

United Nations Oral History Project

**Pauline Frederick
April and May 1984**

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UN INTERVIEW
Pauline Frederick
April and May 1984
Interviewer: Norman Ho

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Oral History/Frederick

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ANNOUNCER: This is the United Nations Oral History Programme's first interview with Pauline Frederick, taped at her home in Westport, Connecticut, on 13 and 23 April and on 4 and 24 May 1984. The interviewer is Norman Hoe (?).

QUESTION: This is the first of a series of interviews which you, Pauline, have kindly agreed to tape for the United Nations Oral History Programme. We are privileged to have your participation in this programme, not only because of your unequalled first-hand knowledge of the United Nations since its inception but also because the widely recognized excellence of your coverage of the Organization has made you a United Nations celebrity in your own right. To many people abroad as well as in this country you are known as the voice of the United Nations.

Your career as a political reporter and commentator in broadcasting broke new ground for women in a field traditionally dominated by men. To mention just a few of the many honours you have been awarded over the years, in 1964 you were named Woman of the Year by the American Association of University Women for your contribution to international understanding. For two straight years you were the only journalist among the world's ten most admired women, as rated by the Gallup Poll. You were also the first woman to win the George Foster Peabody Award for your contribution to international understanding in covering the United Nations and the Dupont Commentators Award for outstanding work in interpretative radio reporting.

At last count I believe the number of honorary degrees awarded to you by various universities and colleges stood at 22.

I am sorry to be going on at such length, but I feel that these facts are relevant to this oral history project, and I know that you are too modest to speak of them yourself.

Before the United Nations came into existence, you were present when Roosevelt and Churchill met in Quebec in 1944 and when the United Nations Charter was drafted in San Francisco in 1945. Since the United Nations was founded you have devoted a working lifetime to informing people about its aims and its work, by radio and television, by the printed word and by public-speaking engagements all over the country. These activities have generated an enormous amount of material, which, fortunately for us, you have kept.

Later on we may deal in more detail with specific issues and personalities, but for today I propose to take you through a general overview of the United Nations as you have seen it grow and change over four decades.

Now at last you will have a chance to get a word in edgeways. Would you begin by telling us something about your early life and family background?

FREDERICK: I was born in Pennsylvania in a little coal-mining town in the mountains called Gulitz, and interestingly enough it was named, I was always told, for a Prince Gulitzen(?), a Russian prince who was sent to this country to convert the heathen. Well, obviously, that was before communism. Anyhow, in that little coal-mining town my father was postmaster, and he also had a so-called dry-goods store with his brother-in-law. When

President Wilson came to office, my father had to look for a new job because he did not belong to the right political party. So we soon moved on to Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, and then on to Tyrone, Pennsylvania, where I was in first grade, and eventually to Harrisburg, where I can say I really grew up.

I was the middle child of three, with a younger brother and an older sister. My father, after leaving the postmastership in Glitzen became associated with the state government in Pennsylvania in the Labour Department, and I recall one of his first jobs was as a mediator in strikes. He used to go to places like Pittsburg to try to help mediate strikes on what was the street railway, the trolley system, in Pittsburg.

I finished grammar school and went to junior high school in Harrisburg, was in the class of the old central high school, graduated mid-year 1926, and then went on to college in Washington.

My mother was a very sweet lady who had no interest in careers but was just a sweet homebody, and my father took very good care of her. It was a very simple home. We had our illnesses and our periods of happiness, and I remember occasionally winning prizes for writing some silly little essay, so that in school I was teased as Polly the Prizewinner, and I hated that like anything. I remember running away from the kids on the way home from school because somebody had started calling me Polly the Prizewinner. I just hated it. But the prizes were important. It just so happened that the announcement would appear in the local paper, and the next thing I knew my father was out showing all the clippings to the neighbours. I was so embarrassed. But anyway he was a great supporter - I suppose my first public-relations helper.

QUESTION: You were also editor of your school publication when you were in junior high school, were you not?

FREDERICK: That's right. For some reason or other, I had always had an interest in journalism - it was not called journalism then; that was much too pretentious - but in reporting and getting the story out to other people for them to read. I was always interested in that, from the time I could reach - well, we did not have typewriters in those days - from the time I could reach a desk where I could use a pencil and a piece of paper. I went to camp a couple of times in summer, and I found an old mimeograph machine when I could and fixed up a camp paper. And in Harrisburg I had an opportunity to send in so-called news to the local papers. It was about the school dances or Mrs. John Doe's visit from Camp Hill visiting Mrs. Richard Roe on Green Street, or something of that nature. So by the time I was ready to graduate from high school as president of the class, I was asked by one of the local papers if I would come in and substitute for two weeks for the social editor, who was going on vacation. I did so, and one of the first things I was asked to do was to cover, of all things, a major musical event, one of the great masses. I was asked to cover that, and I did not know the first thing about music. So I asked a friend if he would go with me. He knew something about music, and he helped me to try to cover this, which I did.

Well, anyway, after the two weeks covering weddings and all kinds of social events, to say nothing of this great musical event, which lasted three nights, I was asked by the editor if I would like to have the job as social editor since the social editor had decided she was going to be married. I said no thank you; I was going to college.

QUESTION: You obviously had an early bent for journalism, but you went on to major in political science at the American University in Washington, and later received a master's degree in international law. What made you choose those fields of study, and what eventually brought you back to journalism?

FREDERICK: Well, I tell you it was a matter of fate, I think. I decided I wanted to go to the American University in Washington, a very new institution, because first of all I wanted to be in Washington and, secondly, as the daughter in a Methodist family I was entitled to apply for a small scholarship, which of course I needed very much, and my family needed, because our income was very low. So I chose American University because I was given this small stipend, which made it possible for me to be in Washington.

I went to Washington thinking I was going to major in journalism. But, lo and behold, the school was so new that there were no journalism courses, but there were some very interesting courses in political science and constitutional law, and this was my second interest because of my father's interest in politics in Pennsylvania, I suppose. Anyhow, the instructor for these courses was a young man by the name of Arthur Sherwood Fleming. At that particular time he was studying law at George Washington University at night. I found his courses most interesting, particularly constitutional law. Then a debate team was set up. He was the coach, and he asked me to be on the debate team. So I decided, well, maybe I might as well study law instead of trying to go ahead with journalism, since there were no courses in journalism there. So I set my course for law. At the end of my senior year in college - I was about to receive my Bachelor of Arts Degree - I had an opportunity to receive

a fellowship in international law at the graduate school. Now, I could not be sure that this would forward my career in law, but, after all, it was a nice fellowship, and I could stay in Washington, and why not take it? So I did.

I was about to receive my Master's Degree in International Law, after a year, when my history professor called me in. He was a fascinating lecturer, Charles Calham Pent (?). I shall never forget him. He called me in. He had always been very generous in his rating of me in history. He said, "You know, Pauline, there are so many lawyers in the world today, and particularly here in Washington, and I do not think there would be too much of a chance for a woman lawyer. I think you should go back to journalism." So I decided that maybe he was right, and that that was the best advice I had ever had. Furthermore he gave me an idea for launching my journalism career, which I was grateful for, and which turned out to be very fortuitous.

He pointed out that when a new ambassador - in those days they were mostly ministers; there were very few ambassadors because the missions were not rated that high - well, anyway, when the diplomatic representative of a country came to Washington, he said, he always wanted to make a good impression. Now, if I were to interview the wives of these new representatives coming to Washington and work into the interview material about their countries as well as about the women themselves, he thought this might make a very interesting series. So I decided - angels rush in where others fear to tread - I did not know how to go about it except to lift the telephone and call a mission. I think the first one was the Czechoslovak Mission; I think the Czech Minister was the newest diplomat to come to Washington at that particular moment.

I called to find out if it would be possible to have an interview with Madam Verderker, which was her name at that time, and I was asked if the interview would be printed and I said, well, it all depended on how the interview turned out. So they finally said OK, I should come.

So I went to the Mission. The night before, of course, I did a lot of boning up on Czechoslovakia and wrote out questions in a notebook, one question at the top of each page. The next morning I went to see this beautiful blond woman. I was ushered into her presence, and she was so gracious and so lovely. And I sat down on the sofa beside her and began asking these questions and after awhile she became a little amused and she said that she could not help noticing that I had these questions written out, one at the top of each page; then I would ask that question and write her answer. She was very gracious about it. And then I said I would like a picture, and so she gave me a picture.

So I went off, and what to do next? Well, there was a new Chinese ambassador, and I decided I would try my luck there and the same thing happened. I was able to get an interview, sort of bluffing my way in because I didn't know what I was going to do with the story. And then I went to see the wife of the Panamanian Minister and did an interview with her.

So I had these three interviews, and what to do with them? I had written them out, I had the pictures. Where to go from there? I slightly knew a well-known political columnist in Washington at the time, a man by the name of Frederick William Wyle.(?) So I decided to go and see him and ask him what I should do with these stories, and he asked, "Would you like a letter to the managing editor of the Washington Star"? and I said, "Would I?". He said, "All right". So he sat down to his typewriter and wrote "Dear Oliver" and so on and so on to Oliver Owen Hume,(?)

Managing Editor of the Washington Star, whom I had never met and knew of only from afar. I went to the Washington Star with this letter and this package of interviews and was ushered into the presence of this very dour, rough man, who never put his paper down from in front of his face while he was talking to me - just looked at me over the paper - and he said, "Well, I'd have to leave these things". He couldn't give me an answer right away, and I said, "Well, it's very hot in Washington. I live in Pennsylvania and I'd like to go home for the summer and it would be nice if I could have a response before I went home". "I couldn't possibly give you a response before two weeks". So I said, "Well then, all right".

So I went back to the apartment I was sharing at that time with a lovely young woman who was the bursar at American University. She was engaged to Arthur Fleming and eventually they were married. I was living with her that summer. So we were having dinner and Arthur was there, and the door bell rang. I answered the door and there was a messenger with a package from the Washington Star, and I thought, "Well, that was over in a hurry. What do I do next?". So I signed for the package and went in and started opening it and there was a letter from Oliver Owen Hume saying that if all the other interviews were like these three he would be glad to take a series every Sunday beginning in October. I nearly collapsed. Anyway that was the beginning and from then on they eventually led to broadcasting.

Even though I was diverted, for a very good reason, from going on to law - for which I have always been grateful - I was not diverted from my real interest in international affairs. In college I had been president of the International Relations Club, and of course I went on to graduate school to study what was then called international law and the first interviews I did had of course to do with the wives of diplomats - which kept me in very close touch with the international scene.

During the period when I was writing these interviews I was also working on a publication called Uncle Sam's Dairy, which was published by David Lawrence, and this had to do with trying to bring into focus in understandable terms the major issues of the day for college and high school students. I was assigned in particular to handle the international stories. From the Uncle Sam's Dairy I went to the United States Daily, which was David Lawrence's big publication then, the predecessor of course of the United States News and World Report, and on this publication I was the correspondent for three departments: the State Department, the War Department and the Navy Department - in those days there was no such thing as the Pentagon, thank goodness - and I covered international affairs from those three points of view, so that I have never really been away from the subject. It's always been my particular focus.

And then interestingly enough - not surprising, to me - my first broadcast had to do with international things. I was doing the print interviews, as I said, for the North American newspaper, the Washington Star, and the North American Newspaper Alliance decided to syndicate them. As a consequence they were being carried in, among other papers, The New York Times every Sunday with my byline. So one day the only person I knew in broadcasting in Washington, H. R. Brockett, called me up and said that NBC New York was trying to locate me to see if I could do the same kind of interview on the air that I was doing in The New York Times. I said that I didn't now, but they wanted an audition, and since he was the only one I knew who had ever done any broadcasting I asked him if he would consent to be interviewed for the audition and he agreed. So I went into a radio studio for the first time, never having been in one before, and did an audition with him.

This "platter", as they called it in those days, was shipped off to New York over the weekend and by the first of the week I was notified that NBC wanted me to do some kind of an interview with a woman on the air and did I have any suggestions? I said, yes, I did. It was at that particular moment that Hitler had entered Czechoslovakia and taken over the Czech diplomatic missions throughout the world. He had ordered them to be surrendered. The Minister in Washington, Vladimir Horbon, (?) had refused. His wife had been born in this country of Czech background, so it occurred to me, as I told the New York people, that it would be interesting to do an interview from the Czechoslovak Mission to indicate that this was the one little piece of Czech soil left in the world and that I would like to do the interview with Madam Horbon. They told me to go ahead and have it ready in two days.

