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ASSESSING REGIONAL TRADING ARRANGEMENTS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC

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ABSTRACT

Using both a gravity model to consider the natural trading bloc hypothesis, and simulation using a CGE model to make welfare estimates, we examine the potential effect of a subset of the new RTA proposal in the APEC region. In broad terms the two approaches appear consistent in their ability to identify RTAs that are beneficial in terms of the welfare of the proposed members. However, comparison of the two alternative approaches does not lead to support for the hypothesis that natural blocs are less likely to be damaging to those economies that remain on the outside of the new proposals.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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I.   INTRODUCTION

In the early 1990s when the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Process (APEC) was gathering momentum and the outcome of the Uruguay Round was uncertain the countries in the Asia Pacific held steadfastly to the most favoured nation principle. As a group, they intentionally avoided discussions and expansion of the existing regional trading agreements (RTA) in the region (Bora and Findlay, 1996). Since then, it appears that the enthusiasm with the ideals of the APEC has recently appeared to give way to disillusionment with the lack of progress towards achieving the ambitious objectives that were set out in Bogor. By early 2000, more than twenty regional trading arrangements (RTAs) have been proposed amongst various APEC members, and the list continues to grow. Some, such as the free-trade arrangement between New Zealand and Singapore, have already been enacted. Important research questions arise from these developments. First, there is a need for quantitative research to examine the potential effects of the proposals. Second, there is a need to understand how the new proposals might help or hinder the achievement of APEC's ultimate objectives. This paper makes a contribution to the former.

There are two basic approaches to the empirical assessment of RTAs. The first, known as the "gravity model" approach, uses a cross-section of bilateral trade data and attempts to estimate a 'normal' trade pattern. If order can be found in the deviations from that pattern, this technique can provide useful information on trade effects of RTAs (in particular if the cross sections are available for several time periods). Because this approach requires the application of statistical techniques to existing data, it is usually used ex-post – to confirm the presence of trade creation/diversion after agreements are put in place. Frankel (1997) is a comprehensive study using this technique.

For situations where analysis prior to the fact is required, the most common technique in recent years has been simulation with a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. This approach is quite different. It takes cross-sectional data from a single base period, not only for trade but also production, and consumption, and imposes a detailed theoretical structure on the interactions between different data elements. These take the form of equilibrium constraints, and assumptions on economic behavior. The models are put to use by imposing changes in the underlying data (in the case of RTAs, removing tariffs between member economies), and observing how the remaining variables adjust. Many studies of this type in the APEC context are surveyed in Scollay and Gilbert (2000).

Although quite different, both techniques can offer insights into areas where the other is commonly used. Hence, CGE models can be used to consider the effect of existing arrangements through backcasting the model, or by using a past equilibrium and projecting forward in the absence of policy changes to try and capture what the economy in question might have looked like without intervention. Similarly, gravity models are often used to try and predict the outcome of proposed agreements by searching for pre-existing trends that might be interpreted as indicating "natural" blocs. The objective of this paper is to see to what extent the predictions from these two disparate techniques can be correlated in the context of the new Asia-Pacific proposals. The

objective is not to advance any of these proposals.

The paper is organized as follows. Section II outlines the methods used in the gravity model simulations. Section III uses the model to assess the current state of regional trading arrangements, in particular APEC sub-regional groups. This section is intended partially as a form of benchmarking, and we discuss the evidence provided by this approach in terms of the traditional features of RTAs: trade creation, trade diversion and the debate over regionalism as path towards global free trade. Section IV uses the model to analyze a subset of new proposals, in an attempt to see whether any conform to the 'natural bloc' criteria. We then contrast these results with those obtained by examining the same proposed blocs in a general equilibrium framework. Concluding comments follow in section V.

II. METHODOLOGY

To analyze the effect of regional trading arrangements in the Asia-Pacific context, the gravity model approach of normalizing bilateral trade patterns and testing for discernable deviations from the estimated norm is adopted. The gravity model postulates that bilateral trade flows are proportional to the product of the size of the two economies, and inversely related to the distance between them. This is a model that is broadly compatible with a wide variety of underlying theoretical models (in particular those emphasizing imperfect competition – see the discussion in Frankel, 1997), and that lends itself easily to empirical verification. The basic applied model estimates the bilateral trade flows as a function of the products of the bilateral GDPs (as a measure of size), and distance (both in log form). Letting i and j index the economies in the model we have:

term can be thought of as capturing the importance of wealth (as opposed to size) as a determinant of trade, the latter can be thought of as capturing the importance of differences between economies (as emphasized in the Heckscher-Ohlin type models). By virtue of the double-logarithmic specification of the estimated function, the parameter estimates on the income and distance variables (the β_k) can be interpreted as elasticities. Hence, β_1 represents, for example, the estimated proportional change in T_{ij} induced by a 1 per cent change in $GDP_i GDP_j$.

$$\ln(T_{ij}) = \alpha + \beta_1 \ln(GDP_i GDP_j) + \beta_2 \ln(DIST_{ij}) + u_{ij} \qquad \forall \quad i < j \qquad (1)$$

where T_{ij} is the total trade between economies i and j, $DIST_{ij}$ is the distance measure, and u_{ij} is the error term. Most applications expand the basic model to provide further explanatory variables. The model that is utilized in this paper is of the following well-established form (see Frankel, 1997; Freund, 2000):

The remaining variables are dummies designed to capture the influence of other factors on trade flows. ADJ_{ij} represents the existence of a common border, and RTA_{ij} the existence of a regional trading arrangement (being one if both countries i and j are members of the RTA in question). $OPEN_{ij}$ is designed to capture the degree of openness of RTA members (being one if country i or country j is a member of the RTA in question), and can be thought of as way of isolating the effect of the RTA.[1] Note that a separate RTA and $OPEN$ dummy for each

$$\ln(T_{ij}) = \alpha + \beta_1 \ln(GDP_i GDP_j) + \beta_2 \ln(DIST_{ij}) + \beta_3 \ln(PC_i PC_j) + \beta_4 \ln(|PC_i - PC_j|)$$
$$+ \gamma_1 ADJ_{ij} + \gamma_2 RTA_{ij} + \gamma_3 OPEN_{ij} + u_{ij} \qquad \forall \quad i < j \qquad (2)$$

where PC_i is per-capita GDP. Note that PC_i enters the equation in two forms, as the product of bilateral per capita GDPs, and as the absolute value of the difference. The former

group under consideration is utilized, and hence RTA and $OPEN$ can be thought of as vectors of dummy variables representing each of the individual RTAs. Because the dummy variables

clearly cannot be expressed in log form, the parameter estimates (γ_k) are interpreted differently. Hence, for example, $\exp(\gamma_1) - 1$ is the proportional increase (decrease) in trade associated with having a common border. The RTA parameters can be interpreted similarly, hence $\exp(\gamma_2) - 1$ is the proportional increase (decrease) in the propensity to trade of the RTA members, relative to otherwise similarly sized and located economies in the model.

The trade data comes from the Economic Research Service (ERS) time-series data in the GTAP Version 5 database (pre-release version 3). The distance data is from the World Distance Tables (Hengeveld, 1996), and represents the direct air distance between economies. GDP and per-capita GDP data is from the World Bank World Development indicators database (2000), and is measured in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms. Using data in PPP terms allows for the avoidance of having arbitrary temporary movements in exchange rates exert undue influence over the results. However, it should be noted that obtaining accurate PPP measures is difficult, which could be an additional source of disturbance in the model. There are a total of 38 economies in the dataset, and hence 703 potential observations in each annual period, split by agricultural and manufactures trade (missing values are dealt with simply by dropping the observation from the regression). There is also a total of 15 periods, from 1984 to 1998 (with services trade data for only one year, 1997).

The model is estimated at selected annual cross-sections, and also using the complete pooled dataset. Using the individual cross-sections allows a chance to observe changes in the structure of world trade over time. Using the pooled dataset also allows to better estimate the influence of existing or potential RTAs where there are limited observations in the cross-sections (for example, CER). The model is estimated not only on the total merchandise trade, but also the individual agricultural and manufactured trade datasets, enabling the identification of the existence of broad-based sectoral differences in trade patterns.

It is common to estimate a gravity model using ordinary least squares (OLS), which will produce unbiased and consistent estimates of the model parameters. However, this dataset exhibits evidence of heteroskedastic errors, as is frequently the case with cross-sectional data. In this situation the efficiency of the parameter estimates can be improved through the application of generalized least squares (GLS). Since the increased error is strongly related to economic size (presumably reflecting measurement errors), the approach of weighting each observation by the inverse of the squared bilateral products of GDP is taken. In the pooled dataset with both cross-sectional and time-series elements, the additional potential problem of autocorrelation is encountered. This is dealt through the covariance method, specifying an additional annual dummy variable for all years but the first. This technique can also be interpreted as controlling for the growth and inflation in the world economy (see Bikker, 1987).

III.   ASSESSING CURRENT ARRANGEMENTS

In the initial evaluation of the economic effects of currently existing regional trading arrangements, seven regional agreements at varying degrees of development were included. Three of these, the European Union (EU), MERCOSUR (MER) and the Andean Community (AN) are groups composed of economies entirely outside of the area of primary interest (the Asia-Pacific). Their presence in the modeling is primarily to avoid distorting results by accounting for potentially influential RTAs as a determinant of global trade patterns. The estimated effects of these agreements also provide a base by which to analyze the effect of the intra-APEC groups that are the focus of this research. In particular, the European Union, as the deepest and oldest example of regional trading arrangements, provides a convenient baseline by which to evaluate the effect of other arrangements.

Of the remaining four groups, three are blocs consisting entirely of a subset of APEC members. These are NAFTA (Canada, Mexico and the United States), AFTA (in the dataset identified as Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand), and CER (Australia and New Zealand). The final group is APEC itself.

