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INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE IN SUPPORT  
OF THE STRUGGLE OF THE NAMIBIAN  
PEOPLE FOR INDEPENDENCE  
Paris, 25-29 April 1983

UNITED NATIONS COUNCIL FOR NAMIBIA

THE MILITARY SITUATION IN AND RELATING TO NAMIBIA

Report of the United Nations Council for Namibia

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## INTRODUCTION

1. In recent years, South Africa's increasing use of military force to suppress the popular resistance in Namibia and to destabilize the neighbouring countries has been a cause of grave concern to the international community. In seeking to perpetuate its illegal occupation of Namibia, the Pretoria regime has moved large numbers of heavily armed troops into the Territory, recruited mercenaries from a number of countries to serve with the South Africa Defence Force (SADF) in Namibia, and launched repeated acts of subversion and aggression against the front-line States. Furthermore, since 1981 the African population of the Territory has been subjected to compulsory service in the army of the occupation regime, causing many young Namibians to flee into exile.
2. Efforts by the United Nations to curb the growth of the South African military machine date back some two decades. In 1977 the Security Council, recognizing that the voluntary arms embargo established under resolution 181 (1963) of 7 August 1963 needed to be strengthened, adopted resolution 418 (1977) of 4 November 1977. By that resolution, the Council decided that all States should cease any provision of arms and related matériel to South Africa, and called upon all States to review existing contractual and licensing agreements relating to the manufacture and maintenance of arms, ammunition, military equipment and vehicles by South Africa. States were also called upon to refrain from any co-operation with South Africa in manufacture and development of nuclear weapons.
3. Due to the growing violation of the arms embargo as well as the continued nuclear collaboration with the apartheid regime by the United States of America and some other Western countries and Israel, the mandatory arms embargo was not successful in stopping the flow of foreign arms to South Africa. The attitude of the Western permanent members of the Security Council has so far prevented the Council from adopting comprehensive sanctions against South Africa under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. Furthermore, the embargo gave a strong impetus to the domestic military industry, which had obtained licences for the manufacture of many foreign weapons.
4. It was in this context that the General Assembly, by resolution 36/121 B of 10 December 1981 concerning action by Member States in support of Namibia, requested all States to cease forthwith any provision to South Africa of arms and related matériel of all types, and to ensure that arms-export agreements provided for guarantees that would prevent embargoed items or any components thereof from reaching South Africa through third countries. The States were also to prohibit the export of spare parts for embargoed aircraft and other military equipment belonging to South Africa and to prohibit government agencies and corporations under their jurisdiction from transferring technology for the manufacture of arms and related matériel to South Africa and from investing in the manufacture of arms and related matériel in South Africa.
5. At its thirty-seventh session, the Assembly adopted resolution 37/69 D of 9 December 1982 on military and nuclear collaboration with South Africa. By that resolution, the Assembly condemned any manoeuvres to create military pacts or arrangements with the participation of the racist regime of South Africa and urged  
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the Security Council to take mandatory decisions, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, to ensure the total cessation of all co-operation with the racist regime of South Africa in military and nuclear fields by Governments, corporations and individuals.

6. For its part, the United Nations Council for Namibia held a series of extraordinary plenary meetings at Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania, from 10 to 14 May 1982 at which it adopted the Arusha Declaration and Programme of Action on Namibia. 1/ In the Declaration, the Council strongly and vehemently condemned the colonialist and racist regime of South Africa for its militarization of Namibia and the use of that Territory for launching armed attacks against neighbouring States. In particular, the Council condemned racist South Africa's unprovoked acts of aggression, invasion and occupation of parts of southern Angola, which constituted a breach of international peace and security, and demanded the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of South Africa's forces from Angola.

7. In the Programme of Action on Namibia, the Council urged the international community to extend all support and assistance, including military assistance, to the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) for its liberation struggle and to the front-line States for the defence of their sovereignty and territorial integrity against South African aggression, and called upon all States to adopt legislative and other effective measures to prevent the recruitment, training and transit of mercenaries for service in Namibia.

8. At its most recent session the General Assembly, in resolution 37/233 A of 20 December 1982, as in previous resolutions, strongly condemned South Africa for its continued illegal occupation of Namibia, its military build-up in the Territory, its introduction of compulsory military service for Namibians, its recruitment and training of Namibians for tribal armies and the use of mercenaries to suppress the Namibian people and to carry out its military attacks against independent African States, and its threats and acts of subversion and aggression against those countries. The Assembly further declared that South Africa's defiance of the United Nations, its illegal occupation of Namibia, its war of repression against the Namibian people, its persistent acts of aggression launched from bases in Namibia against independent African States, its policies of apartheid and its development of nuclear weapons constituted a serious threat to international peace and security.

9. Finally, the Assembly strongly condemned the collusion by the Governments of certain Western and other countries, particularly those of the United States and Israel, with the racist regime of South Africa in the nuclear field and called upon France and all other States to refrain from supplying the racist minority regime of South Africa, directly or indirectly, with installations that might enable it to produce uranium, plutonium or other nuclear materials, reactors or military equipment.

10. By resolution 37/69 A of 9 December 1982, the Assembly condemned the policies of certain Western States, especially the United States and Israel, and of their transnational corporations and financial institutions that had increased political, economic and military collaboration with the racist regime of South Africa despite repeated appeals by the General Assembly.

11. By resolution 37/223 C of 20 December 1982, the Assembly requested the United Nations Council for Namibia to review and report on the military situation in and relating to Namibia. The present report was prepared in compliance with that request and covers the period from March 1982 to the present. (For previous developments, see A/AC.131/L.251/Rev.1 and Corr.1).

12. As part of its effort to gather information on this subject, the Council held a Seminar on the Military Situation in and relating to Namibia at Vienna from 8 to 11 June 1982. The Seminar brought together some 23 experts in the field whose testimony, which was used extensively in preparing the present report, is reproduced in full in documents A/AC.131/SMS/PV.1-6.

13. Furthermore, the Council co-sponsored the International Seminar on the Role of Transnational Corporations in Namibia, held at Washington, D.C., from 29 November to 2 December 1982, at which valuable information was obtained concerning the extent to which transnational corporations collaborate with South Africa in maintaining its illegal occupation of Namibia.

#### I. MILITARY OCCUPATION OF NAMIBIA BY SOUTH AFRICA

14. South Africa continued, during the period under review, to strengthen its military presence in Namibia by sharply augmenting the ranks of its occupation forces inside the Territory, by recruiting large numbers of mercenaries and by forcibly conscripting Namibians into its military machinery. Furthermore, it expanded and fortified its military bases in Namibia, especially along the border with Angola.