Well, I rushed out to the Czech Mission and asked to see Madam Horbon, told her my plan, and she looked at me and said, "Ach, I would be much too frightened. I couldn't possibly do it". I asked her if her husband was home, and she said, yes, he was in the library. I asked her if I might see him. She said yes. So we went down to the library. I told Minister Horbon what I had in mind. I said that I thought it would be interesting for Americans, in particular those of Czech lineage, to know that there was one little place left in the world that was Czech, and that was the legation in Washington, and that his wife would do a great service by responding to the interview. And he looked at her and said, "Dear, I'm afraid you will have to do it"

So came the preparation for that, trying to bring in the story of what had happened to Czechoslovakia and what her reaction would be. I worked on this interview the night before with a fever of 104 from sheer fright because I didn't know what in the world I was getting into. The next morning I went to the legation

to prepare for the interview, which was being conducted from the legation itself, and I found Madam Horbon looking very wan and she said, "I haven't slept a wink"; and I said, "I'm sorry, I haven't either". And she said, "Would you like a glass of wine?" and I said "Yes, I would". So we sat down and had a glass of wine and then did the broadcast from the Czechoslovak legation in Washington and that was my introduction to broadcasting.

QUESTION: Your early years as a journalist in Washington were during the times that were rapidly changing under the Roosevelt Administration. Later President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill were among the first to conceive the idea of establishing the United Nations. What were your impressions of these two leaders when you attended their meeting in Quebec in 1944?

FREDERICK: These were two fascinating personalities, as of course everyone knows by now, and to see them in the flesh was quite an experience - Roosevelt with his cape and cigarette at the angle at which he always carried it, and pudgy Churchill with his cigar. It was interesting to see these two men together who had been talking so much behind the scenes about making a better world from the time they had signed the Atlantic Charter to the fact that eventually they were going to bring about a new effort to try to save the world from wars through the United Nations. That afternoon in Quebec there was a slight interruption in the high-minded purpose of the two men. As they sat there about to begin their news conference a little dog wandered out, followed the famous dog of President Roosevelt, wandered around, sniffed at the feet of the great men and then lay down in front of Churchill with its legs extended and stayed there throughout the conference. While everyone tried to be very serious and listen to what was being said, I am afraid there was more attention being paid to Falla than there was to the great men.

QUESTION: You were in San Francisco covering the opening weeks of the 1945 United Nations Conference when you became a war correspondent for the North America Newspaper Alliance and the Western Newspaper Union. This took you on a world tour of 19 countries, including wartime China, then to Nuremburg where you covered the trials of the German war criminals. Did you have any experiences during this period which might have increased your interest in covering the United Nations?

FREDERICK: The Western Newspaper Union, which was a boilerroom operation for small weekly newspapers across the country, asked me if I would like to go on a trip being planned by the Air Transport Command to take correspondents to north-east India and across the Hump of the Himalayas into China to see how the search-and-rescue operation was being conducted. The search-and-rescue operation was an effort to save the planes that were ferrying men and materiel into China by the "back door", so to speak, because Japan had closed off the front door and the war was still going on there. I said no, because I wanted to go to San Francisco, and furthermore the man to whom I was assistant, Mr. H.R. Bockert (?) of the Blue Network, said he didn't think a woman should go into a war zone and therefore he didn't approve of my accepting. So I went off to San Francisco and was very happy to do so because it turned out to be an exciting experience. Anyhow, after about 10 days, I realized that the Charter of the United Nations was not going to be ratified or approved in a few days, especially with 51 nations having their own points of view and particularly V.M. Molotov, the Foreign Minister of Soviet Union.

So one day, when I was sitting in a beauty parlor having a manicure, I suddenly thought: how silly not to go on this trip to the Far East; how exciting it would be. So I came out of the beauty parlor, called the Air Transport Command in Washington and said that if the place was still available for that trip to the Far East I was willing to go; and I was told by the officer at the other end of the line

"Oh, I'm sure it isn't available because, after all, it was 10 days ago and you you turned it down". So I went back to my business in San Francisco, received a call almost immediately from the same officer in Washington who said, "Well, we do have a space if you'd like to take it". I said, "Fine, I'll take it". So then I finally told Mr. Barkley (?), who was not very happy about it but nevertheless he couldn't do anything about it. I had to leave for Washington immediately, to get uniforms and the necessary shots and so on. All this is by way of saying that this gave me an opportunity to see what war really was and what it meant to try having some kind of an organization to prevent such a catastrophe.

We went by way of the Azores and North Africa, through the Middle East, across what was then India - and is now Pakistan, India and Bangladesh - into north-east India to Chadwar(?), over the Hump into China, and then eventually back by way of, again, North Africa; and this time we came up through Italy and into Germany and back. I saw such terrible devastation in Italy, Germany, India and in so many countries that I couldn't believe it. I couldn't believe that human beings could act this way, and as a consequence if I was ever sold on an effort to preventing war I was sold then. I think I'd been sold before I went over, but I was more sold than ever and this only reinforced my interest in trying to follow through I might ever be able to do to try to prevent another war. This led eventually to my covering the United Nations.

On returning to Washington I was there in time for D-Day which was, of course, a great emotional experience. But if I was ever moved by any one thing it was that I had to go back and see more of the terrible thing that had happened to other people, in Europe particularly. The Nuremburg trials of the nazi war criminals were coming up the first of the year and so I decided that my next move was to get out of Washington. How could you cover this vast story in Washington any more?

I wanted to go to Nuremburg and see these criminals in the dock, and so as a consequence I went to Nuremburg and was there until June 1946.

QUESTION: In late September 1946, now as a political correspondent for the American Broadcasting Company, you travelled to England on the SS Queen Mary's last voyage as a troop ship with General and Mrs. Eisenhower on board. You returned the following month on the maiden voyage of the Queen Elizabeth. Your fellow passengers were 150 delegates to the first UN General Assembly in New York, including Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov, UK delegation head Philip Noel Baker and US Senator Tom Connelly. What stands out in your memory from those voyages?

FREDERICK: Of course first of all the fact that the Queen Mary was going back into drydock to be transformed into a passenger liner again to carry passengers in peacetime after carrying so many men to war and General Eisenhower's being aboard my ship. I did some broadcasting from London too, but (inaudible). On the way back on the maiden voyage of the Queen Elizabeth, we had many distinguished passengers on board and I had the exciting experience of interviewing them, many of them from the ship's bridge the night we took off and during the voyage. Of course the most outstanding passenger newswise was V.M. Molotov again whom, as I said, I had seen at San Francisco. Molotov was the focus of all the media attention. There were quite a few correspondents on this ship and I remember that some of the more seasoned, shall I say, of the reporters who felt they belonged to the prestigious media - the magazines mostly, like Life and Time; television was not very much in the picture at that time, not at all as a matter of fact, and radio was a little bit behind the scenes - decided that we should all cover Molotov, that nobody should get a scoop on him. And as a consequence they decided that all of us correspondents should meet twice a day and exchange all the information we had on Molotov. He was seen walking along the deck, taking his constitutional, or having

a drink or doing anything or saying a few words - which he never did, of course, in public - we were to report those things. So this was a very exciting experience, but as far as content was concerned, Noel Baker, who was coming to the United Nations, was a more forthcoming personality, and the members of the American delegation were coming back from the Paris Peace Conference - there was a small peace conference in Paris at that time, and that's the reason that Senator Tom Connelly was on board.

QUESTION: You barely had time to lose your sea legs before you were plunged into covering the first session of the UN General Assembly held at Lake Success in Flushing Meadows. As if that weren't enough, you were also assigned to cover the Big Four Council of Ministers being held at the same time in the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel. Can you tell us something about the circumstances of these assignments and how the Foreign Ministers' conference related to the work of the United Nations?

FREDERICK: Well the opportunity to cover the Foreign Ministers came about most unexpectedly and for a very unique reason, not particularly unique in these days but it was in those days, because I was a woman. You see at that particular time broadcasting, which was merely radio then - no television, felt that women should not be heard on the air because they did not have authority in their voices and therefore they could not discuss serious subjects, like international affairs, which was what I wanted to discuss. So I had been sent out on various and sundry nonsensical things in my view - fashion shows and a forum on how to get a husband and so on.

And one night I was sort of hanging around the newsroom hoping something would happen and there was a male correspondent there who was on staff - I was at that time merely a free lancer - and the editor looked up and said, "You know, there are two stories to be covered tonight. One is a truck strike meeting and the other is

the Council of Foreign Ministers. He looked at me and he said, "You're a woman. I don't think I should send you to the truck strike meeting because there might be violence. I think you'd better cover the Council of Foreign Ministers". Well, I was very pleased and excited because the only reason why that particular slot was open that night was because the big shots, the males who were the network correspondents, like Elmer Davis, Raymond Swing and Martin Agronsky and H.R. Barkach(?), who had been brought to New York to cover the Foreign Ministers at the Waldorf had had to go back to Washington. They couldn't wait around for Mr. Molotov to make up his mind about the treaties for the little Axis nations; and so as a consequence the slot was left open and I was asked to fill it. So I did and I covered the Foreign Ministers every night then at the Waldorf until they adjourned some weeks later and I was very excited about it. Of course the four Foreign Ministers were Secretary of State James Burns, V.M. Molotov of the Soviet Union, Foreign Minister Bevin of Great Britain and Foreign Minister Bidault of France.

QUESTION: After covering that first UN General Assembly in New York you went on to report and comment on virtually all the Assemblies that followed as well as the Security Council, the other Councils and the work of the United Nations and its agencies as a whole. Through the years you have known and talked with famous people from many countries who played important roles in the growth and development of the world Organization. As a result, you enjoy an unusual vantage point from which to appraise what the United Nations has done so far and where it may be headed in the future.

To go back to the very early days, there was apparently a striking difference between the general atmosphere and the public attitude that existed in the United States towards the United Nations as compared with those which prevailed towards its predecessor when the League of Nations was founded. How would you describe this

difference in the light of what you observed in Washington and San Francisco in 1945?

FREDERICK: Well of course at the time of the founding of the League of Nations there was that little group of so-called willful men in the United States Senate, mostly Republicans - Henry Cabot Lodge, William E. Borah and the like - who decided that this was to be the end as far as the United States was concerned. The United States would have nothing to do with. So they led the fight against the League of Nations and succeeded in defeating it. I have often wondered if, as a result of that, with the coming on World War II there wasn't some sense of guilt in Washington, not among that little group of "willful men", because they apparently were too old to care. Anyhow, there were those in Washington who decided that this time there had to be some kind of an organization to prevent even a third world war, and of course that group was led by President Roosevelt. Roosevelt was very anxious to have this United Nations succeed. He held many conferences, particularly with Winston Churchill about it, but unfortunately he died before his dream could be realized. So Harry Truman took up the cudgel and he named to the delegation to San Francisco for the signing of the Charter a Republican and a Democrat - a very important Republican, Arthur Vandenburg of Michigan, and the Democrat was Tom Connolly of Texas - and they were to lead the delegation to the San Francisco Conference. Before leaving they addressed their colleagues in the United States Senate on their coming mission, and at the conclusion of their speeches there was, as one observer described it, "an uproar of approval in the unusually staid Senate Chamber". Members on both sides of the aisle which whichseparates the parties, as you know, arose clapping and surging toward the two men to shake their hands and embrace them. Vandenburg warned his colleagues that he and Connolly could not hope to chart the millenium in San Francisco nor could they be expected to bring back perfection. But the Charter they did bring back was

almost unanimously approved by the United States Senate on 28 July 1945. The vote was 89 to 2.

The vote in the Senate reflected the feeling in this country that here at last was an opportunity to try to prevent another world war. But, unfortunately, too many people thought it would be so easy, that all the UN had to do was to press some buttons and you'd have peace instead of war. As it turned out, this wasn't the case. As a matter, I heard of one group that formed the so-called Three Cent Club - three cents on a postcard to your senator asking him to vote to ratify the UN Charter and there would be peace. As we all know, it turned out that peace isn't that easily achieved and there were too many factors involved. But it remains to be said that at San Francisco there was great excitement and great hope that somehow or other at last the time had come when nations were going to be wise enough to lay down their arms and try to go to the conference table.

QUESTION: The United Nations, when it first came into being, was quite different from what it has become in more recent years. What in your opinion are some of the main differences?