The results of the first set of simulations, run on selected annual cross-sections (contained in tables 1 through 3). In table 1 – results for total merchandise trade, the first column under each annual cross-section is the estimated relationship without the OPEN variables in place. The second column fits the model with both the RTA and OPEN variables. The first point to note is that, as in other studies, the gravity model does a very good job at explaining trade patterns, with adjusted R^2

measures between 0.76 and 0.86 in all of the simulations.

The basic gravity model variables (GDP, GDPPC, and DIST) are all highly significant in most years, and take the signs expected. Trade increases with income, but at a decreasing rate (the parameter on GDP ranges between 0.73 and 0.86). This is consistent with other studies. The same pattern holds with GDPPC (ranging from 0.81 to 1.07). The negative sign on the distance parameter indicate that trade diminishes as distance increases, as expected (the elasticity estimates are between –0.62 and –0.83). Again, the magnitude of the estimates is consistent with other studies. The difference in GDPPC is the only variable that does not seem to have a strong explanatory role in the model. It is significant in only 1986, and in all cases is small. Hence, little support is found for the hypothesis that differences in the absolute value of income are a significant explanatory factor in overall bilateral trade patterns between 1986 and 1998.

The adjacency variable is significant in each year and has the expected positive effect on trade. The estimated effects are quite substantial. Sharing a common border is estimated to increase trade by between 43 and 81 per cent (exp(0.36)-1 and exp(0.61)-1), again consistent with the existing literature. The estimated coefficients on all of these variables remain similar in terms of both magnitude and significance when the gravity model on manufactures (table 2) and agricultural (table 3) trade is estimated separately. Although it is noted that the fit is not as strong in the case of agriculture as it is in the case of manufactures and total merchandise trade (the adjusted R^2 ranges between 0.52 and 0.63).

Table 1. Estimated Gravity Equations – Total Merchandise Trade 1986 to 1998
(3-yearly intervals)

	1986		1989		1992		1995		1998	
(Intercept)	-21.04 ***	-27.82 ***	-22.24 ***	-27.26 ***	-22.63 ***	-27.93 ***	-23.34 ***	-28.04 ***	-22.93 ***	-26.59 ***
	(1.16)	(1.30)	(1.12)	(1.22)	(1.07)	(1.15)	(1.23)	(1.29)	(1.09)	(1.17)
GDP	0.74 ***	0.84 ***	0.73 ***	0.80 ***	0.73 ***	0.80 ***	0.77 ***	0.83 ***	0.80 ***	0.86 ***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
GDPPC	0.81 ***	1.01 ***	0.88 ***	1.03 ***	0.91 ***	1.07 ***	0.91 ***	1.06 ***	0.84 ***	0.94 ***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
DIFF	0.09 **	0.08 *	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.03	-0.01	0.00	0.02	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
DIST	-0.76 ***	-0.62 ***	-0.72 ***	-0.62 ***	-0.77 ***	-0.69 ***	-0.78 ***	-0.71 ***	-0.83 ***	-0.79 ***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
ADJ	0.48 *	0.61 **	0.46 *	0.57 **	0.52 **	0.60 ***	0.48 *	0.57 **	0.36 *	0.43 **
	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.16)
EU	0.10	-0.04	0.10	-0.01	0.02	-0.05	-0.20	-0.24 .	-0.01	-0.07
	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.12)
NAFTA	-1.01	-0.77	-0.98	-0.64	-0.84	-0.48	-0.72	-0.32	-0.54	-0.12
	(0.68)	(0.62)	(0.64)	(0.58)	(0.59)	(0.53)	(0.63)	(0.57)	(0.55)	(0.49)
AFTA	1.11 ***	0.89 **	1.07 ***	0.73 **	0.73 **	0.36	0.83 **	0.36	1.03 ***	0.65 **
	(0.32)	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.26)	(0.30)	(0.28)	(0.26)	(0.24)
CER	0.42	0.58	0.51	0.70	0.52	0.90	0.47	0.86	0.57	0.82
	(0.96)	(0.88)	(0.91)	(0.83)	(0.84)	(0.75)	(0.90)	(0.81)	(0.78)	(0.69)
MERCOSUR	-0.34	-0.24	0.01	-0.03	0.66	0.74	0.98	0.87	1.33	1.30
	(1.09)	(1.00)	(1.03)	(0.93)	(0.94)	(0.85)	(1.01)	(0.91)	(0.88)	(0.78)
ANDEAN	0.57	1.22 *	0.69	1.38 **	1.81 ***	2.32 ***	1.76 **	2.37 ***	1.80 ***	2.44 ***
	(0.57)	(0.53)	(0.54)	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.45)	(0.54)	(0.48)	(0.46)	(0.42)
APEC	1.01 ***	1.10 ***	1.11 ***	1.12 ***	1.08 ***	1.11 ***	1.13 ***	1.10 ***	1.05 ***	1.12 ***
	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.11)
EUO		0.00		-0.07		-0.10		-0.09		0.08
		(0.11)		(0.10)		(0.09)		(0.10)		(0.09)
NAFTAO		-1.14 ***		-0.97 ***		-0.85 ***		-0.82 ***		-0.67 ***
		(0.13)		(0.12)		(0.11)		(0.11)		(0.10)
AFTAO		0.41 ***		0.48 ***		0.58 ***		0.61 ***		0.61 ***
		(0.10)		(0.10)		(0.09)		(0.09)		(0.08)
CERO		-0.63 ***		-0.48 ***		-0.53 ***		-0.57 ***		-0.22 *
		(0.14)		(0.13)		(0.12)		(0.13)		(0.11)
MERCOSURO		-0.33 *		-0.16		-0.21		0.04		0.03
		(0.14)		(0.13)		(0.12)		(0.13)		(0.11)
ANDEANO		-0.45 ***		-0.55 ***		-0.18		-0.38 ***		-0.33 ***
		(0.11)		(0.11)		(0.10)		(0.11)		(0.10)
APECO		0.22 *		0.13		0.01		0.10		-0.02
		(0.10)		(0.10)		(0.09)		(0.09)		(0.08)
Observations	696	696	701	701	703	703	703	703	702	702
Adjusted R^2	0.76	0.80	0.78	0.82	0.81	0.85	0.78	0.82	0.83	0.86

Standard deviations in parentheses.
*** Significant at greater than 1% level,   ** Significant at 1% level,   * Significant at 5% level.

Table 2. Estimated Gravity Equations – Manufactures Trade 1986 to 1998
(3-yearly intervals)

	1986		1989		1992		1995		1998	
(Intercept)	-21.76 ***	-28.88 ***	-22.29 ***	-27.68 ***	-22.89 ***	-28.61 ***	-23.50 ***	-28.22 ***	-23.20 ***	-27.05 ***
	(1.29)	(1.45)	(1.19)	(1.30)	(1.12)	(1.18)	(1.22)	(1.27)	(1.12)	(1.19)
GDP	0.75 ***	0.85 ***	0.73 ***	0.80 ***	0.74 ***	0.81 ***	0.78 ***	0.84 ***	0.81 ***	0.87 ***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
GDPPC	0.85 ***	1.05 ***	0.89 ***	1.06 ***	0.92 ***	1.09 ***	0.91 ***	1.05 ***	0.86 ***	0.95 ***
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
DIFF	0.10 **	0.08 *	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.02	-0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
DIST	-0.82 ***	-0.64 ***	-0.78 ***	-0.64 ***	-0.78 ***	-0.68 ***	-0.80 ***	-0.71 ***	-0.84 ***	-0.78 ***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
ADJ	0.41	0.60 **	0.41	0.56 **	0.51 *	0.62 ***	0.45 *	0.58 **	0.36	0.46 **
	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.17)
EU	0.12	-0.04	0.07	-0.05	0.03	-0.05	-0.23	-0.27 *	-0.01	-0.06
	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.12)
NAFTA	-0.98	-0.81	-0.99	-0.70	-0.88	-0.51	-0.75	-0.34	-0.56	-0.13
	(0.75)	(0.69)	(0.68)	(0.62)	(0.61)	(0.54)	(0.63)	(0.56)	(0.56)	(0.50)
AFTA	1.36 ***	1.16 ***	0.86 **	0.54	0.75 *	0.35	0.84 **	0.38	1.06 ***	0.66 **
	(0.37)	(0.35)	(0.32)	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.26)	(0.30)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.24)
CER	0.44	0.70	0.46	0.80	0.49	0.99	0.48	0.93	0.57	0.88
	(1.07)	(0.99)	(0.97)	(0.88)	(0.87)	(0.77)	(0.90)	(0.80)	(0.80)	(0.71)
MERCOSUR	-0.51	-0.27	-0.14	-0.13	0.50	0.67	0.85	0.82	1.27	1.30
	(1.21)	(1.11)	(1.09)	(0.99)	(0.98)	(0.87)	(1.01)	(0.89)	(0.90)	(0.80)
ANDEAN	0.79	1.46 *	0.75	1.46 **	1.88 ***	2.43 ***	1.81 ***	2.46 ***	1.86 ***	2.54 ***
	(0.63)	(0.59)	(0.57)	(0.52)	(0.51)	(0.46)	(0.53)	(0.48)	(0.48)	(0.42)
APEC	1.00 ***	1.18 ***	1.13 ***	1.20 ***	1.12 ***	1.18 ***	1.13 ***	1.15 ***	1.06 ***	1.13 ***
	(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.11)
EUO		0.03		-0.09		-0.06		-0.07		0.09
		(0.12)		(0.11)		(0.10)		(0.10)		(0.09)
NAFTAO		-1.19 ***		-0.96 ***		-0.87 ***		-0.85 ***		-0.69 ***
		(0.15)		(0.13)		(0.11)		(0.11)		(0.10)
AFTAO		0.31 **		0.47 ***		0.65 ***		0.60 ***		0.64 ***
		(0.12)		(0.10)		(0.09)		(0.09)		(0.08)
CERO		-0.81 ***		-0.67 ***		-0.63 ***		-0.63 ***		-0.28 *
		(0.16)		(0.14)		(0.12)		(0.12)		(0.11)
MERCOSURO		-0.53 ***		-0.27		-0.28 *		-0.09		-0.06
		(0.16)		(0.14)		(0.12)		(0.13)		(0.11)
ANDEANO		-0.51 ***		-0.59 ***		-0.17		-0.45 ***		-0.39 ***
		(0.13)		(0.12)		(0.10)		(0.11)		(0.10)
APECO		0.20		0.06		0.00		0.05		-0.01
		(0.12)		(0.10)		(0.09)		(0.09)		(0.08)
Observations	690	690	698	698	702	702	701	701	702	702
Adjusted R^2	0.73	0.77	0.77	0.81	0.81	0.85	0.78	0.83	0.82	0.86

Standard deviations in parentheses.
*** Significant at greater than 1% level, ** Significant at 1% level, * Significant at 5% level.

