



**Security Council**

Distr.  
GENERAL

S/15728  
25 April 1983

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

---

LETTER DATED 20 APRIL 1983 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF  
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO  
THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On behalf of the Unified Command established pursuant to Security Council resolution 84 (1950) of 7 July 1950, I have the honour to submit a report of the United Nations Command concerning the maintenance of the Armistice Agreement of 1953 during the period 17 December 1981 through 31 December 1982.

I request that this letter, together with the enclosed report of the United Nations Command, be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Jeane J. KIRKPATRICK

Annex

Report of the United Nations Command concerning the  
maintenance of the Armistice Agreement of 1953  
during the period 17 December 1981 through  
31 December 1982

1. Background

The United Nations Command (UNC) was created pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 84 (1950) of 8 July 1950 (S/1588). In that resolution, the Council recommended the establishment of a unified command for United Nations forces in Korea, under the United States, and also requested that the latter "provide the Security Council with reports as appropriate on the course of action taken under the unified command". The Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC), signed the 27 July 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement. Pursuant to paragraph 17 of the Armistice Agreement, his successors in command are responsible for compliance with, and enforcement of, the terms and provisions of the Armistice Agreement. UNC continues to carry out its functions and fulfil its obligations in accordance with the Armistice Agreement. This includes participating in the activities of the Military Armistice Commission (MAC). The Korean People's Army (KPA) continues to conduct hostile acts directed against UNC and Republic of Korea (ROK) armed forces in violation of that Agreement. This report covers significant incidents and developments involving the Armistice Agreement during the period from 17 December 1981 to 31 December 1982. The last report of UNC to the Security Council (S/15042) was submitted on 5 May 1982.

2. Armistice mechanism and procedures

The Korean Armistice Agreement is designed to ensure a "complete cessation of all hostilities in Korea by all armed forces of the opposing sides until a final peaceful settlement is achieved". "Opposing forces" include all ground, naval and air units of both sides. CINCUNC signed the Armistice Agreement on behalf of all UNC nations, including ROK, which contributed forces to the unified command. The Commanders of the Korean People's Army/Chinese People's Volunteers (KPA/CPV), signed the Agreement on behalf of the KPA/CPV forces.

(a) Military Armistice Commission (MAC)

The purpose of MAC in Korea, as established pursuant to the Armistice Agreement, is "to supervise the implementation of this Armistice Agreement and to settle through negotiations any violations of this Armistice Agreement". The Commission is a joint international organization and is composed of 10 members: 5 senior officers from UNC and 5 senior officers from KPA/CPV. CINCUNC has appointed 1 member from the United States, 2 from ROK, 1 from the United Kingdom and 1 designated on a rotational basis from among the other 4 United Nations Member nations represented on UNC (Australia, Canada, the Philippines and Thailand). Meetings of MAC are held at the request of either side in the Joint Security Area, commonly known as Panmunjom, in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). To assist MAC in

/...

fulfilling its functions, the Armistice Agreement provides for a joint secretariat which maintains 24-hour contact through telephone communication between the joint duty offices of each side located at Panmunjom. The joint duty officers also meet daily except Sundays and holidays and serve as the basic channel of communications between the two opposing sides. There have been 415 plenary sessions of MAC and 471 of the MAC secretaries since the Armistice Agreement was signed. MAC, or the senior member of either side, is authorized by the Armistice Agreement to dispatch joint observer teams to investigate reported violations of the Armistice Agreement that occur within the DMZ. KPA/CPV, however, has frustrated this function of MAC by refusing to join in joint investigations as proposed by UNC since April 1967. During the reporting period alone, the KPA/CPV side failed to participate in 16 joint observer team meetings proposed by UNC to conduct joint investigations of incidents reported to have occurred in the DMZ.

(b) Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC)

NNSC, established by the Korean Armistice Agreement, is composed of four members representing Sweden, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia and Poland. Its primary function is to conduct independent inspections and investigations of Armistice-related developments and violations outside the DMZ and to report its findings to MAC. The Commission holds weekly meetings in the Joint Security Area, Panmunjom, to discuss and evaluate reports submitted by either side of MAC. Although its essential functions have been drastically curtailed, owing to KPA/CPV obduracy, NNSC does provide a very worthwhile and stabilizing influence, as well as a means for indirect communications.

(c) Role of the Republic of Korea (ROK)

A unique feature of the Korean Armistice Agreement is that no nation is a signatory to the Agreement. CINCUNC signed the Armistice Agreement on behalf of the unified command, consisting of the military forces from 16 United Nations Member nations and ROK. During the Armistice negotiations and afterwards, the ROK Government furnished assurances that it would abide by the Armistice Agreement. ROK provides most of the "civil police", who are charged with the mission of maintaining security and order in the UNC portion of the DMZ. The ROK Government and its armed forces have complied and co-operated with UNC in carrying out the Armistice Agreement, and ROK senior military officers have served on MAC for many years.

