

DOCUMENTARY MATERIAL ON THE INDONESIAN QUESTION
SUBMITTED BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
NETHERLANDS TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Note by the Secretary-General

The attached documentary material was forwarded by the representative of the Netherlands to the United Nations with the request that it be circulated as a document in the Security Council series. The following explanation was given in a covering letter, dated 11 September 1947:

"In speaking before the Security Council on 31 July 1947 during the discussion of the Indonesian question, the Netherlands Representative, Mr. E. N. van Kleffens, gave a survey of the reasons which had compelled the Netherlands Government to undertake police action in Java and Sumatra and indicated that documentary material concerning the case would be put before the Council in due course."

"In the course of his speech Mr. van Kleffens touched i.a. on the food blockade by the Republic of Indonesia of the areas held by the Netherlands troops and on the incidents in the Surabaya-Modjokerto area.

"I have the honour to transmit to you hereby on behalf of the Netherlands Government the following documentary material on both above-mentioned subjects:

- a. a historical survey of the food situation in general and the food blockade by the Republic of Indonesia in particular on Java and Sumatra, in which the conditions before the war, after the Japanese capitulation and after the police action are reviewed and to which a number of annexes containing relevant reports on various parts of Java and Sumatra are attached.

(See page 3)

- b. a historical survey of the events round Surabaya between October 1946 and April 1947, which may serve as an illustration

/of wanton

of wanton destruction and misery wilfully created by lawless elements of the Republic of Indonesia." (See page 16)

The letter also stated that the surveys were compiled by the Netherlands Indies Government.

By letter dated 26 September 1947, the following additional material was transmitted:

- c. A report concerning the search for missing and murdered Europeans as well as the liberation of interned Europeans. (See page 36)
- d. a letter from the President of the Medan Indian Community and attached report on Indians and Chinese on the east coast of Sumatra. (See page 41)
- e. an operational order issued by the Republican Territorial Commander of Madura concerning the freeing of criminals from the local prisons. (See page 48)

A. THE FOOD BLOCKADE OF THE NETHERLANDS-CONTROLLED
TERRITORIES IN JAVA AND SUMATRA *

1. Pre-War Conditions

Before the war there was ample food in Indonesia for its population. During the last few years Indonesia was even able to provide fully for her own rice requirements. In the last normal year before the war (1939) there was available for each inhabitant of Java and Madura:

83 kilogrammes of rice
39 kilogrammes of corn
159 kilogrammes of cassava, and approximately
30 kilogrammes of other foodstuffs.

Not only were foods plentiful but prices were very low. For instance, the price of rice in that period was approximately 7 cts. per kg., of corn 4 cts. per kg. and of cassava 1 ct. per kg.

Since in Indonesia the prices for all commodities are expressed in terms of the price of rice and bear a fixed relation to it, the price level in Indonesia was clearly very low and even the humblest, with a daily income of 30 cts., could provide without restriction for their primary needs of existence.

In the Japanese period this situation was very soon changed through mismanagement by the Japanese occupation forces. Nevertheless Indonesia remained a rich food area, and it was possible, after the Japanese capitulation, to increase the production of foodstuffs by simple means to an extent approaching pre-war conditions.

2. The condition after the Japanese capitulation

Immediately after the Japanese capitulation, measures for the improvement of the food situation were taken under the leadership of the British military authorities, in order to ensure a regular supply of rice to the population in the shortage areas.

Since rice surpluses must be found mostly in the rice areas extending to the east of the city of Batavia and in East Java, it is clear that in restoring the rice supply close contact with and co-operation by the Republican authorities was essential. The negotiations with the Republic in this matter were concentrated in the beginning upon the food supply for the city of Batavia, the capital and the largest city of Indonesia. As early as February 1946 a Food Control Board was set up at Batavia for this purpose, to take care of the supply and distribution of foodstuffs, and in particular of rice, for this city. As at that time some months would still have to elapse before the new crop would be harvested, it was agreed with the

* Original: Dutch

Indonesian for the fact that, in exchange for the rice to be made available by the Republican interior, clothing and various other goods and materials would be supplied by the Netherlands Indies government. After delivery of, among other things, 29,000 yards of dry goods to the Republican authorities, and also the distribution by the Netherlands Indies Government of nearly 7,000 tons of I.E.F.C. rice, as an advance on the Republican rice delivery, for the use of the Indonesian population of Batavia, it became evident that the Republic had failed completely to fulfil its part of the bargain. Repeatedly pressed for delivery, the Republic pleaded that it was very willing but that it was unable to furnish any rice because there was not enough available in the interior. Nevertheless, at about the same time the then Prime Minister of the Republic, Mr. Soetan Shahrir, promised India delivery of 500,000 tons of rice (approximately 700,000 tons gabah.)

Notwithstanding this discouraging start, hope was not given up on the Netherlands side, and so, under the leadership of the British authorities, negotiations in the matter were continued. These negotiations resulted in the specific promise by the Indonesian representatives (speaking in the name of the Republic) that, beginning in the month of November 1946, the following quantities of foods would be sent to Batavia each month:

2,000	tons	of	rice
3,000	"	"	paddy
2,000	"	"	corn
500	"	"	<u>katjang idjoe (kedele)</u>
500	"	"	tapioca meal

In addition, the Republic promised to use all possible means to fulfil the following rice shipments:

11,000 tons of rice per month to be supplied for Javanese cities under Netherlands control.

1,000 tons of rice per month to be supplied for Sumatran cities under Netherlands control.

5,000 tons of rice per month to be supplied for the Eastern islands of the Archipelago.

6,000 tons of rice per month to be supplied for the Western islands of the Archipelago.

All these pledges, however, have not led to a single concrete result. Neither the 7,000 tons of rice advanced to the Republic by the Netherlands Indies Government from her own small supply - and received on I.E.F.C. allocation - nor the 50 trucks with gasoline, oil and accessories made available by the British Army for the specific purpose of transporting the rice to Batavia but misused by the Republic for military purposes, were ever

returned to the Netherlands Indies government.

The Republican Army (the Tentara Republik Indonesia, later the Tentara Nasional Indonesia) even placed reinforcements along the demarcation line which ran along the Bekasi river, and which separated the great rice belt of the Krawang plain from Batavia, in order to prevent rice from being brought into the city of Batavia by Chinese and Indonesian merchants.

The other big cities of Java under Netherlands control were in a like situation. An iron ring was drawn round Semarang by the T.R.I., or T.N.I., to make it impossible for any food to find its way into this city. Consequently the rice had to be brought from elsewhere and vegetables had actually to be supplied to Semarang by aircraft.

In Surabaya also conditions went from bad to worse due to the Republican food blockade. After a slight improvement noticeable after the initialing of the Linggadjati Agreement at the end of 1946, there followed a period of bitter oppression culminating in the intentional flooding of the Sidcardjo delta, through which thousands of hectares of sawahs planted with rice were lost.

In Sumatra the Republic behaved in the same way. From the end of 1946 Medan and Padang were so completely sealed off by the Republican troops that the population would have suffered from the severest famine if food had not been imported from elsewhere. Conditions in Medan became so critical that its Republican mayor took steps to induce the Republican authorities outside the city to modify their policy and at least to let small quantities of food through for the Republican officials. As late as May, 1947 the Chinese consul at Medan made an official journey to the small town of Pematang Siantar situated farther inland, where the Republican headquarters were established, to ask for help for the Chinese population of Medan, who were entirely without food. The Republican governor, Hasan, replied to this appeal that rice could be sent only if the Chinese first paid taxes to the Republic. The T.R.I. (or T.N.I.) imposed even harder conditions and consented to let food through only in exchange for weapons. To illustrate the acuteness of the food blockade an incident may be recorded which occurred near Medan on 13 February 1947. The Republican Resident and his party, returning to Medan from a visit to the interior, were stopped near that city by Republican military, who objected to the small food supply which the Resident had brought with him for his own use.

Padang was provisioned almost entirely by air from the end of 1946.

In Palembang the same conditions prevailed. This city, also, lacked any food supplies from the interior, due to the rigorous measures taken by the Republicans. Considering that, counting only the cities in Java and

Sumatra (with the surrounding territory) under its control, the Netherlands Indies government had to care for approximately 5 million people, of whom almost 4 1/2 million were Indonesians, the Republican action obviously not only made great difficulties for the Netherlands Indies government, but also made it next to impossible for the Netherlands Indies government to get sufficient food together to maintain this Indonesian population.

In this situation the Netherlands Indies government did its utmost, within the framework of the activities of the I.E.F.C. (International Emergency Food Council), to import as much rice as possible from abroad. The I.E.F.C. itself, however, had not enough rice available to meet the whole requirement of the Netherlands Indies government; moreover, this organization thought that these cities - especially after the initialing of the Linggadjati Agreement - could expect at any rate some supply of staple foods from the interior.

Obviously the quantities of imported rice were quite inadequate to cover even minimum requirements. As a consequence, rice prices rose from day to day. In the first quarter of 1947 they had already soared to 4 - 5 guilders per kg. in the cities of Java, and 8 - 10 guilders per kg. in the cities of Sumatra. Although the Netherlands Indies government met this situation by distributing the rice imported from abroad at 15 cts. per litre, (1 litre equals approximately 800 grammes), a considerable loss, the effect of these high prices of rice was to put up enormously the prices of other commodities as well. Many people, including countless Indonesians, died as a result. Conditions were made worse still by the inability of the Republican controllers to organize even a moderately efficient distribution of food to the territories under their charge. Anyone who visited the big cities of Java and Sumatra at that time will remember the misery of countless Indonesian refugees who had fled from the Republican territories to seek safety in the territories under Netherlands rule and had so made the provisioning of regions already short of food even more difficult and inadequate.

After the signing of the Linggadjati Agreement on 25 March 1947, one of the first tasks which the Netherlands Indies Government faced in its negotiations with the Republic, seeking to put into practice the idea of co-operation embodied in the Agreement, was to organize the supply of food to the whole of Indonesia, which must always be regarded as a single economic unit. In these discussions it was assumed that the interest of the population would best be served by starting as soon as possible a system of joint rice purchase in the surplus areas to supply the shortage areas of Indonesia. Furthermore, the Republican government was urged first of all to

co-operate in meeting the food requirements of Indonesia, and only when this had been achieved to resume the rice shipments to India which it had undertaken. The Netherlands representatives suggested that the work should be done through a joint food fund. Lengthy negotiations did not, however, lead to a single positive result. The republic wished to dispose of its food surpluses independently and declined any concrete form of co-operation.

