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THE SITUATION IN KAMPUCHEA  
REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE  
DECLARATION ON THE STRENGTHENING  
OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY  
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES  
BETWEEN STATES  
DEVELOPMENT AND STRENGTHENING OF  
GOOD-NEIGHBOURLINESS BETWEEN  
STATES

SECURITY COUNCIL  
Forty-third year

Letter dated 18 August 1988 from the Permanent Representative of  
Democratic Kampuchea to the United Nations addressed to the  
Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith for your information a document entitled "Proposal of Democratic Kampuchea for a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Problem of Kampuchea", issued on 15 August 1988.

I should be very grateful if you would have the above-mentioned proposal distributed as an official document of the General Assembly, under items 23, 72, 130 and 137 of the provisional agenda, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) THIONN Prasith  
Permanent Representative

\* A/43/150.

PROPOSAL OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA  
FOR A COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT  
OF THE PROBLEM OF KAMPUCHEA

- 15 August 1988 -

A. FOREWORD

Democratic Kampuchea has constantly demonstrated its goodwill to promote a political settlement of the problem of Kampuchea. As one partner of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), Democratic Kampuchea has wholeheartedly supported the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions on Kampuchea over the past 9 years.

Moreover, Democratic Kampuchea has actively cooperated with all the forces of the CGDK in working out and putting forward successive proposals for a political settlement of the Kampuchean problem, such as:

- The CGDK's 8-point peace plan of 17 March 1986, which is a generous, comprehensive and reasonable proposal for Kampuchea as well as for the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRVN) and for peace, security and stability of South-East Asia and the world at large. The overwhelming majority of the international community has welcomed and expressed its strong support to that proposal, but the SRVN has flatly rejected it.
- The CGDK's proposal dated 25 June 1988. It represents a new significant concession from Democratic Kampuchea which accepts the simultaneous dismantling of the State of Democratic Kampuchea and the so-called "People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK)", a smoke-screen used by the SRVN in Phnom Penh in its attempt to cover its aggression in Kampuchea. The SRVN has again rejected that proposal.

Prompted by its constant goodwill to arrive at an earliest political settlement of the Kampuchean problem so that the people of Kampuchea and those of Vietnam can enjoy again peace and security, the threat to the regions of South-East Asia and Asia-Pacific is removed, and Kampuchea can become an independent and neutral country, Democratic Kampuchea would like to present a new proposal for a comprehensive political settlement of the problem of Kampuchea.

We believe that, in order to allow our friends the world over to see better the goodwill of Democratic Kampuchea, it would be necessary to recall a number of basic elements on the real nature of the Kampuchean problem.

B. A NUMBER OF BASIC ELEMENTS ON THE REAL NATURE OF THE PROBLEM OF KAMPUCHEA

Democratic Kampuchea is of the view that in the search of a comprehensive political settlement, one should keep constantly in mind the real nature of the problem and should be guided by a number of fundamental principles of international law and the Charter of the United Nations. Indeed, to do otherwise would not lead to a comprehensive political settlement.

1- The real nature of the Kampuchean problem has been the SRVN's aggression and occupation in Kampuchea which go on unabated since late December 1978. The United Nations has directly and seriously dealt with this problem since its 1979 34th General Assembly. It has ever since maintained the seat of Democratic Kampuchea and has adopted, over the past nine consecutive years, resolutions calling for the withdrawal of all foreign forces (precisely the SRVN's aggression forces) from Kampuchea. In 1979, the UNGA resolution on Kampuchea received 91 favourable votes. This number has increased each year and reached 117 in 1987.

This is a clear-cut pronouncement of the overwhelming majority of the international community on the real nature of the Kampuchean problem. The SRVN has no pretext whatsoever to invade and occupy Kampuchea.

2- Therefore, based on such a real nature of the problem, a comprehensive political solution can only be found through direct negotiations between the SRVN and the CGDK, who is leading the Kampuchean people's struggle, for almost ten years now, to liberate Kampuchea from the SRVN's grip. It must be solved in such a way because the warring parties are:

- (i)- The aggressor, who is the SRVN;
- (ii)- The CGDK, who is leading the Kampuchean people's struggle against the SRVN war of aggression.

