to do so by either party, to state with a view to achieving clarification our understanding of our own suggestions as addressed to both parties.

In consequence, we think it useful to repeat or complete explanations and/or understandings given before, formally or informally, to both parties.

The Committee of Good Offices was requested by both parties to go to Jogjakarta in January to inform fully the Republican Government of the meaning and purport of the proposals made or accepted by the Netherlands delegation, and to make one more effort to try to bring about an agreement between the parties.

Following a method often used by the Committee of Good Offices in relation with both parties, the Committee met with the Republican authorities, in Kalioerang on 13 January. Questions were asked by members of the Republican delegation, and answered impromptu by representatives on the Committee. Of course, the Committee can be committed only by its concerted views, duly expressed by itself. The Committee of Good Offices wishes to emphasize that the views of the individual representatives, as set out in the summary record of the meeting at Kalioerang, on 13 January, obviously stand in an entirely different position from the Committee's concerted statement containing the five points (S/AC.10/CONF.2/5 - reproduced as Appendix IX to this Report) and cannot commit the Committee. The Committee's position has been stated clearly in its letter dated 24 January 1948 addressed to the delegation of the Republic of Indonesia and reproduced as an annex to this Appendix.

To meet the circumstances, and help bring the parties closer together, the Committee of Good Offices considered its duty to express its own understandings of several matters, including the six principles which it sponsored. This was done by the document just referred to (S/AC.10/CONF.2/5 - reproduced as Appendix IX to this Report). Those five points were communicated to the Republican authorities in the course of the exchanges of views. As soon as materially possible, they were unofficially communicated to a member of the Netherlands delegation as a matter of information, it being understood that those points involved only the responsibility of the Committee of Good Offices, could not bind the parties, and did not require their agreement.

/They were



They were officially communicated to both parties on 17 January when the six principles were also officially presented to the parties, with a request that they accept them within forty-eight hours.

As far as those five points are concerned, some misunderstanding temporarily arose; it centred on paragraph 2 which reads:

"It is the understanding of the Committee of Good Offices that the eventual acceptance by the parties of the six political principles (S/AC.10/CONF.2/4 - reproduced as Appendix VIII to this Report) presented by the Committee at the fourth plenary meeting on 17 January, can in no way change or modify the status of the parties, particularly in relation to the Security Council."

It has been the established doctrine of the Committee of Good Offices that it had no power to define or determine the status of the parties. To the Committee of Good Offices the parties are what they are in the eyes of the Security Council, i.e., "parties to the Indonesian dispute". The Committee of Good Offices could not and would not go further without infringing the limits of a Good Offices mission.

The acceptance by the Netherlands and the Republic of the twelve principles and the six further principles was unconditional and in identical terms. The statement of the five points contains the views of the Committee; it is not binding on the parties. The only documents binding on the parties are the truce agreement, the twelve principles and the six principles.

The parties have clearly shown their understanding of that position by their unconditional acceptance of those principles, an acceptance which, in the case of the Republic, was made after receipt of the letter referred to above (see annex to this Appendix).

Any conclusions leading towards confirmation or denial of any right or de facto action by either party would be outside the clearly stated position of the Committee of Good Offices.

The Committee of Good Offices issues this statement to the parties to clear up any misunderstanding which, in regard to these matters, has arisen and to avoid in the future any such misunderstanding.

Consequently the Committee wants to emphasize that, today, the two parties have unconditionally and in identical terms accepted the twelve principles and the six principles as a basis for the coming discussions. The importance of those misunderstandings, happily cleared at present, dwindles to very little, if compared with the essential elements obtained towards a just and lasting settlement, by  
/the very agreement

the very agreement on the truce and the eighteen principles. In that spirit, the Committee hopes that the parties will, from now on and without further delay, devote all their energies to the continuance and successful completion of the political negotiations.

ANNEX TO APPENDIX X

LETTER OF THE COMMITTEE HANDED TO THE DELEGATION OF THE  
REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA ON 25 JANUARY 1948 CONCERNING  
THE LATTER'S LETTER OF 19 JANUARY (S/AC.10/CONF.2/11)

Batavia, 24 January 1948.