15. A variety of military, paramilitary and police units are deployed in Namibia to strengthen South Africa's illegal occupation and the apartheid system. These include "counter-insurgency forces" which comprise units of the Permanent Force, the "Citizens Force", "national servicemen", commandos and various paramilitary police forces; "conventional forces" (army, navy and air force) and "support forces" (commando, logistical support and service units, medical corps, etc.). 2/

16. The size of the South African force in Namibia is generally estimated at 100,000, approximately one soldier to every 12 members of the Namibian population. 3/ The actual number of troops increases considerably when preparations are made for military attacks on neighbouring Angola. Before each of these acts of aggression, additional troops are mobilized and moved into the Territory.

17. Since the invasion of Angola by South Africa in 1975, increasing use has been made of special units for cross-border raids into that country and Zambia. These raids, termed "hot pursuit" operations or "pre-emptive strikes", have increased considerably in scale and frequency during the past four years. Among the special units employed are the "32 Battalion", the "Reconnaissance Commandos", the "South West Africa Specialist Unit", the "44 Parachute Regiment" and the "Koevoet Unit". It is widely believed that the latter has been responsible for the assassination of members and supporters of SWAPO. The biggest and most active of these special units is the "32 Battalion" or "Buffalo Battalion", which operates almost entirely inside Angola.

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18. In terms of the actual military operations, the operational area is divided into three sectors: sector 10, with headquarters at Oshakati; sector 20, with headquarters at Rundu; and sector 70, with headquarters at Katima-Mulilo in East Caprivi. Each sector is divided into two to five battalion areas, and these are further subdivided into company areas.

19. According to a statement given at the Vienna Seminar (see para. 12 above) by Mr. Andrei Pritvorov of the Institute of African Studies in Moscow, the forces of occupation are stationed at approximately 85 to 90 South African bases in Namibia, the most important among them being Windhoek, Walvis Bay, Grootfontein, Oshivello, Ondangwa, Ruacana, Oshakati, Rundu, Omega, Mpacha and Katima-Mulilo. (For a complete list of major bases, see annex.) There are 50 bases in the so-called operational area alone (A/AC.131/SMS/PV.2).

20. It may be recalled that the Pretoria regime, in an attempt to usurp the enclave of Walvis Bay, Namibia's only deep-water port, transferred the administration of the area to the Cape Province in 1977.

21. The Security Council, by resolution 432 (1978) of 27 July 1978, declared that the territorial integrity and unity of Namibia must be assured through the reintegration of Walvis Bay within its territory and that South Africa must not use Walvis Bay in any manner prejudicial to the independence of Namibia.

22. According to reports, however, there is a South African air force base in the enclave, and a "counter-insurgency" section of the South African navy, the Marines, has been installed in Walvis Bay as part of a South African plan for the land and seaward "defence" of all ports. One of the elite units of SADF, the South Africa Infantry Battalion Group, is also based in the area. 4/

23. The attempt by Pretoria to separate Walvis Bay from Namibia is considered particularly alarming because South Africa could use its forces and bases in Walvis Bay to destabilize an independent Namibia.

24. In a further effort to strengthen its occupation force in Namibia, South Africa announced in March 1982 a revision of its military service requirements that would make all white males up to 60 years of age liable for military training and service in Citizen Force units. At present, South Africa requires all white men to do two years of full-time active duty in the defence forces followed by regular call-ups to active duty over the next eight years. The new system would require an individual to serve 720 days within the eight-year call-up period as opposed to 240 days under the existing system.

25. On 7 June 1982, the South African Minister of Defence, General Magnus Malan, said during a debate on the Defence Amendment Bill that there had been a 50-fold increase in the number of South African troops deployed in Namibia and South Africa since 1975. 5/ The Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg) indicated on 24 March 1982 that the planned increase in South Africa's military presence in Namibia over the next three years was one of the major reasons behind the proposed changes to the "national service" system.

26. South Africa is already believed to have the ability to mobilize a force of over 400,000 men. 6/ The new system could bring another 800,000 into reserve pool. 7/

27. Closely related to the strategy of total militarization is the policy of "Namibianization" of the war, which led in 1980 to the creation of the so-called SWA/Namibia Territory Force (SWATF). A proclamation issued in October 1980 extended compulsory military service, which previously had applied only to whites, to include all Namibians between the ages of 18 and 25. This legislation followed the failure of "voluntary recruitment" over a period of five years. 8/ The conscription order met with widespread opposition among Namibians, thousands of whom were forced to leave the country. Press reports indicate that, as a result of forced enlistment plus increased use of extensive emergency powers against SWAPO supporters inside the Territory, one tenth of the population has been forced to flee into exile. 9/

28. The racist regime of South Africa has moved a step further in the implementation of its "internal settlement" through the establishment of the so-called SWA/Namibia Police. The new force operates as an arm of the South African Police, who are already, according to reports, responsible for up to 60 per cent of the killings in the war against SWAPO. 10/

29. In the course of the discussion at the Vienna Seminar on the use of mercenaries in southern Africa (see A/AC.131/SMS/PV.3), it was agreed that Namibia had become the centre of operation of mercenaries who were employed by South Africa to strengthen its position in the Territory and to commit acts of aggression against neighbouring African States.

30. Among the forces deployed by South Africa are units consisting largely of mercenaries. As a result of South Africa's extensive recruitment campaign in recent years, an estimated 2,000 to 3,000 mercenaries, mainly from the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, France, Australia\*, Chile\*\* and Israel, are reported to be

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\* The Australian representative has stated that his Government put into force the Crimes (Foreign Incursions and Recruitment) Act, according to which it is prohibited for any person or organization to attempt to recruit within Australia any mercenaries for service outside Australia or for anybody to accept such recruitment.

\*\* The Permanent Representative of Chile to the United Nations, in a letter dated 27 April 1982 addressed to the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia, stated that his Government condemned the use of mercenaries and, having carried out the relevant investigations, had found no evidence whatsoever to substantiate the assertion that there were Chilean mercenaries in Namibia. The Government therefore wished to receive further information, as such a situation would fall under legal sanctions in accordance with Chilean legislation.

fighting alongside the South African forces in the campaign to crush the Namibian liberation struggle.\*

31. Participants at the Vienna Seminar noted that defectors from the "32 Battalion", which was composed largely of mercenaries and was used for operations against SWAPO forces in Angola, had been identified in press reports as coming from Australia, Portugal, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States. South Africa also recruited mercenaries from neighbouring countries, some of whom were induced to serve in puppet groups which operated under the overall command of SADF, while others were assigned to the "32 Battalion". In addition, a large number of Rhodesian whites had joined SADF at the time of Zimbabwean independence.