Table 3. Estimated Gravity Equations – Agricultural Trade 1986 to 1998
(3-yearly intervals)

	1986		1989		1992		1995		1998	
(Intercept)	-17.10 ***	-21.28 ***	-19.56 ***	-22.81 ***	-17.70 ***	-18.69 ***	-18.47 ***	-18.19 ***	-18.91 ***	-18.52 ***
	(1.47)	(1.72)	(1.42)	(1.62)	(1.72)	(1.96)	(1.73)	(1.95)	(1.75)	(1.97)
GDP	0.64 ***	0.75 ***	0.66 ***	0.75 ***	0.64 ***	0.71 ***	0.68 ***	0.71 ***	0.70 ***	0.76 ***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
GDPPC	0.45 ***	0.57 ***	0.50 ***	0.59 ***	0.46 ***	0.49 ***	0.44 ***	0.45 ***	0.40 ***	0.39 ***
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)
DIFF	0.07	0.08	0.13 **	0.15 ***	0.07	0.09	0.11 *	0.12 **	0.14 **	0.13 **
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
DIST	-0.45 ***	-0.60 ***	-0.43 ***	-0.56 ***	-0.55 ***	-0.76 ***	-0.58 ***	-0.78 ***	-0.57 ***	-0.84 ***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
ADJ	0.72 **	0.50	0.67 **	0.49 *	0.76 *	0.38	0.75 **	0.42	0.89 **	0.44
	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.27)
EU	0.07	0.05	0.25	0.22	0.45 *	0.47 *	0.58 **	0.59 **	0.69 **	0.68 ***
	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.20)
NAFTA	-0.56	-0.12	-0.58	-0.12	0.15	0.44	0.26	0.47	0.41	0.71
	(0.84)	(0.80)	(0.79)	(0.76)	(0.89)	(0.86)	(0.85)	(0.82)	(0.84)	(0.80)
AFTA	0.85 *	0.52	1.08 **	0.74 *	0.26	0.25	0.19	0.07	0.19	0.17
	(0.39)	(0.38)	(0.38)	(0.36)	(0.45)	(0.44)	(0.43)	(0.42)	(0.43)	(0.41)
CER	1.04	0.76	1.18	0.72	1.29	0.47	1.31	0.71	1.56	0.76
	(1.19)	(1.14)	(1.13)	(1.07)	(1.26)	(1.22)	(1.21)	(1.17)	(1.20)	(1.14)
MERCOSUR	1.01	0.75	1.26	0.95	2.44	2.07	2.52	1.88	2.42	1.86
	(1.34)	(1.29)	(1.27)	(1.21)	(1.42)	(1.37)	(1.35)	(1.32)	(1.35)	(1.29)
ANDEAN	-0.93	-0.62	0.04	0.57	0.38	0.57	0.06	0.16	0.17	0.13
	(0.70)	(0.68)	(0.67)	(0.64)	(0.92)	(0.90)	(0.72)	(0.71)	(0.72)	(0.69)
APEC	1.11 ***	1.05 ***	1.26 ***	1.12 ***	1.12 ***	1.00 ***	1.06 ***	1.02 ***	0.96 ***	1.00 ***
	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.13)	(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.22)	(0.14)	(0.20)	(0.14)	(0.20)
EUO		0.19		0.20		0.17		0.17		0.32 *
		(0.15)		(0.14)		(0.16)		(0.16)		(0.15)
NAFTAO		-0.60 ***		-0.72 ***		-0.33 .		-0.08		0.03
		(0.17)		(0.16)		(0.18)		(0.17)		(0.16)
AFTAO		0.84 ***		0.58 ***		0.06		0.14		0.23
		(0.14)		(0.13)		(0.16)		(0.15)		(0.15)
CERO		0.45 *		0.50 **		0.87 ***		0.64 ***		1.08 ***
		(0.19)		(0.18)		(0.20)		(0.19)		(0.19)
MERCOSURO		0.64 ***		0.70 ***		0.91 ***		1.18 ***		1.29 ***
		(0.19)		(0.17)		(0.20)		(0.19)		(0.19)
ANDEANO		0.37 *		-0.02		0.58 **		0.31		0.69 ***
		(0.16)		(0.15)		(0.20)		(0.17)		(0.17)
APECO		0.22		0.44 ***		0.42 **		0.30 *		0.18
		(0.14)		(0.13)		(0.16)		(0.15)		(0.14)
Observations	650	650	666	666	628	628	641	641	639	639
Adjusted R^2	0.53	0.57	0.58	0.63	0.52	0.56	0.55	0.58	0.56	0.61

Standard deviations in parentheses.
*** Significant at greater than 1% level,   ** Significant at 1% level,   * Significant at 5% level.

A. Trade creating effects of RTAs

An attempt can be made to ascertain the effect of RTAs in promoting intra-regional trade by examining the estimated coefficients on the RTA dummy variables. The effects of the non-APEC related RTAs are considered first. For the European Union, no evidence is found of a significant effect on total merchandise trade, in any of the years considered. Only one marginally significant effect is found when manufactures trade is separated-out (in 1995) and this is negative. In agricultural trade, however, significant positive effect on trade post-1992 is observed (e.g. after the completion of the common market). Agricultural trade between European Union members ranges between 57 and 99 per cent higher than would otherwise be predicted by the gravity equation. Moreover, the bias is increasing over time. These results clearly reflect the pervasive influence of the CAP. The introduction of openness variables has no significant impact on the results.

Of the two South American agreements, statistically significant results were not found in the case of MERCOSUR. The coefficients are positive, and in some cases quite large, from 1992 onward (the agreement was formed in 1991). For the much older Andean Community, the estimated intra-regional trade bias is substantial, and statistically highly significant from 1992 onward. Splitting the data by sector reveals that the integration is very strong in manufactures, but less strong (and not statistically significant) in the case of agriculture.

Turning to the APEC sub-regional agreements, in the case of NAFTA, evidence of a significant trade-creating effect was not found. All of the coefficients on total merchandise and manufactures trade are negative, although there appears to be an increasing trend. Controlling for openness reduces the negative trade bias in cases, but the lack of statistical significance on any of the estimates makes drawing any conclusions difficult. In the case of agriculture, the estimated coefficients are positive and increasing from 1992 (when the agreement was negotiated, it was ratified two years later). However, again the lack of statistical significance makes drawing any strong conclusions difficult. Since this is, at least in part, related to the problem of limited observations on intra-NAFTA trade in the cross-sectional data, the question of the effect of NAFTA is returned to in the examination of the pooled dataset.

The case of AFTA provides some more clear-cut results. From the total merchandise trade estimates, a positive and strongly statistically significant bloc effect is observed. This effect remains positive, and statistically significant in all years except 1992 and 1995, once the general openness of these economies has been taken into account (as the high and very strongly significant openness coefficients indicate, the economies of ASEAN are very open to trade relative to other similarly sized economies – although this may be inflated somewhat by the unique role played by Singapore). The estimates of the bias range from 43 to a staggering 203 per cent (144 per cent is the highest estimate when openness is included). The bias was clearly significant prior to the decision to move forward with an ASEAN free trade area in 1992. From the sectoral gravity equations presented in tables 2 and 3, most of the intra-ASEAN trade bias is in manufactures trade is observed. While there does appear to be a slightly significant positive bias in agricultural trade, this declines post-1992, and is of lose statistical significance. Hence it can be concluded that ASEAN has (thus far) only been successful in promoting manufactures trade.

CER has been in place since 1983, before the sample period. However, even within the sample period, significant evidence of trade creating effects have not been found. Although the estimates are positive and quite large (in particular in agriculture), none are statistically significant. As in the case of NAFTA, this is a problem of limited observations on intra-CER trade in the cross-sections which were attempted to be dealt with by pooling cross-sectional data.

The final test is on the significance of an APEC group. The coefficients in the merchandise trade equations were found to be highly statistically significant in all years, as well as being consistent at just over one (implying that members of APEC trade with one another roughly 2.7 times as much as otherwise similar economies). Thus, there appears to be a definite APEC-effect that is distinct from the effects of regional trading arrangements within APEC. The estimates do not appear to be sensitive to the inclusion of an openness parameter. However, it was also noted that the effect is stable over time, despite the fact that APEC was not formally established until 1989. Hence, while there is evidence of an effective intra-regional trade bias, it does not appear that APEC's formal implementation has had any effect on that bias, or that APEC has made any progress in further strengthening trade ties since its implementation. Essentially the same pattern holds once manufactures are separated and (perhaps surprisingly) agricultural trade – a strong and significant regional bias, but no evidence of any strengthening of trade ties over time.

B. Pooled data and trade in services

Because of the difficulty obtaining statistically significant estimates of the degree of trade integration in the Asia-Pacific using cross-sectional data, this section considers the results of pooling the dataset across the years 1984–1998. Through this much larger sample size, there is a greater chance of capturing the effect of arrangements among a smaller subset of the cross-section (e.g. NAFTA and CER). The results are presented in table 4, for the total merchandise trade category, and separated by manufactures and agricultural trade. Also presented in table 4 are the estimates from applying the gravity model to services trade data of 1997.