FREDERICK: Of course when the United Nations was created the fathers and mothers so to speak, very few women were involved, unfortunately, created a creature that reflected to a great extent the white, Western cultures of the north. At that time the 51 Members reflected these particular cultures, so therefore the UN was concerned with reflecting this point of view. Moreover, there were two major problems bothering the founders of the United Nations, that is, that Germany and Japan might rise again in their military might and therefore everything had to be done to try to prevent them from again being aggressive. So much of the Charter itself sort of reflected an attitude towards preventing Germany and Japan from rising again.

Now, as we all know, as time went on and many of the colonies achieved independence by one means or another so that a lot of small nations from other areas of the world reflecting different points of view, economies and cultures were brought into being; and the first thing these newly independent nations wanted to do was to become Members of the United Nations. So as a consequence, as time went on these little nations were admitted, one by one, many of them small, many of them poor and most of them from the southern part of the world - they became known as the third world nations - and as a result their points of view became more implanted in the UN, their voices were raised in the interest of better economies, an end to all colonialism and various issues that interested them. As a consequence, instead of the big division between the United States and the Soviet Union, you had really a three-way split between the Soviet Union and the so-called free nations represented by the United States and the small third-world nations, and these began to reflect new programmes, new interests and new difficulties for the United Nations in trying to work out some of the issues that it had been hoped could be achieved by peaceful means.

QUESTION: Unlike the League of Nations, the United Nations was empowered by its Charter to enforce peace-keeping decisions of the Security Council, with the concurrence of the Council's five permanent members. What considerations led to the choice of countries to be the permanent members?

FREDERICK: I think the first consideration was: How many divisions does the other country have? - to sort of paraphrase something Stalin said about the Pope - because in order to enforce decisions it was felt by the original Members of the United Nations that there had to be power enough to counteract any new aggression by Germany or Japan. As a consequence, Churchill and Roosevelt decided that perhaps the big policemen for the Security Council, which is what they were

originally thought to be, should include the Soviet Union because, whether the USSR liked it or, the fact remained that it had military power, and that was what was needed. So the Soviet Union and of course the United States and Britain were understandably three of the five members, whereas China and France were thought of as belong to this group; and these became the five permanent members practically by the decision, I guess, of Churchill and Roosevelt.

QUESTION: The early years of the Security Council's work were marked by dissent among the permanent members. What stands out in your memory of that time?

FREDERICK: The thing that stands out particularly was the emergence of a word that is never even used in the UN Charter, that is, the word "veto". In the Security Council provisions of the Charter it said that there had to be a concurring vote among the big five permanent members, the five policemen, in order for a substantive issue to have any validity, and it was assumed then, of course, that, if there was not a concurring vote, a vote in opposition would in effect be a veto. This device was not used at the beginning when the Soviet Union was the first nation to be hailed before the Council. It was called in because an arrangement during World War II for Britain and the Soviet Union to station forces along the Iranian border to protect oil wells from seizure by the Germans made it possible after the war for the Soviet Union to begin extending its influence without the validity of this agreement that had been previously arranged by the big Powers. As a consequence, Iran decided to bring before the Security Council a complaint that the Soviet Union was interfering in its internal affairs. At first the USSR, represented then by Andrei Gromyko, who is everlasting apparently, did not try to refute very strongly the issue that was brought before the Council and it certainly did not use the veto in those days, although there were occasions when Andrei Gromyko became annoyed and said that the Council did not have the right to

discuss the matter and that he would walk out. In those days, the Soviet Union was not sure about the power the Security Council might exert, and consequently it moved very cautiously along this road without being too obstreperous; and when it found after a while that the Council really did not have any power, or if it did it did not exert it, the Soviet Union became braver and began using the veto. As a consequence this became the well-known instrument in the hands of the Soviet Union and the veto came into the parlance of international diplomacy, even though it wasn't even mentioned in the Charter. Not only did the Soviet Union use the veto on an issue, but Andrei Gromyko decided one day to veto whether or not a question was vetoable, and then having vetoed that vetoed the question itself, and this became known as the double veto. As a consequence this was an issue that aroused the anger of, particular, the representatives of the United States. I remember standing outside the Security Council chamber just after Gromyko had cast the double veto and Warrant Austen, who was then our Permanent Representative, came bursting out the door, his pink cheeks pinker than ever; and I saw him and asked, "Have you any comment?" and he answered, "I'm so mad I don't know what to do". And then he went on to say, "I understand why the Russians do something like this. They are always in the minority; we always have a majority, and consequently, in order to try to prove to the world that the Soviet Union also is a major sovereign Power, it exerts the veto, and that's the reason they do it".

(Frederick)

You see, for about the first 10 years of the United Nations the United States had a complete, clear majority not only in the Security Council but in the General Assembly. We had plenty of friends to vote for our side, so we never had to use the veto. However, when the smaller nations, satellites of the Soviet Union as well as the third world countries, began coming into the United Nations, then this majority changed, eventually even in the Security Council, and as a consequence the United States, which had been very proud of its veto-free record began using the veto as well as the Soviet Union.

QUESTION: As the Cold War was being waged in the United Nations a change was taking place in the American environment surrounding United Nations Headquarters in New York, with the rise of what became known as McCarthyism. How did this affect the United Nations?

FREDERICK: Unfortunately, it had a very severe effect on the United Nations, because many people then began to fear that the so-called foreigners within our midst were all spies, and some of the media I may say helped to encourage that point of view, because a spy story specially centering on the United Nations was always a headline story and there were quite a few of those that came out even though they were never really, as far as I know, substantiated. Anyhow, Henry Cabot Lodge, who was then the United States Permanent Representative at the United Nations, wanted to be sure that the United Nations was purer than pure, so he took the unusual step of bringing into the United Nations something that had never happened before and has never happened since as far as I know. He brought in the FBI to fingerprint American employees to make sure they were loyal to the United States and not spies against it. This is the only time I have ever heard of, and I think

this is true, that a national police force has been brought inside the international enclave which is the United Nations and supposedly an international unit in and of itself to check on its own employees. Moreover, the employees of the United Nations are supposed to be international employees and no longer representatives of their own national Governments. Although that is not always true of some other countries, it was a little disturbing to think that we even questioned Americans at that particular time.

Of course, Henry Cabot Lodge's efforts did not produce any spies as far as I know. As far as I know, no American employee of the United Nations has ever been indicted or convicted of being disloyal to the United States.

As an interesting footnote, Henry Cabot Lodge, the representative of the United States at this particular time, was the grandson of the Henry Cabot Lodge who led the fight against the United States becoming a member of the League of Nations. Whether or not there is any relationship between the two points of view remains for the historians to try to evaluate.

QUESTION: Lodge eventually left the United Nations in 1960 to run for Vice-President on the Republican ticket with Nixon. His successor at the United Nations was Adlai Stevenson. What can you tell us about him?

FREDERICK: Those of us who were present when Adlai Stevenson walked into the Security Council Chamber for the first time saw an unusual demonstration. Every single member around that horseshoe table applauded and then each one made a little address of welcome - even the Soviet delegate. As I say, this was unheard of as far as most of us could remember. In other words, Adlai Stevenson came there as a man of the highest regard. He was known around the world. He was an international citizen and it was looked upon as great evidence of the United States' belief in the United Nations that a man of this stature should be appointed to this particular post.

Unfortunately, this standing did not last too long, through no fault of Adlai Stevenson's. Scarcely three months after he was assigned to his post his own Government kept him in ignorance about the facts of the Bay of Pigs invasion and he was allowed to testify falsely in the Security Council about that invasion. As one sorrowful observer remarked to me, "He came here as a superman and now he's been reduced to a man." Well, Stevenson once said in my hearing "I never thought they'd do this to me."

Nevertheless, Adlai Stevenson was widely respected and deeply loved. He always had a quip and an inspirational word as well. I remember one time his saying that the United Nations diplomat was one part protocol, one part alcohol and one part Geritol. I think it can be said to this day that two of the most respected and loved human beings who were ever associated with the United Nations were Americans, and they were Adlai Stevenson and Eleanor Roosevelt.

QUESTION: The Cold War had another unfortunate effect on the United Nations. This concerned the Charter Articles on the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of peace. What happened to these important provisions of the Charter?

FREDERICK: The Charter provided that member nations should make armed forces available to the Security Council for use in case of an international problem that could not be handled by peaceful means, and so the Military Staff Committee was set up. It was made up of chiefs of staff or their representatives from the five permanent members of the Security Council. The purpose of this Committee was to advise and assist the Council in its military operations. But because of the ideological differences, the

Cold War, the Military Staff Committee could never agree on what force the United Nations Security Council should have or how it was to be deployed, and so to this day five men in spit and polish uniforms assemble in a basement room at United Nations Headquarters at the beginning of each month, and their sole function is to move over one seat to signify the monthly change in chairmanship - a kind of Gilbert and Sullivan performance without music or humour. This is today's United Nations Military Staff Committee.

Of course, the members of the Military Staff Committee were not personally responsible for this deadlock. They, like all representatives who came to the United Nations, represented their Governments, their foreign offices and their executive branches, and had to carry out the views of those Governments. So, as a consequence, the debate that ensued over this military force for the United Nations Security Council was marked by the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. I think it came pretty much to a head in a Security Council meeting which I believe was in June 1947 in which the United States and the Soviet Union expressed their views. The United States, backed up by the United Kingdom, France and China, said that each of the Big Five should contribute to the international force that which each was best able to contribute - in other words, the principle of comparability. The Russians, on the other hand, said there should be equal contributions. In carrying on this debate Herschel Johnson, who then represented the United States, pointed out that for the United States the flaw in the Russian plan was that to accept the principle of man for man and gun for gun would keep the world force down to the strengthen of the weakest nation. On the other hand, the United States contended that each nation should contribute what it was most able to contribute. The Soviet delegate,

Gromyko, argued that this comparability as it was called opened the way for certain powerful nations to take advantage over others. He said "The United Nations doesn't need a huge armed force if it is sincere about disarmament" and he said it was impossible to accept the principle of comparability. That deadlock has never been resolved and so the Security Council has never had the force that was provided for in the Charter.

QUESTION: Since the police power provided for in the Charter was never implemented a number of ad hoc arrangements have been devised from time to time to deal with emergencies. Could you give us some examples?

FREDERICK: Well, since 1947, for example, United Nations observers who keep watch on explosive situations and report back to the Secretary-General or the Security Council or the General Assembly have been sent to many trouble spots in places like Indonesia, the Middle East, Kashmir, Greece, Lebanon and Yemen. They have usually been designated by the Secretary-General with a mandate from either the Security Council or the General Assembly. Of course, the Korean War presented the United Nations with a particular problem, when President Truman sent American land and sea forces to try to stem the invasion from North Korea and at the same time asked members of the United Nations to join the United States in this particular operation. There was a small response for military fighting men from members of the United Nations. In fact, most of the replies had to do with sending supplies to help out the repelling of aggressors.

The Security Council was able to act positively that Sunday when the appeal came to the United Nations because the Soviet delegate, Malik, had walked out the previous January over the fact that the United States would not permit the seating of Communist China in the United Nations, and as a

consequence there was no veto to block action to come to the aid of South Korea. Those who did respond served under a unified American command in Korea, frequently referred to erroneously as a United Nations command.

But the largest United Nations military force so far, ONUC, operated in the Congo, now Zaire, from 1960 to 1964. That was in response to a request from the Congo for aid to help stem a revolution in the Congo when the Belgians released that country to independence. Secretary-General Hammarskjöld brought the matter before the Security Council, and the United Nations responded to his request and this became quite a policing operation, the biggest the United Nations has ever known. Of course, United Nations peace-keeping troops have been stationed on Cyprus - this force was known as UNFICYP - since the outbreak of Greek-Turkish fighting in 1964. I believe something like four wars in the Middle East produced United Nations peace-keeping operations, in addition to the truce supervision organization which established headquarters in Jerusalem in 1948. That was known as UNTSO.

The first emergency force, UNEF I, came about as a result of a conflict among the big Powers, believe it or not. Great Britain and France had decided to go in and deal with Egypt's President Nasser because he had nationalized the Suez Canal, and this meant military action. The United States was on the outside and objected to this, and so as a consequence when the Security Council acted Britain and France both cast vetoes which blocked the action. The United States then, under President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles, decided to bring the matter to the United Nations General Assembly instead of sending in American military forces to try to right the situation. As a consequence, UNEF, the first emergency force, was not(?) set up on the mandate of the Security Council. The first emergency force, UNEF, was set

up by Secretary-General Hammarskjöld working in tandem with Assembly President Lester Pearson when the General Assembly gave him a mandate to send United Nations peace-keeping forces into Egypt to try to prevent the taking over of the Suez Canal by outside forces.