32. One participant stated that he had information according to which 5,000 Zimbabwean mercenaries had been brought together in a South African special unit for possible action in Zimbabwe. He submitted that the failure of the Western countries to take strong measures against mercenary involvement in southern Africa should be considered a form of military collaboration with South Africa.

33. Participants indicated that in certain Western countries, particularly the United States, there were several organizations which published information about mercenary opportunities and actually directed potential recruits to those seeking mercenaries for use in southern Africa.

34. The support which the racist minority regime of South Africa receives from the transnational corporations and other financial interests which are collaborating with it in the exploitation of the natural and human resources of Namibia, has helped it to entrench its illegal occupation of the Territory and to strengthen its system of apartheid.

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\* At the 1220th meeting of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, held on 16 August 1982, Mr. Kapuka Nauyala, a member of the Central Committee of SWAPO, stated:

"As we are sitting here, not only are there well over 110,000 well-armed South African and puppet troops in Namibia with the mission of suppressing the aspirations of our people by attempting to destroy our sole, legitimate and authentic representative, SWAPO, in order for them to remain in Namibia, but over three mechanized divisions of the racist regime's army of aggression, supported by air and ground battalions which include mercenaries from some Western countries, especially Britain, the United States of America, the Federal Republic of Germany and Australia, as well as from Israel, Chile and others, armed with heavy tanks, armoured vehicles, 155-mm artillery pieces, rockets, Puma and Alouette helicopters and squadrons of sophisticated jet-fighter bombers and using Namibia as a launching pad for their aggression ... are over 200 kilometres deep inside the sovereign territory of the People's Republic of Angola."

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35. The transnational corporations and financial institutions operating illegally in Namibia are deeply involved in a range of activities which strengthen the Pretoria regime's military domination of the Territory.

36. The transnational corporations have emerged as major supporters of South Africa's military establishment. They purchase South African defence bonds, service the part of the economy concerned with the production of military equipment, finance arms purchases by South Africa, provide loans which augment South Africa's military expenditures, provide facilities for South African military personnel and serve on the Defence Advisory Board, which unites the private sector behind South Africa's defence effort.

37. With the intensification of the military conflict in Namibia, many transnational corporations have seen fit to increase security measures and to co-operate closely with the army of occupation. In 1980, the National Key Points Act was enacted with the aim of ensuring collaboration between commercial establishments and the security forces in the control and defence of key industries and installations in South Africa and Namibia. Some 633 such installations, many of them foreign-owned, have been designated as key points. The key points scheme, which includes the creation of local defence units or "industrial commandos" demonstrates the increasingly important integration of transnational corporations into South Africa's overall military strategy. 11/ For example, a 69-man private army is maintained at the Rössing uranium mine, distributed in three separate units: the Rössing Security Department, consisting of 15 men; a Security Department Auxiliary of 30 men; and the Swakopmund Commando Industrial Protection Unit, consisting of 24 men. 12/

38. South Africa's military occupation of Namibia and its brutal behaviour have inflicted profound damage on the fabric of Namibian society. The destructive role of the South African occupation forces and their puppets and mercenaries stands in contrast to the efforts made by SWAPO to build a new society for an independent Namibia.

## II. MILITARY EXPENDITURES

39. South Africa's military spending is the largest single component of the total budget. In addition, some military and security allocations are disguised by being listed under categories other than defence. For instance, all construction and maintenance of military bases is paid for by the Department of Public Works. All houses for military personnel are provided by the Department of Community Development, and the welfare of the increasing number of war casualties is the responsibility of the Department of Health, Welfare and Pensions.

40. Military spending is reported to have risen steeply from almost R 700 million in 1974/75 to R 1.4 billion in 1977 and over R 1.8 billion in 1979/80. 13/ The Financial Mail (Johannesburg) estimates that the total defence budget for 1982/83 is R 3 billion, representing a 7 per cent increase over the previous year. 14/ Mr. Brian Wood of the Namibia Support Committee (London) stated at the Vienna Seminar that the Pretoria regime was spending in excess of R 734 million a year for

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its forces in Namibia, including SWATF and the "SWA/Namibia Police" (A/AC.131/SMS/PV.4).

41. Certain international institutions which continue to collaborate with the Pretoria regime, particularly those which grant loans and credits, are thereby assisting the racist regime in strengthening its military capability, perpetuating its repression of the masses in South Africa, consolidating its illegal military occupation of Namibia and destabilizing the African states in the region.
42. Following the disclosure that South Africa had made an application for a loan of one billion special drawing rights (about \$US 1.1 billion) from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia, the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and the Vice-Chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid declared in a joint statement issued on 12 October 1982 (A/37/554, annex) that the Pretoria regime required such assistance because of its enormously increasing expenditure for military and repressive purposes. The credits to South Africa therefore violated the spirit of the mandatory arms embargo against the Pretoria regime.
43. In its resolution 37/2 of 21 October 1982, as in previous resolutions, the General Assembly requested IMF to refrain from granting any credits or other assistance to South Africa.
44. However, despite the representations of the international community and the resolution of the General Assembly, IMF granted a loan of one billion special drawing rights to South Africa on 3 November 1982.
45. By resolution 37/233 A, the Assembly deeply deplored the continued collaboration of IMF with South Africa, as exemplified by the recent grant of a credit of one billion special drawing rights in disregard of resolution 37/2, and called on the Fund to put an end to such collaboration.
46. The loan to South Africa, which many in the international community have qualified as highly political in character, was granted with the active support of the United States. In addition to the United States, other Western countries voting in favour of the loan were the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Canada, the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy. It is significant to note that an overwhelming majority of the members of IMF expressed opposition to the loan, arguing that South Africa's request failed to meet economic criteria established for all borrowers. But because of the Fund's weighted voting system, their opposition had no effect.
47. An analysis of the records of the closed meeting of the Executive Board of IMF, published by the Center for International Policy (Washington, D.C.) on 6 January 1982, indicated that the IMF loan might be but the first in a series of loans to South Africa. Mr. David Gisselquist, an expert who had predicted in May 1982 that South Africa would borrow \$US 1 billion from IMF in 1982, was quoted as anticipating that South Africa's next request would also be for \$US 1 billion.

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### III. SOUTH AFRICAN AGGRESSION AGAINST NEIGHBOURING STATES

48. South Africa has for several years been engaged in a systematic campaign of destabilization of the neighbouring African States. Using the international Territory of Namibia as a launching pad, it has repeatedly committed blatant acts of aggression against Angola and in the process has caused extensive damage and destruction to life and property. Women and children and other innocent civilians have been its constant victims. At the Vienna Seminar, several participants noted that the Pretoria regime had embarked on a premeditated policy of destabilization of the entire southern Africa region (see A/AC.131/SMS/PV.6). That policy had been exemplified by the racist regime's repeated aggression against and occupation of Angolan territory, its raids into Zambia and its training and arming of Mozambican puppet groups which attacked road and air links as well as the oil pipeline connecting Zimbabwe with the port of Beira in Mozambique.

