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SUPPLEMENT FOR OCTOBER, NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER 1980

UNITED NATIONS

New York, 1982



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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/ . . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements of the Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

**CHECK LIST OF SECURITY COUNCIL DOCUMENTS ISSUED DURING THE PERIOD
1 OCTOBER-31 DECEMBER 1980**

NOTE. The titles of the documents printed in the present *Supplement* appear in bold type. Unless otherwise indicated, the documents remain mimeographed and are kept for archival purposes in the Dag Hammarskjöld Library.

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S/13737/Add. 38-51	3, 9, 17, 21 and 27 October, 3, 10, 17 and 26 November 2, 12, 19, 23 and 29 December 1980		Summary statement by the Secretary-General on matters of which the Security Council is seized and on the stage reached in their consideration		
S 14156/Add.1	22 October 1980	a	Special report of the Special Committee against <i>Apartheid</i> on implementation of United Nations resolutions on <i>apartheid</i> by Governments and inter-governmental organizations	Circulated under the double symbol A/35/22/Add.1-S/14156/Add.1 (see <i>Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 22A</i>)	
S 14156/Add.2	17 October 1980	a	Special report of the Special Committee against <i>Apartheid</i> on recent developments concerning relations between Israel and South Africa	Circulated under the double symbol A/35/22/Add.2-S/14156/Add.2 (see <i>Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 22A</i>)	
S 14156 Add.3	3 November 1980	a	Special report of the Special Committee against <i>Apartheid</i> on the <i>International Conference on Sanctions</i> against South Africa	Circulated under the double symbol A/35/22/Add.3-S/14156/Add.3 (see <i>Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 22A</i>)	
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S 14312	29 December 1980	i	Note by the Secretary-General transmitting the curricula vitae of candidates nominated by national groups	Circulated under the double symbol A 35-787-S 14312	
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- e Letter dated 1 September 1980 from the Permanent Representative of Malta to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council
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- g The situation in South-East Asia and its implications for international peace and security. [Letter dated 22 February 1979 from the representatives of Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the President of the Security Council (S/13111)]
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DOCUMENT S/14167/ADD.1

Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 473 (1980)

[Original: English/French]
[18 December 1980]

Since the issuance of his report on 12 September 1980 [S/14167], the Secretary-General has received replies to his note dated 2 July 1980 from the following 11 States: Czechoslovakia, France, Hungary, Iraq, Israel, Japan, Kuwait, New Zealand, Pakistan, Rwanda, Suriname.

The substantive parts of these replies are reproduced in the annex.

ANNEX

Replies received from States

CZECHOSLOVAKIA*

[Original: English]
[12 September 1980]

The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic does not maintain any relations with the *apartheid* régime of South Africa in the political, economic, military or any other field. Accordingly, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic has no contractual or licensing agreements with that régime relating to the manufacture, maintenance or supply of arms, ammunition, military equipment or vehicles.

The Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic fully supports resolutions 418 (1977) and 473 (1980) and the relevant authorities of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and all its organizations are scrupulously complying with all the provisions of these resolutions.

The Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic would like once again to assure the Secretary-General that it will continue to fulfil consistently all its obligations resulting from the decisions adopted in the United Nations in support of the struggle against *apartheid*. In this regard, it would like to reiterate its full support for the demands for further effective measures, under the terms of Chapter VII of the Charter, for the complete international isolation of the racist régime of South Africa and for its final liquidation. Of exceptional urgency currently is, in the view of the Czechoslovak Government, the adoption by the Security Council of necessary measures, in accordance with the Charter, to prohibit all forms of nuclear co-operation with the racist régime at Pretoria.

FRANCE

[Original: French]
[23 September 1980]

The Permanent Mission of France wishes to point out that, as stated in its notes verbales of 30 October 1978, 22 October 1979 and 27 May 1980 addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established by resolution 421 (1977), the French Government has, since the adoption of resolution 418 (1977), taken the necessary measures to put an end to the supply of all weapons and related *matériel* to South Africa. French arms exporters and manufacturers were informed of these measures on 6 December 1977, according to the applicable notification procedure.

Under the Decree-Law of 18 April 1939, the order of 2 April 1971 and the circulars concerning their implementation, the export of any armaments is subject in France to prior authorization by the competent Government authorities. No authorization of this kind has

been granted in respect of South Africa since 4 November 1977, the date of the adoption of Security Council resolution 418 (1977). Moreover, all previously granted authorizations have been revoked.

HUNGARY^b

[Original: English]
[29 September 1980]

The Hungarian People's Republic, by the nature of its social system, attaches great importance to the complete elimination of all forms of racism and colonialism. Accordingly, in keeping with its policy of principle, consistent with the provisions of earlier relevant United Nations resolutions, the Hungarian People's Republic terminated all its trade activities and broke off relations of all kinds with the Pretoria régime in 1963, by virtue of a Government decision, as we stated on 13 December 1977, [S/12485] on 14 July 1978 [S/12810] and on 9 July 1979.^c

Reaffirming the validity of the decision referred to above, the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic would like to lay stress upon the fact that Hungary has never shipped any kind of weapons to South Africa and has not entered into any contractual arrangements with it promoting the manufacture of military equipment, and that the Hungarian position of principles in these matters will consistently be maintained.

The Government of the Hungarian People's Republic would like once again to assure the Secretary-General that it will strictly abide by the provisions of United Nations resolutions adopted in support of the struggle against *apartheid*. In this regard it would like to reiterate its full assistance for the demands for further effective measures under Chapter VII of the Charter for the complete isolation and final liquidation of the racist régime of South Africa.

IRAQ

[Original: English]
[8 September 1980]

Iraq reiterates its decision stated in its letter dated 16 January 1978 [S/12535].

ISRAEL

[Original: English]
[16 September 1980]

The Permanent Representative of Israel wishes to reconfirm Israel's undertaking of 3 April 1978 [S/12475/Add.1] to comply with resolution 418 (1977).

JAPAN^d

[Original: English]
[17 September 1980]

The Permanent Representative of Japan has the honour to inform the Secretary-General of the following measures which the Government of Japan has taken for the strict implementation of resolution 418 (1977).

As part of its national policy, Japan has long adhered to its general principles on arms embargo, and has accordingly prohibited the

^b See S/14204.

^c See A AC.115 L.513.

^d See S/14188.

* See S/14177.

provision, by Japanese nationals or corporate bodies, of arms and related equipment not only to South Africa but to the rest of the world.

In August 1958, even prior to any Security Council resolution on this matter, the Government of Japan amended its Export Trade Control Order (Cabinet Order No. 378), thereby unilaterally subjecting South Africa to arms export control.

In 1963, the Security Council adopted resolutions 181 (1963) and 182 (1963), which call upon all States to cease forthwith the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition of all types and military vehicles to South Africa, as well as the sale and shipment of equipment and material for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition to South Africa. In 1964, the Council, by its resolution 191 (1964), reaffirmed the preceding two resolutions. Further, in 1970, it adopted resolution 282 (1970) which, in addition to reaffirming the above three resolutions, calls upon all States to strengthen the arms embargo by revoking all licences and military patents granted to South Africa, and by prohibiting investment in, or technical assistance for, the manufacture of arms and ammunition, aircraft and naval craft or other military vehicles. These resolutions are not of a mandatory character; nevertheless, the Government of Japan, as announced in its replies to the Secretary-General's inquiries contained in the Secretary-General's reports of 11 October 1963 [S/5438], of 21 April 1964 [S/5658/Add.1] and of 15 December 1970,¹ has consistently and faithfully imposed the arms embargo against South Africa.

In November 1977, the Security Council further adopted resolution 418 (1977) and finally imposed a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa. While, to the best of its knowledge, there exists no licensing arrangement between Japan and South Africa for the manufacture of arms, the Government of Japan has taken the following measures legally to ensure the implementation of the same resolution with regard to the granting of licensing arrangements.

The Cabinet Order concerning control of foreign exchange, which is the legal mechanism to deal with contracts concluded with foreigners on services (including technical assistance) was revised so as to allow for the exclusion of transactions with South Africa from the principle of liberalizing foreign transactions, including contracts on services.

More specifically, the competent Ministers, in accordance with the provisions of the said Cabinet Order, have designated technical assistance concerning the manufacture of arms such as firearms, ammunition, military vehicles and equipment as a category of transactions requiring their approval. It has been decided that the Ministers will not approve such transactions if made with South Africa.

For the purpose of drawing public attention to this matter, the translation of the entire text of resolution 418 (1977) was carried in the *Official Gazette* of 30 March 1978, and the above-mentioned measures were announced in the *Official Gazette* of 30 and 31 March 1978, and put into effect as of 1 April 1978.

The Government of Japan reaffirms its intention to continue its efforts in co-operation with the international community for the abolishment of the *apartheid* policy of South Africa.

KUWAIT

(Original: English)
(16 September 1980)

Kuwait has no diplomatic, consular, trade, cultural or any other relations with South Africa nor will it agree to the establishment of such relations until South Africa renounces its policy of *apartheid*, which is a crime against humanity, and until South Africa recognizes the independence of Namibia.

Kuwait regularly makes contributions to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa, the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa, the United Nations Fund for Namibia, and the Trust Fund for Publicity Against *Apartheid*.

The mass media in Kuwait give sufficient coverage to reports about the atrocities committed by South Africa and will use all possible means and opportunities to expose the policy of South Africa.

NEW ZEALAND

(Original: English)
(15 September 1980)

In response to resolution 282 (1970), New Zealand voluntarily implemented an arms embargo against South Africa with the promulgation, on 15 March 1971, of the Customs Export Prohibition Order 1971. That Order prohibits the export to South Africa of arms, ammunition, vehicles and equipment for the use of armed forces or paramilitary organizations. The Permanent Representative also confirms that there is no co-operation with South Africa in the manufacture and development of nuclear weapons.

PAKISTAN

(Original: English)
(14 October 1980)

Ever since independence in 1947, Pakistan has firmly opposed South Africa's repressive and inhuman policies of *apartheid* and racial discrimination and has consistently supported all actions and resolutions of the United Nations calling upon the Government of South Africa to put an end to its racist policies, which are contrary to the provision of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Pakistan has never established diplomatic relations with the racist minority régime in South Africa nor does it intend to do so. Pakistan has also imposed a complete embargo on trade with South Africa.

Pakistan does not grant landing and passage facilities to South African aircraft and has closed Pakistani ports to use by vessels flying the South African flag. Pakistan has banned the sale of arms, ammunition and all types of military vehicles and other strategic goods to South Africa. Pakistan does not sell or ship equipment and material for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition in South Africa. This was the consistent policy of Pakistan even before the passage of Security Council resolution 418 (1977), which Pakistan supports fully.

In response to resolution 473 (1980), Pakistan calls upon the Pretoria régime to take measures immediately to eliminate *apartheid* and grant to all South African citizens equal rights in every sphere of life and a full and free voice to determine their own destiny.

In compliance with the resolutions and recommendations of the General Assembly and the Security Council, Pakistan has also suspended all cultural, educational, and sports exchanges with South Africa.

RWANDA

(Original: French)
(6 November 1980)

Ever since the Republic of Rwanda realized that the intensification of hostile acts of aggression and armed invasion perpetrated against neighbouring countries by the racist regime of South Africa might endanger international peace, it has spared no effort to condemn the *apartheid* policy practised by South Africa.

The Government of Rwanda also deplores the refusal of the South African Government to comply with the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. For that reason, it has taken a firm decision never to establish diplomatic or other relations of military, economic or technical co-operation with that State.

In conformity with the spirit of resolution 473 (1980), calling for an arms embargo against South Africa, the Government of Rwanda has repeatedly appealed for a strict arms embargo. It should be noted that it is not itself an arms producer. Moreover, the Government of Rwanda will not facilitate the sale or shipment of any weapons, munitions or military vehicles from or to South Africa.

SURINAM

(Original: English)
(16 December 1980)

Suriname remains consistent and firm in its opposition to the *apartheid* system of South Africa. For these reasons, the Govern-

¹ See S 14233.

² See S 14299.

ment of Suriname entertains no relations whatsoever with South Africa and does not intend to establish relations with that country as long as it practices the criminal system of *apartheid*.

Suriname does not manufacture arms or ammunition. Its long-standing strict legislation on the import, sale and transit of arms and

ammunition sufficiently enables it to implement the arms embargo of resolution 418 (1977) and does not require enactment of additional legislative measures.

Suriname remains committed to the arms embargo against South Africa and will continue its strict observance.

DOCUMENT S/14206

Letter dated 1 October 1980 from the representative of Iran to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[1 October 1980]

I have the honour to enclose herewith the text of a message in reply to your letter of 22 September 1980 from His Excellency Mr. Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

It would be appreciated if the enclosed text could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Jamal SHEMIRANI
Chargé d'affaires
of the Permanent Mission of Iran
to the United Nations

LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT OF IRAN ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have received your letter of 22 September 1980 and the text of Security Council resolution 479 (1980) adopted on 28 September. While I wish to express to you our appreciation for your initiatives which derive from your personal convictions and responsibilities, I would like to clarify the position of the Islamic Republic of Iran concerning the present dispute with the Republic of Iraq.

From the very beginning of our revolutionary victory on 11 February 1978, the Government of Iraq has been violating the term of the Algiers agreement of 1975 by sending Iraqi agents and armed units across our western and south-western borders into the provinces of Khuzistan and Kurdistan for the purposes of committing acts of sabotage and assisting counter-revolutionary groups. Furthermore, during the past 20 months Iraq has been a haven for the remnants of the previous régime and other reactionary and criminal elements involved in propagandistic and terrorist activities against the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The expulsion of more than 40,000 Iraqis of Iranian origin or Shiite persuasion from Iraq and their abandonment on our soil last March and April was another indication of Iraqi hostility towards the Islamic Republic of Iran. This violation of human rights was reported to your office but unfortunately no condemnation of this massive inhumanity was issued by any organ of the United Nations.

For months prior to the 22 September attack, there were indications that Iraq was preparing to escalate its

hostile acts against Iran. The unusual movements of Iraqi troops along our common borders during the past month testifies to the premeditated character of the Iraqi design.

In response to the above developments we made no move to provoke Iraq or show any desire to confront it militarily. We could not believe that the Iraqi authorities intended to wage an all-out war of aggression. Our non-aggressive posture can be demonstrated by the fact that we were unprepared to contain or detect the Iraqi attacks against our air bases and airports on 22 September. But, once the Iraqi intention and design became actualized, we retaliated with necessary force. By waging a war of aggression inside our territory and striking against our vital interests, the Iraqi Government left us no choice but that of self-defence in order to secure our sovereignty and protect our interest.

The Security Council resolution has been adopted at a time when the Government of Iraq has waged a war of aggression in clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations and all other norms of international behavior. It is evident that the Iraqi claims are nothing but baseless propaganda to misguide international public opinion.

The character and sequence of the Iraqi armed aggression, in particular, the aerial attacks on industrial installations and populated areas, is a vivid example of the true nature and ambitions of the Iraqi authorities, who, after such grave violations of all legal and moral standards, have now deceptively used the peaceful initiative of the United Nations.

Based on the facts and considerations mentioned herein, while the Iraqi war of aggression against the Islamic Republic of Iran is continuing, the proposals suggested in your letter and contained in the Security Council resolution cannot be considered by our Government. So long as Iraq is in violation of our territorial sovereignty and Iraqi agents are involved in acts of aggression and sabotage within our boundaries, we see no use in any discussion, directly or indirectly, concerning the conflict between the two countries.

(Signed) Abolhassan BANI-SADR
President of the
Islamic Republic of Iran

Letter dated 29 September 1980 from the representative of Morocco
to the Secretary-General

[Original: Arabic/French]
[8 October 1980]

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the Arabic text of the final communiqué of the special session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers on the question of Al-Quds (Jerusalem), held at Fez (Morocco) from 8 to 10 Dhu'l-Qa'ada 1400 A.H. (from 18 to 20 September 1980).

I should be grateful if you would have this text distributed as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mehdi MRANI ZENAR
Permanent Representative of Morocco
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Final communiqué of the special session of the Islamic Conference of
Foreign Ministers on the Question of Jerusalem

The special session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers was held in the city of Fez, Kingdom of Morocco, from 8 to 10 Dhu'l-Qa'ada 1400 A.H. (from 18 to 20 September 1980) on the recommendation of the Jerusalem Committee, which met from 5 to 7 Shawwal 1400 A.H. (from 16 to 18 August 1980) in the City of Casablanca at the request of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

This special session was honoured by His Majesty King Hassan II of Morocco, His Excellency Al-Hajj Ahmed Sékou Touré, President of the Revolutionary People's Republic of Guinea, and His Excellency President Léopold Sédar Senghor of the Republic of Senegal.

The following participated in the work of the session:

- Secretariat of the Organization of the Islamic Conference,
- People's Democratic Republic of Algeria;
- State of Bahrain;
- People's Republic of Cameroon;
- Republic of Djibouti;
- Gabonese Republic;
- Republic of the Gambia;
- Revolutionary People's Republic of Guinea;
- Republic of Indonesia;
- Republic of Iraq;
- Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan;
- State of Kuwait;
- Lebanese Republic;
- Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
- Malaysia;
- Republic of Maldives;
- Republic of Mali;
- Islamic Republic of Mauritania;
- Kingdom of Morocco;
- Republic of the Niger;
- Sultanate of Oman;
- Islamic Republic of Pakistan;
- Palestine;
- State of Qatar;
- Kingdom of Saudi Arabia;
- Republic of Senegal;
- Somali Democratic Republic;
- Democratic Republic of the Sudan;
- Syrian Arab Republic.

- Republic of Chad;
 - Republic of Tunisia;
 - Republic of Turkey;
 - Republic of Uganda;
 - United Arab Emirates;
 - Yemen Arab Republic;
 - People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.
- The session was also attended by His Excellency Mr. Rauf Denktaş, President of the Turkish Cypriot Muslim community, as an observer.

His Excellency President Al-Hajj Ahmed Sékou Touré made a notable statement in which he explained the gravity of the current situation with regard to the question of Jerusalem and Palestine and indicated that the Israeli decision to annex Jerusalem posed a challenge to humanity as a whole. He also emphasized that the city of Jerusalem could not become the property of Israel.

His Excellency then drew attention to the fact that Islam derived its strength not from weapons but rather from its intrinsic nature as a religious faith, an ideology and a code of behaviour and morality. He called for strict adherence to those lofty principles which would ensure the achievement of victory and the recovery of Jerusalem.

His Excellency went on to explain the Islamic principles which guaranteed the identity and the creative abilities of Muslims, wherever they might be, and which made every Muslim an integral member of his society from which he could be neither detached nor isolated.

His Excellency Mr. Muhammad Shamsul Hug, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bangladesh, then read the text of a telegram from His Excellency President Ziaur Rahman of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, in his capacity as a member of the Summit Committee on Jerusalem established at the special session of the Jerusalem Committee at Casablanca, addressed to His Majesty King Hassan II, in which he expressed his deep regret at not being able to join King Hassan II and President Al-Hajj Ahmed Sékou Touré and participate in that special session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers in view of the dreadful floods which his country had experienced.

President Rahman stressed that both he and the people of Bangladesh attached the greatest importance to the work of the session and that they wished to express their full solidarity with their Arab and Muslim brothers.

President Senghor made a statement in which he indicated that his country had been among the first to recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization following the resolution of the Arab summit conference at Rabat which designated the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

President Senghor condemned the Israeli decision to annex Jerusalem. He stressed that Jerusalem was a Holy City not only for the Jews but also for the Christians and Muslims and that 2 billion Muslims and Christians, constituting half the population of the world, were today protesting at the challenge with which Israel was confronting them.

He then emphasized that it would be better for the Conference to base itself on the legal and moral reasons mentioned when justifying its demand, at the United Nations, for the return of the city of Jerusalem to its former status prior to 1967.

King Hassan II of Morocco then gave an edifying address which he began by quoting the Qur'anic verse:

"... and deploy against them whatever forces and cavalry you are able to muster, so that you may cast fear into the heart of the enemy of God and your enemy".

King Hassan II explained that, in Islam, "jihad" should not be interpreted as signifying holy wars or crusades but rather as strategic military and political action and psychological warfare which, if applied by the Muslim community, would guarantee victory over the enemy.

* Circulated under the double symbol A 35 508 & 14207

He declared that Islam yielded not to force or tyranny, but only to the omnipotence of God and to the power of reason, and that the recent Zionist decision had affected the Islamic world, since the Islamic religion and the noble ethics propounded by the Prophet had taught us not to become angry unless the sanctuaries of God were violated. What crime could be greater than the violation of Jerusalem, the first of the two *qiblas* to which men turned in prayer and the third most holy shrine in Islam?

In the name of the Islamic community, King Hassan II assured his brothers, the Palestinian freedom-fighters, that it was not only they who had lost Jerusalem. The entire Islamic world shared its loss and would participate in its recovery. The obligation to safeguard Jerusalem rested not only with the Palestinians but with every Muslim man and woman.

King Hassan II expressed his conviction that the forthcoming Islamic summit conference, due to be held at Mecca in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, would be a rallying point for all Muslims and would eliminate existing antagonisms within the Arab world. His Majesty called for the intensification of efforts, the closing of ranks and the exploitation of mistakes made by the enemy, emphasizing that joint action was preferable to individual endeavours and that collective thought, planning and organization were the best ways to facilitate the achievement of the objective.

The Conference was then addressed by His Excellency Mr. Habib Chatti, Secretary-General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, who referred to recent events and developments affecting the question of Jerusalem since the Eleventh Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, held at Islamabad, and the reactions which they had elicited in Arab, Islamic and international circles.

He also indicated that it was incumbent on the session to determine the fields in which the resources of the Islamic world should be fully mobilized so that the jihad could enter a more effective practical stage in response to their peoples' desire for jihad, especially since they had international public opinion on their side in the battle in view of their resolute stand and firm determination to press on in the face of Israel, despite the expansionist designs of that entity which was usurping the rights of the Islamic world.

In conclusion, the Secretary-General commended the endeavours being made by King Hassan II who, in his capacity as Chairman of the Jerusalem Committee, was motivated by his customary lofty Islamic spirit and by his characteristic zeal, courage and valour in defence of the sublime ideas derived from religious faith.

His Excellency Mr. Agha Shahi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, then addressed the Conference in his capacity as Chairman of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers. He stressed that, at its last meeting at Casablanca, the Jerusalem Committee had adopted a comprehensive plan of action to be implemented by the Islamic States at the national and international levels and through the United Nations with a view to stopping Israel from resorting to the use of force and repression to complete the annexation of the city of Jerusalem and entirely obliterate its Islamic and Christian character.

He emphasized that the cause of Palestine had reached a critical and explosive stage and that there was a consequent need for positive and responsible action on the part of the Islamic Conference. He indicated that a change was taking place in favour of the cause of Palestine. The abstention of the European States in the vote on the resolution relating to Palestine during the special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the subsequent sponsoring of a draft resolution on Jerusalem by the European States members of the Security Council and the condemnation of Israeli policy by major religious groups such as the World Council of Churches were all indicators of an increasing recognition of the just position on that issue.

In conclusion, he commended the role played by King Hassan II, the initial founder of the Islamic Conference and the guiding spirit and constant inspiration of that Organization, and thanked both Presidents Al Hajj Ahmed Sekou Toure and Leopold Sédar Senghor for attending the session and for their commitment to the liberation of Jerusalem and the struggle of the Palestinian people.

The Conference unanimously elected His Excellency Mr. M Hamed Boucetta, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of the Kingdom of Morocco, as Chairman of the special session and His Excellency Mr. Fathulla Jameel, Minister for External Affairs of the Republic of Maldives, as first Vice-Chairman and His Excellency Mr. Hamid Al-Gabid, Secretary of State for

Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Niger as second Vice-Chairman and His Excellency Mr. Agha Shahi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, as Rapporteur of the Conference.

During its plenary sessions, the Conference was addressed by a number of heads of delegations who expressed the views of their countries with regard to the question of Jerusalem and the question of Palestine in general and it became clear that opinion was unanimously in favour of the achievement by the Muslim world of its objectives, namely the liberation of Jerusalem from the evil clutches of Zionism and the realization of the legitimate national right of the Palestinian people to return to its homeland, to self-determination without external interference and to the establishment of its independent State on its national soil.

Opinion was also unanimous with regard to the need to abandon the customary adoption of resolutions based on the condemnation and censure of Israeli attitudes and arbitrary acts in favour of the adoption of resolutions specifying bold, positive and effective steps to meet the Zionist challenge and to ensure the consolidation and co-ordination of all the capacities and resources of the Islamic States to that end.

The Conference authorized the Chairman of the special session to send a telegram to His Excellency President Ziaur Rahman of the People's Republic of Bangladesh expressing the sympathy and solidarity of the Islamic peoples following the loss of life and property resulting from the floods which had devastated certain areas of the sister country of Bangladesh.

The Chairman informed the Conference that he had received a letter from the Eritrean Liberation Front (People's Liberation Forces) requesting support from the Islamic Conference in their struggle to liberate the people of Eritrea.

Working papers were submitted to the Conference by the following:

- Kingdom of Morocco;
- Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan;
- Palestine Liberation Organization and Syrian Arab Republic;
- Republic of Iraq.

A drafting committee was formed from the following delegations:

- Islamic Republic of Pakistan;
- Palestine Liberation Organization;
- Syrian Arab Republic;
- Kingdom of Morocco;
- Kingdom of Saudi Arabia;
- Republic of Iraq;
- Republic of Senegal;
- United Republic of Cameroon;
- People's Republic of Bangladesh;
- Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

During the discussion and consideration of the working papers submitted and during the review of the situation resulting from the decision by the Israeli Knesset to annex Jerusalem, the Conference expressed its deep appreciation of the efforts made by His Majesty King Hassan II, Chairman of the Jerusalem Committee, for the liberation of Jerusalem and the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories. The Conference also gave its blessing and support to the content of the Saudi-Iraqi communiqué issued at Taif, to the efforts made by all the member States and, in particular, to the Syrian communiqué to the Arab League and the note from the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

The Conference expressed its support for the steadfastness of Syria in the face of the parties to the Camp David accords. The Conference also expressed its censure and condemnation of the Zionist campaign against the Islamic States and, in particular, Iraq because of the programme adopted by those States for the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes with a view to the development of their scientific and technological capabilities. The Conference stressed that those threats had assumed serious dimensions and had led to a further escalation of tension in the Middle East. The Conference called upon world public opinion to condemn those threats, stressed the right of the Islamic States and the developing countries in general to acquire and use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and recommended co-operation among the Islamic States in the field of the acquisition and utilization of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

At the conclusion of its work, the Conference expressed its deep gratitude and appreciation to the King, Government and people of Morocco for their kind hospitality and for their efforts which had been highly instrumental in ensuring the success of the Conference's work.

As an expression of the determination of the Islamic States to meet the Israeli challenge and of their resolve to liberate Jerusalem and recover the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories, the Conference approved a resolution containing the following major points:

RESOLUTION

The Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, meeting in special session, on the recommendation of the Jerusalem Committee, in the city of Fez from 8 to 10 Dhu'l-Qa'ada 1400 A.H. (from 18 to 20 September 1980), studied the grave situation facing the question of Jerusalem and Palestine as a result of the adoption by the Israeli Knesset of its decision to annex the city of Jerusalem as the "undivided and eternal capital" of the Zionist entity and regarded that decision as an open challenge to the sentiments of Muslims, as an act of aggression directed against the Islamic States and as a confirmation of Israel's refusal to be bound by the recent Security Council resolution 478 (1980) declaring null and void all Israeli legislative and administrative measures and actions which have altered or purport to alter the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem and calling for their rescission forthwith.

Whereas the Islamic States are committed to meet this challenge, intent on the liberation of Jerusalem and resolved to secure Arab Islamic sovereignty over the Holy City, and in affirmation of their support for the people of Palestine, their determination to face up to this Israeli aggression with all the potential and resources at their disposal and their resolve to continue to provide support for the heroic struggle of the people of Palestine until Jerusalem is liberated and the Palestinian people recover their inalienable rights, including their right to return, to self-determination and to the establishment of their independent State on their territory, and in keeping with the spirit of Islamic solidarity, the Conference adopted the following resolution:

1. Adoption of the recommendations and resolutions formulated by the Jerusalem Committee at its special meeting held at Casablanca and the commitment of the Islamic States to their implementation.

2. Affirmation of the commitment of the Islamic States to the utilization of all their political, financial, oil and military resources to counter the Israeli decision to annex Jerusalem and confirmation that the political and economic boycott will be applied to States which recognize the Israeli decision, contribute to its implementation or establish embassies at Jerusalem.

3. The Conference calls upon all States not to have dealings with the Israeli authorities in any form which might be construed by those authorities as constituting recognition of a fait accompli at Jerusalem and the other occupied Palestinian and Arab territories and consequently render them liable to the provisions of the boycott.

4. The Conference welcomes Security Council resolution 478 (1980) and calls upon the Council to take the necessary measures for the imposition against Israel of the military and economic sanctions specified in the Charter of the United Nations.

5. The Conference expresses its complete satisfaction at the way in which States have responded by transferring their embassies from Jerusalem, thereby recognizing the invalidity and illegality of the Israeli decision, and notes that the compliance by all States with the call of the Islamic States for the transfer of their embassies from Jerusalem emphasizes the unanimous rejection by the international community of the Israeli action in annexing Jerusalem and making it the capital of their entity.

6. The Conference notes with satisfaction the position adopted by the Federal Government of Switzerland in declining to sign an agreement with Israel at Jerusalem and hopes that all States will follow that example.

7. Affirmation that the Islamic States will assist the Palestine Liberation Organization with every means at their disposal and will provide that Organization with the support needed to face up to the war of aggression which Israel is launching against the Palestinian people in occupied Palestine and southern Lebanon with a view to its liquidation and annihilation. The Conference condemns Israeli

aggression against southern Lebanon and calls upon member States to help the Lebanese Government to stop such acts of aggression.

8. Material and political support for the Palestinian Arab people both within and outside its occupied homeland and the strengthening of its abilities to counter the schemes of the autonomy conspiracy and to resist the occupation and its racist practices.

9. The Conference calls upon States members of the Islamic Conference which previously recognized Israel to withdraw such recognition and to sever all their political and economic relations with Israel.

10. Continued resistance to the procedures and accords formulated at Camp David until they are abandoned and rendered abortive.

11. The Conference emphasizes its condemnation of the policy of the United States of America for the support which it is giving to the Israeli occupation authorities in their settlement practices and in their acts of aggression against Islamic Holy Places in the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories and for the positions which it has adopted in favour of Israel and against Palestinian rights in international fora in a manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, with the resolutions of the General Assembly and with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Any support for the Zionist entity in its illegal occupation and in its aggression against the Holy Places, whether openly or secretly, directly or indirectly, represents defiance of the Islamic world.

12. Non-acceptance of any political settlement to resolve the question of Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict while the balance of power is disturbed as a result of the signing of the accords at Camp David and Washington (the Egyptian-Israeli treaty) and Israeli practices; considering Security Council resolution 242 (1967) as incompatible with Arab and Islamic rights and as an inappropriate basis for a solution of the Middle East crisis and, in particular, of the question of Palestine; adherence to the implementation of United Nations resolutions concerning the question of Palestine and, in particular, resolution ES-7/2 adopted by the General Assembly at its seventh emergency special session and the rejection of any initiatives which are incompatible with those resolutions.

13. The undertaking of political action at the United Nations and with the great Powers, particularly the European group, with a view to winning more support for the Palestinian cause and increasing the isolation of Israel.

14. Endeavours to obtain the adoption by the General Assembly at its current session of a resolution requesting an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice regarding Israeli practices and measures in violation of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people and regarding the acts of aggression committed by the Israeli authorities against the Palestinian people in Palestine and the occupied Arab territories, provided that the procedures for the submission of the request for the advisory opinion shall not prejudice the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people and that this shall be done with the approval of the Palestine Liberation Organization, sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

15. Calling upon the General Assembly to decline to accept the credentials of the Israeli delegation to the United Nations on the grounds that it represents a Government which is violating international legality and making Jerusalem its capital.

16. Requesting the great Powers and international organizations to shoulder their responsibilities and to face up to the Israeli challenge by imposing sanctions against Israel in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

17. The Conference calls upon all States to endeavour to prevent Jewish emigration to the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories in view of the Zionist policy of settlement in those territories and Israel's persistence in refusing to recognize the Palestinian people's right to return to its homeland, to exercise its right of self-determination and sovereignty and to establish its independent State on their national soil.

18. Intensification of contacts with the Vatican and Christian bodies with a view to explaining the Islamic position with regard to the recent Israeli decision and calling upon them to support the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people and to recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization.

19. The conducting of an extensive information campaign to censure the Israeli decision, and endeavours to implement the information plan to meet the Israeli challenge.

20. Calling upon member States to halt their loans and contributions to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank unless the latter agree to accept the Palestine Liberation Organization as a member with observer status.

21. The establishment of an Islamic office for the boycott of Israel to implement the resolutions of the Islamic Conference in this regard, provided that there is co-ordination between that office and the Principal Office for the Boycott of Israel established by the secretariat of the League of Arab States.

22. Coverage of the capital of the Jerusalem Fund and consideration of the Fund as a religious endowment.

23. The Islamic States declare their commitment to a holy "jihad" with all its broad human implications of steadfastness and resistance against the Zionist enemy on all fronts, whether military, political, economic, informational or cultural.

24. Assigning the Jerusalem Committee with the task of preparing a comprehensive plan for the mobilization of all the resources of the Islamic States to counter Israeli aggression, referring the contents of the Palestinian-Syrian working paper concerning economic, military and political issues to that Committee, and the submission of that plan to the forthcoming Islamic summit conference to be held in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

DOCUMENT S/14208

Letter dated 3 October 1980 from the representative of Lebanon to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[3 October 1980]

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to draw your attention, once more, to a number of acts of aggression and violations committed by Israel against Lebanon:

1. Israel built a road east of Labbouneh, 500 metres from the common border, inside Lebanon.

2. Israel laid a minefield south of Maroun er-Ras on the Lebanese side of the internationally recognized boundary.

3. Another road inside Lebanon was also built by Israel south of the village of Aadeisse.

4. Israeli artillery shelled El-Bass in the vicinity of Tyre, resulting in wounding two persons and destroying 12 houses. Israeli aircraft overflew the area. Both incidents occurred on 29 September.

5. On 30 September Israeli artillery again shelled the villages of Kfar Tibnit, Zefia, Arnoun and the

"Christian quarter" in Tyre. Preliminary reports speak of material losses and damage to the Greek Catholic bishopric of Tyre.

6. Just today, Israeli gunners shelled the city of Sidon. One woman was wounded, and a home was demolished.

My Government wishes to protest very strongly against this recurrent violence, which is a blatant violation of the Lebanese-Israeli Armistice Agreement of 1949, of the Charter of the United Nations and of Security Council resolutions.

I would be grateful if you could have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council under the item "The situation in the Middle East".

(Signed) Ghassan TUENI
Permanent Representative of Lebanon
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/14209*

Letter dated 29 September 1980 from the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[7 October 1980]

I wish to draw your attention to the latest developments in the case of the Mayors of Hebron and Halhoul and the Sharia Judge of Hebron who were arbitrarily expelled by the Israeli military authorities from their respective cities. Since their expulsion, Israel, in defiance of Security Council resolutions 468 (1980) and 469 (1980), has refused to permit them to return and to resume their functions for which they were popularly elected and appointed.

The expulsion of the Mayors and of the Sharia Judge has been recognized as one more in a series of violations of the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949,¹ and in particular of article 49, which reads

"Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the occupying power, or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive."

This notwithstanding, the Supreme Court of Israel has now, while criticizing the Government's action, upheld, by a split verdict, the expulsion of the Mayors and of the Sharia Judge of Hebron not on legal grounds but for considerations of security. It has also ruled that the Mayors, but not the Sharia Judge, have the right to appeal to an Israeli military review committee, not in person but by proxy. The hearing of that appeal has been fixed for Wednesday, 8 October 1980.

Resolutions 468 (1980) and 469 (1980) of the Security Council called upon the Government of Israel, as the occupying power, to rescind the illegal measures taken

* Circulated under the double symbol A 35 513-S 14209.
¹ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75, p. 287.

and to facilitate the immediate return of those Palestinian leaders.

The action against these Palestinian leaders taken by the Government of Israel through its judicial organs seems to be a regrettable and provocative continuation of illegal measures referred to by the Security Council. Moreover, it would also appear to be contrary to the very essence of judicial practice if the subjects of the appeal are not permitted to appear at the hearing of such an appeal. As long as the Government of Israel maintains even a facade of judicial procedure, it would appear at the very least that these Palestinian leaders should be permitted to be present at the hearing of their appeal.

Paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 469 (1980) requested you, as Secretary-General, *inter alia*, to continue your efforts in order to ensure the immediate implementation of that resolution. It would appear to the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable

Rights of the Palestinian People that convincing the Government of Israel that it should permit these eminent, elected Palestinian leaders to return to their cities and to participate in the appeal of their case would be a positive and judicially correct step towards the implementation of the resolution.

I shall be glad, therefore, if you could exercise your good offices in an attempt to attain this objective—a small measure, perhaps, against the total requirement of the restoration of legitimate Palestinian rights, but one on which the international community is united.

May I request that this letter be circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Falilou KANE
Chairman of the Committee on the
Exercise of the Inalienable Rights
of the Palestinian People

DOCUMENT S/14210

Letter dated 6 October 1980 from the representative of Iraq to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[7 October 1980]

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to enclose herewith a declaration issued by the Revolutionary Command Council of the Republic of Iraq on 5 October 1980.

I would kindly request that this declaration be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Salah Omar Al-Ali
Permanent Representative of Iraq
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Declaration by the Revolutionary Command Council (Sunday, 5 October 1980)

Iraqi troops continue their march, inflicting further defeats on the Persian enemy in view of its non-response to Iraq's unilateral truce that began early Sunday. Iraq will continue its honourable and just battle, whatever the sacrifices, to restore its rights and the rights of the Arab nation.

Iraq, which has proved its ability to achieve victory, has leaned towards peace and goodness from a position of strength, but the racist Persian clique has tried to describe this position as being due to weakness.

The acts of the Iranian authorities have proved their insistence on continuing their aggressive and expansionist ambitions, neglecting their responsibility towards their people and the peoples of the world.

The reaction of the Teheran authorities to the Iraqi initiative to cease all military operations on the ground, air and sea was a continuation of their aggressive operations against our armed forces in the battlefield and over the Iraqi territories. Iranian ground forces have waged assaults on our forces, their war planes have raided our civilian areas inside Iraqi territories, and their naval forces have committed similar acts in the water.

The Iraqi Government announces before the world, with good intentions and adherence to its principles and its sincere will to spare bloodshed and achieve a just solution, its adherence to the announcement of Iraq's President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (on 28 September 1980), in which he affirmed Iraq's immediate preparedness to cease fire if Iran adhered to that sincere appeal, and announced Iraq's readiness to negotiate with Iran to

achieve a just and honourable solution that would guarantee our rights and principles. The Iranian Government must clearly, legally and practically recognize Iraq's historic rights to its lands and waters, adhere to a policy of good neighbourly relations, renounce its racist aggressive and expansionist trends that interfere in the internal affairs of the region's countries and return every inch of Iraqi lands that it usurped, in addition to acknowledging the rights of Iraq and the Arab nation.

Despite the fact that the Iranian authorities have refused the good initiative, which is highly appreciated by the Organization of the Islamic Conference and international friendly circles, and in spite of Khomeini's rejection of a cease-fire, the Iraqi Government has adhered to its obligation towards the Islamic States and the world. The Iraqi President and Commander-in-Chief of the Iraqi Armed Forces has ordered our forces to cease ground, air and naval military operations, effective at dawn on Sunday, 5 October.

The Teheran rulers have not responded to this initiative but have continued their aggressive operations against our armed forces.

Iraq, which was compelled to enter into war in retaliation for continued Iranian acts of aggression, has always emphasized its keenness on maintaining peace and preventing bloodshed, in order to reach a just solution that guarantees the legal rights over its lands and waters, as well as the rights of the Arab nation.

Stemming from military potency and brave victories on the battlefield, President Husseini, in his historical speech last Sunday, announced Iraq's readiness to cease fire and start negotiation with the Iranian side directly or through a third party or international commission or organization which we respect and have confidence in.

Following the United Nations Security Council resolution calling for a cease fire on the same day, Iraq expressed its readiness to comply with that resolution in a message sent by the President to United Nations Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim on 29 September [S/14203]. But, the Iranian authorities did not respond to that initiative. On the contrary, they insisted on pursuing an expansionist policy against Iraq and Arab territories, threatening peace and security in the region and neglecting international public opinion.

Several friendly international circles and organizations have been in contact with Iraq, including Cuban President Fidel Castro, who is the present chairman of the non-aligned movement, and Pakistan President Mohammed Zia ul-Haq, who is the Chairman of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Iraq welcomed both initiatives. Those circles and organizations requested that Iraq, being the capa-

ble party, take an initiative which would save the other party's dignity. Some described it as an initiative of sympathy to bring about a suitable set of circumstances for the other party to comply with the cease-fire appeals from Iraq and the Security Council, as well as other international parties.

Stemming from those stands, Iraq's leadership studied President Zia-ul-Haq's proposals and approved Iraq's unilateral cease-fire for a certain period of time within common and practical conditions. That was given to President Zia to be announced during the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers meeting in New York. President Zia announced Iraq's unilateral initiative for a cease-fire effective Sunday, 5 October at dawn until Wednesday, 8 October with the following conditions, the breach of any of which gives Iraq the right to resume military operations:

1. Any military activity against Iraqi armed forces, whatever and wherever they take place, including reconnaissance activities.
2. The continuation of anti-*cease-fire* announcements and the rejection of negotiations coming from responsible political and military Iranian leaders.
3. Additional military concentrations along the Iraqi borders or on the line of fire between the two armed forces.
4. The expiration of the said period without any frank official statement issued by the highest responsible authority in Iran, accepting the cease-fire and entering immediately into negotiations aimed at respecting Iraq and the Arab nation's rights, and legally and actually approving it.

DOCUMENT S/14212

Letter dated 6 October 1980 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sierra Leone to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[9 October 1980]

Further to the letter of 23 September 1980 to your predecessor from the Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone, on behalf of the African Group, requesting a Security Council meeting to consider the situation in South Africa [S/14189], and further to our discussion this morning, I take this opportunity in my capacity as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, to confirm that it is the wish of the African Group that the Council remain seized of this matter and that, after consultation, an appropriate date will be suggested as the date for its consideration.

(Signed) Abdulai O. CONTEH
Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Sierra Leone

DOCUMENT S/14213

Letter dated 10 October 1980 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[10 October 1980]

Enclosed for your information is a copy of a message I have sent today to the Presidents of Iran and Iraq. You may wish to bring the text of this appeal to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) KURT WALDHEIM
Secretary-General

ANNEX

Letter dated 10 October 1980 from the Secretary-General addressed to the Presidents of Iran and Iraq

I have learned with deep concern of the casualties and damage incurred by international shipping as a result of the hostilities be-

tween Iran and Iraq. I am therefore appealing to both Governments urgently to take the necessary measures to ensure the security of peaceful shipping and lawful international commerce in the conflict area. I would hope very much that, as a first step, immediate measures can be taken to allow such ships now immobilized in the area of conflict to leave the area safely.

I fully understand the difficulties of making such arrangements in a conflict situation. I would therefore be grateful to know urgently your suggestions as to the necessary modalities to enable the ships concerned to leave safely. Clearly, such modalities would have to include at least a local cease-fire. My good offices are available to both parties to assist in making any such arrangements. In view of the international concern over this matter, I hope very much to receive a positive and early response to this appeal.

(Signed) KURT WALDHEIM
Secretary-General

DOCUMENT S/14214

Letter dated 12 October 1980 from the representative of Iran
to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[12 October 1980]

I have the honour to enclose herewith the text of a message addressed to you from His Excellency Mr. Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

It would be appreciated if the enclosed message could be circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Jamal SHEMIRANI
Chargé d'affaires
of the Permanent Mission of Iran
to the United Nations

MESSAGE DATED 12 OCTOBER 1980 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF IRAN
ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I wish to inform you that we have no evidence or indication that any casualties or damages have been done to international shipping as a result of our defensive actions in the war of aggression waged against the Islamic Republic of Iran by the Republic of Iraq. I also wish to assure you that we have absolutely no intention to interfere with peaceful shipping and lawful international commerce in the conflict area. If you have any evidence or concrete information to the contrary, please let us know immediately so that appropriate measures can be taken to remedy the situation.

Abolhassan BANI-SADR
President of the
Islamic Republic of Iran

DOCUMENT S/14215*

Letter dated 10 October 1980 from the Secretary-General to the Chairman of the
Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People

[Original: English]
[13 October 1980]

I wish to refer to your letter of 29 September 1980 (S/14209) and the meeting we held the next day regarding the expulsion from the West Bank of the Mayors of Hebron and Halhoul and the Sharia Judge of Hebron by the Israeli occupying authorities.

As I mentioned to you during our meeting, I have continued my efforts in regard to the implementation of Security Council resolution 469 (1980) and have raised this matter on a number of occasions with Israeli authorities.

On 6 October, I received the information, which was confirmed by the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations, that the Government of Israel had

decided that day to allow the Mayors of Hebron and Halhoul to return to the West Bank to appeal their deportation order before a military review board. According to available information, I understand that the military review board began the procedural aspects of the hearing on 9 October and that the two Mayors have been invited to appear personally before the board between 14 and 16 October. I shall of course continue to follow this case closely.

Since your letter of 29 September has been distributed as a document of the General Assembly and the Security Council, I shall arrange for this message to be circulated in the same way.

(Signed) KURT WALDHEIM
Secretary-General

* Circulated under the double symbol A/35/30 S/14215

DOCUMENT S/14216

Letter dated 13 October 1980 from the representative of Iran
to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[13 October 1980]

The following message has been received from His Excellency Mr. Abolhasan Bani-Sadr, the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in reply to your message dated 10 October 1980 [S/14213], concerning safe passage of commercial ships out of the Shatt Al-Arab waterway:

"The safe passage of all commercial vessels anchored at terminals in Shatt Al-Arab or the ports of Khurramshahr, Abadan and Basra, under the flag of the United Nations, is acceptable to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, provided the Government of Iraq is also willing to guarantee their safety.

"The armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran will not hinder the safe passage of such vessels out of the Shatt Al-Arab, on the condition that they do not unload their cargo at any other Iraqi ports."

It would be appreciated if this message could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Jamal SHEMIRANI
Chargé d'affaires
of the Permanent Mission of Iran
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/14217

Letter dated 13 October 1980 from the representative of Malta to the President
of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[13 October 1980]

More than six weeks ago Malta brought to the attention of the Security Council the armed threat by Libyan warships against Maltese, American, Italian and other citizens engaged in peaceful offshore activities authorized by the Government of the Republic of Malta in full accord with international law and practice.

The representatives of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya at the United Nations had then asked for time to prepare a reply. The statements made since then by the Libyan representatives in the Security Council and in the General Assembly must now be considered as the official Libyan reply.

This briefly amounts to:

1. A denial that Libya had anything but friendly relations with Malta and, in particular, a refusal to admit that there had been an armed threat.

2. An assertion that the matter was purely technical and that Libya was prepared to accept settlement by the International Court of Justice.

As a counter reply to the first point, I am directed by my Government to enclose:

(a) The official records of the telexes and other correspondence that passed between the Libyan Government, the Maltese licensees and their contractors about the incidents;²

(b) A copy of a photograph taken by a member of Malta's Oil Division from the Italian rig showing the Libyan armed vessel C-411 threatening the Italian rig.²

The rig, as can be seen from the vessel's log-book, was some 58 miles south-east of Malta and some 138 miles north of Libya—well outside the area Libya could reasonably claim as its own.

What is even more serious is the fact that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has no intention of giving up the threats or the use of force, whilst at the same time it is looking for all excuses to avoid referring the matter to the International Court of Justice.

Indeed the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, instead of appreciating the great self-control exercised so far by the Republic of Malta in having recourse only to diplomatic means of self-defence, is now threatening the people of Malta that it will not even keep its word given in the General Assembly and in the Security Council to go to the International Court of Justice, if Malta's representative at the United Nations continues to press for a decision by the Council. The official written communication received at Malta's Foreign Office last Friday, 10 October, is as follows:

"The Popular Office of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and wishes to confirm what Mr. Schweidhi informed you about on Friday morning in your office as follows:

² Documents and photograph available in the files of the Secretariat.

"It has been agreed that the question of the continental shelf will be submitted to the People's Congresses for ratification and transfer to the International Court of Justice, but if the Government of Malta would like the matter to be discussed in the General Assembly of the United Nations, it means that the question will be different and there will be no need to submit the matter to the People's Congresses."

The interpretation that can be given to this Libyan note verbale is, at best, that the Jamahiriya is peeved and wants the matter to be shelved without any undertaking on its part, and, at worst, that it intends to continue defying not only Malta but also the highest international authority—the Security Council—in threatening and using force, even though it had agreed four and a half years ago to accept the award by the International Court of Justice.

Malta would be placed in a difficult situation if,

through further postponements, the Security Council failed to give a ruling binding Libya not to resort to the threat or the use of force. If Libya even considers recourse to the United Nations as such a hostile act that they refuse to abide by their own promises, freely given by their representatives in these international fora, they are leaving the people of Malta no choice but either to give up their legitimate rights, or else to ask for the intervention of a more powerful individual State to meet force with force.