3. Conditions after the police action.

The police action taken in Java and Sumatra for the purpose of restoring order, quiet and safety has resulted in the destruction of many important economic assets. These have included many sheds filled with padi which should have relieved the food shortage of the starved population, and a large number of rice-hulling mills which should have processed the paddy.

In the important rice centre east of Batavia (the Krawang territory) 46 percent of the rice-hulling mills were destroyed or burnt down. The large modern mill of the Anglo-Dutch Plantations in the Soebang area was destroyed, and many mills in other rice centres of Java were rendered useless.

Nevertheless padi and rice have been gathered and stored everywhere, under the direction of the food fund of the Netherlands Indies government. The rice will be moved by truck and train to shortage areas, and the rice-hulling plants that remain intact will shortly run to maximum capacity in order to grind the paddy as fast as possible.

Although various gangs are retarding the restoration of order and safety, to the detriment of the population, the food machinery can already be seen to have been restored here and there. This is reflected most clearly in the constant decline in rice prices (West Java 60 cts. to 1 guilder per kg; East Java 30 to 60 cts. per kg; North Sumatra 1 guilder 50 cts. per kg; South Sumatra 1 guilder to 1 guilder 50 cts.), which has brought this staple food once more within the financial reach of the Indonesian population.

The staff of the food fund hopes that a better distribution of the food supplies in hand in Java will result in the release of 150,000 tons of rice for the shortage areas; success in this project will remove the threat of famine and the population will be able to work their sawahs in peace and produce a richer crop next year.

APPENDIX I TO SECTION A

Data Concerning Food Blockade of the
Territories Occupied by the Netherlands*

SOURCE GIVEN:

DESCRIPTION

I. West Java

Tgrm. Cndt. Dec. 7 Div. of 13.11. '46 No. 5630	Iasjkar Rakjat stops all rice supplies via Krawang to Batavia.
Amacab report of 18 Nov. 1946 No. 264	All rice consignments from Krawang are being confiscated.
Weekoverz. 7 Dec. period 7-15 Nov. 1946. No. 2	In Tangerang all food supplies have been stopped completely. The measures against transport to our territory have been made stricter.
Weekoverz. B-Div. Bandoeng Period 12-18 Nov. 1946 No. 2974 M.Trade with the occupied territory is still being prevented by the Republicans. The P.T. organization exercises the chief control and acts ruthlessly against offenders.
Spec. agents.	From Chief of Staff Sect. 2 III Bgde. T.R.I. (Poerwakarta) to Princ. Sect., Operations I Div. at Soemedang. On 2 December 1946 an inward economic blockade or boycott was imposed on territory occupied by the enemy.
Spec. agents 25 Jan. 1947	From Cdt. II Div. T.R.I. (Poerwakarta) to Cdt. Sector 4 (Tandjoengsari). Because there are still gaps in Sector 4 through which the economic blockade against the enemy is being hampered, I request information whether you have as yet been able to withdraw troops from II Div. of the Bandoeng North position for the purpose of attaching them to Sector 4.
Spec. agents 14 March 1947	From Cdt. IV Bgde. T.R.I. (Garoet) and Cdt. Positions and Cdt. Positions Perdjoeangan (Tjiawi).Request placing of guards at Tjiwidej, Lamboerani and Tjitjalengka, and on all dark roads used for smuggling food out. Request radical action. Notes: By "out" is meant "out of Republican territory."
Radio Repoebl. Indonesia (R.V.D. Monitoring) 18 Feb. 1947	On 18 February 1947 Radio Rep. Ind. announced that the import of food into Batavia would be handled by the Civic authority of Batavia (Djakarta) via the Central Commercial Office, a municipal office and the Co-operative Undertakings Centre, a municipal institution. The import and export of goods may take place only with the knowledge of the purchasing office in Batavia which has been officially established for that purpose and is charged with issuing import licences.

SOURCE GIVEN:	DESCRIPTION
B.K. Batavia 18 March 1947	On 12 March 1947 the "Djawatan Economie" (service of economic affairs) declared that <u>no more permits</u> could be issued for importing products from the interior into Batavia. These consumption goods will then become available for export in one way or another, for instance <u>via Singapore</u> . The various military units have received orders to confiscate out of hand goods transported <u>without a Djocja pass</u> .
Antara press dispatch 2 April 1947	From 1 April 1947 an inspection post of the Customs Service has been established at Tjikampek station, with the duty, among others, of controlling the transport of goods from the interior to Djakarta and <u>vice versa</u> .
Sitrap Cdt. West Java 2 June 1947	The Police <u>Tentara</u> has again established an economic blockade at Tjikampek. All private licenses for import of goods to Batavia have been withdrawn.
Spec. agents 5 June 1947	Report of Cdt. III Bgde. T.R.I. (Poerwakarta) to Cdt. I Div. T.R.I. The blockade on rice was withdrawn by us by order of a higher authority (Ministry of Welfare); consequently rice streamed into Batavia. From 1 June 1947 we have re-established and intensified the blockade on rice.
Spec. agents 15 July 1947	From Tasikmalaja Capt. Djohro reported to Section I of the Vth Bgde. T.R.I. (Cheribon) on 14 July that the blockade directed against the enemy had been intensified. The Local Military Commandant of Tjikampek requested the Minister of Welfare on 10 July to put him officially in charge of the economic blockade against Batavia, since in general it was being carried on without any co-ordination. Note: This last request is probably intended as an effort to abolish the civilian customs post and to get unhampered control into military hands.
II. Central Java	
B.K. Semarang No. NS/WO 3/8646 31 Dec. 1947 III/MI/179	Pengkol. Several P.T. soldiers and patrols. The <u>kampong</u> population is terrorized by these soldiers and patrols in a very cruel manner... A woman who arrived in Semarang from Pengkol related, among other things, that her husband had done business in Semarang. When this was discovered, the man was forced to dig a hole, and when this was nearly ready he was shot down while still digging and left dead.
Terr. and Trpn. Commando (O.O.T.) 6/2 thru 13/2-'47	Citizens of kampong KALIANANTJAR (98210) who traded with Semarang were forced by the members of the P.T. to hand over a certain sum to them. On the arrival of newly-appointed P.T. members a number of citizens were arrested, and afterwards the civilian population had to submit to a house search in which food stores and clothing were confiscated. The male population escaped. 77 men succeeded in reaching Netherlands territory. The women were locked up at KALIANANTJAR H.Q. and ill-treated.

SOURCE GIVEN:	DESCRIPTION
B.K. Semarang NO.NS/WC 1/11143 15 March 1947 1/PE/226Indonesians are said to have been ill-treated again in connection with trading with Semarang.
B.K. Semarang NO.NS/WO 3/11358 24 March 1947 III/MI/371/17A few B.P.R.I. people rendered aid to rice sellers on various occasions and accompanied them on their trips from and to Semarang. The P.T. found this out and disarmed the B.P.R.I. These 53 men were to have been interned on the following day, but escaped to Semarang.
B.K. Semarang No. NS/WO 3/11609 3 April 1947 III/MI/389/19	Merchants who want to go to Semarang to sell their products are beaten half to death when this is discovered.
Cdt. "T" Bgde. Tel No. 4991/2 3 April 1947	Rice sellers from the West speak of P.T. terror, of merchants imprisoned, ill-treated and killed, and of merchandise confiscated.
B.K. Semarang No. NS/WC 1b/12187 19 April 1947 I/PE/266	Groups of <u>desa</u> people are said to be still entering Semarang; on the way back home they dip their merchandise in the mud for fear that these goods (purchased articles of clothing) may attract attention as "new"; if this were discovered by the pemoedas it would point to trade with Semarang and the well-known consequences would inevitably follow.
B.K. Semarang No. NS/WO 3/13008 24 May 1947 III/MI/476/19Cases are also known of <u>prahu</u> skippers in JAPARA, WELERI and KENDAL, being questioned and maltreated because they had carried products to Semarang.
III. East Java	
Daily Report VDMB 18/12-'46	Sidoardjo. Members of the <u>Tentera pemberitan Police--(P.T.P.)</u> &c. are at all posts in order to prevent trade with enemy territory. The headquarters of the P.T.P. is situated at Djocja, and a headquarters for the Surabaya front is at Sidoardjo.
Inland Report No.228 A Div. 23-12-'46	On 19 December 1947 the population of Kedaman was forbidden to sell rice in Netherlands territory. Control is exercised by Police <u>Tstimewa</u> , which confiscates goods of offenders.
O.O.T. No. 1 A. Div. 26/12-'46 to 2-1-'47 incl.	In the border territory of Surabaya measures against trade with the Netherlands and possession of NICA money have been tightened up. Some abductions of men and women traders, cases of maltreatment and reprisals by arson have been reported.

SOURCE GIVEN:	DESCRIPTION
NEFIS Document No. 3264 - Issued at Modjokerto 18-3-47	Modjokerto 8 February 1947. The meeting discussed questions and motions on whether the economic blockade should be continued. The Command at the front is to decide on the means to be adopted. The best plan is to consult the Resident on the matter.
O.O.T. No. 3A. Div. - 22/2-6/3-'47	Persons have been sent out by the ALRI to the occupied <u>tambak</u> territory to steal fish from the hatchery and take them over into the territory south of the river. Porong. Enemy units to the south of the river Porong threaten with death everyone trying to trade with occupied territories.
SITRAP A Div. 12-4-'47	10 April 1947. During the last few days freedom of trade between Modjokerto and unoccupied territories has been seriously interfered with by the T.R.I., who confiscate goods and money.
SITRAT No. 114 A. Div. 19-4-'47	T.R.I. are obstructing all trade with Netherlands territory at the village of Betiring 3590.
WEEKRAPP.A.Div. 15-5-'47	Trading traffic still obstructed.
Intercept B.K. Surabaya 24-5-'47	22 May 1947. Major-General Dr. Moestopo, Cdt. Field HQ, East Java, to Lt.-Col. Latif, Sector Cdt. VI. Div. The "food blockade" must be tightened up.
Inrap H.K. Mar. Bgde. 4-6-'47	5 June 1947. District Pandanaroem. Hardly any produce from Republican territories available, owing to strict control by T.R.I. over travellers.
O.O.T. No. 25 A. Div. 12-19 June 1947	Province of Mojokerto. Increasing tendency to resort to terrorization of the inhabitants in order to prevent trade with territories occupied by us.
Weekly Report No. 53 17-23 June-'47	Trawas: The T.R.I. are continuing to prevent trade with occupied territory.
Secret Weekly Report No. 25 A. Div.	19 June 1947. The enemy is making a drive to stop all trade in Modjokerto territory by outrages on the inhabitants.
Inrap. No. 482 VDMB 21-6-'47	20 June 1947. Trawas: The <u>Tentera</u> is forbidding travellers to proceed north on pain of confiscation of foods and maltreatment.
O.O.T. No. 26. A. Div. 19-26 June-'47	The <u>Polisi Umum</u> (ordinary police) at Modjokerto appear to be anti-Netherlands. They have, for example, prevented the transport of cattle to Surabaya on the pretext that there is no need to replenish the Netherlands' stocks.

