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2463rd MEETING: 11 AUGUST 1983

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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/ . . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council.* The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council.* The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

2463rd MEETING

Held in New York on Thursday, 11 August 1983, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. Luc de La BARRE de NANTEUIL (France).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Togo, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zimbabwe.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2463)

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. Letter dated 2 August 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Chad to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15902)

The meeting was called to order at 3.45 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Letter dated 2 August 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Chad to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15902)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In conformity with the decision taken at the previous meeting on this item [*2462nd meeting*], I invite the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of Chad and the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to take places at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Korom Ahmed (Chad) and Mr. Burwin (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) took places at the Council table.

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I should like to inform members of the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Egypt, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ivory Coast, Liberia and the Sudan in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Khalil (Egypt), Mr. Rajaie-Khorassani (Islamic Republic of Iran), Mr. Essy (Ivory Coast), Mr. Kofa (Liberia) and Mr. Elfaki (Sudan) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

3. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The first speaker is Mr. Korom Ahmed, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of Chad. I welcome him and invite him to make his statement.

4. Mr. KOROM (Chad) (*interpretation from French*): Since this is the first opportunity I have had to speak in the Council, I should like to associate myself personally with the sentiments of great satisfaction already expressed to you, Sir, by the delegation of Chad on the occasion of your assumption of the presidency for this month. I take pleasure at that fact, and we would reiterate our delegation's complete readiness to assist you in the performance of your duties.

5. I should also like to associate myself with preceding speakers in paying a respectful tribute to the members of the Council, whose primary responsibility it is to maintain international peace and security.

6. At its meeting on 3 August [*ibid.*] the Council heard the complaint of our Government against Libya for its naked aggression against the Republic of Chad. That aggression, which was at the time limited to the military occupation by the Libyan army of the northern region of Chad known as Tibesti, has increased considerably in recent days and has taken the form of a virtual genocide of the martyred people of Chad, with indiscriminate bombing of sites in the north and east of the country by the Libyan air force.

7. We have asked the Council to live up to its responsibilities by unreservedly condemning Colonel Qaddafi's Libya for its criminal action and demanding that Libya immediately withdraw its troops from Chad.

8. The Council heard the representative of Libya respond to this legitimate complaint from Chad with his habitual arrogance. He asserted that he would not respond to our delegation, because he did not recognize our Government, although, to his great misfortune, he was obliged to sit at the same table as us. This is sufficient proof that the recognition of the legitimacy of the Chad Government cannot be subject to any doubt within the United Nations, nor inside the Organization of African Unity (OAU) or the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

9. But, while claiming that he would not respond to us, the Libyan representative, to divert the attention of members of the Council, painted a fantastic picture of the Chad tragedy, for which his country is primarily responsible, and uttered words whose insolence and insulting nature towards the head of State of Chad have no equal except in the scorn which Colonel Qaddafi has for his African peers.

10. As was only to be expected, the representative of Libya denied the accusations against his country, claiming that Libya does not intervene in the affairs of Chad and has sent neither aeroplanes nor troops to that country.

11. The task of the representative of Colonel Qaddafi in this debate is not easy, so he chose the facile course of categorically denying the allegations against his country, because he was in no position to provide any proof of the much-vaunted neutrality of Libya in this serious matter.

12. One has only to read the many letters which Libya has addressed to the President of the Council in response to our accusations, which were specific, and the statement of the Libyan representative in the Council, to get a precise picture of the high degree of Libyan interference in the internal affairs of Chad and to understand the nature of the open warfare upon which it has now embarked against Chad.

13. Libya has always intervened flagrantly and openly in the internal affairs of Chad, and has never concealed its intention to invade and occupy the whole of Chad and thus forcibly to merge it with Libya. That would be a fine way to resolve the problem of the "Aouzou Strip".

14. Therefore, during the conferences on national reconciliation in Chad, held successively at Kano in northern Nigeria and at Lagos, the federal capital of that country, Libya consistently tried to impose as head of State of Chad a man who was in its pay. If one of the provisions of the Lagos Accord of August 1979 [*S/14378, annex I*] forbade neighbouring countries to intervene in the internal affairs of Chad, that provision was aimed first and foremost at Libya. That obviously did not prevent it from trampling the provision scornfully underfoot.

15. The Lagos Accord was rendered invalid at the time by the Transitional National Union Government of Chad itself, which substituted for it the N'Djamena Agreements—just a few days before the forces of President Hissein Habré took power. Therefore, it is, to say the least, absurd for Libya desperately to cling to that Accord, asserting that it is valid.

16. Libya's interference and intervention in the internal affairs of Chad were exposed when in November 1982 Libya categorically opposed the participation of the official Chad delegation in the second attempt to convene in Tripoli the nineteenth session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU.

17. Libya's shameless manoeuvres to obstruct the participation of the Chad delegation in international conferences were repeated in January 1983 at the ministerial meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries at Managua, which was essentially devoted to questions of Central America, and at the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held at New Delhi in March 1983.

18. Each of these attempts by Libya was thwarted, to the great chagrin of the Libyan delegation. Each time, the Libyan Government tried to justify its extraordinary behaviour by suggesting that the OAU should deal with the Chad question before it could recognize the Government of N'Djamena.

19. The opportunity so ardently awaited by Libya presented itself with the convening at Addis Ababa in June 1983 of the nineteenth session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU. In accordance with both the spirit and the letter of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, the OAU's President at the time and the host country invited President Hissein Habré to take part in the work of the Assembly.

20. Presented with this *fait accompli*, Colonel Qaddafi then proposed some odious horse-trading, consisting of his acceptance of the participation of the Chad delegation at the Assembly on condition that the POLISARIO *Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro* be admitted, although the two questions had nothing whatsoever to do with each other.

21. Everybody knows what happened next. The Chad delegation was officially admitted to take part in the proceedings of the Assembly. Colonel Qaddafi, unable to contain his anger, decided to boycott totally that Assembly of the Heads of African States.

22. The Chad Government's achievement of victory all along the line on the diplomatic level could only irritate the Libyan régime even further, particularly because the Chad Government made clearly known its intention to recover its occupied territory. Since Chad's title to this part of its national territory cannot be denied, and since there is no argument, of however little validity, for its being overturned by any international juridical body, the Libyan régime could only have recourse to force of arms.

23. The Chad delegation brought to your attention on 2 and 4 August [*S/15902 and S/15907*] the magnitude of this war which, since then, has assumed profoundly disquieting proportions. From two military bases set up right in the middle of Chad territory, one at Ogui, to the north-west of Faya-Largeau, and the other at Ounianga-Kebir, to the north-east, Sukhoi, Tupolev, MiG and SF260 aircraft, in flights of six, come every day to drop fragmentation and napalm bombs on the towns of Faya-Largeau, Oum-Chalouba and Kalait, causing considerable loss of innocent life. From 8 to 9 August alone, we counted more than 200 killed and more than 300 wounded, some by phosphorus and napalm bombs.

24. Furthermore, again from the same bases, which house two motorized battalions equipped with 55-mm and 75-mm recoilless cannons and 105- and 106-calibre cannons as well as BM-13, BM-16 and BM-21 so-called Stalin Organs and AML 90s, which were unloaded from large freight aircraft, mostly Iliyushins, as well as four armoured divisions equipped in particular with T-54, T-55, T-62 and T-72 tanks, Libya has since yesterday sent in against Faya-Largeau three armoured columns comprising 350 tanks, the models of which I have just mentioned, supported by observation aircraft and MI-24 helicopter gunships, which are the most sophisticated available today in the Libyan army. This new form of warfare began, as has just been said, on 9 August, with a heavy artillery pounding of that locality. As I am addressing the Council that city is being put to the fire and the sword. Women, children and old persons are dying victims of 500-kilogram and 1-ton bombs. The Council should know the suffering that is taking place in Chad.

25. The people of Chad are offering courageous resistance. It is an affront not only to the people of Chad but to international public opinion. This shows how valuable and beyond price is the struggle for independence and liberty.