I was on the plane with Secretary-General Hammarskjöld on that particular historic mission and was able to go as far as Naples, when he said that unfortunately he could not take a reporter beyond that point, since the UNEF forces were being taken in by Swiss military planes. This UNEF force was set up along a demarcation line as long as the United Nations troops were on the Egyptian side of the line. Israel had been a part of the British-French operation against the Canal, but it would not permit any United Nations forces on its side of the line.

The 1973 Middle East war produced UNEF II, and that was stationed in the Sinai until, I believe, 1979. In addition, there has been a disengagement unit, as they are called, UNDOF, posted on Syria's Golan Heights in 1973, and in 1978 there was an interim force, UNIFIL, sent to southern Lebanon to supervise withdrawal of invading Israeli troops, which of course has not yet occurred, but the United Nations force is still in southern Lebanon.

QUESTION: What can you say about the role of the Secretary-General in such United Nations peace-keeping operations?

FREDERICK: The Secretary-General has always been a prime factor in these peace-keeping operations. For example, when the United States asked for United Nations help in Korea, Secretary-General Trygve Lie supported the American appeal. Unfortunately, it finally led to his departure from the United Nations, because the Soviet Union never forgave him. Secretary-General Hammarskjöld, of course, was most active in setting up peace-keeping forces,

particularly UNEF I and II and the Congo force, and Secretary-General Thant was left to supervise the withdrawal of the force from Egypt, because Egypt would no longer have the United Nations troops on its soil and Israel refused to accept them. He also had to supervise the wind-up of the Congo operation.

QUESTION: Mr. Lie was succeeded in April 1953 by Dag Hammarskjöld of Sweden. What can you say about him?

FREDERICK: Interestingly enough, Dag Hammarskjöld was incurring the disfavour of the Soviet Union as Lie had, because of his operation in the Congo. The Soviet Union accused him of siding with the West in that respect and trying to keep communism out of the Congo. As a consequence, before his death the Soviet Union was demanding his resignation and his replacement by a troika. When Dag Hammarskjöld was first appointed Secretary-General very little was known about him beyond his own circle of immediate friends. He was in the Swedish Foreign Office, and it was assumed that after Lie's experience he would not take too much initiative but on the other hand would be more of an administrative officer at the United Nations. So, much to the surprise of everybody, he became much more of a leader in initiating peace-keeping operations and peace-keeping devices to try to ease some of the tensions in the world than had the previous Secretary-General, and, like Trygve, it was not very long before he was in trouble with the Russians for what they considered siding with the West.

United Nations Oral History Project

**Pauline Frederick
20 June 1986**

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UN INTERVIEW
Pauline Frederick
June 20, 1986
Interviewer: Norman Ho

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UNITED NATIONS

Dag Hammarskjöld
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20 June, 1986

HO: This is the second interview for the United Nations Oral History Programme to which you have generously contributed your time, memories and your abundant records of the Organization's activities and personalities from its very earliest years. In our first interview you told us about how you began your own career which served to open new career opportunities for other women in network radio and television. You also gave us a broad overview of the United Nations, as you had known it so well, over its first three decades. Today we shall focus our attention on one individual, Dag Hammarskjöld, the UN's second Secretary-General, who stands out on the service of the World Organization for which he ultimately gave his life. You eventually came to know Dag Hammarskjöld very well, but can you remember when you first heard of him and how he came to be appointed the UN Secretary-General?

FREDERICK: Thank you very much Norman, I didn't really know him very well, as a matter of fact, very few people did, even his closest friends. Nevertheless, he was a unique personality and came to be well known at the United Nations. Now, as to when I first heard the name Dag Hammarskjöld, that's difficult for me to recall, but I don't believe that I heard it at all until the name was mentioned in connection with the Office of Secretary-General. And that, of course, was something that was pretty unusual for everyone, anyone to learn about because he was not a well-known figure. He had been rather a quiet personality in the Foreign Office in Sweden and . . . when his name surfaced

at the United Nations, it was because it was discovered that both the United States and the Soviet Union would agree to his being Secretary-General. Neither would oppose it, and that was the primary factor in finding a man to hold this important post. The fact that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union would oppose Dag Hammarskjöld for this important post meant that they assumed, as everybody else did, that he would not make waves as Secretary-General Trygve Lie had done. In other words, he would not involve himself in political issues that either of them would be opposed to, and so as a consequence, there was not much controversy, not any as a matter of fact, when his name surfaced, considering him for the post of Secretary-General, because most people assumed that from that time on, after Trygve Lie's experience, as a result of the Korean War and siding with the United States, that the next Secretary-General would not be so forward as to inject himself into a major political issue, especially where the two Big Powers were on opposing sides.

HO: What were your early impressions of Dag Hammarskjöld when he first came on the scene?

FREDERICK: Norman, it was very difficult to get a very strong impression of the man, because he was sort of a quiet, withdrawn-like personality. He was diffident . . . and did not make an effort to place himself in front. As a matter of fact, he said when he first came to the United Nations, "In my new official capacity, the private man should disappear and the international civil servant take his place." Dag Hammarskjöld adhered to that creed during the entire time of his official tenure at the United Nations. He was always the private man, and never sought publicity or never sought to be in the forefront when any major operation was underway. He was always the

private individual from whom it was difficult to get any kind of a news story, because he retained his own views very much of the time.

HO: Later on, despite Hammarskjöld's reputation for being somewhat shy and remote, how did you get to know him as well as you did?

FREDERICK: It was an unusual opportunity presented to me, wholly unexpected. I was elected President of the United Nations Correspondents Association. As such, this gave me an opportunity to ask the first question at a news conference and close off the news conference very much as is done at the White House press meetings. At the same time, I became the Pool Correspondent, so to speak, for any public gatherings for which one reporter was allowed to be present but no more. So, as a consequence, when such unusual occasions were held, such as the Secretary-General holding a black tie, a white tie . . . such as the Secretary-General having a formal dinner for a visiting dignitary, such as the President of State or a king, or other official, I was the one correspondent who could be present. And as a consequence, other correspondents depended on me to give them a report on the situation, and give them a report on the occasion. And, I was consequently, looked to by all the members of the UN as the one representative of the press, and radio and television who would be present at these gatherings. Consequently, this opportunity gave me more of a chance to be present with Dag Hammarskjöld than I would have had otherwise.

HO: The new Secretary-General made himself famous early in his first term, when he travelled to Peking, where he succeeded in negotiating the release of fifteen United States flyers imprisoned by the People's Republic of China which then, as you know, did not yet represent China in the United Nations.

The scripts of your daily coverage of this major news story are still exciting to read. Could you give us a brief synopsis of what happened?

FREDERICK: Much to the surprise of most people at the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjöld, soon after he came there, revealed that he was not going to be just an administrative officer. He was going to involve himself in some of the political issues of the day. And one of the most controversial, for the United States in particular, was the representation of China. The Chinese had captured fifteen American flyers during the Korean War, and were holding them, and the United States felt that it could not contact the Chinese, because it did not have representation with them, so therefore, there was no negotiation between the United States and China for the release of the flyers. Finally, President Eisenhower decided that the UN should do something about it. It was interesting, and on a number of occasions, that such a military man should look to the United Nations for some kind of resolution of some of the issues that were facing the world in those days. Anyhow, President Eisenhower suggested that the UN do something about the situation. The General Assembly adopted a resolution calling on the Secretary-General to do what he could to try to gain the release of the flyers. And after a Security Council meeting, the Secretary-General announced, much to the surprise of many people, that he would go to China himself, personally, and try to talk to Chou En-Lai, then the Foreign Minister, to gain release of the flyers.

It's interesting, how small things can be of great importance. I'm thinking particularly of the exchange of cables between Dag Hammarskjöld and Chou En-Lai. The exchange meant to many people that, first of all, the United Nations recognized the People's Republic of China. And, the fact that Chou En-Lai cabled back, meant that the People's Republic of China recognized the United Nations. So, in spite of all the efforts of the United States to keep

the lid clamped on any recognition of China, the cables had made possible this minor recognition, which, of course, eventually became something more important. Dag Hammarskjöld went to China, and had his conversations with Chou En-Lai, and Chou offered, through Dag Hammarskjöld, to permit the families of the flyers to come to China to visit them. This meant to many people, the possibility that the flyers might be released to their families at that particular time.

However, when the invitation was disclosed by Peking and the United Nations, the State Department immediately said it could not encourage Americans to go into an area where normal protection of American passports could not be offered. Of course, this was the Dulles anti-Chinese, anti-communist policy.

It was not until May 1955 that the first four flyers were released, and the final eleven were let go in August. Thus, ended the first example of Dag Hammarskjöld's successful quiet diplomacy.

HO: Early in the following year, 1956, Hammarskjöld turned his attention to the long-standing problems of the Middle East, travelling to the capitals of the Member States involved, and conferring personally with their top leaders, in an effort to restore observation of the UN-negotiated Armistice Agreements between Israel and her Arab neighbors, and to relieve tensions which had arisen as a result of violations of these agreements. By the end of April, his efforts to do this were widely reported in the media to be successful. Hammarskjöld himself, however, was more guarded about the outcome of his efforts. What prompted Hammarskjöld to undertake this difficult diplomatic mission in the first place?

FREDERICK: The Security Council was aware of the growing tension in the

Middle East, and since Hammarskjöld had indicated that he had some success in private diplomacy, because of the China question he had negotiated, it was decided that Hammarskjöld, the Secretary-General, should be asked by the Security Council to do what he could to try to ease some of the tension in the Middle East. That meant, of course, trying to reinforce the Armistice Agreements that had already been entered into, and to stop the incursions back and forth across the Armistice lines.

HO: On his return to UN Headquarters in May, Hammarskjöld submitted a report to the Security Council. What did it reveal about his mission as a whole?

FREDERICK: The Secretary-General reported establishment of the cease-fire between Israel and its Arab neighbors, and some agreement for withdrawal of opposing forces from the tense borders, erection of barriers on these demarcation lines, and allowing the UN observers a freer movement in the area, and . . . efforts by local commanders to prevent the border clashes which had caused so much tension. The Secretary-General frankly admitted in his report, that this is only a necessary first step, all these efforts he has outlined. They do even attempt to deal with the complicated . . . disorderly issues. But he said that in the area, there is a will to peace, and it is up to Israel and the Arab States to try to work out solutions to their problems without interference from the outside.

HO: In any case, the Secretary-General's diplomatic efforts that spring of 1956, in the capitals of the Middle East, would be overshadowed later in the same year, by the Suez and the Hungarian Crises. For Suez, the General Assembly authorized Hammarskjöld, in agreement with the Governments concerned, to set up the United Nations Emergency Force, known as UNEF. Can you explain

why this Force is considered to be the first genuine United Nations peace-keeping operation, as compared with, say, the Unified Command in Korea?

FREDERICK: . . . Dag Hammarskjöld's belief that there was a will to peace in the Middle East was not exactly borne out in the . . . short time after that. It was only in July that an angry President Nasser decided that he was going to take some action of his own, because the United States, through Secretary of State Dulles, had refused to help him finance the Aswan Dam. This was his dreamed-of monument. So, Nasser decided, President Nasser of Egypt decided that in retaliation, he would seize the Suez Canal, and that the tolls from the passing ships through the Canal would (sentence cut off) . . . This angered particularly the British and the French, whose nationals had built the Canal, and whose nationals also had major financial interests in the Canal.

The British and the French concentrated their military forces on Cyprus, with presumably the thought of moving into Egypt, to take away the Suez Canal from Nasser. But before that, calmer counsels prevailed. Secretary of State Dulles tried to repair some of the damage by going to the Canal Users Conference in London, trying to get them to calm down, but he didn't succeed. When he came back to the United States, it was decided to bring the matter before the UN Security Council. When it was brought there, much to the shock of many nations . . . Britain and France vetoed any action by the UN to intervene in that particular crisis. So at this point, Yugoslavia, presumably acting with the approval of the United States, decided to invoke the Uniting For Peace Resolution, which meant that an issue that was deadlocked in the Security Council because of veto, could be referred to the General Assembly. And that's how the Suez Crisis came to the General Assembly, and the question arose as to how to get United Nations Force in there to enforce it.