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your letter received by the Committee of Good Offices on 19 January, concerning the position of the delegation of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia with respect to the six political principles submitted by the Committee for the consideration of the parties (S/AC.10/CONF.2/11). Paragraph 2 of this letter states that the Republican delegation "agrees to these six principles on the strength of the conceptions and clarifications given by the Committee of Good Offices to the delegation of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia at the formal meeting at Kaliurang on 13 January 1948 and which were recorded in the official minutes taken at the meeting (S/AC.10/SR.61) and the conceptions and clarifications contained in the statement made by the Committee of Good Offices at the formal meeting on board the U.S.S. Renville on 17 January 1948 (S/AC.10/CONF.2/5)."

The Committee believes that it owes an explanation of the precise nature of the two documents cited in your letter.

At the formal meeting at Kaliurang on 13 January, the representatives on the Committee of Good Offices did their best, while speaking without preparation or consultation, to answer questions put to them by members of the delegation and Government of the Republic, and within these limitations, the views they expressed at that meeting represent their individual opinions. It goes without saying that the representatives on the Committee adhere to the spirit of the views they expressed at this meeting -- as at any other meeting -- and which are recorded in summary. However, as you are aware, the comments that the representatives on the Committee were called upon to make could not, being impromptu, be offered as the definitive views of the Committee or even be expressed with the precision which should be accorded to discussions of important and complex matters.

Because of the importance of the matters discussed at Kaliurang, the Committee recognized the desirability of presenting to the parties written clarifications of its concerted views, which would have a definitive status, with respect to the truce agreement and twelve associated political principles and to the additional six principles. The Committee therefore drafted the statement of clarifications which it handed to your delegation on 14 January and which it later presented at the plenary meeting on board the U.S.S. Renville on 17 January as documents S/AC.10/CONF.2/5 and 6. To repeat, this statement represented clarifications of the Committee's concerted views. It was not the intention of the Committee to present this statement as binding upon the parties and the Committee did not, in fact, propose that it should be so considered. Reference to the documents in question will make clear that each of the seven paragraphs were offered as understandings or suggestions on the part of the Committee.

/It will,

It will, therefore, be apparent that neither of the documents to which reference is made in paragraph 2 of your letter of 19 January (S/AC.10/CONF.2/11) can be attached to an agreement between the parties. In view of these facts, the Committee believes that the Republican delegation may wish to reconsider its letter of 19 January, since if this letter stands as the final reply of the Republican delegation, the inference may be that the delegation is attaching conditions to its acceptance of the six political principles and had in effect not accepted these principles, which would therefore not be operative with respect to either party.

If it is the intention of the Republican delegation to accept the six principles upon the same basis as that upon which these principles were accepted by the Netherlands delegation, it is suggested that your delegation inform the Committee of Good Offices that it wishes to confirm its agreement to accept the six principles as stated in your letter of 15 January (S/AC.10/89) which the Committee took to be your delegation's letter of acceptance.

The representatives on the Committee in offering their views at the meeting in Kaliurang, for such value as they might possess, made the point that the questions raised by the members of the Republican delegation and of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia would undoubtedly arise during the negotiation of a political settlement. The Committee would like to take this occasion to repeat that the Republican delegation is of course at perfect liberty to bring up these and similar matters, of which the Republican Government doubtless has many in mind, during the negotiations.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

/s/  
R. Herremans,  
Chairman.

Dr. Amir Sjarifuddin,  
Chairman,  
Delegation of the Republic of Indonesia,  
Jogjakarta.

NOTE: Mr. Critchley, representative of Australia, reserved Judge Kirby's position in regard to this letter.