26. Thanks to the modest defence capacity that has been given to us by friendly countries, we have begun to call a halt to the onward march of this armada of ultra-modern weaponry being unleashed against us. Thus on Friday, 5 August, we shot down a Sukhoi-22 bomber that was bombing Faya-Largeau. Its pilot, who was arrested, was Commander Abdel Salam Mohamed Sharfadine, a colonel in the Libyan air force, of whom we have here some photographs and documents. I would ask the Secretariat to make them available to the Council. Indeed, Libya cannot deny its intervention in Chad. He is a Libyan; he is a colonel who was trained in Libya, Egypt, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. He has confessed everything. He speaks those languages perfectly well. He is now in N'Djamena. There are photographs of him and of some other Libyan soldiers who have nothing whatsoever to do with Chad. There are no white Chadians. These were the Libyan soldiers captured at Faya-Largeau.

27. Commander Abdel Salam Mohamed Sharfadine is the direct subordinate of Colonel Massoud Abdelaziz, commander of operations in northern Chad—southern Libya, as the Libyans so often tend to say. Colonel Massoud, who is conducting the Faya-Largeau operations right now, has as his deputy this Commander Sharfadine, who on 8 August was presented to the public and the press. I think it is appropriate now to inform the members of the Council that the Chad delegation has in its possession all necessary proof of the Libyan presence in the national territory of Chad and the participation of the Libyan army in the in-depth operations inside Chad territory. This is material evidence, and we can make it available to the members.

28. This is the war that has been inflicted upon us by Libya. It is total war. It shrinks from no means and makes no differentiation between victims. It is no longer a war against soldiers. It is a war of extermination, a war of genocide suffered by the martyred people of Chad at the very time we are addressing the Council. Unfortunately, ill-informed or ill-intentioned people continue to describe the events in Chad as civil war. That is not the view of those who are living through it. We are faced with an armed conflict between Chad and Libya. The time of guerrilla warfare in Chad has long passed. It is now total war.

29. For the benefit of those who are still talking about a "Goukouni army" the Government of the Republic of Chad would like to make it absolutely clear that one year ago those protégés of Qaddafi—Goukouni, Kamougué, Mohamat Abba and others—left the national territory in disastrous circumstances without even their luggage and still less with their armed forces.

30. The army now to be found on the national territory of Chad, face to face with the Chad armed forces, is in fact an army that was scratched together by the Tripoli régime using as a basis elements of the Libyan regular army, which constitutes its nucleus. In addition to those elements are Chadian and other African workers in Libya who were press-ganged into action, and particularly the Islamic Legion financed by petrodollars and composed of agents of all nationalities, recruited primarily in the sub-Saharan countries and then sent from Benin towards Libya, where they received training in military camps.

31. The nation of Chad is, then, facing in the field a Libyan army of aggression that is over-equipped, well trained, wholly motorized and tremendously mobile.

32. There is no need to go back over the Libyan motives for this aggression. No one could possibly be fooled by that, so frequent are Libya's acts of interference in the internal affairs of other States and so frequent also are its subversive and destabilizing actions against other countries.

33. Chad has an absolute right to peace and security. Since 7 June 1982, the date on which the patriotic forces threw off the shackles of slavery imposed by settlers and mercenaries of all kinds recruited by Qaddafi and made available to puppets, agents in the pay of the new Libyan imperialism—ever since those forces were catapulted out of Chad, the President of the Republic, Mr. Hissein Habré, has spared no effort to bring about national renewal. But against this fundamental will, Libya believes that Chad has no right to independence. Its aggression is too grave for those States to which peace is dear, and in particular the members of the Security Council, who bear primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security, to assume an attitude of indifference.

34. As everybody knows, Libya excels in the art of falsehood and diversionary tactics. Proof of that has just been supplied by the complaint it has made in connection with various events occurring between sovereign States, in whose name Qaddafi himself has acknowledged he has no right to speak.

35. The fact is that that complaint, contained in document S/15912 of 6 August 1983, is nothing but a fraud pieced together by the Libyans to divert the attention of members of the Council from the real debate on the question of Libyan aggression against Chad.

36. The war of aggression now being waged by Libya against Chad is without justification. It has been inflicted in contravention of the norms of international law. It was launched in flagrant violation of the provisions of Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations, which states that "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force".

37. That is why the Government and people of Chad reiterate their request that the Council fully shoulder its responsibilities and strongly condemn Libya for its armed aggression against Chad, ordering it immediately to cease its bombing and pounding, requiring it immediately to withdraw all its troops from the territory of Chad, and calling upon it to cease its interference in the internal and external affairs of Chad so that the martyred people of Chad can recover its dignity and independence and can live in understanding with all its neighbours.

38. Mr. NGUAYILA MBELA KALANDA (Zaire) (*interpretation from French*): The Permanent Representative would have liked to participate in this meeting himself, but unfortunately he is away from New York and has asked me to make this statement.

39. I should like first of all to welcome the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of the sister Republic of Chad.

40. In our reply of 3 August to the allegations of the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya [*2462nd meeting*], we outlined the basic position of Zaire on the question of Chad at present before the Council. We should like now, in this substantive statement, to state that position in greater detail.

41. But first, Sir, we should like to return to our congratulations, on which we barely touched last Wednesday, on your assumption of the presidency of this important United Nations body. You have long diplomatic experience. You have already acted as President of the Council. You have great talent, and in the course of these few days we have had the opportunity to admire your skill and wisdom, as well as your firmness. In addition, you represent a country which has sealed its friendship with Zaire in a blood-alliance. As the country of freedom, France has sometimes seemed to be, as Jean Giraudoux puts it in *l'Impromptu de Paris*, the "world's spoilsport", for "It was created—and created itself—to undo plots, established roles and long-standing systems in the world." Thus, it is fortunate, Sir, that it is you who are presiding over our work in the present circumstances, and we have no doubt that, thanks to all these things, the Council is in good hands.

42. For reasons beyond our control, we were unable personally to congratulate the representative of China, who guided the Council's work in July with the proverbial skill, competence, finesse and effectiveness which are the heritage of his country's diplomats. Furthermore, Zaire and China have come to enjoy a co-operation and friendship which can be an example to the entire world.

43. To return to the question before the Council, it is significant that certain speakers—and not the least important of them—felt obliged to state that the question of Chad had been discussed last April [*2419th, 2429th and 2430th meetings*] and that, since the Council deferred that question to the OAU, it is for that latter organization to debate it first.

44. That position is clearly mistaken, for the question before the Council last April concerned a border dispute between Chad and Libya. The disputed area is known as the "Aouzou Strip". The question now before the Council is quite different and concerns armed attacks by the aforementioned country against Chad.

45. First of all, have there been acts of aggression or armed attacks against Chad? In his statement of 3 August [*2462nd meeting*], the Libyan representative told us that this was actually a civil war in which Libya was not involved and in connection with which it had maintained strict neutrality.

46. Either the Libyan representative is not at all aware of what is going on in his country, in which case he should be better informed by his Government, or perhaps, on the contrary, he is perfectly well aware of the actions of his Government in Chad; in that case, he was taunting the members of the Council, on whom he wished to foist his lies.

47. In either case, this is a very serious matter. For who on the Council does not know that Goukouni Weddey's troops were trained in Libya and that at this very moment others are being recruited for training in Libya? Who does not know that it is Libya which is arming Goukouni's troops and seeing to their logistic needs? Who does not know that Libya has hired and trained a so-called Islamic Legion, made up of mercenaries and fighting along with Goukouni's troops? Who does not know that military advisers provided by certain countries whose names I shall not mention are guiding that Islamic Legion and Goukouni's troops?

48. We are fully aware that in these conditions the countries which provide those advisers and those weapons are resorting to manoeuvres in order not to be denounced to the Council, but it is foolish to think that these facts are not known to the public at large and, even more so, to the members of the Council.

49. However, if it were only a question of the provision of weapons to Goukouni's troops we would be dealing with a sort of indirect aggression which, moreover, would have been repulsed by the troops of the legitimate Government despite the presence of the celebrated Islamic Legion.

50. The only problem was that, having failed, Libya decided to commit direct aggression. It brought into play on a massive scale its air force. Indiscriminately and in disregard of all international conventions on the subject, it systematically bombed both military and civilian objectives, killing defenceless civilian populations.

51. Since the time of nazism, this is one of the darkest pages ever written and one of the most barbarous acts ever known to history. Other countries may have committed such acts or may still be doing so elsewhere, but it seems to us that this is an excellent opportunity for the Council vigorously to condemn once more such acts and such practices.

52. Too much suffering has been inflicted on the populations of Chad and it is high time that they be allowed to live in peace so that they can tackle the task of rebuilding their country.