The Government of the Republic of Malta knows the great consequences that would follow from such a course and this is why Malta again and strongly urges the Security Council to fulfil the task expected of it.

I have the honour to request that this letter be issued as a Security Council document.

(Signed) V. J. GAUCI
Permanent Representative of Malta
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/14218

Letter dated 13 October 1980 from the representative of Lebanon to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[14 October 1980]

Upon instructions from my Government, and pursuant to my letter of 3 October 1980 [S/14208] protesting Israel's acts of aggression and its violations of Security Council resolutions and of the Armistice Agreement, I have the honour to draw your attention to continued Israeli movement within the Lebanese territory.

Recent reports received by my Government confirm Israel's building of a new fence in the area of the village of Aadeisse, placing the area south of it under total Israeli control, thus effectively moving northward the international border.

Furthermore, the Israeli army is presently undertaking the construction of "patrol roads" in that same area and has established fixed Israeli military positions, for which it is carrying out major topographical changes.

My Government wishes also to draw your attention to the fact that the United Nations observers have been subjected in recent days to continued harass-

ment, with the obvious intention of preventing them from reporting on the above-mentioned violations.

While protesting in the strongest possible terms against the continued violations, my Government considers it imperative that a meeting of the Mixed Armistice Commission should be called to discuss the situation, in accordance with the Armistice Agreement and the Security Council resolutions reaffirming it. We consider it of the utmost importance that measures should be taken to put an end immediately to the above-mentioned violations and to enable the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization to act freely and fully in implementation of their mandate.

I would be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council under the item "The situation in the Middle East".

(Signed) Ghassan TUENI
Permanent Representative of Lebanon
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/14219*

Letter dated 13 October 1980 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of Benin to the Secretary-General

[Original: French]
[15 October 1980]

I have the honour to refer to your report of 29 September 1978 [S/12823], submitted to the Security Council in compliance with resolution 419 (1977), paragraph 5 of which appealed "to all States and all ap-

propriate international organizations, including the United Nations and its specialized agencies, to assist Benin in repairing the damage caused by the act of aggression".

On the instructions of my Government, I wish to inform you of the following facts:

* Circulated under the double symbol A 35 336.S 14219

Further to the appeals made to the international community to assist the People's Republic of Benin to repair the damage caused by the imperialist act of aggression of Sunday 16 January 1977, and since the publication of the Secretary-General's report mentioned above, containing information on the kind of aid which might be required by Benin, we are forced to recognize that the response received from the international community is far from meeting our expectations. Annex III of that report gives eloquent testimony of this.

In view of the paucity of these results in comparison with the needs we had described, the question must now be re-examined.

Let me point out, and above all remind you, that the effects of that act of aggression are still being felt at all levels of the national economy and will always be difficult to quantify them in their entirety, either in the short or the long term.

The situation is all the graver because, for obvious security reasons stemming from the act of aggression, the People's Republic of Benin has had to allocate substantial amounts of funds originally intended for the execution of economic and social projects to national security, defence and the protection of the urban and rural population.

Furthermore, the continuing mobilization of our people to meet other possible incursions by mercenaries has had serious repercussions on the national economy.

The effects of the act of aggression are being felt all the more keenly in Benin because it is one of the least developed countries and therefore particularly sensitive to the international economic crisis.

If, in addition, account is taken of the serious consequences of the persistent drought which, over the last three years, has resulted in a steady decline in the production of export crops, our anxiety will be all the easier to understand.

For all these reasons, the Beninese Government is referring the matter to you, the Secretary-General, and laying before you all this information on assistance to Benin, so that you may study and implement, during the present session of the General Assembly, all ways and means that may help towards the practical implementation of the Security Council's just decision.

It must be clearly understood, however, that the present request does nothing to preclude the Security Council from considering and acting on the reports on the act of aggression, for the Council must continue to be seized of the file on this matter, which we have just brought up to date by including in it some edifying comments published in a French historical journal [S/14211].

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Simon Ifedé OGOUMA
Minister for Foreign Affairs
and Co-operation
of Benin

DOCUMENT S/14221

Letter dated 16 October 1980 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council

(Original: English)
[16 October 1980]

I wish to refer to my letter of 10 October 1980 [S/14213] transmitting the appeal that I addressed to the Presidents of Iran and Iraq concerning the security of ships now immobilized in the conflict area and my suggestions for resolving this problem.

I am enclosing the text of a further message which I sent to His Excellency Mr. Saddam Hussein, President of the Republic of Iraq, on 15 October and of the reply I received today.

(Signed) KURT WALDHEIM
Secretary-General

to the suggestion which I made to Mr. Hammadi that, to avoid misunderstandings, ships leaving the conflict area should fly the United Nations flag. In this connexion, I wish to inform you that the Government of Iran, in a letter of 13 October [S/14216], has accepted this suggestion.

May I again assure you that I have taken this initiative on purely humanitarian grounds and without prejudice to the claims, positions and rights of the parties to the conflict.

(Signed) KURT WALDHEIM
Secretary-General

Message dated 16 October 1980 from the President of Iraq to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to refer to your telegram concerning the protection of vessels located within the combat zone and your proposal regarding the evacuation of these vessels from the zone under the flag of the United Nations.

I regret to inform you that this proposal is not acceptable to us since these vessels must fly the Iraqi flag as long as they are in the Shatt Al-Arab, which is an Iraqi river, in conformity with our full national sovereignty over this river.

(Signed) Saddam Hussein
President of the Republic of Iraq

ANNEX

Message dated 15 October 1980 from the Secretary-General to the President of Iraq

I wish to refer to my message of 10 October 1980 concerning the security of ships now immobilized in the conflict area and my suggestions for resolving this problem, which is of deep concern to the international community.

I have discussed this matter with Foreign Minister Hammadi who, as I understand, reported our conversations to Baghdad. I would be most grateful for an early response to that question and in particular

**Letter dated 17 October 1980 from the representative of China
to the Secretary-General**

(Original: Chinese/English)
[20 October 1980]

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a note of protest sent by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China to the Vietnamese Embassy in China on 16 October 1980. I request that this text be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) LING Qing
*Permanent Representative of the
People's Republic of China
to the United Nations*

ANNEX

Note dated 16 October 1980 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China to the Embassy of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, with reference to the recent repeated provocations and intrusions into Chinese border areas by the Vietnamese armed forces, states the following:

Since late September 1980, the Vietnamese side has carried out a series of armed provocations along the Sino-Vietnamese border areas, inflicting heavy losses of life and property on the army-men and civilians in China's Yunnan and Guangxi border areas.

In Yunnan province, Vietnamese armed personnel repeatedly intruded into the border area of Maguan County, killing and wounding Chinese border inhabitants and frontier personnel on many occasions. On 30 September the Vietnamese authorities dispatched dozens of armed soldiers to intrude into this area once again, where they launched a surprise attack on the patrolling Chinese frontier guards and militiamen, killing three and wounding three. On 1 October, when Chinese army-men and people were celebrating their National Day, the Vietnamese troops took advantage of this occasion and fiercely opened fire on the Luojiaping area of the Jinchang People's Commune, killing and wounding a number of Chinese commune

members. What is particularly serious is that on 15 October, Vietnamese troops flagrantly launched an attack on the positions of Chinese frontier troops in the Luojiaping area of Maguan County. In the face of such frenzied Vietnamese provocations, the Chinese frontier troops were forced to counter-attack and give the intruders due punishment.

In the Guangxi region, on 2 October, Vietnamese troops fired more than 60 rounds of bullets into the Dongxing Commune of Fangcheng County. On 8 October, Vietnamese armed personnel intruded into the areas of Jiangping Commune of Fangcheng County, killing a Chinese commune member and wounding a forest-keeper. On 12 October, Vietnamese troops shelled the areas of the Pingmeng Commune and Shuikou town of Napo County simultaneously, destroying a number of school buildings and private houses. On 13 October, Vietnamese troops again fired intensively into the areas of the Dongxing Commune, killing a Chinese commune member working in the fields.

Recently, in their deliberate attempt to aggravate tension along the Sino-Vietnamese borders, the Vietnamese authorities have carried out repeated armed provocations and killed and wounded Chinese soldiers and inhabitants in the border areas, thus posing a grave threat to the security of China's border areas. This cannot but arouse intense indignation of the Chinese Government and people. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China hereby lodges a strong protest with the Vietnamese side on this matter. Should the Vietnamese authorities continue to ignore the protests and warnings from the Chinese side, and keep on violating China's sovereignty and territorial integrity and provoking incidents, it will be absolutely impossible for them to escape from the consequences arising therefrom.

It must also be pointed out that the Vietnamese authorities' repeated armed provocations and creation of tension along the Chinese border at a time when the thirty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly is going on are clearly designed to divert the attention of the world public opinion, to resist the strong demand of the numerous Member States and the people of the world for the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea and to cover up their acts of intensified aggression against Kampuchea and their threat to peace and stability in South-East Asia. However, they will never succeed in their scheme.

* Circulated under the double symbol A 35 549-S 14222.

DOCUMENT S/14223

**Letter dated 18 October 1980 from the representative of Lebanon to the President
of the Security Council**

(Original: English)
[20 October 1980]

Pursuant to my letter of 13 October 1980 [S/14218] and to previous letters concerning the same topic, I am under instructions from my Government to protest in the strongest possible terms continued violations and acts of aggression by Israel on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon.

While no positive response has been yet received to our request for a meeting of the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission, the Israeli army has been continuing in the past few days its military implantation in southern Lebanon and in what appears to be an outright annexation of Lebanese territory. New roads are under construction, new military fortifications are being built, while previous positions are further con-

solidated. The fence which we mentioned in our previous letter around the region of Aadeisse is being extended and now encompasses an area of no less than 4 square kilometres, which, as stated in our previous letter, is tantamount to moving the international border further north.

While attention in the Middle East is universally concentrated on war outside our immediate area of interest, the Israeli army has seized the opportunity to engage in a major act of aggression. A commando of the Israeli army undertook to launch heavy artillery attacks on Nabatieh, El-Shqif and Arnoun and then landed helicoptered troops which destroyed installations and caused the killing of 9 and wounding of

10 persons. There followed important destruction of property, which resulted in a state of panic in the region and the exodus of the villagers. While this was taking place, Israeli gunboats were patrolling close to the coast of Tyre inside Lebanese territorial waters and shelled various coastal positions. Artillery shelling continued after the return of the Israeli commandos and has spread well beyond both the area of operation of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the area of the Israeli commando raid.

Attention must also be drawn to various Israeli declarations, both civilian and military, announcing that this raid "was neither the first nor the last" and that it was part of Israel's so-called policy of pre-emptive strikes. This so-called policy, needless to say, has been universally condemned by the international community and, in particular, by members of the Security Council, whose decisions and resolutions are thus constantly challenged by Israel.

I am under instructions to press for an urgent meet-

ing of the Mixed Armistice Commission with a view to enabling the competent United Nations authorities to restore the Lebanese border and assess the situation in a manner that enables the Security Council not only to restore normalcy in the area but to create the objective conditions for a full and unhampered implementation by UNIFIL of its mandate.

My Government feels that in the present Middle East context, if no urgent measures are taken by all concerned to enforce Security Council resolutions and the Armistice Agreement of 1949, an escalation of military operations might follow which would involve the area of operation of UNIFIL and imperil international peace and security.

I would be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council under the item "The situation in the Middle East".

(Signed) Ghassan TUÉNI
Permanent Representative of Lebanon
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/14224

Letter dated 17 October 1980 from the representative of Iran to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[20 October 1980]

As you have already been informed, Iraqi authorities have put the 12 Iranian employees of the Common Bureau for Co-ordination, set up for Shatt Al-Arab under the 1975 Treaty between Iran and Iraq, and their families under arrest. These Iranian nationals, whose names are attached herewith, have in collaboration with Iraqi employees administered the above-mentioned Bureau for the past four years.

Under the provisions of the relevant agreements between the two countries, Iraq is committed to provide protection and facilities for the Iranian employees of the Bureau and their detention by the Iraqi authorities is unjustified; therefore, their freedom of movement should be restored and they should be allowed to go to Iran with their families until the proper environment is set for the resumption of the activities of the Bureau.

It would be appreciated if proper measures were

taken to have this letter distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Jamal SHEMIRANI
Chargé d'affaires of the
Permanent Mission of Iran
to the United Nations

ANNEX

List of Iranian employees of the Common Bureau for Co-ordination presently detailed in Iraq

1. Mr. Shubair Abtahi, Director of Financial Affairs;
2. Mr. Heidar Zarei, Director of Administrative Affairs;
3. Mr. Hussein Raja'ian, Traffic Control Officer;
4. Mr. Abdol Reza Mahdavi, Traffic Control Officer;
5. Mr. Mirzai, Head of the Department of Revenues;
6. Mr. Alireza Khoshrou, Marine Expert;
7. Mr. Ehtemami, Accountant;
8. Mr. Ala'i, Accountant;
9. Mr. Ali Sabzevari, FHV Operator;
10. Mr. Kargarbideh, FHV Operator;
11. Mr. Ali Dowlat Abadi, FHV Operator;
12. Ms. Hosseini, Typist.

DOCUMENT S/14226

Letter dated 21 October 1980 from the representative of Iran
to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[22 October 1980]

I have the honour to inform you that the following message has been received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran; it would be appreciated if it could be distributed as a document of the Security Council.

"As certain rumours have been spread concerning the Strait of Hormuz, which might disturb international navigation in that area, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran reaffirms that Iran is commit-

ted to keeping the Straits open to navigation and will not spare any effort for the purpose of achieving this end."

*(Signed) Jamal SHEMIRANI
Chargé d'affaires of the
Permanent Mission of Iran
to the United Nations*

DOCUMENT S/14227

**Letter dated 22 October 1980 from the representative of Iraq
to the Secretary-General**

*[Original: English]
[22 October 1980]*

I have the honour to inform you, under instruction from my Government, that the Iraqi Government has decided to allow the 12 Iranian employees of the Common Bureau for Co-ordination and their families to travel outside Iraq on their way to Iran immediately.

I would like to have this letter distributed as a document of the Security Council.

*(Signed) Salah Omar AL-ALI
Permanent Representative of Iraq
to the United Nations*

DOCUMENT S/14228

Letter dated 17 October 1980 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council

*[Original: English]
[22 October 1980]*

As you know, the Security Council is seized of a complaint by the Government of Malta against the Government of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. The Council held consultations and a formal meeting on 4 September 1980 on this question [2246th meeting]. At that meeting, the representative of Malta stated his Government's case and the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya requested a postponement of the consideration of the matter in order to study the Maltese statement carefully and to consult his Government.

Since that date, I have held consultations with the parties. With their agreement and in order further to assist in the search for a mutually acceptable solution, I intend to send a senior official of the Secretariat as my special representative to the countries concerned to discuss the question at issue with the two Governments.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

*(Signed) KURT WALDHEIM
Secretary-General*

DOCUMENT S/14229

**Letter dated 22 October 1980 from the President of the Security Council
to the Secretary-General**

*[Original: English]
[22 October 1980]*

I have brought your letter dated 17 October 1980 [S/14228] to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They considered the matter in consultations and agreed with the proposal contained in your letter.

*(Signed) Oleg A. TROYANOVSKY
President of the Security Council*

Letter dated 24 October 1980 from the representative of Lebanon to the President
of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[24 October 1980]

While the Security Council, responding to the international community's concern, is actively engaged in seeking a peaceful settlement to the Iraqi-Iranian war, Israel is further escalating its acts of aggression in a manner that endangers world peace and security, and warrants immediate attention by the Council.

Using American sophisticated aircraft, in a manner incompatible with conditions of purchase, let alone international law, Israel has been constantly overflying Lebanon and bombarding towns and villages, causing heavy destruction and casualties. Israeli seacraft have been shelling coastal areas, particularly the city of Tyre, and field artillery has relentlessly bombarded objectives inside and beyond the area of operation of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon.

Heedless of our previous protests to the Security Council and of international reaction, the Israeli army has been consolidating its positions inside the Lebanese international border and engaging in offensive acts, the most recent of which was the blowing up of houses and kidnapping of civilians in the village of Aita el-Jabal (Aita el-Zott) in the night of 22/23 October.

I am instructed by my Government to present this complaint to the Council and protest in the strongest possible terms. The Council will undoubtedly share our concern that if Israel is allowed to pursue its so-called "policy of pre-emptive strikes", a new dimension might be added to the present Middle East crisis in a manner that may be of the utmost gravity to all concerned.

The Lebanese Government, mindful of the Security Council's present preoccupations and agenda, brings the matter to your urgent attention and requests that the Council be seized of it, leaving it entirely to you and the members to decide on what measures must be taken to ensure the implementation of the pertinent resolutions, including the enforcement of the mandate of the Force and respect for the General Armistice Agreement.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council under the item "The situation in the Middle East".

(Signed) Ghassan TUÉNI
Permanent Representative of Lebanon
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/14234*

Report of the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[24 October 1980]

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 34/70 of 6 December 1979. In that resolution, which is summarized in paragraph 43 below, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council periodically on the development of the situation in the Middle East and to submit to the Assembly at its thirty-fifth session a report covering, in all their aspects, the developments in the Middle East.

2. It may be recalled that, on 24 October 1979, the Secretary-General submitted a report on the same

subject to the General Assembly and the Security Council [S/13578], in pursuance of Assembly resolution 33/29 of 7 December 1978. In that report, the Secretary-General gave an account of the efforts undertaken by the United Nations to deal with various aspects of the situation in the Middle East, namely, the status of the cease-fire, the situation in the occupied territories, the Palestine refugee problem, Palestinian rights and the search for a peaceful settlement. A similar pattern is followed in the present report.

3. The present report is based mainly on information available in United Nations documents. In order to avoid duplication, reference will be made to reports of the Secretary-General and other official United Nations documents concerning the Middle East, whenever appropriate.

II. STATUS OF THE CEASE-FIRE

4. The status of the cease-fire in the Middle East up to October 1979 was described in the report of the Secretary-General of 24 October 1979 [*ibid.*, sect. II]. At that time, there were three United Nations peace-keeping operations in the area: an observer mission—the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)—and two peace-keeping forces—

the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

A. ACTIVITIES OF UNDOF

5. UNDOF, established by Security Council resolution 350 (1974), is deployed on the Golan Heights in the Israel-Syria sector. Its activities since October 1979 are outlined in the two most recent periodic reports of the Secretary-General to the Council on the subject [S/13637 and S/13957]. The mandate of the Force has been extended twice during the period under review by the Council. The last extension of UNDOF, as decided by the Council in its resolution 470 (1980), was for a further period of six months, until 30 November 1980.

6. The functions and guidelines of UNDOF have remained as outlined in the Secretary-General's report of 27 November 1974 [S/11563, paras. 8-10]. UNDOF has continued, with the co-operation of the parties, to supervise the area of separation and the areas of limitation of armaments and forces, in accordance with [S/11302/Add.1]. The situation in its area of operation has remained generally quiet.

7. The Force has now a total strength of about 1,290 and is composed of four contingents—from Austria, Canada, Finland and Poland—and 20 observers detailed from UNTSO. In addition, other UNTSO observers assigned to the Israeli-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission assist UNDOF as occasion requires.

B. ACTIVITIES OF UNIFIL

8. UNIFIL was set up by Security Council resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) and operates in southern Lebanon. Its activities since October 1979 are outlined in the Secretary-General's reports on the Force to the Council [S/13691, S/13888 and Add.1-3 and S/13994]. The mandate of the Force has been extended by the Council twice during the period under review. The last extension of UNIFIL, as decided by the Council in its resolution 474 (1980), was for a further period of six months, until 19 December 1980.

9. UNIFIL has continued to function in accordance with the guidelines set out in the Secretary-General's report of 19 March 1978 [S/12611]. According to that report, UNIFIL was envisaged as a two-stage operation. In the first stage, UNIFIL was to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory to the international border. Once that was achieved, UNIFIL was to establish and maintain an area of operation. In this connexion, the Force was to supervise the cessation of hostilities, ensure the peaceful character of the area of operation, control movement and take all measures deemed necessary to ensure the effective restoration of Lebanese sovereignty in the area. As stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 17 October 1978 [S/12896, para. 25], the Israeli forces completed their withdrawal from Lebanese territory on 13 June 1978. However, they handed over control of the border area to Lebanese *de facto* armed forces, rather than to UNIFIL, thus creating serious problems for the full deployment of the Force in the whole area of operation and to the fulfilment of its mandate.

10. Despite intense and persistent efforts, UNIFIL has not been able to make significant progress in overcoming these problems during the period under review. The *de facto* forces, which are supported by Israel, have not only prevented a further deployment of UNIFIL in the enclave, but they have maintained four positions previously established in the UNIFIL area of operation and have attempted to establish additional encroachments. These attempts have been resisted by UNIFIL and have led to serious confrontations. The presence of Palestinian and other armed elements, and the general political and security situation in Lebanon itself, have also contributed to the extremely difficult situation in the south. While the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) has renewed its assurance of co-operation with UNIFIL, the Force has continued to be subjected to attempts by armed elements to infiltrate personnel and weapons into its area. There have been several incidents in Israel for which the PLO took responsibility. Israeli forces have attacked PLO targets in southern Lebanon both in retaliation and in pre-emptive actions. Further exchanges of fire between opposing armed groups over and across the UNIFIL area of operation have been frequent. In these circumstances, UNIFIL has continued to exert its best efforts to prevent infiltration and encroachment and to restore and maintain the cease-fire in the area. UNIFIL has also continued in its endeavour to consolidate its position and, in co-operation with the Lebanese Government, to increase and make more effective the Lebanese presence, both civilian and military, in its area of operation. As pointed out in his last periodic report on UNIFIL dated 12 June 1980 [S/13994, para. 71], the very complex situation in southern Lebanon is inter-related to the wider problem of the Middle East, which still awaits a just and comprehensive settlement. Despite all the difficulties it faced, UNIFIL is performing an indispensable service to peace, not only in Lebanon, but also in the Middle East as a whole. While continuing to strive to fulfil all the terms of its mandate, UNIFIL provides a vital mechanism for conflict control in an extremely volatile situation.

11. UNIFIL has now a total strength of some 6,000. It is composed of contingents from Fiji, France, Ghana, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Senegal and Sweden. UNTSO observers in the Israel-Lebanon sector assist and co-operate with UNIFIL in the performance of its tasks.

C. ACTIVITIES OF UNTSO

12. As indicated above, observers of UNTSO have continued to assist and co-operate with UNDOF and UNIFIL in the performance of their tasks. On the Golan Heights, UNTSO observers assigned to UNDOF man observation posts in the area of separation and carry out periodic inspections in the areas of limitation of armament and forces. In addition, observers assigned to the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission assist UNDOF as occasion requires. In southern Lebanon, observers assigned to the UNIFIL area of operation man observation posts, conduct patrols as necessary and provide liaison teams with various parties. The headquarters of the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission at Beirut functions also as a

liaison office of UNIFIL. In pursuance of Security Council resolutions 459 (1979), 467 (1980) and 474 (1980), the Secretary-General has continued his efforts to reactivate the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission. In this connexion, the representative of Lebanon, in letters dated 13 and 18 October 1980, addressed to the President of the Council and to the Secretary-General, protested that Israel was continuing to violate Lebanese territory and called for a meeting of the Mixed Armistice Commission to discuss the situation [A/35/534, S/14218, A/35/552 and S/14223].

13. Until July 1979, UNTSO observers assigned to the Egypt-Israel sector assisted the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in the performance of the latter's tasks. When the mandate of UNEF lapsed on 24 July 1979, the Secretary-General declared in a statement issued on the same day that, in view of the fact that the withdrawal of UNEF was without prejudice to the continued presence of the UNTSO observers in the area, it was his intention to make the necessary arrangements to ensure the further functioning of UNTSO, in accordance with existing decisions of the Security Council. Thus, a number of observers continue to be stationed in the area.

14. UNTSO also maintains a liaison office at Amman. The Officer-in-Charge of that liaison office is also nominally the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission between Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

III. SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

15. The action taken prior to October 1979 by the United Nations concerning the situation in the Arab territories occupied by Israel and the question of Jerusalem were outlined in the Secretary-General's report of 24 October 1979 [S/13578, sect. III].

16. The General Assembly, at its thirty-fourth session, after considering the report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories,⁴ adopted three resolutions on 12 December 1979. By resolution 34/90 A, the Assembly condemned certain Israeli policies and practices in the occupied territories and demanded that Israel desist forthwith from those policies and practices. It renewed the mandate of the Special Committee, which is composed of Senegal, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia, and requested it to report to the Secretary-General as soon as possible and whenever the need arose thereafter. By resolution 34/90 B, it reaffirmed that the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, was applicable to all the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem, and called again upon Israel to acknowledge and to comply with the provisions of that Convention. By resolution 34/90 C, it determined that all measures and actions taken by Israel designed to change the legal status, geographical nature and demographic composition of the occupied Arab territories had no legal validity and constituted a serious obstruction to efforts aimed at achieving a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. It called once more upon the

Government of Israel to desist forthwith from taking such measures, in particular the establishment of settlements in the Palestinian and other Arab territories.

17. The Special Committee was kept informed of developments concerning the human rights situation in the occupied territories by the periodic communication to the members of information gathered or received from several sources. The Special Committee held periodic meetings to review such information and to hear oral testimony of persons from the occupied territories and to assess the human rights situation in the occupied territories with a view to deciding whether any action could be undertaken. The report, submitted by the Special Committee under resolution 34/90 A, has been circulated as document A/35/425.

18. Earlier in the session, on 16 November 1979, the General Assembly adopted resolution 34/29, entitled "Situation in the occupied territories", in which it called upon Israeli authorities to rescind its decision to deport the Mayor of Nablus outside the occupied Palestinian territory. The Assembly also requested the Secretary-General to report to it as soon as possible on the implementation of the resolution. In his report of 24 November⁴ in pursuance of that resolution, the Secretary-General said that the Prime Minister of Israel, in response to his request for all relevant information, had informed him that the decision in question was based on local regulations in force and would be reviewed by the Supreme Court of Israel in accordance with the due process of law. The Secretary-General added that he was continuing to follow developments closely. On 5 December, the Assembly was informed by the representative of Israel that the deportation order had been set aside.⁵

19. During its thirty-fourth session, the General Assembly also adopted, on 14 December 1979, resolution 34/113 on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories. In that resolution, the Assembly, after taking note of the report of the Secretary-General of 25 October 1979 on this subject,⁶ requested the Secretary-General, in collaboration with the relevant United Nations organs and specialized agencies, to prepare and submit to the Assembly at its thirty-fifth session a comprehensive and analytical report on the social and economic impact of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Arab territories. The Assembly also requested the Secretary-General, in preparing this report, to consult and co-operate with the Palestine Liberation Organization. The requested report of the Secretary-General has been circulated as document A/35/533 and Corr.1.

20. In a related decision, the General Assembly, in resolution 34/136 adopted on 14 December 1979, emphasized the right of the Arab States and peoples whose territories were under Israeli occupation to full and effective permanent sovereignty and control over their natural and all other resources, wealth and economic activities, reaffirmed that all measures undertaken by Israel to exploit the human, natural and all other resources, wealth and economic activities in the

⁴ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Annexes, agenda item 51, document A/34/720.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Thirty-fourth Session, Special Political Committee, 42nd meeting.

⁶ A/34/536 and Corr.1.

occupied Arab territories were illegal and called upon Israel immediately to desist forthwith from all such measures, further reaffirmed the right of the Arab States and peoples subjected to Israeli aggression and occupation to the restitution of, and full compensation for the exploitation, depletion and loss of and damages to, their national resources and called upon Israel to meet their just claims. In that connexion, the Assembly also called upon all States to support and assist the Arab States and peoples and called upon States, international organizations and all other institutions not to recognize, or co-operate with or assist in, any measures undertaken by Israel to exploit the resources of the occupied territories or to effect any changes in the demographic composition or geographic character or institutional structure of those territories. The Assembly also requested the Secretary-General to prepare and submit to it at its thirty-fifth session a report taking into consideration the provisions of paragraph 2 of its resolution 32/161. In a note dated 7 October 1980,⁷ the Secretary-General stated that the secretariat of the Economic Commission for Western Asia, to which the task of preparing the report was entrusted, and had been unable, despite every effort to engage the necessary consultant services, to prepare a report for submission at the thirty-fifth session, and that arrangements were being made to prepare a report for submission to the Assembly at its thirty-sixth session.

21. On 13 February 1980, the Commission on Human Rights adopted resolutions I A and B (XXXVI) concerning the question of the violation of human rights in the occupied Arab territories. These resolutions, in which the Commission condemned Israeli policies and practices in the occupied territories along lines similar to those of General Assembly resolution 34/90 A mentioned above, were brought to the attention of the General Assembly and the Security Council by the Secretary-General in a note dated 10 July 1980 [S/14057].

22. The Security Council held a number of meetings during the period under review to examine various matters relating to the situation in occupied territories and the question of Jerusalem. On 15 February 1980, the Permanent Representative of Jordan requested a meeting of the Council [S 13801] to consider Israeli actions in disregard of resolutions 446 (1979) and 452 (1979), by which the Council had called on Israel to cease the establishment of settlements in occupied territories. On the same date, the Permanent Representative of Morocco, as Chairman of the Islamic Group, also requested an urgent meeting of the Council [S 13802] to consider the grave and disturbing situation created by the measures taken by Israel in the city of Al-Khalil (Hebron) on the West Bank. The Council held five meetings between 22 February and 1 March [2199th-2203rd meetings]. On the latter date, it unanimously adopted resolution 465 (1980), in which the Council, after taking note of the reports of its Commission established under resolution 446 (1979) [S/13450 and Add. I and S 13679], determined that all measures taken by Israel to change the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure or status of the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem,

or any part thereof, had no legal validity and that Israel's policies and practices of settling parts of its population and new immigrants in those territories constituted a flagrant violation of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and also constituted a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East; the Council strongly deplored the continuation and persistence of Israel in pursuing those policies and practices and called upon the Government and people of Israel to rescind those measures, to dismantle the existing settlements and in particular to cease, on an urgent basis, the establishment, construction and planning of settlements in the occupied territories, including Jerusalem; the Council also called upon all States not to provide Israel with any assistance to be used specifically in connexion with settlements in the occupied territories and requested the Commission to continue to examine the situation relating to settlements in the occupied territories and to report to the Council before 1 September 1980. At the request of the Commission, the date of submission of the report was subsequently extended until 25 November [S/14116].

23. On 6 May 1980, the Permanent Representative of Tunisia requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council [S/13926] to consider the expulsion measure taken by the Israeli authorities against the Mayors of Al-Khalil (Hebron) and Halhoul and the Sharia Judge of Al-Khalil. The Council met on 8 May [2221st meeting] and adopted resolution 468 (1980), in which it expressed deep concern at the expulsion by the Israel military occupation authorities of the Mayors of Hebron and Halhoul and of the Sharia Judge of Hebron and called upon the Government of Israel, as occupying Power, to rescind those illegal measures and to facilitate the immediate return of the expelled Palestinian leaders so that they could resume the functions for which they had been elected and appointed. It further requested the Secretary-General to report upon the implementation of the resolution. In his report of 13 May [S/13938], the Secretary-General said that he had immediately brought the text of resolution 468 (1980) to the attention of the Government of Israel and noted that he had also previously made representations to the Government of Israel in that regard. On 9 May, the Government of Israel had informed him that it was unable to allow the expelled Mayors of Hebron and Halhoul and the Sharia Judge of Hebron to return, for reasons indicated in the statement made by the representative of Israel before Council on 8 May. The Secretary-General noted in this connexion reports that the three Palestinian leaders had been denied re-entry into the West Bank by the Israeli authorities on 11 May.

24. On 16 May 1980, the Permanent Representative of Jordan requested that the Security Council meet [S 13941] to consider Israel's defiance of resolution 468 (1980). The Council held two meetings on 20 May [2222nd and 2223rd meetings] and, after considering the Secretary-General's report on the matter [S 13938], adopted resolution 469 (1980), in which it strongly deplored the failure of the Government of Israel to implement resolution 468 (1980) and called again upon the Government of Israel, as occupying Power, to rescind the illegal measures taken by the

Israel military occupation authorities in expelling the Mayors of Hebron and Halhoul and the Sharia Judge of Hebron and to facilitate the immediate return of the expelled Palestinian leaders. It also requested the Secretary-General to continue his efforts in order to ensure the immediate implementation of that resolution and report to it at the earliest possible date. In his report of 24 May 1980 [S/13960], the Secretary-General said that he had once again addressed an appeal to the Prime Minister of Israel to take the necessary action to respond to the call of the Council. In reply, the Prime Minister of Israel had said that the three men in question had openly incited to violence; however, a petition to allow their return had been submitted to the High Court of Justice and the matter was *sub judice* in his country. The Secretary-General added that he was continuing to follow closely developments in regard to that important matter. On 10 October [S/14215], in reply to a letter from the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People [S/14209], the Secretary-General stated that he had continued his efforts in regard to the implementation of resolution 469 (1980) and had raised the matter on a number of occasions with the Israeli authorities. He had received information, which had been confirmed by the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations, that the Government of Israel had decided on 6 October to allow the Mayors of Hebron and Halhoul to return to the West Bank to appeal their deportation order before a military review board.

25. On 3 June 1980, the Permanent Representative of Bahrain, in his capacity as Chairman of the Group of Arab States, requested an immediate meeting of the Security Council [S/13977] to consider the assassination attempts on the Mayors of Nablus, Ramallah and Al-Bireh and the arbitrary detention of a great number of Palestinian students in the occupied territory. At a meeting held on 5 June [2226th meeting], the Council adopted resolution 471 (1980), in which it condemned the assassination attempts on the lives of the Mayors of Nablus, Ramallah and Al-Bireh and called for the immediate apprehension and prosecution of the perpetrators of those crimes. In the same resolution, the Council expressed a deep concern that Israel, as occupying Power, had failed to provide adequate protection to the civilian population in the occupied territories in conformity with the provisions of the fourth Geneva Convention, called upon the Government of Israel to provide the victims with adequate compensation for the damages suffered as a result of those crimes and to respect and comply with the provisions of the fourth Geneva Convention as well as with the relevant resolutions of the Council. The Council further called upon all States not to provide Israel with any assistance to be used specifically in connexion with settlements in the occupied territories, and reaffirmed the overriding necessity to end the prolonged occupation of the occupied Arab territories, including Jerusalem.

26. The situation in the occupied territories, with specific reference to Jerusalem, was considered by the Security Council at eight meetings held between 24 and 30 June 1980 [2233rd-2236th, 2238th, 2239th, 2241st and 2242nd meetings] at the request of the Acting Permanent Representative of Pakistan [S/13966], the current Chairman of the Organization of

the Islamic Conference, in pursuance of the decision taken by the Eleventh Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers. On 30 June, the Council adopted resolution 476 (1980), in which it reaffirmed the overriding necessity to end the prolonged occupation of the occupied Arab territories, including Jerusalem, and strongly deplored the continued refusal of Israel, the occupying Power, to comply with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly. The Council reconfirmed that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel which purported to alter the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem had no legal validity and constituted a flagrant violation of the fourth Geneva Convention and a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, and reiterated that all such measures which had altered the geographic, demographic and historical character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem were null and void and must be rescinded in compliance with the relevant resolution of the Council. The Council urgently called on Israel to abide by that resolution and previous Council resolutions and to desist forthwith from persisting in the policies and measures affecting the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem, and reaffirmed its determination, in the event of non-compliance of Israel with the resolution, to examine practical ways and means in accordance with relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations to secure the full implementation of the resolution.

27. In a letter dated 1 August 1980 [S/14084], the Acting Permanent Representative of Pakistan and current Chairman of the Organization of the Islamic Conference said that Israel, in violation of Security Council resolutions, including resolution 476 (1980), had persisted in its measures to alter the status of the Holy City of Jerusalem and enacted a law proclaiming it the capital of Israel. Recalling that the Council, in resolution 476 (1980), had reaffirmed its determination, in the event of the non-compliance of Israel, to examine practical ways and means in accordance with relevant provisions of the Charter to secure its full implementation, he requested an immediate meeting of the Council. On 20 August [2245th meeting], the Council adopted resolution 478 (1980), in which it censured in the strongest terms the enactment by Israel of the "basic law" on Jerusalem and the refusal to comply with relevant Council resolutions; it affirmed that the enactment of the "basic law" by Israel constituted a violation of international law and did not affect the continued application of the fourth Geneva Convention in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since June 1967, including Jerusalem; it determined that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel which had altered or purported to alter the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem, and, in particular, the recent "basic law" on Jerusalem, were null and void and must be rescinded forthwith; it affirmed also that that action constituted a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East. The Council further decided not to recognize the "basic law" and such other actions by Israel that, as a result of that law, sought to alter the character and status of Jerusalem; it called upon all Member States to accept the decision and those States that had established diplomatic missions at Jerusalem to withdraw

such missions from the Holy City. Finally, the Council requested the Secretary-General to report to it on the implementation of the resolution before 15 November 1980. Since the adoption of resolution 478 (1980), the 10 States which maintained a diplomatic mission at Jerusalem at the time have informed the Secretary-General that they had decided to withdraw their respective diplomatic missions from the Holy City [S/14124, S/14126, S/14127, S/14135, S/14147, S/14138, S/14144, S/14151, S/14163 and S/14168]. The Secretary-General's report in pursuance of resolution 478 (1980) will be circulated shortly [S/14148].

28. Since the General Assembly last discussed the matter, the situation in the occupied territories has been the subject of a number of additional communications addressed to the President of the Security Council or the Secretary-General. These communications dealt with the question of Israeli settlements and the expropriation of land in the occupied territories [S/13795, S/13798, A/35/103, S/13811, A/35/111, S/13820, S/13839, S/13843, S/13844, S/13845, S/13849, S/13851, S/13859 and S/13997], the question of expulsion of and attacks against Palestinian leaders in occupied territories [S/13928, S/13936, A/35/225, S/13976, S/13979, S/13983 and S/13988], the question of Jerusalem [S/13840, S/14017, S/14032, S/14049, S/14098, S/14103, S/14115, S/14169 and S/14207] and other questions affecting the human rights of the population of the occupied territories [S/13720, S/13732, S/13738, S/13765, S/13766, S/13772, S/13782, S/13791, S/13792, S/13793, A/35/101, S/13815, S/13854, S/13861, A/35/158, S/13868, S/13874, S/13922, S/14075, S/14082 and S/14096]. Communications were also received from Israel regarding violent incidents in occupied territories for which the PLO was said to have claimed responsibility [S/13781, A/35/171, S/13923, S/14016, A/35/302, S/14101 and S/14125].

IV. PALESTINE REFUGEE PROBLEM

29. The Palestine refugee problem and the efforts of the United Nations to assist the refugees up to October 1979 were dealt with in the report of the Secretary-General of 24 October 1979 [S/13578, sect. IV].

30. Following its consideration of the report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)* at its thirty-fourth session, the General Assembly adopted on 23 November 1979 resolutions 34/52 A to F, dealing with various aspects of the problem. By resolution 34/52 A, the Assembly noted with deep regret that the situation of the refugees continued to be a matter of serious concern and expressed its appreciation to the Agency in doing all it could for the Palestine refugees within the limits of available resources. The Assembly reiterated its request that the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine had been unable to find a means of achieving progress in the implementation of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III), providing for repatriation or compensation of the refugees, and requested it to continue its work towards that objective.

* *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 13*

31. The financing of UNRWA operations continued to be a matter of increasing concern to the General Assembly. UNRWA funding is derived almost entirely from voluntary contributions, mainly from Governments, and for many years it has experienced difficulty in securing the financial support necessary to maintain its services. In its resolution 34/52 A, the Assembly directed attention to the continuing seriousness of the financial position of UNRWA, noted with profound concern that, despite the commendable and successful efforts of the Commissioner-General to collect additional contributions, the increased level of income available to UNRWA was still insufficient to cover essential budget requirements, and called upon all Governments as a matter of urgency to make the most generous efforts possible to meet the needs of UNRWA; in particular, it urged non-contributing Governments to contribute regularly and contributing Governments to consider increasing their contributions. In a related decision, in resolution 34/52 D, the Assembly extended for another year the mandate of the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA and requested it to continue its efforts, in co-operation with the Secretary-General and the Commissioner-General, to assist in assuring the Agency's financial security.

32. Regarding the problem of the population displaced as a result of the hostilities of June 1967, the General Assembly, in its resolution 34/52 B, endorsed the efforts of UNRWA to provide humanitarian assistance to those persons. After considering a report of the Secretary-General on the question of the return of the population and refugees displaced since 1967,⁹ the Assembly adopted resolution 34/52 E, in which it reaffirmed the inalienable right of all the displaced inhabitants to return to their homes or former places of residence in the territories occupied by Israel since 1967 and declared once more that any attempt to restrict, or to attach conditions to, the free exercise of the right of return by any displaced person was inconsistent with that inalienable right and inadmissible. The Assembly considered any and all agreements embodying any restriction on or condition for the return of the displaced inhabitants as null and void. The Assembly also deplored the continued refusal of the Israeli authorities to take steps for the return of all the displaced inhabitants and called once more upon Israel (a) to take immediate steps for the return of all the displaced inhabitants and (b) to desist from all measures that obstructed their return, including measures affecting the physical and demographic structure of the occupied territories.

33. The situation of Palestine refugees in the Gaza Strip has been of special concern to the General Assembly since 1971, when the Commissioner-General reported¹⁰ that, as a result of operations carried out by the Israeli military authorities, large numbers of shelters in refugee camps had been demolished and approximately 15,000 refugees had been removed. At its thirty-fourth session, after considering the report of the Secretary-General on this subject,¹¹ the Assembly

⁹ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-fourth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 50, document A/34/518.

¹⁰ A/33/83 and Add.1.

¹¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 50, document A/34/517.

adopted resolution 34/52 F, in which it called once more upon Israel to desist from removal and resettlement of Palestinian refugees in the Gaza Strip and from destruction of their shelters.

34. In another decision, resolution 34/52 C, the Assembly appealed to all States, specialized agencies and non-governmental organizations to augment the special allocations for scholarships and grants to Palestinian refugees, invited the relevant United Nations agencies to continue to expand the inclusion within their respective spheres of competence of assistance for higher education for the Palestinian refugee students, appealed to all States, specialized agencies and the United Nations University to contribute generously to the Palestinian universities in the territories occupied by Israel since 1967 and to contribute towards the establishment of vocational training centres for Palestinian refugees. The Assembly requested UNRWA to act as recipient and trustee for such special allocations and scholarships and to award them to qualified Palestinian refugee candidates.

35. In addition to the annual report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA,¹² the General Assembly will have before it at its thirty-fifth session reports of the Secretary-General on the Palestine refugees in the Gaza Strip,¹³ on the return of the displaced inhabitants of the territories occupied by Israel since 1967¹⁴ and on the allocation of scholarships and grants to Palestinian refugees,¹⁵ as well as a report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine¹⁶ and a report of the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA.¹⁷

V. PALESTINIAN RIGHTS

36. The developments concerning the question of Palestinian rights up to October 1979 were outlined in the report of the Secretary-General of 24 October 1979 [*ibid.*, sect. V].

37. At its thirty-fourth session, the General Assembly considered the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People¹⁸ and adopted resolutions 34/65 A to D. By its resolution 34/65 A, the Assembly reaffirmed that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East could not be established without the achievement, *inter alia*, of a just solution to the problem of Palestine on the basis of the attainment of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, including the right of return and the right to national independence and sovereignty in Palestine, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, endorsed the recommendations of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and expressed its regret and concern that those recommendations, endorsed by the Assembly in its resolutions 31/20, 32/40 A and 33/28 A, had not been implemented, once again urged the Council to consider and to take, as soon as possible, a decision on the

recommendations endorsed by the Assembly and authorized and requested the Committee, in the event of the Council failing to consider or to take a decision on those recommendations by 31 March 1980, to consider that situation and to take the suggestions it deemed appropriate. By resolution 34/65 B, the Assembly noted with concern that the Camp David accords had been concluded outside the framework of the United Nations and without the participation of the PLO, the representative of the Palestinian people, rejected those provisions of the accords which ignored, infringed upon, violated or denied the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, and which envisaged and condoned continued Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967, strongly condemned all partial agreements and separate treaties which constituted a flagrant violation of the rights of the Palestinian people, the principles of the Charter and the resolutions adopted in the various international forums on the Palestinian issue and declared that the Camp David accords and other agreements had no validity in so far as they purported to determine the future of the Palestinian people and of the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967. The Assembly, by its resolution 34/65 C, also requested the Committee to keep the situation relating to the question of Palestine under review and to report and make suggestions to the Assembly or to the Security Council, as appropriate. By its resolution 34/65 D, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to ensure that the Special Unit on Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat, under the guidance of the Committee, discharge its tasks and undertake an expanded programme of work. Steps are being taken to implement the provisions of that resolution.

38. In a letter to the President of the Security Council dated 6 March 1980 [S/13832], the Acting Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People drew attention to the relevant provisions of resolution 34/65 and said that the Committee was convinced that the members of the Council would wish to re-examine the Committee's recommendations as urged by the General Assembly in that resolution. On 24 March, the Chairman of the Committee requested [S/13855] that the Council convene urgently to consider those recommendations. The Council held seven meetings between 31 March and 30 April [2204th-2208th, 2219th and 2220th meetings] to consider the question, but no resolution was adopted owing to a negative vote of one of the permanent members of the Council [2220th meeting].

39. In a letter to the Secretary-General dated 1 July 1980,¹⁹ the Permanent Representative of Senegal said that the Committee, over which he presided, had considered the situation as required by resolution 34/65 A, and having in mind the escalating tension in the area, which further aggravated the serious threat to international peace and security, and the continuing failure of the Security Council to exercise its primary responsibility in this respect, he had suggested that an emergency special session of the General Assembly should be held to discuss the question of Palestine. The seventh emergency special session of the General

¹² *Ibid.*, Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 13.

¹³ A 35 473.

¹⁴ A 35 472.

¹⁵ A 35 438 and Corr.1.

¹⁶ A 35 474.

¹⁷ A 35 526.

¹⁸ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 35.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, Seventh Emergency Special Session, Annex, agenda item 5, document A/ES-7.1, annex.

Assembly met from 22 to 29 July to consider the question of Palestine at the request of Senegal.

40. At its seventh emergency special session, the General Assembly, in its resolution ES-7/2, reaffirmed the inalienable rights in Palestine of the Palestinian people, including the right to self-determination without external interference, and to national independence and sovereignty, and the right to establish its own independent sovereign State. It called upon Israel to withdraw completely and unconditionally from all the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since June 1967, including Jerusalem, and urged that such withdrawal from all the occupied territories should start before 15 November 1980. The Assembly requested and authorized the Secretary-General, in consultation, as appropriate, with the Committee, to take the necessary measures towards the implementation of the recommendations contained in paragraphs 59 to 72 of the report of the Committee to the Assembly at its thirty-first session²⁹ as a basis for the solution of the question of Palestine. It also requested the Secretary-General to report to it at its thirty-fifth session on the implementation of the resolution and requested the Security Council, in the event of non-compliance by Israel with the resolution, to adopt effective measures under Chapter VII of the Charter. The Assembly decided to adjourn the seventh emergency special session temporarily and to resume upon request from Member States. In its resolution ES-7/3, the Assembly requested the Committee to study thoroughly the reasons for the refusal of Israel to comply with the relevant United Nations resolutions, particularly resolution 31/20 of 24 November 1976, in which the Assembly endorsed the recommendations of the Committee and the numerous resolutions demanding the withdrawal of Israel from the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories, including Jerusalem, and to submit the study to the Assembly.

41. Since the General Assembly discussed the matter at its thirty-fourth session, a number of communications have been addressed by the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People to the President of the Security Council or the Secretary-General [A/35/230, S/13940, S/13978, S/14089, S/14090 and S/14110]. The rights of the Palestinian people have also been the subject of communications received from Member States [A/35/209, A/ES-7/4, A/ES-7/7, A/ES-7/11 and A/35/390]. In addition, a number of communications in which Israel expressed its view of the PLO have been received and circulated as official documents of the United Nations [S/13872,³⁰ A/35/170, S/13985, A/35/282 and S/14107].

VI. SEARCH FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT

42. The search for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East from June 1967 until October 1979 was described in the reports of the Secretary-General of 18 May 1973 [S/10929, sect. II], 17 October 1978 [S/12896, sect. VI] and 24 October 1979 [S/13578, sect. VI].

²⁹ *Ibid.*, Thirty-first Session, Supplement No. 35.

³⁰ The comments of the PLO on document S/13872 are contained in document S/13908, annex.

