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Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian and disaster relief assistance of the United Nations, including special economic assistance: special economic assistance to individual countries or regions

Assistance for humanitarian relief and the economic and social rehabilitation of Somalia

Report of the Secretary-General*

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* The delay in the submission of the report was due to developments in the situation in Somalia.



I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 55/168 of 14 December 2000, in which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to take all necessary measures for the implementation of that resolution and to report thereon to the Assembly at its fifty-sixth session. It is a review of the current situation in Somalia, detailing humanitarian and rehabilitation assistance provided by the United Nations and its partners over the past year, and draws attention to priority areas of assistance according to likely developments.

II. Socio-economic situation

2. In Somalia, long-standing political, economic and social systems that sustain both lives and livelihoods have been disrupted and transformed by more than a decade of conflict and recurrent episodes of drought and flooding. In the early 1990s, at the height of the civil war, these factors combined to create a humanitarian crisis of immense proportions. Famine, epidemic outbreaks and direct violence claimed the lives of an estimated 400,000 persons.

3. While the plight of Somalis has not remained so visible since the departure of the United Nations Operation in Somalia in 1995, the country's long history of civil strife and economic stratification has limited the ability of many Somalis to cope with further stress or even to meet their basic human needs. As a result, Somalia faces some of the world's highest rates of mortality, morbidity and malnutrition.

4. On average, Somalis face 17 per cent global and 4 per cent severe malnutrition. The infant mortality rate is 132 per 1,000 live births, while the mortality rate for children under five years of age is 224 per 1,000. The maternal mortality rate is 1,600 per 100,000 live births. Morbidity rates are impossible to quantify given the lack of health infrastructure, but poor Somalis are severely vulnerable to tuberculosis, malaria, measles, cholera and kala azar. The limited access to safe water (some 28 per cent of the population) and primary school education (enrolment of 13.8 per cent of children) are mere indications of the critically low access to basic social services by the majority of the population.

A. Political and security situation

5. There have been a number of important political developments in Somalia during the reporting period. These include: the establishment of the Transitional National Government (TNG) in Mogadishu in October 2000; the formation of the Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council in March 2001 by faction leaders opposed to TNG; the holding of the referendum on the Constitution of the self-declared "Republic of Somaliland" in May 2001; and the ending of the three-year initial Charter for Puntland in July 2001.

6. However, these developments have not yet resulted in any significant transformation of the daily lives of Somalis. The socio-political map in Somalia remains one divided between the relatively stable environments in north-west and north-east Somalia compared to the relative insecurity in the south.

7. Civilian populations still suffer intermittent violence in the southern regions. In April 2001, in the Gedo region, fighting around the town of Bulla Xawa caused the displacement of some 10,000 persons into northern Kenya and the death of some 30 persons. In addition, the southern ports of Kismayo and Merca remain places of ongoing, sporadic conflict between rival political interests. Competition over resources, particularly land and urban infrastructure, continues to underpin violence, including the burning of villages. As a result, access to vulnerable populations in the Juba and Shabelle River Valleys is often restricted.

8. In Mogadishu, TNG has succeeded in winning over two of the five factions opposed to it. Furthermore, it has continued its policy of regularizing militias and purchasing and controlling armed vehicles known as "technicals". It has also established 14 police posts in the city. However, there remain a number of militarily strong factions opposed to TNG in the city. Outbreaks of fighting include the incident in Mogadishu port in May 2001 between militias belonging to Hussein Aideed and those of a prominent businessman, Abdulle Delaf, resulting in 50 deaths and over 150 casualties. Subsequently, during a six-day period over the weekend of 9 July, fighting in north Mogadishu between Abgaal sub-clans, which was followed by clashes between Ayr militia and those belonging to factional leaders Osman Ato and Hussein Aideed, resulted in over 100 deaths and many casualties.