In order to carry out this Resolution, Dag Hammarskjöld and Canadian

delegate Lester Pearson worked all night to set up what was to become the first United Nations Emergency Force, to enforce the efforts of the General Assembly to bring peace to the Middle East, to restore peace to the Middle East. This was a very different operation from the Unified Command that had been set up for Korea, because in that case, it was at the request of the United States and was operated by the United States. Whereas, this was to be a wholly UN Force. It was to be made up of military representatives from nations which did not belong to either of the two Big Power groups, in order to reduce as much as possible any political intrusion into the situation.

HO: Ten days later, on the evening of 14 November, 1956, Hammarskjöld left New York by air for Rome, en route to Egypt, to accompany one of the first UNEF contingents to go to Suez, from a staging area near Naples. I understand that you found yourself in a seat next to the Secretary-General on that flight to Italy. How did you manage that, and what did the two of you talk about?

FREDERICK: Well, I didn't immediately find myself next to the Secretary-General, because he was in the portion where the berths were in the back part of the plane, and I was forward. But there was a short period when he did come forward, and we talked. He expressed regret that he couldn't be more communicative than he ever had been any place else, including the United Nations. But, he said that we should have a chance to talk a little bit, on the plane, and we did. We talked about things in general, and about the fact that he was undertaking an unusual step in launching UNEF into Egypt. . . . When we reached Rome, he was transferred to an Italian Air Force plane to take him down to the staging area for UNEF at Naples, or just below Naples. And, there were many correspondents waiting, hoping to get aboard that plane. But, I had a friend who knew the Secretary-General quite well, and he came up and

asked me if I'd like to be on that plane, and I said, "Oh yes, very much so." He said, "Well come with me." So he scuttled around behind the plane so nobody would see us, and put me aboard. So I was on the plane with the Secretary-General from Rome to Naples. And we chatted a bit then. He said that that time, that he knew that in getting out in front, it was possible that he would become a target. But he said, if you don't attempt something, you never get anything done. And so, he was going ahead, regardless. He told me also that he couldn't take me beyond the staging area at Naples because too many correspondents were waiting there to go across, and only the Swiss were making it possible to transport the UNEF men in the white Swiss planes, and he couldn't possibly take someone aboard who was not a member of UNEF.

UNITED NATIONS

HO: Actually, during the more than eight years Dag Hammarskjöld was UN Secretary-General, you were one of the correspondents who came to know him best. You have written, broadcast and lectured about him so much over the years, that you came to be regarded by the general public as an expert on Dag Hammarskjöld. He was known to be deeply dedicated, intellectually brilliant, and completely honest. How do you remember Hammarskjöld, the man, and how would you characterize him?

FREDERICK: The more I knew Dag Hammarskjöld, and the more I saw him in operation, and heard what he thought and said, the more I became impressed by the fact that this man was really dedicated to what the United Nations was meant to be: a place for harmonizing actions to bring about resolution of difficulties so there wouldn't be another war. As a consequence, I was very impressed with him. And, I was, one day, was talking with his close advisor and friend, Andrew Cordier, who was then the Chef de Cabinet. And I asked Cordier what he thought of Dag Hammarskjöld, and he said, "It's interesting to

know that he came into this Office just a short time ago, and said to me . . . that the one thing that everyone who has written about him has missed, is the fact that he is a very religious person. He has deep religious roots." So from that time forward, I began looking into this possibility in his writings and his speeches, and I could find it, frequently, there. There was a great religious strain through it all. And of course, this came out in his Markings, which was left after his death.

It is interesting that he was a man who believed in fairness to all parties, and at one time or another, offended one of the Big Powers, which were responsible for his being in office. For example, at the time of the . . . Chinese situation, when he went to China to free the flyers, he brought back an invitation from Chou En-Lai to have the families come over to see their men, but John Foster Dulles refused to grant them passports for that particular purpose. Of course, he was on the outs, to a great extent, with Charles de Gaulle over Algeria, to the extent that de Gaulle was the only major leader of a world Power not to send condolences to the United Nations at the time of his death.

And, of course, he was very much on the outs with the Soviet Union over the Congo and everything from that time on, to the point where the Soviet Union was doing its best to try to oust him, as they had succeeded in ousting Trygve Lie. And of course, in the case of Britain and France, both of them were annoyed with him for a time, certainly, because of the Suez crisis.

In this connection, he was able to make an arrangement with President Nasser of Egypt to permit the UNEF Forces to be deployed on that side of the border, when, at that particular time, he was not able to get any agreement from the Israelis to permit the UNEF Forces to be deployed on the Israeli side.

HO: It was Hammarskjöld who had the Meditation Room created at UN Headquarters, in the General Assembly Building. What was his motivation for doing so?

FREDERICK: When you know something about the spiritual interests of Dag Hammarskjöld, it's not unusual to know that he was instrumental in creating what he called the Meditation Room. He said that "This House"--which he referred to the UN frequently, he referred to the UN as "this House"--"This House must have one room dedicated to silence, in the outward sense, and stillness, in the inner sense." And to this end, he created one very simple symbol: a block of iron ore in the center of the room, with a single light focused on it. This light, striking on stone, shimmering like ice a shaft of light from above, represented to him a meeting of the light of the sky, and of the Earth. I remember very distinctly one night, when I heard that he had been working most of the night, and about two o'clock in the morning, he called some of his aides in, and they assumed that there had been some bad news from one of the fronts where the United Nations Emergency Forces were then located, but he said, "I want to go down to the Meditation Room." And he took them down to the Meditation Room, and it was about, as I said, two o'clock in the morning, and there he spent considerable time directing the painters to put just the precise coat of paint on the walls of that Meditation Room, so the light would be just as he wanted it. So he had a very close feeling about the spiritual. And he felt that it should be the center of the United Nations. He had a special crew of painters working on the Meditation Room that evening. He said, "We want to bring back, in this room, the stillness which we have lost in our streets, and in in our conference rooms, and to bring it back in a setting in which no noise would impinge on our imagination."

HO: On a lighter note, Hammarskjöld also held some positive views on the subject of holding concerts in the halls of the United Nations. Could you explain?

FREDERICK: Yes. Dag Hammarskjöld believed that international understanding had to be dealt on a much broader base than just political accord. It needed mutual appreciation of the cultures, the art, the literature and music of the world. As a consequence, he introduced concerts in the General Assembly Hall for special occasions. Concerts by the leading orchestras of the world, and the leading soloists. And, he once told me that when he decided to introduce concerts into the UN, someone said . . . that Trygve Lie had remarked that this was "profaning the parliament of man." Hammarskjöld responded, I'm told, that if this was profanity, he was prepared to make the most of it.

HO: In 1960, the United Nations embarked on its largest peace-keeping operation, in the former Belgian Congo, during the course of which Dag Hammarskjöld was to lose his life. You have already dealt in part, in our earlier interview, with the trouble between Hammarskjöld and the USSR over the Congo Operation. Could you tell us in brief outline, some of the events that led Hammarskjöld to fly to the Congo in September 1961, and what happened as a result?

FREDERICK: To begin with, on the July night in 1960, when the Democratic National Convention was nominating John F. Kennedy as its presidential candidate in Los Angeles, the UN Security Council was meeting in crisis

session here in New York. For the first time, a Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld, had invoked Article Ninety-Nine of the UN Charter. This authorizes the Secretary-General to call the Council's attention to any matter he decides threatens international peace. Otherwise, of course, Council sessions are usually requested by Governments. Dag Hammarskjöld had asked for UN military assistance for the new Republic of the Congo, because Belgium had sent troops back into its former African colony, and bloodshed was mounting. The political roll call in Los Angeles was interrupted from time to time that night by the radio and television networks, for reports on the Council proceedings. . . . Before dawn, the Secretary-General was authorized by the Council, to create the UN's largest peace-keeping force, to be recruited from small nations outside the Cold-Warring camps of the Big Powers. This was largely because of the fact that the Big Powers were competing for influence in the Congo. The contingent eventually--that went to the Congo--numbered over twenty-three thousand men, cost three hundred and sixty million dollars, lasted three and a half years, and Dag Hammarskjöld was among the casualties.

The climax approached in the fall of 1961, just before the meeting of the General Assembly. Dag Hammarskjöld decided to fly back to the Congo, three days before the Assembly opened in 1961, in the hope that once more, he could persuade Tshombe, who was then holding on to the rich Katanga province of the Congo, to bring Katanga back into the Congo, and thus help to reunite the country.

HO: The news of Hammarskjöld's death in Rhodesia began to reach New York in the early hours of Sunday, 17 September, 1961. What do you remember of that terrible day?

FREDERICK: That was two days before the opening of the General Assembly, and

NBC put on a special broadcast on television that night, about the issues that were coming up in the coming Assembly. As a matter of fact, I said, in that broadcast, that Dag Hammarskjöld would be destroyed. I meant, of course, that he would not be permitted by the Soviet Union to have another term of Office. But little did I know that, probably, about that moment, his plane was being downed, whether by accident or by intent, it's still not clear. Nevertheless, the next morning, about six o'clock, I was called by NBC to get to the UN because Dag Hammarskjöld's plane was missing. That morning, I was at the UN before Andy Cordier or many of the other UN people. And then came hours of waiting and waiting and waiting for some word, as to the plane, and as to the fate of Dag Hammarskjöld. About noon, there was no longer any opportunity to wait, because the news came in that he was dead. The plane had been . . . brought down. And then followed investigations to determine how it had been--how the accident had occurred, whether it was an accident, or by intent, and . . . nothing has ever been definite as far as the investigations are concerned.

(beginning of sentence cut off) . . . as memorial services were held, and everyone was wondering what going to happen next, with Dag Hammarskjöld gone. The atmosphere at the United Nations was very gloomy, as everyone wondered what was going to happen to the UN itself, with Dag Hammarskjöld gone.

HO: That Sunday evening, you wound up your full day of broadcasting with an eloquent personal statement, obviously from the heart. It is a memorable bit of television commentary and history, and I would be most grateful if you would first read it for us, and then make any comments you might have, twenty-five years later.

FREDERICK: (Reads) "Secretary-General Hammarskjöld is said to have had one

regret about the Big Power Crisis. The Soviet Union's break in relations with him had denied him any opportunity to do something. Hammarskjöld is a hostage of the Cold War. So is the United Nations. This is the time of year when delegates of ninety-nine nations pay lip service to a guilty conscience. In the midst of the greatest war preparation in history, the annual pilgrimage here is under way, in remembrance of a pledge once taken to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. While rocket plants hum, and armies, navies and air forces play their games, men will be going to the rostrum in the Assembly Hall below this booth, to repeat the old clichés about ending man's inhumanity to man. But it appears to be easier to build a rocket and explore space, than to explore the minds of men for the common ground on which to try to cultivate understanding that might prevent the final incineration. The United Nations is only one idea: that the conference table should be substituted for the battlefield. It becomes reality only if the Members so choose. Instead, they have chosen to make it banner under which to fight Cold Wars, big and little. Defeating a political enemy has been more important than defeating the common enemy: war. Saving face has interfered with trying to save succeeding generations. Hammarskjöld's greatest fault is his dedication to finding the answer to what he believes is man's greatest prayer, which asks not for victory, but for peace. In a day when victory is still the goal, even though there can be no victory, this peacemaker will be sacrificed. And so will the United Nations, on the altar of military might, until there is acceptance by all that salvation in the nuclear age lies on the conference table, not on the battlefield; that this is the first resort of men of reason, not the last, as it now is; that in conciliation, mediation and arbitration there is common strength, not individual weakness. Perhaps the trouble with the United Nations is that the people have deserted this ideal, which is too important to leave to the diplomats. The Charter is a covenant

entered into by peoples, not Governments."

END OF INTERVIEW



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United Nations Oral History Project

**Pauline Frederick
11 July 1986**

MAR 23 1994

UN INTERVIEW
Pauline Frederick
July 11, 1986
Interviewers: Norman Ho
and Leanore Silvian

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HO: Thank you, and now, would you care to make any comments, twenty-five years after that broadcasted?

FREDERICK: Yes, looking back on the United Nations since Dag Hammarskjöld's death, I would say that Hammarskjöld's greatest fault was his dedication to finding the answer to what he believed was man's greatest prayer, which asks not for victory, but for peace. In a day when victory is still our goal, even though there can be no victory, this peacemaker was sacrificed. And so will the UN be one of these days, on the altar of military might, until there is acceptance by all that, the salvation of the Nuclear Age lies on the conference table, not on the battlefield.

HO: Some months after Hammarskjöld's death, you were asked by the editor of a magazine in Sweden to write an article which would attempt to "throw light, not just on the public servant, but on the man himself, during the last days . . ."