53. Libyan bombings in Chad are a perfectly obvious fact that cannot be denied. There has, indeed, been an act of aggression committed against Chad, notwithstanding the Libyan representative's feeble denials.

54. It will be recalled that on 1 August, the Libyan media announced that N'Djamena's forces were completely encircled in the city of Faya-Largeau. Immediately there began the pounding of the city and on 2 August the Libyan agency JANA triumphantly announced the death of President Hissein Habré. That death was not, however, borne out by facts. Will we continue to be told that Libya has had nothing to do with what is happening in Chad? I hope not.

55. Is Hissein Habré's Government illegitimate? Similarly, the Libyan representative stated in the Council that the Government of N'Djamena presided over by Hissein Habré was illegitimate. That represents the speaker's point of view only. But such statements and condemnations are in and of themselves a kind of interference in the internal affairs of Chad. Indeed, in public international law there exists what is known as the theory of effectiveness. We are speaking of effectiveness and not about a *fait accompli*. According to that theory the effective Government of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya is the one which rules in effect in Tripoli and governs Libya. The same applies to other countries.

56. One must not confuse legality with legitimacy. Legitimacy is a sociological concept whereas legality has more to do with legal forms. Thus, a Government can be legal without necessarily being legitimate, and vice versa. Naturally it would be ideal for a Government to be both legitimate and legal. After all, it is not because one country denies the legitimacy of another Government that it loses its status. Recognition does not confer legitimacy, on the other hand. It is only the statement of a point of view.

57. At the nineteenth session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, held at Addis Ababa, the legitimacy of the N'Djamena Government was confirmed since it was accepted by the majority, although not by all, of the representatives at the Assembly. Only the head of the Libyan Revolution supported the Government of Goukouni and because of the insult inflicted by his colleagues who were heads of State he had to leave the conference hall and the Ethiopian capital. Furthermore, Mr. Goukouni's Government was also expelled at Managua and New Delhi, as far as we know.

58. We do not think it would be helpful to return to the fact that the N'Djamena Government is illegitimate. We might just recall, as we did on 3 August, that no matter how just his cause, the fact remains that the Libyan Revolution's head is himself an insurgent. Should we therefore conclude that Colonel Qaddafi does not represent Libya? It would, of course, be insane to assert such a thing. Therefore, why would what is true of the Libyan head of State not be true of the N'Djamena Government?

59. Similarly, it seems to us childish to mention to us the Lagos Accord [*S/14378, annex I*] and the declarations of the eighteenth session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, held at Nairobi in June 1981. They were at the time all valid, but one must be honest—we will not say intelligent—one must be honest enough to recognize that the Lagos Accord and the Nairobi declarations, to which the Libyan representative referred, are today no longer applicable.

60. It is as if we were told that the decrees and laws of the ex-King Idris which were abolished by the new order continued to be valid in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

61. The position that the N'Djamena Government is illegitimate does not stand up to analysis. Principles and facts establish this quite clearly. It is not for Libya or for any country to say which governments in the world are legitimate. The time of the Crusades belongs to the past.

62. Regarding the presence in Chad of Zairian troops and advisers from friendly countries, everyone in this room was surprised to hear the Libyan representative speaking about the withdrawal from Chad of Zairian troops or other advisers from friendly countries. This is a little like the thief who cries "Thief!" in order to sow confusion, divert attention and make his getaway after having committed his crime. But our brothers from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya should realize that these manoeuvres are not always successful, especially when the thief is not committing his first misdeed and has been operating in the same neighbourhood for some time. The same is true of Libya: its interventionists seem to be everywhere.

63. Returning to the presence in Chad of Zairian troops, I should like to recall that if they are there it is at the urgent request of the legitimate Government of that country and that Zaire has acted in complete independence and sovereignty.

64. Our country, which has experienced many tragedies of the same kind and been the victim of many acts of aggression, has always been able to count on assistance from friendly countries in difficult times. In spite of our

own difficulties, we cannot, therefore, fail to heed an appeal from a fraternal country faced with an act of aggression orchestrated on a broad scale.

65. The troops of Zaire are in Chad. They certainly do not intend to stay there for ever. Unlike other countries, Zaire has no special interest there except to help its martyred brother, but its troops will remain there as long as aggression continues and as long as the N'Djamena Government wishes it to.

66. Whether it is a question of the Zairian troops or those of other friends which sent the N'Djamena Government equipment or other assistance, we have all come to the assistance of a country that is acting in self-defence. One cannot reasonably place both the aggressor and the victim on an equal footing.

67. We want it to be quite clear. For Zaire, men come and go but States remain. We have nothing against Mr. Goukouni, and if he had been in Mr. Habré's place, as a nationalist and the head of a legitimate government he could have called on Zaire to repulse alien aggression, and Zaire, if the situation so allowed, would have acted in the same way.

68. Moreover, as the representative of Libya so aptly recalled, Zairian troops had already been in Chad under the aegis of the OAU. As such, they abided strictly by the orders received from the command of the OAU, namely, not to intervene in the civil war and to create conditions to restore peace and reconciliation. Now that they are in Chad under the orders of the legitimate Government of Chad, they will abide by the orders of that Government to protect the civilian populations against the fury of the aggressors.

69. The Libyan representative spoke of the communiqué from the OAU Bureau calling on all States not to interfere in the crisis in Chad and appealing to the Chadians to bring about national reconciliation. The Libyan representative seems to have forgotten that, in reality, this appeal was addressed first and foremost precisely to his Government, which bears primary responsibility for current events in Chad and that, if Tripoli had not inspired and encouraged this killing and if it had not committed aggression against Chad, the situation we are deploring today would not have occurred.

70. In the final analysis, Zairian forces and friends of Chad have intervened only because the forces of disorder and the forces of destabilization had already entered Chad. Once these forces of aggression and genocide are withdrawn, the other forces will no longer have any reason to remain in Chad.

71. That said, the statements of the Libyan representative—in which he clearly did not believe himself—must not conceal the gravity of the situation in Chad. Libyan bombing continues to kill innocent people in Chad, people who have done no harm to the Libyan people. These innocent people have made but two mistakes: on the one hand, they have President Hissein Habré as leader, who is not to the liking of the leader of the Libyan revolution; and, on the other, they are poor people—but poor people who are sitting on a golden strip which the aggressors covet.

72. Chad has the right to live in peace, to choose its leaders and to conduct its life in keeping with its culture and its own identity—sheltered from treacherous sirens and any aggressors. It is immoral and criminal that some States, because they are oil producers or wealthy, have chosen to destabilize or commit acts of aggression against poor countries. Where will all this end? If this is allowed to continue, will not insecurity and the law of the jungle become legitimate and legal?

73. It is symptomatic that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has had and continues constantly to have unpleasant dealings with most of its neighbours, not to mention nations thousands of miles from its territory. If it is not Egypt, it is the Sudan; if it is not Brazil, it is Chad; if it is not Morocco, it is Tunisia—even if matters seem to have been settled there; and, if it is not the Palestine Liberation Organization, who will be the next victim?

74. In conclusion, we should like to express again our earnest hope that the Council will condemn such acts of aggression and see to it that they cease.

75. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of the Ivory Coast. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

76. Mr. ESSY (Ivory Coast) (*interpretation from French*): Sir, the delegation of the Ivory Coast is happy, for two reasons, to see you occupying the presidency of the Council, which is debating for the third time in six months this vital problem of Chad, which may determine the very future of the whole of our continent. Your personal qualities and your long experience in diplomacy, which have in recent years been applied to finding concrete solutions in the face of divergent interests within the international community, will be very useful to us in this particular matter of which the Council is seized today. You also represent France, a country with which my own country is honoured to be able to maintain special relations, and one which was very quick to learn the lessons of history and produce, with the active assistance of our leaders, a policy of decolonization which made it possible for the vast majority of States concerned to achieve political independence without bloodshed. No country is in a better position than France to understand the tragedy of Chad in all its dimensions—political, economic, social and, in particular, human—in the face of the misfortunes which have afflicted its people, a people aspiring only to peace so that it can devote itself to the difficult task of development, which is quite rightly of utmost concern to that country's legitimate authorities.

77. My delegation takes this opportunity also to convey its warm congratulations to your predecessor, Mr. Ling Qing, representative of China, for the outstanding way in which he conducted the proceedings of the Council last month.