9. The continuing instability in southern Somalia has restricted aid programming. Large areas, including Mogadishu, Lower and Middle Juba, southern Gedo and Lower Shabelle, remain off-limits to regular monitoring and intervention by international agencies. Over the year a number of agencies have withdrawn, including Doctors Without Borders-Belgium in Kismayo, or had operations severely restricted, including World Vision in Buale and Doctors Without Borders-Spain and Action contra la faim (ACF) in Mogadishu, owing to insecurity. The most persistent problem for all agencies in Somalia — north and south — is the settlement of contractual disputes and the frequent use of violence as a last resort.

10. The most dramatic incident affecting aid programmes was the kidnapping of six international United Nations staff and three Doctors Without Borders-Spain staff in Mogadishu in late March. Although all were ultimately released, the initial attack led to the loss of Somali life and destroyed a non-governmental organization (NGO) compound. This attack followed the previous kidnapping in July 2000 of two expatriate staff working for ACF. As a result, there is no longer a permanent expatriate presence in Mogadishu and any significant aid intervention in the city has been curtailed.

11. Many intergovernmental organizations, including the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations, continually call upon all parties within Somalia to resolve political differences by peaceful means. However, until such time that there is sustained reconciliation in Somalia, factional and criminal violence will continue to play havoc with Somali lives and severely restrict access to and the impact of aid programming.

B. Humanitarian issues

12. Over the past year, emergency conditions across Somalia abated significantly, owing to positive environmental conditions and good harvests. However, gains were insufficient to break the seasonal cycle of boom and bust for poor and middle-income households.

13. Today, this vulnerability is being exacerbated by a number of factors: the partial failure of *gu* rains in key food-producing regions of the south; the economic downturn due to the ban on livestock exports in the

north; insecurity and violent conflict; and inflation resulting from injections of new Somali shilling notes. These factors are not expected to produce large-scale, life-threatening conditions over the next six months. However, with persistent mean malnutrition rates of between 15-20 per cent in vulnerable areas and child mortality rates as high as 224 per 1,000, aid agencies will have to continue to provide significant levels of humanitarian aid to prevent the loss of life and the rapid deterioration of livelihood.

14. Following the partial failure of *gu* season rains in southern Somalia, the Bay, Bakol, Gedo and Hiran regions will face severely reduced harvest output for sorghum, the staple crop. The full extent of food insecurity will only become evident during the October-December period. The heaviest burden will be borne by poor agro-pastoralists, who number nearly 400,000 individuals in the above-mentioned regions.

15. Water catchments in these regions are already drying up, although pasture conditions are near the seasonal norm and household food stocks are considered adequate (but decreasing) following last year's good harvests. Lack of water is likely to lead to above-normal stress migration and may increase the prevalence of disease.

16. Food security in southern Somalia may deteriorate rapidly from this initial assessment if any of the following assumptions significantly change: (i) commodity price levels increase; (ii) terms of trade for labour, milk and agricultural produce deteriorate; (iii) transport routes, market access and kinship networks open for trade with surplus-producing areas (e.g. the Juba and Shabelle regions) become restricted.

17. On its own, one season of limited harvest output will not lead to a serious crisis. In this regard, the success of the *deyr* season rains and harvest in late 2001 is the major risk factor to be monitored. In addition to immediate response measures, continued focus on the structural causes of vulnerability is required, including measures to address chronic health factors, ensuring access to basic social services and rebuilding poor household asset bases.

18. In the northern regions, the livestock ban continues to reduce the ability of poor households to procure necessary social services and food commodities. The most vulnerable groups include internally displaced persons and the urban poor (both of which rely on trade-related employment), as well as

poor pastoralist households (which receive fewer remittances and rely on urban employment as a coping mechanism). The effects of the livestock ban have been mitigated by favourable environmental conditions in 2000 and increased remittances from the diaspora.

19. Towards the end of the dry season in April, many pastoralist groups were forced into debt to procure water, while livestock in the coastal areas of Awdal died due to lack of pasture and water. The arrival of the *gu* rainy season alleviated these stresses. However, if the *deyr* season rains are not favourable in the north-east and north-west, domestic production may no longer be an adequate buffer to the shock of economic downturn and widespread food insecurity may emerge. Continuous monitoring is required.