SILVIAN: Going back to what you were saying, don't you think it was quite a remarkable thing that the new Secretary-General did in getting Spain and--was it Spain and France together, just last week?

HO: Yes, but we don't want to bring him into it, do we?

SILVIAN: No, but I mean, I was absolutely startled and amazed that he had been able to achieve this sort of thing. That was not what you were getting with Waldheim, or anything that you've been getting in the last--

HO: No, but this interview is about Dag Hammarskjöld.

SILVIAN: I know, but are you not contrasting him with other Secretaries-General, or not?

FREDERICK: Well, since I don't know the present one, personally, I don't feel that I can comment on him very well.

SILVIAN: Very good, I think that makes sense.

HO: Well, let's get back, I think to the original Some months after Hammarskjöld's death, you were asked the editor of a magazine in Sweden to write an article which would attempt to "throw light, not on just the public servant, but on the man himself, during the last days, weeks, and months of his life." I haven't seen the published article among your papers, but can you tell us what the gist of it was?

FREDERICK: What I tried to say was that Dag Hammarskjöld was a very different person from the one known publicly. And, one of his great differences was that he was a very religious person, almost a mystic. That, of course, came out later in his book . . . called Markings. . . . Dag Hammarskjöld . . .

SILVIAN: He wasn't religious in that he subscribed to any . . . organized religion, was he?

FREDERICK: No. . . . He was not religious in the sense of belonging to some creed, or church. His was more a universal kind of human brotherhood religion. And he brought it to bear on his concept of the Meditation Room at the United Nations, which we've already talked about.

HO: We must soon bring this interview to a close, and I should like to ask you some questions of a more general nature. How would you evaluate Dag Hammarskjöld in his role as Secretary-General of the United Nations?

FREDERICK: Dag Hammarskjöld is identified more with the United Nations, probably, than any other Secretary-General. He was a leader, and . . . he gave the UN a role in peace-making, as well as in peace-keeping. And many of his initiatives in those two areas have lasted over until this day, although they haven't been carried out completely.

HO: What were some of his most valuable, or significant contributions to the Organization?

FREDERICK: Well, in peace-making, he had a major role in trying to restore order to the Middle East, during that period. And in peace-keeping, he had the distinction of helping to originate the UNEF operation, which separated Israel and Egypt, the military forces of Israel and Egypt. UNEF, United Nations Emergency Force, which was the first big peace-keeping operation of the United Nations, and set a standard for others.

HO: But, I mean, what do you personally most remember Hammarskjöld for?

FREDERICK: I remember him very much as a man who had apparent solutions to many problems, not complete solutions, but at least, knew how to move them off dead center, where a conflict was brewing. And that goes for many of the issues after he went to China, to gain release of the American flyers. That was unique for a Secretary-General, and after that, it seemed to me that we all expected him to something about any of the major conflicts that were raging. And he did try. He wasn't always successful, but he did try.

HO: How do you think the United Nations might have progressed differently if Hammarskjöld had lived on to serve one or more additional terms?

FREDERICK: I don't think Hammarskjöld would have had another term, because the Soviet Union was already dead set against his staying in that office. He had turned out to be more than an administrative officer. He had taken the lead in trying to resolve some of the big problems before the world. And, as a consequence, the Soviet Union didn't want anything to do with him, particularly after the Congo, when they felt that he was siding with the United States in the Congo, and trying to keep the Soviet Union out.

HO: As a final question, I would like you to read parts of the broadcast which you made for the NBC Radio Network, on 17 September 1962, just one year after Hammarskjöld died.

FREDERICK: I said at the time, "One year has passed. In a tree-shaded churchyard in the old university town of Upsala, Sweden, a simple granite headstone marks the resting place of a famous son between his parents, brooded over by a great slab, with the one word, 'Hammarskjöld', engraved on it. There are always flowers on the grave, frequently a single white rose.

Sometimes a yellow rose, sometimes three yellow ones tied together. Trees, blossoms of every season. In the distance is the red turreted castle where Dag Hammarskjöld grew up, and the university he attended, and the cathedral from which he was buried, and the tombs of the Viking kings. Another man will sit in the once vacant chair in the Assembly podium. But this is the day of remembrance. After Dag Hammarskjöld's death, I received a copy of what must have been one of his last writings. It appeared in the magazine 'Together', a publication for Methodist families. What he wrote then is as pertinent for today, will be for many years to come. Here are Dag Hammarskjöld's words:"

"The work for peace must be animated by tolerance," Dag Hammarskjöld said, "and the work for human right, by the respect for the individual." "To some, the word 'tolerance' may sound strange in a time of Cold War, and negotiations from positions of strength. It may have an overtone of weakness or appeasement, and yet, have we reason to believe," asked Hammarskjöld rhetorically, "that what was there in the past is no longer true? It is not the weak, but the strong who practice tolerance, and the strong do not weaken their position in showing tolerance. On the contrary, only through tolerance can they justify their strength in the face of these counteracting forces that their own strength sets in motion." "This holds true of all those in the present world situation who may be, or consider themselves to be strong," Dag Hammarskjöld said, "be it the industrialized West, in relation to the underdeveloped countries, be it the Powers whose military resources give them key positions, or be it those who have achieved a state of democracy toward which others are still groping." And he went on, "Heaven arms with pity those whom it would not see destroy. Over the ages and over the continents, these words join in those of solaced, 'There is forgiveness with thee that thou mayest be feared.'" The words of Dag Hammarskjöld on this Memorial Day.

HO: Thank you very much, Pauline.

(Informal Interview Begins)

HO: OK, so now, what are we going to talk about informally?

FREDERICK: Well, I suppose we want to talk about the characteristics of Dag Hammarskjöld, and what sort of a legacy he left at the UN.

HO: Yes. Well, what about the characteristics of Dag Hammarskjöld, first, before the legacy?

FREDERICK: Well, I once did a . . . little piece about him, which I called "Man Against Fear," because, it seemed to me that, of all things, Dag Hammarskjöld was courageous in taking positions. And, if he hadn't been, he wouldn't have gotten into trouble with the Soviet Union, over the Congo. But he was very courageous because he thought it was only right that the Congo should be saved for the future, and therefore, it was necessary to send in the United Nations troops.

HO: Yes. So far you've talked about courage, but there are a number of other qualities besides. I would say there is integrity, is an important one, and intelligence, to the point of brilliance. What about some of those other attributes?

FREDERICK: I think you have summed them up very nicely in that Dag

Hammarskjöld had a super intelligence, and he was a man of great integrity. It would be difficult to believe that he did anything underhanded, in that trying to bring nations together to try to solve some of these problems . . . and that because of the fact that he was strong and courageous, and as he once told me, got out in front where he knew he'd be a target. That was the reason why he incurred the dislike of the Soviet Union, and their effort to try to unseat him as Secretary-General.

HO: Lee, do you have anything to ask on this particular issue?

SILVIAN: I, unfortunately, have met never the gentleman, but he does seem to have stood out among all the Secretaries-General, and yet, he must have been a very difficult man as far as a reporter is concerned.

FREDERICK: Oh, exceedingly so. I said to him one day, "You know Mr. Secretary-General, if you would only take a strong stand on some of these controversial issues that are coming up, you'd give us reporters something to do, we'd be able to report." And he said, "Well, I feel this way: that I'm like the parents of a wayward son, who do not scold the son while he is in the midst of the crisis, but wait until that passes, and before he gets involved in another one, they try to reason with him, and explain the facts of life." . . . And I asked, "Well how does a bachelor know about these things?" And he said, "But I have nieces and nephews."

SILVIAN: And didn't he also always refer to the UN as his family?

FREDERICK: He referred to the UN as "this House", and gave it a family connotation everytime he had a chance, especially in his speeches.

SILVIAN: And then, also I heard you say something about his temper. If this is the man who preserved his cool in diplomatic relations, but he had to blow off steam occasionally. And who were the targets of that temper? His closest aides?

FREDERICK: I don't know.

HO: I don't think you could say "targets" of the temper, because the temper must have directed at against . . . other people besides his aides. But I know that he must have had people that he could, sort of, unload, and Pauline you probably could remember better than I some of the people, certainly those next to him, like Cordier, and Brian Urquhart, and of course, Ralph Bunche--

FREDERICK: --the Indian, what was his name?--Narsimhan.

HO: Oh, Narsimhan. Yes, C.V. Narsimhan.

FREDERICK: He had difficulty with him, didn't he?

HO: Well, I don't know that you can say that C.V. had difficulty with Hammarskjöld, but I think that he was probably one of the people to whom Hammarskjöld was able to speak. But again, I say, it not be unloading his temper against them.

SILVIAN: But just blowing off steam for a particular situation.

HO: Yes. In stark contrast to Kurt Waldheim, who was known to have terrible

temper tantrums, and well, we won't go into that for the purposes of this.

FREDERICK: Well, I was thinking that, whether he sounded off toward General de Gaulle or not, he and General de Gaulle did not see eye to eye on Algeria. And I would assume that some place along the line, some hot words were traded there. And De Gaulle was the only head of state who didn't send condolences to the UN at the time of Dag Hammarskjöld's death.

HQ: Well, de Gaulle was known to be a character in his own right, but I think that what we are trying to talk about is Hammarskjöld, who was not simply a character, but a character who . . . kept his own personal feelings down within a much larger discipline, in which he was constantly of aware of the needs and welfare of other people, other interests. I think he was a self-sacrificing man.

SILVIAN: Well, he sounds more saintly, from what I'm hearing. Would you go that far? That he really believed and--

HQ: Well, I think that would be unfair to him, but he was certainly absolutely unusual.

FREDERICK: You could say that he was a mystic, if you want to go that far, in the religious connotation.

HQ: And U Thant used to pride himself on being a mystic. And, U Thant was another Secretary-General, whose personal integrity was not questioned.

FREDERICK: That's right. And he meditated everyday, as a Buddhist.

SILVIAN: Did Hammarskjöld go down to the Meditation Room frequently, for a moment of solace, or anything?

FREDERICK: I don't whether he did alone or not

HO: No, but there's one episode that you described earlier, where he went down at two o'clock in the morning and all his close colleagues thought that he wanted to go down to meditate, or something like that. Whereas, it turned out that--he always took a very close . . . supervision of the creation of Meditation Room. It was his own creation. It turned out that, when they got down to the Meditation Room at two o'clock that morning, they found that he had a crew of painters at work, and then, Pauline told us about he did, about supervising the painting.

SILVIAN: But they had all-night crews at the UN, is that it?

HO: No. There are certain services of the UN that are supposed to working at all times. The Security Council, for example, is supposed to available, twenty-four hours a day, three hundred and sixty-five, or sixty-six days a year. So the Security Council is in continuous session. Now, when it's necessary, the UN people, at all levels, are supposed to be at the disposal of the Secretary-General, twenty-four hours a day.

SILVIAN: But I assume the cleaning crews normally work at night, is that right?

HO: Oh, yes. It's done for reasons of economy and so forth, it's the best

way possible. But there are always times, and exigences of circumstances, which may require people to work at odd hours.

FREDERICK: Norman, the Cable Office would be running all night, wouldn't it?

HO: Oh yes, of course. Not only the Cable Office at Headquarters, but all the multitudinous UN communications installations all over the world. It's all on a twenty-four hour-a-day basis.

FREDERICK: And especially when the Secretary-General would be away.

HO: When the Secretary-General was away, he always kept in close contact. And I think this the practice of all the Secretaries-General, with Headquarters.

SILVIAN: Am I wrong, but, didn't that terrible incident where at point the US had insisted on having security clearance of all its people at the UN, do you remember?

FREDERICK: Yes indeed I remember.

SILVIAN: And Lie apparently had gone along with it. And, did Hammarskjöld do anything about reversing that?

FREDERICK: No, it didn't have to be reversed, as far as I know. It was just an incident that the United States permitted its police force to enter the UN, which was supposed to be a--

HO: This was during the McCarthy Era, as you will remember, Pauline.

FREDERICK: --supposed to be a secure enclave, not to be violated by any of the nations. But, it was Henry Cabot Lodge that went into the United Nations to check on American employees to make sure they were loyal to the United States Government.

HO: What happened, as I recall, was that, and I remember because there was a meeting of the Staff Association at the time. It was Trygve Lie who had given permission to the United States authorities, the FBI I think it was, to conduct their investigations and their interrogations of American staff members right on the premises of the United Nations. This gave rise to a certain amount of indignation among the staff, non-Americans, as well as the Americans.