If the two warring parties do not negotiate with each other, and instead leave others to solve the Kampuchean problem, and if the SRVN continues to try to evade its own responsibility, a solution can never be found. Other countries, which are not the warring parties, can only help.

3- In the framework of a comprehensive political settlement, it is necessary to distinguish the pressing key issue of the problem from the issues that come after the withdrawal of all the SRVN's aggression forces from Kampuchea:

First: The pressing key issue

The pressing key issue of the Kampuchean problem is the withdrawal, under international supervision of all the SRVN's aggression forces from Kampuchea.

If the SRVN continues to refuse to negotiate with the CGDK and to withdraw all its aggression forces from Kampuchea, a solution to the Kampuchean problem can not be found, and Kampuchea can not become an independent and neutral country. The war in Kampuchea will go on. Peace and security will not be restored both in Kampuchea and in Vietnam, and the threat to peace, security and stability of South-East Asia and Asia-Pacific will not be removed.

Moreover, if the SRVN continues to refuse to deal with the withdrawal of its aggression forces from Kampuchea, and instead tries to raise other issues to be tackled first, it will be impossible to arrive at a settlement. If the SRVN continues to do so, this will be tantamount to "putting the cart before the horse." What the SRVN tries to do is to evade its own responsibility and to divert the issue so that it can forever occupy Kampuchea.

Second: Issues coming after the complete withdrawal  
of the SRVN's aggression forces from Kampuchea

After the withdrawal of all the SRVN's aggression forces from Kampuchea, all other issues of Kampuchea are internal matters of the Kampuchean people. They must be left to the Kampuchean people to decide by themselves in accordance with the principle of the right of each people to self-determination free from any outside interference. This is one of the fundamental principles of international law and the Charter of the United Nations, which is generally accepted in the world and must be observed.

However, taking into account the views of various Kampuchean parties and concerned countries on the Kampuchean problem, Democratic Kampuchea is also of the view that a number of issues could be raised among the four Kampuchean parties and concerned countries within the framework of an international conference on Kampuchea. Those issues are inter alia:

- National reconciliation among all Kampucheans and among all political parties or factions regardless of their past and their political tendencies;
- The setting up of a provisional quadripartite government to organize direct, free and general elections of a Constituent Assembly which will endow the country with a new Constitution;
- Among the issues coming after the Vietnamese withdrawal:
  - On the one hand, some people are worried about "the return of the Khmer Rouge to power alone or to dominate the others" because those people have clearly seen that the force of Democratic Kampuchea has been playing a very important role in the current national liberation struggle against the Vietnamese aggressors on the battlefield over the past nearly ten years.
  - But on the other hand, the whole people of Kampuchea, at home and abroad, fear the Vietnamese aggression and annexation of their country. For many generations, this fear has never died down because at stake is the very survival of Kampuchea as a people and a nation. They have been worrying whether Kampuchea could become a second Kampuchea Krom (Cochin-China) or a second Champa. (1)

Besides, the majority of the countries of South-East Asia, Asia-Pacific and the world at large have been also worried about the Vietnamese expansionism, at present and in the future, because Vietnam has its own regional expansionist policy and is an ally, a military base and, at the same time, an outpost of the Soviet Union with its global strategy and its expansionist policy in South-East Asia and Asia-Pacific.

Therefore, the whole people of Kampuchea, at home and abroad, and the countries and peoples of South-East Asia, Asia-Pacific and the world at large, see the need to have appropriate measures to prevent Vietnam from implementing its expansionist strategy so as to enable the Kampuchean people to live in peace and security within an

independent, neutral and non-aligned Kampuchea, and to secure peace, security and stability in South-East Asia and Asia-Pacific.