49. For more than a year South Africa has occupied parts of southern Angola as far as 250 kilometres from the Namibian border, with an estimated 5,500 troops operating in the area 15/ notwithstanding the international outcry and condemnation expressed in numerous United Nations resolutions. 16/

50. The latest offensive began on 21 July 1982 when, according to a letter dated 29 July from the Permanent Representative of Angola to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, 17/ the town of Cahama, located 150 kilometres from the border with Namibia, was attacked by 11 South African Mirage aircraft. According to West Africa magazine (16 August 1982), that action resulted in 22 dead and 42 injured, including both civilians and military personnel.

51. The same article quoted Mr. Paulo Jorge, the Minister for External Relations of Angola, as saying that 4 South African brigades, 1 independent regiment, 40 armoured cars, 200 artillery pieces and mortars, 60 fighter planes and 30 helicopters were massed on the southern border. Reports indicated that the invading army also had 300 armoured cars and 50 other aircraft ready to strengthen the war machinery being used in the offensive. It is important to note that the South African military offensive was launched at the same time as consultative talks on Namibia were taking place in New York. The offensive was a clear demonstration that Pretoria was not yet ready to end its illegal and oppressive occupation of Namibia.

52. In his statement to the General Assembly on 4 October 1982, 18/ Mr. Jorge said: "In the course of these last nine months, the South African army has carried out 580 reconnaissance flights, 18 air bombardments, 96 landings of troops from helicopters and several sabotage and reprisal actions against the civilian population".

53. Mr. Jorge reminded the Assembly of the enormous sacrifices which the heroic people of Angola had already made and the extremely high price they were paying in thousands of lost human lives and material damage amounting to more than \$US 7.5 billion.



54. In its issue of 21 August 1982, the Lisbon newspaper Expresso described a conspiracy to depose the Angolan Government in a plan named Operation Kubango. South Africa and the United States were to supply the means (money and mercenaries), with up to 3,000 men being recruited. These men were to be trained in South Africa and to enter Angola from Namibia with SADF.
55. The General Assembly, by its resolution 37/233 A of 20 December 1982, once again strongly condemned South Africa for its persistent acts of subversion and aggression against Angola, including the occupation of a part of its territory, and called upon South Africa to cease all acts of aggression against and withdraw all its troops from that country.
56. In its escalating war against the people of Namibia and South Africa and their national liberation movements, SWAPO and the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC), the racist regime of South Africa has also subjected Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Seychelles, Zambia and Zimbabwe to subversion, military aggression, incursions and other destabilization tactics. As part of its conspiracy against these African States, South Africa has been recruiting, training, financing and equipping mercenaries to cause instability and supplied dissident groups with military hardware and funds in their attacks against the legitimate Governments of these States. According to press sources, a large number of "puppets" from Zambia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique have been trained to act against the Governments of their respective countries. 19/
57. In a letter dated 27 August 1982 20/ addressed to the Secretary-General, the Permanent Representative of Mozambique to the United Nations drew attention to the latest in a series of armed attacks and violations of territorial integrity perpetuated by the apartheid regime against Mozambique. A communication from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, annexed to the letter, stated that on 22 August a group of commandos of the South African army had entered Mozambican territory in violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Mozambique. In the process two civilians had been killed and three kidnapped in addition to looting and destruction of property.
58. In Botswana, South Africa's destabilization tactics include border violations and incursions; unprovoked attacks on units of the Botswana Defence Force patrolling the Botswana-Namibia border; violations of Botswana's airspace by South African military aircraft; kidnapping and abduction of South African refugees in Botswana; and infiltration of agents of various kinds who constantly spy on and harass the refugee community.
59. It has also been reported that South Africa has engaged in clandestine recruitment of Botswanan nations from the Namibian border area for service with its occupation forces in Namibia.
60. According to Brigadier Ian Khama, Second-in-Command of the Botswana Defence Force, South Africa's acts of aggression against Botswana have been on the increase.
61. South African aggression against Zambia has involved a combination of direct military incursions, covert attacks and subversion as well as economic and

political destabilization of the country. On 20 March 1982, the Daily Telegraph (London) reported that South African ground troops operating from the Caprivi area of northern Namibia had mounted armed incursions into Zambia on at least two separate occasions during the previous two months.

62. South Africa's destabilization of Zimbabwe is being carried out through economic and military sabotage. In 1980, the Pretoria regime withdrew its railway engines and wagons which were on loan to Zimbabwe. In 1981, it withdrew from the common tariff agreement with Zimbabwe and resorted to a number of manoeuvres, including delaying the shipment of Zimbabwe-bound goods in South African ports, aimed at causing shortages of goods and commodities in Zimbabwe. Militarily, the racist Pretoria regime has continued to train and infiltrate into Zimbabwe former members of the southern Rhodesian forces as well as South African military personnel and mercenaries. The acts of sabotage committed against Zimbabwe also include the blowing up of munitions depots and the pipeline between Beira (Mozambique) and Mutare (Zimbabwe).

63. On 25 November 1981, mercenaries operating from South Africa attempted a coup to overthrow the Government of Seychelles. The leader of the mercenaries, who reportedly 21 has close ties with the South African National Intelligence Service (NIS) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United States, testified in a South African court that the Pretoria regime had not only approved the attempted take-over but also supplied the weapons used.

64. The supplementary report (S/15492 and Corr.1 and 2) of the Security Council Commission established under resolution 496 (1981) of 15 December 1981 to investigate the mercenary aggression noted that, of the 45 mercenaries who went on trial, 20 were South Africans, 9 British, 7 white Zimbabweans, 2 nationals of the United States and 2 of the Federal Republic of Germany. The report also disclosed that immediately before the attempted coup, all but one of the mercenaries had been resident in South Africa.

65. On 28 May 1982, the Security Council adopted resolution 507 (1982) by which it expressed grave concern at the mercenary aggression which had been prepared in and executed from South Africa against Seychelles.

66. In a statement to the Security Council on 14 December 1982 (S/PV.2406) concerning South Africa's aggression on 9 December against Maseru, capital of Lesotho, in which 42 people, including 12 Lesotho citizens, were killed, the King of Lesotho said:

"In its attempts to stave off the inevitable conflict that is impending within its own borders, South Africa has decided to make itself the imperialist Power in the whole subregion. It is out to destabilize neighbouring African States as an initial step in an attempt to install its agents in their Governments and, failing that, to overrun and rule them as its colonies. This expansionist policy, which it has recently arrogantly equated with the Monroe Doctrine, seems, regrettably, to be encouraged by those of its powerful friends with vested economic interests in South Africa."