As the results in table 4 indicate, the pooling technique does help in the manner intended. Although it makes little difference to the parameter estimates on the basic gravity

variables (with the exception that a statistically significant, but very small effect for the difference in per-capita GDP is obtained), statistically significant results in the case of both NAFTA and CER are obtained (and the European Union in the case of agriculture). In the case of NAFTA, there is a statistically significant negative bias in overall trade and manufactures, and a smaller but still negative bias (but insignificant) in agriculture. Introduction on an openness control lowers the bias, and makes it positive (but still insignificant) in the case of agricultural trade.

As for CER, statistically significant evidence is found of a regional trade bias in both manufactures and agriculture, and overall. The bias is strongest in agricultural trade, and becomes more positive with the control for openness. Thus there is evidence to suggest that CER has been successful in promoting merchandise trade between Australia and New Zealand.

In the case of services, despite the limited data, the gravity model again seems to provide a good fit (the adjusted R^2 is 0.72 without openness 0.89 with).[2] The coefficients on income (both total and per-capita) are similar to those estimated on merchandise trade. The coefficient on distance, however, while still negative, is significantly smaller than on merchandise trade (-0.07 to -0.19). This indicates support for the hypothesis that distance is less important as an explanatory factor in services trade.

Turning to the estimates of the effect of RTAs on services trade, the results contrast quite strongly in places to the effects observed for merchandise trade. There is a significant positive effect in the case of the European Union (services trade is estimated at between 27 and 43 per cent higher than otherwise similar economies). In MERCOSUR and the Andean Community, in contrast to the results on merchandise trade, there exists a statistically significant and strongly negative services trade bias.

Table 4. Estimated Gravity Equations – Pooled Data by Sector

	Merchandise (1984-1998)		Manufactures (1984-1998)		Agriculture (1984-1998)		Services (1997)	
(Intercept)	-21.23 ***	-26.14 ***	-21.49 ***	-26.73 ***	-17.04 ***	-18.30 ***	-22.20 ***	-27.16 ***
	(0.29)	(0.31)	(0.30)	(0.32)	(0.40)	(0.46)	(0.97)	(0.75)
GDP	0.75 ***	0.82 ***	0.76 ***	0.83 ***	0.66 ***	0.73 ***	0.71 ***	0.79 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
GDPPC	0.86 ***	1.01 ***	0.88 ***	1.03 ***	0.45 ***	0.49 ***	0.64 ***	0.76 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
DIFF	0.04 ***	0.04 ***	0.04 ***	0.04 ***	0.08 ***	0.10 ***	0.02	-0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)
DIST	-0.77 ***	-0.68 ***	-0.81 ***	-0.69 ***	-0.51 ***	-0.69 ***	-0.19 ***	-0.07 *
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.03)
ADJ	0.45 ***	0.56 ***	0.42 ***	0.57 ***	0.73 ***	0.45 ***	-0.32	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.18)	(0.11)
EU	0.00	-0.08 *	-0.01	-0.09 *	0.32 ***	0.33 ***	0.36 **	0.24 **
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.13)	(0.08)
NAFTA	-0.84 ***	-0.50 ***	-0.85 ***	-0.53 ***	-0.19	0.18	-0.72	-0.55
	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.53)	(0.34)
AFTA	1.00 ***	0.65 ***	0.99 ***	0.63 ***	0.55 ***	0.32 **	1.50 ***	1.08 ***
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.26)	(0.17)
CER	0.52 *	0.81 ***	0.50 *	0.90 ***	1.20 ***	0.69 *	-1.04	-0.45
	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.31)	(0.30)	(0.76)	(0.49)
MERCOSUR	0.39	0.42	0.28	0.41	1.67 ***	1.25 ***	-3.50 ***	-2.51 ***
	(0.26)	(0.24)	(0.28)	(0.25)	(0.35)	(0.34)	(0.86)	(0.54)
ANDEAN	1.18 ***	1.82 ***	1.27 ***	1.93 ***	-0.41 *	-0.18	-1.34 **	-0.61 *
	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.45)	(0.29)
APEC	1.07 ***	1.10 ***	1.09 ***	1.16 ***	1.14 ***	1.04 ***	0.25 **	0.09
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.08)
EUO		-0.02		0.00		0.18 ***		0.29 ***
		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.04)		(0.06)
NAFTAO		-0.89 ***		-0.91 ***		-0.32 ***		-0.36 ***
		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.05)		(0.07)
AFTAO		0.54 ***		0.54 ***		0.45 ***		1.01 ***
		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.04)		(0.06)
CERO		-0.50 ***		-0.62 ***		0.68 ***		-0.35 ***
		(0.03)		(0.04)		(0.05)		(0.08)
MERCOSURO		-0.16 ***		-0.28 ***		0.90 ***		-1.12 ***
		(0.03)		(0.04)		(0.05)		(0.08)
ANDEANO		-0.41 ***		-0.43 ***		0.32 ***		-0.49 ***
		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.04)		(0.06)
APECO		0.11 ***		0.09 ***		0.28 ***		0.08
		(0.02)		(0.03)		(0.04)		(0.06)
Observations	10506	10506	10467	10467	9613	9613	703	703
Adjusted R^2	0.79	0.83	0.78	0.82	0.55	0.58	0.72	0.89

Standard deviations in parentheses.
*** Significant at greater than 1% level,   ** Significant at 1% level,   * Significant at 5% level.

In the case of both NAFTA and CER, the estimated coefficients are also negative (perhaps surprising in the case of CER, since an explicit agreement to bring services trade under the agreement was signed in 1988). However, as was the case for merchandise trade results estimated on single cross-sections, the results are statistically insignificant (therefore strong conclusions cannot be drawn).

For AFTA, there is a strong positive (and highly significant) intra-regional service trade bias, again indicating that this group has been particularly successful in promoting intra-regional trade. The APEC region as a whole is estimated to have a small positive coefficient on services trade, but this looses significance after control for openness.

C. Trade diverting effects of RTAs

Until this point, the openness variable purely as a form of controlling for the general degree of openness of RTA members when estimating the effect of an RTA on intra-RTA trade has been discussed. The openness variable has another use, however. Observing the level and changes in the degree of openness can give insights into the presence of trade diversion effects – reductions in the level of expected trade of RTA participants with non-members.

There is interest in both the level of the openness coefficient, and any changes in the coefficient over time (in particular if they correspond to post-implementation time-periods). Once again, the relevant results are in tables 1 though 3, and table 4 for the pooled data.

The extra-APEC control cases are begun with. In the European Union, the estimated coefficients on openness are small, and varying in sign, and statistically insignificant, hence no conclusions can be drawn. In the case of MERCOSUR and the Andean Community, the estimated openness coefficients are negative but diminishing overall (becoming positive for

MERCOSUR in later years, but not significant). The coefficients on agricultural trade are generally positive and increasing.

Turning to the APEC sub-regional groups, in the case of NAFTA, the openness coefficient is negative, but declining over time. The pattern holds when manufactures and agriculture are separated (the coefficient does become marginally positive in agriculture in 1998, but this result is not significant). Hence, while the NAFTA economies are not as strongly open to trade as other economies, strong evidence of trade diversion effects cannot be found. In the services sector (table 4), again there is a negative and significant coefficient (-0.34), but the lack of a time series element means it cannot be observed whether this is changing or not.

CER exhibits a similar pattern for total merchandise and manufactures trade – the estimated openness coefficients are negative and significant, but diminishing over time. Splitting the data along sectoral lines reveals quite a different pattern in agricultural trade, however. Here, the economies of CER are shown to be very open, and moreover their degree of openness is increasing over time. Hence, once again, little evidence is found of strong trade-diversion effects. In the case of services trade, the point estimate for 1997 is negative (-0.35).

The estimated coefficients on openness are positive in all cases for AFTA. Moreover, the estimates increase over time on both manufactures trade, and for overall merchandise trade. However, while the coefficients on agricultural trade are estimated to be positive, they are decreasing over time (although they are not statistically significant post-1992). Thus there is some indication, though not conclusive evidence, of trade diversion in agricultural products occurring in ASEAN, although these economies remain relatively open to agricultural trade.

Given APEC's adoption to the principle of "open regionalism", which implies a

commitment to remaining open to non-members, evidence of trade-diversion effects associated with the APEC group is not expected (at least not in the Vinerian sense, since MFN reform cannot lead to the transfer of tariff revenue that is required). The simulation results support this expectation – there are no statistically significant negative coefficients on openness, no significant change post-1989, and no clear evidence of a declining trend in the openness coefficients over time. This conclusion applies to both the merchandise trade data as a whole, and when separated by agricultural and manufactures trade. The services data indicates that APEC is marginally more open than average, but the result is not statistically significant.

D. Building blocks, stumbling blocks and continuously welfare enhancing RTAs

Much ink has been spilled on the topic of whether RTAs might constitute building blocs toward the goal of global free trade, or are instead likely to halt progress in that direction (see Bhagwati and Panagariya, 1996, for detailed discussion of these issues). An important component question is whether it is possible to arrange for RTA configurations that eliminate or minimize harmful effects on non-members, and whether such configurations are likely to occur in practice or can be promoted.