20. Thus far, the annual cholera outbreak has generated fewer than one quarter the number of cases recorded last year. If this trend continues, it will be the mildest outbreak since 1994. Since 1 January, a total of 1,636 cases and 116 deaths have been recorded, leaving an overall case fatality rate of 7.1 per cent. A reported outbreak of new cholera cases in Luuq, in the Gedo region, is currently being investigated. No significant changes in other key diseases, including kala azar, measles and malaria, were reported.

C. Economic issues

21. Vulnerability in Somalia is too commonly attributed to the country's arid natural resource base. While environmental factors are important (in 1997, El Niño rains led to massive flooding, outbreaks of disease and infrastructural damage, while recent poor rains have caused poor harvests), they disguise the key economic factors underpinning the vulnerability of one quarter of the Somali population. These are man-made factors that exist within the natural context of environmental uncertainty.

22. **Asset depletion and destitution.** Political violence has crippled the production capacity of rural households and forced hundreds of thousands of Somalis to flee from their homes. This loss of assets, including land and livestock, has resulted in overwhelming destitution for previously self-sustaining households.

23. **Limited benefits from economic expansion.** Unequal relations of production and high urban unemployment rates have maintained very low returns

to labour, even when the demand for that labour has risen substantially. Unequal terms of trade between capital (in limited supply) and labour (in large supply) mean that private-sector employment for the poor has not yielded anything more than subsistence wages. This does not allow for savings or investment substantial enough for the poor to gain access to new means of production.

24. **Lack of infrastructure and social services.** Following the gradual decline in State investment in social services throughout the 1980s, much of the material, equipment and expertise required to provide and sustain public goods was destroyed and displaced during the civil war. Trade and transportation suffer because of the poor road system as well as insecure conditions along many of the major routes. Despite the best efforts of United Nations agencies, NGOs and donors, public access to aid services is limited by the concentration of projects in urban areas, dwindling agency presence in southern regions and a continually dwindling funding base.

25. **Lack of macroeconomic management.** Large sums of newly printed Somali shillings arriving in Mogadishu have generated rampant inflation. Whereas the shilling has generally remained stable for years, exchanging between So.Sh. 8,000-10,000 per United States dollar, the increased money supply has devalued the currency to over So.Sh. 20,000 per dollar in 2001. Poor and middle-income households that predominantly hold shillings are now unable to purchase imported food items, while the value of any existing savings has decreased by half.

26. **Market dependency and volatility.** Very few, if any, Somali households survive on subsistence production alone. Rather, domestic livestock and agricultural produce are traded for imported foodstuffs and other durable items. Owing to the combination of variable supply of local produce, insecure access to urban market areas and volatile demand from some regional markets (as evidenced by the occasional bans on the export of livestock), Somali producers are vulnerable to extreme fluctuations in their ability to utilize markets to their advantage.

27. **Social support and remittances.** Intra-clan, intra-community and intra-family assistance and resource redistribution have been vital in mitigating the worst effects of recurrent stress and crises. In particular, the Somali diaspora has played a key role by

returning a portion of foreign-earned wages to relatives in Somalia. However, the benefits of the remittance economy accrue primarily to urban, middle-class groups which, because of educational and employment opportunities during the pre-war era, are more likely to have kin living abroad.

III. United Nations assistance in Somalia

28. United Nations agencies work in tandem with over 60 international NGOs and the Red Cross movement, which, with donors, comprise the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB). Over the last 12 months more than \$100 million has been disbursed in aid (some \$50 million through the United Nations system). The United Nations agencies have adopted a four-part humanitarian development strategy to increase access to essential social services and build an enabling environment for peace and reconciliation. The pillars of this strategy are to (i) gain access to vulnerable populations; (ii) secure a safe operating environment; (iii) provide assistance and protection; and (iv) improve coordination, security and support services.