67. The Security Council, gravely concerned at the premeditated aggressive act by South Africa, in violation of the sovereignty, airspace and territorial integrity of Lesotho, adopted resolution 527 (1982) on 15 December 1982. By that resolution the Council strongly condemned the apartheid regime of South Africa for its premeditated aggressive act against Lesotho, which constituted a flagrant violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of that country, and demanded the payment by South Africa of full and adequate compensation to Lesotho for the resulting damage to life and property.

68. The attack on Maseru is but the latest in a series of aggressive actions by which South Africa has sought to destabilize the neighbouring States and punish them for extending humanitarian support to South African and Namibian refugees. This is the context in which the United Nations Council for Namibia and the General Assembly have concluded that South Africa's illegal military occupation of Namibia, which serves as a springboard for many of these acts of aggression, constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security.

69. By its resolution 37/101 of 14 December 1982, the General Assembly condemned South Africa for its unprovoked invasion of Lesotho, resulting in the loss of innocent lives and the destruction of property, and urged the Security Council to take immediate steps to deter South Africa from repeating its acts of aggression and destabilization of Lesotho.

70. In a communiqué issued on 4 September 1982, the leaders of the African front-line States and SWAPO condemned South Africa for its invasion of Angola and called upon the Pretoria regime to cease all acts of aggression and withdraw all its troops from that country. They also condemned South Africa's unprovoked acts of aggression, attacks and sabotage directed against Mozambique, Botswana and Zambia, and its continued support of armed bandits in those countries, as well as in Lesotho. They viewed South Africa's sabotage of the infrastructure in the front-line States as an attempt to frustrate the efforts of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC). 22/

71. For its part, the United Nations Council for Namibia expressed, in the Arusha Declaration and Programme of Action, 1/ its unflinching support for and solidarity with the Government and the people of Angola and saluted them for the untold sacrifice and the heavy burden they were shouldering in support of the liberation struggle of Namibia. In that context, it condemned racist South Africa's unprovoked acts of aggression, invasion and occupation of parts of southern Angola, which constituted a breach of international peace and security, and demanded the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of South Africa's forces from Angola. The Council urged the international community to extend all support and assistance, including military assistance, to the front-line States for the defence of their sovereignty and territorial integrity against South African aggression.

72. In a number of resolutions, including most recently resolution 37/233 A of 20 December 1982, the General Assembly has strongly condemned South Africa's repeated aggression against the African States in the region and called upon the international community to extend, as a matter of urgency, full support and assistance, including military assistance, to the front-line States in order to enable them to defend their sovereignty and territorial integrity against the repeated acts of aggression by South Africa.

#### IV. ACQUISITION OF ARMS AND ARMAMENTS

73. While the vast majority of States have complied with the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa imposed by the Security Council in resolution 418 (1977), there remains a small but powerful group of countries which continue to provide military support to the exploitative apartheid regime.

74. According to Mr. Abdul S. Minty, Director of the World Campaign against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa, while the Pretoria regime has some difficulty in acquiring major items of combat equipment, it is able to obtain spare parts, components, ammunition and most of its war items from a variety of sources. Mr. Minty indicated in a recent report that the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Belgium\* and the United States continued to supply military items which they defined as "essentially civilian" even when ordered directly by the South African military establishment. 23/

75. The United States Government recently lifted existing restrictions on the supply of equipment from the United States to the South African regime for use by its military forces.

76. Even before the restrictions were eliminated, United States corporations were supplying South Africa with military-related material. The new United States policy has facilitated the sale of medical items, air ambulances and sophisticated computers directly to the South African armed forces. 24/

77. The new United States policy has also allowed high-ranking South African military personnel to visit the United States. A number of such visits by senior officers, including the SADF Chief of Staff for intelligence, took place in 1981 and 1982. 25/ Moreover, United States Department of State officials stated in late 1981 that henceforth, South African military officers would be accepted for training with the United States Coast Guard on a "fairly routine basis". 26/

78. This collaboration with the South African regime is part of the general policy of "constructive engagement" of the present United States Administration, which considers the racist regime to be of vital strategic importance to the West, and portends a further strengthening of military relations between Washington and Pretoria.

79. It was also stated at the Vienna Seminar by Mr. Alfred Moleah, Professor of Political Science at Temple University in Philadelphia, that the United States Administration had given the Israeli Government permission to export to South Africa military hardware containing components manufactured in the United States. Among the items mentioned in this connection was the Kfir military airplane produced in Israel (A/AC.131/SMS/PV.3).

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\* At the 114th meeting of Standing Committee II of the United Nations Council for Namibia, held on 27 January 1983, the representative of Belgium stated that, in compliance with the arms embargo against South Africa by the Secretary-General, his country did not supply any military equipment to South Africa.

80. For several years, Israel has been cited in publications of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies of London as a supplier of weapons to South Africa. The New York Times of 8 May 1982 stated that, according to Israel officials, South Africa was the leading recipient of Israeli arms, and the Financial Times (London) of 18 August 1982 stated that Israel might be acting as a proxy for the United States in selling arms to South Africa and other countries.

81. In early 1982, a South African arms dealer, Armsel of Johannesburg, was appointed the sole representative of Bersa, the only private arms manufacturer in Argentina. The Daily Telegraph of London further reported on 2 August 1982 that Spain was regularly violating the United Nations ban on arms sales to South Africa. The weapons, mostly small arms and ammunition, were manufactured in factories at Eiber, near San Sebastian in the Basque country, and flown to South Africa on regular flights of South African Airways from Madrid. Often, up to 100 kilogrammes of arms were sent out on a single flight.

82. The assistance extended by Western countries to South Africa in the form of technical expertise and other types of collaboration has enabled the racist regime to develop its war industry to the point where it is today said to be the world's tenth largest arms producer. 27/

83. The local production and acquisition of arms by South Africa is carried out under the aegis of the State-owned Armaments Development and Production Corporation (ARMSCOR), which was set up by the regime in 1968 in anticipation of the United Nations arms embargo and relies heavily on manufacturing licences obtained from foreign entities.

84. The South African arms manufacturing industry employs about 100,000 people producing military equipment with varying degrees of adaptation to local conditions. 28/ According to the 1982 SIPRI yearbook, 29/ South Africa produces (some items under licence) the French Mirage fighter, the Italian Aermachi training aircraft, the French-designed Panhard armoured car, Israeli-designed missile boats, a derivative of the French Crotale surface-to-air missile, air-to-air missiles, artillery rockets, infantry weapons and a variety of ammunition.