In the light of the afore-cited situation, the world can clearly see that the so-called "Khmer Rouge problem" and the problem of Vietnamese expansionism are two problems whose nature is far apart. (2)

The concern of some people about the "Khmer Rouge problem", whether reasonable or not, is on a matter that falls within the boundaries of a country, not a threat to peace, security and stability of South-East Asia and Asia-Pacific, whereas the threat of Vietnamese expansionism does constitute a very grave danger not only for the survival of the people and nation of Kampuchea but also for South-East Asia as a whole, for South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca, South Pacific and Asia-Pacific.

Even in such a condition, Democratic Kampuchea which has been prompted by its sincere spirit to uphold the interests of the great national union in the liberation and defence of the country higher than anything else, agrees that all effective measures should be worked out:

1. To ensure that Democratic Kampuchea can not return to power alone, and any one Kampuchean party can not dominate the others. This is for the sake of maintaining peace, security and stability within the Kampuchean national society.
2. To ensure at the same time that after the withdrawal, Vietnam will not be able to implement its "Indochina Federation" strategy and its regional expansionist policy in accordance with its claims to be an outpost of the Socialist bloc and as it has done so. This is for the sake of ensuring peace and security in Kampuchea as well as peace, security and stability in South-East Asia, South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca, South Pacific and Asia-Pacific.

To sum up, we believe that the real nature of the Kampuchean problem and a number of fundamental principles of international law and the Charter of the United Nations, as mentioned earlier, are touch-stones to be tested on any proposal for a political settlement of the Kampuchean problem whether it is correct, reasonable and sincere or not, whether it is aimed at solving the problem or simply a trick.

## C. PROPOSAL OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA FOR A COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE PROBLEM OF KAMPUCHEA

### I. THE PRESSING KEY ISSUE

- 1- The SRVN must withdraw all its aggression forces from Kampuchea within a definite time-table, under genuine international supervision, in the framework of an overall agreement.
- 2- Once an overall agreement on the withdrawal of all the SRVN aggression

forces from Kampuchea is signed, there will be a cease-fire among all the parties throughout Kampuchea.

## II. ISSUES COMING AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL THE SRVN'S AGGRESSION FORCES FROM KAMPUCHEA

- 1- At the last phase of the withdrawal of the SRVN forces from Kampuchea, the following measures will be taken:
  - a. Simultaneous dismantling of the "People's Republic of Kampuchea" and the State of Democratic Kampuchea;
  - b. Setting up of a provisional quadripartite government under the Presidency of H.R.H. Samdech NORODOM SIHANOUK;
  - c. Confining to barracks all the armed forces of the four Kampuchean parties, under the supervision of a quadripartite Kampuchean Commission and international supervision.
  
- 2- The provisional quadripartite government will organize, under international supervision, direct, free and general elections of a Constituent Assembly which will endow the country with a new Constitution. The new Constitution will determine the name of the country, the national flag and anthem, the political regime as well as the judiciary, administrative, economic, financial, social, religious, cultural, educational and press system of the country.
  
- 3- On the future national army:
  - During the transitional period, setting up of a quadripartite army, with an equal strength of each of the 4 Kampuchean armed forces, under a quadripartite General Staff; (3)
  - Organizing one National Army according to the new Constitution of Kampuchea, adopted by the Constituent Assembly. (4)
  
- 4- Measures to guarantee the agreement on the Kampuchean problem:

After an agreement on a comprehensive political settlement of the Kampuchean problem is reached, an International Conference will be convened with the participation of all concerned countries and those of the 5 Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council as well as the United Nations Secretary-General in order to find out effective measures to guarantee the agreement and the independence, neutrality and territorial integrity of Kampuchea.