SOURCE GIVEN:

DESCRIPTION

Ri 921/G
B.K. Surabaya
4-7-'47

Importation of tobacco products into Modjokerto is forbidden because these articles are sold to Netherlanders.

G. SITRAP 216
A. Div.
30-7-'47

Tjerme Sector.
Trade with Netherlands territory has been declared a capital offence by the T.R.I.

Sitrap PADANG
ddo. 1-5-'47

Food blockade intensified at approaches East of PADANG.

PTC PADANG
ddo. 22-5-'47

Food supply via Chinese through Republic entirely stopped.

Nefis PADANG
Dag.Mil Geg. No. 62
ddo 29-5-'47

Total food blockade of PADANG re-established.

TPC PADANG
4-6-'47

Total boycott on delivery of vegetables and fruit via Chinese to Netherlands military units and to those who work for the "NICA".
The food supply through Chinese from the UPLANDS became a bone of contention between N.R.I. government and T.R.I. Despite Resident RASHID's veto, trade with PADANG was carried on by the T.R.I.

Nefis PADANG
ddo. 24-4-'47

The Polisi Tentara stops people outside the Eastern demarcation line who enter and leave the occupied territory with food, and forces them to sell these goods 5 km. outside the demarcation line.

APPENDIX II TO SECTION A*

Palembang Residency

Food Blockade

"Y"-Brig.
Inl. Rapp
No. 147
23-24/4-'47

The T.R.I. - though not officially - forbids the people to bring their goods to the passars in the territory occupied by the Netherlands.

"Y"-Brig.
Inl. Rapp.
No. 149
28/4-2/5-'47

At PAJAKABOENG rice and vegetables intended for PALEMBANG are stopped and confiscated for the T.R.I. occupation.

Nefis B.K. Plg.
12/5-'47

With effect from 8 May 1947 the Resident of Palembang at LAHAT prohibited the transport of rice from PALEMBANG, with the exception of a small quantity for personal use.

"Y" Brig.
O.O.T.
No. 28
15-22/5-'47

On 18 May 1947 a meeting was held at PRABOEMOELIH by the Masjoemi. Kijai Hadji HARUN ALI (a student belonging to the group which recently arrived in INDONESIA from CAIRO) urged that a boycott be organized against the territories occupied by the Neths. The cost of living will then become so high that the Indonesians also will have to leave these territories. The boycott must be carried out in conjunction with the Chinese and organized in minute detail.

"Y"-Brig.
Inl. Rapp.
No. 155
19-22/5-'47

The economic blockade by the P.T. is now being intensified. Many foodstuffs are again being confiscated.

Nefis
B.K. Plg.
Dagrap. 34
27/5-'47

The transport of rice and vegetables from the interior is being very much hindered by the Republican military forces, especially by those at PRABOEMOELIH.

Gen. Police
Plg.
No. 62 C.D./Geh.
7/6-'47

26/5 The export of rice from the interior to PALEMBANG is being energetically repressed. Trains are being searched and even small quantities intended for personal use are confiscated.

Nefis
B.K. Plg.
Dagrap. 36
6/5-'47

31/5. As a result of the blockade of foodstuffs from the interior established by the Republican military forces, the price of rice for example has risen within a few days from 650 guilders (Jap. current price) to 1,000 guilders (Jap. current price) per kerosene can.

* Original: Dutch

Nefis
B.K. Plg.
Dagrap. 39
20/6-'47

An informant reported on 20 June that he had returned from Oeloean on the 15th of that month with 7 cows which he intended to sell here. At PRABOEMOELIH, however, the animals were confiscated by the P.T.

"Y"-Brig.
Inl. Rapp.
163
16-19-6-'47

The population of LANGKAN and surroundings have been forbidden by the Republican troops to go to SIMPANG LANGKAN. All approaches to and from POELAU have been closed off by Republican posts outside the 2-km. zone.

The population of KERTAPATI complains that Republican troops at PAJAKABOENG stop rice transports, so that the rice situation has become critical.

Nefis
B.K. Plg.
Dagrap. 39
20/6-'47

Four prahus of Djeroeks belonging to a fruit dealer were confiscated by the T.R.I. because the crew had taken with them a small quantity of rice for food during the voyage.

"Obor Ra'jat
15/7-'47

Decree of the defense council of the residence PALEMBANG, dated LAHAT, 6/7-'47, concerning transport of essential goods (art. 4, State Defense Council decree No. 15). Special permission is required for the transport of the following essential goods:-

- (a) rice, weight exceeding 16 kg.
 - paddy " " 30 "
 - corn " " 16 "
- (b) gaplek " " 16 "
- (c) - - - -
- (d) - - - -
- (e) cattle " " - -
- (f) cattle meat, weight exceeding 1 kg.

"Y"-Brig.
O.O.T.
30-10/7-'47

All importation of rice and vegetables is stopped by the T.R.I. at the demarcation line. Sub-governor ISA lodged a protest with the Resident of PALEMBANG at LAHAT on 8 July 1947 and urged him to see that rice supplies were not obstructed any further.

Nefis
B.K. Plg.
B.K. Plg.
No. 0154/B
10/7/47

The Resident of PALEMBANG at LAHAT informs the sub-governor at PALEMBANG that rice is not being stopped and that, on the contrary, all due attention is being paid to ensure that the city of PALEMBANG receives an adequate supply.

"Y"-Brig.
Inl. Rapp.
No. 170

Inhabitants of kampong LINGKIS (within the demarcation line) (coming from the passar (market) in SIMPANG RAMBOETAN) were robbed of goods and money on 13 July by a T.R.I. patrol near the road fork within the demarcation line. One inhabitants was robbed of 40,000 guilders (Jap. current price).

Gen. Police
Plg. No. 68
C.D./Geh.
11/7-'47

Passengers who arrive by automobile from the interior at PALEMBANG are not only forced by the N.R.I. police to pay certain amounts in cash, but special attention is given to and taxes are levied on rice and other foodstuffs brought in.

/"Y"-Brig.

"Y"-Brig.
Inl. Rapp.
No. 170
10-14/7-'47

The supply of rice to the territory controlled by the Netherlands is still forbidden. The HIZBOELIAH TROOPS especially oppose this import, and will continue to oppose it even if Sub-governor ISA himself issues an order to transport rice and other foodstuffs to PALEMBANG.

B. HISTORY OF EVENTS ROUND SURABAYA DURING THE PERIOD
FROM OCTOBER 1946 - APRIL 1947*

1. The City's water supply

During the fighting round Surabaya in 1945 and 1946 the supply-pipes which brought drinking-water from the sources some dozens of kilometres outside the city were so damaged that no more water could be brought in. Water had therefore to be brought in from the Brantas River through a purifying plant, and a further supply was obtained from wells. In the dry East-monsoon time the water-level in the river and the wells sank rapidly. The situation, however, became really critical when the Republican forces who were encamped around the city began to cut off the normal supply of river-water, which they were able to do by closing the locks at Lengkong, Kepadjaran, Milirip and Bakalan. Normally over 5,000 hectares of sawah (wet rice fields) are planted round Surabaya, but owing to this shortage of water only 900 hectares could be irrigated, so that the food situation, already serious because of a food blockade imposed by the Republicans, could be expected to become a great deal worse.

2. In September 1946 it appeared that 11 percent of the sawah crop was lost for lack of water; furthermore 33 percent of the vegetable crop in and around the city failed. For a population which in normal times used 32,000 cubic metres of water a day, this month only 11,400 cubic metres of purified water were available daily, so that the situation became extremely critical for tens of thousands of inhabitants. Under these circumstances it was decided to come to an agreement with the Republican authorities who exercised control in the territory where the locks were, so that with their help a more generous flow of water could be obtained.

3. Under the chairmanship of the British Brigadier-General Guinness, a mixed Netherlands and Indonesian "Technical Committee on the Surabaya Water Supply" was formed. It met for the first time in Batavia on 17 October 1946. The following is an extract from the minutes of that meeting:

"The Chairman explained the severity of the water shortage in Surabaya and its surroundings. In Surabaya itself one-quarter of the original peace-time pipe supply was available by pumping on river. In the kampongs outside Surabaya the drying-up of the canals had led to a fall in the water table and the consequent drying-up of the wells, many of which had become saline. On 8 October it was estimated that there were 10,000 kampong dwellers with insufficient water even for drinking. It is probable by now that some 25,000 dwellers may be suffering severe shortages."

4. On 25 October the Indonesian representative on the Technical Committee promised a more generous water supply, but complete agreement was not reached until 2 November. Since then sufficient water has been reaching Surabaya, but new difficulties arose in another field. After opening the locks mentioned in Section 1, irresponsible Republican military leaders used the raised water level of the river to tap off, above Surabaya, water which was then used not for irrigating rice fields but for strategic flooding. The vital interests of the population of this area were thus harmed, since the fields could not be cultivated. A territory of 2,000 hectares which should have produced 2,000 times 25 quintals (about 12 months' food for 25,000 persons) was made unproductive. For irrigation and for the city of Surabaya new difficulties thus arose in relation to the food supply.