85. South Africa also manufactures the G-5 155-millimetre extended-range howitzer, which is capable of being fitted with nuclear warheads. Another advanced weapon produced by South Africa is the G-6, which consists of a G-5 gun mounted on a very fast-moving six-wheel vehicle. The new weapon system, also known as the "Kalahari Ferrari", is expected to go into mass production within four years. South Africa reportedly plans to include the G-6 among the arms products it makes available to foreign buyers. 30/

86. ARMSCOR subsidiaries and contractors manufacture 141 different kinds of ammunition for the army, air force and navy. On 25 May 1982, the Financial Times (London) reported that one subsidiary, Pretoria Metal Pressing, had recently opened a R 176 million rapid-fire ammunition plant outside Pretoria and that Atlas Aircraft, another ARMSCOR subsidiary, was producing Mirage and Impala combat aircraft.

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87. Although ARMSCOR claims to be the tenth largest arms producer in the West, the racist Pretoria regime is still clandestinely acquiring some items of military equipment. According to an article published in The New York Times on 25 May 1982, South Africa succeeded between 1976 and 1978 in obtaining from a United States company, the Space Research Corporation based in Vermont, some 60,000 155-millimetre long-range shells, at least four guns and technical assistance which enabled South Africa to produce its own facilities for manufacturing such equipment (see para. 85 above). According to The Military Balance, the authoritative annual armaments review published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, "Minister"-class missile boats are built in South Africa on the basis of the Israeli Reshev design. In addition, the Skerpioen missiles which arm the boats are identified as a South African version of the Israeli "Gabriel". 31/

88. Besides its own production facilities, ARMSCOR depends on about 800 private sector contractors, 32/ including many local subsidiaries of United States and Western European companies. These subsidiaries produce a range of weapons including naval equipment, armoured vehicles and heavy artillery. 33/ All the subsidiaries operate under stringent secrecy laws that cover defence matters. 34/

89. Several experts indicated at the Vienna Seminar that there was a growing military alliance between Western and other capitals and Pretoria. Mrs. Gonzalez Diaz de Villegas, of the Centre for Studies on Africa and the Middle East in Havana, stated that for a number of years strategists of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had been pushing for the creation of a "South Atlantic Treaty Organization" that would unite South Africa with a number of Latin American countries such as Chile\*, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay and Argentina.

90. Fearing that confrontation with the liberation forces in South Africa and in Namibia would bring the downfall of the Pretoria regime, NATO officials had promoted the pact as a means of channeling the requisite military support to the South African regime as the liberation struggle intensified. In the meantime, it was reported that South Africa intended to expand its naval forces to undertake a greater role in the South Atlantic Ocean (A/AC.131/SMS/PV.2).

#### V. SOUTH AFRICA'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY

91. Alongside the build-up and improvement of its armed forces, South Africa is making efforts to develop its nuclear technology and installations and to acquire nuclear weapons capability. These efforts, which constitute a manifest threat to international peace and security, take on particularly ominous overtones in view of the highly aggressive stance which South Africa has adopted towards the neighbouring States.

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\* At the 115th meeting of Standing Committee II of the United Nations Council for Namibia, held on 28 January 1983, the representative of Chile categorically rejected the affirmation that his country had or had had any intention to participate in a pact of this kind.

92. The development of South Africa's nuclear potential has been considerably enhanced and accelerated by the collaboration extended to the apartheid regime at various levels by the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany\*, as well as Belgium\*\*, Israel, Japan, the Netherlands and Switzerland\*\*\*, through assistance in uranium extraction and processing, the supply of nuclear equipment, transfers of technology, the provision of training and exchanges of scientists. Such collaboration, together with external financial support for the South African nuclear programme, has encouraged the Pretoria regime in its defiance of the international community and obstructed efforts to eliminate apartheid and bring an end to South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia.

93. The General Assembly, in its resolutions on military and nuclear collaboration with South Africa, including resolutions 32/105 F of 14 December 1977, 33/183 G of 24 January 1979 and 34/93 E of 12 December 1979, has called on all States to cease forthwith all collaboration with South Africa in the nuclear field and to put an end to all transfers of nuclear equipment, fissionable material, technology and personnel. That prohibition was to apply equally to corporations, institutions, agencies, and individuals under the States' jurisdiction.

94. Despite these appeals by the international community, the Anti-Apartheid News (London) reported in June 1982 that the United States was supplying South Africa with a range of items including a Cyber 750/170 computer designed for nuclear weapons research, as well as Helium 3, a substance required to produce Tritium, which in turn is an essential element for the manufacture of thermonuclear weapons.

95. Furthermore, press reports indicate that the United States Department of Commerce has permitted an increase in sales to South Africa of dual-use items with nuclear weapons programme applications. (The term "dual-use" refers to equipment having both military and civilian uses.) The Secretary of Commerce was reported in May 1982 to have admitted that five export licences for equipment which could be used in South Africa's nuclear programme had been approved since 1980. For instance, the Department had approved the sale of vibration test equipment which could be used to test the reliability of warheads and ballistic re-entry vehicles,

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\* In a letter to the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia dated 10 December 1982, the Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United Nations rejected allegations of nuclear and military co-operation with South Africa.

\*\* Belgium has rejected the notion of nuclear collaboration between Belgium and South Africa.

\*\*\* The Permanent Observer of Switzerland to the United Nations, in a letter dated 23 March 1983 addressed to the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia, denied the allegations directed at the Government of Switzerland in paragraph 92. The Permanent Observer stated that the Swiss Federal Council strictly enforced the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as well as the embargo on exports of war materials to southern Africa decreed by the Federal Council itself in 1963.

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as well as computers and multi-channel analysers which could analyse data from hundreds of cables at a nuclear test site. 35/ An official of the United States Administration was quoted as stating that "the new nuclear policy reflected a broader disposition to improve relations with South Africa, which the White House views as strategically vital to the United States and critical to any resolution of the disputes over Namibia and Angola". 36/

96. Firms from Western Europe and the United States have been heavily involved in the construction and operation of the Koeberg station, South Africa's first commercial nuclear power plant. Dr. Frank Barnaby, Director of SIPRI, wrote in April 1981 that the French-Belgian-United States firm Framatone was supplying the pressurized-water reactors, the French-Belgian company Spie-Batignolles was doing the civil engineering work and the French company Alsthom was furnishing the turbogenerators. Fuel for the nuclear reactors would be supplied by the United States under a contract lasting until 1992 and by Eurofuel, a Franco-Belgian concern. 37/ Mr. Wolf Geisler, of the Anti-Apartheid Movement of the Federal Republic of Germany, also indicated at the Vienna Seminar that in early 1982 the Kaiseraugst company, a firm based in Switzerland and owned by concerns from Switzerland, France and the Federal Republic of Germany, had delivered enriched uranium for the Koeberg reactor (A/AC.131/SMS/PV.4).