43. The situation in the Middle East was considered again by the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session. On 6 December 1979, it adopted resolution 34/70, in which it condemned Israel's continued occupation of Palestinian and other Arab territories, declared once more that peace was indivisible and that a just and lasting settlement of the Middle East question must be based on a comprehensive solution, under the auspices of the United Nations, taking into account all aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict, in particular the attainment by the Palestinian people of all its inalienable rights and the Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied Arab and Palestinian territories, including Jerusalem, condemned all partial agreements and separate treaties which violated the recognized rights of the Palestinian people and contradicted the principles of just and comprehensive solutions to the Middle East problem, reaffirmed that, until Israel withdrew from all the occupied territories and until the Palestinian people attained and exercised its inalienable national rights, a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, in which all countries and peoples in the region lived in peace and security within recognized and secure boundaries, would not be achieved, called anew for the early convening of the Peace Conference on the Middle East, under the auspices of the United Nations and the co-chairmanship of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, with the participation on an equal footing of all parties concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, urged the parties to the conflict and all other interested parties to work towards the achievement of a comprehensive settlement covering all aspects of the problem and worked out with the participation of all parties concerned within the framework of the United Nations, and requested the Security Council, in the exercise of its responsibilities under the Charter, to take all necessary measures to ensure the implementation of relevant resolutions of both the Council and the Assembly and to facilitate the achievement of such a comprehensive settlement aiming at the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the region.

44. As outlined earlier in this report, the General Assembly also held an emergency special session in July 1980 to discuss the question of Palestine (see paragraphs 39 and 40 above), and the Security Council held seven series of meetings to examine various problems relating to the rights of the Palestinian people, the situation in the occupied territories and the question of Jerusalem (see paragraphs 22-27 and 38 above). The outcome of these meetings is relevant to the search for a comprehensive settlement of the Middle East problem.

45. During the period covered by the present report, the Secretary-General, in his periodic reports on the activities of UNDOF [S/13637 and S/13957], reiterated the view that, although the area of operation of the Force was quiet, the situation in the Middle East as a whole was unstable and would remain so unless and until a comprehensive settlement covering all aspects of the Middle East problem could be reached. The Security Council, in renewing the mandate of UNDOF for further periods of six months in November 1979 and in May 1980, concurred with this view [S/13662 and S/13970] and called upon the parties concerned to

implement immediately its resolution 338 (1973) [resolutions 456 (1979) and 470 (1980)].

46. Since the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly, a number of communications addressed to the President of the Security Council or the Secretary-General have dealt with the situation in the Middle East or various aspects thereof. By a letter dated 11 February 1980 [S/13810], the representative of Pakistan transmitted the text of the resolutions and the final declaration of the extraordinary session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers held at Islamabad from 27 to 29 January 1980. In a letter dated 28 April 1980 [S/13912], the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya transmitted the text of the declaration made at the conclusion of the Fourth Summit Conference of the Steadfastness and Confrontation National Front, held at Tripoli between 12 and 15 April 1980. The texts of declarations issued by the European Community, in Luxembourg on 28 April and at Venice on 13 June 1980 respectively, were transmitted by the representative of Italy [S/13925 and S/14009]. By a letter dated 22 July 1980 addressed to the Secretary-General,²² the representative of Cuba requested the circulation, in connexion with the seventh emergency special session of the General Assembly, of the relevant parts of the final declaration of the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Havana from 3 to 9 September 1979. In a note verbale dated 8 August 1980 [S/14097], the representative of Jordan transmitted the texts of final documents adopted by the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers at its second extraordinary session, held at Amman on 11 and 12 July 1980. By a letter dated 20 August 1980 [S/14129], the representative of Pakistan transmitted the texts of resolutions adopted by the Eleventh Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers,

²² A/ES-7.8.

held at Islamabad from 17 to 22 May 1980. The communiqué of the extraordinary meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and heads of delegations of the non-aligned countries to the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly, held at Headquarters on 2 and 3 October 1980, was transmitted by the Permanent Mission of Cuba in a note verbale dated 14 October.²³

47. The Camp David agreement and subsequent negotiations undertaken between Egypt and Israel have been the subject of a number of communications mentioned above as well as those addressed to the President of the Security Council or the Secretary-General by the representative of Egypt [S/13795, S/13845, S/13945 and A/ES-7/112].

48. In his annual report on the work of the Organization,²⁴ the Secretary-General has indicated that the main aspects of the Middle East problem are interdependent and cannot be separated. A continuous and determined effort must therefore be made to achieve a comprehensive settlement through negotiations involving all the parties concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization. Any future solution of the problem will have to be based on the right of all States in the area to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force, on the inalienable rights of the Palestinians, including their right to self-determination, and on withdrawal from occupied territories. In this context the question of Jerusalem is of primary importance and cannot be solved through any unilateral decision. The Secretary-General continues to believe that the United Nations can do much to facilitate a settlement, and he earnestly hopes that it will play an increasingly important role in this vital endeavour.

²³ A/35/542.

²⁴ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 1.*

DOCUMENT S/14235*

Letter dated 24 October 1980 from the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[27 October 1980]

I have the honour to refer to the most recent developments in the case of the Mayors of Al-Khalil (Hebron) and Halhoul, who were arbitrarily and illegally expelled by the Israeli authorities from the occupied territories last May and who have been refused permission to return to their homes and families in spite of the Security Council's specific request contained in resolutions 468 (1980) and 469 (1980).

Earlier this month, in response largely to the pressure brought upon it by the international community, the Government of Israel permitted the two Mayors to be present at the hearing of their appeal before the military review board. However, as it turned out, they were not permitted to enter the occupied territories but were confined at the border post where the hearing was held.

According to reports, their appeal has been rejected and, while their lawyer attempts to carry their appeal further, they themselves continue to be held in confinement at the border post where, in protest against the unjust treatment meted out to them by the Israeli authorities, they have gone on a hunger strike.

On behalf of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, I wish to express our gravest concern at this further defiance by the Israeli authorities of international opinion and of the resolutions of the Security Council, which no doubt is shared just as strongly by the members of the Council.

We feel it is essential that it should be brought to the notice of the Government of Israel that as a Member State it has certain obligations to this Organization and that such open defiance of the Security Council, the chief organ for the maintenance of international peace

and security, is a clear reflection of the cynicism and arrogance on the part of Israel, which is not in keeping with its protestations of good faith and of its desire for peace.

It behooves the international community to protest strongly against these illegal actions of the Israeli authorities and to insist that the Mayors should be permitted to return to their homes and families as requested by the Security Council.

I should be glad if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Falilou KANE
Chairman of the
Committee on the
Exercise of the Inalienable Rights
of the Palestinian People

DOCUMENT S/14236

Letter dated 27 October 1980 from the representative of Iraq to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[27 October 1980]

I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter addressed to you by Mr. Jaadon Hammadi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq.

I would kindly request that this letter be circulated as a document of the Security Council under the item entitled "The situation between Iran and Iraq".

(Signed) Salah Omar Al-ALI
Permanent Representative of Iraq
to the United Nations

LETTER DATED 24 OCTOBER 1980 FROM THE MINISTER
FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF IRAQ ADDRESSED TO THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL

On the occasion of the present discussion in the Security Council and, after the Council has had the opportunity to hear the views of Iraq and Iran on the subject under discussion, I should like to recall once again that Iraq does not have any territorial ambitions in Iran and to reaffirm that we do not desire anything but the restoration of our sovereignty and rights with effective guarantees.

We wish to recall that Iran in reality started the hostilities. Iran committed aggression when it intentionally shelled Iraqi border posts and towns, such as Khanaqin and Mendeli with heavy artillery, and resorted to aerial bombardment of towns and economic targets, especially oil targets, and forcibly closed Shatt Al-Arab for navigation.

These Iranian military acts began on 4 September 1980. This was the beginning of the war waged actually by Iran against Iraq, and not 22 September, which is the date on which Iraq exercised preventive self-defence to defend its people and territories. The presence of the Iraqi military forces inside Iranian territories is solely for defensive purposes. After the military attacks of the Iranian forces during the period from 4 to 22 September, it became necessary to push the Iranian forces away from Iraqi towns situated within the range of Iranian heavy and long-range artillery capable of shelling them and which actually shelled them, as we have mentioned, beginning on 4 September.

In order to guarantee our full sovereignty over Shatt Al-Arab, our national river, and to be in a position enabling us to actually exercise that sovereignty, it is imperative to secure the eastern bank of the river after

Iran refused to recognize our sovereignty and used force to close it to navigation. Shatt Al-Arab is our only water outlet to the outside world.

In the light of the above-mentioned considerations, the Government of the Republic of Iraq wishes to point out that any call for the withdrawal of Iraqi forces, before Iran recognizes the said Iraqi sovereignty in practice and legally, is in our view a legal and practical impossibility, for Iran has not delimited its borders with Iraq in a precise manner.

The question should be directed to the Iranian Government: Where are Iran's borders in accordance with which the sovereignty of Iraq over its land territories, national and territorial waters is to be defined and respected, as well as the respect for the sovereignty of the other Arab States bordering the Arabian Gulf, which will ultimately lead to the achievement of durable peace and stability in the area?

Iran has always, and particularly in recent years, pursued in its actions vis-à-vis Iraq and the other Arab countries bordering the Arabian Gulf an expansionist policy, and we have, in addition to the actual practices, documents which prove this fact.

Iranian officials have made statements of a clearly expansionist nature. They have acted in a similar manner at the expense of the Arab States neighbouring Iran or situated near it. It is, therefore, necessary to guarantee the sovereignty and full rights of Iraq and the other Arab countries. When reference is made to the withdrawal of the Iraqi forces, we shall ask at once: But to what borders, and according to which border agreement, shall such a withdrawal take place? How and who would guarantee that Iran, after our withdrawal, will not threaten our cities and national security? What guarantee is there that Iran will refuse again, as it did in the past, to recognize our sovereign rights over our territories and waters? Who will guarantee that Iran will not again wage war on us and the whole problem will start all over again? The lands reached so far by Iraqi forces are the necessary positions for defence until Iran recognizes our rights and guarantees are reached for the achievement of a final and permanent solution to the dispute.

On the basis of military considerations and topography, there may be better positions forward for defensive purposes but there are none backward. Consequently, no partial or total withdrawal should be prac-

tically contemplated unless it is supported by the achievement of the following:

1. The recognition by Iran of our sovereignty and rights which are in harmony with international law and custom, and its reaffirmation of the principle of the inadmissibility of its acquisition by force of Iraqi territories and those of the neighbouring Arab States in the Arab Gulf and that this should be in word and deed.

2. The withdrawal should be guaranteed by practical arrangements which would make a surprise Iranian military aggression against Iraq materially impossible.

In further clarification, we wish to point out that there is no longer any border agreement which delimits the frontiers between the two countries with the exception of the Protocol for the Delimitation of the Turco-Persian Frontiers signed in 1913, the views of Iraq and Iran regarding that Protocol notwithstanding.

Consequently, and on the basis of all these considerations and facts, and from a position of responsibility and in order to reaffirm the principles of right and justice, we believe that the only possible, logical and practical resolution in the present situation which would not undermine the interests of either party is one which includes a cease-fire and immediate negotiations between them under the auspices of the Secretary-General with the goal of achieving a final solution to the conflict by demarcating the frontiers between the two countries in a final manner, and by the withdrawal of both parties from the territories and waters that do not fall within their territorial boundaries according to the frontiers line.

(Signed) Saadoon HAMMADI
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Iraq

DOCUMENT S/14237*

Letter dated 27 October 1980 from the representative of Israel to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[28 October 1980]

I wish to draw your urgent attention to two further outrages perpetrated by the terrorist PLO in Israel with intent to cause indiscriminate murder and havoc.

Both of these attacks took place yesterday, 26 October 1980. The first occurred at Ramat Gan, east of Tel Aviv, when an explosive device went off at a bus-stop, wounding one civilian. The second incident occurred at a hitch-hiking post outside Jerusalem, where an explosive device also went off and wounded 14 persons, including several soldiers who had been on home leave. As usual, the PLO immediately boasted of its responsibility for these outrages through its news agency in Lebanon (as reported by the Associated Press at Beirut).

I should point out that hitch-hiking is widespread in Israel and, in the interests of road safety, official hitch-hiking posts have been designated throughout the country. The PLO favours attempts on these posts since, as with other public places such as bus-stops and open markets, they offer relatively easy ways of striking against men, women and children in Israel

going about their daily business. Thus, for example, on 26 August 1980 an attempt was made on the hitch-hiking post near the Achim Junction, in the coastal plain south of Gedera, without causing injury. The PLO, as is its wont, immediately took responsibility for that incident on its radio station in Lebanon.

As regards yesterday's outrages, the timing was also significant. It was staged to coincide with the official State visit to Egypt by President Yitzhak Navon of Israel—the first of its kind by a president of Israel to any Arab country, and a symbol of the new reality emerging in the region as a result of the Israel-Egypt peace treaty signed in March of last year.

The PLO outrages in Israel yesterday give further proof, if such were necessary, that the PLO is a sworn enemy of peace in the Middle East.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yehuda Z. BLUM
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

* Circulated under the double symbol A/35/568-S/14237.

DOCUMENT S/14238

Letter dated 28 October 1980 from the representative of Lebanon to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[28 October 1980]

Pursuant to my letter of 24 October 1980 [S/14232], I am under instructions from my Government to complain to the Security Council against continued acts of Israeli aggression against Lebanon.

We feel that it may have become urgent, as appears from the list of aggressions in this letter, that the Security Council should consult on the situation and determine, with the Secretary-General, what course of

action must be followed to prevent further escalation that may endanger peace and security in the area.

In the afternoon of yesterday, 27 October, no less than 23 military Israeli planes overflew southern Lebanon, and particularly the area of Tyre. Three helicopters overflew Beaufort Castle and 12 military armoured vehicles were moving on the road to Yarin. Seven Israeli seacraft were constantly patrolling within Lebanese territorial waters in the south.

On 26 October, at 1515 hours, seven rounds of artillery hit Jwayyah and the city and area of Tyre. Artillery continued in the morning of 27 October, particularly on Tyre. The city of Sayda was also shelled, and

one shell hit the Lebanese army barracks, causing grave wounds to Sergeant Ali Suweid, whose arm has been amputated.

In addition to these specific examples, Israeli military activities in the south have been continuing as described in the previous letters.

I would be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council under the item "The situation in the Middle East".

(Signed) Ghassan TUÉNI
*Permanent Representative of Lebanon
to the United Nations*

DOCUMENT S/14239*

Note verbale dated 27 October 1980 from the Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the Secretary-General

*[Original: Arabic/English]
[28 October 1980]*

The Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations has the honour to enclose herewith a message addressed to the Secretary-General by the Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, with regard to the occupied Syrian territory in the Golan.

The Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic kindly requests the Secretary-General to circulate this message as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

LETTER FROM THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, OF THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

In view of information received to the effect that the Israeli Knesset intends to discuss a bill for the annexation of the Syrian Arab region of the Golan to Israel, the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic wishes to draw the attention of the international community to the fact that mere consideration of such a bill constitutes a blatant violation of the principles of international law and of the Charter of the United Nations, under which respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States is one of the first rules of international order.

The disdain of the Israeli authorities for interna-

tional law, their denial of the rights of the Palestinian Arab people and their disregard for the decisions and resolutions of the United Nations, from their seizure of the territory of others by force, the establishment of settlements in the occupied territories, the expulsion of the Arab population from its lands, up to the annexation of Arab Jerusalem and its adoption as their capital, would not have happened if the Security Council had gone beyond censure of these steps to the stage of applying to Israel the sanctions provided for in the Charter.

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, while keeping a close watch on these new hostile Israeli intentions in the Golan region, can only draw the attention of the international community and, in particular, of the Security Council and the General Assembly to the grave dangers to peace and security in the region and in the world which this new Israeli scheme involves. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic re-emphasizes the need for the international community to take practical steps finally to put an end to aggressive and expansionist Israeli practices and to work for the implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations on this matter.

(Signed) Abdul Halim KHADDAM
*Vice-President of the
Council of Ministers and
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Syrian Arab Republic*

* Circulated under the double symbol A 35 571-S 14239.

DOCUMENT S/14240*

Letter dated 28 October 1980 from the representative of Democratic Kampuchea to the Secretary-General

*[Original: French]
[29 October 1980]*

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith, for your information, the statement issued on 18 October

1980 by the Office of the Prime Minister concerning the situation in Kampuchea at the close of the rainy season and the onset of the 1980/81 dry season.

I should be grateful if you would have this statement

* Circulated under the double symbol A 35 573-S 14240.

circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) THOUNN Prasith
Permanent Representative
of Democratic Kampuchea
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Text of the statement

The 1980 rainy season is over, and we are now on the verge of the 1980/81 dry season.

Throughout the rainy season, our people, our national army and our guerrillas, under the leadership of the Government of Democratic Kampuchea and of the Patriotic and Democratic Front of Great National Union of Kampuchea persevered in their fight against the Vietnamese enemy aggressor, annexationist, devourer of territories and exterminator of nations, successfully bogging down the enemy ever deeper in the mire, militarily, politically and diplomatically. The enemy attack is on the wane and its trajectory towards final defeat is ever clearer. The popular war of our people, led by the Government of Democratic Kampuchea and the Patriotic and Democratic Front of Great National Union of Kampuchea is continuously on the advance in all fields.

* * *

Militarily, we have met and surpassed our planned target of eliminating 50,000 Vietnamese troops during the rainy season: 68,000 enemy troops have been put out of action, 40,000 of whom have been killed or totally incapacitated. In addition, the Vietnamese enemy has suffered many other losses of its active men, as a result of malaria and other diseases. Desertion, mutiny, refusal to obey orders to go to the front and protests at lack of food supplies, particularly in the remote areas, pitched battles between South Vietnamese and North Vietnamese troops, between Kampuchean troops forcibly pressed into service by the Vietnamese occupier and Vietnamese troops, have been much more numerous and more frequent than during the last dry season.

The Vietnamese enemy moved its troops from the interior of Kampuchea and positioned them to attack the army and guerrillas of Democratic Kampuchea in the western border areas. But these military operations failed. The enemy certainly had considerable numbers of men, but its fighting force was insufficient, because troop morale, already at a low ebb in the last dry season, had sunk even lower. At the same time, by bringing its troops from the interior of Kampuchea to the border regions, the enemy has left a vacuum behind it.

As for the national army and guerrillas of Democratic Kampuchea, they are increasingly effective, penetrating ever deeper into the country to conduct operations along strategic routes and railways, in the large towns, including the capital of Phnom Penh, and right up to the eastern border areas of Kampuchea. Our penetration is taking place systematically on the basis of a well-defined plan.

* * *

In addition to the military impasse in which it finds itself at the close of the rainy season, the Vietnamese enemy is facing increasingly serious political difficulties from which it will never be able to extricate itself:

1. The people of Kampuchea are resolutely squaring up to the Vietnamese enemy politically, by every means they can, each according to his or her ability.
2. The Vietnamese occupier is facing opposition from all the self-defence forces and Kampuchean soldiers it forcibly recruited.
3. The Vietnamese enemy has lost all confidence in its staff in the Phnom Penh administration. All around it, it sees nothing but forces hostile to it or allied to the Government of Democratic Kampuchea.

Thus, in Kampuchea, the Vietnamese enemy has no political backing among the Kampuchean population; it has no military force to serve as a puppet army; it has no Kampuchean manpower to service its administration established at Phnom Penh. It must count entirely on its purely Vietnamese forces, numbering 300,000 men, in

other words on the 250,000 troops of the Vietnamese regular army brought in to deal with the army and guerrillas of Democratic Kampuchea and to police the areas temporarily under Vietnamese control, and on another 50,000 Vietnamese administrative staff.

The Vietnamese enemy is totally incapable of winning the support of the people of Kampuchea. For nearly two years now it has been unable to win that support, and it never will be able to do so. All it can do is massacre the people of Kampuchea more systematically and on an ever-growing scale, in accordance with its policy of racial extermination, using all kinds of weapons, including chemical products and toxic gases sprayed over and dropped on areas inaccessible to its troops, and starvation.

As for the Government of Democratic Kampuchea and the Patriotic and Democratic Front of Great National Union of Kampuchea, their political situation has taken another big step forward. The people of Kampuchea as a whole, both in the areas temporarily controlled by the Vietnamese enemy and in those controlled by the Government of Democratic Kampuchea, have always supported and continue to support Democratic Kampuchea and the Patriotic and Democratic Front of Great National Union of Kampuchea. They have clearly understood that Democratic Kampuchea is motivated by a deep love for the nation and its people, that it is determined to share the fortunes and misfortunes of the nation and the people in all circumstances, and that it is leading the struggle against the Vietnamese aggressors, in defence of the nation and people of Kampuchea. A new turn in the situation has become apparent during the past rainy season. The people have acquired ever-growing faith and confidence in the new strategic policy of the Government of Democratic Kampuchea and in the political programme of the Patriotic and Democratic Front of Great National Union of Kampuchea. The Front has enlarged and consolidated its base and its organizations in villages, communes and districts throughout the country, and this has been of powerful assistance in improving the effectiveness of our military operations against the Vietnamese enemy.

* * *

Trapped in this military and political impasse, the Vietnamese enemy is also extremely isolated in the international arena. The international front backing the just struggle of the people of Kampuchea to defend their nation and their territorial integrity has been greatly expanded and consolidated. Besides upholding the just cause of the people of Kampuchea, the international front exists essentially to contain the strategy of aggression and expansion of Viet Nam and the Soviet Union in South-East Asia and the Pacific. It was very much in evidence during the victorious struggle mounted at the United Nations in order to enable Democratic Kampuchea to retain its seat. That victory is the common victory of all forces world wide which cherish peace, independence and justice and of all forces which uphold the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, international law, and the principles of non-alignment. It is the common victory of the forces which stand in solidarity against the Vietnamese-Soviet forces of invasion and aggression that are shamelessly violating the sovereignty of small States. The defeat of Viet Nam and the Soviet Union at the United Nations had a fateful effect on the Vietnamese troops of aggression in Kampuchea and within the Hanoi Le Duan clique itself, and is exacerbating the hatred of the Vietnamese people against that clique. This is a further major difficulty to add to the multitude of other difficulties facing the Le Duan clique and its Soviet masters, who, having lost still more of their trump cards, are in another strait-jacket, this time at the diplomatic level.

* * *

The military and political situation described above illustrates the decline of Vietnamese strength, a decline which set in towards the end of the 1979/80 dry season and deepened throughout the rainy season. On the other hand, the popular war of our people for national survival, conducted under the leadership of the Government of Democratic Kampuchea and of the Patriotic and Democratic Front of Great National Union of Kampuchea, is gradually making headway.

This excellent situation and these successes can be accounted for as follows:

1. They are due to the efforts of our people, our national army and our guerrillas at the front who, under the leadership of the Government of Democratic Kampuchea and the Patriotic and

Democratic Front of Great National Union of Kampuchea, have risked life and limb in their fight. They have exerted all their efforts: on the military front, to fight the Vietnamese enemy, and on the political front, to implement the political programme of the Patriotic and Democratic Front of Great National Union of Kampuchea in order to mobilize all the forces of the broad union of the Kampuchean nation and people.

2. This excellent situation cannot be dissociated from the efforts made in the international arena by the countries of the Association of South-East Asian Nations. The latter have shown themselves to be a force which is playing an important role in uniting world-wide forces that cherish peace, independence and justice, in defence of peace and stability in South-East Asia and the Pacific and to ensure the containment of the war in that region, in particular by defending Democratic Kampuchea's seat at the United Nations and demanding, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 34/22, the withdrawal of all Vietnamese troops of aggression from Kampuchea, in order to enable the people of Kampuchea to decide their own future free from outside interference of any kind.

3. Neither can these victories be dissociated from the efforts of the overwhelming majority of countries, governments, peoples, mass organizations and individuals world wide that cherish peace, independence and justice.

The Government of the Patriotic and Democratic Front of Great National Union of Kampuchea wishes to seize this opportunity to renew the expression of their deeply-felt gratitude on behalf of the entire Kampuchean nation and people. The support of those countries, governments, peoples, mass organizations and eminent individuals for the cause of the Kampuchean people in their struggle bears witness to their firm determination to defend the Charter of the United Nations, international law and the principles of non-alignment, in the face of the jungle law of the Vietnamese and Soviet expansionist aggressors. That support has greatly contributed to the favourable turn which the struggle on the Kampuchean front has taken and has considerably encouraged the Kampuchean people in their tenacious and persevering struggle to defend their nation and their territory. The Kampuchean people have made enormous sacrifices in the struggle that they are obliged to wage in order to drive out the Vietnamese enemy. Although it is true that these sacrifices are made primarily in order to ensure the survival of the Kampuchean nation, at the same time they objectively constitute an effective contribution, in flesh and blood, to the cause of the defence of peace and stability in the regions of South-East Asia and the Pacific. The Kampuchean people are greatly encouraged by the fact that the world is realizing more and more clearly what is at stake in their struggle. They are determined to raise ever higher the banner of the struggle to defend their national cause and, through that struggle, to make their contribution to the struggle to counter the strategy of aggression and expansion of Viet Nam and the Soviet Union in the region.

In the present international situation—where the struggle is increasingly bitter between, on the one hand, the forces of aggression and expansion of the Soviet Union, Viet Nam and their allies, and, on the other hand, all forces that cherish peace and justice in the world—Democratic Kampuchea, the Patriotic and Democratic Front of Great National Union of Kampuchea and the Kampuchean people must make a choice in order to ensure the survival of the Kampuchean nation. They have chosen to side resolutely and unequivocally with the international front of all the forces that oppose the strategy of aggression and expansion of Viet Nam, the Soviet Union and their allies.

The Vietnamese enemy is confronted with insurmountable difficulties in all fields. It has been driven into a situation from which there is no escape. It will, however, make every possible effort to maintain its grip on Kampuchea.

--By persistently sending further military reinforcements to Kampuchea in order to fill the void left by its troops that have been eliminated and to pursue its genocidal war in Kampuchea:

--By massacring the Kampuchean people on an even greater scale;

--By continuing to engage in a variety of perfidious diplomatic manoeuvres.

Our nation, our people, our cadres and our combatants, both men and women, must redouble their vigilance, overcome all obstacles and use every possible means to complete the tasks of the 1980/81 dry season:

—On the military front, we must continue to step up and strengthen our attacks on the Vietnamese enemy in order to wipe out its manpower; the plan we have established for the 1980/81 dry season sets the number of Vietnamese soldiers to be put out of combat at 70,000;

—Politically, we must continue to implement fully the new strategic policy of the Government of Democratic Kampuchea, the political programme of the Patriotic and Democratic Front of Great National Union of Kampuchea, and the guiding principles of the directives of the Government of Democratic Kampuchea, and to consolidate further the forces of union of the nation and the people, both inside and outside the country, in order to put even greater vigour into every aspect of the struggle against the Vietnamese enemy aggressor;

—And we must continue to mobilize the support of all forces in the world that cherish peace, independence and justice so that they may exert pressure on the Vietnamese enemy with a view to obliging it to withdraw all its troops from Kampuchea and in order to bring about the failure of its perfidious manoeuvres.

* * *

At this juncture, when the successfully completed tasks of the rainy season lie behind us and we are about to enter the 1980/81 dry season, the Government of Democratic Kampuchea and the Patriotic and Democratic Front of Great National Union of Kampuchea appeal to the entire Kampuchean people, to all fellow citizens both inside and outside the country to continue to raise ever higher the banner of the Patriotic and Democratic Front of Great National Union of Kampuchea, to consolidate further all the forces of the nation and the people and to unite in a single bloc in order to wage the struggle, in all its forms, against the Vietnamese aggressors of the Le Duan clique, until they disappear altogether from the territory of our beloved Kampuchea, for which we are quite ready to sacrifice our lives. The Government and the Front call upon all the cadres and combatants, both men and women, of our national army and on all our guerrillas and on the senior staff and the personnel of all our administrative and governmental bodies to pursue their glorious tradition of struggle and to raise ever higher the standard of battle in order to discharge the manifold tasks of every kind incumbent on them, displaying to the full their sense of responsibility for the fate of the Kampuchean nation and people, and thus help to perform successfully the tasks of the 1980/81 dry season in all areas, in order to bring about further great victories until the final victory is achieved over the Vietnamese aggressors of the Le Duan clique.

* * *

On this same occasion, the Government of Democratic Kampuchea and the Patriotic and Democratic Front of Great National Union of Kampuchea appeal to countries, Governments, peoples, mass organizations and eminent individuals that cherish peace, independence and justice to continue to support vigorously the cause of the Kampuchean people in their struggle:

—By continuing to exert pressure on Hanoi to withdraw all its troops from Kampuchea, in accordance with United Nations resolution 34 22, and allow the Kampuchean people to decide their future themselves without any outside interference;

—By pursuing their concerted efforts to thwart the perfidious manoeuvres of Hanoi so that it cannot maintain its grip on Kampuchea;

--By pursuing their action to prevent the Vietnamese forces of aggression from continuing to massacre the Kampuchean people with weapons of all kinds, including starvation and chemical devices;

—By continuing to grant sufficient humanitarian assistance, to distribute it on the Thai-Kampuchean border and to take measures to distribute it directly to the Kampuchean population living in regions temporarily under the control of the Vietnamese enemy.

* * *

On this occasion the Government of Democratic Kampuchea and the Patriotic and Democratic Front of Great National Union of

Kampuchea also appeal to the Vietnamese people to step up and intensify their struggle against the war of aggression of the Le Duan clique in Kampuchea with a view to rapidly putting an end to the tragedy of the Kampuchean people and to the misfortunes and sufferings of the Vietnamese people themselves. The Vietnamese people have derived no benefit from this war of aggression, which has brought them nothing but ruin, sorrow and separation. They were already broken by over 30 years of war and had suffered very deeply. The Le Duan clique has now dispossessed them of the little property, money and food they still had in order to feed its war of aggression in Kampuchea. Their sons and daughters and their husbands and wives are being snatched from their arms and thrown into the flames of the war of aggression in Kampuchea. The increasingly cruel policies of impoverishment, fascism and terror to which the Vietnamese people are being subjected by the Le Duan clique are a consequence of the impasse in which that clique finds itself in its war of aggression in Kampuchea. As long as the Le Duan clique continues this war, it will become increasingly bogged down and will intensify all the more its policies of impoverishment, fascism and terror. At the same time, it will make Viet Nam a colony of the Soviet Union, destined to be an even more contemptible pawn of the latter. The Vietnamese people and youth will then be indefinitely condemned to be enlisted as cannon fodder to serve the needs of the Soviet Union's strategy of aggression and expansion.

Moreover, the Le Duan clique has no hope whatsoever of winning this war of aggression it is waging in Kampuchea. How can the Le

Duan clique of Hanoi avoid ultimate defeat when it is undermined by internal discord and must face the growing insecurity that is spreading throughout Viet Nam and stronger and stronger opposition from the people, when it is denounced and condemned by the entire world, and when Viet Nam's economy is tottering and is bled further daily? Its master, the Soviet Union, has a very heavy burden to bear in the Vietnamese war of aggression in Kampuchea. It will not be able to save the Le Duan clique from ultimate defeat, whatever it does, particularly since it is itself becoming bogged down in Afghanistan and must, in addition, bear the burden of the deterioration of the situation in Poland.

It is therefore only once the Le Duan clique has withdrawn all its forces of aggression from Kampuchea that, simultaneously, peace and security will be restored to the Kampuchean people and the Vietnamese people will have peace and tranquillity.

The Government of Democratic Kampuchea and the Patriotic and Democratic Front of Great National Union of Kampuchea have already stated repeatedly that, provided that the Le Duan clique withdraws all its troops from Kampuchea, the Government of Democratic Kampuchea, the Patriotic and Democratic Front of Great National Union of Kampuchea and the Kampuchean people will harbour no grudges and will demand no compensation. Our two countries and our two peoples will, moreover, be able to coexist as good neighbours, in peace and tranquillity, on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence.

DOCUMENT S/14241*

Letter dated 29 October 1980 from the representative of Jordan to the Secretary-General

[Original: Arabic/English]
[31 October 1980]

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to convey to you the statement by the official Jordanian spokesman concerning the criminal attempt to burn the Church of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem. This criminal act, which took place on Tuesday, 14 October 1980, can only be seen as the result of Israeli policy to destroy Christian and Islamic holy places and transform the city of Jerusalem into an exclusive Jewish city.

I respectfully request you to use your good offices in calling upon the Government of Israel to abide by the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on the protection of holy shrines and cultural institutions in occupied areas.

I kindly request that this letter and the enclosed statement be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hazem NUSEIBEH
Permanent Representative of Jordan
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Statement by the official Jordanian spokesman concerning the fire at the Church of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem

It was reported by the news agencies from occupied Arab Jerusalem that a fire broke out last Tuesday night in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in the Holy City and that the fire destroyed some of the precious relics there.

The official spokesman said that this act of aggression against the Christian holy places was not just another fortuitous incident but was a premeditated act constituting yet another episode in the policy of Zionist religious fanaticism directed against the holy places of the Islamic and Christian faiths.

The spokesman added that this was not the first time since 1967 that the Church of the Holy Sepulchre had been the victim of acts of pillage and theft of its valuable historical and religious property and that the years of Zionist occupation were filled with incidents involving aggression against other Christian sites and precious historical property at Jerusalem, not to mention the profanation and desecration of Christian and Islamic holy places through the commission of acts of indecency within their precincts under the very eyes of the occupation authorities.

The official spokesman emphasized that this phenomenon was regarded as extremely serious since it recalls to mind the fire at the blessed Al-Aqsa Mosque, the profanation of the Ibrahim Mosque at Hebron, the theft of the Crown of the Virgin from the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, the aggression against the property of the Coptic Monastery, the burning of a number of Christian cultural centres in the Holy City and the excavations within the precincts of the Al-Aqsa Mosque, the structure of which is now threatened with subsidence and collapse. All of this provides confirmation that the recent incident at the Church of the Holy Sepulchre is simply the implementation of an Israeli policy designed to destroy both the Islamic and the Christian holy places and to endow the Arab Holy City with a Jewish character.

The official spokesman appealed to all civilized States and, in particular, the Christian world to regard the incident as extremely grave and serious and to consider putting a rapid and definite end to the occupation practices which were endangering both the existence and the future of the Christian and Islamic holy places.

The Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, while condemning the attempt to burn down the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, holds the Israeli Government and the occupation authorities responsible for this premeditated criminal act which exposes the serious and hostile nature of Israeli policies towards the holy places in occupied Arab territory.

* Circulated under the double symbol A/35/578-S/14241.

Letter dated 29 October 1980 from the Secretary-General to the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People

[Original: English]
[30 October 1980]

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 24 October 1980 [S/14235] regarding recent developments relating to the Mayors of Hebron and Halhoul.

Your observations have been carefully noted. The developments mentioned in your letter coincide with our information. I should add that, according to the information we have received, which has been confirmed by the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations, the Supreme Court of Israel is scheduled to hear the appeal submitted by the lawyer of the two Mayors on 30 October. I have also learned that the Israeli occupation authorities have decided to transfer the two Mayors from the customs terminal, where they were confined, to Ramleh Prison in Israel.

I need hardly stress my deep and continuing concern with the implementation of Security Council resolutions 468 (1980) and 469 (1980). In May 1980, I addressed an appeal to the Prime Minister of Israel to take the necessary action to respond to the call of the Council. Since then, I and my advisers have followed closely the developments relating to this matter and, on a number of occasions, have raised the various aspects of this matter with the Permanent Representative of Israel and other Israeli representatives. You may be assured that I shall continue to exert all possible efforts to implement the Council resolutions.

Since your letter of 24 October has been circulated as a General Assembly and Security Council document, I am arranging for this reply to be distributed in the same manner.

(Signed) Kurt WALDHEIM
Secretary-General

* Circulated under the double symbol A/35/581-S/14242.

DOCUMENT S/14243*

Letter dated 4 November 1980 from the representative of Israel to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[5 November 1980]

I have the honour to refer to the letter of 29 October 1980 addressed to you by the Permanent Representative of Jordan [S/14241], to which he annexed, somewhat belatedly, a statement of 16 October by a Jordanian spokesman regarding the small fire which occurred in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem on 14 October. In his letter, the Permanent Representative of Jordan went so far as to allege that that fire was a "criminal attempt to burn the Church of the Holy Sepulchre" which, to his mind, was the result of an "Israeli policy designed to destroy Christian and Islamic holy places".

The Permanent Representative of Jordan makes these wild and inflammatory charges without supplying a shred of supporting evidence—for good reason, since his accusations are groundless.

Given the fact that Jordan is a country which considers itself as being in a state of war with Israel, the letter in question can only be regarded as yet another attempt by its Permanent Representative to fan the flames of religious incitement for the purpose of political warfare against my country. This is by no means the first time that Jordan has acted in such a reckless and irresponsible manner (see, for example, my letters to you of 25 January [S/13766] and 12 February 1980 [S/13793]).

The facts of the present case are as follows: on Tuesday, 14 October, a devotional candle toppled onto

the wooden floor in the Armenian Chapel of St. Helena within the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. The fire was extinguished quickly. Such damage as there was, was confined to an oil painting hanging nearby.

It should be pointed out that fires have occurred from time to time in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, as indeed they are liable to occur in any place of worship where hundreds of candles are in use. In fact, on 14 October 1955—when the walled city of Jerusalem was under Jordanian occupation—a fire broke out in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in circumstances almost identical to those surrounding the fire in the Church last month. A devotional candle was accidentally toppled and as a result a carpet and some clerical robes were burned, and part of the Church's fabric was damaged.

A few years earlier—also during the Jordanian occupation of the walled city—the Church of the Holy Sepulchre was engulfed in a far more serious conflagration. On 23 November 1949, a major fire broke out in the dome of the Church and raged for over 24 hours. Through the intermediary of the United Nations, the Government of Israel offered to send fire-fighters to help extinguish the blaze, but that offer was rejected by Jordan. The entire roofing of the dome was destroyed and, at the time, the material damage to the church was estimated at almost \$1 million, as reported in *The New York Times* of 26 November.

Given Jordan's unenviable record of desecration of holy places at Jerusalem, it ill becomes a representa-

* Circulated under the double symbol A/35/595-S/14243.

tive of that country to express an opinion in the matter at hand, let alone mendaciously manipulate the means and machinery of the United Nations in a relentless campaign of political warfare against Israel. With particular regard to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre under Jordanian occupation, a report of the Middle East correspondent of *The Times* of London, published on 14 July 1959, bears remembering:

“Especially in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre any sensitive visitor must be appalled by the maze of steel and wooden buttresses that alone save the structure from collapse, and by the accompanying mantle of almost impenetrable gloom and dirt.”

The Christian communities at Jerusalem made plans to restore the Church against background indications from the Government of Jordan that it would insist on a Muslim architect to direct the work. For that and other reasons the restoration of the Church was not completed before the reunification of the city of Jerusalem in 1967.

The condition of the Church has improved markedly since then. With the full co-operation of Israel, the Christian authorities responsible for the maintenance and administration of the Church have proceeded unimpeded with the restoration work, and major parts of it have been completed. *The New York Times* of 23

July 1973 reported that the façade of the Church was gradually emerging from the ugly scaffolding that had covered it for decades, and that a brighter, structurally safe interior now greets the thousands of tourists and pilgrims who visit it every day.

The French architect responsible for renovating the Armenian section of the Church called it “the most ambitious restoration of the Holy Sepulchre undertaken since the time of the Crusaders”. Any visitor or pilgrim to Jerusalem can see for himself the remarkable results of this major restoration and renovation project.

Hence the Jordanian letter will no doubt be seen and treated for what it is—yet another extraordinary example of how little compunction the representative of Jordan has about injecting religious hatred into the Arab-Israel conflict and about abusing religious sentiment for his own partisan purposes. In doing so, he displays a reckless disregard of the facts and possible consequences of his ill-considered statements.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yehuda Z. BLUM
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/14245*

Letter dated 6 November 1980 from the representative of Pakistan to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[7 November 1980]

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to draw your attention to the serious escalation of provocative actions from the Afghanistan side along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. The Government of Pakistan, which has maintained a policy of restraint towards a large number of the violations of Pakistan's air space by aircraft with Afghan markings, is constrained to take a grave view of the three recent armed attacks by helicopter gunships detailed below:

(a) On 26 September 1980, a formation of helicopter gunships from Afghanistan attacked a Pakistani border post in Bajour Agency with rockets and cannons for about 20 minutes, killing two men of Pakistan's civilian armed forces and injuring another;

(b) On 28 September, five helicopter gunships

coming from Afghanistan fired 10 rockets at the Pakistani border post at Nowa in Mohmand Agency;

(c) On 24 October, six MI-24 helicopter gunships from Afghanistan attacked two villages and one Afghan refugee camp in North Waziristan Agency well inside the Pakistani territory, causing injuries to three civilians, including one child.

In protesting the above aggressive acts, the Government of Pakistan sincerely hopes that these unprovoked armed raids, which constitute a serious violation of Pakistan's territory, would cease forthwith.

I shall be grateful if the text of this letter is circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Niaz A. NAIK
Permanent Representative of Pakistan
to the United Nations

* Circulated under the double symbol A/35/605-S/14245.

DOCUMENT S/14246

Note by the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[7 November 1980]

1. The President of the International Court of Justice, by a communication of 25 September 1980, informed the Secretary-General of the death, on 25 September, of Judge Richard R. Baxter (United States

of America). It will be recalled that Judge Baxter was elected to the International Court of Justice by the Security Council and the General Assembly on 31 October 1978 for a term to expire on 5 February 1988.

By a further communication, dated 4 October, the President of the Court informed the Secretary-General of the death, on that date, of Judge Salah El Dine Tarazi (Syrian Arab Republic), who had been elected to the Court on 17 November 1975 for a term of office to expire on 5 February 1985.

2. In view of the foregoing, two vacancies have occurred in the International Court of Justice which must be filled in accordance with the terms of the Statute of the Court. Article 14 of the Statute provides:

"Vacancies shall be filled by the same method as that laid down for the first election, subject to the following provision: the Secretary-General shall, within one month of the occurrence of the vacancy, proceed to issue the invitations provided for in Article 5, and the date of the election shall be fixed by the Security Council."

Article 5, paragraph 1, of the Statute provides:

"At least three months before the date of the election, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall address a written request to the members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration belonging to the States which are parties to the present Statute, and to the members of the national groups appointed under Article 4, paragraph 2, inviting them to undertake, within a given time, by national groups, the nomination of persons in a position to accept the duties of a member of the Court."

3. The Secretary-General invited nominations for the vacancies caused by the deaths of Judges Baxter and Tarazi by communications dispatched on 1 and 8 October 1980 respectively. Accordingly, the three-month time-limit will expire on 8 January 1981.

4. Since, under Article 14 of the Statute, the Security Council has to fix the date of the election, it is suggested that the Council might consider this question at an early meeting. The Council may wish to decide that the elections to fill the vacancies shall take place during a resumed thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly in January 1981.

5. While it will be necessary, on the occasion of the elections, to ballot separately for each vacancy, those ballots could be held at the same meetings of the Security Council and the General Assembly. The reason for balloting separately derives, *inter alia*, from Article 15 of the Statute, which provides that:

"A member of the Court elected to replace a member whose term of office has not expired shall hold office for the remainder of his predecessor's term."

As pointed out in paragraph 1 above, Judge Baxter's term would have run until 5 February 1988 and Judge Tarazi's term until 5 February 1985.

6. Should the Security Council decide as suggested above, the Secretary-General will communicate the Council's decision to the General Assembly for appropriate action.

DOCUMENT S/14247*

Letter dated 7 November 1980 from the representative of Israel to the Secretary-General

(Original: English)
[10 November 1980]

I should like to draw your urgent attention to the fact that a series of rockets were fired from Lebanese territory yesterday evening, 6 November 1980, at civilian targets in the Galilee panhandle in northern Israel. In the northern town of Kiryat Shmona, five civilians were injured in this barrage, for which the terrorist PLO has since taken responsibility.

Israel regards this latest incident with the utmost gravity. It is the first of its kind since August of this year, when there were two similar incidents, on the 20th and 23rd of that month. Moreover, it is the first in

which there have been casualties since the rocket attack on Kiryat Shmona on 25 August 1979, as reported in the annex to my letter of 15 April 1980 to the President of the Security Council [S/13895].

As I have observed on previous occasions, the Government of Israel is duty-bound to take all measures necessary to protect the lives and safety of its citizens.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ychuda Z. BLUM
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

* Circulated under the double symbol A 35 610-S 14247.

DOCUMENT S/14248

Report of the Secretary-General under Security Council resolution 478 (1980)

(Original: English)
[11 November 1980]

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of resolution 478 (1980), adopted by the Security Council on 20 August 1980 on the question of Jerusalem. The operative part of that resolution reads as follows:

"The Security Council,

"1. Censures in the strongest terms the enactment by Israel of the 'basic law' on Jerusalem and

the refusal to comply with the relevant Security Council resolutions;

"2. *Affirms* that the enactment of the 'basic law' by Israel constitutes a violation of international law and does not affect the continued application of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since June 1967, including Jerusalem;

"3. *Determines* that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, the occupying Power, which have altered or purport to alter the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem, and in particular the recent 'basic law' on Jerusalem, are null and void and must be rescinded forthwith;

"4. *Affirms also* that this action constitutes a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East;

"5. *Decides* not to recognize the 'basic law' and such other actions by Israel that, as a result of this law, seek to alter the character and status of Jerusalem and calls upon:

"(a) All Member States to accept this decision;

"(b) Those States that have established diplomatic missions at Jerusalem to withdraw such missions from the Holy City;

"6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of the present resolution before 15 November 1980;

"7. *Decides* to remain seized of this serious situation."

2. The text of the resolution was transmitted to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel by the Secretary-General immediately after its adoption. In a note dated 6 October addressed to the Permanent Representative of Israel, the Secretary-General drew attention to his reporting responsibility under paragraph 6 of the resolution and requested the Permanent Representative to make available to him by 5 November his Government's comments on the implementation of the resolution. The reply of the Permanent Representative of Israel is contained in a note dated 4 November, which reads as follows:

"The Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and, in response to the latter's note of 6 October 1980 con-

cerning Security Council resolution 478 (1980), has the honour to draw attention to the statement made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel on 29 September²⁵ in the course of the general debate at the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly.

"As the Foreign Minister observed, the situation of the various religions represented at Jerusalem has never been better than that prevailing since the reunification of the city in 1967. Israel has assured the free and unfettered observance of the religious rights of members of all faiths, who also administer their communal activities and their holy places without any interference.

"The Minister went on to note that throughout recorded history, only the Jewish people has made Jerusalem its capital. For the last 150 years the majority of the city's population has been Jewish.

"He further expressed the hope that nations who seek peace, and know the reality which prevails at Jerusalem today, will respect the undivided city of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, in the same way that Israel respects the holy places of all religions and their freedoms in the city."

3. Before the Security Council adopted resolution 478 (1980), the Governments of Chile, Ecuador and Venezuela had announced their decisions to withdraw their diplomatic missions from Jerusalem. Thus, at the time of the adoption of the resolution, 10 States maintained diplomatic missions at Jerusalem. In the course of August and September 1980, the Governments of those States informed the Secretary-General that they had decided to withdraw their respective diplomatic missions from the Holy City. Their communications have been circulated as documents of the Security Council. The dates of the communications and the symbols of the relevant Council documents are set forth below:

<i>States</i>	<i>Date of communication</i>	<i>Document symbol</i>
El Salvador	22 August	S 14124
Costa Rica	26 August	S 14126
Panama	26 August	S 14127
Colombia	28 August	S 14135
Haiti	29 August	S 14137
Bolivia	29 August	S 14138
Netherlands	29 August	S 14144
Guatemala	5 September	S 14151
Dominican Republic	9 September	S 14163
Uruguay	9 September	S 14168

²⁵ *Ibid.*, Thirty-fifth Session, Plenary Meetings, 15th meeting.

DOCUMENT S/14249

Letter dated 10 November 1980 from the representative of Iran to the Secretary-General

[Original: French]
[11 November 1980]

I have the honour to communicate to you herewith the text of the note dated 26 October 1980 from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran addressed to the Embassy of Iraq at Teheran and to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Iraq in reply to the latter's note dated 17 September [S/14272, annex I] alleging the unilateral abrogation of the Treaty concerning the State frontier and neighbourly relations between Iran and Iraq, signed on 13 June 1975.

I should be grateful if you would arrange for the text of this letter and the attached note to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Jamal SHEHRIANI
Chargé d'affaires of the
Permanent Mission of Iran
to the United Nations

Note dated 26 October 1980 from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran addressed to the Embassy of Iraq at Teheran and to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Iraq

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, with reference to the note dated 17 September 1980 from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran at Baghdad, wishes to state the following.

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has always respected the Treaty of 13 June 1975 concerning the State frontier and neighbourly relations between Iran and Iraq, the three Protocols annexed thereto* and the four supplementary agreements of 26 December 1975," and it still considers itself bound by the provisions of the above-mentioned instruments.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran vigorously protests against the aggressions and inhuman acts of the Government of Iraq, and wishes to stress that it is the Government of Iraq which has violated the provisions of the 1975 Treaty and above all the Protocol concerning security on the frontier between Iran and Iraq, particularly by infiltrating agents and armed groups into the provinces of West Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, Kermanshah, Ilam and Khuzistan for the purpose of undertaking subversive activities and assisting the counter-revolution. By so doing, the Government of Iraq has violated the internal security of Iran and done serious harm to good neighbourly relations between the two States.

Assuming that from the point of view of the Government of Iraq difficulties had existed with regard to the application and interpretation of the Treaty or the other agreements concluded, action should

* See United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 1017, No. 14903.

" *Ibid.*, Nos. 14904-14907.

have been taken in accordance with article 6 of the Treaty and the addendum of 26 December 1975, in which the procedures for the settlement of disputes were clearly specified.