Truce, and Breach of Truce by the Republic

5. Meanwhile, on 14 October, a military truce was concluded between the Government of the Netherlands Indies and the Indonesian Republic under which certain lines of demarcation were established by a central mixed British-Netherlands-Republican Truce Committee at Batavia. On the Republican side the local military leaders round Surabaya could not agree with the proposed demarcation lines, and the result was that continual clashes occurred on this line. Enemy activity continued practically uninterrupted for months. The floodings mentioned in Section 4 were one of the results.

6. In January 1947 hostile acts round Surabaya increased in number. In these acts the Republic abused the good faith of the Netherlands. The Netherlands-Indies Government in concluding the Truce had submitted army maps on which the demarcation line was marked, and the positions of the Netherlands forces were disclosed. The Republican military forces made use of these maps to direct accurate artillery fire on to the Netherlands positions. Since 10 January artillery fire was received practically daily. In view of this, on 18 January 1947 the Commission-General demanded that the Republican delegation stop this firing definitely before 25 January. It was also emphatically brought to the attention of the Republic that this continual shooting was constantly augmenting the existing tension, and that reactions from the Netherlands side were bound to be forthcoming.

7. On 24 January at 11:30 hours the order was given by the Republicans to cease fire, but it was only to take effect at 24.00 hours. In the meantime the Republican army, the "T.R.I.", had probably conceived suspicions that a mopping-up action was being planned on the South and south-west front. Probably the T.R.I. at that moment had no knowledge of the ultimatum by which firing was to cease before 25 January, so that no

/direct action

direct action was to be expected from the Netherlands side.

They put into action a plan of their own, and on 21 January in the neighbourhood of Krian they began a general evacuation of the territory held by them. On 23 January a great number of Indonesians and Chinese fled from this district over the demarcation line to the Netherlands and informed them that because of the withdrawal of the T.R.I. and the forced evacuation of the population serious disorder was threatening. The Republican Government they said, had also evacuated, so that no body of authority was left to act against brigandage and other crimes.

8. As the artillery fire on the Netherlands positions was continuous during the night of 23-24 January, a small group of Netherlands forces executed a reconnaissance movement in Krian on the morning of 24 January. Under the circumstances this reconnaissance was understandable. It was evident that in this territory practically no Republican troops and no Republican administration were present, so that the Netherlands troops remained on the spot in order to take over at least some responsibility for law and security and to fill the vacuum in authority.

9. In the territory to the south of Surabaya the Republican troops and administrative organizations had also withdrawn, and from a number of inhabitants of this locality (the place called Sidoardjo) a request for protection was received. A number of cases of pillage and threats against life had already occurred, and consequently on 27 January military protection was granted by the Netherlands. In this locality small units of Netherlands troops were encamped near specific pieces of valuable property such as sugar-factories, in order to protect them against pillage.

10. From the Netherlands side at the same time it was clearly explained that the occupied territory was not to be definitively made a part of the Netherlands territory. Thus in a declaration of the Commission-General on 29 January it was stated:

"It is not our intention to absorb this territory as such into the occupied territory. The forces temporarily there will be withdrawn as soon as a regular administration is restored and the assurance is received that the inhabitants are safe and that the properties situated there - belonging to natives as well as to Netherlands and foreigners - will not be further molested."

11. The Republican press and radio made much ado over this action and alleged that the Netherlands had sent in a division, that heavy action had taken place and that there were heavy casualties. Actually the Netherlands had sent in only two companies, there were practically no skirmishes, and on the Netherlands side one man only was slightly

wounded (the Republican losses were not made known).

12. The Netherlands military action was naturally at once brought forward by the Republican delegation in deliberation with the Commission-General. After a discussion at Batavia, the official communiqué on the proceedings was given out on 4 February 1947; it is reproduced here as Appendix I (in the English text).

New Floods

13. In spite of this joint declaration, the Republican fighting groups round Surabaya at once intensified their activities, in the course of which the Truce of 14 October was repeatedly violated. (Since no order to cease fire was given by the Republican side after the coming into force of the Truce, violations of the Truce occurred not only round Surabaya but more or less generally throughout the Netherlands Indies where there were demarcation lines). In particular, however, the Republicans attempted to damage Netherlands interests by bringing about extensive inundations in the delta of the Brantas above the newly-occupied places, so that great areas were put under water. A Netherlands air reconnaissance on 7 February showed, for instance, that a bend in the Northern Porong River dike had been pierced so that the water was streaming in through a breach twenty metres wide and an area of 55,000 hectares was threatened with inundation. Furthermore, a number of locks had been opened which should have remained closed in order to keep the water at a proper level. An air reconnaissance showed also that a very important dam (the Lengkong) was undermined. Destruction of this dam would lead to the draining of another portion of the delta, with all the consequent disastrous results for the harvest. The severe floods and the draining of water from great areas seriously endangered the crops standing in the fields.

14. Republican military aggression continued in the meantime, and the Truce was broken daily. On 5 February, for instance, the Netherlands side was fired upon as follows:

Post Banjoerip	5	artillery shells and fire from 20 mm. guns
Post Legocndi	15	" "
Post Djerebcng	8	" "
Post Prambon	12	" " (a direct hit on a lodging caused 1 dead and 1 wounded)
Post Kremboeng		nightly machine-gun fire
Post Porong	80	10.5 cm. shells
Post Permisan		nightly fire

Many other facts of this sort could be adduced but will be omitted owing to the necessity for restricting the length of this report. It may, however, be stated that the military situation was made untenable by this

/continual

continual shooting, and also that the interests of the population who were threatened by water in the flooded areas demanded a speedy change in the situation.

15. On 9 February, in a written communication to the chairman of the Republican delegation, the chairman of the Commission-General pointed to the deterioration of the situation, with respect both to the floodings and to the violations of the Truce. (See Appendix II). An answer to this communication was expected by 11 February at the latest - one moreover which would show that the justifiable demands of the Netherlands had been complied with. From the military reports of 10 February it appeared that a sudden calm had fallen on the Surabaya front that day, but this lasted one day only; after that the artillery activity of the Republic increased. Later it appeared from Republican press dispatches that on 10 February the Republican Minister of Defence, Mr. Sharifuddin had been to the Surabaya front, so that the quiet had only been a "show" put on for the minister.

The chairman of the Republican delegation did in fact send a telegram on 10 February to the chairman of the Commission-General in which he stated that he had given orders to improve the situation (See Appendix III). Nevertheless, the subsequent reports received from Surabaya demonstrated clearly that there was no sign of any improvement in the situation, and so no sign of obedience to the order of this high official.

16. In order to prevent all misunderstanding, on 18 February the Netherlands side once more sent three maps of East Java, with the demarcation lines indicated, to the T.R.I. liaison officer at Batavia with the request to make these demarcation lines known as soon as possible to the commanders of the Republican forces involved and to see to it that orders be issued charging them with the responsibility of withdrawing their troops to at least two kilometres outside this line, as had been agreed upon in the Truce. This request was, however, never complied with, and the shooting at Netherlands posts and patrols continued, though on 14 February the Republic ultimately gave a cease-fire order.

17. On 26 February the water in the Kali (river) Porong was so high that a breach of the dike could be expected at any moment. The delta to the west of Prambon-Krian was already under water. The Kali Kedoenggoeling had reached its maximum water level. The Prambong Kremboeng road was flooded and in some places the water was 50 centimetres deep on the road. Everywhere in the flooded areas the food situation was very critical and there were daily cases of death from under-nourishment. The rice growing in the fields was in danger of rotting.

Since the local Netherlands and Republican authorities had not been able to reach any agreement which would improve the situation, the Commission General decided to approach the Republican delegation by telegram, in order to draw attention to the critical situation and to try to bring about an improvement. The telegram dated 26 February ran as follows:

"Very dangerous situation for population and crops in fields, as well as for salt-water fish-ponds situated on seashore. Measures taken to date insufficient. Commission General urges in strongest terms measures for speedy settlement. Propose Engineer Klein travel to Modjokerto with Republican experts to observe conditions there and prepare measures for improvement. On our side gladly prepared to offer all possible help."

Two days later, 28 February, another telegram was sent by the Commission-General to the Republican delegation, as follows:

"Continuation telegram subject flood Brantas delta. Further information makes necessary that, before proposed visit engineers from Department maximum number of sluice-gates of Lengkong dam be raised immediately and Kepadjaran sluice fully opened. This only chance to relieve present distress of population somewhat and perhaps limit spread."

18. The emergency had greatly increased because of the continued flooding, and direct measures were required on behalf of the local population, to the number of some hundreds of thousands of Indonesians and Chinese, if a catastrophe were to be prevented. The food situation was already very critical for tens of thousands of Indonesians, and as some thousands of hectares of planted ricefields had been flooded, the prospect for the future was also gloomy. The Red Cross was obliged to feed more than 6,000 people twice a day at field kitchens, viz. at Gedangang 1,000, at Driaredja 500, at Watoetoelis 1,200, at Sidoardjo 1,500, at Tanggoelangin 1,200, and at Popoh fully 1,000. The health situation in this area, already bad enough because of undernourishment, was seriously threatened, and medical services of the Red Cross and Government therefore extended their help in as generous a measure as possible.

19. On 3 March the Secretary-General of the Republican delegation sent the following answer to the Commission-General:

"Concerning inundation Brantas delta necessary steps already taken. Experts will be sent today to investigate and if previous steps appear inadequate more complete measures will be taken. Sending of Engineer Klein is not considered necessary."

/In this telegram,

In this telegram, therefore, steps were promised, and the help of an expert from the Netherlands Department of Buildings and Roads was actually refused. However, in the days immediately following 3 March no sign of any improvement appeared, and in fact the situation rapidly worsened. This was indeed to be expected, for reconnaissance showed that in the meantime the Porong sluice and the important water distribution plant at Kepadjan-Lengkong had been destroyed, and the sluices at Degah and Kedongsoro had been quite unnecessarily opened, so that more and more water was streaming over the fields. Most of Sidoardjo was flooded in this way and only the main road remained passable. The local sugar depot, the rice-hulling works and the oil factory were under water. Many houses had collapsed because of the continuous floods. In a territory of 500 hectares other structures and roads were threatened with undermining. Furthermore, over the whole delta many connecting roads appeared impassable, which had resulted in large centres of population being completely isolated, so that food supply and medical care were seriously handicapped. This situation was made still more dangerous by the probability, increased by the emergency, that epidemics would break out.