3. United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNMAC) activities

Meetings of MAC are normally called to discuss serious incidents involving the Armistice Agreement and significant issues arising under it. These meetings, as well as 24-hour telephone communication between the two sides, serve to prevent escalation of incidents based upon possible miscalculations. The Commission is a valued means of communication, as demonstrated by its continued use by both sides. Of seven MAC meetings held during the reporting period, UNC called two meetings and the KPA/CPV side called five. UNC charged the KPA with sending armed infiltrators into the south on two occasions in a deliberate violation of the Armistice Agreement. (The appendix to this report contains the details of these serious

/...

incidents.) During the reporting period, the major emphasis of UNC at MAC meetings has been to promote positive actions to reduce tensions on the Korean peninsula. (The appendix to this report also discusses specific positive proposals presented by UNC at MAC meetings.) On the other hand, the KPA/CPV side have misused these meetings to disseminate distorted political propaganda and have refused to respond positively to any UNC initiatives to reduce tensions. Of seven MAC secretaries' meetings held during the reporting period, UNC called four and the KPA/CPV side called three. UNC returned through secretaries' meetings the remains of one KPA armed intruder killed in the Republic of Korea and the remains of three others who had drowned and were recovered from the rivers south of the DMZ (in the Republic of Korea). On 28 August 1982, pfc. Joseph T. White, a member of the UNC DMZ police went across the military demarcation line into the KPA/CPV portion of the DMZ. UNC requested through telephone messages that pfc. White be interviewed by a UNC representative. The KPA responded that pfc. White had requested political asylum, but failed to answer the UNC request for an interview. UNC called the 471st secretaries meeting (13 September 1982) and again requested a face-to-face interview with pfc. White. UNC also requested the KPA arrange for an international telephone link from pfc. White to his family in the United States. The KPA refused to address either request and insisted that UNC not bring up the subject again. During the reporting period, UNC charged the KPA/CPV side with more than 11,800 violations of the Armistice Agreement. Those charges were passed expeditiously either telephonically or through the daily joint duty officers' meeting in the Joint Security Area (Panmunjom), to provide KPA/CPV with an opportunity to cease ongoing violations or to conduct timely investigations to prevent similar violations.

#### 4. Conclusions

For more than 29 years, MAC has been the only joint mechanism existing between the two opposing military commanders in Korea for the resolution of serious incidents, the reduction of tensions and the prevention of miscalculations. Additionally, in the past it has been used effectively by both sides to obtain the repatriation of military and civilian personnel who have fallen into the hands of the other side, as well as the remains of both military and civilian personnel. UNC will continue to fulfill its obligations under the mandate of the Armistice Agreement and the Security Council resolution of 7 July 1950 until the parties directly concerned are able to arrive at a more permanent arrangement for peace in Korea.

Appendix

Major incidents/issues discussed by the Military Armistice Commission  
(17 December 1981 to 31 December 1982)

1. KPA intrusion and attack in the DMZ

At about 0221 hours, 21 April 1982, the KPA soldiers at a KPA guardpost located north of military demarcation line marker No. 0810 fired automatic weapons toward Pyoru hill in the North Korean portion of the DMZ. During the course of this illegal firing, many tracer rounds crossed the military demarcation line and impacted on a UNC DMZ civil police post located south of the military demarcation line. These firings across the military demarcation line constitute serious violations of the Armistice Agreement. One of the KPA guardposts in the area twice directed a searchlight toward the military demarcation line in the vicinity of Pyoru hill. The associated broadcasts repeatedly ordered, "Halt where you are!" and "Return at once!". Apparently, the KPA forces were firing at some of their own people who were attempting to defect to the south. At about 0515 hours, two KPA guardposts simultaneously opened fire on UNC guardposts across the military demarcation line. UNC returned fire in self-defence; both sides were engaged in one of the most intense exchanges of fire in recent years. At about 0620 hours, a UNC patrol, while searching the area where a light was seen earlier, observed 15 armed KPA soldiers in a ravine 300 metres south of the military demarcation line in the UNC portion of the DMZ. Such armed intrusion constitutes a serious Armistice violation. The UNC patrol fired on the KPA armed intruders. At about 0650 hours, two KPA guardposts once again opened fire in a deliberate attack on UNC guardposts. This time, the KPA used 82 mm recoilless guns in their attack. UNC returned fire in self-defence. Later in the morning, KPA soldiers were observed carrying four unconscious individuals toward their vehicles. The UNC patrol recovered KPA clothing and equipment including: one 30-round, type-68 assault rifle magazine; 19 expended 7.62 mm cartridges used with the type-68 assault rifle; one KPA field uniform/cap manufactured in 1981 at the 105th Munitions Factory in Hamgyong-Nam Do. UNC displayed this evidence in support of its charges, at the 412th meeting of MAC, held on 4 May 1982, that during the early morning hours of 21 April the KPA in fact sent armed intruders across the military demarcation line into the UNC portion of the DMZ in gross violation of the Armistice Agreement.