In any event, in accordance with article 4 of the Treaty which stipulates that:

"The High Contracting Parties confirm that the provisions of the three Protocols, and the annexes thereto, referred to in articles 1, 2 and 3 above and attached to this Treaty as an integral part thereof, shall be final and permanent. They shall not be infringed under any circumstances and shall constitute the indivisible elements of an over-all settlement."

and with article 5 of the Treaty which reads:

"In keeping with the inviolability of the frontiers of the two States and strict respect for their territorial integrity, the High Contracting Parties confirm that the course of their land and river frontiers shall be inviolable, permanent and final."

no provision whatever is made for the right of unilateral abrogation of the Treaty and the agreements annexed thereto. On the contrary, in conformity with the provisions of the Treaty, no difference of opinion concerning their application can constitute a pretext for announcing their unilateral abrogation.

As has been emphasized on many occasions, from the point of view of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Treaty of 13 June concerning the State frontier and neighbourly relations between Iran and Iraq and also the three Protocols annexed thereto and the notes exchanged and the record and addenda thereto, as well as the four supplementary agreements signed on 26 December 1975, of which the instruments of ratification were exchanged on 22 June 1976, all these agreements having been registered with the United Nations Secretariat in conformity with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations under reference Nos. 14903-14907, are still in force and binding.

DOCUMENT S/14250*

Report of the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[11 November 1980]

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of paragraph 12 of General Assembly resolution ES-7/2, adopted on 29 July 1980 during its seventh emergency special session, in which the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to report to it at its thirty-fifth session on the implementation of the resolution.

2. In that resolution, the General Assembly recalled and reaffirmed its resolutions 3236 (XXIX) and 3237 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974 and all other relevant United Nations resolutions pertinent to the question of Palestine, reaffirmed, in particular, that a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East could not be established, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant United Nations resolutions, without the withdrawal of Israel from all the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories, including Jerusalem, and without the achievement of a just solution of the problem of Palestine on the basis of the attainment of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine, reaffirmed the inalienable right of the Palestinians to return to their homes and property in Palestine, from which they had been displaced and uprooted, and called for their return, reaffirmed also the inalienable rights in Palestine of the Palestinian people, including (a) the right to

self-determination without external interference, and to national independence and sovereignty, and (b) the right to establish its own independent sovereign State, reaffirmed the right of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people, to participate on an equal footing in all efforts, deliberations and conferences on the question of Palestine and the situation in the Middle East within the framework of the United Nations, reaffirmed the fundamental principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force, called upon Israel to withdraw completely and unconditionally from all the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since June 1967, including Jerusalem, with all property and services intact, and urged that such withdrawal from all the occupied territories should start before 15 November 1980, demanded that Israel should fully comply with the provisions of resolution 465 (1980) adopted unanimously by the Security Council on 1 March 1980, further demanded that Israel should fully comply with all United Nations resolutions relevant to the historic character of the Holy City of Jerusalem, in particular Security Council resolution 476 (1980) of 30 June 1980, and expressed its opposition to all policies and plans aimed at the resettlement of the Palestinians outside their homeland.

3. In a letter dated 30 July 1980, the Secretary-General requested the Permanent Representative of

* Circulated under the double symbol A 35 618.S 14250.

Israel to inform him at an early date of the measures taken or envisaged by the Government of Israel to implement the provisions of resolution ES-7/2. The reply of the Permanent Representative of Israel is contained in a letter dated 4 November. It reads as follows:

"I have the honour to refer to your letter of 30 July 1980 with which you enclosed a copy of resolution FS-7/2, adopted by the General Assembly on 29 July 1980.

"It will be recalled that Security Council resolution 242 (1967) constitutes the only agreed basis for a negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict.

"In this connexion, I should like to refer to the statement made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel on 29 September 1980²⁵ in the course of the general debate at the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly. On that occasion, the Foreign Minister stated that the Camp David framework accord for peace in the Middle East—which is based on resolution 242 (1967)—is the only approach which is within the realm of the possible, and that, in accordance with that framework accord, negotiations have been taking place for the attainment of full autonomy for the Palestinian Arab inhabitants of Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza district. He also urged those who genuinely seek peace to encourage the progress which has already been achieved in the Camp David process."

4. In paragraph 13 of General Assembly resolution ES-7/2, the General Assembly requested the Security Council, in the event of non-compliance by Israel with the resolution, to convene in order to consider the situation and the adoption of effective measures under Chapter VII of the Charter. By a note dated 5 August 1980 [S/14088], the Secretary-General brought to the attention of the Council resolution ES-7/2, and in particular paragraph 13 of the resolution. The present report is being circulated as a document of the Assembly and the Council.

5. In paragraph 11 of the resolution, the General Assembly requested and authorized the Secretary-General, in consultation, as appropriate, with the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, to take the necessary measures towards the implementation of the recommendations contained in paragraphs 59 to 72 of the report of the Committee to the Assembly at its thirty-first session²⁶

²⁵ *Ibid.*, Thirty-first Session, Supplement No. 35.

as a basis for the solution of the question of Palestine. The Secretary-General has given careful consideration, in consultation with the Bureau of the Committee, as to what measures he could take towards the implementation of the recommendations of the Committee. Those recommendations concern essentially (a) the establishment by the Security Council of a time-table for the complete withdrawal by the Israeli occupation forces from those areas occupied in 1967, (b) certain measures to be taken by the United Nations during and after the withdrawal, including the possibility of setting up temporary peace-keeping forces to facilitate the process of withdrawal, (c) measures to be taken to facilitate the return of displaced Palestinians to their homes and (d) action to be taken by the Council on the question of the Israeli settlements in occupied territories. With regard to the setting up of temporary peace-keeping forces, in the event of the Security Council taking a decision on this matter, contingency plans can be presented to the Council without delay. With regard to the return of displaced Palestinians, it may be recalled that in 1978 the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People inquired what the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East might be able to do as preparatory work to implement the Committee's recommendations. The Commissioner-General of the Agency stated in his reply that, given the authority, the funds and the co-operation of the Governments concerned, the Agency could be capable of providing the assistance referred to by the Committee promptly, efficiently and economically.²⁷ The Commissioner-General has reiterated this assurance to the Secretary-General. With respect to the other measures referred to in the recommendations of the Committee, such as those in paragraph 72 (e), (f) and (h) of the report of the Committee, they can be taken only after the question of the withdrawal has been resolved. The question of the withdrawal, as well as that of the settlements in occupied territories, has been dealt with by the General Assembly in paragraphs 7 and 8 of resolution ES-7/2 and also in its paragraph 13, which requests the Security Council to take up the matter in the case of non-compliance. The above conclusions of the Secretary-General have been brought to the attention of the Bureau of the Committee.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 35, para. 45.

DOCUMENT S/14251

Letter dated 11 November 1980 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[11 November 1980]

I wish to refer to your statement of 5 November 1980 about the situation between Iran and Iraq [S/14244]. In that statement you mentioned that members of the Security Council welcomed the fact that, in the exercise of his good offices, the Secretary-General was considering sending a representative to the region in order to facilitate authoritative communication with and between the Governments concerned so that negotiations for peace could proceed on an urgent basis.

Since that time I have been in touch with the Governments of Iran and Iraq and have today been informed by both of them that they would accept my sending a representative to the region as soon as possible. I have therefore asked Mr. Olof Palme of Sweden to serve in this capacity and to proceed as soon as possible to the area. I am glad to inform the Council that Mr. Palme has accepted this assignment and will be undertaking his duties shortly.

(Signed) KURT WALDHEIM
Secretary-General

DOCUMENT S/14252

Letter dated 11 November 1980 from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[11 November 1980]

I have the honour to refer to your letter of 11 November 1980 (S/14251), which I have discussed today with members of the Security Council in informal consultations.

The members of the Council agree with the contents of your letter.

(Signed) Anthony PARSONS
President of the Security Council

DOCUMENT S/14254*

Letter dated 7 November 1980 from the representative of Viet Nam to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[11 November 1980]

I have the honour to forward herewith the excerpts from the communiqué dated 5 November 1980 of the commission of inquiry into the Chinese expansionists' and hegemonists' crimes of aggression concerning the crimes committed by the Beijing authorities against Viet Nam during October 1980 and kindly request you to have this note and its enclosure circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) HA VAN LAU
Permanent Representative of the
Socialist Republic of Viet Nam
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Excerpts from the communiqué of the commission of inquiry into the Chinese expansionists' and hegemonists' crimes of aggression on the crimes committed by the Beijing authorities against Viet Nam during October 1980

Along with their political manoeuvres aimed at causing disorder and instability inside Viet Nam and isolating it internationally, the Chinese authorities have increased their armed provocations and incursions all along the border with Viet Nam as well as moving more troops and armaments to the border and beefing up their military installations there. The Chinese have evacuated their populations further from the border while openly threatening to "attack Viet Nam in the dry season".

Meanwhile, shellings and land, sea and air incursions have continued

On land, 57 armed provocations were recorded all along the Sino-Vietnamese border from Lai Chau to Quang Ninh provinces.

especially in Ha Tuyen and Cao Bang provinces, causing many casualties among the civilian population and substantial property losses. In particular, a district town was heavily damaged by artillery shellings.

On the sea, from 10 through 13 October, China made hundreds of incursions into Vietnamese territorial waters in the areas of Hai-phong, Quang Ninh, Thanh Hoa and the Truong Sa islands.

In the air, Chinese jet aircraft at some points intruded as far as six kilometres into Vietnamese air space in Lai Chau, Cao Bang and Lang Son provinces.

Most serious were the shellings and incursions in Xin Man district, Ha Tuyen province.

From 1 to 14 October, Chinese artillery fired all along the border of Xin Man district while company and battalion-sized units of Chinese soldiers crossed the border and occupied several mountain peaks in Vietnamese territory.

On 15 October, a Chinese infantry regiment attacked and occupied Xin Man village in the district of the same name after sustained shelling from 10 a.m. to 5 p.m. (in all, 2,000 120-mm shells and rockets were counted); the shelling killed more than 20 persons, wounded 32 others and caused substantial property losses to the population.

In the following days of 16 and 17 October, the aggressors, from bases in China and the newly occupied mountain peaks in Viet Nam, fired more than 200 artillery shells and rockets on the Xin Man district town, killing a saleswoman of the local State department store and demolishing the store. They shelled four other villages, damaging many maize fields and killing many draught animals. In spite of protests from the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry, the Chinese side started consolidating their military positions on new occupied Vietnamese territory while sending several more regiments to the border with Xin Man district.

On 24, 26 and 28 October, the Chinese occupying forces fired machine-guns and artillery on the surroundings of Xin Man while a Chinese platoon pushed as far as Cao Ma Po village in Quan Ba district to steal timber and take it to China.

* Circulated under the double symbol A/35/609/S/14254.

The Chinese military action at Xin Man involving a relatively large force constituted a blatant violation of the territorial sovereignty of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam.

Also in October, for the purpose of sabotaging Viet Nam economically, the Chinese authorities smuggled spies into Viet Nam,

they spread deceitful propaganda, paid high prices for draught animals and crops to send to China in order to create shortages, poisoned water sources to kill draught animals, as was the case in Son Vi and Thuong Phung villages in Ha Tuyen province, and sent diseased buffaloes and pigs into Vietnamese territory to contaminate the animals on this side of the border.

DOCUMENT S/14255

Letter dated 12 November 1980 from the representative of Japan to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[12 November 1980]

I have the honour to transmit the following letter addressed to you from His Excellency Mr. Masayoshi Ito, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan:

"I have the honour to refer to your letter addressed to the President of the Security Council dated 11 November 1980 [S/14251].

"More than seven weeks have passed since the fighting between Iran and Iraq has intensified. The fact that there are as yet no prospects for a cease-fire and that the present conflict seems to be of a prolonged nature is a source of grave concern to my country.

"The conflict not only is causing loss of innocent life and is inflicting severe damage to the property in both countries, but could constitute a threat to international peace and security. The development of the situation is a matter of profound concern to Japan as well as to the entire international community.

"My Government welcomes and fully supports the continuing positive and constructive efforts for the settlement of the conflict carried out by you and by the Security Council.

"I wish on this occasion to pay high tribute to your tireless dedication to the solution of this difficult problem. We have been informed that, as a part of the ongoing efforts of your good offices to bring about an early and peaceful settlement to the conflict, you have decided, in accordance with the

statement of the President of the Security Council on 5 November [S/14244], to send, as your representative, Mr. Olof Palme of Sweden to both countries involved in the conflict. We heartily welcome this decision.

"Japan strongly hopes that Mr. Palme's visit to those countries will result in a breakthrough for proceeding to peaceful negotiations for a just settlement of the problem.

"We earnestly hope that the conflicting parties will establish a cease-fire as soon as possible and will exert efforts for a peaceful settlement to the conflict. It is our sincere wish that third parties will continue to observe the principle of non-interference as they have done so far.

"The Government of Japan continues to welcome and support all initiatives for the peaceful settlement of the conflict—not only the efforts of the United Nations, but also those of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and of the non-aligned countries. I wish to add here that should there be any role for Japan to play in this matter, it is prepared and willing to do so."

I should like to request that this letter be circulated as a Security Council document under the item entitled "The situation between Iran and Iraq".

(Signed) Masahiro NISHIBORI
Permanent Representative of Japan
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/14256

Report of the Secretary-General on the mission of his Special Representative to Malta and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

[Original: English]
[13 November 1980]

1. In a letter dated 17 October 1980 addressed to the President of the Security Council [S/14228], the Secretary-General recalled that the Council was seized of a complaint by Malta against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and that the Council has held a meeting on the question on 4 September [2246th meeting]. Following that meeting, the Secretary-General had held consultations with the parties and had decided, with their agreement and in order further to assist in the search for a mutually acceptable solution, to send a special representative to discuss the issues at hand with the two Governments. In a letter dated 22 Octo-

ber [S/14229], the President of the Council informed the Secretary-General that his letter had been brought to the attention of the members of the Council and that they had agreed with the Secretary-General's proposal.

2. The present report has been prepared, on the basis of the consultations held in Malta and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya from 29 October to 2 November, by Mr. Diego Cordovez, who was designated by the Secretary-General as his Special Representative.

3. The reason underlying the dispute between Malta and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya is that there is

no agreed delimitation of the continental shelf between the two countries. The matter has been under discussion since 1972. Having failed to reconcile their legal positions, the two Governments, on 23 May 1976, signed a special agreement to submit the matter to the International Court of Justice. Malta rests its case for commencing offshore exploratory drilling operations, an action which led to the incident of 20 August 1980, upon the contention that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has so far failed, without justification, to ratify the 1976 agreement. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya does not accept unilateral responsibility for the delay in ratification.

4. A review of the events and documentary records over the last four years indicates that the agreement signed by the parties in 1976 was followed by a series of complex negotiations. Indeed, the contents and terms of the agreement were periodically subject to further discussion and negotiation, at times in the context of other aspects of the relations between Malta and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Modifications in the text of the agreement were discussed as recently as November 1979. The exchanges between the two Governments on the issue, and the circumstances surrounding some of those exchanges, led to a gradual deterioration in the relations between Malta and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. The drilling incident of 20 August exacerbated the situation; Libyan personnel were expelled from Malta, and several lines of co-operation and assistance were substantially curtailed.

5. The Secretary-General consequently concluded that the early ratification of the 1976 agreement would be an essential first step towards an easing of tensions between the two countries. That view was conveyed to the two Governments. The Secretary-General is now in a position to report to the Security Council that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has undertaken unconditionally to submit the original text of the agreement to the Popular Congresses for ratification during their current session, which is scheduled to conclude on 22 November, with a view to exchanging the instruments of ratification and formulating the joint notification to the Registrar of the International Court of Justice, as provided for in article IV of the agreement, during the first two weeks of December. The Secretary-General is prepared to assist the parties in carrying out the relevant formalities should they so request.

6. Malta has confirmed that it had accepted an implicit understanding, when the agreement was signed in 1976, that it would not begin drilling operations until the Court had reached a decision and an agreement on delimitation had been concluded in accordance with article III of the agreement. Malta considered that since the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya had failed to ratify the agreement, it was legally entitled to commence drilling operations. The efforts aimed at the production of oil were considered by Malta to be a vital economic necessity and an integral part of its evolving policy of neutrality and non-alignment. The

financial losses deriving from Malta's decision to close in 1979 the military bases maintained by the United Kingdom for many years would consequently have been offset. In the circumstances, Malta wished to enter into negotiations with the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya whereby drilling operations in the disputed area, pending the decision of the Court, would be discussed. It wished such discussions to be conducted, not in the legal context of delimitation issues but within the framework of the traditional co-operation and understanding between the two countries. Malta has pledged to hand over any part of the continental shelf which the Court might decide does not belong to it.

7. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya rejects any legal justification of Malta's decision to commence drilling operations, if only because, as indicated above, it does not accept unilateral responsibility for non-ratification of the 1976 agreement. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya considers that drilling operations in the disputed area would prejudice the delimitation case. It contends that interim drilling operations cannot even be considered as falling within the category of "provisional arrangements" envisaged in article 83 of the informal text of the draft convention on the law of the sea.²⁸ Accordingly, it holds the view that a discussion on interim drilling operations could, in itself, compromise its legal position.

8. The Secretary-General has conveyed the position of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya on the subject of interim drilling operations to the Government of Malta. In so doing, he has expressed his confidence that the submission of the delimitation case to the International Court of Justice next month will bring about an improvement of relations between the two countries. The Secretary-General notes that both parties have expressed the hope that further progress in the deliberations of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea will also contribute to a greater clarification of the issues involved. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has reiterated that it supports Malta's policy of neutrality and non-alignment, and that it stands ready to continue and strengthen relations of friendship and co-operation with Malta as in the past. Malta has informed the Secretary-General that it would expect, in that context, to work out an arrangement with the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya which, as an expression of goodwill, would enable Malta to conclude the one drilling operation which was suspended on 20 August 1980.

9. The Secretary-General trusts that the steps taken to clarify the issues and lay the foundations of a peaceful solution outlined in the present report will enable the two parties to look towards the future in a spirit of renewed co-operation and mutual understanding.

²⁸ A CONF.62/WP.10 Rev.3.

Letter dated 14 November 1980 from the representative of Israel to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[17 November 1980]

I wish to draw your urgent attention to yet another attempt by PLO criminals based in Lebanon to perpetrate indiscriminate terror in Israel.

On the night of 12/13 November 1980, a group of PLO terrorists passed through the area of operation of the United Nations Interim Force in southern Lebanon and attempted to cross into Israel about a mile south of Kibbutz Misgav Am in the upper Galilee. The terrorists were spotted early yesterday morning by an Israel Defence Forces patrol and in the ensuing encounter two were killed. Besides Soviet-manufactured Kalashnikov sub-machine-guns, ammunition and explosives, they also carried a Soviet-made camera. They were clad in civilian clothing, but wearing combat boots and carrying the insignia of the so-called "Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine".

Shortly after the incident, that "Front"—which is a constituent of the PLO—took responsibility for it in a press statement, as reported in today's issue of *The New York Times* (on the basis of a Reuters cable from Beirut).

This is only the latest in a series of similar PLO attempts to cross the border from Lebanon through the area of the United Nations force with the intention of committing mass murder or taking hostage innocent

men, women and children in Israel (see my letters of 14 January [S/13028], 19 April [S/13261] and 9 May 1979 [S/13312], 8 February [S/13785], 7 April [S/13876], 9 April,²⁹ 14 April [S/13892] and 16 May 1980 [S/13947]).

It will be recalled that earlier this year Misgav Am was the scene of a barbarous PLO outrage. On 7 April, five of its criminals seized two nursery buildings at the kibbutz, an atrocity which resulted in the death of an infant and a civilian, as well as the wounding of four toddlers, the death of an Israel soldier and the injuring of 11 other soldiers.

The mindless killing of civilians in general and of children in particular, frequently involving hostage-taking, has been characteristic of the PLO since its inception. Its designs, whether successful or not, are those of a group of international criminals, and not—by any stretch of the imagination—of a national liberation movement.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yehuda Z. BLUM
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

* Circulated under the double symbol A/35/630-S/14257.

²⁹ A/35/171.

DOCUMENT S/14259*

Letter dated 17 November 1980 from the representative of Democratic Kampuchea to the Secretary-General

[Original: English/French]
[18 November 1980]

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith, for your information, a text entitled "Evidence of diversion and pillaging of international humanitarian relief by the Vietnamese invaders in Kampuchea".

I should be grateful if you would have this text circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) THOUNS Prasith
Permanent Representative
of Democratic Kampuchea
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Evidence of diversion and pillaging of international humanitarian relief by the Vietnamese invaders in Kampuchea

1

At the end of numerous attacks launched against military convoys and strongholds of the enemy, the national army and guerrillas of Democratic Kampuchea discovered quantities of international hu-

manitarian relief (rice, canned foods, medicines) which were diverted by the Vietnamese occupiers to feed their invading forces in Kampuchea.

During September 1980, for instance, they discovered:

1. On 9 September, one sack of rice, 12 canned foods and 100 metres of material in a Vietnamese military convoy on the front of Koh Andet, Takeo province (southern region);
2. On 10 September, one sack of rice and two cases of food and medicines in a Vietnamese unit of transportation near Neak Luong, Prey Veng province (south-eastern region);
3. On 11 September, a great quantity of food supplies and medicines in a military convoy, north of Neak Luong, on highway 1 (south-eastern region), heading for South Viet Nam;
4. On 19 September, four sacks of rice and 22 canned foods in the Vietnamese strongholds at Phum Speu and Phum Svay Teap, in Chamcar Loeu district, Kompong Cham province (central region);
5. On 20 September, five sacks of rice and 27 canned foods in a Vietnamese military convoy 3 kilometers from Krakor, Pursat province (north-western region);
6. On 27 September, three sacks of rice, 12 canned foods and medicines after an ambush laid against a Vietnamese military unit at the village of Sdok Chhouk, Touk Meas district, Kampot province (south-western region);
7. On 30 September, 30 canned foods and medicines in a Vietnamese military stronghold at the village of Yeang, Sisophon district, Battambang province (north-western region);

* Circulated under the double symbol A/35/644-S/14259.

8. On 2 October, two sacks of rice and 15 canned foods in a Vietnamese stronghold at the village of Sralao, Sangkum Tbmci district, Preah Vihear province (northern region).

II

The Vietnamese occupying forces pillage and kill the inhabitants who go and "receive" or "have received" international humanitarian relief after stagings of "distribution":

1. On 25 September, in the north of Khvay village, Thmar Puok district, Battambang province, the Vietnamese aggressors intercepted and machine-gunned a convoy of 13 oxcarts of the inhabitants who went and received humanitarian relief at the Kampuchea-Thailand border. Only seven of the 35 people of the convoy succeeded in escaping from the massacre and in rejoining the region under the control of Democratic Kampuchea. All carts and oxen were taken away by the Vietnamese pillagers.

The survivors disclosed that famine was rampant in the regions under the temporary control of the Vietnamese aggressors and that in each village, from four to five people were dying every day. The Vietnamese occupiers have never distributed the international humanitarian relief. Furthermore, they prohibited the population from going to the border to receive humanitarian relief on pain of being shot down. They searched houses and seized all humanitarian relief received by the inhabitants directly from the international humanitarian organizations at the border.

2. On 29 September, in the district of Kong Pisei, Kompong Speu province, (western region), the Vietnamese occupiers stationed at Choam Sangke forced the inhabitants, with 16 of their oxcarts, to go and carry international humanitarian relief intended for the people of Kampuchea, from Kompong Speu market to Vietnamese secret warehouses. Back in a forest on the way out of Phum Lalat village, the Vietnamese occupiers ordered them to take a "rest". When the inhabitants were untying their oxen for pasture, the Vietnamese criminals started savagely to shoot at them by shouting "the guerrillas are coming". Ten of the inhabitants were killed on the spot, two others seriously wounded and only six of them succeeded in escaping.

3. On 30 September, in the district of Oudong, Kompong Speu province, the Vietnamese aggressors sent for Kampuchean self-defence guards and the inhabitants of Khum Chan Sen to the market of Oudong in order to "receive" humanitarian relief. But on their way back from Oudong, they were intercepted at Chan Thnal village by the Vietnamese aggressors, who fired at them to intimidate and force them to carry all the humanitarian relief to their barracks.

III

Vietnamese impostures

In order to get financial and material aid from international humanitarian organizations, the Hanoi authorities do not hesitate to indulge in charlatanism and international swindle. The Government of Democratic Kampuchea has already denounced such a fraud as the attempt by the Vietnamese expansionists to get \$US 15 million in order to settle in Kampuchea the so-called 300,000 Kampuchean refugees while the latter are in fact former Vietnamese residents in Kampuchea who willingly left Kampuchea in 1973 at the instigation of Hanoi [see S/14174 of 16 September 1980].

Another example of swindle of the Vietnamese aggressors in Kampuchea is their request for international aid for the so-called "more than 5,500 primary schools with more than 900,000 children". On this matter, it is necessary to underline the following:

1. In 1970-71, there were in Kampuchea, for a population of more than 7 million people, 1,490 primary schools with 338,000 children.

2. The figures of more than 5,500 primary schools with more than 900,000 children in Kampuchea today have been made up out of nothing. Indeed, how can Kampuchea, devastated by war and where the people (in particular children) have been decimated by the Vietnamese invaders, have three times more primary schools with more than three times more children? Only the machiavellianism and cynicism of the Vietnamese expansionists can exhibit such an imposture!

DOCUMENT S/14260*

Letter dated 19 November 1980 from the representative of Democratic Kampuchea to the Secretary-General

*[Original: French]
[20 November 1980]*

I have the honour to transmit herewith, for your information, a statement dated 8 November 1980 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Democratic Kampuchea.

I should be grateful if you would kindly have it distributed as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

*(Signed) TIHOUSS Prasith
Permanent Representative
of Democratic Kampuchea
to the United Nations*

ANNEX

Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Democratic Kampuchea of 8 November 1980

The United Nations General Assembly, at its thirty-fifth session, discussed for several weeks the problem created by the aggression of the Hanoi authorities against Kampuchea, during the general debate in the course of the consideration of the report of the Credentials Committee, and during the debate on the situation in

Kampuchea. The latter item in particular was the subject of detailed discussions.

The overwhelming majority of heads of State or Government, Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representatives denounced or condemned the acts of aggression of the Hanoi authorities and demanded the total withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea. During those debates, they also declared their countries' firm commitment to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, denounced the pretexts, deceitful manoeuvres and false assertions of the Hanoi authorities, and affirmed their support for the legitimate rights of Democratic Kampuchea in the United Nations.

At the conclusion of the debates, the General Assembly voted to maintain the rights of Democratic Kampuchea in the United Nations with an even more overwhelming majority of votes than at the thirty-fourth session. In addition, it adopted - also by an even more overwhelming majority than at the previous session - the draft resolution proposed by the members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and over 20 other peace- and justice-loving countries, which again called on the Hanoi authorities to implement resolution 34/22 through the withdrawal of all their troops from Kampuchea, and decided, in that spirit, to convene an international conference to solve the problem posed by the Hanoi authorities' aggression against Kampuchea (resolution 35/6).

The resounding victory achieved with regard to those two questions delivered such a stunning blow to the Vietnamese aggressors

and their master that they did not venture to put forward in the General Assembly the draft resolution concerning the so-called "Question of peace, stability and co-operation in South-East Asia", an item which they themselves had requested should be included in the agenda.

That victory was of very great significance because it was won as a result of the common efforts and the dogged struggle of the ASEAN countries and of all other peace- and justice-loving countries. It is the common victory of all those countries. The five ASEAN countries appeared as a force playing the role of catalyst in a union of the forces of peace, independence and justice the world over. That victory reveals the dynamic power of the international front against the Vietnamese-Soviet strategy of aggression and expansion in South-East Asia, the Pacific and other regions of the world.

For the people of Kampuchea, the maintenance of the legitimate rights of Democratic Kampuchea in the United Nations and in other international organizations, together with General Assembly resolution 35/6, which again called on the Hanoi authorities to implement resolution 34/22 by the withdrawal of all their troops from Kampuchea, constitute a far-reaching act of justice. It shows that, on the one hand, the international community opposes the Vietnamese-Soviet acts of aggression, the law of the jungle and the violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of the principles governing relations among States and, on the other hand, the international community reaffirms the sacred and inalienable right of the nation of Kampuchea to exist, to remain independent as a separate entity, and to develop in harmony with the other countries of the world.

Thus, for the people of Kampuchea, that act of justice is of very profound importance, for the war of aggression waged by the Hanoi authorities against Kampuchea is not an ordinary colonial or imperialist war, as seen in history; it is a war of extermination of an entire nation, an entire people which the Hanoi authorities are waging in order to annex Kampuchea and to make it an integral part of Viet Nam, in keeping with their attempts to achieve their expansionist ambition in South-East Asia.

In that connexion, the Government of Democratic Kampuchea, on behalf of the nation and people of Kampuchea, renews the expression of its profound and heartfelt thanks to the Governments of the ASEAN countries and to the other peace- and justice-loving countries and peoples of the world.

In the past two years, peoples, Governments and the international community have clearly seen the true, ferocious deceitful nature of the Hanoi authorities. The latter are pursuing manoeuvres in their desperate attempt to evade the implementation of resolutions 34/22 and 35/6:

First, at the military level, by sending further troop reinforcements to Kampuchea in order to make up their losses and, with the supply of weapons with which the Soviet Union is seeking to provide them, to pursue their war of racial extermination in Kampuchea and to threaten Thailand and the ASEAN countries;

Secondly, at the political level, by seeking to legitimize the Vietnamese administration at Phnom Penh through cosmetic changes

and the staging, under the heel of 250,000 of their troops, of a so-called "election";

Thirdly, on the international scene, by pursuing perfidious manoeuvres aimed at achieving at the diplomatic level what they failed to obtain on the battlefield in Kampuchea, namely the legitimization of their invasion of Kampuchea through recognition of a fait accompli.

The Government of Democratic Kampuchea and the Patriotic and Democratic Front of Great National Union of Kampuchea are firmly convinced that all peace- and justice-loving countries will unite even more closely in order to force, through their pressure the Hanoi authorities to withdraw all their troops from Kampuchea, pursuant to resolution 34/22, and to solve the problem posed by their aggression against Kampuchea in accordance with resolution 35/6, without their being able to evade its implementation, thereby thwarting their underhand manoeuvres behind the backs of the people of Kampuchea, who are now spilling their blood so that the nation of Kampuchea may survive. The Government of Democratic Kampuchea and the Front are also firmly convinced that those countries will continue their aid and support in all fields—political, moral, material, diplomatic and humanitarian—in the cause of the just struggle of the people of Kampuchea.

The withdrawal of all Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea is the only way to ensure the survival of the Kampuchean nation as an independent nation, the only way which, by safeguarding the peace, stability and security of South-East Asia, may enable that region to be transformed into a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality. With regard to the seat of Democratic Kampuchea in the United Nations, as the General Assembly clearly indicated at its thirty-fourth and thirty-fifth sessions, only a Government of Kampuchea that is democratically elected by the people of Kampuchea under United Nations supervision, after the total withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea, will be entitled to occupy the seat of Democratic Kampuchea.

The Kampuchean people, the Government of Democratic Kampuchea and the Patriotic and Democratic Front of Great National Union of Kampuchea will unite with the ASEAN countries and the other peace- and justice-loving countries of the world in order to achieve those objectives. In specific terms, they will continue to overcome all obstacles, endure all difficulties and make supreme sacrifices on the battlefield of Kampuchea, in order to ensure the triumph of their sacred national cause and thereby avert the danger posed by the aggressive strategy of the Vietnamese-Soviet expansionists in those regions, thus contributing to the maintenance of peace, stability and security in South-East Asia, and in Asia, the Pacific and the world at large.

In a world characterized by an increasingly intense struggle between, on the one hand, the aggressive and expansionist forces of the Hanoi authorities, the Soviet Union and their supporters, and, on the other, all the forces of peace, independence and justice, Democratic Kampuchea, the Patriotic and Democratic Front of Great National Union of Kampuchea and the Kampuchean people, for the survival of the Kampuchean nation, have chosen to place themselves resolutely on the side of all forces which oppose the aggressive and expansionist strategy of the Soviet Union, the Hanoi authorities and their supporters.

DOCUMENT S/14261*

Letter dated 19 November 1980 from the Acting Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People to the Secretary-General

{Original: English}
{20 November 1980}

I have the honour to convey the deep concern of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People at the most recently reported

outrage by the Government of Israel in the Palestinian territories illegally occupied by Israel.

Reports from 11 students of Bir Zeit University by gunfire from Israeli military forces who had fired into the university campus as the students were demon-

strating against the closure of the university to prevent observance by the university of Palestine Week.

This latest violation of basic international law is yet another outstanding example of Government-sponsored terrorism aimed at Palestinian youth. The attitude of the Israeli authorities is particularly offensive if the report is to be believed that live ammunition was used as a matter of policy, when rubber bullets could have been used just as effectively. On this occasion, the Israeli authorities appear to have unleashed a blatantly terrorist act without even seeking the spurious shelter of "national security", which they have frequently done in the past to justify similar acts of terrorism.

It is clear that the Government of Israel now feels confident of its ability to defy international opinion with impunity and that such instances will continue to occur with increasing frequency unless firm action is taken to prevent a recurrence.

In this connexion, I wish to draw attention to paragraphs 113 to 115 of annex I to the report of the Secretary-General on living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Arab territories,³⁰ where reference is made to the banning by the Government of

Israel of certain books and the exclusion of passages from others, which made it difficult for students in the occupied territories to appreciate certain aspects of their culture and history. The report also refers to the constant harassment of students and staff in the form of frequent arrests, beatings and administrative detentions, and the closure of schools.

It is clear that these extreme actions are intended not to preserve national security but to deprive, illegally, the inhabitants of the occupied territories of all their links to their cultural and national heritage.

It should be brought to the attention of the Government of Israel that such policies are a violation of the established principles of international law in general and of the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 in particular, and persistence in such policies can only exacerbate tensions in the area and constitutes a threat to peace and security.

I shall be glad if you will have this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Raúl ROA-KOURI
Acting Chairman of the
Committee on the Exercise of the
Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People

³⁰ A/35/533 and Corr.1.

DOCUMENT S/14262

Letter dated 20 November 1980 from the representative of Tunisia to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English/French]
[20 November 1980]

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter from Mr. Zehdi Labib Terzi, Permanent Observer of the Palestine Liberation Organization to the United Nations.

I request you to have the text distributed as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Taieb SUM
Permanent Representative of Tunisia
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Text of the letter dated 18 November 1980 from the observer of the Palestine Liberation Organization addressed to the President of the Security Council

I am instructed by Chairman Arafat to bring to your immediate attention the cowardly attack by Israeli soldiers against unarmed students from Ramallah, Bethlehem and Al-Bireh demonstrating this morning against the arbitrary closing of Bir Zeit University.

With unconscionable savagery the soldiers frenziedly attacked and shot at the students, causing the deaths and serious wounding of at least 10 students. Among those wounded was the child of the Deputy Director of Bir Zeit, his 15-year-old daughter Hania Baranki.

We are witnessing a renewal of the campaign of violence and barbarity against the Palestinian people under Zionist occupation. It is obvious that the Zionists feel no self-condemnation or pangs of conscience about resorting to State-licensed murder, genocide and assassinations to meet their racist ends—the total extermination of the Palestinian people.

While drawing your attention to this latest attack against our people, the Palestine Liberation Organization strongly deplores that adequate measures have not been taken to put an end to the prolonged and illegal occupation of Palestinian territory, or to the intolerable and uncivilized treatment of the Palestinian people living under Zionist occupation.

The United Nations and its organs, including the Security Council, are called upon to assume their responsibility to put an effective end to such criminal and inhuman acts committed by a Member of the Organization.

**Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force for the period
24 May to 20 November 1980**

[Original: English]
[20 November 1980]

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Map. "UNDOF deployment as of November 1980" (see end of volume).

INTRODUCTION

1. The present report describes the activities of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) for the period 24 May to 20 November 1980. Its purpose is to provide the Security Council with an account of the activities of UNDOF in pursuance of the mandate entrusted to it by the Council in resolution 350 (1974) and extended by resolutions 363 (1974), 369 (1975), 381 (1975), 390 (1976), 398 (1976), 408 (1977), 420 (1977), 429 (1978), 441 (1978), 449 (1979), 456 (1979) and 470 (1980).

I. COMPOSITION AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE FORCE

A. COMPOSITION AND COMMAND

2. The composition of UNDOF as of 20 November 1980 was as follows:

Contingents:	
Austria	529
Canada	225
Finland	389
Poland	135
United Nations military observers (detailed from UNTSO)	18
TOTAL	1,296

3. In addition to the above, observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization

(UNTSO) assigned to the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission assist UNDOF as the occasion requires.

4. Command of the Force continues to be exercised by Major-General Guenther Greindl.

B. DEPLOYMENT

5. UNDOF personnel remain deployed within and close to the area of separation, with base camps and logistic units located nearby. UNDOF headquarters is located at Damascus. The UNDOF deployment as of November 1980 is shown on the attached map.

6. At present, the Austrian battalion mans 18 positions and 7 outposts and conducts 31 patrols daily in the area of separation north and inclusive of the Damascus-Quneitra road. The Finnish battalion mans 15 positions and 3 outposts and conducts 20 patrols daily in the area of separation south of the Damascus-Quneitra road.

7. The Austrian battalion base camp is located near Wadi Faouar, 8 kilometres east of the area of separation. The Finnish battalion base camp is located near the village of Ziouani, west of the area of separation. The Austrian battalion continues to share its base camp with the Polish logistic unit, and the Finnish battalion shares Camp Ziouani with the Canadian logistic company. The Canadian signal unit has detachments at Camps Ziouani and Faouar, as well as at Damascus and Quneitra. Military police detachments are located at Damascus, Tiberias and Camp Ziouani.

C. ROTATION

8. The Austrian contingent completed partial rotations on 20 and 29 May and on 9 and 18 September. The Finnish contingent completed partial rotations on 6 and 12 June. The Polish logistic unit carried out a rotation on 3 and 12 June. The Canadian logistic company and signal unit rotate in small groups every second week.

D. DISCIPLINE

9. There were no disciplinary problems within the Force during the reporting period. The discipline, understanding and steadfastness of the members of the Force have been of a high order, reflecting credit on the soldiers and their commanders, as well as on the countries contributing contingents to the Force.

E. CASUALTIES

10. There was one casualty during the reporting period. On 15 September, an Austrian soldier was seriously injured in a mine accident at position Hotel South.

II. ACCOMMODATION AND LOGISTICS

A. ACCOMMODATION

11. Living accommodation and office space have been improved at main bases and some positions with the addition of prefabricated buildings and trailers. Sanitation facilities have also been improved at main bases and at Austrian battalion position 20. The updating of the electrical distribution system for Camp Ziouani has been started. The medical care shelter at Camp Faouar has been completed. Laboratory facilities have been expanded in the Polish logistic unit. The installation of electrical and plumbing fittings for the UNDOF forward command headquarters at Quneitra is nearing completion.

B. LOGISTIC SUPPORT

12. As a result of the termination of support functions previously provided by the United Nations Emergency Force, UNDOF logistic support has undergone a significant increase during the period under review. The transition to self-sufficiency has, in general, been accomplished smoothly, and requirements in terms of personnel and material have been provided to meet the increased responsibilities.

13. Second- and third-line logistic support is provided by the Canadian and Polish logistic units, and the Damascus international airport continues to serve as the UNDOF airhead for all rotation and supply flights. In-theatre air support is provided by UNTSO on special request.

III. ACTIVITIES OF THE FORCE

A. FUNCTIONS AND GUIDELINES

14. The functions and guidelines of UNDOF, as well as its tasks, remain as outlined in the report of 27 November 1974 [S/11563, paras. 8-10].

15. UNDOF has continued, with the co-operation of the parties, to fulfil the tasks entrusted to it. This has been facilitated by the close contact maintained by the Force Commander and his staff with the military liaison staffs of Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic.

B. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

16. The Protocol to the Agreement on Disengagement between Israel, and Syrian Forces of 31 May 1974 [S/11302 Add.1] provides for all contingents to operate with full freedom of movement. However, the problem of restrictions on the freedom of movement still exists. The Secretary-General will continue to exert all possible efforts to correct this situation.

C. MAINTENANCE OF THE CEASE-FIRE

17. UNDOF continues to supervise the observance of the cease-fire between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic. The cease-fire has been maintained during the period under review. No complaints concerning the UNDOF area of operation have been lodged by either party in this respect.

D. SUPERVISION OF THE AGREEMENT ON DISENGAGEMENT WITH REGARD TO THE AREAS OF SEPARATION AND LIMITATION

18. UNDOF continues to supervise the area of separation to ensure, in accordance with its mandate, that there are no military forces within it. This is carried out by means of static positions and observation posts, which are manned 24 hours a day, and by foot and mobile patrols operating at irregular intervals on predetermined routes by day and night. In addition, temporary outposts are established from time to time to perform specific tasks, such as traffic control. The ability of UNDOF to supervise the area by night will be enhanced in future by the acquisition of new night observation devices.

19. The safety of Syrian shepherds who graze their flocks close to and west of the A line continues to be of concern to UNDOF. The intensified patrolling on new mine-cleared patrol paths and, from time to time, the establishment of standing patrols in these areas have helped to prevent incidents. In addition, the grazing security fence erected over some 5,500 metres in the southern part of the area of separation has proved to be effective in reducing the number of incidents.

20. In accordance with the terms of the Agreement on Disengagement, UNDOF continues to conduct fortnightly inspections of armament and forces in the areas of limitation. These inspections are carried out with the assistance of liaison officers from the parties who accompany the UNDOF inspection teams. UNDOF also lends its assistance and good offices on request from the parties. In carrying out its tasks, UNDOF has continued to receive the co-operation of both parties, although restrictions of movement and inspection are sometimes placed on UNDOF teams in certain areas by both sides. UNDOF has continued to seek the lifting of these restrictions so as to guarantee its freedom of access to all locations on both sides. During the period under review, UNDOF has been able to have two long-standing violations of the area of separation removed.

E. MINES

21. Mines continue to pose a threat to members of the Force and to the local population and were the cause of a serious accident to an Austrian soldier (see paragraph 10). Efforts continue to be undertaken to make the area safe. During the period, the three Polish mine-clearing teams have cleared 24,100 metres of paths and tracks, and 8,500 square metres for living area at bases in the area of separation. In the process, 9 mortar shells, 1 anti-tank grenade, 3 anti-tank shells and 20,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition were destroyed.

F. HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES

22. UNDOF has continued to assist the International Committee of the Red Cross with facilities for family reunions and student exchanges. Both parties continue to co-operate with UNDOF in making the family meetings possible, in accordance with the agreed procedures.

IV. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

23. As indicated in the Secretary-General's report of 3 November 1980 to the General Assembly on the financing of the Force,³¹ the costs of UNDOF beyond 30 November 1980, should the Security Council renew its mandate beyond that date, and assuming continuance of its existing strength and responsibilities, would be \$2,211,917 gross (\$2,185,677 net) per month based on the present rates of reimbursement to troop-contributing countries. Should the General Assembly approve the new rates of reimbursement which are recommended by the Secretary-General in his report of 11 November 1980,³² the cost of UNDOF beyond 30 November 1980 would be \$2,572,250 gross (\$2,546,000 net) per month.

V. IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 338 (1973)

24. In deciding in its resolution 470 (1980) to renew the mandate of UNDOF for a further period of six months, the Security Council also called upon the parties concerned to implement immediately its resolution 338 (1973) and requested the Secretary-General to submit at the end of the period a report on the developments in the situation and the measures taken to implement that resolution.

25. The search for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East and, in particular, the efforts undertaken at various levels to implement resolution 338 (1973) have been dealt with in the report on the Middle East problem [S/14234] which the Secretary-General submitted on 24 October 1980 in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 34/70 of 6 December 1979.

VI. OBSERVATIONS

26. The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, which was established in May 1974 to supervise

the cease-fire called for by the Security Council and the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces of 31 May 1974, has continued to perform its functions effectively, with the co-operation of the parties. During the period under review, the situation in the Israel-Syria sector has remained quiet, and there have been no serious incidents.

27. Despite the present quiet in the Israel-Syria sector, the situation in the Middle East as a whole continues to be potentially dangerous and is likely to remain so unless and until a comprehensive settlement covering all aspects of the Middle East problem can be reached. I continue to hope that determined efforts will be made by all concerned to tackle the problem in all its aspects, with a view to arriving at a just and durable peace settlement, as called for by the Security Council in its resolution 338 (1973).

28. In the prevailing circumstances, I consider the continued presence of UNDOF in the area to be essential. I therefore recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of the Force for a further period of six months, until 31 May 1981. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic has given its assent to the proposed extension. The Government of Israel has also expressed its agreement.

29. In concluding the present report, I wish, once again, to express my gratitude to the Governments contributing troops to UNDOF and to those which provide UNTSO military observers assigned to the Force. I take this opportunity to pay tribute to the Commander of UNDOF, Major-General Guenther Greindl, to the officers and men of the Force and its civilian staff, as well as to the UNTSO military observers assigned to UNDOF. They have performed with exemplary efficiency and devotion to duty the important tasks assigned to them by the Security Council.

ANNEX

[Map, "UNDOF deployment as of November 1980." See end of volume.]

DOCUMENT S/14264

Letter dated 20 November 1980 from the representative of Israel to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[20 November 1980]

I wish to draw your urgent attention to the campaign of intimidation and subversion by the terrorist PLO, which has been intensified in recent days in Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza district.

The campaign thus far has taken two forms: political assassinations in the Gaza district, and disturbances in the streets of towns in Judaea and Samaria.

On 18 November 1980, Mr. Muhammad Abu Warde, the Deputy-Mayor of Jabelieh near the town of Gaza, was assassinated. Through its news agency in Lebanon, the PLO immediately took responsibility for what it called the "liquidation" of its victim.

Mr. Abu Warde was a supporter of the Israel-Egypt peace treaty signed in March 1979 and was a member of the group which, headed by the Imam of Gaza, Sheikh Hashem Khuzander, went to Egypt shortly after the signing of that treaty to express support of the peace process. It will be recalled that the Imam of Gaza was assassinated in cold blood by the PLO on 1 June 1979, on his way home from evening prayers, also because he was prepared to work for peace. After his murder, the PLO announced that it would continue to assassinate Arab leaders of whose political views it disapproved.

Two hours before Mr. Abu Warde was assassinated, a merchant in the Shatti refugee camp, Hassan Muhammad Al-Bazzam, was also murdered, apparently because he too was not prepared to abide by PLO orders, and was willing to work for peaceful coexistence with Israel.

The disturbances at Ramallah, Bethlehem and Al-Bireh which occurred on 17 and 18 November were preceded by deliberate incitement at the end of last week at the University of Bir Zeit. As will be recalled from my letters of 28 February [S/13126] and 8 June 1979 [S/13385], this university has been a hotbed of PLO subversive activities for the last few years. As an extension of the technique of working through the student body at institutions of higher learning, the PLO agents have also chosen to work through teen-age boys and girls who were, as on previous occasions, at

the forefront of the disturbances at the beginning of this week, undoubtedly with a view to creating a "media event".

All these activities have one object in mind, namely to frustrate as far as possible the ongoing peace process in the Middle East, and in particular, to intimidate and silence the residents of the areas concerned who yearn for peace. Since these activities endanger the lives and safety of private individuals, Jews and Arabs alike, Israel is duty bound to take whatever steps are necessary to maintain and safeguard public security.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yehuda Z. BLUM
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/14265*

Letter dated 20 November 1980 from the representative of Democratic Kampuchea to the Secretary-General

[Original: English/French]
[21 November 1980]

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith, for your information, a text entitled "Monstrous crimes of the Vietnamese invaders in Kampuchea".

I should be grateful if you would arrange for the text to be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) THOUNN Prasith
Permanent Representative
of Democratic Kampuchea
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Monstrous crimes of the Vietnamese invaders in Kampuchea

In its vain objective to crush the just struggle of the Kampuchean people, Hanoi's Le Duan clique frantically keeps on committing its genocidal crimes in Kampuchea. In addition to the weapon of famine, diversions of international humanitarian relief and the use of chemical products, the Vietnamese invaders arrest, torture, execute and massacre all those who refuse to live under their expansionist yoke. The following monstrous crimes show that they are the worst war criminals ever known in history since Hitler.

1. On 8 September 1980, in Varin district, Siemreap province (northern region), the Vietnamese aggressors arrested 30 inhabitants, 13 from Varin village, 3 from Rumduol village, 3 from Kauk Phnom village, 11 from Teal village, charging them with carrying out anti-Vietnamese activities. They executed all of them inside their post at Kauk Daung village. On 9 and 10 September, in the same district of Varin, the Vietnamese aggressors surrounded the villages of Kauk Stok, Kauk At, Kauk Phnom, Santich, Rumduol, Varin, Kauk Chan, Kauk Sar, Kauk Kandal and Lovea Teal. They arrested 76 inhabitants and executed all of them in the forest of Prey Daun Em. One hundred and six persons were thus massacred by the Vietnamese aggressors in the district of Varin.

2. On 17 September, in Koh Sla district, Kampot province (south-western region), the Vietnamese aggressors savagely carried out a mopping up operation against the village of Stung Andet. They killed one person and wounded another one. The day after, they carried out another mopping up operation against the village of Trang Bon, commune of Taken. A whole family of five members were massacred.