How wilfully these conditions had been brought about was clearly shown when, for example, explosives were used to blow holes in the Mangatan canal bank, at a point 1 1/2 kilometres inside Netherlands territory, where, according to the Truce, Republican troops had no right to come. No room was left for doubt of the malice and purposefulness of the local Republican commanders; they trifled with the vital interests of hundreds of thousands in this area. Conspicuous proof of this was furnished by the inundation of the rice crops standing in the fields and the consequent threatened loss of 2000 tons of rice from an already scanty world food supply. Besides the rice, much damage was also done to the sugar cane, for the fields in which the sugar cane should have been planted for the 1949 harvest could not be cultivated, and so the world sugar shortage will be increased as well. The food situation thus called for measures to be taken, but the Republic, unconcerned, quietly continued to flood the country and in the meantime to shoot regularly at our troops with rifles, automatic weapons and artillery.

20. On 20 March, the Commission-General again sent a telegram:

"Concerning inundation Brantas delta request information whether measures mentioned in telegram 28 February have been taken. Await explanation of your expert about catastrophic extent of flood also what further measures will be taken at his suggestion. Insist on admission of expert from our side."

/No answer was ever received

No answer was ever received to this telegram, although the situation grew steadily worse, so that extensive measures had to be taken by the Netherlands side to render help to the suffering Indonesian and Chinese populations.

Emergency Calls for Action

21. On 17 March the emergency was so great that the Netherlands side could wait no longer before taking measures. Certain military groups in the threatened area received orders to take such steps as would enable the Department experts to take the appropriate measures to make the delta safe and habitable again. This action was reported to the chairman of the Republican delegation in a letter from the chairman of the Commission-General, accompanied by an exposition of the development of the situation (see Appendix IV).

The population in many villages in the distressed area appeared delighted when the Netherlands troops came; the soldiers were treated to fruit and eggs. The Chinese population of Modjokerto prepared an enthusiastic reception for them.

22. At once the repair of the damaged sluices, dikes and other water works was commenced, and within four days about half of the flooded region was dry again. In three weeks the whole region had been reclaimed. It then appeared that a substantial part of the planted rice was in fact lost.

23. The occupation of the water works also clearly revealed the bad faith of the Republicans. The measures proposed by the Netherlanders in a telegram on 28 February had never been taken in contradiction to the telegram of the chairman of the Indonesian delegation of 3 March, in which it was said that the necessary steps had already been taken (see Section 19). Still more serious were the special measures which had been deliberately taken to raise the level of the water even higher than it had already been. Bad faith was thus clearly evident. Effective measures to relieve the emergency could quite easily have been taken; this was obvious from the fact that the steps which the Netherlanders had taken were directly effective, so that the water level fell immediately and quickly. Moreover, in one dam there was found a fused aerial bomb, placed there with the definite intention of causing the greatest possible destruction. The prompt arrival of the Netherlands troops prevented this.

24. In order to show again that the Netherlands had taken active measures in this case only because the Republic had neglected to act, even after being asked to do so repeatedly, over a long period, and for many reasons, the Netherlands side adopted a generous attitude. The Republican local authorities were left in office, or where necessary reinstated. Furthermore,

/the Netherlands-Indies

the Netherlands-Indies Government discussed with the Republican Government a solution for the situation in Modjokerto, and one moreover which should satisfy both parties. Besides, the Netherlands-Indies Government showed its honourable intentions by withdrawing the Netherlands troops who had occupied the Patjet and Trawas complex on 25 and 26 March in order to assure the safety of the Surabaya drinking-water supply, as the water-pipes had been destroyed in some places. Although these places lay outside the territory which according to the plan of the action would be temporarily occupied, the occupied complex was given back to the Republic.

25. A clear proof of the Netherlands good will was demonstrated finally in the agreement which the Commission-General concluded with the Republican delegation on 29 March. In this it was mutually agreed to bring about a demilitarization of the Regency of Modjokerto as quickly as possible so as to leave the highest power with the Republican civil authorities. The Netherlands-Indies Government and the Republican Government agreed, further, to take immediate steps to achieve this object and to ensure the safety of persons and property in the area (See Appendix V).

26. Nevertheless, good though the intention of the agreement was, there was not the slightest question of its observance. Good will was lacking on the Republican side, certainly among the military leaders in the area. Because of this Modjokerto never became the real "experimental garden of cooperation" which had been hoped for. This was the more regrettable for the good will which had been shown on the Netherlands side in settling the dispute as quickly as possible and making far-reaching concessions.

Immediately after the signing of the Linggadjati Agreement (on 25 March) the Republic might have been expected to show its good faith, but in fact it showed the opposite, as did the Republican press and radio, which continually pointed to Modjokerto as a Netherlands act of aggression without mentioning the gross blunders and short-comings of the Republican side.

27. Not only was a real desire for co-operation absent among the Republicans, but the military activity of the Republican forces showed clearly that, in spite of all the good intentions on the highest level, in lower circles no honest wish for earnest co-operation existed. Instead a long series of breaches of the Truce could be cited, of which the following only will be mentioned here:

3 April. Firing at a Netherlands patrol on an open road;

18 April. Heavy firing at a Netherlands patrol during which the Republicans, including machine gunners, took up positions within the demarcated Netherlands territory;

/19 April.

19 April. Renewed firing at a Netherlands patrol at the same place, causing one dead and two wounded;

Daily destruction in the district between Modjokerto and Djombang and on the Western front, in spite of an order against destruction which was promulgated by both sides. In spite of a promise given by the Republic, the destroyed railroad bridge near Djombang was not repaired;

Destruction of roads;

Infiltration of Republican men and officers into Netherlands territory, including the Naval establishment at Surabaya.

In the period from 24 April to 12 May inclusive the T.R.I. was responsible for the following incidents in the district of Modjokerto: five bridges destroyed, forty-three road blocks built, mines laid on the road in twenty-seven places, one mine laid in the structure of a dike, fourteen cases of oppression reported by the population, three cases of sabotage behind the front line, and every day one or more cases of firing on Netherlands patrols.

On the Republican side, furthermore, and contrary to the terms of the Truce, tree barricades have been regularly and continually laid on the roads and tank traps and fortified positions built. Moreover, the population in the demarcation zone have been terrorized, abductions have taken place, evacuations have been compelled and Indonesian dwellings have been burnt.

On 9 June, the Netherlands military spokesman at Batavia, in a review of the week, described the situation thus:

"In the Surabaya territory Netherlands patrols and posts have been shot at fully twenty times. Incidents have taken place in all sectors but especially in that of Modjokerto. T.R.I. officers have been arrested on Netherlands territory. The loerah (headman) of the Tampoeng-Redjo desa was forcibly removed with his family by a band." The breaches of the Truce went on until the police action of the Netherlands forces on 21 July 1947.

28. Résumé

(a) In the period September-November 1946 the water supply of Surabaya was cut off by the Republican forces so that a shortage of drinking water occurred and important food crops were lost.

Through conversations at a high level an improvement in this situation was obtained.

(b) After this water shortage there was a water surplus, because after November Republican military personnel started floods and inundated road villages, factories and rice-fields. The existence of a population

/of some hundreds

of some hundreds of thousands was threatened, while tens of thousands suffered want through this action. A serious danger of epidemics arose. This time consultation was not successful, and so on 23 January 1947 the Netherlands military forces took certain steps through which the emergency was ended for the time being.

(c) Since then the Republicans continued to create floods. Furthermore, a part of the delta was dried up by draining off the necessary irrigation water. In this way a large harvest of rice, sugar and vegetables was lost and the lives of tens of thousands were threatened. For many weeks the Commission-General tried on the highest level to move the Republican delegation to intervene, but when this proved unsuccessful, on 17 March the Netherlands side again took a number of steps to improve the situation. Within some weeks the situation was again normal.

(d) From the Netherlands side it was at once pointed out that only the emergency situation made a one-sided action necessary. In a declaration on 29 March it was, moreover, clearly stated that as soon as possible appropriate steps would be taken to find a solution satisfactory to the Regency of Modjokerto and to both parties.

(e) The desired objective has never been reached because the Republican side lack the will to co-operate and continually break the Truce concluded between the two parties.

APPENDIX I TO SECTION B

Communique dated 4 February 1947*

The Commission-General and the Indonesian delegation have discussed the latest events around Sourabaya.

The situation created by recent military action is considered as a temporary situation by which the line of the discussions shall not be influenced.

Both parties shall co-operate in order to create a normal situation as quickly as possible.

Previous proposals from the Dutch side regarding fixation of the lines of demarcation are maintained so that the territory lying outside the original line of demarcation shall be treated as a special case. In this regard the following lines shall prevail:

When the general command to cease fire has been given and effectuated, this territory shall as soon as possible be brought under civil Republican Government, whereby the necessary safeguards for the safety of person and good shall be given.

For the preparation of the return of the population and of the original apparatus of government including the police, discussions shall commence forthwith. These discussions shall equally refer to the question as to what extent and to what number the Republican police shall at once in anticipation of a definite arrangement, be inserted in the carrying on of the government.

The Dutch military occupation shall merely be maintained until normal conditions shall be re-established and safety shall be guaranteed; from the Republican side no further military occupation shall be placed in this territory.

According to the latest news hostilities at the frontiers of this territory have ceased; also with regard to important economic items, dependent on objects situated outside the territory, such as the water supply, a regular provision shall be guaranteed.

* Original: Dutch and English

APPENDIX II TO SECTION B

Letter from the President of the Commission-General for the Netherlands East Indies addressed to the President of the Indonesian delegation dated 9 February 1947*

From reports received by the Director of Communications and Public Works it appears that demolitions have been carried out on the inlet sluice of Lengkong and the water-distribution plant of Kepadjaran. The resulting flood has breached the dike of the North Porong conduit. The breach has widened considerably in a very short time (on the 7th instant an increase from 6 to 20 metres was noted in 6 hours). This may cause serious flooding, which may bring about the destruction of large areas of paddy with disastrous consequences for the population. To prevent this the level of the reservoir should be lowered immediately by partially opening the sluice of Mlirip and raising the sluice-gates of the Lengkong dam, while the sluice at Kepadjaran should be opened fully. The breaches in the dike of the Porong conduit should then be repaired at once. We are ready and willing to give any necessary help.