97. The Washington Post reported on 13 November 1981 that South Africa had come up with enough enriched fuel to launch the first of two plants at Koeberg on schedule in June 1982. The same newspaper indicated on 13 April 1982 that two United States firms, Edlow International of Washington, D.C. and Swuco, Inc. of Rockville, Maryland, had bought excess uranium held by Switzerland and Belgium, turned the uranium over to two European enrichers (the consortium Eurogy and another unnamed firm) to be enriched into usable fuel, and then sold title to it to South Africa. According to the same source, South Africa had also arranged to send 4,800 kilogrammes of the uranium it was buying through Edlow to be enriched in the United States. It was further reported in the September 1982 issue of Southern Africa magazine that Transnuclear, Inc., a company based in Virginia, had recently applied to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for a licence to export enriched uranium to South Africa for the reloading of Koeberg.

98. Dr. Ampie Roux, former Chairman of South Africa's Nuclear Enrichment Corporation, is reported to have said that South Africa would begin to produce its own enriched uranium in 1987. Only then would it be self-sufficient in supplying fuel to nuclear plants such as Koeberg. Until then, South Africa would need more uranium to reload Koeberg I and to load its second nuclear reactor, Koeberg II, possibly in 1983. 38/

99. The Koeberg installation is being developed under the direction of the Electricity Supply Commission of South Africa (ESCOM). According to a paper prepared for the United Nations Centre against Apartheid, 39/ it appears that a large number of foreign banks have at various times participated in arranging Eurocurrency credits and Eurobonds for ESCOM. Western banks - and particularly French banks - have helped finance virtually the entire cost of the Koeberg project. The leading banks include Crédit Lyonnais, Banque de l'Union Européenne, Crédit Commercial de France and Banque de l'Indochine et de Suez UK. Also, France is training South African nuclear technicians to run the Koeberg reactors.

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100. At the Vienna Seminar, Mr. Pritvorov stated that the South African Department of Energy and Mineral Affairs had been allocated a 55 per cent increase in funds for the Atomic Energy Research Fund - a total of R 106 million for fiscal year 1983 - to be spent mainly on uranium enrichment research (A/AC.131/SMS/PV.2).

101. Mr. Geisler reported that firms of the Federal Republic of Germany were helping South Africa make itself less vulnerable to sanctions by building strategic factories. Firms like Linde, Lurgi, Deutsche Babcock and Siemens, for example, were currently involved in the construction of the coal liquefaction plants Sasol II and Sasol III. It was foreseen that substances required for the production of explosives would be produced at those plants in addition to fuel.

102. The political and military implications of these developments have become a source of grave concern to the international community. It was in this context that the General Assembly, at its thirty-seventh session, adopted resolution 37/233 A in which it once again vigorously condemned the collusion by the Governments of certain Western and other countries with the racist regime of South Africa in the nuclear field and called upon all States to refrain from supplying the racist minority regime of South Africa, directly or indirectly, with installations that might enable it to produce uranium, plutonium and other nuclear materials, reactors or military equipment.

103. By the same resolution, the Assembly requested the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, which operate the Urenco uranium-enrichment plant, to have Namibian uranium specifically excluded from the Treaty of Almelo, which regulates the activities of Urenco.

#### VI. WAR OF NATIONAL LIBERATION LED BY SWAPO

104. In the face of the continued illegal occupation and militarization of Namibia and the increased repression by the racist Pretoria regime, the people of Namibia under the leadership of SWAPO, their sole and authentic representative, have intensified their armed liberation struggle.

105. During the period under review, the combatants of the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), the military wing of SWAPO, intensified the armed struggle and scored numerous successes against the racist South African forces in Namibia, resulting in heavy casualties and destruction of military installations and equipment on the side of the occupation forces.

106. According to war communiqués issued by SWAPO on 12 and 13 August 1982, PLAN forces earlier that month launched a heavy artillery shelling on a South African base at Omahenene, some 45 kilometres east of the town of Ruacana. During the attack, 30 South African soldiers were reported killed and many others wounded. Ammunition and military installations were completely destroyed. A week later, on 9 August 1982, PLAN forces fought fierce battles against South African ground and air forces during which three Alouette and four Puma helicopters were hit by SWAPO anti-air gunners. In the course of four or five days, PLAN forces brought down a total of seven South African helicopters and six Mirage jet fighters. The New York

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Times stated on 14 August 1982 that 15 South African airmen and paratroopers were reported killed during the operation.

107. The 1982 annual report by the Commanding Headquarters of PLAN 40/ states that in the period between November 1981 and November 1982, PLAN combatants initiated 802 armed actions against the forces of illegal occupation in Namibia. Those actions ranged from attacks on South African military positions, demolition of military, economic and communications installations and land-mine destruction of vehicles and armoured cars, to ambushes of troops and raids on military targets.

108. The report indicates that altogether 2,865 enemy soldiers were put out of action, either killed or wounded, and 230 enemy agents were captured. Some 79 enemy trucks and 37 armoured personnel carriers were destroyed; and 18 enemy aircraft, 14 helicopters and 2 reconnaissance planes were shot down.

109. These successful operations against the enemy were in most instances made possible by the support SWAPO receives from the Namibian people. The widespread repression suffered by the Namibian people at the hands of the South African occupation forces, rather than reducing the level of their support for SWAPO, has instead strengthened their opposition to racist South Africa's continued illegal occupation.

110. A delegation visiting Namibia in February 1982 on behalf of the South African Council of Churches found that the large majority of the people supported SWAPO and strongly resented the continued illegal occupation of their country by South Africa.

111. Civilian support to the combatants of PLAN in their fight against the South African occupation forces includes, among other things, the provision of protection and shelter as well as vital information on army installations and enemy positions and movements.

112. The military achievements of PLAN have proved that Pretoria's sophisticated military machinery, which has been built up through the collusion of certain Western powers and Israel with racist South Africa, is not invulnerable when confronted by the steadfast determination of the Namibian people to achieve freedom and independence in a united Namibia.

#### Notes

1/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 24 (A/37/24), para. 767.

2/ For further information see testimony of G. Cawthra at the Seminar on the Military Situation in and relating to Namibia (A/AC.131/SMS/PV.2).

3/ See Apartheid's Army in Namibia (London, International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, January 1982), p. 3.