APPENDIX XI

TRUCE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS  
AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA SIGNED AT THE FOURTH  
MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE OF GOOD OFFICES WITH THE  
PARTIES ON 17 JANUARY 1948

The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, referred to in this agreement as the parties, hereby agree as follows:

1. That a stand fast and cease fire order be issued separately and simultaneously by both parties immediately upon the signing of this agreement and to be fully effective within forty-eight hours. This order will apply to the troops of both parties along the boundary lines of the areas described in the proclamation of the Netherlands Indies Government on 29 August 1947, which shall be called the status quo line, and in the areas specified in the following paragraph.
2. That in the first instance and for the time being, demilitarized zones be established in general conformity with the above-mentioned status quo line; these zones as a rule will comprise the territories between this status quo line and, on one side, the line of the Netherlands forward positions and, on the other side, the line of the Republican forward positions, the average width of each of the zones being approximately the same.
3. That the establishment of the demilitarized zones in no way prejudices the rights, claims or position of the parties under the resolutions of the Security Council of 1, 25, and 26 August and 1 November 1947.
4. That upon acceptance of the foregoing by both parties, the Committee will place at the disposal of both parties its military assistants who will be instructed to assume, in the first instance, responsibility for determining whether any incident requires enquiry by the higher authorities of either or both parties.
5. That, pending a political settlement, the responsibility for the maintenance of law and order and of security of life and property in the demilitarized zones will remain vested in the civil police forces of the respective parties. (The term civil police does not exclude the temporary use of military personnel in the capacity of civil police, it being understood that the police forces will be under civil control). The Committee's military assistants will be available to advise the appropriate authorities of the parties and to serve in such other proper capacities as may be requested. Among other, they should;
  - (a) call upon pools of police officers established by each party in its demilitarized zone to accompany the military assistants in their endeavours and moves throughout that demilitarized zone. Police officers of one party will not move into and throughout the demilitarized zone of the other party unless accompanied by a military assistant of the Committee of Good Offices and a police officer of that other party.
  - (b) promote co-operation between the two police forces.
6. That trade and intercourse between all areas should be permitted as far as possible; such restrictions as may be necessary will be agreed upon by the parties with the assistance of the Committee and its representatives if required.

/7. That this

7. That this agreement shall include all the following points already agreed to in principle by the parties:

- (a) To prohibit sabotage, intimidation and reprisals and other activities of a similar nature against individuals, groups of individuals, and property, including destruction of property of any kind and by whomever owned, and to utilize every means at their command to this end.
- (b) To refrain from broadcasts or any other form of propaganda aimed at provoking or disturbing troops and civilians.
- (c) To initiate broadcasts and institute other measures to inform all troops and civilians of the delicate situation and the necessity for strict compliance with the provisions sub (a) and (b).
- (d) Full opportunity for observation by military and civil assistants made available to the Committee of Good Offices.
- (e) To cease immediately the publication of a daily operational communique or any other information about military operations unless by prior mutual agreement in writing, except weekly publication of lists of individuals (giving names, numbers and home addresses) who have been killed or have died as a result of injuries received in action.
- (f) To accept the principle of the release of prisoners by each party and to commence discussions with a view to the most rapid and convenient implementation thereof, the release in principle to be without regard to the number of prisoners held by either party.

8. That, on the acceptance of the foregoing, the Committee's military assistants will immediately conduct enquiries to establish whether and where, especially in West Java, elements of the Republican military forces continue to offer resistance behind the present forward positions of the Netherlands forces. If the enquiry establishes the existence of such forces, these would withdraw as quickly as practicable, and in any case within twenty-one days, as set out in the following paragraph.

9. That all forces of each party in any area accepted as a demilitarized zone or in any area on the other party's side of a demilitarized zone, will, under the observation of military assistants of the Committee and with arms and warlike equipment, move peacefully to the territory on the party's own side of the demilitarized zones. Both parties undertake to facilitate a speedy and peaceful evacuation of the forces concerned.

10. This agreement shall be considered binding unless one party notifies the Committee of Good Offices and the other party that it considers the truce regulations are not being observed by the other party and that this agreement should therefore be terminated.