3. On 20 September, 10 inhabitants of the villages of Po Teap and Chuh, in Cheom Ksan district, Preah Vihear province (northern region), were deadly poisoned by toxic chemical products sprayed in their fields by the Vietnamese aggressors. On the same day, three other inhabitants were shot down in the centre of Cheom Ksan district after having been barbarously tortured by the Vietnamese aggressors who charged them with anti-Vietnamese activities.

4. On 25 September, in Chhuk district, Kampot province (south-western region), the Vietnamese invaders pillaged the inhabitants of Sre Samrong district. One inhabitant named Beng, his wife and their three young children were cruelly massacred. Having heard these crimes, the inhabitants of the neighbouring villages, supported by the guerrillas, ambushed the Vietnamese assassins on the way out of the village and killed three of them and wounded a number of others.

5. On 25 September, in the north of Khvay village, in Thmar Puok village, Battambang province (north-western region), the Vietnamese invaders intercepted and savagely machine-gunned a convoy of 13 ox-carts of the inhabitants, who went and received humanitarian relief at the Kampuchea-Thailand border. Only seven of the 35 persons of the convoy succeeded in escaping the massacre and rejoined the region under the control of the Government of Democratic Kampuchea. The Vietnamese pillagers took away all the carts and oxen.

6. On 28 September, one inhabitant named Em of Tuol Pongro village, commune of Som, Kirivong district, Takeo province (southern region) was shot to death by the Vietnamese invaders, who charged him with anti-Vietnamese activities.

7. On 29 September, three inhabitants named Khan, Phi and Onn of Angkor Chey village, Angkor Chey district, Kampot province were taken away by force to Tonloap and jailed. They were barbarously tortured to death.

8. On 1 October, in the commune of Trapeang Reang, Chhuk district, the Vietnamese troops surrounded the villages of Danrei Kaun, Mom and Monocut and arrested six people. They sent them to prison and tortured them to death.

9. On 2 October, the Vietnamese aggressors arrested five officials of the "ministries" of education and agriculture and two teachers. After having savagely tortured them, the Vietnamese executioners shot them to death.

10. On 3 and 5 October, in Battambang province, the Vietnamese aggressors arrested and shot down nine inhabitants including two women of the Sisophon market, of the villages of Toek Thla

and Nimit, who were charged with carrying out anti-Vietnamese activities.

11. On 8 October, in Kompong Cham province (central region), five inhabitants of Meak village, Stung Trang district, were killed and three others wounded by mines laid by the Vietnamese in their rice-fields. In the face of the anger of the population, the Vietnamese executioners cynically charged their victims with harvesting rice alleged to belong to the Vietnamese. As they could no more restrain themselves, the inhabitants assaulted the Vietnamese aggressors and inflicted on them a just punishment.

12. On 9 October, in Samrong district, Oddar Meanchey province, north-eastern region), the Vietnamese aggressors, heavily armed, went down to Chongkal village to carry out a raid. They took away 37 people, who were savagely tortured before being shot to death.

13. On 13 October, in Kong Pisei district, Kompong Speu province (western region), the Vietnamese aggressors took away nine people of the villages of Ta Amm and Antei and tortured them to death.

14. On 18 October, in Samrong district, eight people of Sandek village were killed or wounded by mines laid by the Vietnamese aggressors around the village to prevent the population from going and harvesting rice.

15. On 18 October, in Touk Meas district, Kampot province, the Vietnamese invaders shot down one inhabitant of the commune of Khum Dang Tong after having savagely tortured him.

16. On 18 October, the Vietnamese aggressors arrested five inhabitants of Samrong village, Mongkol Borel district, Battambang province, and tortured them savagely. They made them swallow soapy water and, after having lacerated their bodies, they rubbed them with red pepper. The five victims died after having suffered horrible pains.

17. Recently, in Kompong Chhnang province (central region), the Vietnamese aggressors arrested nine families of Peam village and savagely killed them. They were charged with being members of the Patriotic and Democratic Front of Great National Union of Kampuchea.

DOCUMENT S/14266

Further report of the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978)

[Original: English]
[24 November 1980]

1. On 31 March 1980, I reported to the Security Council [S/13862] concerning the implementation of its resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) on the question of Namibia. In that report I described discussions undertaken by a mission led by Mr. Brian Urquhart, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, in southern Africa during February and March. Following detailed technical discussions on the proposed demilitarized zone, I concluded that, in the light of the mission's findings, the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) could, with the co-operation and support of all concerned, function and fulfil its obligations satisfactorily on the basis of the arrangements discussed. I also stated that we had come to a point where the necessary political decisions had to be taken to move the matter from the stage of discussion to the stage of implementation.

2. On 12 May, I received a letter from the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs and Information, Mr. R. F. Botha [S/13935]. Mr. Botha reiterated that South Africa sought an international settlement of the Namibian question. He stated that South Africa had tested and evaluated the feasibility of the demilitarized zone and, in the context of its effort to make the zone a feasible proposition, wished to receive information on four matters. Having also mentioned certain additional subjects, he concluded by stating that as soon as the issues raised in his letter had been resolved the South African Government would co-operate in implementing resolution 435 (1978).

3. After consultations, I replied to Mr. Botha's letter on 20 June [S/14011]. In my letter, I dealt fully with the four points which he had raised relating to the demilitarized zone. I stated that, in view of the information which I had thus provided upon those questions, which were those remaining to be dealt with after the recent United Nations mission to southern Africa, I hoped that South Africa would now be in a position to co-operate in the implementation of resolu-

tion 435 (1978). I also dealt with the additional matters to which he had referred. I reiterated that the principle of impartiality had been, and would be, consistently followed in the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) and recalled in that connexion my report of 29 August 1978 [S/12827] which stated that "In performing its functions, UNTAG will act with complete impartiality. In order that the proposal may be effectively implemented, it is expected that the Administrator-General and all other officials from within the Territory will exhibit the same impartiality." Finally, I reiterated my belief in the urgency of arriving at a peaceful solution to a question which had preoccupied the international community for many years, and whose unresolved condition had led to tragic loss of life and destruction in Namibia and throughout the whole region.

4. On 29 August, I received a further letter [S/14139] from the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs and Information. This letter, *inter alia*, contained a number of assumptions made by South Africa in regard to the matters described in my letter of 20 June. The assumptions related to certain of the military and technical subjects which I had clarified, including the functioning of selected locations in the demilitarized zone, the return of SWAPO personnel after the elections, the commitments of Angola and Zambia, and the deployment of the military component of UNTAG. Mr. Botha then dealt at length on the question of impartiality. In conclusion, he stated that, on the basis of his assumptions, and my confirmation, the South African Government stood ready to discuss with me the composition of UNTAG, the status of forces agreement and the setting in motion of the implementation of resolution 435 (1978).

5. Following extensive consultations, I replied to this letter on 19 September [S/14184]. I stated that, taking all factors of the situation into account, as well as the need to move forward without further delay, it

was my belief that we should now proceed with the implementation of the United Nations plan. I proposed to Mr. Botha that I send a team of senior officials to South Africa to discuss with the Government the setting of a time-frame and other modalities for such implementation. I recalled that I had, on many occasions, expressed my deep concern at the cycle of violence resulting from the unresolved nature of the Namibian question. I reiterated that the best way to stop such violence was to establish, as soon as possible, the cease-fire which is the first step in the implementation of resolution 435 (1978).

6. Mr. Botha replied on 22 September [S/4185] suggesting that the United Nations mission visit South Africa during the period from 20 to 27 October. He assumed that at the outset the matters raised in his letter of 29 August would be discussed. I replied on 25 September [S/4202] stating that, while I would have preferred an earlier date, I had noted the reasons for the suggestion of 20 October, and would be arranging for the United Nations team to be at Pretoria on that date.

7. After I had held consultations with the Security Council on 15 October, the United Nations mission departed for South Africa. The mission, led by the Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, Mr. Brian Urquhart, consisted also of Mr. Abdulrahim Farah, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Questions, Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, my Special Representative for Namibia, Lieutenant-General D. Prem Chand, Commander-designate of the military component of UNTAG, and a group of senior political and military experts from the Secretariat. The mission had discussions with the South African Government from 20 to 25 October at Pretoria.

8. At the opening meeting, Mr. Urquhart first summarized the course of events since the visit of the previous mission to South Africa in March 1980. He emphasized that the outstanding matters remaining for discussion, as confirmed in the published records, occupied a very narrow spectrum and that consensus had been reached in regard to virtually all the technical aspects of resolution 435 (1978) and the demilitarized zone. He explained that the mission was precluded from reopening any matters which had previously been agreed. While the mission was willing to discuss the various matters alluded to in Mr. Botha's letter of 29 August, Mr. Urquhart wished from the outset to emphasize the grave concern felt by the United Nations membership as a whole, and by the Secretary-General, in regard to the delays which had affected the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). These delays could additionally complicate the search for a peaceful settlement of the issue, as well as lead to a further escalation of the violence resulting from its unresolved nature. Many of the questions that had been raised by the South African Government relating to implementation could be definitively dealt with only in the context of a firm time-frame for a cease-fire and the emplacement of UNTAG in Namibia. In that connexion, the matters raised by South Africa in its comments upon the impartiality of the United Nations were inextricably linked to the need for an implementation time-frame. Mr. Urquhart moreover recalled that South Africa also had duties which required strict impartiality under the settlement proposal [S/2636 of

10 April 1978]. In the light of all these considerations, Mr. Urquhart emphasized the primary importance of establishing a time-frame.

9. In his opening statement, Mr. Brand Fourie, Director-General for Foreign Affairs, said that South Africa, too, was concerned over the delays in implementing resolution 435 (1978). He did not feel that it would be constructive during the forthcoming discussions, however, to seek to allocate responsibility for such delays. South Africa also saw the need for a time-frame for implementation but believed that it could not be achieved without resolving the remaining issues to which reference had been made in the letter of 29 August. He referred in particular to the question of impartiality and equal treatment of the parties and said that a deep suspicion existed among the Namibian people that the United Nations was not impartial and could not therefore enjoy their confidence in supervising and controlling the free and fair elections to which all parties were committed. In that connexion, the South African Government hoped that the United Nations mission would make time available to see representatives of those political parties who travelled to Pretoria from Windhoek for that purpose. Mr. Urquhart explained that the mission would, as was the practice of the United Nations, do its best to make time available, if requested by any Namibians, to see them during its stay in Pretoria. He then set out the position of the United Nations in regard to the technical aspects of implementation which were the subjects of assumptions in paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 of the South African letter of 29 August.

10. On those points, Mr. Fourie stated that South Africa had taken note of the mission's comments and was grateful for the clarifications that had been given. On the question of deployment, he emphasized the importance South Africa attributed to the deployment of the military component of UNTAG in the entire demilitarized zone. He said that that issue was closely linked to the question of the creation of trust and confidence, which was, in his view, associated with the question of partiality. It was of paramount importance to overcome this problem if implementation were to be agreed upon.

11. The United Nations mission pointed out that the establishment of trust and confidence was a subjective and imprecise criterion. If any party sought to use it as a pretext for delay, the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) would be seriously undermined. The mission strongly expressed the opinion that the South African viewpoint should not imply the introduction of a general reservation to prior agreements. The mission was assured that no such reservation was contemplated and it reiterated, once again, the need for a time-frame for implementation.

12. Mr. Urquhart then dealt with the question of impartiality in regard to the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). He said that impartiality had two aspects: undertakings which the United Nations might reasonably require of the South African administration so as to ensure the impartial discharge of its responsibilities under the settlement proposal; and those which the United Nations would wish to adopt in order that its impartiality as the supervisor of free and fair elections would be manifest. Mr. Urquhart recalled that UNTAG had been established by the Security

Council. The settlement proposal and resolution 435 (1978) contained full provisions for the holding of free and fair elections under United Nations supervision and control. Resolution 435 (1978) would be the governing resolution for the conduct of the elections and was therefore solidly based on provisions for the fair and equal treatment of all parties. The Secretary-General had given repeated assurances of United Nations impartiality in the conduct of the elections. All participants in the political process would, at the commencement of the transition period and thereafter, be placed on an equal footing by UNTAG, which would be directly responsible for implementation. Upon agreement on implementation, including an early date for cease-fire and emplacement of UNTAG, appropriate measures would need to be taken to support and ensure such an approach by both the United Nations and South Africa.

13. Mr. Fourie stated that the discussions had made it clear that lack of trust was the main obstacle in the way of implementation of resolution 435 (1978). He said that he believed that the internal parties had emphasized that obstacle when they had called on the mission. He repeated that if South Africa were to proceed to implementation a solution to the problem must be found.

14. The mission explained to the South African Government the situation regarding the composition of the UNTAG military component. Mr. Urquhart described the normal processes of consultation and emphasized that final decisions on composition were taken by the Security Council on the basis of proposals by the Secretary-General. The mission also held discussions with the South African Government regarding the draft status of forces agreement and identified the remaining minor matters on which agreement would be sought upon a decision being taken to implement resolution 435 (1978).

15. In his final statement on 24 October Mr. Urquhart reiterated, once again, the pressing need for a South African response to the mission's repeated request for an agreement on the implementation of resolution 435 (1978), including, in particular, an early date for the cease-fire and the emplacement of UNTAG. He referred to the deep concern of the United Nations membership as a whole and of the African States in particular over the protracted delays. On the residual questions, as well as on the matter of creating confidence, Mr. Urquhart said that he believed that progress had been achieved during the talks with the South African Government and that no insurmountable obstacles should remain, if the political will to proceed were present.

16. During the concluding phase of meetings with the South African Government, discussion focused upon the question of means to facilitate the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) within a specified time-frame and in a context which would deal with any remaining concerns. In this connexion, views were exchanged on the subject of a possible pre-implementation meeting.

17. At the end of the mission, Mr. Farah and Mr. Ahtisaari travelled to inform the current Chairman of the Organization of African Unity and the Presidents or Prime Ministers of the front-line States and Nigeria concerning the discussions at Pretoria, and to brief the

President of SWAPO. Consultations also continued with the Government of South Africa which, on 21 November, stated that it gave its assent to the conclusions which are set out in paragraphs 18 to 24 below. While assent was also given by the other parties consulted to the course of action there proposed, concern was expressed that if the time-frame for starting implementation were linked even indirectly to the issue of trust and confidence, there could be the risk of a further and unacceptable delay. In this connexion, I have set out the position taken by my representatives at Pretoria in paragraph 11 above. I am deeply aware of the concern of the international community over the all too long postponement of a solution to the question of Namibia. I believe, however, that we may have reached a decisive phase in the long and difficult effort to resolve this question. I hope, therefore, that all concerned will now be prepared to move forward boldly and in good faith along the lines now suggested in order to ensure a sequence of events leading to the start of implementation of resolution 435 (1978) in March 1981, and independence by the end of 1981. In the consultations which I have undertaken since the return of the mission with the Governments of the five Western members of the contact group, they have pledged their support for the course of action proposed and in particular for the time-frame set out below. They have also emphasized that they would continue to use their good offices to that end.

Conclusions

18. It is of vital importance that the independence of Namibia should be achieved in 1981, in accordance with resolution 435 (1978). In order to achieve this aim, a date for the cease-fire and a start of implementation should be set in the early part of 1981.

19. One of the main obstacles to progress in the negotiations hitherto has been acute mutual distrust and lack of confidence. The mission was informed by the South African Government that this problem in itself affects the setting of a date for implementation. It was also informed that, if this obstacle can be overcome, the end of 1981 would be a realistic target date for the independence of Namibia.

20. A means of facilitating agreement and of creating the necessary climate of confidence and understanding would be a pre-implementation multiparty meeting in which the parties concerned in the envisaged election would be included. There is general agreement that this meeting should be held under the auspices of the Secretary-General.

21. There have recently been a number of initiatives and approaches from various quarters for such a meeting based on the United Nations plan, in conformity with resolution 435 (1978) and other practical proposals. Such a meeting could facilitate the implementation of that resolution by discussing relevant aspects of implementation with the purpose of securing the co-operation of all concerned. In this connexion, it will be recalled that, under the settlement proposal, the task of drawing up and adopting a constitution is the function of the Constituent Assembly.

22. It would be understood that the proposed meeting would be held in the context of an agreed time-frame, with a view to the parties themselves as-

sisting in resolving difficulties created by distrust and lack of confidence, South Africa having reaffirmed its continuing role as the interlocutor under resolution 435 (1978).

23. In the expectation that the problem of confidence can be overcome by the holding of such a meeting, and subject to a satisfactory arrangement concerning the composition of UNTAG, I would, on the basis of the discussions recently held at Pretoria and after the necessary consultations, propose March 1981 for the commencement of implementation of resolution 435 (1978).

24. Accordingly, the intention would be to hold a pre-implementation meeting from 7 to 14 January 1981 under the auspices and chairmanship of the United Nations. The basis of the meeting would conform to the formula agreed upon during bilateral discussions held earlier this year on the question of "direct talks". Accordingly, South Africa and SWAPO have been contacted concerning the composition of the respective delegations that would participate in the meeting. I have also contacted the front-line States and Nigeria, the Organization of African Unity and the contact group of five Western States about the sending of observers.

DOCUMENT S/14267*

Letter dated 21 November 1980 from the representative of Israel to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[24 November 1980]

In my letters to you and to the President of the Security Council over the last year, I have had frequent occasion to observe that the organization which calls itself the PLO is a criminal group which serves as a tool of international terrorism.

I have also had occasion to note that in all its activities the PLO serves the interests of those who are implacably opposed to peace in the Middle East. Those rejectionists, both in the Middle East and beyond, seek to destabilize the region, and see in the PLO a convenient tool for their purposes.

The PLO's role as a linchpin of the "Terrorist International", and the Soviet Union's use of it—directly or through various proxies, such as East Germany—as an instrument to advance Soviet foreign policy objectives in the Middle East as well as its subversive interests elsewhere, was exposed in an authoritative article published in *The New York Times Magazine* of 2

November 1980. Its author, Mr. Robert Moss, is a lecturer at the Royal College of Defence Studies in London.

Mr. Moss convincingly documented the support and training which the Soviet Union gives to PLO terrorists, and the services which the PLO renders in return in order to further Soviet interests in places as far removed from the Middle East as Europe and Australia, with all that this implies as a threat to international peace and security.

I attach excerpts from that article¹³ and I have the honour to request that they, together with this letter, be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yehuda Z. BLUM
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

* Circulated under the double symbol A 35.654.S 14267.

¹³ The text is not reproduced in the present Supplement.

DOCUMENT S/14268

Report of the Security Council Commission established under resolution 446 (1979)

[Original: English/French]
[25 November 1980]

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

25 November 1980

In our capacity as members of the Security Council Commission established under resolution 446 (1979), we have the honour to submit to you herewith the report prepared by the Commission pursuant to paragraph 9 of resolution 465 (1980).

This report was adopted unanimously on 25 November 1980.

(Signed) Leonardo MATHIAS, Portugal
(Chairman),
Julio DE ZAVALA, Bolivia,
Kasuka Simwinji MUTUKWA, Zambia

I. INTRODUCTION

A. MANDATE AND COMPOSITION OF THE COMMISSION

1. The present report is the third³⁴ which the Commission has the honour to submit to the Security Council in implementation of its mandate, as determined in paragraph 4 of resolution 446 (1979).

2. Following the submission of the Commission's second report, the Security Council adopted, at its 2203rd meeting, on 1 March 1980, resolution 465 (1980), which reads as follows:

[For the text, see Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council, 1980.]

3. The term of Bolivia as a member of the Security Council having expired on 31 December 1979, the President of the Council announced, on 16 June 1980 [S/14000] that a decision had been taken to maintain the original composition of the Commission. The Council further decided, on 20 August [S/14116], to extend the deadline for the submission of the present report until 25 November.

³⁴ The first and second reports were submitted to the Security Council on 12 July [S/13450 and Add.1] and 4 December 1979 [S/13679] respectively.

B. ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMISSION AT HEADQUARTERS

4. In the course of its work, which resumed on 18 June 1980, the Commission paid particular attention to the discussions which during that period were taking place on matters related to its mandate in both the Security Council (5, 27 and 30 June and 20 August) and the General Assembly, which held its seventh emergency special session, on the question of Palestine, between 22 and 29 July.

5. More specifically the Commission had on its table the following resolutions:

(a) For the Security Council: 471 (1980) of 5 June condemning assassination attempts on the lives of the Mayors of Nablus, Ramallah and Al-Bireh; 476 (1980) of 30 June regarding the status of Jerusalem; 478 (1980) of 20 August censuring Israel for the enactment of the "basic law" on Jerusalem proclaiming a change in the character and status of the Holy City;

(b) For the General Assembly: resolution ES-7/2 of 29 July regarding the question of Palestine.

6. Furthermore, the Commission was kept informed of relevant publications recently or currently published by other organs of the United Nations.

7. After having studied again its terms of reference as renewed and clarified by the Security Council in resolution 465 (1980), the Commission decided to focus its efforts on two specific goals: first, to obtain as much information as possible on the developments which had occurred in the area since its last report, giving special attention to the question of depletion of natural resources, particularly the water resources; and secondly, to ascertain from the parties directly concerned their views on those developments.

8. On that basis, the Commission decided to seek assistance again from the Governments concerned. Accordingly letters were addressed to the Permanent Representatives of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic expressing appreciation for the help the Commission had already received from their respective Governments when preparing its previous reports and requesting them to provide any new available information that would have a bearing on the Commission's tasks.

9. A letter was sent also to the Permanent Representative of Israel. In that letter, the Commission, regretting Israel's lack of response to the Commission's repeated appeals for co-operation, expressed the hope that the Israel Government would reconsider its position and provide any relevant information which the Commission would take into consideration when drafting its next report.

10. In a letter addressed to the Permanent Observer of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the Commission, recalling with appreciation the assistance already received from that organization, appealed for further assistance.

11. Similar letters were addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and to the Chairman of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories.

12. The Commission, having considered that the League of Arab States might be in a position to provide

substantial information, decided to request its assistance also.

13. At its 27th meeting, on 27 August, the Commission was provided with a slide and sound presentation by a representative of the Jordanian Mission on the situation now prevailing on the West Bank of the Jordan River, including Jerusalem. The Jordanian representative also informed the Commission that more information would be made available to it, either at Headquarters or preferably on the spot if it decided to visit the area again in order to make an evaluation of the situation there since its last visit.

14. In response to the Commission's letters, several Governments expressed their keen interest in the renewal of its efforts, and offered their full assistance.

15. The Governments of Jordan, Egypt and the Syrian Arab Republic indicated that, should the Commission decide to visit their capitals, meetings could be arranged with government officials and possibly individual witnesses who would be heard by the Commission.

16. Furthermore, the Permanent Observer of the PLO informed the Commission that Chairman Arafat would appreciate the opportunity to meet with the Commission whenever it visited the area.

17. Meanwhile, the Commission took note of the contents of a letter dated 8 July addressed to the Deputy Permanent Representative of Portugal by the Permanent Mission of Israel, in which the *Chargé d'affaires a.i.* recalled his Government's position with regard to the Commission's mandate and stated that the position had remained unchanged [see *S/13450 and Add.1, paras. 17 and 23, and S/13679, para. 15*].

18. After further consultations with the parties concerned, the Commission reached the conclusion that, in order to report usefully to the Security Council, it should not only obtain as much information as possible on recent incidents but also make an evaluation of the earlier findings brought to the attention of the Council after the Commission's visit to the area in May-June 1979. Such an evaluation, it was felt, could be more comprehensive if conducted on the spot. Accordingly, despite the short time which could be devoted to such a visit, a decision was taken by the Commission at its 28th meeting, on 11 September, to make a second visit to the area.

19. In view of that decision, the Commission felt that the meeting envisaged with the representatives of the League of Arab States could take place at Tunis with the Secretary-General of that organization. The Tunisian Government, having been informed of the Commission's intention to visit Tunisia, proposed that a meeting be held also with government officials, a proposal which the Commission gratefully accepted.

20. The Commission also decided to seek an audience with His Majesty King Hassan II in his capacity as President of the Committee on Jerusalem of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, a decision which was welcomed by the Government of Morocco.

21. On the eve of its departure, the Commission met at Headquarters with Mr. Boutros Ghali, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Egypt, who examined with the members matters relating to the Commission's mandate and assured them of the full support of

his Government, although, to his regret, he could not personally be at Cairo at that time.

22. Furthermore, the Commission, bearing in mind the unique character and spiritual dimension of Jerusalem, decided to send new letters to those of the representatives of the great monotheistic religions who, as indicated in the second report, had informed the Commission of their views on Jerusalem, in order to ascertain whether they had any new elements to add to their previous communications.

23. A reply, dated 10 November, was received from the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs of the World Council of Churches and may be found in annex IV.

24. In his reply, dated 14 November, the Permanent Observer of the Holy See, referring to its communication of 3 December 1979, the text of which was included in the annex to the second report, said that he had no new element to provide to the Commission.

25. The present report is based on elements of information which have been gathered from various sources both at Headquarters and during the visit to the area. In addition to the present introductory section, it contains four parts, i.e., section II, which relates the Commission's visit to the area; section III, which describes the prevailing situation relating to settlements in the occupied Arab territories with particular emphasis on the question of water resources there; section IV, devoted to observations; and section V, which contains the Commission's conclusions and recommendations.

26. The present report was unanimously adopted at the 29th meeting, on 25 November.

II. VISIT TO THE AREA

A. ORGANIZATION OF THE VISIT

27. During its visit to the area, the Commission was composed of the following members: Ambassador Leonardo Mathias (Portugal), Chairman; Ambassador Julio de Zavala (Bolivia); Mr. Kasuka Simwinji Mutukwa (Zambia).

28. They were accompanied by Mr. Fernando Neves from the Permanent Mission of Portugal to the United Nations.

29. The Commission decided that, as during the previous visit, it would hold consultations with the government authorities concerned and also receive at hearings, or individual interviews, oral or written materials by other authorities, organizations or private individuals.

30. In that connexion, it was decided that the rules of procedure which the Commission intended to follow during those hearings would be the same as those it had applied during the first visit [*S/13450 and Add.1, paras. 30 to 32*].

31. The Commission organized its visit to the area as follows: the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 26-28 September; the Syrian Arab Republic, 28 and 29 September; the Arab Republic of Egypt, 29 September to 1 October; Tunisia, 1-3 October; the Kingdom of Morocco, 3 and 4 October.

32. During its visit the Commission held consultations with the government authorities concerned and with other authorities speaking on behalf of relevant

organizations. It also received testimony from private individuals.

33. In the course of the meetings held in that regard, tireless efforts were expended on a critical and analytical examination of the pertinent issues and clarification of the various points raised by members of the Commission. The Commission benefited from those extensive exchanges of views, which proved most useful in providing additional information and in further elucidating matters previously brought to its attention. The Commission would therefore like to express its most sincere appreciation to all the authorities and individuals concerned for their co-operation.

B. VISIT TO JORDAN

Meetings with His Highness the Crown Prince of Jordan and with Government officials

34. On 27 September, the Commission had a working meeting at Amman at the Ministry for Occupied Territories Affairs, where it was received by Mr. Hassan Ibrahim, Minister of State for Occupied Territories Affairs. Also present at the meeting were Mr. Shawkat Mahmoud, Under-Secretary, Ministry for Occupied Territories Affairs, and other Government officials.

35. After welcoming the members of the Commission, the Minister of State said that the Government of Jordan had noted with grave concern that, as a result of the persistence of Israel in its settlement policies and practices, the situation in the occupied territories, with particular reference to the West Bank, was becoming increasingly difficult. The Government had therefore felt it necessary to create a new ministry, the Ministry for Occupied Territories Affairs, which had been put specifically in charge of following closely the developments in the areas concerned and, in particular, to undertake practical efforts to alleviate the deteriorating living conditions of the Arab population of the occupied West Bank.

36. Reviewing the situation in the West Bank, the Minister of State observed that Israel had not complied with the terms of Security Council resolutions 452 (1979) or 465 (1980). He pointed out in that regard that Israel had neither ceased the establishment, construction and planning of settlements in the territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, as called for in the first resolution, nor had it dismantled the existing settlements, as called for under the terms of the second. On the contrary, Israel was establishing, constructing and planning new settlements, as well as expanding those already established.

37. In that connexion, the Minister of State drew attention to a plan said to have been announced in Israel,³⁵ under which 46 Israeli settlements were to be set up in the occupied Arab territories by the end of 1983, at a cost of 32 billion Israeli pounds.³⁶ By a subsequent amendment 22 more settlements would be added to the original 46. The policy of settlements was

therefore very much active in all the occupied territories including the Golan Heights and Gaza, where roads were being built and electricity and water systems installed in preparation for the establishment of further Israeli settlements, thus causing the Arab population to despair and leave.

38. In its efforts to induce the Arab population to remain on the West Bank, the Government of Jordan was providing financial support, through the Jordanian Palestinian Commission, to projects there, such as those providing housing or educational facilities. By recent decisions, however, Israel was endeavouring to stop the flow of funds from Jordan. The Minister of State noted in that regard that those new restrictions by the occupying authorities not only hampered Jordan's efforts to assist the Palestinians in their plight but had also to be seen as a direct obstacle to the generous initiative of the Arab countries, which at the 1978 Baghdad summit had established a special fund for that very purpose.

39. Another instance of non-compliance by Israel with the afore-mentioned Security Council resolutions was a decision adopted by the Israeli Cabinet on 16 September 1979, which allowed Israelis to purchase lands and property in the occupied West Bank, including Jerusalem.

40. Turning to the question of Israeli settlements, the Minister of State said that, between March 1979 and September 1980, 28 new settlements had been established in the West Bank and four existing settlements further expanded. As to the extent of the land which had been confiscated on the West Bank during the same period, he said that it amounted to some 300 million square metres, thus bringing the total of the land confiscated on the West Bank to one third of the full area.

41. Israeli policy towards the people of the occupied territories, according to the Minister of State, had become more severe in the last months, as evidenced, for example, by the deportation of mayors from the West Bank, attempts on the lives of the mayors of Nablus, Ramallah and Al-Bireh, destruction of crops at Hebron, curfews established to confine people to their homes, heavy fines or imprisonment for political activity, punitive destruction of private houses and indiscriminate killing of young students.

42. The Minister of State also drew attention to the changes brought to existing Jordanian law in the West Bank concerning education and labour which gave Israel full control in those two fields. He noted further that whenever members of the Jordanian staff who had remained in the Jordanian Administration in the occupied West Bank after 1967 had to quit for retirement or any other reason, their posts were systematically taken over by Israeli officers.

43. Concerning Jerusalem, the Minister of State said that in addition to the land and properties already confiscated, as previously reported, there was a new plan to expropriate 79 million square metres and to build 12,000 housing units in the north and east of the city. This would affect 27 Arab villages and could lead to the emigration of 130,000 Arab citizens. Furthermore, in connexion with the decision by the Israeli Prime Minister to move his office to East Jerusalem, Arab families living in that area had been ordered to vacate their dwellings.

³⁵ "Master Plan for the Development of Settlements in Judaea and Samaria, 1979-1983", prepared in October 1978 by M. Drobles, Department for Rural Settlement of the World Zionist Organization (see A/33/582 of 22 October 1979).

³⁶ Approximately equal at the time to SUS 1.77 billion.

44. The intervention of Israeli authorities to control every sector had not spared the religious authorities, who were now required to submit to new regulations making it compulsory to obtain written authorization from the Israeli Ministry of Religion in order to erect a building or even to repair or maintain existing structures.

45. In conclusion, the Minister of State appealed to the Commission to convey to the Security Council the conviction of the Jordanian Government that in the recent months the situation in the occupied territories had taken a turn for the worse and that Israel had launched an all-out effort to establish itself as the permanent and final authority in the area.

46. In the afternoon of the same day, the members of the Commission were received by the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister of Information, Mr. Adnan Abu Odeh, who was accompanied by other government officials. He welcomed the members of the Commission on their second visit to Jordan. The fact that the conclusions and recommendations in its two reports had been accepted and approved by the Security Council was, he said, a testimony of the accuracy and objectivity maintained by the Commission, as also demonstrated by resolution 465 (1980) which was adopted unanimously, that the situation would improve. Unfortunately, things had become only worse on account of the negative response of Israel, which had decided to ignore that resolution, like so many others on the Middle East question.

47. Reviewing the course of events on the West Bank since the Commission's last visit in 1979, Mr. Odeh said that the total number of Israeli settlements had gone up from 78 to 106, an increase of 28. Moreover the so-called "Drobles plan" had called for the gradual establishment of additional settlements in the West Bank by 1983.

48. As the establishment of new settlements necessitated the expropriation of new Arab land, the amount of land that had so far passed under direct Israeli control had increased from 27.5 per cent to 33.3 per cent of the West Bank. Furthermore, four of the existing settlements had been expanded during that period.

49. Adverse developments had also occurred in the field of human rights: the repression of Arab liberties in all aspects of life had further increased the frustrations of the Arab inhabitants on the West Bank and was making the conditions of daily life intolerable. He gave specific instances, such as the expropriation of the property of a high-ranking leader, the expulsion of mayors and their deportation from the West Bank, and an attempt on the lives of other mayors, two of whom, gravely hurt, were still in serious condition.

50. With the deterioration in relations between the Israelis and the Arab inhabitants, coupled with the deliberate aggravation of Arab conditions, the people of the West Bank were becoming more and more demoralized and anxious to leave their occupied land, if only to guarantee certainty of future to their children. In fact it appeared that Israel was purposely promoting such a feeling. It was common, for instance, for the Israelis to subject young schoolchildren to hard and intimidating interrogation at police stations in order to create fear and other psychological problems both for the children themselves and their families.

51. Mr. Odeh also gave a general assessment of the relations between Israel and its neighbours and of the attitude of Israel on the Middle East problem itself. He said that the level of bitterness between the people of Israel and those of the neighbouring countries had reached a point even higher than in 1967. In fact, despite the prevailing conditions of occupation, relations had started to improve and there had been a promising possibility of accepting coexistence. But then Jewish religious fanatics, led by the Gush Emunim movement, had increased their activities on the West Bank, culminating in the establishment of settlements which were nothing but a clear act of aggression in violation of international law.

52. In that connexion, Mr. Odeh identified three patterns of relations between Israel and its neighbours as follows:

(a) The case of the Egypto-Israeli initiative, which was an attempt to normalize relations between the two countries;

(b) The Jordanian pattern, based on the observance of the cease-fire;

(c) The Lebanese pattern, based on the mobilization of forces and intermittent military engagements (that pattern, he said, was potentially the most dangerous one because it gave Israel a pretext for its policy of expansionism).

53. Referring to Israel's intransigent and adamant attitude, Mr. Odeh said that Israel derived encouragement from the unreserved support it was receiving from the United States; that privileged treatment constituted a big obstacle to the aspirations of the Palestinian people and to the attainment of a peaceful solution concerning the occupied territories.

54. Mr. Odeh expressed doubts concerning Israel's efforts to justify the establishment of its settlements in the occupied territories on the basis of internal or external security. The real problem in the present circumstances was not one of security but one of acceptability. Israel felt that it was an alien and isolated body in the area, and feared that its isolation was bound to increase with every sign of solidarity and cohesion within the surrounding components.

55. Consequently Israel had found its safeguard in being a divisive element both inside the occupied territories and outside, where it purposely incited warlike activities which, because of its present strong military position, it could control; that actually explained the present situation in Lebanon.

56. Mr. Odeh concluded that Israel could afford such an attitude only because its alliances left it with the option of war or peace while, for the present, the Arab countries had only the option of peace. The fact that Israel was taking advantage of its present position to obstruct the just expectations of the Arab countries was creating nothing but bitterness and frustration.

57. On 28 September, His Highness Crown Prince Hassan bin Talal received the Commission. Present at the meeting was also Mr. Bassam Sakat, Director of the Economics Department of the Royal Scientific Society. At that meeting an extensive exchange of views took place on the subject of settlements, in particular the impact of those settlements on the future of the West Bank. The exchange covered also Israel's

policies affecting the economic and social developments in the area as well as the prospects of peace.

58. The Crown Prince said that by early September 1979 Israel had established 106 settlements and confiscated 183,000 hectares of land in the West Bank. He also pointed out that exploitation of the West Bank resources was not limited to land only but was practically extended to all its resources including water, manpower and the area's external trade.

59. The Crown Prince also indicated that, in establishing those settlements, Israel had undermined the agriculture and economic life of the West Bank by expropriating large areas of farm land and utilizing the available water resources for the benefit of the settlements.

60. Regarding the external trade of the area, Israel followed a policy aiming at linking the economy of the West Bank to that of its own territory. In the process it had resorted to various practices which gave Israel full control over the economy of the area, transforming it into a market for its products, resulting in a trade surplus to its advantage.

61. At the same time Israel subjected the trade from East to West Bank to restrictions and levied exorbitant duties on imports from Jordan. Another example of controlling the area's economy was to place Israeli labels on West Bank industrial and agricultural products, making it impossible for Jordan or other Arab countries to accept the import of such products.

62. Referring to the restriction of development opportunities for the Arabs in the occupied West Bank, Prince Hassan said that the level of Jordanian investments channelled into the West Bank was being subjected to strict regulations established by the occupying Power. Financial restrictions imposed by Israel rendered Jordanian promotion of Arab agriculture and industry in the West Bank very difficult. Promotion of only vertical growth in both sectors was possible but any attempt to encourage development of the West Bank, such as in a programme recently suggested by the United Nations Development Programme, was negated. In fact, all endeavours to preserve the Arab identity in the West Bank through educational planning or otherwise were being blocked by Israel. Furthermore, he said, there was a deliberate attempt by Israel to treat the West Bank as a political and economic zone separate from the Gaza Strip and to link the West Bank to the Israeli economy.

63. The Crown Prince continued saying that when Jordan agreed to an "open bridge" policy between the East and the West Bank it had in mind the necessity to maintain a contact with Arab inhabitants in the West Bank so that a part of their economic, trade and social needs would be met. He pointed out that that policy had been adopted mainly for humanitarian reasons which could not be ignored.

64. Crown Prince Hassan reminded the Commission that Jordan's position concerning Jerusalem and the West Bank had been repeatedly stated. On Jerusalem, he said that Jordan considered the Holy City as an integral part of the West Bank. It was an essential problem which, once solved, could lead to a comprehensive solution.

65. The Crown Prince stressed that Israel continued to deny the rights of the Palestinians and was attempting to impose on them a solution which ignored those rights. In his view, the idea of so-called "autonomy" was not the answer because, while giving Israel economic and political advantages, it ignored the wishes, aspirations as well as the inalienable rights of the people under occupation and therefore could not be considered the solution to the problem.

66. Referring to Israel's contentions that the population of the West Bank had rather increased since 1967 and that the settlements did not adversely affect its growth, the Crown Prince indicated that, contrary to those contentions, the population of the West Bank had decreased. At present the annual growth rate there was only 1.2 per cent, while in the East Bank it was 3.4 per cent.

67. Other aspects of economic difficulties encountered by the West Bank population were mentioned by Mr. Bassam Sakat, who cited three particular areas in which Israel was concentrating its efforts with the ultimate objective of making the West Bank economy dependent on Israel, namely production (labour), land and capital. In pursuit of that objective, large industrial Israeli complexes were being established in the midst of densely populated Arab areas and, while the Arab enterprises had been financially hurt as a result of the closing of all Arab banks in the occupied territories, the Israeli Government lent continuous support to Israeli industrial enterprises, making Arab industries less competitive and eroding their ability to survive.

68. The Crown Prince's statement was highlighted by a presentation of slides on Israeli settlements in the West Bank (including Jerusalem) as well as statistical charts. Comments made during the presentation emphasized Israel's determination to strengthen its presence in the West Bank by fortifying its settlements and by surrounding Jerusalem with a ring of residential buildings practically cutting it off from the rest of the West Bank.

69. The presentation indicated also that the real advantage which Israel was deriving from its occupation was not the enforcement of its security but the alleviation of its national economic plight through the control and exploitation of the occupied Arab territories.

Hearings held at Amman

70. During its stay in Jordan the Commission had the opportunity of having six witnesses who had expressed the wish to appear before it. A summary of each statement received by the Commission can be found in annex I to the present report.

71. Among those statements, the Commission noted with particular interest that of Mr. Ruhi El-Khatib (witness No. 2), who was Mayor of Jerusalem when he was expelled from that city in 1968. Mr. El-Khatib, who had already testified before the Commission in 1979 [S/13450 and Add.1, annex II, witness No. 15], said that since his last appearance, Israel's policy of judaizing Jerusalem by eliminating Arab presence and history had been systematically enforced. He referred in particular to the archaeological excavations which, pursued despite United Nations

and UNESCO resolutions, were gravely damaging Moslem shrines and driving away Arab inhabitants, the taking over of Arab public services such as the Electricity Company of Jerusalem, a case presently pending before an Israeli Court, the decision to transfer the Prime Minister's office to the Old City of Jerusalem, for which Arab inhabitants in the coveted area had been evacuated and work had started, the law declaring Jerusalem the capital of Israel and the closure of one of the few remaining Arab educational institutions on the West Bank. Mayor El-Khatib insisted that the time was running short before the trend became irreversible.

72. Another witness (No. 3), described the incidents which had taken place at Hebron in connexion with the establishment of settlements in that area. He said that a military post had first been set up in the hills overlooking the town. It had soon been transformed into a settlement that proliferated on expropriated lands, despite the inhabitants' protests. Describing the ceaseless provocations endured by the population, which led to molestations, a period of famine and deaths, he emphasized that those instances of violence were not the acts of unruly individuals but were well known to the authorities, who sometimes instigated them.

73. The fourth witness was a university professor, who said he had been summarily deported three months earlier for an unknown reason. He described to the Commission the difficulties of Arab teachers and students, strictly controlled in their teachings and studies and frequently threatened by the occupying authorities. He felt that his unexplained expulsion was meant to be a warning to his colleagues.

74. Witnesses Nos. 5 and 6 dwelt on the question of the confiscation of Arab lands by the Israelis, through the brutal process of direct and sudden confiscation or the more subtle means of water resource depletion, which unavoidably brought despair and surrender among the farmers.

75. In that connexion, witness No. 6 referred in detail to the case of the village of Al-Auja, near Jericho, already brought to the attention of the Security Council [S/13679, para. 44], where citrus plantations had been ruined as a result of the unilateral diversion of the water resources that used to feed the village spring to the exclusive use of the newly established Israeli settlements.

C. VISIT TO THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC

Meeting with Government officials

76. The Commission travelled to Damascus on 28 September. It was received the following morning by the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Nasser Kadour, Mr. Taher Houssami, Deputy Director of International Organizations, was also present. The Vice-Minister welcomed the members of the Commission on their second visit to Syria, and pointed out that the existence of Israeli settlements in the occupied Arab territories was a matter that portended extreme danger for the area. He assured the Commission of the full co-operation of his Government.

77. Turning to the developments which had taken place in the occupied Golan Heights since the last visit of the Commission, Mr. Kadour said that Israel had

officially declared its intention to establish five new settlements in the Golan Heights by the end of 1981. These new settlements would bring the total number to 35, since at present there were already 23 official settlements and 7 posts. The following locations were indicated for the proposed new settlements:

- (a) At Sukayk, on the road leading to Mas'adah;
- (b) At the slope of Mount Qata, near Lake Mas'adah;
- (c) Near Tell Abu Qatif, i.e., near the village of Ayn Ayshah;
- (d) At Mazra'at Quneitra;
- (e) Near the village of Dabbusiyah, adjacent to the Al-Rahhad River.

78. Mr. Kadour explained that the posts to which he had referred were described by Israel as control towers and that, according to Israel, those posts necessitated military fortifications, which meant that barracks for soldiers had to be constructed around them. A chain reaction was thereby established in a subtle manner, intended to disguise the actual intentions of the occupying authorities: first to establish posts in the guise of protective units for the nearby settlements, and then to establish military fortifications for the protection of the protective posts, which thereafter became actual settlements.

79. He added that, in continuation of its endeavours to absorb the remaining Arab population, Israel was pursuing the destructive policies which had been reported to the Commission during its previous visit to the area [see S/13450 and Add.1, paras. 100-120]. Those included biased educational programmes, compulsory nationality registration and, of course, absolute control of manpower, economic, industrial and agricultural activities.

80. He also noted that Israel's refusal to co-operate with the Commission was not only consistent with its past record of defiance of United Nations decisions but that, in the present circumstances, it expressed the clear intention of Israel to hide from the Security Council the truth about the disastrous conditions prevailing in the occupied Arab territories.

81. Mr. Kadour also emphasized that at the core of the problem in the Middle East, which had started in 1947, was the failure to deal with the rights of the Palestinian people. For that reason, he said, it was highly regrettable that Egypt had felt it appropriate to go on its own and, abandoning the Arab cause, had decided to enter into bilateral relations with Israel in complete disregard of the Palestinian issue. In doing so, Egypt, the largest country in the Arab world, had left the battlefield, and the alliance which it had signed with Israel had changed the balance of power.

82. Mr. Kadour added that, considering that Israel depended totally on the support of its allies, it was incumbent on the Arab States to develop their own forces and achieve solidarity. Once the gap in the balance of power was eliminated, he said, then meaningful negotiations between the parties concerned could be undertaken on a basis of parity. In Syria's view, such negotiations should then preferably be conducted under the auspices of the United Nations.

83. As to the prerequisites of a comprehensive and lasting peace upon which such negotiations could be centred, the following were suggested:

(a) The withdrawal by Israel from all the occupied Arab territories;

(b) The implementation by Israel of the relevant articles of the Charter of the United Nations prohibiting the acquisition of territory by force;

(c) The recognition by Israel of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people for self-determination and an independent State;

(d) The implementation by Israel of the resolutions adopted by the United Nations on the matter, in particular, General Assembly resolution ES-7/2 on the question of Palestine.

84. Concluding his statement, Mr. Kadour pointed out that, while Israel had repeatedly stated its need to keep the Golan Heights under its control as an area of the greatest strategic significance, the same reason of security applied to Syria concerning that region, which was an integral part of Syrian territory and which therefore the Government of Syria would never abandon.

D. VISIT TO EGYPT

Meetings with Government officials

85. On 29 September the Commission arrived at Cairo. The following morning, it was received at the Prime Minister's Office by Mr. Fouad Mohyeldeen, Deputy Prime Minister of Egypt. Also present at the meeting was Mr. Samir Ahmed, Under-Secretary for International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

86. Mr. Mohyeldeen said that Egypt was following with great concern the crucial issue of settlements in the occupied Arab territories; it was deplorable that, in spite of numerous condemnations by the international community, Israel had continued to establish a substantial number of settlements in those territories.

87. Israel sometimes claimed that its settlements were built on public property, although in fact it was also using privately owned land. It also claimed that some of its settlements were created for the purpose of military security, but security for Israel could not be found in building settlements, whatever their type, size or geographical locations; Israel's security could be guaranteed, as President Sadat had declared, only through fostering good relations with its neighbours.

88. Mr. Mohyeldeen said that the dismantling and relinquishing of settlements from the Sinai had established a precedent that henceforth could be applied in dealing with other occupied territories. As such, the existence of Israeli settlements in any occupied Arab territories should no longer be considered as a sign of permanent Israeli presence there.

89. Mr. Mohyeldeen also pointed out that when Egypt felt that the negotiations for the autonomy in Gaza and the West Bank were not going as expected, it had suspended the negotiations. President Sadat, in exchanging letters with Prime Minister Begin, had included the following reasons for the suspension of negotiations: the decision to annex Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, the establishment of additional settlements in the West Bank and Gaza and the renewed repression of the Arab population.

90. Mr. Mohyeldeen assured the Commission of his appreciation for its continued efforts and expressed

the hope that the pressure of public opinion could be exerted in favour of a solution for the crucial question of settlements.

91. He also pointed out that while his Government felt that it might be easier to start the peace process concerning the occupied territories within the Gaza Strip, Egypt would not agree to separate the question of Gaza from the issue of the West Bank as a whole.

92. On the same day, the Commission was received at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by Mr. Usama El-Baz, First Under-Secretary, and afterwards held a working session with Mr. Samir Ahmed, Ambassador Ahmed Ezzat Abdel-Latif, Director, Department of Palestine Affairs, and other government officials also attended those meetings.

93. Mr. El-Baz expressed Egypt's appreciation for the work of the Commission. He said in particular that, despite Israel's refusal to co-operate, the work of the Commission was most useful not only for its impact on international public opinion but also in fostering the position of those in Israel who questioned the wisdom of the settlements policy in the occupied territories. Mr. El-Baz assured the Commission of the continuing co-operation of his Government, in particular by providing to the Commission all available information in furtherance of its tasks.

94. In the course of his remarks, Mr. El-Baz reiterated the conviction of the Government of Egypt that, without resolving the Palestinian question, there would be no solution to the Middle East problem as a whole and consequently no peace in the area. With that premise in mind, Egypt had decided to enter into direct negotiations with Israel, a process which was still continuing. However, he said, the experience of the Egyptian negotiators had been one of disappointment because of the negative stance of the Israeli authorities, who had deliberately shown insistence on protocol and procedural issues rather than willingness to deal with the substance of the matter. Consequently, there had been a series of setbacks which led to unavoidable suspensions of the negotiations.

95. Nevertheless, the Government of Egypt felt bound not to put a final stop to the negotiation process, in the deep conviction that, because of its commitments, Israel for the first time had found itself bound by its own signature regarding some aspects of the Palestinian rights.