4/ Namibia - The Facts (London, International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, September 1980), p. 12.

5/ British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts, Part 4, No. ME 7047, June 1982.

6/ The Military Balance (1981-1982) (London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981), p. 64.

7/ The New York Times, 25 March 1982; Rand Daily Mail, 24 March 1982.

8/ Africa Contemporary Record (New York, Africana Publishing Company, 1981), p. B7.

9/ The Windhoek Observer, 16 October 1982.

10/ Anti-Apartheid News (London), May 1982.

11/ See Terry Shott, Role of Banks in Strengthening South Africa's Military Capability, Notes and documents No. 21/81, United Nations Centre against Apartheid, August 1981.

12/ The Guardian (London), 28 May 1982.

13/ Robert S. Jaster, South Africa's Narrowing Security Options, Adelphi Papers No. 159 (London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1980), p. 28.

14/ Financial Mail (Johannesburg), 17 September 1982 and 29 October 1982.

15/ The New York Times, 14 August 1982; Noticias (Maputo), 10 August 1982.

16/ See, in particular, General Assembly resolutions ES/82 of 14 September 1981, 36/121 of 10 December 1981 and 37/233 A of 20 December 1982.

17/ Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-seventh Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1982, document S/15321.

18/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-seventh Session, Plenary Meetings, 16th meeting.

19/ Anti-Apartheid News (London), October 1982; New Perspective (Helsinki), March 1982.

20/ A/37/414-S/15380. For the printed text, see Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-seventh Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1982.

21/ The New York Times, 10 May 1982.

22/ As quoted in Namibia in the News (publication of the Office of the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia, New York), September 1982.

23/ Abdul S. Minty, The Hemispheric Implications of South Africa's Military and Nuclear Build-up (paper presented at the Asian Regional Conference on Action Against Apartheid, held at Manila from 24 to 26 May 1982).

- 24/ The Guardian (London), 13 and 18 November 1981.
- 25/ The New York Times, 12 March 1982.
- 26/ Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg), 29 September 1981.
- 27/ Financial Times (London), 14 September 1982.
- 28/ Ibid.; see also British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts, Part 4, No. ME/7192, September 1982.
- 29/ World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1982 (Stockholm, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1982), p. 64.
- 30/ Financial Mail (Johannesburg), 17 September 1982; Financial Times (London), 14 September 1982.
- 31/ The Military Balance (1981-1982), op. cit., p. 64.
- 32/ The Washington Post, 27 September 1982.
- 33/ Financial Times (London), 25 May 1982.
- 34/ Ibid., 14 September 1982.
- 35/ The New York Times, 19 May 1982; The International Herald Tribune, 15 May 1982.
- 36/ As quoted in The New York Times, 19 May 1982.
- 37/ Frank Barnaby, Nuclear South Africa (General Assembly document A/CONF.107/2), p. 12.
- 38/ The Windhoek Advertiser, 8 June 1982.
- 39/ Terry Shott, op. cit., paras. 29-30.
- 40/ Communiqué on Military Operations of the People's Liberation Army of Namibia, 11 January 1983.

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Annex

## SECURITY FORCE BASES AND UNITS PERMANENTLY STATIONED IN NAMIBIA

All the units listed have been transferred to the South West Africa/Namibia Territory Force (SWATF) unless otherwise indicated. Medical and administrative units and supply bases are not listed.

Location	Facilities and Units
Windhoek	South West Africa Command Headquarters (non-SWATF) SWATF Headquarters 91 South West Africa Brigade Headquarters 911 Battalion Headquarters 91 Armoured Car Regiment 91 Composite Field Regiment 91 Maintenance Unit Alta Feste Area Force Unit Khomasdal Area Force Unit Air Force Base 1 South West Africa Squadron
Grootfontein	Northern Supply Command Headquarters (non-SWATF) 101 Engineer Support Unit (non-SWATF) 101 Workshop (non-SWATF) 16 Maintenance Unit (non-SWATF) Transit camp for South Africa Defence Force (SADF) Units Area Force Unit Air Force Base
Ruacana	Kaokoveld Counter-insurgency Headquarters Air Force Base
Oshakati	South Africa Police Headquarters and Detention Centre Army Base
Ondangua	Ovambo Counter-insurgency Headquarters 85 Technical Services Unit (non-SWATF) Air Force Base
Rundu	Kavango Counter-insurgency Headquarters 202 Battalion 32 Battalion (non-SWATF) Air Force Base
Katima Mulilo	Caprivi Counter-insurgency Headquarters
Okahandja	South West Africa Military School Area Force Unit

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Location	Facilities and Units
Walvis Bay	2 South Africa Infantry Battalion Group (non-SWATF) Rooskop Air Force Base South Africa Navy Base
Omega Bagani/Buffalo	201 Battalion 32 Battalion (non-SWATF)
Mpacha	701 Battalion Air Force Base
Eenhana	32 Battalion (non-SWATF)
Olunu	101 Battalion
Tsumkwe	203 Battalion
Opuwo	102 Battalion
Otjosundu	Company, 911 Battalion
Kamanjab	Company, 911 Battalion
Drimiopsis	Company, 911 Battalion
Navaspoort	Company, 911 Battalion
Narubis	Company, 911 Battalion
Oshivello	Major base 1 South West Africa Specialist Unit
Namutoni	913 Battalion
Omaruru	912 Battalion Area Force Unit
Okakuejo	Etosha Area Force Unit
Outjo	Major base Area Force Unit
Otjiwarongo	Major base Area Force Unit
Okakarara	Hereroland Area Force Unit

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Location	Facilities and Units
Uis	Damaraland Area Force Unit
Gobabis	Area Force Unit
Swakopmund	Area Force Unit
Rehoboth	Area Force Unit
Aminius	Area Force Unit
Aranos	Bo Nossob Area Force Unit
Stampriet	Anob Area Force Unit
Mariental	Area Force Unit
Gibeon	Namaland Area Force Unit
Bethanien	Area Force Unit
Keetmanshoop	Area Force Unit
Luderitz	Area Force Unit
Karasburg	Area Force Unit
Oranjemund	Area Force Unit
Rietfontein	Area Force Unit
Khomas Hochland	Area Force Unit

Other large bases include Nkongo, Oshigambe, Oshikango, Andara, Otavi and  
Umeb.

The location of the following SWATF units is not known:

- 1 South West Africa Signal Regiment
- 1 South West Africa Engineer Regiment
- 1 South West Africa Medium Workshop
- 16 Engineer Squadron

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Location	Facilities and Units
South West Africa Services School	
1 Provost Unit	

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Source: Apartheid's Army in Namibia, Fact Paper No. 10 on Southern Africa (London, International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, 1982).