2. KPA armed infiltration into the Republic of Korea

At about 0350 hours, 15 May 1982, UNC security guards sighted two KPA armed infiltrators on a beach on the east coast of Republic of Korea, about five kilometres south of the military demarcation line (DMZ). These two infiltrators were in an area that is readily accessible only by sea. The two armed KPA infiltrators approached to within 10 metres of a UNC observation post. (At that time, they were clearly identified as KPA armed infiltrators.) UNC security personnel opened fire on them. The KPA armed infiltrators fired their type-68 assault rifles and threw hand grenades at the UNC security personnel. In this fire-fight, one of the KPA armed infiltrators was killed and the second infiltrator fled the scene. Equipment recovered on the dead KPA infiltrator included: one 7.62 mm type-68 assault rifle manufactured in the North with a 30-round

/...

magazine; one 7.62 mm type-66 pistol, also manufactured in the North; two swim suits; two inflatable life preservers; two sets of frogmen flippers; two snorkels; a radio receiver/transmitter with a battery; a Canon Camera (Serial No. 872168) with a 500 mm telephoto lens and 39 rolls of film; and an imitation ROK Army uniform. On 16 May 1982, the KPA/CPV component of MAC, in an obvious attempt to cover the infiltration, notified UNC that some KPA personnel, who were on a training mission along the east coast near the DMZ, were missing. They requested that UNC return the remains of those missing trainees should UNC find them. The remains of the KPA infiltrator were returned through the 465th MAC secretaries' meeting held on 18 May 1982 by means of a routine transfer procedure. (This was the first time that the KPA accepted the remains of an armed infiltrator who was killed in the Republic of Korea. However, it should be noted that the KPA did not know that they would subsequently be charged with the infiltration. They accepted the remains under the assumption that the case was closed.) UNC called the 413th MAC meeting held on 28 May 1982 to charge the KPA with sending armed infiltrators into ROK territory on 15 May 1982 in violation of paragraphs 7, 12 and 17 of the Armistice Agreement. At that meeting, UNC presented physical evidence to show that the intruders were not trainees, as claimed, but armed infiltrators on a hostile mission to the Republic of Korea.

### 3. United Nations Command initiatives

Despite KPA hostilities and their blatant use of MAC for propaganda purposes, UNC continues to approach MAC meetings in the manner intended. In the past year and a half UNC has resurfaced past UNC tension-reducing initiatives and introduced several new proposals, unprecedented in MAC history, which would certainly reduce tension if adopted by the other side.

#### (a) Mutual notification of major military training exercises

In early December 1981, in the wake of massive secretive KPA exercises unprecedented in scope, UNC proposed that both sides provide prior notification of major military training exercises. To demonstrate its good faith, UNC also announced the dates for the exercise "Team Spirit '82". They have not responded to this initiative.

#### (b) An invitation to observe the training exercise "Team Spirit '82"

In January 1982, in the face of continued and heated denouncement of "Team Spirit '81" (although exercises are clearly not a proper subject for MAC meetings) by the KPA/CPV side as a preparation for invasion of the North, UNC invited the five members of the KPA/CPV Armistice Commission (one Chinese and four representatives of the KPA) in company with the four principal NNSC members (Swiss/Swedish and Czech/Polish members) to come and see for themselves the defensive, nonprovocative nature of "Team Spirit '82". In March 1982, UNC, again in response to protests against "Team Spirit '82", outlined the agenda of "Team Spirit '82" in an effort to demonstrate the nonprovocative nature of that exercise.

(c) Role of NNSC in the DMZ

UNC has many times over the years requested, without success, that the KPA join UNC in an effort to demilitarize the DMZ. They have also rejected repeated UNC requests to form joint observer teams to investigate incidents in the DMZ. Joint observer teams composed of both KPA and UNC personnel were organized to investigate Armistice Agreement violations reported to have occurred in the DMZ. In order to improve the integrity of investigations, and as a positive influence on the tense situation in the DMZ, UNC proposed that MAC empower NNSC - a third party - to perform investigative functions in the DMZ. (NNSC was originally organized to supervise the implementation of paragraphs 13 (c) and 13 (d) of the Armistice Agreement, which prohibit the introduction into Korea of reinforcing military personnel and military equipment. Additionally, NNSC was to investigate Armistice Agreement violations occurring outside the DMZ. As a result of KPA actions, NNSC has been prevented from performing its designated functions over the years. However, it does perform a vital role today both as a means of communication and as a stabilizing influence in the Joint Security Area.

(d) MAC meetings to negotiate UNC proposals

In June, UNC informed the KPA/CPV side that it would periodically call MAC meetings for the sole purpose of negotiating specific tension-reducing measures. The agenda would be announced well in advance to ensure adequate time to prepare; and, in an effort to reduce emotions, prevent distractions and negotiate a mutually beneficial result, UNC would not discuss incidents or allegations. The agenda (prior notification of major military training exercises) for the first special negotiating meeting was announced to the North Koreans in December 1982.

4. KPA/CPV patterns in MAC

During the majority of this reporting period, the KPA/CPV side had used MAC in a manner which has been characteristic over the past several years. Specifically MAC was used by them to dispense distorted political propaganda which carried the theme that tension was caused by the United States and the Republic of Korea, that United States forces should be withdrawn to remove tension, and that the Armistice Agreement should be replaced by a peace treaty. Dissemination of such political propaganda themes at the MAC forum is clearly outside the purview of the Armistice Agreement. They have yet to respond positively to UNC initiatives designed to reduce tensions.

-----