The theoretical literature on RTAs has answered the existence question in the affirmative. It can be shown that under certain conditions a preferential trading arrangement will result in a net rise in global welfare, with no negative consequences for non-members. This result is generally attributed to Kemp and Wan (1976), although there is some debate over whether the principle was in fact recognized earlier (see Panagariya, 2000). For the case of a custom's union, an intuitive explanation is as follows: If the net trade vector of the partner economies was frozen with the rest of the world, this would ensure that non-members are unaffected by the formation of the union (in a

world of perfect competition and homogeneous goods). Then, with the external trade vector as a constraint, the joint welfare of member economies is maximized by equating the marginal rate of transformation and the marginal rate of substitution for each pair of goods across all agents in the union. This is accomplished by eliminating all intra-union trade barriers, and setting a common external tariff (endogenously) at exactly the level that satisfies the extra-union trade constraint. Panagariya and Krishna (1997) have recently proved a similar result for the case of FTAs, showing that by freezing the initial vector of imports into each member via country-specific tariffs, welfare of non-members could be maintained intact, and the net welfare of members cannot fall.

These theorems state that it is possible to find preferential trading arrangements that must improve global welfare, but say nothing about the consequences of any agreement actually implemented in practice. Trade economists are painfully aware that the existence of welfare gains alone is not sufficient to guarantee liberalization in any form. Moreover, as Panagariya (2000) has noted, in neither case can guarantee be made that net welfare in all members of the union or FTA will rise – only that their joint welfare will rise – indeed it will generally be the case that one member loses while the other gains. It could therefore be argued that divergence of interests among potential members would prevent the formation of welfare-enhancing RTAs.

However, it is possible that diverging interests could lead to competition to lower external protection, as the KW criterion requires, and thus let FTA's (at least) become truly "building blocks" toward achieving global free-trade. This possibility is explored by Richardson (1993), whose argument is essentially based on recognition of the presence of trade deflection and the associated tariff revenue, including the idea that FTA members might compete for this revenue by lowering their tariffs to slightly below that of their part-

ners. When tariffs are endogenized in this manner, the outcome is effectively free trade. Of course, other political economy models can be set-up in which support for free trade will decline subsequent to RTA formation (see Grossman and Helpman, 1995; Findlay and Panagariya, 1996; and Krishna, 1998), so the question of whether protection declines after RTA formation is an empirical one.

Once again, estimated coefficients on openness, and more importantly the changes in those coefficients over time, provide some useful information on this debate. As discussed above, at least in the context of APEC sub-regional RTAs (e.g. NAFTA, AFTA and CER), evidence is found that the openness coefficients are generally increasing over time. This is true both overall, and for manufactures and agricultural trade. Since the openness coefficients can be taken as a broad proxy measure of the level of protection in these RTAs, the results appear to lend weight to the hypothesis that protection levels in RTAs within APEC are declining, and that RTAs have not hindered progress toward more openness to trade in general. However, caution must be exercised so as to not conclude that the formation of RTAs has itself has promoted the openness. Although the results are not inconsistent with this hypothesis, the data cannot render information on causality. It may equally be speculated that the success of negotiations under the WTO, or the influence of APEC, is responsible. Moreover, as always, the counter-factual is not observed.

IV.   NEW PROPOSALS AND THE "NATURAL RTA"

There are two empirical methods commonly applied to the analysis of RTAs. The first is simulation with a gravity model, as followed in this paper. This technique is generally applied *ex-post*, e.g. in the search for effects of RTAs after they have been implemented. The other technique, counter-factual simulation with partial or (more commonly in recent years) general equilibrium trade models, is frequently used to analyze the implications of proposed RTAs. Scollay and Gilbert (2001) have recently used simulation techniques to consider the question of whether there might be conceivable paths toward APEC goals through the new Asia-Pacific RTA proposals (they identify and discuss more than twenty such arrangements at various stages of development). Their analytical approach centers on whether strong welfare incentives exist at each stage of a conceivable end-point (e.g. an East-Asian bloc, or APEC liberalization) that might lead to expansion of prior agreements. Of key concern in their analysis is identifying agreements that have strong trade diversion effects, and those that leave open the potential for welfare gains through further expansion.

An interesting question is whether existing trade patterns provide any clues as to when this will likely be the case, and thus whether gravity model simulations can provide any useful analytical input. One possibility lies in extending the notion of "natural" trading blocs. Krugman (1991) has suggested that trading blocs comprised of economies that are in close geographical proximity are unlikely to result in significant trade diversion effects. Of course, this position has been criticized on the grounds that distance primarily affects transportation costs, at that these are in principle no different from any other source of comparative

advantage (Bhagwati and Panagariya, 1996, among others). Evidently, this is again a matter for empirical verification on a case-by-case basis.

Gravity models contribute to the debate by using an alternative definition of "natural". It may be speculated that in cases where strong and increasing trade integration is observed between economies for which there is no formal RTA in place, having already controlled for distance/adjacency, there is some sort of "natural" trading bloc phenomenon being revealed (the results for APEC above might be interpreted in this light). If it is held that trade integration in the absence of a formal agreement can be a useful indicator of potentially welfare-improving RTAs, then gravity simulations can be useful. Hence, in this section a final set of simulations with the gravity model is performed, testing to see whether any of the recently proposed agreements are in any sense "natural", and whether this provides useful information on their likely effect, relative to other potential methods.

To provide the basis of comparison, the results of counter-factual simulations using CGE methods are incorporated. CGE models are in essence numerical models based on general equilibrium theory, which are implemented in the form of computer programmes. They have a number of useful features as they are multi-sectoral and in many cases multi-regional, and the behavior of economic agents is modeled explicitly through utility and profit maximizing assumptions. In addition, they differ from other multi-sector tools of analysis in that economy-wide constraints are rigorously enforced. Distortions like trade barriers in an economic system will often have second-best

repercussions far beyond the sector in which they occur. Where the distortions are wide-ranging, general equilibrium techniques are effective in capturing the relevant feedback and flow-through effects. The price paid, is in additional complexity of the model, and the inability to easily use statistical verification techniques.

The model utilized in this paper is the standard GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project) model, a publicly available model the basic structure of which is documented in Hertel (1997). The model formulation is a standard, multi-region CGE, which assumes perfectly competitive markets and constant returns to scale technology. The major departure of the model from those of standard trade theory is the assumption of product differentiation by national origin, controlled by a set of Armington (1969) substitution elasticities.[3] This serves the dual purpose of allowing two-way trade in each product category, and avoiding extreme production and trade responses.

The model is closed by assuming full employment of all factors of production, and that all returns to these factors accrue to households in the region in which they are employed. Final demand in each region is governed by a single representative household, which allocates regional income across household expenditures, government spending and savings using a Cobb-Douglas function.

Because CGE models attempt to capture the features of real world economies, they incorporate data on the structure of production and trade in the economy under consideration. In general the starting point for multiregional models will be a set of national input-output and a set of trade matrices. The simulations in this paper use the latest data available – the pre-release of the GTAP5 database, a global general equilibrium dataset has a base year of 1997.[4] Because part of the objective is to compare the two techniques, consistent data is required, hence the database has been aggregated to match the gravity sample exactly, with 33 unique regions plus a ROW aggregate, and three sectors (agriculture, manufactures, and services).

The following nine arrangements are considered (a subset of those considered in Scollay and Gilbert, 2001):

- Singapore-Japan (SJ)
- Singapore-United States (SUS)
- Japan-Canada (JC)
- Republic of Korea-Mexico (KM)
- FTAA
- Japan-Republic of Korea (JK)
- Japan-Republic of Korea-China (JKC)
- ASEAN plus Japan-Republic of Korea-China (A3)
- ASEAN plus Japan-Republic of Korea-China plus CER (A3C)

A. Gravity results

The significance of these groupings within the gravity model using the same dummy variable techniques used for existing arrangements above are estimated, using the pooled data for merchandise trade (and agriculture and manufactures separately). Because many of the arrangements involve only one observation (being bilateral FTAs), this gives the greatest chance of obtaining statistically significant results. The dummies for the existing RTAs are left in place in the regressions. However, because some of the arrangements listed above are closely related to others, each is tested separately rather than at once (thus avoiding problems of collinearity in the regressors).

The results are presented in table 5 (only the dummy coefficients are displayed). The gravity results for the new bilateral proposals are mixed. The two arrangements involving Singapore have positive and strongly significant coefficients on manufactures trade, but not agricultural trade. Thus trade ties between Singapore and Japan and Singapore and the United States appear to be very strong. The coefficients decline sharply (but remain positive and

Table 5. Estimated Gravity Coefficients for Proposed RTAs – Pooled Data by Sector[1]

	Merchandise (1984-1998)		Manufactures (1984-1998)		Agriculture (1984-1998)		Services (1997)	
SJ	1.51 ***	0.71 **	1.54 ***	0.70 **	0.19	0.23	0.57	-0.44
	(0.27)	(0.25)	(0.27)	(0.25)	(0.36)	(0.35)	(0.82)	(0.52)
SUS	1.91 ***	1.44 ***	1.95 ***	1.45 ***	0.75	0.60	0.98	0.04
	(0.28)	(0.25)	(0.28)	(0.26)	(0.38)	(0.36)	(0.85)	(0.52)
JC	-0.12	0.08	-0.20	-0.03	1.51 ***	1.90 ***	-0.81	-0.65
	(0.30)	(0.28)	(0.30)	(0.28)	(0.40)	(0.39)	(0.90)	(0.57)
KM	-0.37	-0.10	-0.28	-0.04	-1.95 ***	-1.32 ***	-0.28	0.12
	(0.28)	(0.26)	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.37)	(0.36)	(0.85)	(0.54)
FTAA	0.02	1.14 ***	-0.00	1.20 ***	0.18 *	0.45 ***	-1.32 ***	-0.07
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.15)	(0.13)
JK	-0.36	-0.57 *	-0.42	-0.64 *	0.17	0.25	-0.64	-0.43
	(0.29)	(0.27)	(0.30)	(0.28)	(0.40)	(0.39)	(0.90)	(0.57)
JKC	0.40 **	0.34 **	0.40 **	0.32 **	0.10	0.32	-0.16	0.17
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.37)	(0.23)
A3	1.15 ***	0.78 ***	1.16 ***	0.77 ***	0.52 ***	0.64 ***	0.85 ***	0.33 *
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.20)	(0.13)
A3C	1.07 ***	0.97 ***	1.04 ***	0.99 ***	1.14 ***	0.95 ***	0.55 ***	0.29 *
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.17)	(0.12)
SJO		0.75 ***		0.71 ***		0.68 ***		0.32 ***
		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.05)		(0.08)
SUSO		1.04 ***		1.00 ***		1.27 ***		0.59 ***
		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.05)		(0.07)
JCO		0.00		-0.02		0.18 ***		-0.16
		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.05)		(0.08)
KMO		-0.02		0.02		-0.72		0.11
		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.05) ***		(0.07)
FTAAO		-0.11 *		-0.13 **		0.67 ***		-0.10
		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.07)		(0.10)
JKO		0.43 ***		0.43 ***		0.10		0.04
		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.06)		(0.08)
JKCO		0.57 ***		0.60 ***		0.07		0.36 ***
		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.05)		(0.07)
A3O		0.49 ***		0.54 ***		-0.10		0.35 ***
		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.05)		(0.07)
A3CO		0.46 ***		0.50 ***		-0.18 **		0.40 ***
		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.05)		(0.08)