For the Government of the Kingdom  
of the Netherlands

/s/ Raden Abdulkadir Widjojotmodjo,  
Chairman of the delegation

For the Government of the  
Republic of Indonesia

/s/ Dr. Amir Sjerifuddin,  
Chairman of the delegation

The signatures appearing above were hereunto subscribed this 17th day of January 1948, on board the U.S.S. Renville, in the presence of the representatives on the United Nations Security Council Committee of Good

/Offices

Offices on the Indonesian question, and the Committee Secretary, whose signatures are hereunto subscribed as witnesses:

Chairman: Mr. Justice Richard C. Kirby (Australia)

Representatives: Mr. Paul van Zeeland (Belgium)  
Dr. Frank P. Graham (United States)

Secretary: Mr. T. G. Narayanan

ANNEX

CLARIFICATION OF THE AGREEMENT

1. As regards paragraph 1 of the foregoing agreement, it is understood that the two parties will endeavour to implement the various points of the truce agreement without any delay and with all means at their disposal; it is equally understood that, should one of the parties meet with special difficulties in carrying out fully within a few days any obligation imposed upon it by the truce agreement, upon notification to the other party the time limit of forty-eight (48) hours provided in the first article of the proposals will be extended up to a maximum of twelve (12) days.
2. As regards paragraph 2 of the foregoing agreement, it is understood that if, as expected, the truce agreement is increasingly implemented and the general situation continues to develop favourably, the demilitarized zones will, as a matter of course, be further extended. The question of an extension of demilitarized zones will upon the request of either party, be considered forthwith by the Committee's military assistants who, acting within the intent of paragraph 5, will advise the appropriate authorities.
3. As regards paragraph 4 of the foregoing agreement, it is understood that the military assistants of the Committee of Good Offices will have every opportunity in the execution of paragraph 4 of the truce agreement, for determining whether any incident requires inquiry by the higher authorities of either or both parties, in which case they will of course at the same time refer the matter to their principal, namely, the Committee of Good Offices, whose services will be available to assist in adjusting differences between the parties in regard to the truce.



## APPENDIX XII

LETTER RECEIVED ON 15 JANUARY 1948 FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE DELEGATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA CONCERNING ACCEPTANCE BY THE DELEGATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE POLITICAL PRINCIPLES, OF THE PROPOSALS FOR A TRUCE AGREEMENT PROPOSED BY THE NETHERLANDS DELEGATION AND OF REDRAFTED PARAGRAPHS AND EXPLANATION OF PARAGRAPH 10 OF THE NETHERLANDS PROPOSALS FOR A TRUCE AGREEMENT TRANSMITTED INFORMALLY TO THE REPUBLICAN DELEGATION ON 4 JANUARY, AND MADE FORMAL ON 9 JANUARY 1948

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that the Government of the Republic of Indonesia is willing to accept:

(1) the proposals for a truce agreement submitted informally by the Netherlands delegation on 2 January 1948, and made formal on 9 January 1948 (document S/AC.10/82/Rev.1), and the redrafted paragraphs and explanation of paragraph 10 of these proposals submitted on 4 January 1948 and made formal on 9 January 1948 (document S/AC.10/83/Rev.1);

(2) the political principles for the settlement of the dispute, including the four principles of the Linggadjati Agreement taken from the Committee's Christmas draft message, proposed informally by the Netherlands delegation on 2 January 1948 and made formal on 9 January 1948 (document S/AC.10/81/Rev.1);

subject to the clarifications of the truce agreement which you have handed to me today, and with the understanding that these documents will be signed and published on the same day, and subject to the acceptance by the Netherlands delegation of the principles referred to in the following paragraph, as mentioned in sub-paragraph (d).

The Government of the Republic of Indonesia also agrees to accept the six principles for the negotiations towards a political settlement contained in document S/AC.10/84/Rev.1 of 10 January 1948 with the following understanding:

- (a) That point 2 will become operative after the signing of the political agreement envisaged in this document;
- (b) That the reference to article 4 in point 6 does not prejudice the number of component states to be within the future United States of Indonesia;
- (c) That the six points will be presented formally and publicly to both parties following the signing of the truce agreement and the issuance by both parties of the requisite identical cease-fire orders;
- (d) That the Committee upon its presentation of these points formally and publicly to both parties will request both parties to state their replies not later than forty-eight (48) hours thereafter, when both parties will state their acceptance.

/I have the honour to be,

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

Amir SJARIFUDDIN,  
Chairman,  
Delegation of the Republic  
of Indonesia.

Mr. Justice Richard C. Kirby,  
Chairman,  
Committee of Good Offices.