To reach these objectives, the International Conference could discuss a number of issues as follows:

- a. The guarantee of the agreement by the 5 Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council;

- b. The setting up of an international mechanism, be it a United Nations International Commission or another International Commission, or any other measure, which the four Kampuchean parties and all the countries attending the International Conference agree upon in order to prevent Democratic Kampuchea or any one Kampuchean party from dominating the others, and to prevent the SRVN from committing again acts of aggression against Kampuchea.
- 5- To ensure peace and security in Kampuchea, in the SRVN and in South-East Asia, there will be a peace and non-aggression treaty between Kampuchea and the SRVN or better still a peace and non-aggression treaty among Kampuchea, Vietnam and other countries of South-East Asia.
- 6- An independent, neutral and non-aligned Kampuchea will establish good relations in all fields with all the countries in the world, from the West, from the East and from the neutral and non-aligned countries, and welcome
- the assistance of all countries to rebuild Kampuchea after the liberation, and
  - investments from any country

15 August 1988

(Signed): KHIEU SAMPHAN  
President of  
the Democratic Kampuchea party

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NOTES

(1): Champa was a Kingdom who occupied the present day Central Vietnam. Her population, the Chams, are Muslim people. From the 15th Century, the Vietnamese began its invasion and occupation of Champa, and started to Vietnamize the lands and the Cham people till finally the Kingdom of Champa disappeared from the world map and the Cham people exterminated.

Kampuchea-Krom (called Cochinchine by the French) which occupied approximately the present day South-Vietnam, a territory roughly from the 12th Parallel Southward, was part of Kampuchea's territory. It is called Kampuchea-Krom (literally lower Kampuchea) because it is a flat area formed by the delta of the Mekong river in Southern part of Kampuchea. After the Kingdom of Champa, it was the fate of Kampuchea-Krom to suffer the Vietnamese invasion and occupation and the Vietnamization process on the lands and population. (See map)

Since 1976, the Kampuchean of Kampuchea-Krom, nearly 4 millions, who were suffering already from many hundred years of Vietnamization process, have been exposed to the fascist policy of the Hanoi leadership. They have been expelled from their ancestral homes, villages and rich lands (on the delta of the Mekong river), and sent to miserable life in arid or swampy, unfarmable lands.

Hitler, through his "vital space" and "purity of the Aryan race" policy, has committed genocide against the Jewish people.

For its part, the "Indochina Federation" strategy is to Vietnamize Laos and Kampuchea and annex them into Great Vietnam, to Vietnamize the peoples of Laos and Kampuchea who are to become Vietnamese citizens, and take away their lands for the benefit of the Vietnamese settlers.

The 1977 Vietnam-Laos treaty is simply a treaty to eliminate the State boundaries between the two countries. Actually, Vietnamese settlers began to occupy Eastern Laos since the 50s. After the 1954 Geneva Accord, Vietnamese troops and settlers continued to occupy the regions of Phong Sali, and Sam Nua of Laos. Even after the 1962 Geneva Accord on Laos, the number of Vietnamese troops and settlers continued to increase. They settled in Laos, from Phong Sali, Sam Nua, the Plain of Jars in the North, to Attapeu in the South, and by 1975 reached nearly 2 millions including those stationed on the so-called Ho Chi Minh trails. After 1975, a number of Vietnamese troops on Ho Chi Minh trails were withdrawn but the Hanoi leaders continue to send in, according to their systematic, planned policy, the Vietnamese population especially those living in the provinces bordering with Laos. At present, the Vietnamese settlers in Laos amount to more than 3 millions.

- (2): It is noteworthy that the SRVN has come out with "Pol Pot or Khmer Rouge problem" as a pretext to justify its aggression and occupation in Kampuchea. One may wonder why Vietnam has been so virulent about "Pol Pot or Khmer Rouge problem"? And in such a planned and systematic way? The reason is that Democratic Kampuchea, designated as "Pol Pot or Khmer Rouge problem" by the Hanoi leaders, constitutes the main obstacle for them to achieve their "Indochina Federation" strategy in swallowing up Kampuchea, and to Vietnamize Kampuchea. It is Democratic Kampuchea which hampers their aim to speedily Vietnamize Laos. Democratic Kampuchea is also an obstacle that prevents the Hanoi leaders from implementing their regional expansionist strategy, from realizing their medium-sized "Indochina Federation" (which includes 16 provinces of Northeastern and Northern Thailand), and their Greater "Indochina Federation" (beyond the Northeastern and Northern Thailand.)

Besides, history has recorded how the aggressors and expansionists always try to paint white black, to set up provocations and to invent pretexts to justify their aggression and expansion.