Concerning the military situation in the Sidoarja region and to the west of Surabaya, I regret to inform Your Excellency that Netherlands posts are still receiving heavy fire. I must earnestly request you to have this stopped, for otherwise the present military situation will become untenable, and as things are we are going steadily from bad to worse.

I shall be glad to receive word not later than 11 February 1947 that Your Excellency has given instructions that these requests be complied with.

President of the Commission-General,
for the Netherlands East Indies.

To: His Excellency
Soetan Sjahrir

* Original: Dutch

APPENDIX III TO SECTION B

Letter from the Secretary-General of the Indonesian Delegation
addressed to the President of the Commission-General for the
Netherlands East Indies dated 11 February 1947*

To

His Excellency Prof. W. Schermerhorn
President of the Commission-General
D j a k a r t a . -

In reply to your letter No. L 1026, dated 9 February 1947, a
telegram was received in the evening of 10 February 1947 by His
Excellency the President of the Indonesian Delegation, reading as
follows:

"With reference to your letter on the irrigation
works in the Surabaya region and firing in the
Sidoardjo region and west of Surabaya, I have
given orders that the request contained in
your letter be complied with."

(H. Algadrie).

For the Secretary-General of
the Indonesian Delegation.

* Original: Dutch

APPENDIX IV TO SECTION B

Letter from the President of the Commission-General for the
Netherlands East Indies addressed to the President of the
Indonesian Delegation dated 17 March 1947*

We have to inform Your Excellency hereby that a start was made today with applying the Netherlands' own measures to relieve the emergency which has arisen in consequence of the floods in the Sidoardjo delta.

As a first step, the water distribution plant of Lengkong and Mlirip were occupied by our forces this morning.

Owing to the flooding in the delta itself, which has in consequence become practically impassable, this military operation had to cover an area wider than the delta proper and also had to include the occupation of Modjokerto. We naturally regret that the discussions held on this matter have not yet produced any positive and visible results.

We enclose a detailed account of the representations we have made to your Delegation, and of the situation which has developed in spite of the undertakings given by you.

After the military occupation is over, and after the steps necessary for the relief of the emergency have been taken by our Departmental experts, we shall be prepared to enter into consultation concerning the manner in which normal conditions can be restored in this region in co-operation with the Republican administrative bodies. Our willingness to enter into consultation results from the express statement by the Netherlands Government that it has no desire to influence the development of political relations in Indonesia by military means. Action such as the present measures, which it is the first to regret but feels obliged to take, can have no other object than the relief of an emergency threatening the lives of innumerable persons.

We are fully aware of the serious implications of the use of military force as a last resort, even in a situation like the present one; but an earnest consideration of the whole situation has induced us, in the case of Surabaya, to accept the difficulties involved.

* Original: Dutch

We may conclude by expressing our confidence that an improvement in the political situation as desired by both our delegations may lead in the near future to such co-operation that local incidents of this nature will become things of the past.

The President of the Commission-General
for the Netherlands-Indies.

To His Excellency Soetan Sjahrir
President of the Indonesian Delegation.

Enclosure sent with Letter to the Indonesian Delegation dated 17 March 1947

With reference to the flooding in the Brantas delta, the following relevant facts may be stated:

1. On 26 February 1947 the water level in the River Porong was so high that a breach of the Porong dike was to be expected at any moment.

The delta to the west of the Prambon-Krian was then already under water.

The River Kedoenggoeling had reached its maximum water level.

The Prambon-Kremboeng road was flooded, and in some places the water was 50 centimetres deep on the road.

Everywhere in the flooded areas the food situation was very critical and there were daily cases of death from undernourishment. The bibit standing in the fields was in danger of rotting.

2. Since the local Netherlands and Republican authorities had not been able to reach any agreement likely to lead to an improvement in the situation, the Commission-General decided on 26 February to approach the Republican Delegation by telegram in order to draw attention to the critical situation and to try to bring about an improvement.

The telegram read as follows:

"Very dangerous situation for population and crops in fields, as well as for salt-water fish-ponds situated on seashore. Measures taken to date insufficient. Commission-General urges in strongest terms measures for speedy settlement. Propose Engineer Klein travel to Modjokerto with Republican experts to observe conditions there and prepare measures for improvement. On our side gladly prepared to offer all possible help."

/3. Two days later,

3. Two days later, on 28 February, another telegram was sent by the Commission-General to the Indonesian delegation, reading:

"Reference telegram subject flood Brantas delta. Further information requires that, before proposed visit engineers from Department, maximum number of sluice-gates of Lengkong dam be raised immediately and Kepadjaran sluice fully opened. This only chance to relieve present distress of population somewhat and perhaps limit spread."

4. On 3 March the Commission-General received the following answer from the Secretary-General of the Indonesian delegation:

"Concerning inundation Brantas delta necessary steps already taken. Experts will be sent today to investigate and if previous steps appear inadequate more effective measures will be taken. Sending of Engineer Klein is not considered necessary."

5. Although in the telegram quoted in paragraph 4 above an assurance was given that the steps necessary to improve the situation had been taken, no sign of them could be seen in the first few days of March. On the contrary, at various points in the Brantas delta the water was still rising gradually.

The Commission-General therefore sent another telegram on 4 March reading:

"Concerning inundation Brantas delta request information whether measures mentioned in telegram 28 February have been taken. Await explanation of your expert about catastrophic extent of flood also what further measures will be taken at his suggestion. Insist on admission of expert from our side."

6. Although the Commission-General, in its telegram of 4 March, had enquired whether the measures mentioned in the Indonesian delegation's telegram of 28 February had been taken, no answer of any kind had so far been received.

In the meantime, the situation in the Brantas delta deteriorated steadily and large-scale measures had to be taken by the Netherlands authorities to bring food and medical help to the hard-hit Indonesian and Chinese population.

The Red Cross opened field kitchens at various points where meals were provided twice a day for the destitute. A total of about 10,000 persons are being fed every day: these include: at Gendangan 1000, at Driaredja 500, at Watoetoelis 1200, at Sidoardjo 1500, at Tanggoelangin 1200 and at Popoh fully 1000.

/At various

At various places the mortality from undernourishment has risen alarmingly.

Medical care of the population was, however, much hampered by the flooding of roads, a number of places being completely isolated. This fact, combined with the very unstable state of the population's health, increased the danger of epidemics of diseases such as malaria, typhus and intestinal infections.

7. From a report dated 14 March received by the Commission-General, it appears that:

Communications between Krian-Sidoardjo have been completely disrupted:

The Porong sluice has been destroyed:

The water distribution plant at Kepadjang-Lembang has been completely demolished;

The sluices of Gedeh and Kedongsoro have been quite unnecessarily opened, so that the area to the north of the River Surabaya has been flooded:

Breaches have been blown in the bank of the Mangetan canal with explosives (in particular at one point situated inside Netherlands territory) $1\frac{1}{2}$ kilometres from the demarcation line;

The bulk of Kotta Sidoardjo is flooded so that the sugar depot, the rice-hulling mill and the oil factory are under water and people have to wade through water up to the waist;

Many houses are threatened with collapse, and over an area of 5000 hectares buildings and roads are in danger of being undermined by water;

Finally, about 2500 hectares of planted rice fields are so badly flooded that the harvest is threatened with destruction.

8. The foregoing shows how critical the situation is. Even now dozens of persons have to be supplied every day with food and medical care. A harvest of 2000 tons of rice will be completely lost by floods, so that the world food supply, already small, will have to be called upon to an additional 2000 tons of rice to relieve the shortage.

APPENDIX V TO SECTION B

Settlement for the Regency of Modjokerto*

On 29 March 1947 the following settlement was reached between the Commission General and the Republican delegation for the Regency of Modjokerto:

1. The Commission General and the Indonesian delegation have consulted together with a view to reaching a settlement of the situation at Modjokerto satisfactory to both parties.
2. In discussing the measures to be taken, both sides started from the principle that the occupation of Modjokerto and district by Netherlands troops was undertaken to put an end to an emergency and not to extend the territory under Netherlands rule.
3. Both parties aim at demilitarizing the territory of the Regency of Modjokerto in such a manner that supreme authority will ultimately be vested in the Republican civil authorities and responsibility for order and safety transferred to the police.
4. In order to ensure the safety of persons and property in this area and to prevent a repetition of the emergency, both delegations have decided on the following measures:

- (a) The Netherlands Indies Government and the Government of Republican Indonesia confirm the provisional settlement reached on the spot. Insofar as the Republican Administration has not been completely maintained, Republican administrative bodies, including the judicial authority, are to be reinstated.
- (b) The Government of the Republic shall forthwith issue orders to ensure that hostile acts, including demolitions, shall cease.
- (c) Where necessary, joint guard posts shall be established within the territory. A Netherlands technical liaison staff shall be established at Modjokerto to maintain contact with the Republican irrigation service and with other technical services.
- (d) On the borders of the territory to be demilitarized, joint Netherlands and Indonesian police posts shall be established in order to prevent military units or armed persons from entering the territory.

* Original: Dutch

(e) At Modjokerto a joint Netherlands-Indonesian Commission shall be established, responsible for supervising the observance of the provisions of the joint Proclamation I of 29 March 1947 (see below).

(f) The Republican Government guarantees freedom of trade and occupation for non-Indonesians, and forthwith commences to apply Article 14 of the Linggadjati Agreement in this territory.

5. The Netherlands Indies Government and the Government of the Republic shall devote themselves energetically to the execution of the above measures. As soon as these have been executed to the satisfaction of both delegations, the military occupation of Modjokerto and district by the Netherlands is to be withdrawn.

Joint Proclamation I of 29 March 1947

reads:

Whereas the conclusion of the Linggadjati Agreement had ended the state of conflict between the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia and it is accordingly necessary to remove any idea of revenge or reprisal and by a resolute and energetic policy to allay the fear of such measures, still entertained by many;

And whereas the many problems remaining to be solved by joint action can only find their solution in an atmosphere of friendship and confidence;

Now therefore the Commission General and the delegation of the Republic publish the following joint statement:

No one shall be persecuted or in any way prejudiced for having adhered to either of the parties or for having placed himself under the protection of either of the parties.