Standard deviations in parentheses.
*** Significant at greater than 1% level,   ** Significant at 1% level,   * Significant at 5% level.
1   Each proposed agreement is estimated in isolation, but with existing agreements as in Section 3 in place. Coefficients on standard gravity variables are omitted from the table.

significant) once openness variables are included (suggesting that the strong integration reflects at least in part the entrepot role of Singapore). The other two arrangements, between Canada and Japan, and Republic of Korea and Mexico (both of which may be thought of as defensive maneuvers given NAFTA and the prospects of an FTAA), show mixed results. In neither case is there any evidence of strong integration between these economies overall (in both cases, the coefficients are negative, but not significant), nor for manufactures or services. In the case of agriculture, however, there is a statistically significant pattern. There is a very strong positive bias in agricultural trade between Japan and Canada, and a very strong negative bias in agricultural trade between Republic of Korea and Mexico.

Given the uniformly negative estimated coefficients on the Republic of Korea-Mexico RTA dummy, there seems little doubt that such an arrangement could not be described as natural, irrespective of what definition is used. The Japan-Canada estimates also provide little justification for enthusiasm on natural trading bloc grounds, the positive coefficients on agricultural trade being a possible exception.

The estimated coefficients on the FTAA, which would bring together NAFTA and the economies of South and Central America, are interesting. Here, merchandise is small with statistically insignificant results. However, once the overall level of openness of these economies is controlled (which is relatively low), the level of integration appears strongly positive. This might be interpreted as a case of a "natural" trading bloc that, through lingering protectionism, has not yet become strongly integrated in trade. As such, it perhaps provides a useful case upon which to judge the usefulness of the natural trading bloc hypothesis.

The proposed Japan-Republic of Korea bilateral arrangement has negative coefficients in all experiments except agriculture (positive but not significant), indicating that these economies are not strongly integrated. The coeffi-

cients on merchandise trade and manufactures are significantly weak once the openness dummies are included. Hence there is little evidence that Japan and Republic of Korea form a natural trading bloc, despite their geographical proximity. There may of course be many explanations for this (most obviously the political and economic rivalry between the two nations, and the associated bias in trade policy, such as Republic of Korea's only recently abandoned Import Sources Diversification programme).

Expanding the Japan-Republic of Korea arrangement to include China results in a positive estimated coefficient on trade integration between these economies, strongly significant in both manufactures and overall merchandise. Given the lack of integration between Japan and Republic of Korea, this might suggest that both are natural partners of China, and therefore (if the natural trading bloc hypothesis is accepted) that a bloc centred on China might be beneficial. Further expanding the arrangement to include ASEAN results in highly significant positive coefficients (smaller but still positive and significant for agriculture). The addition of CER to the group results in a slight fall in the coefficients on manufactures and overall, but raises those on agriculture. Thus the results do seem to lend support to the hypothesis of a "natural" trading bloc within East-Asia, although they can reveal little about the potential welfare effects of such an arrangement. This is where CGE simulation can be useful.

B. CGE simulation results and sensitivity

Using the GTAP model and the GTAP5 data as described above, the implementation of the each proposed RTA was simulated in isolation by the complete removal of all tariffs on a preferential basis. The exception is APEC, which was provided with a benchmark. Here, the assumption is of MFN reform. The simulations are all comparative static, and thus emphasize efficiency effects in much the same

way as standard models of trade. The estimated welfare effects of each proposal are presented in table 6 and 7, measured as the equivalent variation in regional income, in $1997 millions (this is the estimated monetary equivalent of the change in consumption, evaluated at constant initial prices). Also presented are the estimated approximate standard deviations around the welfare results, obtained using the systematic sensitivity techniques developed by Arndt (1996) and Arndt and Pearson (1998).

The results of CGE simulations are known to be particularly sensitive to the assumed values of the Armington elasticities, and so it is to these values that the computed standard deviations relate. We assume that the lower level elasticities in the GTAP5 database are the mean values of these parameters, and that there are symmetric triangular distributions around each of these parameters with minima and maxima at mean ± 75 per cent. Each sectoral element of the vector is assumed to vary independently. The assumption is maintained, that the upper level Armington parameters are double the lower level parameters. Because the Armington parameters enter the model as random variables, the model results are also random variables, and it is possible to use numerical integration techniques to obtain approximations of the means and standard deviations. The standard deviations, while only approximations, allow to observe directly which results are robust to changes in the parameter values, and which are not. As a rule of thumb, if the mean estimate maintains the same sign within two standard deviations, the probability is (more than 95 per cent) that the sign of the estimated value is correct.

Considering the bilaterals first, the results for which are presented in table 6, despite strong evidence of trade integration between Singapore and Japan, the simulation results indicate negligible gains for either economy (actually small losses for Japan). The estimated effects, while small, do appear to be robust to parameter changes. By the same token, however, the non-members are barely affected by

this agreement in net welfare terms, and the potential for negative welfare effects on non-members as a consequence of trade diversion seems minimal. A similar result holds in the case of Singapore–United States. The CGE techniques do not indicate the presence of any significant net welfare gains (in fact the sum to members is negative). However, the (robust) welfare estimates vary widely over the two partners, with Singapore estimated to suffer a welfare decline, and the United States a welfare improvement. Once again, there seems little evidence of substantial trade diversion effects on non-members (this is the one preferential simulation where the net-welfare of non-members is actually estimated to rise slightly).

The CGE simulations of a Japan-Canada agreement indicate a significant positive welfare effect on both Japan and Canada, although it does not appear to be very robust to parameter changes in either case. Negative welfare effects seem to be concentrated on the United States (and appear reasonably robust). Simulation of the other NAFTA-related bilateral, Republic of Korea–Mexico, reveals a similar situation. There are insignificant and not very robust positive welfare consequences of such an arrangement for the members. However, there is a negative welfare effect for the United States, which, though very small, does seem to be robust. Hence, there may be some cause for concern within the United States regarding the new bilateral agreements that its NAFTA partners are negotiating within Asia. Decomposition of the welfare change (not shown) in both cases shows that the losses are almost exclusively a consequence of terms of trade declines, indicating that the effect is due to a loss of preferential access to NAFTA partners. The estimated effects on other non-members are small (but generally negative).

The FTAA simulation indicates positive welfare gains for all of the proposed FTAA members in the dataset. However, only in the case of the United States is the estimated effect clearly robust to parameter changes. Negative net welfare effects for non-members indi-

Table 6. Estimated Welfare Effect of Proposed RTAs – Equivalent Variation
($1997 millions)