In World War I (WW I), the German expansionists were behind the assassination of the Austrian Crown Prince in Sarajevo, and incited Austria to invade Serbia. Later on, Germany itself invaded Austria. Now everybody accepts that the Sarajevo incident was a provocation set up by Germany as a pretext to precipitate WW I. Actually, Germany's objectives at that time were to expand its territories in Europe as well as in European colonial territories. Thus, pretexts were invented and used by Germany to serve its political objectives.

World War II (WW II) broke out by similar invented pretexts. The political objective was Hitler's 1937 programme to "conquer vital space by military force." To achieve his political objective, he set up provocations and invented pretexts, and implemented his programme:



1. Germany started to reoccupy Rhineland (a very important strategic territory because of steel industry in the Ruhr region on the bank of the Rhine);
2. Later on, Germany annexed Sudetenland, and afterward the whole Czechoslovakia;
3. Then, Germany invaded and occupied Poland.

Thus WW II broke out. Now, everybody undisputedly recognizes that the Sudetenland event was only a pretext for Hitler to implement his expansionist policy.

The Vietnamese Communist Party follows the same line. We would like to invite the world community to look at the history of the "Indochinese Communist Party (ICP)", and the policy and practices of the Vietnamese leadership since the year 1930.

Since its foundation in 1930, by its very name the ICP set a strategy for "Indochina Federation." In its Statute, which is its political programme, there was a clause which clearly indicated that ICP was a party for the three parts of Vietnam, namely Tonkin (North Vietnam), Annam (Central Vietnam) and Cochin-China (South Vietnam), and for Laos and Kampuchea. According to its Statute, the three countries (Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea) were to be united under the sole ICP leadership.

Based on this Statute, the ICP organized its Vietnamese cadres into 5 branches, with a committee for each branch:

1. A Committee in charge of Tonkin, called Bac Bo;
2. A Committee in charge of Annam, called Trung Bo;
3. A Committee in charge of Cochin-China, called Nam Bo;
4. A Committee in charge of Kampuchea, and
5. A Committee in charge of Laos.

These five committees were entrusted with the tasks of implementing the ICP Statute.

The Vietnamese leaders have continuously and persistently implemented this "Indochina Federation" strategy during the past more than a half of century. They have annexed Laos, and have not hesitated to invade and occupy Kampuchea, in flagrant violation of the principles of international law and the Charter of the United Nations. So, we can see that

- the ICP was expansionist by design;
- the Lien Viet Front, created by the ICP, was equally expansionist;
- the Viet Minh Front set up by the ICP was no less expansionist; and
- after its unification, Vietnam continues to be expansionist.

If the SRVN were able to occupy Kampuchea forever, the Hanoi leadership would certainly become all the more arrogant in their threat to peace, security and stability of South-East Asia. It will be recalled that Vietnam and its Lao puppets openly made a territorial claim against 16 provinces of Thailand. This reflects the expansionist policy of the Hanoi leadership.

Besides, a few years after the invasion and occupation of Kampuchea by the SRVN troops, Hanoi leaders came out openly to threaten one South-

East Asian country, who does not condone their expansionist policy, saying that "two Vietnamese army divisions will be enough to strangle to death" that South-East Asian country.

Before it began its large-scale aggression and occupation in Kampuchea in late December 1978, how did the SRVN threaten Democratic Kampuchea, and want her to kneel down? How many acts of aggression and encroachments against Kampuchea, did it commit along the borders areas? And against Kampuchea's sea territorial water? Did it not occupy Kampuchea's Koh Wai islands? How many times did it perpetrate its attempts of coup d'Etat to overthrow Democratic Kampuchea?

Now after nearly ten years of its occupation of Kampuchea, how many million Kampucheans have been killed or murdered by the Vietnamese troops? How many hundreds of thousands of Kampucheans have to flee their homeland to seek refuge abroad? How much do the Vietnamese occupying troops plunder the Kampuchean people's properties? How much do they bring destructions and devastations to Kampuchea?