29. However, Somalia remains one of the most difficult operating environments in the world. All United Nations agencies have a permanent presence in Somalia, but since 1995 international aid agencies have been based in Kenya, and as with all cross-border operations, the provision of assistance is extremely expensive and arduous. With such operations there are a number of overarching constraints, including restricted and unpredictable access owing to insecurity; lack of presence of international partners in much of southern and central Somalia; limited or late funding, curtailing prevention and longer-term activities; and community expectations and needs that heavily outweigh the capacity of many agencies.

30. Despite the difficult operating environment of Somalia, United Nations agencies have achieved a number of objectives outlined in the Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Somalia for 2001.

A. Food security and rural development

31. With the improvement of the food security situation in most of Somalia during the latter part of

2000, the World Food Programme (WFP) made a shift in strategy away from emergency food distribution towards more food-for-work and social support. Given the low level of needs over the past nine months, the Programme's food pipeline was reasonably healthy in the first part of 2001. However, with the likelihood of increased vulnerability among populations in many parts of the country, WFP foresees a very significant increase in its distribution requirements during the latter half of the year. Pending a more definitive assessment of the *gu* crop harvest by the Food Security Analysis Unit (FSAU), WFP now estimates a minimum requirement of 20,000 tons (amounting to \$16.4 million) to meet food aid needs to end-June 2002.

32. WFP distributed 15,296 tons of food commodities to an estimated 1.3 million beneficiaries in Somalia from July 2000 to June 2001. Of this, 62 per cent was distributed in the south, 25 per cent in the north-west and 13 per cent in the north-east. Of the total, 12 per cent was utilized for relief activities, 62 per cent for rehabilitation and recovery activities through food-for-work and 26 per cent for support to social institutions like maternal and child health centres, care institutions, tuberculosis treatment centres, pilot school feeding and adult literacy programmes.

33. The combined efforts of the food agencies, including WFP, the Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE) and the International Committee of the Red Cross, contributed to reducing malnutrition rates and stabilizing food market prices. By ensuring timely food intervention and profiting from good harvests, acute food shortages and widespread hunger were averted.

34. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) provided 330 tons of seeds and tools to 16,500 vulnerable farmers, 20,000 vegetable kits and 40,000 hoes so as to increase food production in households headed by females and diversify the crops of vulnerable farming households in rain-fed and irrigated areas. Home gardening support, with nutritional education, is provided to increase vegetable production for domestic consumption and local marketing for female-headed households in the riverine areas and FAO assisted in constructing 35 sluice gates for cultivation and flood prevention work. Another eight sluice gates were completed during the first half of 2001.

35. An emergency response by FAO and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to the floods in the Lower Juba valley resulted in the reconstruction of houses in Arare village. The Juba River embankment was also rehabilitated to close breakages on the east bank between Jamame and Jilib. Seventy-five tons of maize seeds and 35 tons of cowpea seeds were distributed to vulnerable farmers in the Jamame district for planting in the *gu* season.

36. FAO and UNDP collaborated on ways in which the United Nations could support efforts to lift the ban on livestock imports imposed by Gulf States on the Horn of Africa. The joint activities aimed at (i) contributing to increased dialogue about livestock trade between importing and exporting countries; (ii) developing well-regulated longer-term export quality assurances as well as removing the current ban; and (iii) developing the appropriate technical and scientific consensus on ways of reducing disease transmission. One importer, the United Arab Emirates, has lifted the key ban and others are engaged in continuing technical, business and political dialogue.

37. The Food Security and Assessment Unit continued to monitor food insecurity and provide early warning of emergencies. In collaboration with the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and other partners, the Unit has carried out nutritional surveillance and provided training and technical support to partners. A FAO special fund provided input to agricultural activities in the Lower Shabelle, Bay and Hiran regions. These activities were carried out by local NGOs.

B. Health and nutrition

38. UNICEF and the World Health Organization (WHO), in partnership with NGOs, local authorities and communities, vaccinated an estimated 1 million children against polio, while sustaining the provision of essential drugs and basic medical equipment to some 350 health units all over Somalia. Medical supplies, including equipment and drugs, were provided sufficiently by UNICEF to support the work of all actors in the primary health-care sector throughout Somalia. These include malaria and cholera kits and supplies for the expanded programme on immunization to enable the work of mother and child health facilities, health posts, traditional birth attendants and community health workers. More than 15,000

individuals benefited from the Fund's supplementary feeding programmes in central and southern Somalia.