96. Noting furthermore that the absence of such a negotiation process would not have restrained Israel from continuing its construction of further settlements, Mr. El-Baz emphasized that the dialogue started at and embodied in those agreements had introduced a new dynamism in the situation, with legal and psychological consequences for both sides. For the Arabs, it had demonstrated that the physical presence of the settlements was not an irreversible phenomenon, and for the Israelis it had destroyed the myth that the establishment of a settlement in an Arab territory conveyed a guarantee of permanent Israeli presence in that area.

97. Thus when, as a result of direct negotiations, an Israeli settlement, highly and extensively developed, was relinquished to an Arab authority, a legal and historical precedent had been established in El-Arish which would have been considered inconceivable previously.

98. Egypt also felt that the negotiation process afforded an opportunity to enlighten public opinion both inside and outside Israel regarding the real consequences of the settlements policy; in particular, it focused attention on the fact that, contrary to Israel's claims, the establishment and maintenance of settlements in the occupied territories constituted a liability far more than an element of security for that country. Indeed, daily incidents demonstrated that those settlements were the main source of friction between the Israelis and the Palestinians, often generating serious acts of violence which, by their very existence, contradicted Israel's security claim.

99. Mr. El-Baz noted in that regard that, during the negotiations, the Egyptian delegation had requested the Israeli representatives to provide any evidence justifying the security value of each settlement. The Israeli representatives had failed to put forward any consistent and coherent explanation concerning the settlements as guarantees for Israel's security. Instead, they had resorted to their well-known claims of so-called historical and biblical rights.

100. Nevertheless, a moratorium on further construction of Israeli settlements during the period of the direct negotiations had been the subject of an oral agreement. But Israel had reneged on that agreement, as amply demonstrated.

101. Recalling that Egypt regarded the Israeli settlements as utterly illegal and constituting a direct obstacle to peace, Mr. El-Baz pointed out that Egypt's stand corresponded to the position of the United Nations as indicated in Security Council resolutions, in particular resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973).

102. Turning specifically to the question of the Gaza Strip, Mr. El-Baz stated that Gaza was part of the Palestinian entity whose territorial integrity must be preserved. Therefore, Egypt would never accept an agreement on Gaza separate from the West Bank. Both Gaza and the West Bank had to be subjected to the same legal process and the inhabitants of those areas as a whole must be granted their inalienable rights, including, naturally, their right to self-determination. For that reason, Egypt believed that the voting rights of the inhabitants of East Jerusalem should be exercised there and not anywhere else, as had been suggested as a compromise.

103. However, he said, if it were felt appropriate, the implementation of the autonomy plan could well start in the Gaza Strip which, because of its small size, would be administratively easier to organize. Then, if successfully conducted, such experience would facilitate Israel's acceptance of the idea that the evolution towards autonomy did not automatically lead to mass violence and terrorism.

104. As to the final agreement concerning the right of self-determination of the Palestinian people, Mr. El-Baz stressed pointedly that Egypt did not claim in any way to speak for the Palestinians in that account. The Camp David framework, he said, was only a transitional arrangement intended to provide a basis for the final settlement which should be reached as a result of direct negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis.

105. Following that meeting the Commission held a working session with Mr. Samir Ahmed.

106. After recalling the position of the Egyptian Government on the question of the Middle East and the Government's particular concern regarding the pursuance by Israel of its settlement policy, despite the moratorium which had been agreed upon at Camp David, the Under-Secretary gave information on the settlements in the Gaza Strip.

107. According to the most recent information, the seven settlements which had been reported previously to the Commission were still active; and one of them, Kfar Darom, a nahal military settlement established near the refugee camp of Mughazi, had been doubled to accommodate 400 settlers.

108. Since then three new settlements had been established: one close to Gaza, called Nahal Taadeel, where some 4,000 settlers lived; one near Rafah, called Holeet, which contained some 300 housing units; and another one between Deir El-Balah and Khan Yunis, which had joined its agricultural activities with the two other settlements of Katif A and Katif B, already reported upon, thus bringing the total number of settlers of those three settlements from 550 to more than 1,000. In addition, a settlement called Beit Lahat was under construction north of Gaza.

109. Commenting on the purpose of the Israeli Government in pursuing a policy which was everywhere condemned as contrary to all relevant tenets of international law, Mr. Ahmed refuted the "untenable" biblical claims on the basis of which some Israeli leaders were referring to the West Bank as Judaea and Samaria, as well as the "security myth" which, he said, was not even supported in high levels of the Israeli military command, which considered that in case of war the current situation in those territories would be fraught with danger.

110. The real purpose of those operations, he said, was to separate by a demographic line the Arab and Jewish populations which had originally lived together. Then, by pushing away that line and filling the land vacated by the Arabs with Israeli settlers, a political and even geographical transformation of the area was taking form which, once completed, would render virtually impossible the return of those Arab lands to their legitimate owners.

111. Egypt, he continued, faced with the practical reality that it was no longer feasible in the present circumstances to resort to war as a means of resolving the Middle East question, had taken the only course of action which was left open towards the search for a comprehensive peace in the area.

112. As a result of its initiative, the Egyptian Government was heartened by the fact that, for the first time in history, Israel had appended its signature to certain concepts of legal and political relevance for the Palestinians, a step which heretofore would have been considered inconceivable. Thus, Israel had acknowledged the existence of the Palestinian issue and had pledged itself to participate in solving the question in all its aspects. It had agreed to withdraw the Israeli military government and its civilian administration from the West Bank and Gaza and have them replaced by an elected Palestinian authority, which at the end of a specified transitional period would hold direct negotiations with Israel towards self-determination for the Palestinians.

113. In his view, Egypt's initiative in the matter had also another consequence of importance. For years, public opinion had been made to believe that, if no negotiations were taking place, it was the fault of the Arabs. Now that an agreement had been signed and that furthermore a main Power, the United States, had testified that a verbal moratorium on the establishment of further settlements had been jointly agreed upon, the situation was reversed, and Israel was henceforth held accountable to international public opinion in the event that it reneged on any part of it.

114. Mr. Ahmed added that Egypt would faithfully support any effort of the United Nations which could lead towards the achievement of a comprehensive peace in the area.

Hearings held at Cairo

115. During its stay in Egypt, the Commission heard six witnesses who had expressed the wish to appear before it. As with the hearings held at Amman, the Commission decided to append a brief summary of each of the statements received at Cairo in annex I to the present report.

116. Those six witnesses, most of whom had come from the Gaza Strip, spoke about the living conditions of the population in that area. They said that before 1967 the Gaza Strip, with its small size of 360 square kilometres, with an Arab population of some 600,000 and scarce resources, was already overpopulated. The arrival of thousands of Israeli settlers had rendered the situation hopeless.

117. They confirmed the plight of the inhabitants, as it had already been reported to the Commission during its previous visit [*ibid.*, paras. 160-174], and said that the policy of expropriation of land to establish new settlements or expand others had been ruthlessly pursued. They added that by now the compulsory payment for every cubic metre of water, even when taken from private family wells, had been generalized while by contrast, water was free for the settlers. They also said that a recent order by Israeli military authorities prohibiting construction in a wide area had rendered the relocation of refugees even more difficult.

118. Complaining about the provocations which, they said, were currently being made by armed settlers who could not be taken to court for their actions, they described the situation as one of despair and requested the Commission to make their statements known to world opinion.

E. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION

119. On 29 September, the Commission had a meeting at Damascus with Mr. Mohammed Zuhdi Nashashibi, Secretary-General of the PLO Executive Committee.

120. Mr. Nashashibi conveyed to the Commission the deep regrets of Chairman Arafat who, being outside the area to pursue his efforts for peace between Iraq and Iran, could not come himself despite his personal wishes and the considerable importance which his Organization attached to the work of the Commission.

121. Mr. Nashashibi gave an account of his experience as a Palestinian who had been expelled from his own land. He then pointed out the biased attitude of zionism which, while advocating the right for the Jews to be recognized as a people, was systematically hostile to any Palestinian entity, rejecting even the right of the Palestinians to return to their land as well as their right for self-determination.

122. He added in that connexion that while the existence of Israel had been the result of an international decision taken by the United Nations some 35 years ago, the right of the Palestinians to independence and sovereignty was the result of a long and continuous process. The fact that that process had been hampered by the expansionist policy of zionism, despite the repeated and pressing decisions taken by the United Nations on the matter, would not put a stop to that historic process.

123. The duplicity of the Israeli Government in its approach to the question appeared also from its attempted justifications for its illegal occupation of Palestine. Depending on circumstances, Israel spoke of political borders, security borders, hydraulic borders and, when none applied, it claimed those supposedly established by the Bible. Needless to say, such an approach had little to do with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with international law as a whole.

124. Criticizing the Camp David agreement, Mr. Nashashibi said that the idea of self-rule as envisaged in its context was a clear denial of the very existence of the Palestinian people. It was nothing but an attempt to legalize the occupation of Arab territories, justify the Israeli settlements and put a final stop to any hope that the Palestinians, who under duress had been compelled to leave their country, could ever return there. Meanwhile Israel's grip on those territories continued unabated.

125. Referring to a presentation which the PLO had made recently to an industrial conference of Arab States, Mr. Nashashibi described the measures used by the occupying authorities to suffocate Arab business. He said that Arab industries were prevented from importing basic materials from Arab countries so that they would be compelled to buy Israeli materials only. The manpower was entirely controlled by Israeli authorities. As to the finished products, if not sold inside Israel or the occupied territories, they had to be shipped through Israeli ports where automatically Israeli labels were affixed on them. As a result of this, Arab countries were prevented from accepting goods which in fact had been produced by Arabs.

126. Banking facilities were also used as a means of pressure. Arab banks having been closed or taken over, it was extremely difficult for Arab industries to obtain financial assistance; thus the competition was practically impossible with Israeli enterprises which, by contrast, were receiving full support from their banks.

127. As to international aid, which as a general rule is made available to any developing country, including Israel, the Israeli authorities did not allow contributions to be received by the Palestinians in the occupied territories from Arab or other international sources.

128. Mr. Nashashibi added that that lack of financial support was not hampering only the industry but the farmers as well, whether as individuals or grouped in co-operative societies.

129. Pointing out that the purpose of Israel in doing so was to drive the Arab population to despair and to compel them to leave, Mr. Nashashibi appealed to the Commission to draw once again the attention of the Security Council to the plight of the Palestinians who, faced with the continuing development of foreign settlements, were being driven out of their own land.

F. MEETING IN TUNISIA WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES

130. On 2 October, the Commission was received by the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, Mr. Chedli Klibi, at the headquarters of the League at Tunis. Mr. Klibi was accompanied by Mr. Mohamed El-Arbi Daoudi, Director for Palestinian Affairs, and other officials.

131. Mr. Klibi welcomed the members of the Commission and expressed the hope that the Commission's work would lead to the establishment of peace in the area. He noted that the question of Palestine must be examined from two standpoints—i.e., the outrages, injustices, wrongs and other acts which were being perpetrated in the occupied territories; and the inter-connexion between the problems inherent to those territories and the Middle Eastern question as a whole.

132. Concerning the situation in the occupied territories, he said that, through threats of imprisonment, exile or even attempted murders, Israel was tightening its stranglehold on the mayors; controlling all aspects of the public administrative and educational systems. Recently the world had witnessed in attacks against Palestinian leaders a return by Israel to the very methods of terrorism which were practised before the establishment of that State by such organizations as the Irgun and the Stern.

133. While those acts of persecution were being perpetrated, the Israeli military authorities were establishing settlements, in complete disregard of condemnations by world organs as contrary to basic principles of international law and in spite of warnings from friendly Governments, including its main supporter.

134. Indeed the two operations were linked because the real purpose of the settlement policy was to drive out the Arab inhabitants from the occupied territories so as to replace them with a Jewish population. That plan was in conformity with the declarations made by various Israeli leaders since the establishment of the State of Israel. Thus in 1971 the former Prime Minister, Mrs. Golda Meir, had declared that the border of Israel lay wherever there were Jews and not where a mere line had been drawn on a map; similarly, in 1973 the former Defence Minister Moshe Dayan, after pointing out that Israel would never leave nor abandon any of its settlements, had said that the borders of Israel reached wherever the Israeli army marched, and that every Zionist generation had the task of extending those borders. The fact that the present Prime Minister, Mr. Begin, insisted on referring to the West Bank as Judaea and Samaria showed that, despite the United Nations stand on the matter,

he also considered those areas an integral part of Israel.

135. In view of such a clear design, Mr. Klibi wondered what the sense was of the negotiations undertaken between Israel and Egypt. Indeed the Egyptian Government was wasting its time while Israel kept pursuing the consolidation of its objectives under the cover of internationally publicized negotiations.

136. Although the United Nations was commendably attaching great importance to the human aspect of the consequences of the occupation and to the oppressive acts which were taking place in the occupied territories, it should not be ignored that those crimes, in violation of human rights, had as their major political objective the final obliteration of an entire people. Israel was in search of its "*espace vital*", its "*Lebensraum*". It was therefore expelling Arab inhabitants so that the occupied territories thus vacated could become an integral part of Israel.

137. An end should be put to the conspiracy currently prevailing against the Palestinians. The United Nations, with all its power, should take the necessary measures which would ensure the liberation of the occupied territories and place them temporarily under an international administration prior to a referendum under the auspices of the United Nations by which the Palestinian people could freely express their wishes.

138. Pointing out that the unabating activities of Israel in the occupied territories were rendering the situation more difficult every day, Mr. Klibi emphasized that all States could help to facilitate the achievement of a just solution which alone could consolidate a comprehensive and lasting peace in the area. For that reason, he said, the European initiative—even though its outcome was uncertain—was welcomed as a well-intentioned endeavour.

139. Mr. Klibi then appealed to the Commission to do its utmost not only to alleviate the burden of oppression imposed on the inhabitants of those occupied territories but above all to focus attention on the fact that what was happening there was only a prelude to the eclipse of a people who, numerically and qualitatively, was by no means inferior to the Jewish people. Indeed, the vitality and distinction of the Palestinian people had come to be recognized at the international level by their determination to preserve their identity and their resolve to fight to the end in order to achieve freedom and true self-determination.

G. MEETING WITH OFFICIALS OF THE TUNISIAN GOVERNMENT

140. While in Tunisia, the Commission had the opportunity to pay a courtesy call on the Tunisian Government authorities and to have an exchange of views with them.

141. On 2 October, the Commission was received at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by Mr. Mahmoud Mestiri, Secretary-General of the Ministry, Ambassador Ridha Bachbaouab, Director, Department of International Organizations and Conferences, and Ambassador Mohamed Amamou, Director, Arab Affairs, and other Government officials of the Foreign Ministry were also present.

142. Mr. Mestiri welcomed the Commission and said that his Government regarded the situation in the Middle East with the greatest apprehension. Tunisia categorically condemned the settlement activities of Israel, which constituted a fundamental tenet of Zionism, and was convinced that the continuation of those activities in defiance of United Nations resolutions created an acute problem which should be considered with the utmost concern by the Security Council.

143. Noting that in addition to its moral and political authority the Security Council possessed other means of action under Chapters VI and VII of the Charter of the United Nations, Mr. Mestiri emphasized that his Government considered that, if the credibility and respectability of the world Organization were to be maintained, the United Nations should bring pressure upon those of its members who were in a position to exert influence on Israel.

144. Mr. Mestiri felt that the time factor was of great importance when dealing with the Israeli settlements problem, in so far as any delay would be exploited by the Israelis to establish more settlements and deprive the Arab population of its own land. The United Nations, he pointed out, had already provided in various resolutions, in particular Security Council resolution 242 (1967), a framework for the solution of the Middle East question which would guarantee secure and recognized borders for all concerned. The only shortcoming in resolution 242 (1967) was its failure to provide for the establishment of a Palestinian State and for the exercise of the right of self-determination by the Palestinian people.

145. Turning to the question of the settlements, Mr. Mestiri spoke of the changes in the demographic structure resulting from the establishment of those settlements and the consequent expulsion of the Arab population from those areas. The ultimate objective of the Israeli settlements policy, he added, was the destruction of the Palestinian entity. In that context, he felt that the United Nations had a basic role and a fundamental duty to reverse the situation.

146. On the question of Jerusalem, Mr. Mestiri voiced the grave concern of Tunisia which, he said, was shared by almost 1 billion Moslems all over the world in connexion with the purported annexation of East Jerusalem by Israel. He noted in that connexion that the Tunisian community, which had been living for generations at East Jerusalem, had been expelled by Israel and forced to flee to other Arab countries.

147. Mr. Mestiri stated that Tunisia favoured a solution of the Middle East problem through peaceful negotiations and considered that the United Nations should take the appropriate initiative in that regard.

H. AUDIENCE WITH HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF MOROCCO, CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON JERUSALEM OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE

148. On 4 October, at Ifrane, Morocco, the Commission was received in audience by His Majesty King Hassan II. Addressing the Commission as Chairman of the Committee on Jerusalem of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, King Hassan stressed the necessity of establishing a global, just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

149. After observing that, if a new conflict should break out in the region, it would be of infinitely graver proportions than in the past, owing to the ever-growing military capacity of the parties concerned, King Hassan stated that, in order to be lasting, such a peace must guarantee security without humiliating anyone.

150. Jerusalem, he said, was a special problem within the context of the occupation by Israel of Arab territories, an unjust occupation that was incompatible with the most elementary principles of international law. What was in question in the case of the Holy City was not only the exercise of a right to sovereignty over a territory but also the administration of a spiritual centre of world-wide significance. Thus, by attempting to alter the status of the Holy City with the intention of making it the capital of the Jewish State, Mr. Begin's Government had trampled on the dignity of both the Arab world and the Christian world.

151. King Hassan added in that regard that, when the Arabs had requested the Holy See and other Christian authorities to join in their efforts, they had *ipso facto* recognized that the question of Jerusalem also had a Christian dimension. Consequently, he said, it was expected that the future status of the city would take into account the moral and material contribution of Christianity; it was interesting to note that, whereas there were differences of opinion even among the Moslems on other aspects of the question of Palestine, there was, with respect to the future of Jerusalem, agreement of principle not only among the Moslems themselves but apparently between them and the Christians.

152. That was probably why Mr. Begin's Government systematically turned down every opportunity to negotiate on the Holy City, a matter on which it doubtless felt too vulnerable. However, that was also precisely why any negotiations should begin with Jerusalem, the possible key to a solution for the overall question of the occupied territories. Jerusalem could thus serve as a starting point in peace efforts. Such efforts would initiate a process that would subsequently extend to the other occupied territories.

153. As to the strategy which the Arabs were thinking of adopting, through the Committee on Jerusalem, in order to exert the necessary pressure on Israel, it would be necessary to establish economic sanctions covering petroleum or other products, which the Organization of the Islamic Conference would co-ordinate in order to make them fully effective. If an embargo were to be imposed, it would be strictly applied by Morocco. King Hassan then alluded to the "jihad", and explained that the word basically signified a global struggle in which all the potentialities of the Moslem world were mobilized, both at the cultural and information levels and in the economic, political and military fields. He emphasized, however, that only as a last resort would recourse be had to war, as the final stage in efforts to attain an objective.

154. It must be realized that Israel benefited from two important means of assistance in addition to help from its allies. First, it received the unconditional support of most members of the Jewish faith; and second, thanks to their control of the mass media in many countries, it benefited from the ignorance of the rest of the world concerning the situation prevailing in the areas concerned.

155. The least that should be secured for the Holy City was the *status quo ante* of 1967, leaving aside for the time being the question of sovereignty, which could only be settled simultaneously with the other territorial questions concerning the occupied territories. It would therefore appear desirable to entrust the administration of Jerusalem to spiritual leaders under some form of guardianship arrangement. That would be a provisional measure, pending an ultimate solution, which could be achieved through negotiations once the voices of reason with Israel succeeded in making themselves heard. But as long as the Government of Mr. Begin persisted in speaking of Judaea and Samaria to designate the West Bank of Jordan, no such solution could be contemplated.

156. After affirming that the goal was the recognition of the right to security and survival of all the States of the region, including a Palestinian State, King Hassan expressed the hope that one day the Israeli and Palestinian peoples, united in a joint effort, would be in a position to compete with the most powerful by virtue of their human potential and the intellectual and material resources available to them.

157. During the exchange of views which followed, King Hassan dwelt on the advantages to be derived by the Commission from seeking an opportunity of having contact with the Holy See, not only because Christianity, and especially the Vatican, had an important role to play in solving the question of Jerusalem but also out of deference to the remarkable personality of His Holiness the Pope, whose advice and support could facilitate the efforts being undertaken.

III. INFORMATION ON THE ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS AND ON THE DEPLETION OF WATER RESOURCES IN THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES

A. INFORMATION ON SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES, INCLUDING JERUSALEM

Introduction

158. In its resolution 446 (1979), by which the Commission was created, the Security Council determined that "the policy and practices of Israel in establishing settlements in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967 have no legal validity and constitute a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East".

159. In its two previous reports, the Commission indicated that, despite the Council's appeals to Israel, as the occupying Power, to abide by the 1949 fourth Geneva Convention and, in particular, not to transfer parts of its own civilian population into the occupied Arab territories, Israel was pursuing its policy of settlements.

160. On the occasion of its recent visit to the area, the Commission endeavoured to obtain additional information and to compare the present situation with that which it had brought to the attention of the Council in its two previous reports following its first visit in May 1979.

Implementation by Israel of its settlement policy

161. In its first report, the Commission indicated that, between 1967 and May 1979, Israel had estab-

lished altogether 133 settlements in the occupied territories, consisting of 79 in the West Bank, 29 in the Golan Heights, 7 in the Gaza Strip and 18 in the Sinai [S/13450 and Add.1, para. 212].

162. According to recent information, the settlements which have been established since then or which are under construction in the various occupied territories number as follows: 28 in the whole West Bank, including five which were already under construction in May 1979 but had not been reported to the Commission at the time, and four in the Gaza Strip. In addition, one settlement was founded in the Golan Heights during 1980 and five new ones are planned there by the end of 1981.

163. As a whole, therefore, leaving aside the Sinai area, where settlements have been vacated, Israel has established 33 new settlements since the adoption of resolution 446 (1979), bringing the total number to 148 (see annex II). In addition, a number of the existing settlements have been expanded, sometimes to more than twice their original size.

164. With the active support of the Government of Israel, the number of settlers has also increased. According to information available to the Commission, a report from the Director General of the Prime Minister's Office indicated that, since the present Government came to power in 1977, the number of settlers in the West Bank alone had risen from 3,200 to 17,400. Those figures do not include the settlers in East Jerusalem and the Jerusalem area, who by now number approximately 80,000.

165. Furthermore, the Commission's attention was again drawn to the "Master plan for the development of settlements in Judaea and Samaria, 1979-1983", which was prepared by Mr. Matiyahu Drobles, Director for Rural Settlement, Department for Rural Settlement of the World Zionist Organization.

166. That plan, which in its original form called for the establishment of 46 new settlements to be built in the West Bank by 1983 with a view to housing 27,000 families, has already been amended to add 22 more settlements to be established there by the same date.

167. In addition to an extensive building programme, the Drobles plan, as it is generally referred to, is said to provide for the construction of a highway and road system which would effectively implement the division of the West Bank into 22 districts. In each of those districts settlements would be established, thus giving credence to information previously reported to the Commission that the location of the settlements in the West Bank was planned with the aim of "compartmenting" the Arab population [*ibid.*, para. 217].

168. It should also be noted that the settlement policy is not limited to rural areas. Thus, in connexion with the West Bank, the Commission was informed that the Israeli Ministry of Construction and Housing had submitted a plan for the establishment at Hebron of 200 housing units for settlers. Similarly, in addition to Hebron, the towns of Beit Jala and Al-Bireh are now surrounded by Israeli settlements. As a result of this, those towns are not only barred from expanding but also threatened with a reduction in their present limits. In fact, that has already been the case for an important part of Al-Bireh and almost one third of Beit Jala.

which were taken away for the expansion of Jerusalem.

169. As to the Gaza Strip, witnesses heard at Cairo testified to the Commission that large areas of lands had been delineated by the occupying authorities and declared out of bounds for any Arab construction. That division caused fear among the inhabitants that a development programme might be under contemplation there also.

Acquisition of land

170. In order to implement the establishment of new settlements and the expansion of existing ones, the occupying authorities have taken not only public land, but also privately owned land. The Commission was informed that the extent of the land confiscated in the West Bank had increased from 27 per cent of the total area in May 1979 to 33.3 per cent last September. No precise figure has been given for additional confiscation of land in the Golan Heights. However, on the basis that only five Arab villages have been left and that only some 8,000 inhabitants have been able to remain out of the original population of 142,000, it seems fair to conclude that the occupying authorities control virtually all the land.

171. Similarly in the Gaza Strip, according to witnesses, confiscation of land is final; however, no reliable figures have been made available to show the extent of the land confiscated so far.

172. In the West Bank, some judicial actions have been taken by Arab inhabitants in an attempt to protect their rights, but apparently without any significant result.

173. It may be worth recalling in this regard the various methods used by the Israeli authorities to acquire land or property. Those methods, which were described in the first report [*ibid.*, para. 193], may be summarized as follows:

(a) Acquisition of public lands allocated for public facilities or for the expansion of municipal zones;

(b) Expropriation of privately owned land by invoking the Emergency Law, which in its revised form authorized military governors to declare certain areas as zones closed for military purposes;

(c) Confiscation of "absentees' property";

(d) Compulsory sale of land under military pressure.

174. This time, however, the particular attention of the Commission was drawn to another aspect of the matter, namely, that the establishment of a settlement in the occupied territories is by no means a static event, but the beginning of a dynamic process of expansionism. In such circumstances, the chances are not equal between the Israeli settlers and the Arab inhabitants, and the Commission was repeatedly informed of increased harassment of the Arabs, particularly those living close to the neighbouring settlements. It was noted in that regard that such harassment, which in the past was essentially initiated by the occupying authorities, was now frequently resorted to by the settlers themselves, acting without any restraint from the military authorities, for the purpose of bringing the Arab owners to despair thus causing them to abandon their coveted land.

Jerusalem

175. Deep concern about the unilateral transformation of East Jerusalem has been expressed by every authority with whom the Commission has had an opportunity to exchange views.

176. The Commission was reminded that shortly after the 1967 war, East Jerusalem was the subject of an illegal and unilateral decision by Israel to annex the Holy City and to incorporate it into the Israeli Jerusalem municipality. Then a special policy was applied to the Holy City to alter its demographic character by creating conditions for the replacement of the Arab inhabitants with a Jewish population through an intensive programme of settlement.

177. Despite United Nations resolutions opposing any measures which could alter the demographic character of the Holy City, the construction programme by Israel which started several years ago has been actively pursued. According to recent information, by early 1980 six major new residential suburbs housing over 50,000 Israelis had been practically finished, thus encircling the 110,000 Palestinians who were still living in East Jerusalem and separating them from the rest of the West Bank. Furthermore, a plan was announced last March for the construction of a wide living complex in the district of Beit Hanina. In addition, the Commission was also informed of the existence of another plan called the "Greater Jerusalem plan" which is reported to be under implementation. That plan would lead to the additional expropriation or dispersion of some 130,000 Arab inhabitants living in 27 villages in order to include the area concerned within the city limit of "Greater Jerusalem".

178. On several occasions the Commission was also reminded of Israel's recent announcement that Jerusalem had become the united capital of Israel. Following that so-called "basic law", although it was censured by the Security Council, initiatives were taken by the Israeli authorities to transfer into East Jerusalem not only the Office of the Prime Minister—a move which raised international concern—but also a number of official services and several ministries.

179. As to the building to be used by the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, the work is said to be proceeding. Arab properties adjacent to it have already been confiscated and several Arab families have been ordered to vacate their nearby houses due to be demolished.

B. DEPLETION OF WATER RESOURCES IN THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES

Introduction

180. Early in the course of its examination of the situation relating to settlements in the occupied Arab territories, including Jerusalem, the Commission came upon three basic elements regarding the question of water resources in those territories, namely: that the use and control of water resources there was a matter of vital importance for the economic and social life of the Arab inhabitants; that a significant part of those water resources was used by Israel to sustain its own economic viability and that of its settlements; and that the Israeli authorities were manipulating the allocation of water in the occupied territories as a means of

economic pressure for political purposes against the Arab population there.

181. The matter was brought to the attention of the Security Council. At the 2203rd meeting, the Council adopted resolution 465 (1980), which requested the Commission to continue to examine the situation in the territories and to investigate the question of the depletion of natural resources, particularly the water resources, with a view to ensuring their protection.

182. Accordingly, during its recent visit to the area the Commission sought to obtain as much additional information as possible on the matter. It also examined relevant documentation published by Governments, international bodies, organizations or private experts.

183. The following account contains a summary of the information so obtained, all gathered from sources considered reliable. The Commission undertook efforts to check and verify the accuracy of the information so received, where necessary, with representatives of those Governments which had expressed willingness to co-operate with the Commission.

Importance of the availability of water in the area

184. An adequate supply of water for drinking, personal hygiene and other domestic purposes is essential to public health and well-being. Furthermore, in many rural areas, the amount of water available for agricultural irrigation and animal consumption is considered as one of the most determinant factors of success or failure in agriculture and animal husbandry. But when the question of water availability arises in connexion with an arid land, it may become a key to life and eventually a major cause of conflict.

185. Such as been the case in the area concerned where, because of climate and geography, water resources are scarce, the only permanent sources being the Jordan River and its tributary system and the subterranean aquifer.

186. The Jordan River flows southward in the rift which extends from northern Syria across the Red Sea into Egypt. It is formed in the Hulch Basin in northern Israel by the confluence of three separate headwater springs—the Hasbani, the Baniyas and the Dan—which rise in Lebanon, Syria and Israel respectively. These converge about 25 kilometres above Lake Tiberias to form the Upper Jordan which, enlarged by numerous springs, flows in a narrow channel to Lake Tiberias. At the southern end of the lake, it is joined by its main tributary, the Yarmouk, which forms part of the border between Syria and Jordan. It then flows through the Jordan Valley to the Dead Sea. As the Jordan River reaches the Dead Sea, its salinity increases. Although the river is not navigable, its waters are valuable for irrigation but do not solve the problem of water shortage in the area. The situation is rendered more complex by the fact that the Jordan basin forms a single hydrologic unit and that, furthermore, Israel and the West Bank constitute a single natural and geological region for the exploitation of underground water and the collection of surface run-off water.

187. Therefore, in an area which is so politically divided, whoever controls the sources of the water supply and its subsequent use retains powerful means of determining the level of the economic activity of the

whole area with significant social and political consequences.

188. For that reason, over the years numerous plans have been drawn up for the utilization of the water resources of the Jordan River.³⁷ Any attempt to find a comprehensive solution to the Middle East question has generally been accompanied with proposals concerning the distribution of water resources, such as the Unified Development of the Water Resources of the Jordan Valley Region which was prepared at the request of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and proposed in 1955. Essentially for political reasons, that plan as well as all the others were not found acceptable by some or all of the parties concerned and no peaceful solution could be found to the water problem, which has never ceased to be crucial. It should be noted in that regard that, until 1967, many of the incidents which took place between Israel and its Arab neighbours had their origin in attempts by one side or the other to control, divert or use unilaterally the water resources of the area. Bitterness is still vivid in that regard: for instance, the Commission was reminded of a military action conducted by Israeli troops before 1967 against the village of Qalqilia, located just across the Israeli-Jordanian border, as a result of which 11 artesian wells were purposely destroyed [*ibid.*, para. 92].

189. The availability of water resources in the area has always been recognized as a matter of paramount importance. In this connexion it may be recalled that in an article published in 1956 by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, which analysed the essentials of the Israeli water programme submitted by the Israel Ministry of Finance to the Jerusalem Conference of World Zionist Leaders in October 1953, the author concluded that while Israel's concerted efforts to carry out all the preliminary stages of those long-range plans had had a striking success, it was also clear that within the limits of its then existing water resources, Israel could not complete many of the projects needed to relieve its heavy dependence on food imports.³⁸

³⁷ Following is a chronological list of such "development plans" as provided by K. B. Doherty in a study entitled "Jordan Waters Conflict", published in the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Series. See *International Conciliation*, No. 553, May 1965.

	Year proposed
Ionides survey	1939
Lowdermilk proposal	1944
Hays Plan	1948
MacDonald report	1951
All Israel plan	1951
Bunger plan	1952
Israeli seven-year plan	1953
Main plan ^a	1953
Cotton plan ^a	1954
Arab plan (revised) ^b	1954
Baker-Harza plan	1955
Unified plan ^c	1955
Israeli ten-year plan	1956
National water plan	1956 ^d
East Ghor canal project	1958
Arab headwater diversion	1964

^a Regional development plans.

^b The plan became operational in 1964 and was to be completed by 1969.

^c The project became operational in 1961.

^d *International Conciliation*, No. 506, January 1956, p. 248.

190. After the 1967 war, Israel gained almost full control of the main sources of water in the area and since then has strictly organized the system of water distribution in the occupied territories with close links to its own national water system.

Interest of Israel in obtaining additional water resources

191. The present population of Israel is given as 3,903,700.³⁹ The Arab population in the West Bank is estimated at 673,000; in addition, in 1979 there were some 91,000 Israeli settlers in the West Bank, including 76,000 living in the Jerusalem area.⁴⁰

192. From the time of its establishment in 1948, until 1967 Israel's annual water consumption rose by more than 600 per cent.⁴¹ During that period, Israel obtained one third of its annual water requirements by drilling artesian wells and pumping water from the water aquifer system that also contains the water reserves for the West Bank. As its water needs have increased since then, Israel has continued to avail itself of this source of water. It is estimated that the water retained in underground aquifers amounts to 600 million cubic metres per year. This, in addition to 250 million cubic metres of surface run-off and the waters of the Jordan River, makes a total potential of 850 million cubic metres,⁴² of which only 620 million are reported to be easily usable.⁴³ According to available figures, Israel is currently drawing some 500 million cubic metres from the aquifer,⁴⁴ thus leaving about 120 million cubic metres of water for all the inhabitants of the West Bank.

193. In a recent study submitted at the United Nations Water Conference, the representative of Israel indicated that the total known feasible water resources in Israel amounted to 1.7 billion cubic metres, which, he said, was sufficient to irrigate about 10 per cent of the gross area. Adding that the coastal area contained ground-water supplies but that excessive over-all withdrawal rates must therefore be avoided to prevent sea-water intrusion, he said that the amount of water presently utilized in Israel exceeded 90 per cent of the utilizable portion of Israel's water potential.⁴⁵

³⁹ *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*, Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, vol. XXXI, June 1980. According to the *United Nations Monthly Bulletin of Statistics* (vol. XXXIV, No. 10, October 1980), the population of Israel at mid-1979 stood at 3,780,000, and the *United Nations Demographic Yearbook* (30th ed., 1978) gave the population of Israel for 1978 as 3,690,000 "including data for East Jerusalem and Israeli residents in certain other territories under occupation by Israeli military forces since June 1967".

⁴⁰ 1979 estimates reported by Jordan, in particular the Jordanian Royal Scientific Society, Economic Department, in the revised edition of *The Significance of Some West Bank Resources to Israel*, April 1979.

⁴¹ *Israel Economic Development*, issued by the Economic Planning Authority, Prime Minister's Office, Tel Aviv, 1968, p. 378.

⁴² "Agricultural Sector and Water Resources in the West Bank", a study to be published before the end of 1980 under the auspices of the Jordanian Royal Scientific Society, Economics Department.

⁴³ "Israel Drains West Bank water resources", a study by Rami Khouri, water expert, published in *Al-Ra'i* on 13 September 1979.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*; see also Hisham Awartani (Chairman, Department of Economics, Al-Jannah National University, Nablus, West Bank), "Water resources and water policies on the West Bank", *Research Bulletin*, No. 2, October 1979.

⁴⁵ Saul Arlosoroff (Deputy Water Commissioner, Israel Ministry of Agriculture), "Israel—A Model of Efficient Utilization of a Country's Water Resources", *Proceedings of the United Nations Water Conference*, vol. 1, part 4, E/CONF.70/TP150.

194. Considering that it is estimated that by 1985 Israel's total requirements will rise to approximately 2 billion cubic metres,⁴⁶ additional water sources are clearly needed.

195. In that regard, Israel has reported a number of experiences with cloud seeding and weather modification for creation of artificial rain, desalinization of sea water, reclamation and purification of water from sewage, and development of water-saving technologies.⁴⁷ However, either on account of prohibitive costs, uncertainty or the small yield of expected results, or because of the long span of time required to obtain the requisite product, none of the proposed measures has given confident optimism for filling the projected deficit in Israel's water supply. Accordingly, internal pressure has been exerted on Israeli authorities to increase Israel's water supply from West Bank sources.

Depletion of water resources in the West Bank

196. According to figures quoted by the Jordanian Royal Scientific Society⁴⁸ from a study by Hisham Awartani,⁴⁹ average individual total water consumption on the West Bank amounts to 142 cubic metres per year, compared with 537 cubic metres in Israel. Of that amount, 13 cubic metres is used for domestic consumption in the West Bank and 86 cubic metres in Israel. The total amount of water used for agriculture in Israel is about 15 times greater than the corresponding amount used on the West Bank (1,325 million cubic metres to 90 million cubic metres per annum).

197. The combined annual total for industrial and domestic use in Israel amounts to 395 million cubic metres as compared with 10 million for the West Bank. Furthermore, the present circumstances of occupation make it inevitable that the total quantity of water left for use on the West Bank must be shared between the Arab population and the Israeli settlers. It is reported that Israeli settlements in the West Bank are presently using about 15 million cubic metres of water per year, 5 million of which is spent in the agricultural sector. Future agricultural development in those settlements, it is estimated, may require as much as 50 million cubic metres of water annually.⁵⁰

198. The above figures tend to justify the growing apprehension among the Arab inhabitants of the West Bank for their own survival in view of their present deprivation, which is exacerbated by Israel's catering to the needs of an increasing number of its settlers. Such is the extent of deprivation that, according to the information received so far, the economic activity of a number of the Arab inhabitants has already been reduced to subsistence level, as the water originally available to them has been turned to the benefit of the Israeli settlers. In some cases, it has been reported that

⁴⁶ Uri Davis, Antonia E. L. Maks and John Richardson, "Israel's Water Policies", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Beirut, Winter 1980, No. 34, and *The Significance of Some West Bank Resources to Israel*, *op. cit.*

⁴⁷ Davis, Maks and Richardson, *op. cit.*

⁴⁸ "Water resources and water policies on the West Bank", *op. cit.*

⁴⁹ *The West Bank-Gaza Economy: Problems and Prospects*, report prepared by the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division of the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, for the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States House of Representatives (96th Congress, second session, 1980).

Arab villagers have been forced to abandon their exsiccated farmlands in order to find an alternative livelihood elsewhere.

199. Since 1967 the Israeli water company, Mekorot, has drilled 17 deep-bored wells to serve Israeli settlements in the Jordan Valley alone, many of the new wells in close proximity to the existing Arab wells in the area, numbering 88. During 1977 and 1978 the 17 Israeli wells produced 14.1 million cubic metres of water (i.e., approximately 830,000 cubic metres per well), as compared with 9.9 million from the 88 Arab wells (i.e., approximately 112,500 cubic metres per well),⁴⁹ a yield by far inferior to their earlier output. That situation was attributed to two main factors: the depletion of the available amount of ground water diverted to the exclusive use of the Israeli settlers, and the restrictive control imposed on the Arab population by the occupying Power concerning the water resources.⁵¹

Israel's policies concerning the control of water resources in the occupied Arab territories

200. All matters concerning the exploitation, distribution and use of water in Israel are under the direct control of the Israel Water Commission. Two companies, Mekorot (Israel water company) and Tahal (water planning for Israel company), both operating under that Commission, as well as the Commission's Department for Water Allocation and Certification, are entrusted with supply and management of water resources to all users under Israeli rule. Since 1967, the Israeli Water Commission, through its Department of Water Allocation and Certification, has taken over direct control of the water supply in the occupied Arab territories.⁴⁷

201. The policies and objectives attributed to the Israeli authorities with regard to the handling of water resources in the occupied territories, particularly in the West Bank, have already been referred to by the Commission in its previous reports. In the course of the examination of the information made available to it, the Commission came across evidence that most of the Israeli practices in that regard fell under the following categories: measures based on claims of national security requirements; restrictive measures aimed at controlling the search for, and the development and use of, water by the Arab population; and practices resulting in quantitative reduction of, and subsequent qualitative damage to, the water made available to them.

202. A number of instances were pointed out to the Commission in substantiation of those practices. Thus, the Commission was told that in the early days of the occupation, Israeli authorities under the claim of security blew up 140 Arab pumps installed on the West Bank of the River Jordan. As a result of that action, the Arab farmers were prevented from pumping water from the river for agricultural irrigation, whereas the

Israeli settlers in the area were allowed to continue to do so. Also, in the summer of 1979, Israeli military authorities destroyed the irrigation canals alongside many of the citrus and banana plantations in the district of Jiftlik on grounds of establishing a new security belt, thus causing the dessication and destruction of extensive areas of crops.

203. As to any endeavours by Arab farmers to undertake water development projects, it was said that they were systematically discouraged by the occupying authorities. In contrast, new hydrological surveys have been undertaken by the Israeli settlement authorities in co-operation with the Mekorot company to meet the water needs of the Israeli agricultural settlements. On the basis of those surveys, Mekorot has since 1968 drilled altogether 30 new artesian wells in the West Bank for the exclusive use of the Israeli settlements. Moreover, a number of wells belonging to those whom Israel calls Arab absentee owners are now being used exclusively for the settlements. Furthermore, since the early 1970s, all users have been required to install meters on their wells to enable the Israeli authorities to check on the water used. Only meagre quantities of extraction from Arab wells are permitted, and penalties are imposed for pumping in excess of the authorized limits.

204. The drilling of any new artesian wells or deepening of existing ones is forbidden without special permits. Since 1967 no such permit has been granted to any Arab inhabitant in connexion with irrigation wells, and, under heavy public pressure, only seven permits have been granted for the purpose of boring wells for domestic purposes.⁵²

205. It is worthy of note that under no circumstances are Arab inhabitants permitted to drill wells close to the borders of Israel. The rejection of such a request by the inhabitants of Nablus in that regard is a case in point. In contrast, as already stated, many Israeli wells have reportedly been drilled in close proximity to existing Arab wells and springs, with a most detrimental effect on the quality and quantity of water made available to Arab inhabitants.⁵³ In some cases, village wells and springs have dried up altogether. Specific references were made in that regard to the villages of Al-Auja, Ramallah, Al-Birch, Bardala, Tel-el-Beida, and Kardala, whose water supply had been drastically diminished owing to the new wells dug for Israeli settlements within a few hundred metres of the existing Arab springs or wells.

⁴⁹ Paul Quiring, "Israeli Settlements and Palestinian Rights", *Middle East International* (London), October 1978, No. 88. The Awartani study (*Research Bulletin*, No. 2, *op. cit.*) identifies the location of five of those wells as follows: two in Nablus and one each in Qalqila, Tulkarm and Jenin. There are also seven wells owned by the Israeli military administration in the vicinity of Israeli settlements which provide drinking water to those settlements and to some Arab villages. However, the ultimate purpose of those wells located at Qabatiya, Beit Ayba, Arraba, Al Far'a, Bethlehem, Al Zawiya and Shabtin is to cater to the interests of the adjacent Israeli settlements.

⁵¹ Through technological advances, Israeli wells can be drilled to depths of 300 to 500 metres, whereas the existing Arab wells are limited to a depth of no more than 100 metres. There is little doubt, according to Jordanian assessments, about the effect on the Arab wells and springs of the proximity and depth of Israeli wells. In fact, Jordanian law prohibits the drilling, under areas of the same artesian pressure, of any new wells within 2 kilometres of an existing well. Also, for areas under the same water table systems, no two wells must be drilled within 500 metres of each other.

⁴⁷ *Israeli Settlements in the Occupied West Bank, including Arab Jerusalem since 1967*, report dated May 1979 submitted to the Commission by the Government of Jordan, and Hisham Awartani, "West Bank Agriculture: A New Outlook", *Research Bulletin*, No. 1, Al-Najah National University, Nablus, West Bank, November 1978.

⁵² The question of the adverse impact of the Israeli wells drilled in proximity to existing Arab wells was repeatedly brought to the attention of the Commission, in particular by individual witnesses.

206. That policy was said to be followed in disregard of the vital interest of the Arab population. Thus, in the instance of the village of Tel-el-Beida, Mekorot advised the neighbouring Israeli settlement of Mehola in 1968 that a planned new well for the settlement would adversely affect the five neighbouring Arab wells and springs; nevertheless the proposed Israeli well was dug and, as a result of it, the output of water from the central spring of Tel-el-Beida fell from 80 cubic metres per hour before 1970 to barely 5 cubic metres per hour in 1976.⁵⁴

207. It happened that in such cases the occupying authorities offered to the Arab inhabitants concerned, as an alternative arrangement, to have their water provided by the Israeli settlement. That offer was made, for instance, to the inhabitants of Bardala at the time their well's pump had to be reset deeper. The Mekorot Company then offered to connect the village's water supply to that of the neighbouring Israeli settlement in exchange for closing the village well. The villagers refused the offer, for fear of becoming dependent on the whims of the settlers and they reset their pump. But thereafter, a second Israeli well was drilled in the immediate vicinity, raising the fears of the villagers that after their well dried up they would be compelled anyway to buy water from the Israeli settlement on a per-person basis. In that connexion the Commission was reminded that in the Bardala/Tel-el-Beida area mentioned above, 11 springs and all but one of the eight Arab artesian wells had dried up.

Depletion of the water resources in the Golan Heights and the Gaza Strip

208. Although evidence of the Israeli water policies is documented mostly in connexion with the West Bank, similar practices have been experienced by the Arab inhabitants in the Golan Heights and in the Gaza Strip. Before 1967, according to information provided by the Syrian authorities, more than 140,000 Arab inhabitants in the Golan Heights were using 12.5 million cubic metres per year. Presently, barely some 8,000 of the original Arab inhabitants still remain in the Golan Heights, while the number of Israeli settlers is estimated at 6,400. Additional plans have been announced to increase the number of settlers up to 10,000 by the end of 1981 and 50,000 by 1985, of whom 20,000 are expected to be settled in agricultural and industrial villages.⁴⁷ In order to meet the water requirements of the settlers by then, the Israeli plan calls for increasing the water supply in the Golan Heights to a level of consumption amounting to 46 million cubic metres, which may deprive the Arab population of its own supply.

209. With regard to the Gaza Strip, the Commission received information similar to that already reported above concerning, in particular, the restrictions imposed on the amount of water that could be used for irrigation by the Arab inhabitants who furthermore had to pay high prices for each cubic metre of water, while by contrast water was free for Israeli settlers. Furthermore, it was repeatedly pointed out to the Com-

mission that the Arab inhabitants in Gaza, like those in the West Bank and the Golan Heights, were deprived of any possibilities of developing their own water resources.

Information relevant to other natural resources

210. Information was also received about a decision taken last August by the Israeli Cabinet by which it had approved in principle a plan to construct a canal connecting the Mediterranean Sea with the Dead Sea. The proposed route for that canal would start at the village of Katif in the Gaza Strip north of Khan Yunis, and run in a south-eastern direction across the Negev Desert to Ein Bokek on the Dead Sea. Full details of the plan and the impact of the canal are not yet known. However, the Commission feels it appropriate to draw the Security Council's attention to the plan which, according to data reported to the Commission, might, through a drastic rise in the water level, alter the mineral content of the Dead Sea, damage its ecology and endanger Jordan's mineral works on the eastern shore.

IV. OBSERVATIONS

211. With the submission of this third report, the Commission considers that it has fulfilled the mandate which was originally entrusted to it by resolution 446 (1979), i.e., "to examine the situation relating to settlements in the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem", and which was first renewed on 20 July 1979 [resolution 452 (1979)] and again on 1 March 1980, [resolution 465 (1980)], together with an additional request to investigate the reported depletion of water as one of the most important natural resources of those territories.

212. During that period of 20 months the Commission followed closely the developments in the occupied Arab territories and also had the opportunity not only to receive the views of government and other officials, leaders of organizations and private individuals, all of those directly concerned with the question, but also to reassess periodically the accuracy of its earlier findings through renewed or additional contacts. The Commission cannot but deplore that despite the repeated appeals it has made, in particular on 13 April, 28 September 1979 and 18 June 1980, it has been unable to obtain the co-operation of the Government of Israel.

213. In concluding this report the Commission would like therefore to give both its assessment of the present situation and its views on the trend of developments which it has carefully observed during the period of its mandate.

214. Concerning the present situation, the Commission has been informed that since the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 446 (1979), which also called upon Israel "not to transfer parts of its own civilian population into the occupied Arab territories", Israel has established 33 additional settlements and expanded the size of a number of others.

215. The establishment and expansion of those settlements has led to further confiscation of Arab lands. In the West Bank, for instance, the extent of the land confiscated has increased from 27 per cent of the

⁴⁷ Hisham Awartani, *Water Resources and Water Policies on the West Bank*, *op. cit.*; Quiring, *op. cit.*; Ann Lesch, "The Impact of Israel's Settlements", *Palestine Human Rights Bulletin*, September 1979, No. 22.

total area in May 1979 to 33.3 per cent in September 1980.