In Vietnam itself, how fascist is the policy of the Hanoi leadership? How many hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese young and old alike have been arrested and imprisoned, in one way or another? How many millions of Vietnamese people are facing starvation? How many millions more have not enough to eat? How many millions of Vietnamese "boat people" have fled the fascist regime? And among the latter, how many tens of thousands have, in a most tragic manner, perished in the sea during their attempt to escape that fascist regime?

During the nearly ten years of the SRVN's occupation, if the people of Kampuchea and the Kampuchean patriotic forces in which Democratic Kampuchea is playing an important role, were not able to hold in check the Vietnamese forces, what would happen to

- South China Sea?
- the Strait of Malacca?
- South-East Asia?

All these are a set of issues similar to Rhineland, Sudetenland, Czechoslovakia and Poland.

(3): Democratic Kampuchea is of the view that the strength of the armed forces of each Kampuchean party should be limited to 10,000. The reasons for such a proposal are as follows:

- a. Such a troop strength would be in conformity with the situation after the war;
- b. There would already be international guarantee;
- c. There would also be a peace and non-aggression treaty between Kampuchea and the SRVN or among Kampuchea, the SRVN and other South-East Asian countries,
- d. To reduce the armed forces of each party to such a level so as to minimize eventual clashes among the four Kampuchean armed forces;

- (4): *Democratic Kampuchea has already determined its own stance on national defence in the future by abiding firmly by the great national union policy. It has already made this stance known to the other two partners of the CGDK as well as to friendly countries, through its documents dated 8 March 1987. We are pleased to attach this document in annex for the information and the judgment of national and international public opinion.*
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APPENDIX

THE DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA PARTY'S STAND  
ON  
THE NATIONAL DEFENCE POLICY

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The fundamental policy of the Democratic Kampuchea party stems from its clear perception of the regional --South-East Asia and Asia-Pacific-- geopolitical context in which Kampuchea is evolving and which will not likely to change for many decades to come.

Against this geopolitical foreground and for the sake of the very survival of Kampuchea, it is imperative to have suitable internal and external policies so as to ensure the great national union and the support of the international community.

Therefore it is not our intention to seek the monopoly of power.

At present, Democratic Kampuchea together with the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) firmly abides by the relevant United Nations resolutions on Kampuchea and the CGDK's 8-point peace proposal for a political settlement of the Kampuchean problem, for the withdrawal of all the Vietnamese aggression forces from Kampuchea and for the national reconciliation among all Kampuchean.

In the future, the Democratic Kampuchea policy on national defence will be as follows:

1. We will firmly pursue the great national union policy.
2. We will firmly abide by the 8-point political programme considered from now on as the basis of the national Charter of Kampuchea.
3. We will honour our commitment to work within the framework of the free enterprise system and the liberal democratic regime.
4. We will firmly remain committed to the policy of an independent, neutral and non-aligned Kampuchea, which dictates the necessity to establish relations with all countries, near and far, on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence, and not to authorize the stationing of any foreign military base on Kampuchea's territory.
5. There will be one and only national army that has to be hammered out in accordance with the above-mentioned great national union policy and the 8-point political programme.

In practical terms, the question of that one and only national army will be discussed on the basis of the above-listed 4-point policy on national defence and the consensus decision-making rule, either within:

- (i)- The present tripartite Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, or
- (ii)- The quadripartite coalition government to be organized according to Point 4 of the CGDK's 8-point peace plan of 17 March 1986, or
- (iii)- The coalition government to be formed after the elections.

The objective is to have all national forces discuss among themselves the problem of that national army, which shall be under the control of the Ministry of National Defence, with only one High Command and one General Staff, and shall have its own rules and regulations. That national army shall be sanctioned by the National Assembly or shall be recognized by the whole Kampuchean people through referendum.

8 March 1987




(Signed): KHIEU SAMPHAN  
President of  
the Democratic Kampuchea party

# VIETNAMESE EXPANSION

from 15th to 20th century



legend

-  champa : 15th-17th century
-  Kampuchea Krom : 17th-20th century
-  Present limits