78. It will be recalled that at the end of our deliberations last April [*2419th and 2428th to 2430th meetings*], following Chad's complaint against Libya on account of military occupation by Libyan troops of part of Chad territory—the Aouzou Strip—the Council urged the two parties to abstain from any action likely to aggravate the situation and to settle their disputes by peaceful means, in keeping with the relevant principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, which demand respect for the territorial integrity and political independence of States.

79. Statements in the debate and the difficult negotiations that made possible the drafting of a declaration read out by the President of the Council [*S/15688*] showed in particular the desire of States to see the two parties settle their differences by peaceful means.

80. The nineteenth session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, held in June at Addis Ababa, only acknowledged once again that which was obvious in any case, that is, the authority of the leaders in N'Djamena, who alone are authorized to speak on behalf of Chad and to enter into commitments internationally.

81. The events that have occurred since then in Chad have made it clear that one of the two parties—in this case, Libya—did not see fit to comply with the recommendations of the Security Council and the decisions of the OAU.

82. Indeed, not content with having obstinately refused to associate itself with the efforts of the international community and, above all, those of the OAU to establish peace in Chad and promote the restoration of the unity of the country, undermined as it was by years of fratricidal struggle, the Libyan Government actually strove to destroy that State by supplying its henchmen with a vast quantity of sophisticated weapons, the annual cost of which far exceeds the operating budget of the overwhelming majority of African States that have known only peace hitherto.

83. One may well wonder what financial resources coming from what territory can permit Goukouni to justify the exorbitant means at his disposal to destroy his country to pursue a scorched-earth policy by providing an opportunity to the Libyan air force to rain fragmentation and phosphorus bombs on his own brothers.

84. In the face of such a situation, in the face of the disproportion between the forces concerned, how can one imagine that the legitimate Government of N'Djamena should not have appealed to friendly countries which might provide it with necessary aid for its own survival?

85. It is in the face of this new evolution in the fratricidal war fomented and maintained from outside by destabilizing elements, enemies of freedom, that the Political Bureau of the Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast-African Democratic Rally, meeting on 1 July 1983, published a communiqué in which it approved the energetic measures taken by France within the framework of agreements of military co-operation between it and Chad to come to the assistance of the legitimate Government of that country, the Government recognized by the United Nations, the OAU and the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, and appeals to the true friends of Africa who are anxious to see its harmonious development in peace, freedom and independence to come to the assistance of the legitimate Government of Chad fighting for respect, the territorial integrity of its country, restoration of peace and national reconstruction.

86. The statements of the N'Djamena Government and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of Chad—confirmed from many different sources, and all of which agree—demonstrate undeniably, in spite of Tripoli's denials, the direct participation of the Libyan air force in the Chad conflict, thus fully justifying the presence at the side of the Chad Government of friendly States which come to its aid at its request to provide military assistance as called for by the situation.

87. Apart from Libya, none of Chad's neighbours has any territorial ambitions or hidden economic designs on Chad.

88. The occupation of the Aouzou Strip draws attention to and highlights Libya's true interests and ambitions in Chad. By dismissing at its will certain leaders of FROLINAT to arm others who are more subservient to its policy and by imposing itself as judge and as party to the Sebha agreements, it was no longer able to dissemble its wish to bring Chad within its sphere of influence.

89. Of course, internal causes can explain in part the Chad problem—and, indeed, this is the case in many States—but it is, above all, external factors which go well beyond the confines of that country, the many cases of interference which this State in its death throes cannot resist, which explain the present situation.

90. The concern to make Chad a united nation has been a constant of the policy of that country ever since its independence. One factor could have played an essential role in the emergence of national unity: the level of economic development for which peace is indispensable. After more than 20 years of fratricidal warfare, the only growth one is able to observe today in Chad is that of its underdevelopment.

91. Condemned to live together within frontiers which it did not choose, the different elements of the Chad population must find solutions in terms of possible coexistence which will promote contacts, exchanges and mutual esteem—any solution which excludes the idea of oppression of one party by another. The Sudan, Chad's immediate neighbour, has been able to come up with a form of organization adopted to its country.

92. Chad, left to itself and free of external interference, can overcome its internal problems by dialogue to restore peace and stability, which will in turn permit it to devote itself to its development in the higher interest of the people of Chad.

93. The Council should not allow itself to be taken in by the cry of "Thief" uttered by the fugitive thief himself to mask his own crime and divert attention from himself.

94. My delegation expects of the Council not only that it recall the cardinal principles of the United Nations and of the OAU but that it take all necessary steps to ensure that no Member contravenes international rules without which no State can feel safe.

95. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of the Sudan. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

96. Mr. ELFAKI (Sudan) (*interpretation from Arabic*): My delegation would like to express its gratitude and appreciation to the President and members of the Council at a time when it is examining an important question closely connected with peace and security in our region and, indeed, in the whole world.

97. We have studied with great interest the many messages which have been sent to us by the Government of the fraternal country of Chad and listened with interest to the important statement by our brother Ramadane Barma, the representative of Chad [*2362nd meeting*]. He reviewed the serious events which have occurred and continue to occur in his country as a result of the flagrant aggression and interference by Libya in Chad's internal affairs and of the repeated bombing and bombarding of Faya-Largeau and other villages and towns in Chad, along with Libyan material and logistic support to the insurgents and outlaws who have turned against the legitimate Government of Chad.

98. Today we have listened with great interest and concern to the important statement by Mr. Ahmed, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of the fraternal country of Chad, who has given us valuable additional information regarding Libyan intervention and the bombing and bombarding of some cities in the north of Chad. I should like to take this opportunity to welcome him to the work of the Council.

99. The persistent and intensive acts of aggression, past and present, of the Libyan authorities against the territory, towns and villages of Chad were described today by the Secretary of State and yesterday by Chad's representative as an attempt to commit an act of genocide against the people of Chad, and as another attempt by Libya to destabilize the Government of Chad. This is a brazen violation of the principles that we have always defended—principles in the Charter of the Organization of African Unity and the Charter of the United Nations, as well as principles of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

100. The Sudan, like all the countries neighbours of Chad and Libya, has a great interest in these grave developments, because they constitute an actual and direct threat to its security, integrity and stability. They also constitute a violation and breach of the basic principles of relations among neighbouring countries that must be respected and upheld. Foremost among those principles are those that apply to the sovereignty and independence of States and to their territorial integrity, as well as to non-interference in their internal affairs and non-use or threat of force, and the settling of all conflicts and differences by peaceful means.

101. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations set forth quite clearly the principles I have just enunciated, and need no further explication. Article III of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity[1] sets forth the principles that underlie that important regional organization. It sets forth the need to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each African State and its inalienable right to independent existence, as well as affirming the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration. It prohibits subversive activities on the part of neighbouring States or any other State. Article VI, which concerns the obligations of members of the OAU, requests every member to observe scrupulously the principles enumerated in Article III of the Charter. Every member has an absolute duty to do this, and no member that fails to respect those articles in its relations with other countries can remain a member of the OAU, an organization whose survival and development we must preserve if we want to see the hopes placed in it realized.

102. The delegation of the Sudan was not surprised to read the many letters addressed to the President of the Council by the Libyan authorities over the past few days. We were not surprised to hear the representative of Libya speaking in the Council on 3 August [*ibid.*], because experience has made us familiar with the practices and habits of the Libyan leaders. We know what they are capable of and we know what they seek. The letters and the statement were a desperate attempt to deny Libya's intervention in Chad. Those letters and the statement made in the Council have mentioned that the Government of Chad, a country that is a full-fledged member of the United Nations and of the OAU, as well as of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, is illegal and does not represent the people of Chad. Can there be any greater form of aggression and interference? The Libyan Government wishes to impose its authority on Chad and to interfere in that country's internal affairs, acting against those who are governing the country. What right or instrument do the Libyan authorities have to legalize Governments of other countries? Do those authorities not know that the legitimacy of Governments is an internal affair of concern only to the people of the country involved? Such senseless allegations cannot justify subversion or support for rebellion. Neither can they be invoked as a justification for aggression and interference in the internal affairs of another country or for threats against the sovereignty and independence of another country, or occupying its territories by force. Is it not time that Libya realized that no dispute over the legitimacy of Governments, should such dispute arise, can serve as a pretext for occupation, aggression or expansion, or for the appropriation of the territory of others by force? Has Libya not learned its lesson?