	SJ		SUS		JC		KM		FTAA	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Argentina	-0.1	(0.0)	1.1	(0.1)	10.1	(5.6)	-0.5	(0.2)	975.0	(140.8)
Australia	-1.1	(0.2)	9.5	(1.8)	-65.8	(15.3)	-0.7	(0.3)	-47.7	(2.6)
Austria	-0.5	(0.3)	14.7	(2.5)	2.2	(1.8)	0.3	(0.1)	-21.9	(9.9)
Belgium	0.1	(0.3)	12.2	(2.0)	-45.4	(17.7)	0.9	(0.3)	-95.0	(25.9)
Brazil	-0.9	(0.2)	0.5	(3.5)	-64.2	(14.0)	-2.4	(0.8)	1 239.8	(570.7)
Canada	-0.7	(0.5)	-22.0	(12.5)	4 604.5	(1 862.9)	4.9	(0.6)	95.4	(57.5)
Chile	-0.3	(0.1)	-1.7	(1.1)	-7.7	(1.8)	-0.5	(0.1)	112.8	(19.2)
China	-3.8	(0.4)	25.4	(3.0)	-63.9	(28.9)	-25.9	(5.7)	-228.6	(12.1)
Columbia	-0.1	(0.0)	1.7	(0.4)	-5.9	(4.9)	-0.4	(0.3)	325.3	(58.6)
Denmark	-0.1	(0.2)	4.6	(1.2)	0.0	(1.4)	0.4	(0.0)	-9.2	(6.3)
Finland	-0.2	(0.1)	3.5	(0.7)	-0.9	(0.7)	-0.2	(0.1)	-23.2	(2.2)
France	-1.5	(0.6)	44.5	(6.8)	29.7	(10.3)	0.5	(0.2)	-180.4	(30.0)
Germany	-3.8	(1.1)	62.8	(11.0)	55.8	(24.6)	-9.2	(1.4)	-491.6	(34.3)
Greece	0.0	(0.0)	2.0	(0.6)	0.1	(1.4)	-0.3	(0.0)	-1.7	(1.4)
Hong Kong, China	-3.2	(0.8)	94.2	(18.0)	34.9	(17.4)	-9.0	(1.0)	-12.5	(1.9)
India	-1.4	(0.3)	10.1	(1.2)	16.7	(6.0)	-1.6	(0.6)	-40.5	(2.1)
Indonesia	-1.4	(0.2)	11.1	(3.1)	-0.6	(10.6)	-4.1	(0.8)	-45.5	(3.9)
Ireland	-0.9	(0.3)	17.4	(3.1)	2.1	(1.9)	-0.4	(0.1)	-29.3	(2.6)
Italy	-1.6	(0.8)	32.2	(5.1)	-43.0	(19.5)	-2.9	(0.6)	-298.1	(38.9)
Japan	-33.8	(5.9)	23.2	(3.8)	306.0	(539.3)	-2.8	(1.4)	-610.2	(37.6)
Republic of Korea	0.4	(0.4)	14.9	(2.7)	31.5	(17.2)	263.2	(62.5)	-249.3	(28.8)
Malaysia	0.9	(1.1)	92.1	(11.5)	4.2	(6.8)	-3.7	(0.3)	-38.1	(1.7)
Mexico	-0.1	(0.1)	-2.6	(2.5)	63.1	(31.0)	37.2	(19.1)	158.6	(109.7)
Netherlands	-0.3	(0.6)	25.0	(4.2)	3.4	(5.7)	1.1	(0.2)	-102.8	(29.5)
New Zealand	-0.3	(0.1)	2.5	(0.5)	-33.0	(11.8)	-0.9	(0.3)	-21.0	(1.4)
Peru	-0.1	(0.0)	0.0	(0.3)	-12.6	(2.9)	0.0	(0.0)	129.6	(43.4)
Philippines	0.5	(0.2)	17.5	(5.1)	7.0	(8.1)	-2.8	(0.5)	-8.2	(1.5)
Poland	0.1	(0.1)	2.7	(0.4)	-2.0	(1.5)	-1.8	(0.2)	3.6	(3.6)
Portugal	-0.1	(0.0)	3.0	(0.4)	2.8	(1.1)	-0.1	(0.0)	-11.9	(1.7)
Rest of world	-8.4	(2.2)	90.0	(16.8)	-459.6	(144.6)	-18.9	(2.8)	-897.7	(78.9)
Singapore	60.1	(16.9)	-1 270.2	(198.3)	83.2	(38.5)	-5.0	(0.9)	-9.6	(12.6)
Spain	-0.5	(0.2)	14.0	(2.1)	-5.3	(5.3)	-2.5	(0.6)	-201.3	(26.5)
Sweden	-0.2	(0.2)	7.3	(1.1)	-1.1	(1.2)	-0.2	(0.1)	-70.8	(10.7)
Switzerland	-0.3	(0.0)	2.7	(1.0)	-1.8	(2.0)	0.2	(0.2)	-92.0	(12.6)
Thailand	1.1	(0.3)	31.3	(4.0)	50.3	(25.9)	-2.2	(0.5)	-24.5	(1.9)
Turkey	0.1	(0.0)	2.0	(0.5)	7.6	(4.9)	-0.3	(0.1)	-15.0	(3.3)
United Kingdom	-1.2	(0.4)	31.5	(4.8)	14.1	(14.2)	-1.5	(0.4)	-224.7	(32.4)
United States	-3.3	(1.4)	1 009.3	(173.6)	-1 840.2	(591.5)	-151.1	(31.0)	3 823.9	(332.5)
Venezuela	-0.1	(0.0)	0.7	(0.3)	-6.7	(2.4)	-1.3	(0.3)	87.0	(62.9)
Members	26.2		-261.0		4 910.6		300.4		6 947.3	
Non-members	-33.5		681.5		-2 240.9		-245.1		-4 098.6	
World	-7.3		420.5		2 669.6		55.3		2 848.7	

Source: Model simulations.

Table 7. Estimated Welfare Effect of Proposed RTAs – Equivalent Variation
($1997 millions)

	JK		JKC		A3		A3C		APEC	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Argentina	2.3	(0.3)	-55.1	(3.4)	-74.6	(5.4)	-72.9	(3.2)	1215.1	(80.2)
Australia	-57.2	(7.1)	-260.8	(27.8)	-493.0	(48.5)	3 940.4	(854.1)	2 797.0	(573.0)
Austria	0.4	(1.6)	12.1	(12.7)	5.0	(23.7)	7.7	(27.8)	-276.3	(125.4)
Belgium	-1.6	(2.3)	-0.3	(19.6)	-54.4	(39.7)	-115.4	(60.8)	-135.2	(38.6)
Brazil	-15.6	(3.5)	-155.9	(27.1)	-227.4	(38.2)	-271.3	(38.6)	2 351.6	(442.3)
Canada	1.0	(0.9)	-50.8	(14.9)	-21.0	(16.2)	-159.1	(31.9)	2 032.9	(1 184.9)
Chile	-13.2	(1.8)	-65.2	(3.5)	-91.0	(5.3)	-114.5	(7.8)	108.2	(92.4)
China	-172.3	(27.6)	249.1	(721.2)	441.0	(651.4)	118.9	(463.1)	1 726.5	(1 800.3)
Columbia	-4.8	(1.0)	-27.2	(6.2)	-27.8	(6.9)	-38.4	(7.4)	747.6	(42.5)
Denmark	-0.4	(0.9)	-1.2	(7.1)	-14.5	(13.7)	-26.0	(19.6)	606.8	(360.0)
Finland	-3.5	(0.6)	-24.7	(3.0)	-62.4	(8.0)	-69.0	(9.3)	29.6	(13.5)
France	5.4	(4.2)	8.2	(48.5)	-86.1	(79.8)	-157.1	(106.5)	1 018.8	(173.3)
Germany	-60.1	(8.4)	-398.6	(76.6)	-803.6	(125.2)	-984.3	(169.7)	1 849.4	(235.2)
Greece	0.5	(0.5)	12.0	(4.2)	19.3	(5.7)	17.4	(11.2)	-273.3	(84.2)
Hong Kong, China	-8.9	(4.1)	2 811.1	(504.7)	3 410.0	(238.5)	3 389.2	(225.2)	6 788.5	(584.9)
India	-2.5	(1.7)	-34.1	(18.5)	-126.5	(34.5)	-227.2	(39.9)	919.7	(155.5)
Indonesia	-54.5	(6.9)	-251.9	(43.5)	621.8	(35.0)	420.6	(33.2)	734.9	(110.5)
Ireland	-14.0	(2.0)	-38.3	(9.8)	-64.3	(18.0)	-68.4	(20.4)	84.8	(53.0)
Italy	-13.4	(4.6)	-96.4	(39.6)	-200.9	(69.6)	-347.9	(92.1)	1 023.0	(117.7)
Japan	1 430.6	(153.9)	5 285.1	(809.9)	8 208.5	(1 080.5)	7 900.8	(1 535.5)	8 819.4	(2 380.8)
Republic of Korea	291.8	(102.6)	5 535.2	(1710.9)	5 700.9	(1 736.8)	5 559.8	(1 742.8)	5 261.9	(1 902.7)
Malaysia	-53.7	(7.1)	-248.1	(37.9)	182.7	(156.1)	72.8	(156.2)	94.2	(222.0)
Mexico	5.0	(1.5)	33.3	(16.7)	62.4	(20.3)	34.9	(28.3)	-1 036.4	(377.2)
Netherlands	-8.0	(3.3)	-90.7	(29.2)	-188.6	(58.3)	-177.1	(71.6)	447.3	(292.9)
New Zealand	-5.4	(0.9)	-101.3	(16.2)	-141.6	(14.8)	1 484.1	(463.7)	1 301.5	(449.2)
Peru	-0.4	(0.3)	-33.4	(5.4)	-43.2	(6.5)	-53.5	(8.2)	55.6	(78.9)
Philippines	-22.6	(3.7)	-96.5	(16.2)	22.9	(86.6)	-108.4	(74.6)	747.4	(267.1)
Poland	3.8	(1.1)	34.3	(9.7)	35.0	(13.9)	44.0	(15.2)	481.2	(77.3)
Portugal	1.1	(0.5)	17.6	(5.0)	22.0	(6.4)	19.5	(9.0)	276.5	(56.2)
Rest of world	-372.4	(49.4)	-2 731.2	(411.3)	-4 335.9	(564.7)	-5 468.9	(719.6)	1 527.7	(619.2)
Singapore	-30.4	(10.3)	-135.7	(74.7)	116.2	(167.0)	158.6	(163.6)	-1 183.2	(205.3)
Spain	3.9	(2.4)	19.1	(21.6)	-3.5	(34.1)	-26.5	(45.9)	756.1	(55.5)
Sweden	-5.1	(1.0)	-46.3	(10.8)	-101.4	(18.4)	-121.2	(22.0)	-237.0	(57.5)
Switzerland	-22.9	(3.6)	-76.5	(19.0)	-157.4	(31.1)	-221.3	(47.7)	10.4	(8.9)
Thailand	-49.0	(7.8)	-269.2	(49.9)	1 641.3	(374.3)	1 553.4	(364.9)	1 988.3	(574.9)
Turkey	5.3	(0.7)	37.1	(9.7)	48.7	(12.7)	28.8	(20.0)	-46.1	(115.6)
United Kingdom	-26.2	(8.9)	-40.9	(64.9)	-233.5	(104.8)	-581.9	(208.4)	2 363.8	(525.1)
United States	-381.1	(48.1)	-2 487.6	(287.6)	-4 131.7	(383.4)	-4 758.9	(441.9)	271.6	(1 119.6)
Venezuela	-0.3	(0.2)	-0.6	(3.2)	0.1	(3.5)	-6.0	(4.6)	-20.3	(4.8)
Members	1 722.4		13 880.5		20 345.3		24 069.5		30 508.4	
Non-members	-1 370.9		-7 644.8		-11 491.7		-13 494.1		14 721.3	
World	351.6		6 235.7		8 853.6		10 575.5		45 229.7	

Source: Model simulations.

cate that there is also considerable trade diversion occurs in this simulation.