The Netherlands Indies Government and the Government of the Republic will use all their power to secure the observance of this statement and take the strictest measures against its infringement. In addition, both sides will do everything possible to set at liberty those who have become victims through taking part in the political conflict, and to investigate cases where such persons have been abducted and held captive by irresponsible elements.

REPORT CONCERNING THE SEARCH FOR MISSING AND MURDERED
EUROPEANS AS WELL AS THE LIBERATION OF INTERNED EUROPEANS*

According to the command of the action-leader, Captain Geerlings, to liberate with all available means the Europeans still in Republican hands and to arrest the murderers of the already killed Europeans, two sections departed at 1:00 P.M. under the command of Second Lieutenant W.G. van der Veen toward the enterprise Kali Bendo where, according to information received, Europeans were supposedly still around.

At this place were found, in very neglected condition:

Mr. T.C. Coert with wife and child
Mrs. Kat
Mrs. Grant and two children

Information was received there that more Europeans were supposed to be in the neighborhood of Litjin of whom many had supposedly already been murdered. Section I was sent back to Banjoewangi with the above-mentioned persons while the other section proceeded to Litjin.

In Litjin the following persons were found hidden in ravines in a very bad condition and near to starvation:

Mr. A.T. Schultz, wife and children
Mr. C. Meyer
Miss L. Meyer
Widow A.C. Schultz
Mrs. S. de Groot and baby
Mr. N. Leydelmeyer
Mrs. de Lang and 2 children
Mrs. C.H. de Lang

These persons were transported to Banjoewangi where they arrived at 5 P.M. At 6:00 P.M. Section I proceeded to Kali Boera, where 70 Menadonese were liberated and transported to Banjoewangi: arrival 10 P.M.

At 11 P.M. a telephone message was received from Kali Bendo that a European woman had been encountered there who spoke incoherently. Section I proceeded to Kali Bendo and found a seriously wounded lady, Mrs. van der Linde.

From her explanations it became clear that her husband and 5 children had been inveigled by Indonesians to leave the house, under the pretext of fleeing. They were taken to a ravine and, in spite of the pleadings of the parents, the children were brutally slaughtered. After that, her husband was killed while she herself was beaten across the neck and shoulder with a cutting weapon so that she collapsed and became unconscious. As the fiends

believed her to be dead, they did not bother any further with her. After 2 hours she regained consciousness and dragged herself to the enterprise Kali Bendo. She was taken to Banjoewangi. The surroundings were searched, but the corpses were not found.

We did discover two small children in the forests, namely Hendrik and Tineke de Lang, respectively 6 and 4 years old who, upon interrogation, hold that their father and elder sister had been murdered before their eyes. During the killing they had been able to escape and were in an entirely overwrought condition.

A further search, 3 kilometers south of Litjin, led us to Mrs. de Lang and her two other children who were in a very apathetic condition. At the approach of our soldiers she yelled: "Yes, go ahead and kill us too. You have already murdered my husband and 2 children, murder me too". When it became evident that she was not dealing with Pemoeda's, but with soldiers of the KNIF and that her two small children had been saved, she could hardly believe her good fortune.

The rescued persons were transported to Banjoewangi where they arrived at 9 A.M. on 25 July.

25 July 1947

At 11 o'clock Section I to Kampong Pakis whence fetched:

Miss C.H. Schultz

P.Z. Schultz

Miss T. Schultz

From the Detachment Banjoewangi one section to Djamboe and Kali Bendo in further search for Europeans. The mutilated corpse of Mr. Nieuwenburg was found which the miscreants had thrown into a latrine. The earthly remainders were buried on the spot.

26 July 1947

In the morning, Section I went to Kampong Djamboe where, according to information, escaped Europeans were to be found. They turned out to be:

Mrs. Hemmekam

Miss Hemmekam

Tarzan Hemmekam

These persons had spent two days without food in the ravines and fled at the approach of our soldiers. When they heard Dutch spoken, they returned.

Mr. Hemmekam had been murdered already in 1943 by the Japs. Mrs. Hemmekam was able to tell us that 17 Europeans had been murdered, viz.

Mr. v. d. Linde and 5 children

Fam. G.I. Leydelmeyer (husband, wife and 3 children)

Fam. Nieuwenburg (husband and wife)

/Mrs. G. Schalk

Mrs. G. Schalk

Mr. Ottolander

At 1 P.M. Section I under Bataljon Commander left for Kali Bedo and Djambi to search for missing Europeans and the bodies of the murdered ones, according to indications by Mrs. van der Linde, one of the survivors of the murderous raid.

In the ravine N.W. of Alas Panggang there were found the bodies of Mr. van der Linde and 5 children who had been bestially murdered.

The bodies showed the following signs of bestiality:

Mr. van der Linde missed his left arm, a deep cut in the neck and a split open stomach.

Daughter Carla (age 19) missed left breast, cut in the neck, spear wound in sexual organs. According to information first raped.

Eldest son (12 years): lacerated thigh and calf, cut wound in the neck, half-smashed skull.

The other children had been murdered by spear wounds in breast and stomach.

After having taken remaining jewelry from the bodies, the victims were given an honorable burial on the spot.

27 July 1947

Section I to Litjin for search in ravines. In one of the ravines was found: G. de Lang, age 11 who was escorted to his mother in Banjoewangi.

28 July 1947

Further search for Europeans in the surroundings of Litjin.

Still missing:

Mr. M.L. Meyer

Mrs. Meyer

3 children

Mrs. L. Slotman

Mr. V. Slotman

According to information these persons had been taken along by the TRG in a westerly direction.

All these persons were found in a few days and brought to Banjoewangi.

29 July 1947

Detachment settled at Litjin.

30 July 1947

The next-of-kin and relatives of those murdered had requested to bury the remains in Banjoewangi. Accordingly 2 sections of detachment Litjin with 200 coolies were dispatched to the places where Europeans had been murdered. All those killed were found and identified. Phoned Banjoewangi and received

word that Commander of Third Infantry XII would take care of the graves in the European cemetery.

31 July 1947

Gasoline drums requested in Banjoewangi for transport of physical remains to cemetery.

1 August 1947

Physical remains packed in gasoline drums and transported to Detachment Litjin.

2 August 1947

By three ton truck, drums with physical remains transferred to European cemetery in Banjoewangi where accepted by Commander of Infantry XII for interment.

Mr. Plateel delivered short eulogies.

Report of Mr. Meyer

On July 22 at 11 o'clock we heard wild screams of "Boence olanod semoea, Merdeka", accompanied by the throwing of stones. I recognized many as members of the Masjoemi Party. This party had shown intent to murder us previously.

After all Europeans had been dragged outdoors, they were asked whether they were willing to join the Islam. This was answered affirmatively.

This meant merely a show, however, as a beginning was made immediately with the brutal killing of the people. Children wept but were beaten brutally in the neck by the fiends with cutting weapons. Mothers who tried to defend their children were butchered in inhuman fashion before the eyes of their husbands guarded by armed men while the fiends did not refrain from cutting off the women's breasts and from thrusting spears into their sexual organs. After the men had been forced to dig not only their own grave, but also those for their wives and children, they were, together with the still living women and children massacred and thrown into the graves.

I saved myself by locking the room in which I was at that time. A hand grenade was thrown into the room but fortunately failed to explode. Later I was saved by an old coolie of mine who took me outside with my mother and small brothers as well as with Mrs. Slooteman and her son.

We fled toward the West but were picked by fleeing TRI soldiers. When we overheard that we were scheduled to be killed the same night, we escaped under cover of darkness and roamed about without food until the military rescued us.

The houses where these Europeans were murdered, have all been completely looted and destroyed while everything was covered with blood. The places where the corpses were found were noticeable by the traces of blood leading from the

/house

house to the graves. At some graves small children's wooden shoes and blood-stained clothing was found while some victims bodies were only partially buried.

Interrogation of accomplices revealed that the murder had been previously planned by members of the Masjoemi.

Made at Banjoewangi, August 10, 1947

The Reserve First Lieutenant

H.P.E. Buys

Cdt 3 GNF XII

The Second Lieutenant

W.I.V.D. Vien

Cdt 3rd Pel 3 INF XII

Conform to copy,

M.W. van 't Hof

Sub chief General Secret Service

D. LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE MEDAN INDIAN COMMUNITY
AND ATTACHED REPORT ON INDIANS AND CHINESE
IN THE EAST COAST OF SUMATRA*

Medan, 11th August 1947.

Dr. J. J. v. d. Velde
Government Advisor for Political Affairs for Sumatra
Soekamoelia
at
Medan.

Sir,

We beg to forward to your good self copies in duplicate of a report sent by airmail today by the Medan Indian Community to the Government of India explaining the plight of Indians and Chinese at the hands of irresponsible Indonesians in the East coast of Sumatra.

We would be extremely happy if you will pass on one copy of this to His Excellency the Lt. Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies at Batavia.

We remain,
Respectfully yours,
Ranjit Singh
President,
Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee
Kesawan 42
Medan.

Certified to be a true copy.

E. Vitner.

Controller NEI, Internal Administration

* Original: English

Medan, Sumatra East Coast,
9th August 1947.

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru,
Minister for External Affairs & Commonwealth Relations,
Government of India,
Delhi, India.

Your Excellency,

We, the undersigned, have deemed it necessary to address Your Excellency this petition explaining the miserable plight in which the Indians of Sumatra have been in since 1942, and particularly since 1946.

The Indians mostly consisting of Madrasis, Sikhs, Hindus and U.P. Mohammedans are estimated to be between 15000 and 20000 and have been living in several parts of Sumatra for the last 50 or 60 years, and several of them have immovable property in some of the large towns like Medan, Siantar and Padang.

As soon as the Japanese invaded Sumatra, the Indians were mercilessly persecuted and several of them had cash and valuable besides their articles of trade taken away by force and under threat of bodily hurt and torture. Of course, we felt it was wartime and we had to submit to it calmly.