103. All attempts to prevent the legitimate Government of Chad from participating in the extraordinary Ministerial Meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Countries, held at Managua last January, and the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi in March of this year, have failed. Has Libya not understood that the OAU, at the nineteenth session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government held at Addis Ababa last June, said its final word on the subject and that it will not countenance Libya's desperate attempts to challenge the legitimacy of the Government of Chad? Does Libya want, by such peculiar behaviour, to disassociate itself from the decisions of the nineteenth session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU with regard to Chad?

104. There is no need to state the need for respect for principles, covenants, agreements, resolutions and conventions and that such respect must be reflected in practice. Slogans and fine words are not enough; all countries have eyes and ears. They can see, hear, and watch the practices and behaviour of each other.

105. Libya's aggression against Chad and its interference in that country's internal affairs, as well as Libyan occupation of part of the territory of Chad and its renewed attempts to impose its authority and hegemony through the use of agents, insurgents and mercenaries to destabilize it, are obvious to all and cannot be denied. Libya wants a régime subject to its influence in Chad and in collaborating or even merging with such a régime, Libya could appropriate the entire Aouzou Strip. Libya wants a régime it can use to satisfy its greed and carry out its conspiracies against neighbouring countries, including the Sudan, which has been, and continues to be, the victim of countless aggressive schemes and plots on the part of Libya.

106. The Democratic Republic of the Sudan has expressed, here and in other international and regional bodies, its condemnation and denunciation of all foreign intervention in the internal affairs of any other State, regardless of the reasons invoked or the pretexts used. Such intervention is contrary to customs, laws and international agreements accepted by the whole international community as a basis for relations between States, nations and peoples. It is on that basis that the delegation of the Sudan strongly condemns Libyan aggression against the fraternal people of Chad and interference in its affairs. It requests that this aggression and interference be ended immediately and that Libya withdraw its troops from Chad territory unconditionally, so that the people of Chad, who have long suffered, may win back their security, integrity, independence and sovereignty and the unity of its territory. We call on Libya to put an immediate end to material and logistical assistance that can help the insurgence against the Government of Chad. We call on it to put an end immediately to its air and land attacks on the towns, villages and people of Chad, and to put an end to the use of mercenaries of all nationalities in order to sow death and destruction in Chad territory.

107. With the support of sincere, fraternal African countries, the Government and people of Chad can once again regain national unity and stability, which are necessary to get rid of the aftermath of the periods of aggression and insurrection and to embark on the long-awaited projects of economic and social development.

108. In March and April last [*2419th and 2428th to 2430th meetings*], the Council considered Chad's complaint against Libya, which had occupied the Aouzou region, and the Council issued a statement on 6 April [*S/15688*], noting the desire of various countries to enter into negotiations to put an end, by peaceful means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, to the dispute and to the escalation of the situation. The situation that prompted the Council to issue that statement has deteriorated and become more acute. Now the two countries must enter into negotiations, into a dialogue, to end the dispute, which has lasted too long. A final solution must be found. We must put an end to one of the causes of the crises and instability that our region has experienced from time to time.

109. It must be remembered that at its fourteenth session, held at Libreville in 1977, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU created an *ad hoc* Committee[2] to study the border dispute between Libya and Chad. We hope that the two countries will co-operate with the Committee and put a peaceful end to their dispute, by means of a dialogue, an understanding, or arbitration. Alternatively, the matter could be taken up by the International Court of Justice, which could hand down a just and final judgement.

110. Chad has come before the Council, which is the international body primarily responsible for international peace and security. That action also demonstrates the gravity of the present situation. It is serious not only for Chad but for the integrity and sovereignty of the countries of the region. All necessary steps and measures must be taken to protect the sovereignty and independence of Chad and the security and integrity of neighbouring countries, along with the security of the world. We support Chad's request that Libya's aggression against it be condemned and denounced, and that Libya end its armed aggression and its bombing, that it withdraw its troops from all Chad territory and that it cease giving assistance to the insurgents and the mercenaries.

111. My delegation wishes to take this opportunity to appeal to the international community as a whole, and to African countries in particular, to support the efforts of the Government of Chad to safeguard the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Chad, as well as to rebuild what has been destroyed as a result of aggression, civil war and foreign intervention, in order to bring about the economic and social development necessary for people who have suffered so much and sacrificed so much. We ask all those countries to give whatever assistance they can to the Government and people of Chad. We are very grateful to those countries that have already

offered such assistance in an effort to help Chad to protect its independence and sovereignty and to prevent attempts of displacement and genocide against it.

112. We have good-neighbourly relations with the fraternal people of Chad and Libya. We are anxious to see that these two fraternal peoples, as well as others in the region, will make full use of their sovereignty and independence, their bonds of fraternity and good-neighbourliness, and will promote co-operation to bring about prosperity and peace, which we all ardently desire.

113. The people and Government of the Sudan will continue to do their utmost to realize the hopes of all of us to enjoy peace, stability and progress in fraternity and fruitful co-operation.

114. Mr. ADJOYI (Togo) (*interpretation from French*): My delegation would like to take this opportunity to welcome Mr. Korom Ahmed, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of Chad. We thank him for the important statement that he has just made. His participation in the Council's work is an expression of his Government's concern about the situation in his country.

> "The people of Togo earnestly hope that they and all nations will enjoy peace and progress, but peace must be real and contribute to the effective emancipation of all countries. That is why Togo, given the general state of disarray of world affairs today, threatening international equilibrium, has always advocated a fraternal dialogue and a general meeting of minds in an effort to bring about just solutions, in peace, to the painful conflicts which exist in our world and which take such a heavy toll of human life."

Those words of the President and founder of the Rassemblement du peuple togolais and President of the Republic, General Gnassingbe Eyadéma, assume great significance given the present tragedy in Chad, where military operations suggest that tomorrow the picture will be even more sombre.

115. It is not surprising that my country, which shares with other members of the Council primary responsibility for peace in the world, is once again trying with others to agree on a negotiated solution to the tragedy in Chad. It was in that spirit that we joined in the consensus that emerged last April in the Council, which adopted a statement calling on both parties

> "to settle the dispute without undue delay and by peaceful means, on the basis of the relevant principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, which demand respect for political independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity"

and urged

> "both sides to refrain from any actions which could aggravate the current situation" [*ibid.*].

116. The situation has worsened over the past five months. One of the sides, flouting on the one hand the statement engaging the responsibility of the Council and on the other the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, has by widespread military actions questioned the legitimacy of the existence of the other side—Chad's legitimate Government that was indeed recognized by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government at its nineteenth session, held at Addis Ababa last June.

117. The facts as reported by that other side are very troubling. Innocent civilian populations have been bombed for no reason—or, rather, for the sole reason of enjoying the protection of the competent authorities of their country.

118. How can the bombing of Faya-Largeau be justified except by saying that it is the result of a savage desire to create chaos in Chad with a view to pursuing certain unavowed goals? An end must be put to these bombings at once, and foreign occupying troops must be withdrawn to allow the people of Chad to tackle the great task of national reconstruction it has already begun. The demand for an end to the bombing and the withdrawal of the occupying troops is part and parcel of the refusal of the international community to see violence set up as a political system governing relations among nations. There is no need to recall that the occupation of a country through the use of force is a violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

119. Togo is a country that cherishes peace and freedom, and we believe that relations among States must be based on respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and on the principles of non-interference, good-neighbourliness, non-use of force and the settlement of disputes through negotiation.

120. In signing or acceding to the Charter of the United Nations, all States have pledged to respect and defend those principles. My country will always feel concern when those principles are flouted, no matter what country is responsible, particularly when African countries are involved. That is why my country has deplored and continues to deplore the occupation of Chad and the bombing of civilian populations. That is why Togo joins all other peace-loving nations that cherish the principles of the Charter in calling for the withdrawal of the occupying forces from Chad so that the Chadian people, which has suffered such hardship during these long years of war, may finally enjoy all their rights in freedom and peace.

121. My delegation appeals to both countries concerned without delay to apply the statement of the Security Council of 6 April [*ibid.*]. The international community cannot accept the occupation and bombardment of Chad as a *fait accompli*. If it did, that would establish a precedent that would jeopardize the confidence that militarily weak, small countries have placed in the United Nations to ensure their right to existence and independence and respect for the integrity of their territory.

122. The people of Chad have claimed that right to existence and is prepared to go to the negotiating table in order to exercise it. Since Libya has also declared here its deep desire to settle the problem of Chad by means of dialogue, my delegation has reason to hope that the guns will soon fall silent and that there will commence negotiations to bring about an independent and free Chad in which peace will have full significance.

123. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of Egypt. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

124. Mr. KHALIL (Egypt) (*interpretation from Arabic*): Since this is the first time that we speak under your presidency, the Egyptian delegation wishes to express its satisfaction at seeing France occupying the presidency of the Council, which bears a heavy responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. We are particularly happy, Sir, to see you personally in the Chair, for your wisdom and judiciousness are well known to us all and are a reflection of your vast experience and expertise. Those qualities have been manifested in your conduct of the proceedings in the Council's consideration of this particularly delicate matter: the complaint by Chad against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. The circumstances surrounding this complaint have rapidly worsened and have reached the stage of aggression and invasion of the territory of an African country and a Member of the United Nations by a fellow African State, also a Member of the Organization. This poses a threat to security and stability in a vast and vulnerable region.

125. Before I go into the item under consideration today in detail, I should like to convey the congratulations of the Egyptian delegation to the representative of China, Mr. Ling Qing, who did such a good job of conducting the proceedings of the Council in July.

126. We asked to participate in this debate because of the deterioration in the situation in that vital part of the African continent, resulting from the ambitions of certain leaders in the region, from regional expansionist designs, from foreign intervention in the affairs of other States, and from encroachment on the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of those States. Egypt considers that the complaint before the Security Council is founded in the fundamental principles by which we abide always and in all circumstances. Libyan intervention in Chad is not in the interests of the African continent or of the cause of liberation. It is a matter of constant concern to the OAU, whose Charter we respect. I should like to mention in this connection the resolutions adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU at its previous sessions, in particular that of the nineteenth session held last June at Addis Ababa.[3]

127. Chad is sorely in need of constructive assistance so that it can stand up against internal dissension. This is of great importance to the OAU; we all need stability, peace and understanding so that we can be the masters of our own development, and so that we can ensure the progress of our peoples. Accordingly, Egypt and other fraternal African countries cannot remain silent in the face of designs and actions which have led to instability as they have now done in Chad. Egypt condemns Libyan aggression against Chad and supports legitimacy in Chad. We therefore support the legitimate Government under the presidency of Hissein Habré.

128. At a time when we all desire stability, this is a very serious situation posing the threat of instability. The Charter of the Organization of African Unity has forbidden the use of force, and this makes the matter even more serious because of the intervention of a neighbouring country, Libya, in an internal conflict between a legitimate Government and other parties not enjoying the same legitimacy. Libya has committed armed aggression with armoured and airborne units; the statement by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of Chad before the Council today provided considerable details of this aggression, which leaves no room for doubt about the role being played by Libya in this aggression.

129. On every possible occasion, the Government of the Jamahiriya persists in denying that it is interfering in Chad's affairs, claiming that what is happening in Chad is a spontaneous internal conflict between Chadian parties, and that Libya is leaving it up to the inhabitants of Chad to settle their differences and is taking up a neutral position. There is a blatant contradiction here between words and deeds: Libya's present deeds require no further proof. We cannot conceal the fact that the problem of Chad, with its two parties, Libya and Chad—that is, the legitimate Governments of Libya and Chad—presents us with great difficulties. The people of Libya is the people of a fraternal Arab country, and that of Chad is the people of a fraternal African country. We do not like to see the territory of Chad being occupied by Libya, which refuses to recognize the legitimate Government of Chad. Libya refuses to negotiate with the legitimate Government of Chad concerning the occupied Aouzou Strip, and also refuses to settle the dispute between the two countries by peaceful means. We are worried at seeing Libya constitute a source of instability and threaten the legitimate order in certain African countries.

130. That is why when, last year, Libya withdrew its forces from Chad, saying that it would no longer interfere in the internal affairs of that African country, we glimpsed a ray of hope that a new era of Libya keeping its promises might be ushered in, thus opening the way for the people of Chad to achieve true national reconciliation emanating from the people itself, to direct its efforts towards the development of its resources, and to live in peace and co-operation with all countries. That would be in the interest of everyone. Unfortunately, we see from the facts that Libya is still bent on its old designs and ambitions: to interfere in the internal affairs of Chad, to impede national reconciliation, to attempt to overthrow the legitimate Government of the country, headed by President Hissein Habré, and to assist those who have turned against the legitimate Government and have breached Chad's sovereignty through acts of aggression by land and air.

131. We think that in order to put an end to the fighting and bring about peace and stability, so ardently hoped for by the people of Chad, we must create a propitious climate for that. There must no longer be any interference in the internal affairs of Chad or any attempt to oppose its legitimate Government. This is the only possible basis for peace and stability for the people of Chad in that vulnerable part of the African continent.

132. As for the attempts at destabilization and the origin of the intensive air bombardments, everyone knows that the rebel forces have never had any air capability. How could those rebel forces overnight come into possession of modern bombers, which are dropping bombs of great destructive power on civilians?

133. Suffice it to reiterate, at the conclusion of our delegation's statement, what has already been stated by the representative of Chad and Secretary of State, Mr. Korom Ahmed. The Egyptian delegation hails his appearance before the Council and echoes his appeal. We wholeheartedly support him in his request made on behalf of his country. It is incumbent upon the Council to live up to its responsibilities under the Charter and condemn the bombings and acts of Libyan aggression against Chad. Libya must be called upon to put an end to these acts and to undertake no further intervention in the affairs of Chad and to withdraw from all Chad territory.

134. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, whom I invite to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

135. Mr. RAJAIE-KHORASSANI (Islamic Republic of Iran): I am happy to have heard almost all the statements made to the Council regarding the sad conflict which exists between Chad and Libya. I have learned a lot from those statements.

136. I realized, as everyone in the audience did, that some speakers attacked the Libyan leaders. Some of them named President Qaddafi; some of them attacked just the leaders in general. I learned also that there is a problem in Chad. There is a sort of insurgent movement, and I learned that the insurgents have been moving towards the capital but have been stopped. This information has been passed on to me and to the rest of the audience by the speakers. I thank them all.

137. I learned also that military assistance has been given, quite legitimately, to Chad upon the request of the Chadian régime and I think I also heard that this military assistance has been very necessary for the survival of the Chad régime.

138. I learned something else that was not new to any of us, that is, that the Chad régime is legitimate and that the people of Chad support it very strongly. I do not know why then so much military assistance has been necessary.

139. However, I did not hear anything about some other sources which very generously offer military assistance and other help to the area and, as a matter of fact, add fuel to the fire. I am sure that everybody has read today's paper and knows that some 180 soldiers from France have already been deployed and that another 100 might be deployed very soon. We have also heard of the assistance that is given to the Chad régime by the United States. I do not know why these two important pieces of information were simply forgotten.

140. My delegation believes that there is a far better solution to the problem of Chad than coming to the Council and magnifying the problem. Chad is a very young country. I think it achieved its independence about 20 years ago, and has unfortunately had problems almost ever since. It was after only five years, in 1965, I think, that the French army returned to the country, presumably because they thought it was necessary.

141. However, in a young country like Chad, whose independence is only 20 years old, one can objectively assume and conceive that there might be some border differences with the neighbouring countries. These differences, my delegation believes, should be resolved in a very peaceful manner. It is quite unfortunate that those who are adding fuel and contributing to the conflict are probably preventing or delaying a peaceful solution to the conflict. It is very sad that some countries, which are now adversaries and contributing to this conflict, have signed so many peace treaties and agreements, one of them being the Lagos Accord [*S/14378, annex I*], which is very recent and the signatures to it still fresh. We therefore think the best way is for them to go back to those previous agreements and not be used by the imperialist Powers to aggravate the situation and create further animosity between the countries of the region.

142. One good and practical way of resolving these differences is probably direct negotiation. I believe the OAU is a very relevant and appropriate referee for this problem, particularly since the Council has not been very successful in resolving such differences.

143. My delegation therefore believes taking sides in this matter, trying to work out resolutions that might create injury for one of the parties or making any attempt to magnify and strengthen animosity should be avoided.

144. I hope some super-Powers that always find it in their interests to create conflicts in the area will refrain from contributing to this conflict; I also hope that some puppet régimes—respectfully speaking—in the area will refrain from further contributing to this sad conflict.

145. My delegation hopes the parties will soon achieve peace and contribute to the stability and strengthening of the area.

146. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has asked to speak in exercise of the right of reply, and I now call on him.