FREDERICK: Yes, and one member of the staff committed suicide over it, didn't he?

HO: Yes. That was Abe Feller, the Chief Legal Counsel. We don't know officially why he committed suicide, but it seems fairly obvious that this terrible situation which had been fomented by McCarthy, and his supporters.

FREDERICK: This intrusion into the United Nations was so unique that it never happened before or since, as far as I know, but curiously enough, the Soviet Union, as far as I know, did not make any complaint about it, did it?

HO: I'm not quite sure what you mean, the Soviet Union has not made any complaint about what?

SILVIAN: About the invading the--

FREDERICK: --the American FBI going in.

HO: I can't remember anything official. But then perhaps, they would like would to do the same thing themselves.

FREDERICK: Maybe they were already there. (laughter)

SILVIAN: I'm curious to--wonder why you think that the UN is no longer held in such high regards?

UNITED NATIONS

FREDERICK: Well, I tell you. Adlai Stevenson said, when he was ambassador, that if the UN was not in existence, it would have to be invented. But I think Stevenson was thinking about the UN as it should have been, and was meant to be, rather than what it is. He didn't foresee the helplessness of the Organization in trying to deal with international conflicts, or threatened conflicts. It, of course, has become a valuable world hall, as contrasted with town hall, where each nation has a right, and does, speak its peace. But, until, if ever, nations agree to forego their emphasis on their own sovereignty, to the detriment of the solution of international problems, the UN will never be--achieve what it was meant to be. And that is, to try to solve some of the conflicts on the conference table instead of on the battlefield.

SILVIAN: Well, you still feel that it will go on? But also, it seemed to me that the nations were sending more highly respected people to represent them

at the UN in the old days, than they are now. It seemed to me that some of the best men were going, the best men or women.

FREDERICK: Well, that's perfectly true, Lee. And frequently, the head of the delegation would be a Foreign Minister. And, if he wasn't . . . at the head of the delegation then, it wouldn't be long before having served as Foreign Minister, he came as head delegate to the UN. So there were outstanding personalities at the UN in those days.

HO: Well, you have to remember that in those days, there were only fifty-one Members of the United Nations, and it was immediately following the Second World War, when so many people were hopeful that the world could achieve some of the aims and purposes of the United Nations, as expressed in the Charter. The Charter herself stands, but the enthusiasm about the United Nations, not only on the part of people who work for the UN, as been diluted by the tremendous increase in size of the Organization, both in Membership, and in the size of the staff. The Secretariat of the United Nations now is feeling that problem, because of budgetary difficulties.

SILVIAN: All the countries have to be represented, but is there any way that either of you can think of that they can be more effective, even though they are so large in Membership?

FREDERICK: Well, there's a great deal of criticism on the part of Americans who don't understand what the UN is all about. Criticism to the effect that, these little nations like Zambia, and Cyprus, and so on, have one vote, along with the United States, one vote, so that anything you tried to right that wrong, would raise a huge howl of some kind, because everybody wants to have

an equal voice, just as they do in the House of Representatives.

SILVIAN: Well, have you any suggestions on what they might do?

FREDERICK: I haven't any, but I know that one suggestion going around is called the "Triad", which is supposed to be an effort to get all votes--

HO: As distinct from the "Troika". (laughter)

FREDERICK: That's right, which is what the Russians wanted to put in after Dag Hammarskjöld's death, and even before his death. But, the "Triad" is supposed to try to count votes in the General Assembly on the basis of population and economic strength, and so on, so that the little nations wouldn't get the same kind of vote that United States and the Soviet Union would have.

SILVIAN: What do you think of that?

FREDERICK: I don't think it will work.

HO: Well, in any case, the little nations don't have the same kind of vote as the United States and the Soviet Union, plus the three other Permanent Members of the Security Council. That difference in vote was considered, at the beginning, to be necessary in order to compensate for the enormous differences in size, power, and wealth of the Member Nations. And that was when the membership of the UN was less than one third of what it is now. . . . Well, I think we're wandering away from Hammarskjöld.

SILVIAN: Well, did Hammarskjöld ever talk about having such a large . . . membership?

FREDERICK: I don't recall that he did, because he wouldn't have attacked the small nations, and they were the ones that really made up the overbalance of power.



HO: In the very beginning, you know, countries smaller than some of our present Member States, who applied for membership, like Monaco, and the--

FREDERICK: Holy See.

HO: The Holy See is another one, but that's not quite the same as the small States like Monaco, and Lichtenstein, and Andora . . . They did apply for membership, but they were rejected, on the grounds that they were too small. Now, of course--

SILVIAN: Aren't they in now?

HO: No.

SILVIAN: They don't like to be twice spurned, is that it?

FREDERICK: I don't know what the answer is to this problem. I'm not sure

that it's a problem, it just means that if the small nations don't want something to pass in the General Assembly, they can stack up the votes against it.

HO: Pauline, to get us back to Hammarskjöld, what do you think Hammarskjöld might do about the United Nations and its present unhappy state of affairs if he were here, and could do something about it?

FREDERICK: Well, all I can say is that, one time, when he talking about the Russians, Soviet Union, he said his greatest regret was that he wasn't able to do anything about the attitude of the Soviet Union, and . . . Secretary-General Hammarskjöld is said to have had one deep regret about the crisis between the United States and the Soviet Union over the Congo. And that was the Soviet Union's break in relations with him, had denied him any opportunity to try do something about this situation.

SILVIAN: I didn't quite understand, why were the Russians so angry with him over the Congo?

FREDERICK: Because they wanted to get a foothold in Africa, and particularly in the Congo, because of the so rich Katanga. And as a matter of fact, they backed Lumumba and Tshombe in the Katanga.

HO: Except that the part of the Congo which they actually went into was the Northern part, Stanleyville and so forth. But, they were interested in the Congo as a whole.

SILVIAN: Then they were willing to have an unholy alliance with the Union

Muniere , then, is that right?

FREDERICK: I think so.

HO: I'm not sure about that.

SILVIAN: Well, because they were the major interests in there, were they not?

HO: But there were so many other powers, including the United States, I think which had kind of an unholy alliance--

FREDERICK: But I remember hearing that Dag Hammarskjöld said that he wanted to be sure that communism was kept out of the Congo. And that would mean he'd have to side with the United States. And the United States was using him for a while, wouldn't you say?

HO: Well, yes. Certainly, Hammarskjöld's great fear was that the Congo would become the theatre of confrontation between the forces that were of allegiance to the United States and the Soviet Union, and that could have led direct conflict between the two great super-Powers.

FREDERICK: And especially in Africa, which was very dangerous.

HO: Well, I'm sorry, I interrupted you, or rather Lee interrupted you, but--

SILVIAN: I did? (laughter)

FREDERICK: Well you see how much Dag Hammarskjöld depended on private

diplomacy, and quiet diplomacy, whichever you want to call it, because he said that he did not have an opportunity to try to work out this Big Power crisis, and that was one of his great regrets. And he couldn't talk to the Russians in particular, because they had decided they weren't going to recognize him anymore, in order to try and get him out of office before he was killed.

SILVIAN: So, how did they get together on Waldheim, and after?

FREDERICK: The Security Council got together on Waldheim. . . . I think he was one of two candidates; the other one was from Finland. . . . Max Jacobsen, wasn't it?

HO: (correcting her pronunciation) Max Jacobsen.

FREDERICK: Max Jacobsen, who was Foreign Minister of Finland. He was the other candidate.

HO: Who would have made a wonderful Secretary-General.

FREDERICK: Yes, but the United States and the Soviet Union fixed on Kurt Waldheim. As a consequence, there was no major opposition to him in the Security Council.

SILVIAN: Why do you think they favored him?

HO: Excuse me, there was opposition to him--major. I understand that in the secret ballots, which the Security Council takes on such matters, that for thirteen ballots, both the United Kingdom and China, as Permanent Members,

voted against Waldheim. And so, there was considerable opposition. And, I don't know what made them both cave in, but it was when they both caved in that Hammarskjöld in fact--and when he was up for re-election, he failed the last time, because only one Permanent Member of the Security Council refused to go along with him, and that was China.

SILVIAN: Why do you suppose both the United States and Russia favored Waldheim's candidacy?

FREDERICK: Well, there are all kinds of rumors about. Who knows? I don't know anything at first hand.

HO: Well here again I think we're wandering away from our subject, which was Hammarskjöld.

SILVIAN: Well, but I think it shows how it's almost an accident when you get a completely neutral man who is named the Secretary-General.

HO: Well, it's an extremely difficult--as Pauline explained to us earlier, the requirement of the concurring votes of all five--

SILVIAN: Security Council Members--

HO: But largely the super-Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. I think Waldheim was a rare, and hopefully, a largely rare occurrence.

SILVIAN: Well, they'll probably strike all that, I should think. But you were talking freely before, and you both said that you felt that both the

United States and Russia were aware of Waldheim's background.

HO: Well, that's speculation.

SILVIAN: Well, what is the speculation?

FREDERICK: Aware of his background, and therefore they could control him better. . . . That's what Norman said. Now, I'm not surprised at that. I can see that's possible. But I don't have anything at first hand, and I don't like to put it on tape, unless I do.

SILVIAN: OK. It took you a long time really, not a long time, but, until Hammarskjöld intervened and offered to go to China to try to release the flyers. But, prior to that time, had you had much occasion to be with him, or did--the great respect that you had for him seemed to have begun with the China situation. Was that true?

FREDERICK: I was very surprised and pleased that he would take that initiative. But my association with him was warmer and more frequent when I became President of the UN Correspondence Association. That was 1958.

HO: Yes, I remember, because you mentioned about how, when there were formal stag dinners, you would be the only woman present in your capacity as the President of the Correspondence Association, and it was your duty then to act as a pool correspondent in such affairs. But I think there was a very unusual guide, I don't recall any other piece--certainly not that early in Hammarskjöld's career--where he was as close as he was with you. I refer to the time when he was flying out to Egypt to accompany the first contingent of

the United Nations Emergency Force. And you were on the same plane with him from New York to Italy, and--

SILVIAN: Were you the only correspondent on the plane?

FREDERICK: Yes.

HO: Did you know that he was going to be on the plane?

FREDERICK: Oh, yes. The NBC people called me the night before and told me what plane he was going to be on, and said I must get on that plane. So, I talked to some of his aides and they were all sort of aghast that there'd be a correspondent on the plane. But finally, they said it was OK, and I got my ticket, and got on.

HO: Yes, but, then I understand that, at one point, you were in the seat next to him, and you had a chance to talk with him.

FREDERICK: Yes, well we talked a bit that night, early in the morning, because it was quite late when he came aboard, and . . . I had a chance to talk with Bill Renallo, his bodyguard, and another man who was with him. And, we talked a bit, and we reached Rome. The Secretary-General sent me a little note saying that he was sorry to cause me any difficulty in getting a story, but he wondered if we couldn't sip some brandy and sort of, talk. And then he told me the story of a man who had given up his berth on the plane so Dag Hammarskjöld could rest that night, and how kind he thought it was. And then I was able to obtain, in the next few days, the little note that he had sent to the daughter of this man to thank her for her . . . father's generosity.

And . . . I said, "What kind of a man do you think Dag Hammarskjöld is?" And she said, "I think he's the kind of man we need to make peace."

HO: Yes. Well, that's that same trip . . . when you were able to see Dag Hammarskjöld, and I understand that you took one leg of the journey--he was on his way to the UN military staging area.

FREDERICK: That's right, around Naples.

HO: It is, it's Papadoquino(?), I think. But you had a chance to ride with him in the next seat.

FREDERICK: That's right. UNITED NATIONS

HO: And what did you talk about?

FREDERICK: Well, we talked in general about a number of things, but he said very clearly that he was quite aware of the fact that when you step out in front in a situation, you can become a target. And he was quite aware of the fact that he would someday become a target, which of course, he did. But not over the Suez Crisis so much as the Congo. And when we reached Rome, one of his close friends, who was helping as an aide, came and asked me . . . one of very close friends, who was acting as a kind of an aide to him, came up to me and said, "Would you like to go down to Naples?" And I said, "Would I?!" And he said, "Well, they have to very careful about this, because there are all kinds of people waiting to go." Especially correspondents, they wanted to go down to Naples, too. So, he took me out back of plane, and it was an Italian Air Force plane we were going to go in. He took me out back of the plane, and

smuggled me aboard, so to speak, so that when Dag came aboard, there I sat. And so, we had a chance to do a little chatting on the way down to Naples. He was explaining to me that he couldn't possibly into Egypt with the UNEF forces, because they were flying in Swiss planes, and he couldn't possibly take somebody not associated with the UNEF forces aboard. So, I had to let go at Naples.