Immediately when the hostilities ceased in 1945, we Indians felt that the situation would improve and normal conditions would be restored as soon as possible, but the Indonesian Independence Movement on the Fascist model gained strength with the result that anarchy and lawlessness took the place of peace and order. The British and Indian forces of occupation, to be frank and outspoken, should have used an iron hand to suppress this anarchy and lawlessness but on the other hand revealed their utter and total inability to bring the Indonesians to their senses.

Immediately, the Indonesians suspected all peace-loving Indians and Chinese as leaning towards the Dutch and anti-Indonesian; and with Japanese Koumpotai (Jap Military Police) as their leaders and advisors began to kidnap Indians and Chinese anywhere and everywhere they could lay hands on. In particular Medan and its outlying districts, Padang, Palembang and Siantar had everyday news of brutal murder and arson, such that the Indians and the Chinese did not know what to do and shuddered to hear their tragic end.

/These

These Indonesians have organized themselves in roving bands under strange names as Flying Dragon, Buffalo Head, Wolf Pack, Tiger Band, and Elephant Group etc. and have infested the areas and woods around the large cities. They have their Gestapo and Detective Branches actively working with the result that rich Chinese, Indians and even peace-loving Indonesians began to be kidnapped, their houses looted and burnt and they themselves ultimately tortured in the most brutal manner, unknown for the last 1000 years.

Several Chinese and Indians, who could afford, have left this country for good but then there are thousands, who could not emigrate for the simple reason that they cannot dispose of their immovable property like houses, lands and cattle. The Indians, in particular are either cattle owners, landlords or labourers. These cattle owners could not easily accommodate themselves in towns for want of grazing fields and hence they had perforce to stay in the outskirts of Medan or any other large town. What did these roving bands of Indonesians do? They intimidated them, got a cow or a calf as a bribe and were pacified for a time but the bands of robbers had become innumerable with the result that the poor Indian milkseller was so pestered daily that at last not only his cows dwindled to nothing but he with his family was kidnapped, mercilessly treated, and even not let off although a large amount of money had been offered as bribery.

The brutality of these Indonesians is beyond description and control although the Indonesian Government often tries to do something to curb the activities of these robber bands by the T.R.I. which they have organized. This T.R.I. is entirely useless and powerless for it lacks coordination of work and discipline, with the result that it exists in name only and practically does no work.

Daily, these bands of robbers are having their strength increased by all never-do-wells and criminals of the hardened type taking their leadership.

Those bands under the name of Social Revolution arrested or kidnapped almost all members of the Royal families among their own people and for no reason but for their belonging to the Royal family, they were hacked to pieces and made to die a lingering death. Their royal palaces were robbed of all available things and then the buildings were set on fire, to make

/extinct

distinct any further trace of the man and family murdered.

While the British and Indian forces of occupation were in Sumatra several Indians were kidnapped and up to now, several of them have not been heard of. Whenever the Governor of Sumatra and many of the responsible officials in his cabinet are asked, they simply shrug their shoulders and say that this kidnapping or that looting has not been done by their men but by the roving bands of robbers and anarchists, who are not under their control.

Several Indians, who worked with the Indian and British forces as Interpreters or labourers and many for the simple reason that they lived in Medan or had to go to Medan for some urgent reason, have been kidnapped, houses looted, bodily tortured and murdered in cold blood. Some, of course, have come back after being made to live in the most filthy places and being subjected to the most abject treatment. Through them some tragic stories of cold blooded murder have been revealed. Very often what do these Indonesians do to the Chinese and Indians before setting fire to their homes or to whole towns and villages? Well, the events of the last three weeks have revealed this. The shops and houses, under threat of taking their life if they resisted, were at first looted, the whole families then, forcibly made to get into their houses or shops, doors locked or nailed, and the entire row or rows of houses set on fire, and when the occupants clamoured and prayed for mercy, these future owners of Indonesia simply grinned.

There are also instances, where patients lying in hospitals have been helplessly left to die while the whole village has been set on fire.

There are several other instances showing that daily these Indonesians have been making certain parts of Toomboeng, Brastagi, Kvala Begoemit, Kaban Djahe en Siantar run red with pools of bloodshed from innocent Chinese, Indians and even Indonesians, and for two years the Soekarno Government has been watching it as a disinterested spectator, but at the same time kicking up a hue and cry that the Dutch are not the owners of Indonesia but the Indonesians, and duping the world by giving false news and not the actual facts which the world must have and then act as the arbiter.

We Indians do not mean to side the Dutch and

/speak

speak ill of the Indonesians, but we cannot help saying that the Dutch have been very patient and left no stone unturned to come to some sort of arrangement so that the Indonesians could carry on their "de Facto" Government and at the same time restore peace and order in their country.

The Chinese and Indians particularly in Medan felt themselves in a precarious position for if they left the bounds of the town, they fell a prey to one of the roving bands of Indonesian robbers and if they kept within the town, they would find that they could not get the minimum of the food, necessary to sustain them, for the Indonesians had cut off all supplies of rice and vegetables completely and even water supply from the hill reservoir of Sibolangit.

To revert to this point for a moment, the Indians in 1945, when the Japanese laid down their arms, had their padi fields up country about 10 or 12 miles from the city of Medan, and some of them solely depended on those for 1945-1946 and had nothing else to live upon, but the Indonesian chiefs of the country, instead of allowing the Indians to take away their well earned harvest, became the masters of the fields and very few Indians were able to get back to their houses more than 1/10 of the crop and that quantity at the risk of their lives and property.

Since the last three weeks, hundreds of Chinese and Indian refugees are being brought into Medan by the Dutch people and they are telling terror stricken tales of what the Indonesian extremists, chiefly Bataks, Achinese and Mandailings, have done to them. In the vicinity of Medan not more than 4 miles away, only a few days ago, these terrorists, because they could not stand against the Dutch who had at last decided to clean up the surrounding country, took law into their hand and murdered six Chinese women and two Indian girls without any compunction, and other parties have done similar things in various parts of Sumatra. They have killed little children in front of their mothers, raped virgins and forcibly converted Chinese to Mohamedanism.

Furthermore, it has been evident that from whatever village or town the Indonesians have retreated, they have taken along the poor villagers and those who refused, their belongings have been looted, house burnt and some bodily hurt done to the men, women and children. After a few days we find the
/poor villagers

poor villagers who were forced to accompany them have come back, starved, half-naked, thoroughly exhausted and penniless after marching through a number of jungles.

We feel that the sudden decision taken by the Dutch is highly beneficial not only to the foreigners (Chinese and Indians) but even to the thousands of Indonesians themselves for what we have noticed is that the villagers and townspeople who had been under the lawless rule of the various bands, not only were in terror of losing their lives but had become penniless and had begun suffering from all sorts of tropical diseases. In place of cloth they had to use sacks, and whatever rice they planted was taken forcibly by the various lawless bands, and the poor villagers had to eat tapioca and yams. The people living within the Dutch liberated towns and villages enjoy security of life and property, clothing, ration and medical attention and above all good sanitation.

The Indonesian Government armies, the T.R.I., do not seem to have any weapon but these Flying Dragon and other self-formed bands seem to have weapons formerly used by the Japanese, or those imported and smuggled in from Singapore. Here we find that these lawless marauders consist chiefly of people from the highlands of the East coast, the Bataks, a half civilised blood-thirsty tribe and the bigoted Achinese, who believe that murder of a Kafir is chopping wood.

What we have described above is a fraction of the vast number of atrocities committed by the Indonesian marauders and we feel that other than a few intelligent and educated Indonesians in Java, the remaining islands can count very few natives who can really be a credit to their country. Their action in dealing with foreigners have revealed that they are far below human beings and not much superior to animals for by antagonism to the Indians and Chinese they have simply alienated their sympathy. Under these circumstances, the Indians and Chinese living in the Dutch East Indies hate it with intensity that the Indonesians should appeal to Your Excellency to back them up in the international world against the Christian Dutchmen. Again, we cannot help mentioning here that certain hasty action of the Indian Government against the Dutch here might tell upon the Indians, who are scattered all over Indonesia. It might have an adverse effect on us both economically, socially and politically.

. /We feel

We feel that the Indonesian radios and officials have greatly misrepresented facts to most foreign countries especially to India and we strongly advise the Indian Government to send a Commission to Indonesia and examine the facts and their doings on the spot with scrutiny and impartially, and then decide how far the Indonesian Government has been fair to all foreigners who have been instrumental in bringing their country to such a height of prosperity in the short period of only 60 years.

With greetings from the Indians in Sumatra,

We remain, Your Excellency,
Your most loyal subjects,

1. sd. Ranjit Singh, (for President), Gurdwara Parbandak
Committee, Medan.
2. sd. Wali Mohamed, U.P. & C.P. Representative, Medan
3. sd. Abdül Majid, Muslim Community Representative,
Medan
4. sd. Gurcharan Singh, Secretary, Indian Merchants'
Association, Sumatra.
5. sd. Bahadar Singh, Indian Member to Red Cross, Medan.
6. sd. Sawdagar Singh, Member of Advisory Board to
HBM Consul, Medan.

Certified to be a true copy.

E. Vitner.

Controller NEI, Internal Administration

E. OPERATIONAL ORDER ISSUED BY THE REPUBLICAN TERRITORIAL
COMMANDER OF MADURA CONCERNING THE FREEING OF
CRIMINALS FROM LOCAL PRISONS*

V. 3711 - Secret

Order of Operation No 49

- I. As soon as the enemy has occupied a certain region, the jail located there must be opened.
- II. Those freed must be influenced by us in such a manner that they will undertake as task to perform deeds of terror against the hostile troops of occupation.
- III. The jails must be blown up totally. Concerning this matter, direct contact must be established with the Regional Sub Sector Commanders (Batallion Commanders)
- IV. End of Order

This order has been presented to:

1. The Heads of Public Jails at Pamekasan, Bangkalan, Sampang and Soemenep
Copy for
2. the sub sector Commanders I to VI inclusive
3. C. S. 35 Regiment.

Promulgated on July 23, 1947. 10 o'clock by the Territorial
Commander of Madura,

(signed) Chandra Hasan

(Lieutenant Colonel R. Chandrahasan)

Provided with the stamp of the 35 Regiment, VI Division T.R.I.

* Photostatic copy (Original: Malay) retained in Secretariat files.