39. A standardized health information system, which had been lacking in Somalia, was finally initiated through the efforts of WHO, UNICEF, FSAU and other SACB partners in all 18 regions of the country. In addition, a rapid outbreak detection network system for cholera, meningitis, measles, bloody diarrhoea and other diseases was established in all regions. The system allows for comparison of data and thus serves as a useful tool for emergency response and monitoring health trends. Outbreak surveillance for epidemic diseases was carried out nationwide, with cholera control activities implemented in Puntland and southern and central Somalia. Furthermore, as part of emergency preparedness, WHO trained 55 technicians in laboratory support and 93 health workers to build local capacities for outbreak crisis-response.

40. Capacity-building in health services management was provided to local authorities and communities through training programmes and workshops across Somalia. Specifically, UNICEF supported five regional health planning workshops and the training of five regional health boards under the decentralization of health management structures in Somaliland. WHO continued to promote increased awareness of mental health issues and provided psychiatric drugs and training to relevant partners.

41. As part of a special global initiative, Somalia has been one of only five countries around the world to be selected for support from the global drug fund in the tuberculosis programme. WHO supported the establishment of an additional five tuberculosis centres in Somalia. New initiatives were aimed at improving the functional integration of existing health sector interventions with other, cross-sectoral initiatives. These included the rehabilitation of and provision of better sanitation facilities to the Bossaso mother and child care centre, which serves as a women's centre providing health education and services.

42. In collaboration with the SACB Nutrition Working Group, FAO and UNESCO developed nutrition education materials for community members and field workers, held pilot nutrition training for teachers and prepared a teachers' guide on nutrition in primary schools.

C. Water and sanitation

43. UNICEF, in partnership with NGOs, local authorities and communities, rehabilitated urban water systems, rural boreholes and hand-dug wells. A total of four urban and semi-urban water systems were rehabilitated or constructed in Somalia. A number of boreholes and mini-water systems were rehabilitated, nine in the north-west, 11 in the north-east and 33 in south and central Somalia. One hundred and twenty-three wells with hand-pumps were dug in south and central Somalia, another 40 were dug in the north and 20 were dug in both Puntland and Somaliland. This improved the accessibility of clean water for about 500,000 people over the course of the year.

44. In south and central Somalia, the priority was to restore and upgrade water facilities in the rural areas. In this respect, cost-sharing for rehabilitation activities was initiated, resulting in the success of the project. In the northern regions of Puntland and Somaliland, the focus was on upgrading and building new water systems for urban and major towns in collaboration with line ministries.

45. UNICEF provided supplies to combat outbreaks of disease and improved the supply of safe water to urban settlements by establishing chlorination systems. Other sanitation activities included construction of latrines and hand-washing facilities for schools. Capacity-building activities have been undertaken, in particular, on the development of strategy and policy framework with local authorities.

46. FAO, in collaboration with UNDP, has established a water information management system to improve data collection and the analysis of water resources, particularly in drought and flood-prone areas.

D. Education

47. UNICEF and UNESCO, in partnership with NGOs, local authorities and communities, increased gross enrolment in primary schools by 34 per cent in the past one and a half years, including an increase in school attendance of 35 per cent for girls. Moreover, 50 new schools were constructed in hard-to-reach areas, community education committees were established in 800 schools and in-service training was provided to new teachers. The establishment of improved sports

and recreation activities and facilities was also supported.

48. Thirteen syllabi for skill-grades 2 and 3 were developed in the areas of carpentry, garment-making, masonry, metal fabrication, electrical installation, agriculture and entrepreneurship. Reference materials and textbooks were provided. These services have also been extended to support peace and reconciliation initiatives through the initiation of basic and vocational education for demobilization of youth militia.