HO: Good old George. I didn't know was behind that, but he did the same thing so many times when I was in the Congo as spokesman. And I officially had to know nothing about it, but he smuggled a number of correspondents onto UN planes, from Leopoldville to Katanga.

SILVIAN: He had a better sense of public relations than Mr. Hammarskjöld.

FREDERICK: And he was very close to Dag. He never forgave himself for not being on the plane the day it crashed.

HO: Well you know, I was supposed to have been on that plane. I never forgave Linner for not letting me go, because I felt that I should be.

SILVIAN: How did you address him? Was he so formal that you always had to call him Secretary-General, or--

FREDERICK: Mr. Secretary-General, yes.

SILVIAN: You did. You never would call him Dag, or anything--Dag was only for talking about him when he was not there.

FREDERICK: That's right.

HO: He was an amazing editor. I was in charge of the Press Desk at the time, the UN Press Desk. And we would do transcripts of his press conferences. The various verbatim reporters would come up and dictate from their stenotype notes directly to our typists in our typing pool. And, we at the desk would go through the stencils, the carbons from the stencils to catch any errors, and so forth. And, we would send him up copies of our corrections and, in spite of the fact that we had some of the best copy editors in the UN, he would succeed in finding little mistakes, and he'd do it with enormous speed. He would put off his lunch until he'd gone through this with his very neat little notations--

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FREDERICK: In blue-green ink.

HO: Blue-green ink sometimes, sometimes red. And it was amazing how accurate he was.

SILVIAN: Did he primarily have lunch at his desk, or except for--

FREDERICK: No. In the dining room.

HO: Yes, he went to the dining room, but at one time, I remember he even went across the street to a place called "Ferdie's", also known as "the greasy spoon."

SILVIAN: Oh, I didn't think that was a greasy spoon, it was pretty good.

FREDERICK: But in the main, he ate in the dining room.

HO: Yes. Unlike his predecessor Trygve Lie, when he first came into Office, on his way to his office he would take the high-rise elevator to the thirty-eighth floor, which, in the past had always been, if Trygve Lie arrived, he was taken up by himself, or with his immediate companions to the thirty-eighth floor. But Hammarskjöld said "no, no"; he told the elevator operator and the security people to let the other people who were going up in the elevator to come in.

SILVIAN: He was not just security conscious?

HO: I'm sure he was security conscious, although there was no where near the need for security that now, unfortunately exists. But he also made a point of . . . not putting his Office in such a way that--well, just the elevator plea is a perfect example.

SILVIAN: He never threw his weight around, then.

HO: No. . . . He often made a geniune, I think the sincere attempt to be just one of the UN people.

FREDERICK: I think I recall seeing him in the cafeteria one day, with the rest of the correspondents. And, I wanted to say that, when he arrived, the morale at the UN was very low, because we'd been through the McCarthy Period, and Ambassador Lodge coming in to check the loyalty of Americans working for the UN. And, one of the first things Dag Hammarskjöld did, as far as I can remember, was to go to every office in that building and shake hands with

every single employee. I remember us coming down to the bullpen of the press section, and he had to shake hands with everybody, and have a word or two with them, which I think improved morale a great deal.

SILVIAN: Was he always formal with you? Were you always Miss Frederick, or were you--

FREDERICK: Yes.

SILVIAN: Never Pauline, or--

FREDERICK: Not to my face, (chuckling) whether he used it behind my back, I don't know, he may have. UNITED NATIONS

HO: But another word about his dining habits, which reflects the difference. Trygve Lie used to have table number one, in the delegate's dining room. That's the table in the corner of the dining room, you know, the north-east corner. And Hammarskjöld never took that table. When he did dine in the dining room, it was always at table number four, if it was vacant. (laughter)

FREDERICK: That was along the side.

HO: Yes, it was along the north side.

FREDERICK: Yes, I remember.

SILVIAN: Was he a man who arrived at the office at six o'clock in the morning, or--

FREDERICK: Well, sometimes he wouldn't go home, and stay all night, and work. Especially the night he went down to the Meditation Room. But once the troops were deployed, in the Congo and elsewhere, he would work almost round the clock.

SILVIAN: Was his apartment near the UN?

HO: He had, on the thirty-eighth floor, as part of his office, a suite. There was a small bedroom, and a bathroom, and a kitchenette, attached to it. I don't think he used that much as a--I understand, the only person who ever used the bath in the bathroom, was John F. Kennedy, when he came to make a speech, and he was having back trouble, so they cleaned the bathtub out for him, and they let him take a hot bath.

SILVIAN: The UN doesn't maintain an apartment for the Secretary-General?

HO: The apartment still exists.

SILVIAN: No, I mean not in the UN building, as far as a home quarters are concerned.

HO: No, no, the UN provides the Secretary-General's accommodations. Trygve Lie had a rather luxurious in Forest Hills. And, then, some very kind and wealthy people in Sutton Place, who had a house in Sutton Place made that available to--

FREDERICK: Wasn't it the Rockefellers?

HO: I don't know. Well, actually the whole property belonged to the Rockefellers, and the Rockefellers gave it as a gift to the UN. It was worth about eight and a half million dollars at the time, I think. But at the same time, after the UN had established its headquarters, the value of Rockefeller-owned properties all around the former UN site, which as you know, used to be slaughterhouses, and very depressed, it multiplied. So, whatever eight and a half million dollars, or whatever it was the Rockefellers gave to the UN, was a very lucrative gift for them in the end.

SILVIAN: But I didn't know Hammarskjöld stayed at Sutton Place, did he?

FREDERICK: No, they didn't have that house.

HO: No, U Thant was Secretary-General when--yes.. And then of course, Waldheim succeeded.

SILVIAN: So where did Hammarskjöld live?

FREDERICK: Wasn't it about sixty-second street?

HO: Yes, he had an apartment in town, and a had a place out in--

SILVIAN: Brewster.

FREDERICK: Near Margie Britter's.

SILVIAN: Did you ever go there?

FREDERICK: Not to his house, but to the Britter's, I've been. Margie tells about a couple of men coming up one day, and crossing her property, or something like that. And she went out, and I think one of them was shooting something. It doesn't sound right, but anyway, doing something that isn't ordinarily done there, and she went out and scolded the person, and said, "By the way, what's your name?" And it was Dag Hammarskjöld and Bill Renallo.
(laughter)

SILVIAN: But, had he gotten friendly with the neighbors there at all? Did he--after Ridder had been a correspondent, had he not?

FREDERICK: Ridder of Times of London. I don't think that--I think that there's just that one time that he stopped there. He walking across the field, as he like to walk, and be out of doors.

SILVIAN: It was pretty hard to keep up with him when he went walking.

FREDERICK: Oh, he would stride. He wouldn't walk, he'd just stride. Even through the halls, I could see him with a couple of aides going down the hall, just way ahead of them. . . . And they were running, practically to keep up with him.

SILVIAN: He was fluent in four languages, is that right?

FREDERICK: At least four. Swedish, English, French . . .

HO: German, I'm sure he knew because he used read that German philosopher--

FREDERICK: Hans Bucher?

SILVIAN: Why, he translated that, didn't he? Wasn't it Martin Bucher?

FREDERICK: Martin Bucher.

HO: Martin Bucher, yes.

FREDERICK: Martin Bucher, I think so.

SILVIAN: Where did he have time to this? He smoked cigars, didn't he?

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HO: Small--small cigars, yes. Cigarillos.

SILVIAN: Can you smoke in the Assembly, or in the Security Council? Can they smoke there?

HO: Oh yes. In fact, they provide ashtrays. They used to, I assume they still do.

SILVIAN: But, he was so formal and so disciplined. Would he smoke in the Assembly or would he--he was a doodler, wasn't he?

HO: Smoking in those days was generally done, as you might remember. Unlike nowadays.

SILVIAN: Was there anything that showed the correspondents' special respect

or admiration for him in any way? Did they ever present him with anything, or--because I gather that the respect which you had for him was not extraordinary, that most of the reporters thought highly of him.

FREDERICK: Well, I think that was true, but I don't know that we gave him any token of our regard.

SILVIAN: You had him at the Correspondents' Association. Didn't he speak there?

FREDERICK: Yes.

SILVIAN: And did he then talk off the cuff? Because, as a one time reporter myself, I think he must have been the most subject to ever get a story from.

FREDERICK: He was.

SILVIAN: Did he ever talk off the cuff?

FREDERICK: Not really. (to Mr. Ho) You don't remember, do you?

HO: Yes, I remember I used to go to all those UN Correspondents' Association Luncheons. Sometimes he could be quite witty, in sort of off the cuff remarks. He had a sense of humor, too. That was one of the things that a lot of people forget.

FREDERICK: Yes, he did have that. I can't remember anything . . . he was

very witty. Were you at the Correspondents' Luncheon when old Bokhari caved in?

HO: Yes. (laughter)

SILVIAN: What do you mean?

HO: Bokhari was a Pakistani who accompanied Dag Hammarskjöld on his trip to Peking. And he was a rather odd person. I'll leave it at that. (chuckles)
He was bright--brillant, a brillant man, but rather odd.

FREDERICK: An intellectual.

SILVIAN: Well, what happened, at this luncheon?

FREDERICK: Well, Bokhari had been having some difficulty of some kind; we heard about it, but we didn't see it. And at this luncheon, at the Correspondents' Luncheon, all of a sudden he started going down like this.
(imitates Bokhari)

SILVIAN: And he fell asleep?

FREDERICK: No, no, he was sick. We assume he was sick.

SILVIAN: Or maybe he had something to drink?

FREDERICK: Well, Dag went over to him, and sort of pushed him around a little bit, and got him up, took him out.

SILVIAN: Well, he does seem like he's a most remarkable man.

FREDERICK: He was. His like will not be seen again for a long time. Nobody would be selfless enough to take that job.

HO: I remember when Bokhari came back with Hammarskjöld after the trip to Peking. He gave a press conference, and, all he had to say about Peking--Well actually . . . Hammarskjöld had a press conference, and Bokhari was present and was asked to answer questions too. He later became the acting head of the Department of Public Information. But, he was asked a number of questions, but the only thing that he could talk about was how cold it was in Peking, (laughter) which to me, being an old Pekinese, seemed to be a rather inadequate way to . . . (laughter)

SILVIAN: How did Hammarskjöld dress? Always in diplomatic dark suits, or did he ever wear a sports jacket, did he--

HO: Bow ties, frequently.

SILVIAN: Bow ties, well that would be indicating--

HO: In summertime. (laughter)

FREDERICK: I don't remember. I guess he wore a sports jacket. Certainly, when he'd be out plowing around the countryside--

SILVIAN: --away from the public eye. He was very neat, wasn't he?

FREDERICK: Oh, yes.

SILVIAN: Was he very neat in his office, too? Was he one of those executives that always had the clear desk?

FREDERICK: I think he did.

HO: Yes, he was very neat.

FREDERICK: Didn't he bring in the paintings from the modern gallery?

SILVIAN: The Museum of Modern Art, you mean?

FREDERICK: Yes. For his office. They were borrowed.

HO: Yes . . . on loan. They would make them available for him. so he had them hanging in his office. He also was one to whom, in the name of the United Nations, they loaned that lovely tapestry rendition of Picasso's "Woman Descending a Staircase", or ladder, or something, which was beautiful. It used to hang outside the South Lounge.

SILVIAN: Well, he was very advanced in his feeling for art.

HO: Yes. . . . Mind you, before he came, there were all kinds of so-called art objects given to the United Nations, despite the fact that when Trygve Lie

was Secretary-General, they had an international panel of artists, world-famous artists, to pass on the acceptability of gifts of art. A lot of junk was unloaded on the UN. (laughter) That Committee never met, as far as I know. But when Hammrskjöld took over, there was a distinct upgrading of the--

SILVIAN: Tastes.

FREDERICK: And he worked with the Committee in planning the concerts at the UN.

HO: Oh yes. One time the security guards came out in new uniforms, looking like sort of Texan types, you know, with the . . . black pocket covers and stuff, looking like the rough--

SILVIAN: --Texas, right.

HO: Yes. And he took one look at them, on his way to the office, and gave the order that those uniforms had to go. And, I guess, they did. . . .

[END OF INTERVIEW]