147. Mr. BURWIN (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (*interpretation from Arabic*): I should like to make a brief statement and at the same time exercise the right of reply. Permit me to make some comments on the question we are now discussing.

148. We stated clearly at the previous meeting [*2462nd meeting*] that the present situation in Chad concerned solely the Chadians and that imperialist forces were trying to internationalize the conflict in Chad by supplying one of the parties with weapons of all kinds and sending in troops and aircraft to support that party—that is, Hissein Habré, the Commander of the northern army, one of the 11 parties to the Chad dispute—Mr. Hissein Habré, who rebelled against the legitimate Government under the 1979 Lagos Accord counter-signed by 11 parties [*S/14378, annex I*].

149. The Government of Goukouni Weddey is the sole legitimate Government; it came to power not by force but under an agreement counter-signed by neighbouring countries and accepted by the Chadian parties; the other Governments came to power by military *coups d'état* or by force of arms.

150. We have stated more than once that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya is neutral and is not intervening on the side of any party, because we recognize in Chad only the legitimate Government of National Unity, headed by Goukouni Weddey. We have stated in the Council that the question of Chad is an African question which is before the OAU, which has set up an *ad hoc* committee.[2] We have also stated that, in order to find a solution to this problem, we have to bring about national reconciliation and that all parties should take part in the government of the country. We have proposed a council for national reconciliation, under the aegis of the OAU. We expressed our willingness, along with our African brothers, to participate in the search for the solution of this problem.

151. We should like to see an end to the assistance and massive supplies of weapons to the northern army; we should like to call upon the parties to bring about national reconciliation; we should like to ask the OAU to work towards such national reconciliation, which would put an end to civil war and foreign intervention in Chad.

152. But the imperialist forces are continuing to make charges against my country, unfortunately with the support of one of the African forces that receives orders from Washington. These imperialist forces want to find a pretext for their intervention in the area to perpetuate the state of war. They are sending tons of weapons and ammunition to Mr. Habré; they are supplying him with thousands of soldiers and mercenaries of many nationalities; they have taken no initiative to put an end to the war and bring about reconciliation. We hear no one in Washington or anywhere else calling for reconciliation within the country among all Chadian parties; but we do hear appeals to war and war cries addressed to Chad. The objective of those forces sent to Chad is crystal clear: to threaten the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

153. Those countries that defend Hissein Habré are defying the OAU and want to make it impossible for the OAU to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. It is amusing that they are not talking about the people of Chad but of supporting Hissein Habré. Everyone knows that he is an insurgent and rejected by the people of Chad, and that those countries are acting against the will of the people of Chad, which supports its legitimate Government of Goukouni Weddey. We wonder where those countries were in the past, and why they did not help the legitimate Government against the rebellion of its Minister of Defence, Mr. Hissein Habré. Why did those countries not think of providing food, medical and clothing aid to Chad before these events? They have taken advantage of recent events to provide the rebels with all kinds of weapons which are used for genocide against the people of Chad.

154. Permit me to say here that Mr. Habré enjoys no popular support. He left the capital so that French, American and Zairian troops could protect it and, with a group of mercenaries, resist the forces of the Government of National Unity headed by Goukouni Weddey. The proof of that can be found in the rejection by Mr. Habré of the proposal of sending a fact-finding commission by the OAU. It is clear he does not want world public opinion to know that he has very few troops: just a few mercenaries of various nationalities. Many newspapers have reported those facts, and I shall confine myself to what has been published by *The Washington Post* in its issue of 4 August 1983:

> "According to French news accounts, an unknown number of foreign mercenaries have also been recruited to serve with Habré's forces and could be called upon to help install anti-aircraft defences in Faya-Largeau."*

155. Some Japanese journalists also saw mercenaries in Abéché and Oum-Chalouba.

156. I shall quote some extracts from *The Washington Post* of 24 June:

> "A Chadian diplomat in Washington said yesterday that the Embassy here had not received any precise information, but the Chadian Chargé d'Affaires in Paris was quoted by the Associated Press as saying that Libyans, Libyan-recruited foreigners and rebels loyal to ousted President Goukouni were involved in the fighting.
>
> "A State Department official said yesterday that there were 'no reports' on Libyan use of aircraft against the government defenders of Faya-Largeau."*

157. *The New York Times* of 14 July published the following:

> "He said that as many as 600 rebel soldiers had been killed, wounded or captured since Friday. He said no more than '3 or 4' Government troops had been lost.

* Quoted in English by the speaker.

Among those killed on the rebel side, he said, were 3 Libyans, but he offered no evidence that Libyans had been there."»

158. The following is from *The Washington Post* of 1 August:

"Battlefield reports could not be confirmed independently because journalists were not permitted to travel to the front."*

159. *The New York Times* of 3 August reported that:

"Mr. Soumalia also reported that Faya-Largeau, the largest town in northern Chad, came under Libyan air attack Tuesday for the fourth day. He said large parts of the oasis had been destroyed, and casualties were heavy among the 10,000 residents and the combatants.

"It was impossible to verify the reports because journalists are not permitted to travel to Faya-Largeau."*

160. There are many things that I could point out here by way of example. One recent example is the following from *The Washington Post* of 10 August which reads:

"The sources, whose information could not be independently verified, said that Libya had dispatched Soviet-made T-62 and T-72 tanks loaded on flatbed trucks but that the trucks had become bogged down in soft sand 50 miles north of Faya-Largeau."*

161. Most of this comes from the sources of Mr. Habré and from American sources, even from the White House or the State Department.

162. I should like to quote also the following article from the *Daily News*, representing Tanzania's stand on the question of Chad:

"This intervention has taken not only the form of massive military and logistic support to one faction of the Chadian conflict, namely the Hissein Habré forces, but it has also taken the form of the introduction of military personnel under the excuse of providing training for these forces.

"The factional fighting between the Habré forces and those of former President Goukouni Weddey is continuing the civil war. It is neither here nor there to argue that the Habré régime is the legitimate Government of Chad, for from where does that Government draw its legitimacy? Or, to put it differently, how more legitimate is the Habré régime compared to the legitimate Government of Goukouni? In an attempt to justify intervention, a number of factors of recent history are conveniently forgotten. Goukouni was the President of Chad leading a Government of National Unity. The Government in which Hissein Habré was Defence Minister was recognized and supported by the Organization of African Unity. Indeed, it was given formal support by the Heads of State and Government of Africa at their eighteenth Assembly, held at Nairobi in June 1981.

"Ironically, it was also that Government that facilitated the OAU peace-keeping force in Chad in the aftermath of Libya's quick withdrawal of its forces from Chad following the request to do so by the Government of President Goukouni. Those Libyan forces were there at the request of the legitimate Government of Chad. That Chad's legitimate Government was forced to abandon N'Djamena in the face of heavy forces, despite the presence of the OAU peace-keeping forces outside the country does not really answer the question of legitimacy."

"At any rate that is the view of one of the countries."*

163. I should like to quote another statement issued in Accra on 9 August:

"The Ghana Government yesterday, 8 August 1983, appealed to the Organization of African Unity to redouble its efforts to find a peaceful solution to the Chadian conflict and to save that country from further suffering. The Government added that the internal conflict had been turned into an explosive international situation because of the massive military assistance to Habré by the United States and France. The Foreign Minister's statement said that the Government was watching with concern the worsening situation in Chad and added that Ghana deplores the internationalization of the Chadian conflict and supports the call of the OAU for all outside Powers to desist from further interference, direct or indirect, in Chad."*

164. I should also like to note what was said on CBS on 27 June. CBS reported that early in 1981 the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had begun to provide arms to Hissein Habré and FAN, the Armed Forces of the North. The original amount of the appropriation for assistance to Habré was $10 million.

165. In his statement the representative of Zaire tried to tell us something about morality. He gave us a whole juridical lecture on that subject. My response, however, will not be long. Briefly, I would say that I am aware that the authorities of his country are forced to send their troops to Chad because those who sent troops to the insurrection in Katanga and who protected the Mobutu régime have imposed on it the duty of sending troops to Chad. We might have hoped that Zaire would send its troops to one of the front-line African States confronting the racist régime of Pretoria, which is occupying part of Angola. We know that that is not possible for that régime, since Zaire has very close links with the racist régime in Pretoria and imports many goods from that country, even the carrot, in violation of the decisions of the OAU.