E. Human rights and gender

49. Work undertaken by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), UNICEF, UNDP and the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), in partnership with local and international partners, included mainstreaming of human rights and gender issues into all United Nations programmes. The results included common guidelines and joint initiatives in advocacy on such issues as female genital mutilation, judicial and police training and legal development. Specifically, UNICEF, with assistance from UNIFEM, continued to work with religious, educational and advocacy leaders in promoting the eradication of female genital mutilation. UNICEF and UNIFEM have also been involved in promoting women's participation in civil governance and self-help groups.

50. In order to strengthen the capacities of women as peace-builders, UNIFEM developed with the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) a gender disaggregated database on demobilization and reintegration for former militias and their dependants in north-west Somalia. UNIFEM also undertook a preliminary study on the role of women in demobilization efforts in Mogadishu, providing the basis for a gender mainstreamed demobilization programme. Additionally, United Nations agencies have promoted the role of women in facilitating inter-clan dialogue under the culture of peace programme. UNICEF and UNIFEM advocated for women's rights and the elimination of all forms of discrimination through campaigns during International Women's Day and other activities. Furthermore, UNIFEM has been active in facilitating inter-clan dialogue among women to promote reconciliation, particularly in the Jowhar, Lower Shabelle and Bay regions.

F. Repatriation and reintegration

51. UNHCR continued its support for the voluntary repatriation and initial reintegration of Somali returnees during 2000 and 2001 in line with its policy regarding voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees developed at the end of 1999. A total of 51,481 refugees from Ethiopia (50,340), Djibouti (886) and Yemen (255) benefited from UNHCR assistance to return to their areas of origin during the reporting period. Most of them have settled in north-western and north-eastern regions, with the remainder opting to settle in Mogadishu.

52. One of the main activities undertaken by UNHCR, in collaboration with the authorities, was to monitor the settlement of returnees and to ensure that their rights were not violated. In this context, UNHCR carried out a total of 129 community-based Quick Impact Projects in areas where the returnees were settled, in a number of different sectors, including water and sanitation, health, education and food security. These projects, apart from meeting the basic needs of the communities and increasing the capacity of those areas to receive more returnees, have played a role in fostering reconciliation between the returnees and host communities.

53. A UNHCR and UNDP joint initiative was finalized and implementation of the programme began in July 2001. The programme covers four districts, including Hargeisa, Burao, Garowe and Bossaso. The experience gained from the implementation of this project will guide similar approaches to the implementation of reintegration programmes in other regions in Somalia.

G. Development programmes

54. The Somali Civil Protection Programme (SCPP) continued to expand its activities across Somalia. Two hundred and fifty policemen completed training at the Mandera Police Training Centre. Another 350 policemen are currently participating in the training. The rehabilitation of the Centre commenced in mid-June. Another 3,000 former militiamen are currently being trained at the Lafole Training Centre, the Somali Asphalt Centre and at the ex-police transport compound in Mogadishu.

55. SCPP national experts travelled extensively in all districts of Somalia, meeting with local authorities and communities to raise awareness about the community policing approach. This resulted in the creation of six regional and 15 local centres and in the communities' actively participating in community policing. The rehabilitation of various structures in Somaliland is in progress. These include the three courts in Hargeisa, the courts in Gabiley and Boroma, the Hargeisa, Boroma and Gabiley prisons and a training hall for the judiciary system.

56. Nine workshops have been held in Mogadishu in 2001. The workshop participants included armed militia, intellectuals, religious and traditional leaders and parliamentarians. As a result, a general conference on demobilization was developed, the aim being to obtain policy and strategy recommendations.

57. The Somali Mine Action Center (SMAC) and Information Management System for Mine Action were established through assistance for the SCPP programme. Training in demining supervision, data management, logistics and financial management was provided to 20 staff members of SMAC. In the north-east, the Puntland Mine Action Center was established.