Turning to the results for East-Asian integration, which are presented in table 7. Scollay and Gilbert (2001) discuss the Japan–Republic of Korea agreement as a possible base for formation of an East-Asian bloc. A situation is envisaged whereby this agreement expands to incorporate China (including Hong Kong,China), the economies of ASEAN and finally the economies of CER (although no claims are made as to the likelihood of these configurations actually occurring). The Japan-Republic of Korea simulation alone results in relatively small welfare effects for the participants (although larger than the other bilaterals considered above). The results are robust for Japan, less so for Republic of Korea. Significant welfare losses to are estimated to be imposed on non-members.

Expansion to include China substantially increases the total welfare gains, as well as the gains to the members of the preceding group. The estimates for China are, however, relatively small and apparently highly sensitive to the parameter assumptions (the Hong Kong, China results are larger and robust). The extent of welfare losses to non-members also rise, but fall as a proportion of member welfare gains. Bringing in ASEAN to the group again results in greater estimated mean net welfare gains to all existing members, and further welfare gains to the new members (although with the exceptions of Indonesia and Thailand, the estimated gains to ASEAN members are not very robust). Total member gains rise with this expansion also, as do non-member losses (though remaining roughly constant as a proportion of member gains).

The addition of CER results in a slightly different pattern. The estimated welfare of the new members rises (by a significant amount and with robust sign), but the estimated welfare of all the existing members falls (albeit only slightly). Total welfare to members again rises, and total welfare to non-members again

falls. Given that the economies of CER are efficient agricultural producers, this result is a little perplexing. Examination of the decomposition reveals that the previous members do gain from bringing in CER in allocative efficiency terms as a result of expansion of agricultural imports, as we would expect. It is small declines in the terms of trade as a result of losing their preferential access that account for the slight welfare declines (relative to the RTA without CER).

The final simulation, of APEC on an MFN basis, provides a benchmark for evaluating the size of the costs and benefits of the new RTA proposals. The estimated total welfare gains to APEC from MFN reform are larger than those of any other group considered, approached only by the other comprehensive East Asian bloc considered. However, they are quite sensitive for some economies (notably Canada, China, Malaysia and the United States). The choice of MFN reform under the banner of "open regionalism" ensures that trade diversion is not a possibility.

C. Contrasting the techniques

The next task is to consider whether or not the results of gravity model simulations and CGE simulations tell a consistent story in the case of the new Asia-Pacific RTA proposals. If there is a consistency, as well as being of analytical interest, this would present more grounds for confidence in the model predictions.

The bilaterals are begun with once again, the results for which are presented in tables 5 and 6. From the gravity model, the two Singapore agreements were shown to have a high degree of integration. The CGE simulation techniques, indicate what intuition might have led some to expect – small bilateral agreements like these within the APEC region are likely to have only marginal effects on the economic welfare of members and non-member alike, positive or negative. Whether the ar-

rangements are "natural" or not in the gravity sense appears to be of little consequence in these cases, although neither has any substantial trade diversion effect on non-members (the net effect on non-members of Singapore–United States being positive, but small).

There is a clear consistency in the case of Republic of Korea–Mexico. Here, the gravity model indicated that this was in no sense a natural trading bloc. The CGE simulation indicates negligible welfare gains (not even signable in the case of Mexico) from a preferential agreement, and also the presence of trade diversion. Hence, the gravity model and simulation techniques do appear to both identify this agreement as an unlikely candidate for a model RTA.

In the case of Japan-Canada, again the gravity model results do seem to coincide with the predictions of the simulation techniques, at least in the context of agricultural trade. The gravity simulations indicated a strong bias in agricultural trade, but little bias in other merchandise trade. The CGE simulations indicated positive (and large by the standards of the other bilaterals) net welfare gains to both Japan and Canada. Harberger (1971) has shown that the welfare effect of any change within a general equilibrium system can be expressed in terms of its component parts by measuring changes in movements of goods across existing distortions. GTAP implements this decomposition automatically using a set of routines developed by Huff and Hertel (1996). Examination of the results (not shown), indicates that Japan's welfare gain comes almost exclusively as a consequence of increased agricultural imports from Canada. Canada's gain, by contrast, comes almost exclusively from improved agricultural terms-of-trade with Japan (e.g. through increased exports). Hence, there is a consistency of results across the two techniques in this case. However, we note that the estimation of net welfare gains to the members does not rule out significant welfare losses to non-members in the simulation approach, and so while there is a degree of consistency, the simulation techniques do not support the supposition that natural blocs are less trade-diverting.

For the FTAA, the gravity model did seem to indicate an intra-regional trade bias once the overall openness of the economies was included in the model. The natural bloc identified in the gravity simulations did seem to coincide with estimated positive net welfare gains for FTAA members. However, for many of the economies the welfare gains are not very robust, and once again the results were not consistent with small welfare losses for non-members according to the simulation approach.

The East-Asian groups are considered next (tables 5 and 7). It will be recalled from the discussion above that there was little evidence from the gravity approach of strong integration between Japan and Republic of Korea, stronger evidence of integration between these two economies and China, stronger evidence still of integration between these three economies and ASEAN and finally strong evidence of integration between all of the East-Asian economies and CER in terms of agricultural trade (though not overall).

The results of the CGE simulations are again broadly consistent with the gravity results. The Japan–Republic of Korea simulation alone, results in relatively small welfare effects for the participants (at least relative to the size of these economies), and welfare losses to non-members. This fits with the gravity prediction that this is not a natural trading bloc. The addition of China/Hong Kong, China to the group, results in a very substantial increase in the net welfare of the members, composed of increases for both the original members and the new members. Again, this pattern matches with the increase in the degree of intra-regional trading bias (relative to Japan–Republic of Korea alone) that the gravity approach captures. The pattern repeated with the addition of ASEAN, an increase in welfare for the new members and the old is observed under the CGE simulation method, corresponding to the increase in the estimated RTA coefficient ob-

served under the gravity approach.

When the same grouping is simulated with the addition of CER, in the CGE simulations there is again observed that total welfare gains to members increases, but in contrast to the other expansions, the estimated welfare gain to existing members falls. The gravity model simulations indicated a small reduction in the overall degree of intra-regional bias in this case on overall trade. On agricultural trade, there was an increase in the intra-regional bias, matching the welfare gains associated with increased agricultural trade in this simulation.

Thus the estimated welfare effects of these RTAs on the members of the RTAs do match quite closely the results of the gravity analysis – changing in line with the gravity predictions. Do they lend support to the natural trading bloc hypothesis? The answer to that question is less clear cut. To the extent that the natural trading bloc hypothesis states that RTAs between "natural" partners are less trade diverting, the simulation results do not bear this out. In each case, the estimated trade diversion costs (in terms of welfare losses imposed on non-members) increases as the bloc becomes more "natural" according to the gravity definition. Moreover, since the pool of non-member economies is shrinking at each step, greater losses are being imposed on a smaller group of

non-members. It is difficult therefore to conclude that the simulation results support the desirability of "natural" blocs.

It may also be speculated that these results support a hypothesis more basic than the natural bloc. That is, they support the general hypothesis that large blocs are better than small ones (at least for the members involved). The reason is that the larger and more diverse the group of economies in the RTA, the more likely it will be that one of them is an efficient producer of each commodity, and the less likely it will therefore be that trade diversion will occur. The results of the final simulation certainly support this hypothesis. The estimated total welfare gains to APEC from MFN reform dwarf those of any other group considered, for members and non-members alike. Here the reform includes a large, diverse group of economies. Moreover, the choice of MFN reform under the banner of "open regionalism" ensures that trade diversion is not a possibility.

Overall, the comparison of a gravity type search for natural trading blocs, and the simulation approach to estimating the effects of proposed agreements seems to yield some connection, but does not support the hypothesis that natural blocs are less likely to be trade diverting. If anything, the natural trading blocs may be more likely to be welfare enhancing for the members.

V.   CONCLUDING COMMENTS

Both the gravity model and CGE approaches suggest that there may be significant welfare gains associated with some of the new RTA proposals in the Asia-Pacific region. These gains are largest when the group considered is large and diverse. The results for most of the bilateral agreements are somewhat less impressive. In many cases, there does appear to be a consistency between the "natural" bloc estimates of the gravity approach and the simulation estimates of welfare benefits to members (but not clearly to an absence of trade-diversion).

Do the results imply that the new RTAs should be actively promoted? Unfortunately, modeling work such as this cannot provide a definitive answer to this question. It is clear that the total benefits of liberalization within APEC on an MFN basis are substantially greater than those associated with any of the new RTA proposals. It is also clear from the simulation work that even where the RTAs have substantial net benefits for the member economies, they are likely to often impose substantial costs on non-members – including the remaining members of APEC. The key question is therefore the dynamic time-path question. Would the welfare costs imposed on non-members by these new agreements cause fractures within APEC that prevent the achievement of the Bogor goal? Or would they encourage conglomeration of the disparate blocs within APEC, which combined with gradual elimination of barriers to non-APEC members leads to the same end-point as APEC MFN? This will be an area of fruitful future research.

NOTES

[1]   The authors consider the effect of the European Union, NAFTA, AFTA, CER, MERCOSUR, the Andean Pact and APEC as part of their base scenario. They also consider the degree of integration between Japan, Republic of Korea, China, AFTA, CER and other economies in their analysis of new RTA proposals.

[2]   It should be noted that, because of the nature of the construction procedure of the GTAP database, the services data is not as "clean" as the time series data used in the merchandise trade simulations. Hence, the services results should be interpreted cautiously.

[3]   Modeling bilateral trade this way, when combined with transportation costs, is compatible with a gravity approach.

[4]   As this data is still a work in progress, there remain some anomalies. Among the most glaring are high output and import taxes in the manufactures sectors in Singapore and Hong Kong, China. These were eliminated prior to our main simulations.

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