# APPENDIX XIII

## PRINCIPLES FORMING AN AGREED BASIS FOR THE POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS ACCEPTED AT THE FOURTH MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE OF GOOD OFFICES WITH THE PARTIES ON 17 JANUARY 1948

The Committee of Good Offices has been informed by the delegation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and by the delegation of the Republic of Indonesia that, the truce agreement having been signed, their Governments accept the following principles on which the political discussions will be based:

1. That the assistance of the Committee of Good Offices be continued in the working out and signing of an agreement for the settlement of the political dispute in the islands of Java, Sumatra and Madura, based upon the principles underlying the Linggadjati Agreement.
2. It is understood that neither party has the right to prevent the free expression of popular movements looking toward political organizations which are in accord with the principles of the Linggadjati Agreement. It is further understood that each party will guarantee the freedom of assembly, speech and publication at all times provided that this guarantee is not construed so as to include the advocacy of violence or reprisals.
3. It is understood that decisions concerning changes in administration of territory should be made only with the full and free consent of the populations of those territories and at a time when the security and freedom from coercion of such populations will have been ensured.
4. That on the signing of the political agreement provision be made for the gradual reduction of the armed forces of both parties.
5. That as soon as practicable after the signing of the truce agreement, economic activity, trade, transportation and communications be restored through the co-operation of both parties, taking into consideration the interests of all the constituent parts of Indonesia.
6. That provision be made for a suitable period of not less than six months nor more than one year after the signing of the agreement, during which time uncoerced and free discussion and consideration of vital issues will proceed. At the end of this period, free elections will be held for self-determination by the people of their political relationship to the United States of Indonesia.
7. That a constitutional convention be chosen according to democratic procedure to draft a constitution for the United States of Indonesia.
8. It is understood that if, after signing the agreement referred to in item 1, either party should ask the United Nations to provide an agency to observe conditions at any time up to the point at which sovereignty is transferred from the Government of the Netherlands to the Government of the United States of Indonesia, the other party will take this request in serious consideration.

The following four principles are taken from the Linggadjati Agreement:

9. Independence for the Indonesian peoples.

/10. Co-operation

10. Co-operation between the peoples of the Netherlands and Indonesia.
11. A sovereign state on a federal basis under a constitution which will be arrived at by democratic processes.
12. A union between the United States of Indonesia and other parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands under the King of the Netherlands.

Confirmed for the Government of  
the Kingdom of the Netherlands

Confirmed for the Government of  
the Republic of Indonesia

/s/ Raden Abdulkadir Widjojoatmodjo  
Chairman of the delegation

/s/ Dr. Amir Sjarifuddin  
Chairman of the delegation

The representatives on the United Nations Security Council Committee of Good Offices on the Indonesian Question, and the Committee Secretary, whose signatures are hereunto subscribed on this 17th day of January 1948, on board the U.S.S. Renville, testify that the above principles are agreed to as a basis for the political discussions.

Chairman:	/s/	Mr. Justice Richard C. Kirby (Australia)
Representatives:	/s/	Mr. Paul van Zeeland (Belgium)
	/s/	Dr. Frank P. Graham (United States)
Secretary:	/s/	T. G. Narayanan

APPENDIX XIV

ADDITIONAL STATEMENT MADE BY THE COMMITTEE OF GOOD OFFICES AT ITS  
FOURTH MEETING WITH THE PARTIES HELD ON 17 JANUARY 1948

1. The truce agreement having been signed, the Committee of Good Offices calls the attention of the Netherlands authorities to the desirability of allowing Republican representatives to accompany the Committee's military assistants, not only within the demilitarized zones, but also outside of them, under the same conditions, in order to implement more rapidly and more easily the movements of troops and equipment referred to in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the truce agreement.
  2. The Committee understands that in the first instance and for the time being the Netherlands Indies Government is willing, without prejudice, to admit three Republican officers into areas controlled by Netherlands forces with the sole objective of accompanying the military assistants of the Committee of Good Offices. The task of these Republican officers will be exclusively to assist the military assistants and the responsible Netherlands officers to prepare the evacuation of such elements of the Republican military forces as continue to offer resistance behind the present forward positions of the Netherlands forces.
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