58. Trade is the mainstay for the Somali people. Owing to the lack of funding, the development of seaports and trade was scaled down to a minimum. UNCTAD continued its support to the private sector by expanding training activities and providing assistance for marketing. Critically needed equipment was provided and information technology was upgraded.

59. A pilot radio project was initiated in the beginning of 2001. A series of audio programmes were produced and re-broadcast throughout Somalia. Radio programmes are a means of communicating with the Somali people on the activities and views of various United Nations bodies and the Somali diaspora. In return, the Somali people also get a chance to voice their concerns. Some areas of Somalia have not benefited from this service owing to insecurity.

60. UNDP launched three new projects over the past year to support good governance, economic growth in favour of the poor and the reintegration of refugees, returnees and internally displaced persons. With the funding received thus far, implementation of the programmes across the country is now ready to begin.

H. Coordination and security

61. The United Nations coordination unit maintained the proactive preparation and response mechanisms in the Humanitarian Analysis/Humanitarian Response Group. The unit, in close collaboration with SACB, also provided support to agencies on formulating strategies for working in Somalia. Coordination at the field level has been greatly improved by the placement of dedicated field coordination officers and through the regular holding of inter-agency meetings and strategy sessions. Furthermore, the unit has promoted the wider use of humanitarian principles and operational guidelines in engagement with local authorities in Somalia.

62. The United Nations security establishment has met the minimum operating security standards for Somalia and United Nations staff security has been enhanced to minimum levels through the cost-shared security system and also received much needed equipment from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

IV. Assistance provided by Member States

63. Accomplishing the tasks described above is only possible with adequate financial and material resources. To support their humanitarian, recovery and development activities, United Nations agencies launched the Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for 2001.

64. To date, only \$20,727,179, or 16 per cent, of the funding requested in the appeal for 2001 has been provided by the States Members of the United Nations. Without further assistance, it will be impossible to extend the United Nations presence in Somalia and provide emergency assistance to populations in need.

V. Observations

65. The combined effects of a decade of continuing conflict at varying levels, climatic change and economic disinvestment have made Somalia one of the poorest places on Earth. On average, Somalis live off less than half a dollar a day and have an average life expectancy of 45 years of age. As environmental conditions deteriorate once again, with the prospects

for increasing vulnerability and malnutrition ever likely towards the end of 2001 and the beginning of 2002, increased international support is even more important.

66. However, few vulnerable Somalis are able to rebuild their livelihoods in a sustainable manner. One of the long-term socio-economic effects of the war in Somalia has been to entrench differential access to the country's productive resource base. The expansion of the private sector has benefited from available resources. However, groups that have become dispossessed have not benefited from concomitant returns. Poverty is sustained by Somalia's history of economic stratification, devastated household asset bases, lack of basic social services and the progressive alienation of producers from the country's productive resource base. Until such underlying factors are addressed, longer-term development efforts will be compromised. From this analysis, there are a number of observations which can be made about the current situation in Somalia.

67. Further steps need to be taken to assist in the building of a sustainable peace in Somalia. Such a transition should include a robust framework which addresses many of the issues arising from the Somali conflict. In particular, these issues include the nature of governance and political structures in Somalia, the forced appropriation of land and property and past human rights atrocities.

68. Such efforts by national actors, supported by international actors, must encompass the promotion and protection of human rights, with special attention to restoring social and economic rights through the rehabilitation of basic social services and infrastructure. This should be undertaken with particular attention to marginalized and vulnerable communities which are continually prone to the exigencies of economic and climatic shocks, resulting in a continuing cycle of humanitarian emergency.

69. While social breakdown and upheaval has had a negative impact upon women, particularly with an increase in violence and destitution, it has also transformed gender relations. Women are more and more at the forefront of domestic, economic and political decision-making. Such forces, along with an increase in the role of civil society and the media, must be supported by external actors.

70. Given the political fragility of Somalia, all efforts by the international community will be continued to

ensure a synchronized political and aid approach allowing for humanitarian access and neutrality. Such an incremental approach of increased engagement according to the appropriate conditions, without exacerbating internal conflict, remains the core of the aid programme for Somalia.