166. I do not know what Zaire's attitude is towards the problems of Kampuchea, but, according to the represen-

* Quoted in English by the speaker.

tative of Zaire, those who occupy that country's capital are the country's legitimate authorities. I hope that he would advise his Government and Zaire's ally, the United States, to apply the same principle to Kampuchea.

167. As for the theft, corruption and exploitation of the goods and property of the people, I need say nothing about the corruption and plundering of the money of the people of Zaire, nor of the money deposited in Belgian banks and other banks. We are aware of the price of sending troops to N'Djamena.

168. The OAU appeal was addressed to Libya; it was directed at extra-African forces. Perhaps the representative of Zaire does not know that Libya is a part of Africa, or perhaps he considers it non-African.

169. Libyan leaders have no private bank accounts. They are not subject to the CIA. Libya's oil income is exploited solely in development projects with a view to benefiting the people of Libya. Its distribution is equitable. At the time of the visit to Washington of the President of Zaire, the papers stated that he had lunch with Messrs. Bush, Shultz and Casey. Everyone knows Mr. Casey—he is the head of the CIA. A deal was worked out and Mobutu received the price of his intervention in N'Djamena in United States dollars, through the CIA, which were deposited in private accounts in American and Belgian banks.

170. My brother the representative of the Sudan vented all his anger against my country. It would appear that he was making a fine distinction. He expressed his pleasure at seeing the troops of Zaire, France and the United States in Chad, and he is not calling for the withdrawal of those troops. He is claiming that there are Libyan troops there and that they should withdraw. We in our country call for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Chad, and we are ready to co-operate with the OAU in dispatching a fact-finding commission. My country wants peace restored to Chad and everywhere else in the world. My country is the biggest donor of assistance to Chad—not by sending arms, but by loans, by joint agricultural ventures in agriculture, fishing and other fields, while the United States has provided instruments of war.

171. There is no doubt that the United States is particularly pleased to see dissent and struggle between us and our brothers so that it can have a pretext to justify its presence in the region, and to return to the days of military bases and economic exploitation.

172. The representative of Egypt said many things. I repudiate everything he said about expansionist designs and any invasion of Chad by Libya. It is not true. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has quite enough territory of its own, and we have no population explosion. We want to preserve our own territory. If there are those in Egypt, people like Sadat and those who worked with him, who are ready to give away Egyptian and other Arab territory, the Libyan leadership and the Libyan people are not ready to act similarly, in such a shameful manner, but we are determined to protect Libyan territory and to help our Arab and African brothers to defend their territories.

173. Egypt, the Egypt of Nasser, and its great people played a great role in the liberation of the third world. It faced up to imperialism and imperialist bases. Unfortunately, the situation today is different. Egypt is a base for aggression against Arabs; it is allied with the United States; it is the enemy of the Arabs, Muslims and Africans and of the liberation movement of the third world.

174. The United States claims to be interested in Egypt. It destroyed the Egyptian army and Egyptian schools with arms given to the racist régime in Palestine. It supports the régime in South Africa, which is committing aggression against the front-line States; it is sustaining and protecting South Africa in its attacks on Angola, Mozambique and other States.

175. We know why Egypt, that is, the Egyptian régime—because Egypt is a great country that plays a great role and has been in the lead of Arabs for a long time—is interested in Habré. The answer is very simple. Habré supports the Camp David accords and is prepared to establish relations with Israel. The Egyptian régime finds itself in an awkward situation in the Arab and Islamic world, and it must therefore use all possible means to find régimes which might follow its own path.

176. I do not wish to respond to my colleague from the Ivory Coast, whose country faces major difficulties. Its President received promises of assistance from the American Administration if he takes up an anti-Libyan position, and in particular a position against Colonel Qaddafi who, as we know, is Mr. Reagan's enemy number one.

177. In concluding my statement, I should like to say that we are greatly concerned about the peace and security of Chad. Chad is a neighbour of Libya, and the Chad and Libyan peoples have bonds of blood, bonds forged in their common struggle. We should like there to be peace in Chad. Without peace we shall see imperialist forces arrive very close to our borders in the south. We are prepared to co-operate and enter into dialogue with any legitimate Government in Chad, and we are prepared to co-operate with Chad and with other countries in economic development and to act for Chad's well-being, if those countries themselves wish Chad's well-being.

178. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The Council has heard the statement made by the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. He had asked to exercise his right of reply, and I granted him that right. That being so, I must, in my capacity as President of the Council, refer to the Council's records, and particularly to the statement made on 6 April by the Council's President on behalf of the members of the Council [*S/15688*]. That statement, the terms of which are surely remembered by all the members of the Council, is one in which the Council indicates that it had heard the statement made by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of Chad and the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. It is a statement in which the Council gives its

opinion about the dispute between Chad and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and in which the Council refers to both parties—Chad and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

179. In my capacity as President of the Council, and in keeping with the text adopted by the Council, I cannot fail to reply to the statement made by the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya about the legitimacy and the very existence of the Government of Chad.

180. Mr. NGUAYILA MBELA KALANDA (Zaire) (*interpretation from French*): The Libyan representative had difficulty in refuting the arguments put forward by the delegation of Zaire on the specific question before us. He tried to look through the papers and quote some writers. Finally he said that Zaire collaborated with South Africa. Does he have proof? When we are speaking about South Africa, what about Libyan oil going there via third parties?

181. I know that the Libyan representative is a great champion of his country's interventionist policy. It is his right. But is the distribution of Zairian property of any concern to Libya? Has Zaire asked Libya to come and tell us how to distribute our material goods?

182. Is the presence of my President in the United States Libya's problem? To speak of such matters is indeed interference in the internal affairs of a country. To speak of the visit of a head of State to a friendly country is interference. Are we here to consider the presence of our President in the United States or to consider the matter of the Libyan aggression against the territory of Chad?

183. Do not members of the Council believe that for the Libyan representative to speak of the foreign or domestic policy of Zaire is interference in the affairs of my country? The question that we are considering here is Libyan aggression against Chad. Let the Libyan representative speak. Let him refute the arguments which the delegation of Zaire put forward here.

184. Zairian troops are present in Chad at the request of the N'Djamena Government. Can the Libyan representative tell me that the presence of the Libyan troops in Chad is at the request of the N'Djamena Government? Since he will deny their presence, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of Chad has shown us photographs. The Libyan representative has come to tell us that Libya is not intervening. What about the pictures?

185. I know that everything that we have said has gone straight to the heart of our Libyan friend. I know that all these matters are things that he will not be able to refute. He has spoken about events that are happening in my country. Why are we not giving assistance to the front-line States attacked by South Africa? Has he himself already sent troops there? Has he organized an Islamic army or legion to liberate Namibia?

186. If the legitimate Governments of the front-line States request it of Zaire, we should certainly not fail quite legitimately to help those countries, as we are helping Chad, and as other friendly countries have helped us when we have had difficulties.

187. I reserve my right to speak again on another occasion.

188. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): This morning, in our informal consultations, it was agreed that we would stop the debate on the complaint of the Government of Chad at 6 p.m. I think that under the circumstances it would be appropriate to hold to what we said. We could then, as agreed, immediately proceed to take up the complaint of Libya, it being understood that the debate on the complaint by Chad would be resumed tomorrow, 12 August, at 10.30 a.m.

189. I call on the representative of Chad, though just for one minute. I think we must stick to the arrangements we have agreed upon.

190. Mr. BARMA (Chad) (*interpretation from French*): I shall be brief. The Libyan representative has shown the Council how many arguments he has. He has indulged in an exercise that has, I think—at least this is the impression of my delegation—put the members of the Council to sleep. He has given confused arguments, citing newspaper articles in an effort to prove that his country is not intervening in Chad. I do not think the members of the Council have been fooled.

191. As is apparent, the Libyan representative has not even denied that a Libyan aircraft was shot down by the armed forces of Chad and that its pilot was captured and made a statement that we shall make available to the members of the Council in a Council document.[4]

192. As regards the sending of a fact-finding mission to Chad, I should simply like to observe that the Government of Chad has never refused such a mission. I shall hold to that.

The meeting rose at 6.25 p.m.

NOTES

[1] United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 479, No. 6947.
[2] A/32/310, annex II, decision AHG/Dec.108 (XIV).
[3] A/38/312, annex, resolution AHG/Rev.106 (XIX).
[4] Subsequently issued under the symbol S/15928.

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