216. As foreseen by the Commission in its second report [S/13679, para. 51], the pursuance of that settlement policy has led to a further deterioration in the situation in the occupied Arab territories. The Commission considers that that deterioration has been felt in particular in the human, economic and demographic areas.

A. IMPACT OF THE SETTLEMENT POLICY ON THE LIVING CONDITIONS OF THE ARAB POPULATION

217. The consequences of the settlement policy on the living conditions of the Arab population have already been described in the first report of the Commission [S/13450 and Add.1, paras. 221-226].

218. During its last visit the Commission was informed that the situation in that regard had further deteriorated. Among the means of repression, both individual and collective, the most frequently cited were the imposition of heavy fines or even imprisonment for anything which could be described as "political activity", the establishment of curfews and sometimes the isolation of a city bringing further hardship to the population, as was the case in Hebron, the destruction of crops and of private houses and the control of water resources.

219. Arab leaders who dare oppose Israel's policies are subjected to particular harassment which may include confiscation of their property or expulsion, as was the case examined by the Security Council in May 1980.

220. The occupying authorities have taken control of the educational field, including the programme of studies and the texts to be used, in a further attempt to discourage the Arab population from remaining in the area. Students have been arbitrarily arrested. As a most disconcerting example of harassment, the attention of the Commission was again drawn to cases of arrest of young schoolchildren. Such cases had previously been reported to the Commission [*ibid.*, para. 52]. It was said that such arrests had become a method used to frighten the Arab population in the context of creating conditions adverse to their remaining in the territories. Children were said to be submitted to harsh and intimidating interrogation by police and military authorities.

221. The Commission considers therefore that, by its consequences on the living conditions of the Arab population in the occupied territories, Israel's policy of settlement is a constant cause of violation of the basic human rights of the Arab inhabitants.

B. IMPACT OF THE SETTLEMENT POLICY ON THE ECONOMIC LIFE OF THE ARAB POPULATION

222. The Commission was given a number of examples showing that by its settlement policy Israel has undermined the economic life of the occupied territories.

223. Concerning agriculture, Israel has expropriated large areas of land and utilized the available water resources, essentially to the benefit of its settlers.

224. It is the considered view of the Commission that water, being such a scarce and vital commodity in the area, should be shared by the inhabitants on equitable terms. It is therefore in the interest of all the legitimate users to ensure that a mutually acceptable mechanism is established which will guarantee such equitable distribution.

225. Israel has imposed strict financial regulations on the activities of local populations concerning industry. At the same time all the Arab banks have been closed or taken over. Meanwhile, large industrial Israeli complexes which benefit from government support are being established in the midst of densely populated areas, thereby undermining existing Arab businesses which in any case are compelled to buy basic materials from Israel.

226. As a whole, the occupying authorities have taken control of the resources and public facilities in the territories, including manpower and the public services. The *de facto* control of the Electricity Company of Jerusalem, a matter presently pending before an Israeli court, is a case in point.

227. The Commission considers as credible the statement made by government authorities that a main advantage which Israel is deriving from its occupation is the alleviation of its national economic difficulties through the control and exploitation of the occupied Arab territories.

C. IMPACT OF THE SETTLEMENT POLICY ON THE DEMOGRAPHY OF THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES

228. Concern about demographic changes resulting from the settlement policy have been repeatedly expressed to the Commission, as reflected extensively in the Commission's previous reports.

229. In the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, where the Arab population is still considerable, the policy of harassment is generally construed as an endeavour to force the Arab inhabitants to leave their lands, which could thereafter be settled by Israelis.

230. In the Golan Heights the Arab population has been reduced to 6 per cent of its number in 1967, and the number of villages to 3 per cent, while at the same time the number of Israeli settlers has almost matched that of the remaining Arab population, and the number of settlements is now above that of the Arab villages.

231. In the Jerusalem area alone there are approximately 80,000 settlers while the remaining Arab population there numbers barely 110,000.

232. The Commission considers that the time has come to explore the possibility of having a United Nations presence established in the area as a first step to ensure normalization of the situation and to create a congenial atmosphere for negotiations by the parties under United Nations auspices on the basis of relevant Security Council resolutions. In that framework, consideration should be given to the return of the refugees and other persons forced to leave their homes.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. CONCLUSIONS

233. In the fulfilment of its mandate and during its contacts with Government authorities, pertinent orga-

nizations and private individuals directly concerned, the Commission has examined the situation in the closest manner possible, as the previous reports so indicate. The Commission has noted deep anxiety about what was unanimously considered as a continuous process of deterioration of the situation in the occupied Arab territories, including Jerusalem, which is marked by heightened tensions and increased conflict and could lead to a major conflagration.

234. Consequently, after having carefully examined all the elements of information which the Commission has been in a position to gather in the implementation of its mandate, the Commission would like to reaffirm the entirety of the conclusions contained in its two previous reports, and more specifically the following:

(a) The Israeli Government is actively pursuing its wilful, systematic large-scale process of establishing settlements in the occupied territories;

(b) A correlation exists between the establishment of Israeli settlements and the displacement of the Arab population;

(c) In the implementation of its policy of settlements, Israel is resorting to methods—often coercive and sometimes more subtle—which include the control of water resources, the seizure of private property, the destruction of houses and the banishment of persons in complete disregard for basic human rights;

(d) The settlement policy has brought drastic and adverse changes to the economic and social pattern of the daily life of the remaining Arab population and is causing profound changes of a geographical and demographic nature in the occupied territories, including Jerusalem;

(e) Those changes constitute a violation of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, and of the relevant decisions adopted by the Security Council in the matter.

235. Consequently, the Commission wishes to reiterate that Israel's policy of settlement, by which, as an example, 33.3 per cent of the West Bank has been confiscated to date, has no legal validity and constitutes a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the area.

236. In view of the recent deterioration of the situation in the occupied Arab territories, the Commission considers that Israel's settlement policy, with the unjustified sufferings which it imposes on a defenceless population, is an incitement to further unrest and violence.

237. The Israeli policy of settlements has led to major displacements and dispossession of Palestinians, adding to the ever-growing number of refugees, with all the attendant consequences.

238. Available evidence shows that Israeli occupying authorities continue to deplete the natural resources, particularly water resources, in the occupied territories for their advantage and to the detriment of the Palestinian people.

239. As water is a scarce and precious commodity in the area, its control and apportionment means control of the most vital means of survival. It would seem, therefore, that Israel employs water both as an economic and even political weapon to further its policy of

settlements. Consequently, the economy and agriculture of the Arab population is adversely affected by the exploitation of water resources by the occupying authorities.

240. On Jerusalem, the Commission has noted with grave concern that tension and confrontation between Israel and the Islamic world have increased, especially following the enactment of a "basic law" in the Israeli Knesset proclaiming a change in the character and status of the Holy City which has also affected Christendom.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

241. In view of the observations and conclusions above, the Commission would like to make the following recommendations.

242. After a thorough assessment of the situation, and in the light of the numerous recommendations of the United Nations which are yet to be implemented to deal with the potentially explosive dangers therein, and in the light of the information available, the Commission has come to the conclusion that appropriate ways and means under the auspices of the United Nations should be found to arrest the situation in the interests of the parties involved, and in the interest of peace and security in the region and the world at large.

243. In the Commission's view, the problem of settlements and occupation raises fundamental problems for peace. The longer they continue to persist, the greater the potential for escalating the conflict. Mutual trust and acceptance through coexistence will be rendered difficult if not impossible in the area if the opportunities are missed. The Commission perceived a clear consensus in favour of a negotiated settlement and believes that the international community should take advantage of that favourable climate to advance the resolution of the problem. The Commission is of the view that the settlements policy is one of the major components at the core of the conflict in the area.

244. In that context, the Commission considers that the persistent refusal of Israel to heed the repeated appeals of the Security Council on the matter should be censured.

245. The Commission once again deems it necessary to reiterate its earlier recommendation that the Security Council, bearing in mind the inalienable rights of the Palestinians to return to their homeland, again draw the attention of the Government and people of Israel to the disastrous consequences which the settlement policy is bound to have on any attempt to reach a peaceful solution in the Middle East.

246. The Commission is of the view that Israel should be made aware of the serious deterioration of the situation in the occupied territories resulting from its policy of settlement and called upon, as a matter of urgency, to cease the establishment, construction, expansion and planning of settlements in those territories.

247. In view of the vital importance of water resources for the prosperity of the occupied Arab territories and of the serious depletion of those resources as a result of intensive exploitation by the Israeli authorities, mainly for the benefit of the Israeli settlements, the Commission recommends that appropri-

ate measures should be sought for an equitable allocation of water resources in the area outside of any political considerations.

248. With regard to Jerusalem, bearing in mind what was already stated in its previous reports, the Commission again strongly recommends that the Security Council urge the Government of Israel to implement fully the Council resolutions adopted on that question as from 1967, including resolution 478 (1980), by which the Council determined, *inter alia*, that the "basic law" on Jerusalem must be rescinded forthwith, and to desist from taking any further measures which would change the status of Jerusalem, including the pluralistic and religious dimensions of the Holy City.

249. The Commission wishes to reiterate its recommendation that the Security Council adopt effective measures to prevail on Israel to cease forthwith its settlements policies in all aspects in the occupied Arab territories, including Jerusalem.

ANNEX I

Summaries of testimony

In the course of its second visit to the area, the Commission heard individual testimony in addition to the discussions with Government officials and with the representatives of pertinent organizations in the countries visited.

The substantial part of those discussions has been reflected in the body of the report. Also in the report can be found an analysis of the testimony received.

Individual summaries of the testimony have been prepared by the Secretariat. They are reproduced in this annex in the order in which the witnesses appeared before the Commission, i.e., six at Amman and six at Cairo as follows:

I. Amman, Jordan:

- Witness No. 1: Mrs. Aisha Musa
- Witness No. 2: Mr. Rubi El-Khatib
- Witness No. 3: anonymous
- Witness No. 4: Mr. Walid Mustafa
- Witness No. 5: anonymous
- Witness No. 6: anonymous

II. Cairo, Egypt:

- Witness No. 7: anonymous
- Witness No. 8: anonymous
- Witness No. 9: anonymous
- Witness No. 10: anonymous
- Witness No. 11: anonymous
- Witness No. 12: anonymous

I. JORDAN

Witness No. 1 (Mrs. Aisha Musa)

1. The first witness said that she was from the town of Qalqilia and that, at the beginning of July 1980, she visited her son, Anis Dölleb, who had been imprisoned in Ashqan. When she wanted to visit him for the second time, she was unable to do so because there was a hunger strike going on in the prison. Later on, when she visited him she found him complaining of maltreatment. Before her fourth intended visit she learned that her son had died.

2. The Mayor of Qalqilia, Haj Ameen Al Nasr, was informed of the death by the Red Cross. She said that she wanted to bury her son at Qalqilia and that she tried every avenue for 22 days to get the body from the Israeli authorities but was unsuccessful.

Witness No. 2 (Mr. Rubi El-Khatib, Mayor of Jerusalem)

3. The witness said that during his previous testimony before the Commission [N 13450 and Add I, annex II, witness No. 15] he had outlined Israel's acts of aggression against the Holy City and the Palestinian people, of which he had been in a position to have

knowledge in particular, until his expulsion from Jerusalem on 7 March 1968.

4. He indicated his intention this time to draw attention to specific actions which had occurred since his last appearance.

(a) Excavations conducted in the Holy City

5. Mr. El-Khatib said that Israel had continued its illegal digging inside the city walls, especially around such holy Islamic shrines as the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Holy Dome of the Rock. In that area, he said, the excavations were essentially concentrated on the southern and western sides of the Al-Aqsa Mosque, where the Israelis carried out diggings of various depths, from 10 to 14 metres, in an area 50 metres wide. This was done in spite of the various resolutions which UNESCO had adopted on the matter, condemning these excavations and appealing to Israel to desist forthwith from continuing the excavations undertaken unlawfully. As a result of that work, one building had collapsed and 26 others were so badly damaged that several hundreds of inhabitants had to be evacuated. The witness added that such vandalism was all the more deplorable in view of a letter published in the *London Times* of 17 August 1972 by a leading archaeologist, Ms. Kathleen Kenyon, describing those historic buildings as unique treasures of the Islamic Mamluk period, and emphasizing that similar treasures existed only at Cairo. The witness indicated that he had sent a communication to UNESCO on the matter.

(b) Arbitrary measures against the Electricity Company of Jerusalem

6. Mr. El-Khatib stated that the Electricity Company of Jerusalem was the largest share-holding company on the West Bank, with shares owned by approximately 2,000 Arabs. It was supplying electricity to around 300,000 inhabitants and 131 industrial enterprises.

7. On 31 December 1979, an order had been issued by the Israeli Minister of Energy and the Military Commander of the West Bank to the Electricity Company of Jerusalem to sell its undertaking as defined in its concession. The sale was to become effective on 1 January 1981. The purpose was to integrate the Arab company into the Israeli system.

8. On the same day, the Chairman of the Board conveyed to the Minister of Energy the Company's protest and rejection of that arbitrary measure which was contrary to international law, and requested the Minister to reconsider the decision.

9. The Israeli occupation authorities refused to reconsider the matter and the company submitted the case to the Court, where it is still pending.

(c) Expropriation of Arab lands around Jerusalem

10. The witness referred also to an article published in *The Jerusalem Post* of 8 November 1974 under the headline "On building a fortress Jerusalem", which described the construction made by Israel on expropriated Arab lands during the period 1968-1973 and the Israeli settlements, which had been established in the northern and eastern parts of the city after 1967. Since then, the witness said, the Israeli authorities continued to expropriate more of the Arab lands around Jerusalem. The most important case happened in February 1980, when the Israeli authorities took 600 dunums from the village of Abu Dees, south of Jerusalem. On 11 March, Israel further expropriated 1,000 dunums from the village of Al-Isawiya, east of Jerusalem. The purpose of these expropriations was, according to Israeli sources, to establish new settlements to accommodate 60,000 settlers. But, clearly enough, it was also to encircle the whole city of Jerusalem and to cut it from the rest of the West Bank.

(d) Closure of the Arab Science College of Abu Dees

11. Mr. El-Khatib stated also that on 16 March 1980, the Board of Abu Dees' Faculty and its benevolent society had been taken by surprise by an order issued by the Israeli military authorities to close the Faculty within two weeks on the pretext that, with three other universities and 12 Arab institutions in the West Bank, the Palestinian students had sufficient educational facilities.

12. The Board of the Faculty submitted a complaint supported by a report made by English educators and experts to the effect that the West Bank institutions would not be able to absorb more than 30 per cent of the students of Jerusalem. Nevertheless, the Israeli authorities closed the Faculty on 1 April.

* 1 dunum = 1,000 square metres.

(e) *Law declaring Jerusalem the "undivided capital" of Israel*

13. Mr. El-Khatib recalled that since 1947 the international community had refused to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Despite subsequent decisions adopted by international organizations, in particular since 1967, refusing to recognize the annexation of the remaining part of Jerusalem to Israel, the Israeli Parliament, on 20 July 1980, enacted a law declaring Jerusalem the "undivided capital" of Israel. In his particular capacity as Mayor of Jerusalem, Mr. El-Khatib strongly objected to that decision.

(f) *Decision to transfer the Prime Minister's office*

14. As to the well-known decision to establish the Prime Minister's office at Jerusalem, Mr. El-Khatib said that offices were being built for that very purpose on lands taken by force from their Arab owners. He recalled that that action had been examined by the Security Council, which had declared that decision null and void and called for the restitution of the lands to their Arab owners. The witness added that, among the families who had fallen victim to that expropriation was his own family, which had lost 60,000 square metres of *waqf* land on which the Israeli construction for those offices had already started. Recently, it was reported that those offices would be shortly ready for occupancy and that the office of the Prime Minister would be transferred there in accordance with previous planning.

Witness No. 3 (anonymous)

15. The witness said that he was going to talk about what he had witnessed himself at Hebron which, after Jerusalem, was the other most important target of Israel's colonization. A number of settlements were established on the hills overlooking the town, the largest one being that of Kiryat Arba. The inhabitants of Hebron had protested and demonstrated against the establishment of that settlement, which was done by force. In response, the Israeli authorities had assured them that the settlement was only a military camp and that no civilian would ever inhabit it. But soon after, Israeli settlers came to the area, most of them belonging to a religious group of fanatics. The settlements were then expanded and Arab villages demolished and Arab lands expropriated for the use of the settlement. To take Arab lands and properties, the Israeli authorities had used the same methods as in the past. Recently, they had also occupied the hills of Alfa'abera and Al-Dahyieh. The Arab inhabitants submitted the case to the Court, where it was still pending. But, while by taking the case to Court the pursuit of expropriation had been suspended, the inhabitants were still forbidden to build on their land pending the Court's decision. Meanwhile the settlers of Kiryat Arba were engaged in ceaseless acts of provocation and aggression against the local inhabitants, whose complaints to the Israeli authorities were systematically ignored.

16. After the establishment of Kiryat Arba, the Ibrahimi Mosque—a deeply revered Islamic shrine—became the target of the settlers. They first demanded the right to visit the Mosque, then later on to pray in it, and finally they had taken over the control of two thirds of it. The Jews were provoking the Moslem worshippers by acts of profanity and desecration with the acquiescence and sometimes encouragement of the Israeli authorities. Complaints by the municipality of Hebron as well as the inhabitants having been to no avail, a serious situation developed.

17. A month later an attack was conducted on settlements, and a number of people were killed. A curfew was imposed for 17 days, after which the Mayor of Hebron and the Sharia Judge of Hebron were informed that a meeting had been arranged for them with the Minister of Defense, but instead of going to that meeting they found themselves expelled to Lebanon.

18. With the establishment of the curfew at Hebron, all outside communications were cut, including telephone services. The authorities forbade any food to enter the city, including food which had been sent by the people of Jerusalem, Ramallah and Bethlehem. Famine prevailed and milk was very scarce. Babies and older people died as a result of these restrictions.

19. During the curfew some people were taken by force from their homes to the police station for interrogation. They were threatened, tortured and then those who were let free to return home found themselves exposed to the patrolmen who, during the curfew, were allowed to shoot anyone found in the street. The witness referred specifically to the case of an old man who, after having been beaten up at the police station, was given a paper which he was told would permit him to return home safely. The old man was not aware

of the contents of the paper, which, to the contrary, encouraged any patrolmen he might meet to beat him again.

20. Also, during the curfew, Arab houses were entered by force, those inside were violently treated, belongings were destroyed and food, which was so scarce, was spilled on the ground or mixed together to make it inedible.

21. Those actions were not the act of unruly individuals. The military authorities had full knowledge of them and, in fact, when an indignant soldier started speaking about it he was threatened by his authorities that if he spoke to the press about those acts he would appear before a military tribunal.

22. Among the numerous acts of violence committed against citizens, the witness recalled that one day he saw two young men who were taken away by force. He was informed later that they had been locked in a room with two wild dogs which mauled them. The witness saw the wounds himself and said that medical reports on the incident had been made.

23. The witness concluded by saying that the aim of those actions was to expel Arab landowners by law or by fear in order to bring foreigners to live in their place.

Witness No. 4 (Mr. Walid Mustafa)

24. The witness said that he was the Chairman of the Geography Department and a member of the academic community of Nablus. He was deported on 23 July 1980 on the basis of an amendment which had just been brought to a standing military order. That amendment authorized Israeli military authorities to control the appointment of teachers and the subjects to be taught, as well as eventually the closing of any educational establishment.

25. The witness pointed out that such a law, which of course did not apply to the Israeli school system, was particularly damaging because there were not enough universities and high schools for Arab students in the occupied territories. That law was published early in July and he was deported on 23 July. Since the final end-of-term examinations were to start on 26 July, the head of the university asked that the witness—who was the only teacher with a Ph.D. in Geography in the West Bank—be allowed to stay until the end of the semester, but that request was denied.

26. The witness did not know the reason for his deportation. The soldiers who took him away said that they knew nothing about it and his request to see the military commander at Nablus was not answered. He was not even allowed to take his books with him nor to receive his payment from the University, nor to visit his 70-year-old mother, who still lives at Jerusalem.

27. In conclusion, the witness expressed the view that his case was intended to be an example to other Arab teachers.

Witness No. 5 (anonymous)

28. The witness said that he had just come from the West Bank to address the Commission.

29. About one and a half years before, the military authority at Nablus had summoned him to let him know that 950 dunums of land belonging to 100 families were going to be expropriated. He protested, saying that those lands were the main source of livelihood of the people of the village. In reply the authorities told him that there were other ways of earning a livelihood, for example, working in Israel. The villagers decided to bring the matter before the Court of Justice, pointing out that the lands were private land inherited from generation to generation. The Court rejected the claim on the grounds that the order had come from the military authorities of the West Bank, and that the lands should be used solely for military purposes. Since then, nevertheless, most of the land has been sold and 600 additional dunums requisitioned.

30. The witness insisted that although the two major targets for Israeli settlements were Jerusalem and Hebron, in fact the real goal was the colonization of the whole of the occupied territories. He noted in that connexion that just a few days before the Commission arrived, an Israeli group came to visit a neighbouring area and everyone feared that there again they were planning for the establishment of a new settlement. Even land which had been occupied by force with such complete lack of procedure that its seizure had been ruled illegal by the Court had not yet been returned to its Arab owners.

31. The pressure was relentless. About a week previously, the military authorities at Nablus had notified the mayors and chiefs of the municipality of the new restrictions concerning the use of underground water resources. Financial support which used to come from Jordan to help the villagers had been forbidden while additional pressure was being put on agricultural owners through high taxation.

32. The witness added that he hoped that the members of the Commission would be able to see with their own eyes the misery of the people living in the occupied lands and to convey the facts in its report.

Witness No. 6 (anonymous)

33. The witness said that he worked as a university professor in the occupied territory. People in his village watered their land from the spring of Al-Auja, but now the output of water was no longer sufficient because the Israelis had dug four artesian wells which produced 15,000 cubic metres of water to irrigate their own settlements. The amount of water thus pumped from those wells had brought the flow of Al-Auja spring to a mere trickle, especially because of the lack of rain. Furthermore, in spite of the low level of rainfall, the pumping of water from the artesian wells by the Israeli settlers had been increased, thus further diminishing the water which could have been used by the Arab inhabitants. The villagers had asked for authorization to dig a well for each family both for drinking and irrigation purposes. Their request had been rejected and their loss was considerable. An appeal to the military authorities went unheard.

34. Moreover, even the very limited supply of water allocated to the Arabs was sometimes stolen by the settlers during the night. The villagers set up a guard to protect their supply, but two days later a curfew starting at 7 p.m. was imposed by the military authorities.

35. There were several settlements around the witness's village which absorbed the villagers' manpower. This led to great losses during the harvest because of the scarcity of labour. Moreover, a decision was taken that any Arab worker employed in the settlements who also worked for the Arabs would be dismissed by the settlers. Even Arab children of 9 and 10 years of age were also put to work by the Israeli settlers.

36. The witness continued that even the situation of those who worked for the settlers was miserable because of the constant rise in prices in the occupied territories.

II. EGYPT

Witness No. 7 (anonymous)

37. The witness introduced himself as a Palestinian residing in the Gaza Strip. Since 1968, the Israeli authorities had established a number of settlements surrounding the Strip from all directions, isolating it from Egypt and even isolating the villages from each other. Recalling that Gaza was small in area, densely populated and poor in resources, the witness added that the arrivals of new settlers who, in addition to expropriating the land also depleted the water resources, had created insufferable difficulties which led many Palestinians to despair and to leave. This in fact was clearly the aim of the policy pursued by the occupying authorities. It should be noted in that connexion that a few weeks previously the military authorities in Gaza had issued an order whereby Arabs were prohibited from constructing in an area stretching from Eritz Street at Gaza City to the cease-fire lines and one kilometre from the seacoast eastward, thus rendering even more difficult the relocation of refugees.

Witness No. 8 (anonymous)

38. The witness said that after 1967 Israel started to build settlements in the Gaza Strip. A number of settlements were established, mainly in six localities. To do so, large areas of land had been expropriated.

39. Settlers in those settlements, most of them religious fanatics, were allowed to carry arms in the midst of a defenceless population. Constant provocations by the settlers caused many incidents, in particular at Deir El Balah and Rafah. The Arab victims were left without recourse because they were not allowed to bring such matters to Court, while by contrast, for any act of violence committed by a Palestinian a collective punishment was imposed.

40. Concerning the depletion of water resources, the witness said that water consumption was free for the settlers but that the Arabs had to pay 8 Israeli pounds for each cubic metre.^b

41. There was no doubt for the witness that the location of the settlements around the Strip was made with a view to confining the Palestinians and in particular to isolating them from any contact with Egypt.

Witness No. 9 (anonymous)

42. The witness said that Israel, under the pretext of security purposes, continued to establish settlements in the Gaza Strip.

43. Recalling that the Gaza Strip was small in size and endowed with very modest resources, he pointed out that, with a population of more than a half-million, the area was already over-populated. The arrival of the Israeli settlers had rendered the situation hopeless.

44. Those settlements, the witnesses said, had been established in strategic locations, and the presence of settlers who were armed caused great fear among the inhabitants.

45. Arabs in the Gaza Strip were treated as second class citizens. They had no rights even for their daily business. As an example, he indicated that since all imports were controlled by the Israeli Chamber of Commerce, the inhabitants were prevented from importing goods or materials needed for their small industries.

46. Pondering on what the inhabitants could look for in the future, even if the current negotiations between Egypt and Israel led to the so-called self-rule in the area, he wondered whether in such case the lands taken away would be returned to the people of Gaza or whether the Israeli settlements would be maintained as a State within a State.

Witness No. 10 (anonymous)

47. The witness said that the establishment of settlements was bound to delay the process of peace and expressed the conviction that in fact they would prevent the Palestinian people from regaining their rights.

48. Talking about the difficulties encountered by the farmers in Gaza, the witness said that the amount of water to be used for irrigation was restricted and that the users had to pay high prices for the very water which they had dug themselves. He also informed the Commission of the most recent restriction imposed by the Israeli authorities, prohibiting construction in a wide area.

Witness No. 11 (anonymous)

49. The witness said that the total area of Gaza was 360 square kilometres, which were distributed as follows: houses occupied 180 square kilometres; orchards, farms and agricultural land covered 90 square kilometres; roads and the like covered 10 square kilometres and 70 square kilometres had been so far used for Israeli settlements, leaving aside 10 square kilometres from the total area of the Strip.

50. The population of Gaza was approximately 600,000, including the refugees. He noted that before the establishment of those settlements, the Strip was already suffering from over-population.

51. Settlements had been established in such a way as to surround the Strip from all directions. While the settlers could go anywhere, the inhabitants were restricted in their movements, particularly in the area close to the settlements. As to the water resources, water was supplied at no cost and with no limitation to the settlers, while Arab farmers' consumption was restricted to definite amounts and a high price had to be paid.

52. Speaking of specific cases of expropriation for the establishment of settlements, the witness said that in the village of Beit Lahya 500 dunums had been taken from one inhabitant and 200 dunums from another one. He gave their names. A number of other settlements had been built on lands which had been distributed in 1962 and 1963 by Egypt to the inhabitants as part of development projects and where, since then, Arab families had lived. He emphasized that the lands confiscated to establish settlements were arable lands.

^b Approximately equal to S.U.S 0.50.

53. The witness said that, immediately after the occupation of Gaza in 1967, the Israeli authorities had fenced the Strip with barbed wires. Then at Beit Lahya they had confiscated lands belonging to two inhabitants for the purpose of creating two settlements. Arabs were not allowed to be found in the vicinity of settlements. In the process of expropriation, houses were demolished, including those

of refugees whose dwellings had been built by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.

54. The witness said also that a number of Palestinians who had left the Strip to visit relatives abroad or in the West Bank had been denied re-entry. He also mentioned that farmers were restricted from shipping their products to the West Bank, and that all shipments had to go through Israeli ports and be labelled as Israeli products.

ANNEX II

List of settlements*

A. ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK

Year	Date founded	Location	Type	Economic base	Land used (in dunums)	Original landowners	
1.	Atrot	1970	Jerusalem: N. edge, near airport	Industrial zone	61 factories	10 000	Arab residents of Beit Hanina village
2.	Neve Ya'akov	1973	Jerusalem: north of town	Residential suburb	2,500 housing units	10 000	Arab residents of Beit Hanina village
3.	Ramat	1973	Jerusalem: north-west, near Nabi Samwil	Residential suburb	750 housing units (8,000 units planned)	30 000	Arab residents of Beit Iksa village; 100 Arab homes demolished
4.	Ramat Eshkol	1968	Jerusalem: north side	Residential area	1,700 housing units	600	Arab land (expropriated)
5.	French Hill	1969	Jerusalem: north side, along Jerusalem-Ramallah road	Residential area	2,100 housing units	15 000	Arab land; land from Catholic convent
6.	Nahalat Dafna		Jerusalem: north side	Residential area	250 housing units	270	Arab families and waqf properties
7.	Gilo Sharafat (Gilo)	1973	Jerusalem: south side, near Beit Jala	Residential suburb	1,200 housing units out of 10,000 planned	4 000	Palestinian residents of Jerusalem, Beit Jala, Beit Safafa and Sharafat
8.	East Talpote	1973	Jerusalem: east side, south of Jabal Al-Mukabber where United Nations headquarters was situated	Residential suburb	1,000 housing units (3,000 planned)	20 000	Arab residents of Jerusalem, Sur Bahir, Sheikh Sa'ad and United Nations enclave expropriated
9.	Jewish Quarter (Old City of Jerusalem)	1967	Jerusalem: "Old City" between western wall of Al-Aqsa Mosque and Latin Convent	Residential area	320 housing units and shops		160 Arab house demolished, 600 homes expropriated, 6,500 Arab residents evacuated
10.	Hebrew University	1969	Jerusalem: north side	University campus	Offices, classrooms, dormitories and hospital		Expansion of pre-1948 university for which land was expropriated
11.	Sanhedria extension	1973	Jerusalem: north side	Residential area	250 housing units		Former demilitarized zone, entirely expropriated
12.	Shiloh	1976	East of Nablus-Ramallah road	Gush Emunim		15 000	From villages of Turmus Ayya, Qaryut, Abu-El-falah and El-Maghireh
13.	Kochav Hashahar	1975	North-east of Taiyyibe village	Nahal, then kibbutz	Agriculture	80 to 90	Dunums closed off, almond trees cut down
14.	Ofra (Ba'al Hatzer)	1975	East of Ramallah on Jericho road	Gush Emunim	Workshops and agriculture	4 000	Land from Deir Jarir and Kufur Malik; water from Ain Samia, Ramallah's sole water source
						350	100 dunums from Ain Yabrud village, 250 dunums from Silwad village

15.	Mevo Horon	1969	Latrun salient	Moshav	Agriculture, 2 wells	16 000	Land from Yalu, Imwas and Beit Nuba villages, destroyed by Israel after 1967 war
16.	Beit Horon ^b	1977	Mid-way on Ramallah-Latrun road, near Tira	Gush Emunim		150	Initial takeover of Arab land
17.	Mevo Horon Dalet (Matityahu).....	1977	Latrun area, 3 km from armistice line		Agriculture		DMZ-(Midya Arab village prior to 1948)
18.	Kfar Ruth	1977	Latrun area, 1 km south-east of Shayelet settlement		Agriculture		DMZ-(site of Midya village), thousands of dunums of irrigated lands
19.	Givat Hamivtar ..	1975	On north side of Jerusalem		350 housing units		Land area entirely expropriated
20.	Canada Park	1976	Latrun salient: on Latrun-Ramallah road	Jewish National Fund Park		4 200	Land of destroyed villages of Yalu, Imwas and Beit Nuba (including 1,500 dunums of orchards)
21.	Ramonim ^b	1977	North-east of Taybeh and Ramun villages, north of Ramallah-Jericho road	Nahal		300	Residents of Taybeh village (expropriated lands)
22.	Beit El	1977	North of Ramallah-Nablus road	Gush Emunim		35	Arab land; settlement to expand on 250 dunums of expropriated land
23.	Giv'on ^b	1977	North-west of Jerusalem: near El-Jib village	Gush Emunim			Previously Jordanian military base; 5,000 dunums needed to be expropriated from El-Jib village
24.	Shayelet (Mevo Hori'im)	1977	Latrun area	Moshav	Agriculture		DMZ land (site of Arab village of Midya)
25.	Neve Zuf (Nabi Saleh)	1977	North-west of Ramallah; near Beir Nidham	Gush Emunim		400	Closed off, including 100 dunums of wheat fields and almond trees of Nabi Saleh villagers
26.	Mehola	1968	Jordan valley: north end of West Bank	Nahal until Nov. 1969, then moshav	Field crops, metal factory, 1 well and 1 reservoir	3 000	Residents of Bardala and Ain el-Beida villages. Water supply of villages depleted by wells of Mehola
27.	Argaman	1968	Near end of Damya-Nablus road	Nahal until May 1971, then moshav	Agriculture, 5 absenteees' wells, 1 reservoir	5 000	Arab agricultural land, including 1,000 dunums from Marj al-Naja
28.	New Massuah.....	1976	Jordan valley: south of Nablus-Damiya road			800	Residents of Arab villages of Al-Ajajra and Jiftlik
29.	Massuah	1970	Jordan valley: just south of settlement No. 28	Nahal until May 1974, then kibbutz	Vegetables, fishpond, water from Hamra, 1 well, 2 reservoirs	3 000	Residents of Al-Ajajra and Jiftlik village, "expropriated land"
30.	Phatza'el B	1977	South of settlement No. 29	Rural settlement		1 500	Arab land
31.	Phatza'el	1970	End of south-west road from Aqraba	Moshav	Vegetables, 3 wells, "600 cubic metres per hour", 1 reservoir	3 000	Residents of Fazayil village
32.	Tomer	1976	Jordan valley: south of settlement No. 31		Hothouse vegetables		Unknown, as construction still going on

A. ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK (continued)

No.	Name	Year founded	Location	Type	Economic base	Land used (in dunams)	Original landowners
33	Gilgal	1970	Jordan valley: south of settlement No. 32	Nahal until May 1973 then moshav	Vegetables, citrus, field crops	3 300	Arab land; "plan to pump water from Jordan river"
34	Netiv Hagdud	1976-1977	South of Gilgal settlement No. 33	Nahal to become moshav		Unknown, as construction still going on	
35	Missom (Sa'arant)	1977 began construction	Jordan valley, near Arab village of Al-Auja	Nahal to become moshav			Land expropriated from residents of Al-Auja village
36	Yitav	1970	West of Al-Auja village	Nahal until Oct. 1976 then kibbutz	Vegetables, field crops	2 000	Arab land from Al-Auja village "including that of absentee owners", water from Ain Al-Auja and two wells nearby
37	Almog	1977	Jordan valley: north-west of Dead Sea	Nahal			Water supply drawn by 12-inch pipeline from well near Aqbat Jaber, Jericho refugee camp
38	Kalia	1968	Jordan valley: north-west of Dead Sea	Nahal until 1975, then kibbutz	Vegetables, dairy, vineyards, fishponds		Previously Jordan army camp; water supply from Wadi Keit west of Jericho
39	Mitzpe Shalem	1970	Dead Sea: west shore	Nahal then kibbutz	Date palms, vegetables	over 50	
40	Malke Shua	1976	North edge of West Bank: south of Mt. Gibboa; access road from Beit Shean	Nahal			
41	Ro'i	1974	"Limit of settlements" road (L.S); north end	Nahal; moshav by 1978	Agriculture	2 500	Tubas village residents, land cultivated with wheat
42	Begot	1972	L.S road, north end: south of Ro'i (No. 41)	Moshav	Poultry, vegetables, citrus	5 000	Tamun village, land closed off
43	Hamra	1971	L.S road: on east of West Nablus-Damya road, in lush valley. Farm land	Moshav	Vegetables, flowers, citrus, poultry; 1 well, 2 reservoirs, 12-inch water pipeline to Mas-suah (No. 29) in Jordan valley	450	Land from Bab al-Nagab village, valley land near Damya Bridge; 450 dunums of "absentee owner groves"
44	Mekhora	1973	L.S road: south of Hamra (No. 43)	Nahal until July 1976, then moshav	Vegetables, fruit	4 000	From Bab al-Nagab, Beit Dajan and Beit Furik villages; water supply includes 1 well, 3 reservoirs
45	Gitu	Aug. 1972	L.S road: near east-west Aqraba valley road	Nahal until Dec. 1975, now kibbutz	Vegetables, field crops	5 000	Land from Aqraba closed off, sprayed with defoliants early 1972
46	Ma'ale Ephraim	1972	L.S road: on east-west Aqraba valley road	Regional centre		200	Arab land
47	Nevo Shifoh (Givat Aduma)	Nov. 1976	South of Ma'ale Ephraim settlement No. 46			1 300	Residents of Turmus Ayya, Abu-Fallah and al-Mughayyir villages

48.	Mishor Adomin (Ma'ale Adomim)	Nov. 1974	Dominates road	Jericho-Jerusalem	Industrial estate and army base; Gush Emunim settlers	Industry	(81 000)	70,000 dunums closed off Oct. 1972 by Israeli army; additional 700 dunums expropriated from villages of Abu Dees, Umaryya and Is- sawyya, 10,000 dunums from Silwad, 300 dunums from Silwad and Anota
49.	Mizpeh Jericho...	Early 1978	East of Mishor Adomin settle- ment (No. 48) overlooking Jericho					Land expropriated from above-mentioned vil- lages
50.	Reihan (Ne'fami Bet).....	1977	North-west of Jenin, 3 km beyond armistice line		Nahal, 1978 kibbutz	Agriculture		Arab land
51.	Dotan (Sanur)....	Oct. 1977	Along Nablus-Jenin road in Sanur valley		Gush Emunim			Land of pre-1967 Jordanian police station near Sanur village
52.	Natal Ma'ale.....	Jan. 1978	East of Nablus-Jenin road		Gush Emunim		550	Land confiscated from Silat al-Dhaha village, including 25 olive trees
53.	Shomron.....	Oct. 1977	On Nablus-Jenin road				1 680	Kufr Sur village
54.	Salfit (Tsur Nathan Bet).....	Aug. 1977	South-east of Tulkarm		Nahal		1 000	Kufr Sur village, half of land privately owned (cultivated), half com- mon land for grazing
55.	Elon Moreh (Qaddum).....	Dec. 1975	Near Nablus-Qalqilya road		Gush Emunim		300	Arabs of Kufr Qaddum village
56.	Qarney-Shomron..	Oct. 1977	South side of Nablus-Qalqilya road, near Jinsafut village		Gush Emunim		150	Taken from villages of Jin- safut, Hajj and Kufr Laqif
57.	El Qana' (Mes'ha Pe'erim).....	April 1977	South-east of Qalqilya		Gush Emunim, nahal		10 300	Site of former Jordanian police station from Mes'ha village
58.	Tafuah (Bareget)..	Jan. 1978	Along Nablus-Ramallah road 13 km south of Nablus				150	Arab villagers of Yasuf
59.	Haris.....	Feb. 1978	2 km west of Nablus-Ramallah road, near Salfit junction		Nahal; 2 km access road built		800	300 dunums expropriated for military camp; 500 dunums of pasturage closed off from villages of Kufr Haris, Harda and Salfit
60.	Har Gilo.....	1976	In Beit Jala village area		Residential suburb		400	Grapevines and fruit trees expropriated from Beit Jala residents, June 1976
61.	Efrat.....	1978	On road south of Bethlehem				7 000	Expropriated land, most of which cultivated
62.	Tekoah.....	June 1975	South-east of Bethlehem near Hebron		Nahal		3 000	Land expropriated from Rafidya village
63.	Elazar.....	Oct. 1975	South of Bethlehem		Religious moshav	Chemical laboratory, electronics	350	Vineyards expropriated from Hadar village, 1973

A. ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK (continued)

Name	Date founded	Location	Type	Economic base	Land used (in dunums)	Original landowners
64. Rosh Ezzurim	July 1969	North of Hebron (Etzion bloc)	Kibbutz	Poultry	3 000	Including site of pre-1948 settlement plus expropriated land from Nahalin village
65. Alon Shvot	July 1969 settlers, 1972	North of Hebron (Etzion bloc)	Regional centre for religious Jews	Yeshiva students plus families commute to Jerusalem	1 200	Land expropriated in 1969 from Arabs
66. Kfar Etzion	Sept. 1967 first settle- ment on the West Bank	North of Hebron (Etzion bloc)	Kibbutz	Some agriculture, a factory		Site (1943-1948) of Jewish settlement and cultivated land (vineyards)
67. Migdal Oz	1977	West of Hebron (Etzion bloc)	Kibbutz	Agriculture	1 000 to 2 000	Residents of Beit Umar village, closed first as military area: 600 plum and almond trees uprooted in Dec. 1977
68. Kiryat Arba	1970	Adjoins town of Hebron	Urban settlement	Factories, services, some commute to Jerusalem, 401 housing units	4 250	Individuals from Hebron and Halhoul (1,500 dunums expropriated)
69. Yatta	July 1977	South of Hebron, near armistice line	Gush Emunim moshav		17 000 planned to be fenced	Pasture land
70. Zohar						
71. Sallat Dhahr	1978	On Nablus-Jenin road			550	Expropriated from Arab residents of Sallat Dhahr
72. Anatot	Late 1978	North of Jerusalem			3 000	Expropriated from residents of Anata village
73. Ya'afu Horom	1978	Near Arab village of Yatta: west of Hebron				
74. Tretsch						
75. Jericho	Approved 1978	Jericho area				
76. Zif	1978	South of Hebron	Under construction			
77. Neweimch	1979	Near Jericho				
78. New Kfar Etzion	1979	On road between Bethlehem and Hebron				
79. Huwara	1979	Few miles east of Nablus	600 settlers already live there			
80. Tell Kebir	1979; still under con- struction	New location village of Deir el-Hatab in the district of Nablus				
81. Qarney Shomron (b)	mid-June 1979	On the main road between the towns of Nablus and Tulkarm, 3 kilometres west of the settlement of Qarney Shomron (a)				
82. Qarney Shomron (d)	Sept. 1979	South of the settlement of Qarney Shomron (a)		Scheduled to accommodate 100 families initially and 300 families after 5 years		
83. Reihan	Sept. 1979	In the district of Jenin third settlement		To accommodate 50 families initially and 100 after 5 years		

84.	Elazar	Sept. 1979	District of Kfar Etzion in the vicinity of another settlement, Elazar		
85.	Yafit	Second half of 1979	In the district of Jiftlik	500	Confiscated land from Arab owners in the Jordan Valley
86.	Gebciot Oz (b)	Beginning of 1980	Between the villages of Shaikh, Iskandar and Kafr Salim in the district of Jenin		
87.	Reihan (c)	1980	East of the settlement of Reihan (b), in the district of Jenin		
88.	Eidan	July 1980	Middle part of Wadi Araba, south of the Dead Sea		Presently populated by 17 families and due to be joined by a further 20
89.	El Qana (b)	July 1980	East of the settlement of El Qana, west of Nablus	111	Government-owned land—previously sealed off
90.	Qarney Shomron (h)	Began construction Sept. 1979	8 km. west of Qarney Shomron (a)		Scheduled to accommodate 100 families initially and 300 more after 5 years
91.	Ma'ale Adomim	1979	North-east of Jerusalem (El-Khan El-Ahmer)		
92.	Ma'ale Adomim (c)	1979	East Jerusalem	400	Lands belonging to Jerusalem
93.	Mehola (b)	1979	North of the Jordan Valley		Consists only of military tents
94.	Nahal Maoz	1979	North-east of Hebron in the district of Al-Yaghama		Established as a camp to protect settlements in the district
95.	Ariel (b)	1979	In the district of Salfit, next to the settlement of Ariel (Haris)	1 330	Villages of Mardeh and Sikaka
96.	Leona	1980	On the Jerusalem-Nablus road		Village of Al-Laban
97.	Beit El (b)	1980	In the district of Ramallah		Village of Beitein
98.	Efrat (town)	Mid-October 1979	West Bethlehem, centrally located in relation to the Kfar Etzion	1 300	Village of Al-Khudr
99.	Giv'a Hadasha	Decision on its establishment—mid-October 1979	In the vicinity of another settlement, Giv'on, district of Ramallah	85	Confiscated land, belonging to the village of El-jib
100.	Matityahu	1976	District of Ramallah	600	Private land of inhabitants of the village of Nalein
101.	Giv'on (b)	1977	District of El-Jib, northwest of Jerusalem		
102.	Elon Moreh	June 1979	5 km south of Nablus	1 300	Villages of Rujeeb and Aurta
103.	Neve Tzuf	Sept. 1979	Between the villages of Deir Ballout and Aboud, north of Ramallah	900	
104.	Dotan	1977	South of Jenin, near the village of Araba	100	Scheduled to accommodate 150 families initially and rising to 500 within 5 years
105.	Ariel (Haris)	1977		500	Currently inhabited by 30 Jewish families Village of Kafr Haris (Salfit)

A. ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK (continued)

Name	Date founded	Location	Type	Economic base	Land used (in dunums)	Original landowners
106. El Qana	1977	In the district of Abu-l-Qarnain on the Nablus road	Scheduled to accommodate 500 Jewish families		150	Two thirds of area previously privately owned by Arab citizens Village of Taffouha
107. Tafzah	1978	In the district of Jenin				

Source: List of settlements, maps, information supplied by the Government of Jordan as of September 1980.

A comprehensive, cumulative and updated list of all the known Israeli settlements in the occupied Arab territories, including any additional information on the settlements contained in

the previous list [S 13450 and Add.1, annex III] and information on projected settlements

^a Settlement planned for expansion (for details see annex III).

^c Work on settlement suspended following Israeli Supreme Court order. Instead a new settlement was started (Tel Kebir) as an alternative. Elon Moreh settlement was not abandoned.

B. ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE GOLAN HEIGHTS

Name	Date founded	Location	Type	Economic base	Land used (in dunums)	Original landowners	
1. Neve Ativ	1971	South slope of Mount Hermon	Moshav	Ski-station 400 trees at Benia's spring	apple	Total land of village	Syrian village, Jab'at az-zayat
2. Snir	1967	Edge of ex-DMZ; pasture on Golan	Nahal up to 1968, then kibbutz	Agriculture			Syrian village lands
3. Har Odeh	1976	Mount Odeh, between Mas'ada and Bugatha villages	Moshav	Industrial base established	200	Syrian nature reserve 200 dunums from Bugatha	Syrian village of Ainkharja and some land from Bugatha
4. El Rom	1971	North, near Bugatha	Kibbutz	Agriculture (apples)	Total land of Ainkharja, some land of Bugatha		
5. Merom Golan	July 1967	North, west of Quneitra	Kibbutz	Cattle, 6,000 dunums field crops	6 000	Agricultural land west of Quneitra	
6. Ein Zivan	1968	North, west of Quneitra	Kibbutz	Agriculture, 340 dunums orchards in Quneitra valley	340 dunums of orchards	Agricultural land west of Quneitra; near former Syrian village, Ain Zi-ware	
7. Katzrin	1973	Centre-west; near Yaacov Bridge across Jordan River	Industrial centre, field-school	Industries (200 housing units under construction)		Near Syrian village, Qas-rine	
8. Keshet	1974	Originally at Quneitra then at Khusniya	Religious moshav; Gush Emunim settlers	Plans for field-school, botanical garden, wood-working, agriculture		Syrian town, Khusniya	
9. Aniam	1976	South of Katzrin (No. 7)	Industrial moshav	Industries		Syrian village land, Qas-rine	
10. Yonatan (Yonati)	1975	Tel Faraz, south of Keshet (No. 8)	Bnei Akiva religious youth movement	Agriculture			
11. Sha'al	1976	Centre	Moshav	Agriculture, industries planned		Syrian village	
12. Gamla	1976	Overlooks Lake Tiberias	Moshav	Agriculture		Syrian village land	
13. Ramot	1969	Overlooks Lake Tiberias	Moshav	Agriculture		Syrian village land	
14. Merkaz Hisfin (Khisfin)	1973	South Golan	Rural centre			Syrian town, Khisfin	
15. Ramat Magshumim	1968	South-east, 1.8 km from buffer zone	Moshav	Agriculture, cattle		Former Syrian army base	

16.	Avni Eitan.....	1976	South Golan	Moshav	Agriculture		
17.	Nov (Nab).....	1972	South Golan	Moshav	Agriculture, reservoir nearby		
18.	Geshur.....	1969	South; moved west due to 1974 disengagement	Nahal	Field crops		
19.	Eli-Al (El-Al).....	1968	South Golan	Nahal until May 1973, then moshav	Agriculture		
20.	Giv'at Yo'av.....	1968	South Golan; adjoins No. 21	Histadrut moshav	Field crops, poultry, cattle		
21.	Merkaz Bnei Yehuda.....	1972	South Golan; joint entrance with No. 20	Rural centre			
22.	Ne'ot Golan.....	1968	South, overlooks Lake Tiberias	Moshav	Agriculture	100 dunums field crops	
23.	Afik.....	1967	South Golan	Nahal until 1972, then kibbutz	Agriculture		Near Syrian town Fiq
24.	Kfar Haruv.....	1973	South, overlooks Lake Tiberias	Kibbutz	Agriculture		Near Syrian village Kafr Hared
25.	Mevo Hamma.....	1968	South, overlooks Lake Tiberias	Kibbutz	Agriculture, tourism at Hamma Springs, pasture	25 000	Syrian village at Hamma Springs
26.	Urtal.....	1978	Centre-west	Kibbutz	Industries planned		Syrian village land
27.	Ramath Shalom...						
28.	Har Shifon.....						
29.	Dalhmiya.....						
30.	Natur.....	1980	5 km south-west of Ramat Mashimim				

Source: List by the Syrian Government; information on settlements—Ann Lesch.

C. ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE GAZA STRIP

Name	Date founded	Location	Type	Economic base	Land used (in dunams)	Original landowners
1. Netzarim	1972	4 km south of Gaza City; between north-south highway and coast	Nahal became moshav	Agriculture	700	Land expropriated from Abu Madyan Arab tribe, early 1971
2. Kfar Darom	1970	South of Mughazi refugee camp, east side of north-south highway	Nahal until 1978, then kibbutz	Glass-house vegetables	200 enlarged to 400	
3. Netzer Hanzani	1973	North of Khan Yunis	Nahal until 1977, then moshav	Glass-house vegetables	300	State land
4. Katif A	1973	West of Netzer Hazani settlement (No. 3) between Deir el-Balah and Khan Yunis	Moshav	Glass-house vegetables		
5. Katif B	1978	Close to Katif A settlement		Glass-house vegetables		
6. Katif C	1979	Close to Katif A and B			1 000	
7. Morag	1972	On coast between Khan Yunis and Rafah	Nahal, then kibbutz	Agriculture	12 000	Land expropriated from Umm Kalb village, El-Atadella and Khan Yunis early 1971
8. Eretz Azov	1969	North-east of Gaza City		Industries	800	
9. Nahal Taadeel	1972	Close to Gaza and Deir el-Balah next to El-Ogool	Nahal	Agriculture	4 000	State land
10. Holeet	1977	Close to Rafah			300 housing units	
11. Beit Lahat (under construction)		North Gaza				

Source: List of settlements and map provided by the following: the Government of Egypt; Najib al-Admad, Special Representative, Political Department, Palestine Liberation Organization; Ann Lesch, former representative in the Middle East of the American Friends Service Committee, from part of her testimony before the Sub-Committee to the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, 19 October 1977.

ANNEX III

List of new settlements planned for 1981

NEW SETTLEMENTS PLANNED ON THE WEST BANK

Name	Location
1. Na'meh (a)	} All around the town of Jericho
2. Na'meh (b)	
3. Na'meh (c)	
4. Almog (b)	
5. Beit Ha'ria	
6. Mitzpe Yeriho (b)	

Source: Information provided by the Government of Jordan.

NEW SETTLEMENTS PLANNED IN THE GOLAN HEIGHTS

Name	Location
1. Sukayk	Village of Sukayk, Wasi/Mas'adah Road
2. Ram Lake	On the slope of Mount Qata at Mas'adah
3. "	Tell Abu Qatif, near village of Ayn Ayshah at Mazra'at Quneitra
4. "	
5. "	At the village of Dabbusiyah

Source: Information provided by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic.

" Name of settlement not yet determined.

ANNEX IV

Communication received by the Commission in connexion with paragraph 22 of the present report

LETTER DATED 10 NOVEMBER 1980 FROM THE COMMISSION OF THE CHURCHES ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS OF THE WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION

In response to your request to provide new elements to be brought to the attention of the Security Council related to the mandate of the Commission which you chair, I have the honour to submit the enclosed statement on Jerusalem adopted by the Central Committee of the World Council of Churches during its meeting held at Geneva from 14 to 22 August 1980. In order to facilitate your task, I also include provisional translations of the text into French and German.

(Signed) Dwain C. EPPS
Executive Secretary

Statement on Jerusalem adopted by the Central Committee of the World Council of Churches during its meeting at Geneva from 14 to 22 August 1980

1. On the basis of previous World Council of Churches statements, the Central Committee opposes the Israeli unilateral action of annexing East Jerusalem and uniting the city as its "eternal capital" under its exclusive sovereignty.

2. This decision is contrary to all pertinent United Nations resolutions. It dangerously undermines all efforts towards the just solution of the Middle East problem and thus jeopardizes regional and world peace.

3. The Central Committee reiterates the statement on Jerusalem issued by the World Council of Churches Assembly at Nairobi in 1975 [see S/13679, annex], which stressed that the tendency to minimize Jerusalem's importance for any of the three monotheistic religions should be avoided. The destiny of Jerusalem should be viewed in terms of people, including Christians as well as Jews and Muslims, and not only in terms of shrines. Therefore, just as the future status of Jerusalem has been considered part of the destiny of the Jewish people, so it cannot be considered in isolation from the destiny of the Palestinian people, and should thus be determined within the general context of the settlement of the Middle East conflict in its totality.

4. The Central Committee calls the member churches to exert through their respective Governments all pressure on Israel to withhold all action on Jerusalem, the future of which should be included

in the agenda of official negotiations involving Israel and the Palestinians on self-determination and on the solution of the Middle East conflict.

5. Recognizing that Jerusalem is a focus of the deepest religious inspiration and attachment for all Christians in the world, the Central Committee urges the World Council of Churches to undertake an active role in expressing the concerted Christian voice and to aid churches in fully assuming their role as partners in deciding the future character of Jerusalem.

6. The Central Committee also urges the General Secretary to explore, in consultation with member churches in the area and the Vatican, possibilities of trying to find the best solution to the problem of Jerusalem through all appropriate and effective means and ways such as convening jointly or separately international consultations or any other approaches or actions on Jerusalem. The General Secretary should also explore possibilities of consultations with the Muslim and Jewish communities concerned with the future character of Jerusalem in order to seek ways to consolidate justice and human coexistence in the City of Peace.

ANNEX V

Documents received by the Commission and retained in the custody of the Secretariat

A. DOCUMENTS RECEIVED FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN

—Awartani, Hisham. "West Bank Agriculture: A New Outlook". *Research Bulletin*, No. 1. Nablus, West Bank, Al-Najah National University, November 1978.

—Awartani, Hisham. "Water resources and water policies on the West Bank". *Research Bulletin*, No. 2. Nablus, Al Najah National University, October 1979 (in Arabic).

—His Royal Highness Crown Prince Hassan bin Talal. *A Study on Jerusalem*. London and New York, Longman, 1979.

—"Agricultural Sector and Water Resources in the West Bank". Royal Scientific Society. To be published before the end of 1980.

—*Jerusalem*, a report prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Executive Committee of the Occupied Territories, 1980.

—"Jordan Valley area/Mekorot/settlements: Amount of pumping water from the artesian wells during 1977-1978 for irrigation" (in Arabic).

—Report on Israeli settlements in the West Bank of Jordan, May 1979 to September 1980 (in Arabic).

—*The Significance of Some West Bank Resources to Israel* (rev. ed.). Economics Department, Royal Scientific Society, April 1979.

—A transcript from a sound and slide show on Israeli settlements in the West Bank, prepared by the Office of His Royal Highness Crown Prince Hassan, May 1980.

B. DOCUMENTS RECEIVED FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC

—"Israeli settlements in the Golan" (in Arabic).

—"Information concerning Israel's violations in the occupied territory of the Golan" (in Arabic).

—"Israeli actions in the Golan during the period 1979-1980" (in Arabic).

—Map of settlements in the Golan.

C. DOCUMENTS RECEIVED FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT

—"Israeli settlements on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip".

—*Performance Report: Egypt and the Palestinian Question, 1945-1980*. Cairo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State Information Service.

D. DOCUMENTS RECEIVED FROM THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION

—Paper entitled "Water resources and policies in the West Bank".

—Terzi, Zehdi Labib. *Memorandum on the Water Resources of Palestine*.

E. DOCUMENTS RECEIVED FROM WITNESSES AT AMMAN

Witness No. 2 (Mr. Ruhi El-Khatib)

- Copy of his testimony before the Commission (in Arabic), enclosing:
- Map of Jerusalem showing the "Israel plan to expropriate and demolish the Arab Moslem properties within the Old City and the evacuation of its occupants";
- Copy of an Order dated 31 December 1979 issued by the Israeli Minister of Energy and the Military Commander of the West Bank notifying the Jerusalem District Electricity Company of the purchase of the Company's undertaking by the Government of Israel, effective 1 January 1981;
- Copy of a letter dated 31 December 1979 from the Chairman of the Board of the Jerusalem Electricity Company addressed to the Israeli Minister of Energy protesting and rejecting his notice of purchase; copy of identical letter addressed to the Military Commander of the West Bank;

—Letter from Ms. Kathleen Kenyon regarding tunnelling along the western wall of the Haram Al-Charif (*The Times*, London, August 1972);

—A/35/158. Letter dated 28 March 1980 from the Permanent Representative of Jordan addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting a statement issued by Mr. Ruhi El-Khatib in which he strongly deplored the latest act of aggression perpetrated by the Israeli occupation authorities in the Jerusalem area.

Witness No. 4 (Mr. Walid Mustafa)

—Copies of documents relating to Law No. 16, concerning education in the West Bank (in Arabic).

Witness No. 5 (anonymous)

—Copies of documents relating to confiscated lands on the West Bank (in Arabic).

DOCUMENT S/14270*

Letter dated 25 November 1980 from the representative of Viet Nam to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[26 November 1980]

I have the honour to forward herewith a note dated 21 November 1980 addressed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China concerning the very serious territorial violations committed by the Chinese authorities in the Vietnamese border areas, and request you kindly to have this letter and its enclosure circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) HA VAN LAU
Permanent Representative of the
Socialist Republic of Viet Nam
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Note dated 21 November 1980 addressed by the Foreign Ministry of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam to the Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of China

In recent months, along with their armed provocations at the border areas and encroachments upon Vietnamese air space and territorial waters, and their war preparations and threats directed against Viet Nam, the Chinese authorities have made extremely serious territorial violations along the border between the two countries and have continued their nibbling attacks on the Vietnamese territory:

(a) The Chinese side has occupied many hills and clusters of hills at the border, invaded Vietnamese territory and built many observation posts, blockhouses and trenches, forming a system of combat installations on the hills along the border line in the provinces of Lang Son, Cao Bang, Ha Tuyen and Hoang Lien Son. More concretely, it has seized and built military installations on the hills and clusters of hills from marker 3 to marker 20, Van Lang district, hill 636 in the area of marker 52, Loc Binh district, Lang Son province.

A row of blockhouses has been built on the hills between marker 49 and marker 73 and on hill Chong Mu between markers 62 and 63, Trung Khanh district, Cao Bang province.

The Chinese have occupied —Several hills in Xin Man, the area from marker 1 to marker 4, Xin Man district; several hills in Ca Ma Po, the area from marker 1 and 2, Quan Ba district, a group of hills in

Mo Phong—Vanh Khan, the area of marker 20, Meo Vac district, Ha Tuyen province:

—Several isolated hills and a cluster of hills between markers 3 and 12, Muong Khuong district, Hoang Lien Son province:

—Other areas.

By occupying those hills and clusters of hills, the Chinese side aims to establish a situation whereby it could control wide strips of Vietnamese land in the border areas, and be in a position to use these areas as a spring-board for further continual attacks and encroachments on Vietnamese territory.

(b) The Chinese side has gradually extended the areas they had previously occupied and continues to nibble at many other areas of Vietnamese territory. For example:

—In Lang Son province: a number of hills where the French had erected their military posts which were border posts of Viet Nam until 17 February 1979; hill 583, in the area between markers 15 and 16; hill 371, in the area south of marker 19, Van Lang district:

—In Cao Bang province, Nam Bang hill in the area south-west of marker 107, Ha Quang district:

—In Lang Son province: the Kim Ngan cluster of hills, marker 43, Loc Binh district, hills Po Coc Phung, Co Min and Keo Lac Vai, the area between markers 17 and 20; the area of the Friendship Gate; Po Pun-Leo Cao; the area between markers 15 and 16; Pa Chi; the area of marker 9, Van Lan district:

—In Cao Bang province: the Chong Mu cluster of hills; Phia Un, the area between markers 94 and 95, Tra Linh district:

—In Hoang Lien Son province: Ta Lung Thang area between markers 21 and 22, Muong Khuong district:

—Other places.

This encroachment has been carried out in many forms: occupying land and growing crops on it, sending civilians for illegal settlement, furtively transferring marker posts, blatantly using armed forces to attack. Most seriously, on 15 October, a Chinese infantry unit of regimental size, supported by heavy artillery, attacked several areas in Xin Man village. This was the subject of a strong note of protest by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Viet Nam to the Chinese Foreign Ministry on 18 October.

(c) The Chinese side continued to remove and transfer dozens of marker posts in an attempt to modify the historical border line between the two countries. Some markers have been moved deep into Vietnamese territory, for example marker 33 in Cao Lau village, Cao Loc district, Lang Son province, which was moved 1,400 metres from its former position.

The creeping occupation of Vietnamese territory by Chinese armed forces and the modification of the historical border line is creating a situation of permanent tension and military action along the border. It demonstrates the Chinese authorities' contempt for

* Circulated under the double symbol A 35 661-S 14270.

international law and constitutes a continuous, blatant violation of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Viet Nam. It grossly tramples on the conventions which were signed between the French Government and the Ch'ing administration in 1887 and 1895 on border delineation between Viet Nam and China and which both Viet Nam and China have promised to honour. These arrogant acts of the Chinese authorities have exposed their big-nation expansionist and hegemonist policy.

The Foreign Ministry of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam energetically denounces and severely condemns these actions of the Chinese authorities. It strongly demands that the Chinese side immediately cease all such activities and immediately withdraw its troops from illegally occupied areas of Vietnamese territory and from the hills on the border line of the two countries.

The Chinese authorities must bear full responsibility for the consequences of their hostile and illegal actions.

DOCUMENT S/14272

Letter dated 25 November 1980 from the representative of Iraq to the Secretary-General

[Original: Arabic/English]
[26 November 1980]

I have the honour, upon instructions from my Government, to refer to document S/14249 dated 11 November 1980 containing the letter addressed to you by the Chargé d'affaires of the Permanent Mission of Iran to the United Nations, and its annex entitled "Note dated 26 October 1980 from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran addressed to the Embassy of Iraq at Teheran and to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Iraq".

In setting the record straight, I should like to annex herewith the text of the note No. 5/17/14024 of 17 September 1980 addressed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq to the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran at Baghdad. It clearly appears from the Iraqi note, which is self-explanatory, that no so-called "unilateral abrogation" was suggested by the Government of the Republic of Iraq, and that the Iranian allegation is nothing but a legal fantasy of the making of the Iranian Government.

It is noteworthy to highlight the deception of the Iranian Government in the present case. The Iranian note appearing in the annex in document S/14249 does not quote the full text of article 4 of the Treaty concerning the State frontier⁵⁵ and omits the most fundamental obligation of the two Parties thereunder. The part omitted reads as follows:

"Accordingly, a breach of any of the components of the over-all settlement shall clearly be incompatible with the spirit of the Algiers agreement."⁵⁶

It is to be observed that, in an attempt to dilute the legal situation, the Iranian Government has once again made reference to the provisions of articles 5 and 6 of the Treaty of 1975. Iraq has already had the occasion to dispel this Iranian argument in the General Assembly during the present session and in the Security Council. To put it briefly, articles 4 and 6 are mutually exclusive, in the sense that the application of article 6 presupposes the existence of the Treaty through the non-violation of any of its indivisible elements. In other words, article 6 could only operate when the Treaty still exists, and when the Parties disagree on the interpretation or application of the technical details thereof. When article 4 is violated, this means that the whole Treaty becomes terminated, as the said article represented the politico-juridical aspects of the package deal on which the agreement of the Parties was based. Any argument to the contrary makes the provisions of these two articles contradictory and impos-

sible to apply. The continuous Iranian violations of the elements of the Algiers agreement and the Treaty, mentioned in paragraph 4 and article 4 thereof respectively, as was emphasized in the Iraqi note, left Iraq in fact with no treaty to implement.

In this connexion, it is significant to note that if the Iranian Government really believes in the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the defunct Treaty, then why did it not have resort to such a mode of settlement with Iraq instead of opting to commit aggression against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq despite Iraq's repeated reminders regarding the 1975 Treaty?

The outrageous charge contained in the Iranian note that Iraq committed aggression and inhuman acts against Iran is another allegation to which the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Iraq responded in detail in the General Assembly and the Security Council on 3,⁵⁶ 15 [2250th meeting] and 17 October [2251st meeting]. A detailed reply is not called for on this occasion because the facts speak for themselves. As for the allegation that Iraq has violated the internal security of Iran and done harm to good neighbourly relations between the two States, it is pertinent to recall two concrete facts. First, what the Iranian Government calls a violation of internal security is in fact an attempt to blame Iraq for the struggle of the national Iranian minorities to achieve their national rights in return for their patriotic role against the Shah. Secondly, if good neighbourly relations are so dear to the Iranian Government, then it is legitimate to wonder whether continuous shelling and bombardment of Iraqi towns and villages are in accord with that principle.

Finally, I should like to enclose also herewith the text of a note No. 7/1/4/15639 dated 16 November 1980, which was sent by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq to the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran at Baghdad in reply to the latter's note referred to above.

I should be grateful if you would arrange for the text of this letter and the attached notes to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Salah Omar AL-ALI
Permanent Representative of Iraq
to the United Nations

⁵⁵ See United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 1017, No. 14903.

⁵⁶ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fifth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 22nd meeting.

ANNEX I

Note dated 17 September 1980 addressed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq to the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran at Baghdad

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq presents its compliments to the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran at Baghdad and has the honour to inform it that, in view of the violation by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran of the components of the over-all settlement contained in the Algiers agreement concluded between Iraq and Iran on 6 March 1975, through Iran's constant interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of Iraq, its harbouring of elements hostile to Iraq since the early days of the overthrow of the régime of the Shah, its meddling with the internal security of Iraq, its abuse of good neighbourly relations, its encroachment on Iraqi territories and its failure to hand over such territories to Iraq, thereby forcing the Republic of Iraq to seek to recover those territories by force in exercise of its legitimate right to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity, and through Iran's overt and tacit conduct expressed in the declarations and acts of its responsible officials who refuse to be bound by the said agreement, the Government of the Republic of Iraq has decided to consider the Algiers agreement concluded between the two countries on 6 March 1975, the Treaty concerning the State frontier and neighbourly relations concluded between the Government of the Republic of Iraq and the Imperial Government of Iran, together with the three Protocols annexed thereto and their annexes, signed at Baghdad on 13 June 1975, on the basis of the said agreement, the four supplementary agreements to the said Treaty, with their annexes, signed at Baghdad on 26 December 1975,* the notes exchanged and the joint records, as null and void in view of their violation by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran by word and deed and in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 4 of the Algiers agreement and article 4 of the afore-mentioned Treaty.

* United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 1017, Nos. 14904-14907.

The Government of the Republic of Iraq invites the authorities of the Government of the Islamic Republic to accept the new situation and to adopt a reasonable and wise attitude towards the exercise by Iraq of its sovereignty and its legitimate rights throughout its land and river territory in the Shatt Al-Arab exactly as the situation used to be prior to the afore-mentioned Algiers agreement.

The Ministry trusts that the Embassy will communicate the above to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and takes this opportunity to convey to the Embassy the assurances of its highest consideration.

ANNEX II

Note dated 16 November 1980 addressed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq to the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran at Baghdad

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq presents its compliments to the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran at Baghdad and has the honour to inform it that the Government of the Republic of Iraq rejects discussion of the provisions of the 1975 Treaty concerning the State frontier and neighbourly relations between Iraq and Iran, together with its subsequent Protocols and annexes, which Iraq regards as null and void in view of the fact that Iran has, in practice, rendered them ineffectual by its persistent breaches of that Treaty not only through the declarations of Iranian officials to the effect that they do not recognize the Treaty but also through Iran's violation of its essential elements. All of this has been set forth in notes from the Iraqi Government to the Iranian Government stating the violations and calling for their discontinuation. The escalation of Iranian aggression against Iraq by the launching of an undeclared war against frontier posts, the shelling of Iraqi towns and interference in the internal affairs of Iraq is cogent proof of Iran's clear refusal to be bound by the afore-mentioned Treaty. Accordingly, the contents of the note of 26 October 1980 from the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran is rejected in whole and in part.

DOCUMENT S/14273

Letter dated 26 November 1980 from the representative of Israel to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[26 November 1980]

Further to my letter of 20 November 1980 [S/14264], I wish to draw your attention to a further example of the campaign of political assassination carried out by the terrorist PLO against Arabs in Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza district because they are not prepared to abide by PLO orders and favour living in peace with Israel.

On 23 November, Abd Al-Wahhab Al-Masri, of Jabelieh, near the town of Gaza, was murdered. Later on the same day, the Libyan press agency published a statement in which the PLO took responsibility for this crime, indicating specifically that it was carried out because the victim was prepared to work for peaceful coexistence with Israel.

As I pointed out in my letter of 20 November, the PLO has been working systematically to intimidate and silence Arab leaders of whose political views it disapproves. By engaging in political terror against Palestinian Arabs, the PLO is following in the footsteps of its mentor, the notorious Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin Al-Husseini who had no compunction about terrorizing and assassinating his political rivals.

The PLO adopted this ugly tactic well before the current peace process began. Indeed, since 1966 it has

frequently threatened, terrorized and intimidated Arab mayors, heads of local councils, mukhtars (heads of villages) and local leaders in other walks of life, particularly business and journalism, throughout Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza district.

All told, PLO terrorism has claimed the lives of over 360 Arabs since 1966. It has wounded and maimed over 1,800 others.

The following is a list of some of the PLO's crimes in this regard since 1967.

1. In the years 1968 and 1969, several members of the family of the Mayor of Halhoul, the Milhem family, were murdered.

2. In 1973, an attack was made on the life of Rashad Al-Shawwa, the Mayor of Gaza, who is still on the "hit list" of PLO agents operating in the area.

3. In 1976, Joe Nasser, the editor of the Jerusalem paper *Al-Fajr*, was abducted and his body has never been found.

4. In 1977, the so-called "Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine", one of the constituents of the PLO, swore to assassinate any Palestinian Arabs who accepted invitations to the peace conference held at Cairo in December of that year. The PLO made

good its threat. On 26 December 1977, its news agency announced that orders had been issued "to liquidate a number of agents", and boasted that it had eliminated Hamdi Kadi, who was in charge of education at Ramallah.

5. On 8 February 1978, Adb Al-Nur Janho, a member of the Ramallah municipality and a prominent businessman, was assassinated. Mr. Janho had rejected the PLO because, in his words, "We must live together. Hatred helps no one."

6. The Imam of Gaza, Sheikh Hashem Khuzander, who led a group which went to Egypt shortly after the signing of the Israel-Egypt peace treaty to express support for the peace process, was assassinated on 1 June 1979.

7. On 15 May 1980, *Al-Hadaf*, a bulletin put out by the so-called "Popular Front", another constituent of the PLO, referred to an explosion which had occurred in the car of Muhammad Abu-Zallaf, the editor of the Jerusalem newspaper *Al-Quds*, and stated that the bomb had been planted because Abu-Zallaf had co-operated with American representatives with regard to the autonomy talks. The bulletin added that the action was a warning to all other Arabs who did not toe the PLO line.

8. As reported in my letter referred to above, earlier this month Mr. Muhammad Abu Warde, the Deputy Mayor of Jabelieh, and Mr. Hassan Muhammad Al-Bazzam, a merchant in the Shatti refugee camp, were both assassinated for precisely that reason.

True to form, the PLO openly boasts of responsibility for those murders. Commenting on the killing of Hamdi Kadi in 1977, the PLO observer at the United Nations publicly justified the murder, telling NBC news:

"... the collaborators with the forces of occupation are executed. They are not assassinated. So this man must have been executed because of his collaboration with the forces of occupation."

Asked by the disbelieving NBC interviewer whether he actually condoned what had been done, he replied: "Those who collaborate with the enemy should be executed, yes."

In the twisted logic of the PLO, this terminology applies to all those Palestinian Arabs who yearn for peace with Israel and are willing to work towards it.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yehuda Z. BLUM
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/14274

Letter dated 26 November 1980 from the representative of Iran to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[28 November 1980]

I have the honour to enclose a letter addressed to you from His Excellency Mr. K. Khoda Panahi, Acting Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

It would be appreciated if the above-mentioned letter is distributed as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Jamal SHEMIRANI
Chargé d'affaires of the
Permanent Mission of Iran
to the United Nations

LETTER DATED 12 NOVEMBER 1980 FROM THE ACTING
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF IRAN AD-
DRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Regarding the letter dated 6 August 1980 of the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates [S/14111], I would like to bring the following points to your attention:

1. As we have repeatedly informed the representatives of various countries of the world at the United Nations, the three Iranian islands Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb, located in the Persian Gulf, have always been an integral part of Iran and the existing maps, papers and documents as well as historical facts are evidence and testimony to this reality.

2. Iran has continually exercised its sovereignty over this part of its territory, and only during the period that the British colonial Power occupied the islands by force was Iranian sovereignty temporarily

interrupted; after the departure of the British forces from the Persian Gulf in 1971, Iran resumed the exercise of her rightful sovereignty over these islands.

3. As stipulated in our reply [S/13987] to the letter of the Foreign Minister of Iraq dated 2 April 1980 [S/13918], the fact that the above-mentioned islands belong to Iran cannot be subject to consideration or discussion under any circumstances, and in fact, there is not a free and independent country in the world that would be willing to discuss or compromise a part of its territory with another country.

4. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran asserts, once more, that at no time, even during the period in which Iran's sovereignty over the three Iranian islands was interrupted owing to their occupation by the British colonial Power, has it had any confrontation with its brotherly Arab neighbours.

5. Contrary to the opinion of the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates who expresses surprise at the letter of the Iranian Foreign Minister, we wonder how, at a time when the Islamic Republic of Iran through the struggles of its Muslim people is attempting to repel the domination of the super-Powers from this area, such fabricated allegations, which could only have a negative effect on the principle of unity and fraternity among the friendly and neighbourly countries of the region, can be made, and this is what astonishes the Muslim people of Iran and makes them deeply regretful. We deem it necessary to bring to your attention, as the Secretary-General of the

United Nations, that the Muslim nations of the world, who have been and still are subject to the pillages and aggression of the Powers of the "East" and "West" particularly at a time when the Islamic revolution of Iran is paving the way for a new era of liberty, independence, and glory for all Muslims and the oppressed peoples of the world, should utilize all their efforts and abilities to protect and safeguard this "sacred ideal" and refrain from irrational acts and unrealistic statements which may be misused by the exploiting agents of the "East" and "West" as well as international Zionism.

The points expressed by the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates in connexion with the three Iranian islands Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb are part of a calculated plot and provocation, planned well in advance, which has materialized through pressure by the Iraqi Government in the region. The inauspicious result of this adventurism is now evident in the Iraqi savage aggression of Iran.

Iraq not only imposed this all-out war on Iran but also has, in order to attain its ambitious delusions, insanely expanded the dimensions of this destructive war. As you are well aware, over a month ago the Baathist Government of Iraq invaded the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran and each day heedlessly and wickedly bombs and destroys Iranian cities as well as residential areas with every destructive and inhuman means possible; up to the present, it has caused the martyrdom of thousands of our countrymen, mostly civilians—men, women and children.

The crimes so far committed by the Government of Iraq are not justifiable by any international or humanitarian laws or regulations, and it is quite clear that these crimes are committed under the protection of the super-Powers and world imperialism, which claim to be the defenders of human rights.

The Government of Iraq, under the pretext that the régime of the Islamic Republic has not observed the

principle of "good neighbourly policy" and the contents of the Treaty and Protocols signed in 1975, claims that it has been compelled to resort to the use of force and military action.

Now this question is raised: If, in the opinion of the Iraqi Government, difficulties existed in the execution of the Treaty concerning the State frontier and neighbourly relations and Protocols signed between Iran and Iraq, why didn't it take action according to article 6 of the above-mentioned Treaty and its Protocols, which explicitly and in detail define the manner of investigation to resolve the differences? Even assuming, according to its absurd and unfounded claims, that Iraq's territorial integrity was jeopardized by Iran, why did it ignore peaceful and basic means available, and with military action, as well as obvious aggression through surprise air attack on our cities and residential areas, impose this war on Iran?

As you are well aware, Iraq has violated the contents of the 1975 Treaty, particularly the Protocol relating to the security of the frontiers, and among other things has dispatched agents and armed groups to the provinces of West Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, Kermanshah, Ilam, Khuzistan and even to Sistan and Baluchestan, to sabotage and to assist the counter-revolutionaries and has thus deranged Iran's internal security as well as causing irreparable damage to the good neighbourly policy between the two countries.

In conclusion we would like to emphasize once more that the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is based on independence and territorial integrity of all the countries of the world and good neighbourly policy toward all its neighbours. It is self-evident that the Iranian nation will defend the independence and territorial integrity of its homeland with all its might.

(Signed) Mohammad Karim KHODA PANAH
Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the Islamic Republic of Iran

DOCUMENTS S/14275 AND ADD.1

Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus for the period 1 June to 30 November 1980

DOCUMENT S/14275

[Original: English]
[1 December 1980]

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INTRODUCTION

1. The present report on the United Nations operation in Cyprus covers developments from 1 June to 30 November 1980 and brings up to date the record of activities of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force

in Cyprus (UNFICYP) pursuant to the mandate laid down in Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and its subsequent resolutions concerning Cyprus, including, most recently, resolution 472 (1980) of 13 June 1980.

2. In its resolution 472 (1980), the Security Council also urged the parties to resume the intercommunal talks within the framework of the 10-point agreement of 19 May 1979 [S/13369, para. 51] in a continuing, sustained and result-oriented manner, avoiding any delay, and it requested me to continue my mission of good offices, to keep the Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of that resolution by 30 November 1980. In pursuance of the resolution, I submitted to the Council on 11 August a report pertaining to my mission of good offices [S/14100]. Further developments on this subject are summarized in section V below.

I. COMPOSITION AND DEPLOYMENT OF UNFICYP

3. The table below shows the establishment of UNFICYP as at 30 November 1980:

<i>Military personnel</i>			
<i>Austria</i>			
HQ UNFICYP	5		
Infantry battalion UNAB 18	303		
Military police company	6	314	
<i>Canada</i>			
HQ UNFICYP	8		
Artillery regiment "Cinquième Regiment d'Artillerie Légère du Canada"	468		
Signal squadron	19		
Medical centre	7		
Military police company	12	514	
<i>Denmark</i>			
HQ UNFICYP	5		
Infantry battalion—DANCON XXXIV	347		
Military police company	13	365	
<i>Finland</i>			
HQ UNFICYP	6		
Military police company	5	11	
<i>Ireland</i>			
HQ UNFICYP	7	7	
<i>Sweden</i>			
HQ UNFICYP	8		
Infantry battalion UN 77C	407		
Military police company	14	429	
<i>United Kingdom</i>			
HQ UNFICYP	19		
HQ BRITCON	7		
Armoured reconnaissance squadron—C Squadron The Blues and Royals	119		
3rd Battalion The Royal Anglian Regiment	342		
RHQ UNFICYP support regiment	42		
Engineer detachment	8		
Signal squadron	55		
Army aviation flight	19		
Transport squadron	101		
Medical centre	6		
Ordnance detachment	14		
Workshop	39		
Military police company	8		
B Flight 84 Squadron RAF (Whirlwind)	38	817	
TOTAL		2 457	
<i>Civilian police</i>			
Australia	20		
Sweden	14		
TOTAL		34	
TOTAL UNFICYP		2 491	

The current detailed deployment of UNFICYP is shown on the map attached to this report.

4. I have continued to keep the strength of the Force under review, bearing in mind the manning requirements for carrying out the operational commitments of UNFICYP under its mandate and financial limitations. In this connexion, I received on 31 July the report of the Secretariat survey team, which I had set up in May to carry out, in close co-operation with the Force Commander, a review of the establishment, strength and functioning of UNFICYP, with a view to assessing the scope for possible economies. The report of the team is reproduced in the annex to the present report. The survey team maintained close contact with a working group set up for this purpose by the troop-contributing countries.

5. In paragraph 60 of its report, the survey team recommends a course of action calling for a moderate across-the-board reduction in manpower levels, a possible withdrawal of certain units, a possible one-year experimental reorganization involving two of the contingents, and an arrangement to be negotiated with the parties, under which these would assume a fair share of the costs pertaining to the Force, including the cost of utility services, and facilitate certain UNFICYP operations. On 18 September, I transmitted the report of the survey team to the troop-contributing Governments and to the parties, and I have since engaged in consultations with them concerning the implementation of its recommendations.

6. Mr. Hugo Gobbi continues to be my Special Representative in Cyprus. The Force remains under the command of Major-General James Joseph Quinn.

II. UNFICYP OPERATIONS

A. MANDATE AND CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

7. The function of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus was originally defined by the Security Council in its resolution 186 (1964) in the following terms:

"in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions".

That mandate, which was conceived in the context of the confrontation between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities and between the Cyprus National Guard and the Turkish Cypriot fighters, has been repeatedly reaffirmed by the Council, most recently in its resolution 472 (1980). In connexion with the events that have occurred since 15 July 1974, the Council adopted a number of resolutions, some of which have affected the functioning of UNFICYP and, in some cases, have required UNFICYP to perform certain additional or modified functions.⁵⁷

8. UNFICYP continues to supervise the cease-fire lines of the National Guard and of the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot forces and to use its best efforts to

⁵⁷ These include resolutions 353 (1974), 354 (1974), 355 (1974), 357 (1974), 358 (1974), 359 (1974), 360 (1974), 361 (1974), 364 (1974), 365 (1974), 367 (1975), 370 (1975), 383 (1975), 391 (1976), 401 (1976), 410 (1977), 414 (1977), 422 (1977), 430 (1978), 443 (1978), 451 (1979), 458 (1979) and 472 (1980).

prevent the recurrence of fighting (see part D). It also continues to provide security for civilians engaged in peaceful activities in the area between the lines, in accordance with its normalization functions (see part E).

9. UNFICYP continues to use its best efforts to discharge its functions with regard to the security, welfare and well-being of the Greek Cypriots living in the northern part of the island.

10. UNFICYP has continued to visit, on a regular basis, Turkish Cypriots still residing in the south.

11. In addition, UNFICYP has continued to support the relief operations co-ordinated by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and carried out in co-operation with the World Food Programme (see section IV). It has also continued to discharge certain functions handed over to it by the International Committee of the Red Cross at the time of the withdrawal of its delegation from Cyprus in June 1977 [see S/13369, para. 12].

B. LIAISON AND CO-OPERATION

12. UNFICYP has continued to emphasize the essential requirement of full liaison and co-operation at all levels to enable it to carry out its role effectively. These efforts have been met with a positive response from both sides. Liaison between UNFICYP and the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot forces and between UNFICYP and the National Guard remains satisfactory.

C. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OF UNFICYP

13. As mentioned in my report of 3 June 1980 [S/13972], following discussions between UNFICYP and the appropriate authorities concerning UNFICYP movement in the north, which had been restricted under guidelines issued by the Turkish Cypriot authorities in October 1979, a new set of guidelines was issued by the Turkish Cypriot side in December 1979. While the new guidelines represent some improvement of the situation, transit of UNFICYP vehicles continues to be restricted both by fixing the hours during which checkpoints can be used and by limiting the routes open to UNFICYP.

D. MAINTENANCE OF THE CEASE-FIRE

14. UNFICYP surveillance over the area between the cease-fire lines is based upon a system of 136 observation posts, 63 of which are permanently manned. During the period under review, two permanently manned observation posts, A-09 at Famagusta and C-66 near the Nicosia airport, were changed to observation points manned on a part-time basis. Standing patrols are deployed as required to provide observation of sensitive areas. Vehicle-mounted patrols are conducted by day and night. The combination of static and mobile surveillance systems enables UNFICYP to conduct continuous surveillance of the cease-fire lines and provides the information necessary to identify cease-fire violations and the ability to react immediately. The project to improve the United Nations patrol track, which runs the length of the buffer zone, is still proceeding slowly. When this work is completed,

ability of UNFICYP to monitor the cease-fire will be improved. This will further reduce reaction time and operational costs.

15. The nature and frequency of shooting incidents, movement and construction forward of the cease-fire line have remained essentially unchanged since my last report. Satisfactory channels of communication and liaison between UNFICYP and the two sides have enabled the force to control such cease-fire violations. In certain areas, the delineation of the cease-fire line is in dispute. Concerning one such area, the Ovgos River valley north of the village of Mammari, it was agreed that neither the Turkish forces nor the United Nations would patrol into the disputed area. This will maintain the *status quo* until a final agreement can be reached.

16. Improvements to existing positions and constructions of new fortifications, mainly by the National Guard, also remain the subject of disagreement. In most cases it was possible to find an agreed solution. In other cases, however, agreement has not been possible, owing to differing opinions with regard to the impact on the *status quo* of new positions constructed behind the cease-fire line.

17. There have been, as in the past, a number of complaints about aircraft flying on the wrong side of the cease-fire lines. In each instance, UNFICYP used available liaison channels with the parties to prevent any worsening of the situation.

E. MAINTENANCE OF THE *status quo*

18. The cease-fire lines extend to a length of about 180 kilometres across the island, from the Kokkina enclave and Kato Pyrgos, on the north-west coast, to the east coast south of Famagusta, in the area of Dherinia. The total area between the lines, the width of which varies from 20 metres to 7 kilometres, covers about 3 per cent of the land area of the island.

19. UNFICYP has facilitated normal farming activity in the area between the lines, especially by providing escorts to enable farmers to work their fields and orchards in sensitive areas.

F. MINES

20. The seriousness of the land-mine hazard has not diminished since the last report. UNFICYP continues to improve markings and barriers surrounding known or suspected minefields and maintains a programme of inspections and recording. Both the National Guard and the Turkish forces have responded in a positive way and have co-operated with UNFICYP in remarking and recording minefields.

G. HUMANITARIAN FUNCTIONS AND NORMALIZATION OF CONDITIONS

21. UNFICYP continues to discharge humanitarian functions for the Greek Cypriots remaining in the north. Temporary visits to the south for family and other reasons continue on an *ad hoc* basis, both directly and through the good offices of UNFICYP. During the period under review, a total of 484 Greek Cypriots came temporarily to the south for family rea-

sons, and a total of 52 Greek Cypriots came temporarily to the south for medical reasons. Temporary transfers of Greek Cypriots to the north, as well as requests by Greek Cypriots holding foreign passports who return to the island from abroad to visit their relatives in the north, have not been granted, but these relatives are now permitted to travel to the south on such occasions.

22. Permanent transfers of Greek Cypriots from north to south have continued. The total number of such transfers since my last report has been 102, including 46 children, compared with 90 during the previous six-month period leaving 1,206 Greek Cypriots in the north. Transfers continue to be monitored by UNFICYP to ensure that they have been undertaken voluntarily. Three Turkish Cypriots crossed to the south, and two Turkish Cypriots returned to the north during the period under review.

23. The situation of the two Greek Cypriot primary schools operating in the north has changed little since my last report. The school at Ayia Trias now has 35 pupils, and at Rizokarpaso there are 73. The position regarding school holiday visits by Greek Cypriot children attending secondary school in the south to their families residing in the north remains unchanged and efforts by UNFICYP to arrange for such visits for the summer holidays were unsuccessful.

24. Two adult Maronites have been permanently transferred to the south since my last report. Contacts between members of the Maronite group residing on opposite sides of the cease-fire line remain frequent. In the north, they enjoy considerable freedom of movement, and visits from north to south and vice versa are arranged on an *ad hoc* basis.

25. UNFICYP officers, in performing certain humanitarian tasks in the north, continue to have the opportunity of speaking in private with Greek Cypriots living there.

26. Periodic visits by UNFICYP officials to the Turkish Cypriots living in the south are continuing, and contacts with their relatives in the north are maintained.

27. As reported previously, the first phase of the Nicosia sewerage system went into operation on 24 May 1980. Planning is now in progress, in consultation with the European Economic Community, for the second phase of the project which will also be carried out under the auspices of the United Nations Development Programme and with the assistance of UNFICYP. A project manager has been selected for the Programme-assisted Nicosia master plan project, and field work is expected to commence before the end of 1980. This project will benefit both communities at Nicosia.

28. UNFICYP has made arrangements to facilitate meetings between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot officials of the Water, Health and Veterinary Departments, as well as between press representatives of both sides.

29. The postal arrangements and delivery of Red Cross messages [see S/13672 of 1 December 1979, para. 33] remain unchanged. Mail posted by Greek Cypriots in the north is being delivered in the south on a regular basis.

III. THE CIVILIAN POLICE ELEMENT OF UNFICYP

30. The civilian police element of the Force (UNCIVPOL) continues to be deployed in support of UNFICYP military units and operates in close liaison with both the Cyprus police and the Turkish Cypriot police. UNCIVPOL contributes to the maintenance of law and order in the area between the lines and to the protection of the civilian population, particularly in areas where intercommunal problems exist. It assists in the control of the movement of civilians in the area between the cease-fire lines, escorts persons transferring from the north to the south and vice versa, inquires into complaints of criminal activity having intercommunal implications and, in the north, distributes social welfare payments to Greek Cypriots in their habitations and monitors their welfare. UNCIVPOL continues to maintain a missing persons bureau at UNFICYP headquarters.

31. I have continued my efforts with a view to arriving at a solution of the problem of setting up an investigatory body for the tracing of and accounting for missing persons of both communities in Cyprus [see S/13972, para. 31]. I recently conveyed to the parties certain ideas in this regard. I and my representatives are now engaged in renewed intensive consultations with the parties.

IV. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME

32. Since my report of 3 June 1980, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has continued, at my request, to assist the displaced and needy population in the island in his capacity as Co-ordinator of the United Nations Humanitarian Assistance for Cyprus. The scale of these activities, however, will be gradually adjusted to take account of present requirements. The competent authorities in Cyprus have been kept informed about these developments.

33. The 1980 programme provides \$US 15,101,000 to finance 17 projects. This programme, which is co-ordinated by the Cyprus Red Cross Society, involves participation in the construction of temporary housing and a general hospital and in the overseas procurement of equipment and supplies for the health, education and agriculture sectors.

34. Total contributions to the United Nations humanitarian assistance programme since 1974 amount to \$121,689,545 in cash and in kind from 38 donor Governments. A further \$382,417 has been received from non-governmental organizations and other donors, as well as \$8,942,055 in kind from the European Economic Community.

35. UNFICYP has continued to support the Co-ordinator's relief programme by delivering food supplies and other items. A major contributor to this programme since 1974 has been the World Food Programme. A total of 699 tons of relief supplies was distributed or delivered during the period under review through UNFICYP facilities. This included 513 tons, representing 229 truckloads of food-stuffs, clothing, gas and diesel oil, delivered to Greek Cypriots and Maronites in the north, and 186 tons, i.e., 39 truckloads, delivered to needy Turkish Cypriots in the north. Since August 1974, a total of 19,628 tons of relief supplies has been provided to Greek Cypriots

and Maronites in the north, and 18,302 tons to Turkish Cypriots.

36. During the period under review, UNCIVPOL distributed social welfare payments to the Greek Cypriots in the north in the amount of £C 86,975.

37. UNFICYP provides emergency medical services, including medical evacuation by ambulance or helicopter. Delivery of medicines to the Turkish Cypriot community is made on a regular basis and emergency requests for medicines are met immediately.

V. GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

38. During the period under review, I have pursued the mission of good offices entrusted to me by the Security Council in paragraph 6 of its resolution 367 (1975) and continued by subsequent resolutions, including, most recently, resolution 472 (1980). Following the mission to Nicosia, Ankara and Athens undertaken on my behalf by Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, on which I reported to the Council at its meeting of 13 June [2230th meeting], intensive consultations continued both in New York and at Nicosia throughout July. On 6 August, Mr. Gobbi reported to me that agreement had been reached by the two parties to resume the talks formally at Nicosia on 9 August [see S/14100].

39. At the meeting held on 9 August, Mr. Gobbi delivered an opening statement [*ibid.*, annex] on my behalf. The statement outlined my understanding of the common ground that had been worked out in the course of the consultations which had taken place over the preceding months and listed the four items to be discussed in the intercommunal talks on the basis of the 19 May 1979 agreement. It was understood that those four items should be dealt with concurrently in rotation at consecutive meetings. Having heard the opening statement, the two interlocutors, Mr. George Ioannides for the Greek Cypriot community, and Mr. Umit Suleiman Onan for the Turkish Cypriot community, agreed to begin the substantive phase of the talks at the second meeting on 16 September. It was also agreed that the proceedings would be kept confidential.

40. Since then there have been 10 meetings of the resumed intercommunal talks, and each of the four items of the agenda has been discussed at least twice. All meetings were held in private, in the presence of my Special Representative. The Greek Cypriot community was represented by Mr. Ioannides and his advisers, Mr. Michael Triantafyllides and Mrs. Stella Soulioti. The Turkish Cypriot community was represented by Mr. Onan and his advisers, Mr. Necati Munir Ertekin and Mr. Rustem Z. Tatar. Experts of both sides also attended some of the meetings.

41. On 16 September, the interlocutors took up consideration of the first agenda item, "Reaching agreement on the resettlement of Varosha under United Nations auspices, in accordance with the provisions of point 5 of the 19 May 1979 agreement". The Greek Cypriot interlocutor submitted the proposals of his side. On 24 September, the interlocutors discussed the second agenda item, "Initial practical measures by both sides to promote goodwill, mutual confidence and the return to normal conditions, in accordance with the

provisions of point 6 of the 19 May 1979 agreement, which states that special importance will be given to this matter". The Turkish Cypriot interlocutor presented the proposals of his side and the Greek Cypriot interlocutor also submitted detailed suggestions. On 1 October, the third item on the agenda, "Constitutional aspects", was taken up. The two interlocutors submitted their respective proposals for a future constitutional arrangement. Both sides undertook to study them, with a view to discussing them in depth at the next meeting on the subject. On 8 October, the fourth agenda item, "Territorial aspects", was discussed. Both interlocutors set forth their respective positions. There followed a frank exchange of views in the same good atmosphere as at previous meetings.

42. On 15 October, the interlocutors resumed consideration of the first agenda item. The Turkish Cypriot interlocutor presented the proposals of his side concerning the resettlement of Varosha. On 31 October, the interlocutors continued discussion of the agenda item concerning initial practical measures. Areas of co-operation and the machinery required for that purpose were explored in detail. On 5 November, consideration of the third agenda item, concerning constitutional aspects, was continued. There was a lengthy discussion, during which both sides explained further their respective constitutional proposals. On 12 November, the interlocutors continued discussion of the fourth agenda item, concerning territorial aspects. Both sides further elaborated their respective positions on the subject and discussed in depth the various issues raised.

43. The third cycle of the talks began on 19 November, at which time the interlocutors resumed consideration of the first agenda item concerning the resettlement of Varosha. They explored at length each other's proposals and had a constructive and frank exchange of views on the item. On 26 November, the interlocutors took up again the agenda item concerning initial practical measures, which gave rise to a frank exchange of views. The constitutional and territorial items are scheduled to be discussed at the meetings to be held on 3 and 10 December, whereupon the interlocutors are planning to recess until 7 January 1981.

VI. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

44. Voluntary contributions in the amount of approximately \$262.2 million have been paid to the UNFICYP Special Account by 65 Member States and one non-member State in respect of the periods from the inception of the Force on 27 March 1964 to 15 December 1980. In addition, voluntary contributions from public sources, interest earned on investment of temporarily undischarged funds and other miscellaneous income received by the Account have totalled about \$7.3 million. Accordingly, some \$269.5 million have, so far, been made available to the UNFICYP Special Account towards meeting the costs of UNFICYP to the United Nations for the periods through 15 December 1980.

45. The costs to be borne by the United Nations for the operation of UNFICYP for the periods from the inception of the Force to 15 December 1980 are estimated at \$354.4 million. This figure includes the direct cost to the United Nations of maintaining the Force in

Cyprus, as well as the amounts to be paid to Governments providing contingents in respect of their extra and extraordinary costs for which they seek to be reimbursed by the United Nations. The amount of \$269.5 million so far received by the UNFICYP Special Account falls short of the requirement of \$354.4 million indicated above by approximately \$84.9 million. However, in addition to the voluntary contributions that have already been paid to the Account, some \$4.6 million are expected to be received in due course against pledges made by Governments but not yet paid by them.

46. If to the amount of \$269.5 million so far received, the amount of \$4.6 million of anticipated receipts is added, the receipts of the UNFICYP Special Account since March 1964 can then be expected to total approximately \$274.1 million. The difference between this figure and the costs of approximately \$354.4 million to be met becomes \$80.3 million. Accordingly, unless additional contributions from existing or new pledges are received before 15 December 1980, the UNFICYP Special Account deficit as of that date will be \$80.3 million.

47. If the Security Council should decide to extend for six months beyond 15 December 1980 the period during which the Force is to be stationed in Cyprus, it is estimated that the additional cost to the Organization for the Force would amount to approximately \$14.8 million, as detailed below. These estimates, which are based on the current strength of the Force and continuance of present reimbursement commitments, are subject to revision as and when the survey team's recommendations referred to earlier in this report (paragraph 5) are implemented, in consultation, as appropriate, with the troop contributors or the parties.

UNFICYP COST ESTIMATE BY MAJOR CATEGORY OF EXPENSE
(Thousands of United States dollars)

I. Operational costs incurred by the United Nations	
Movement of contingents	260
Operational expenses	1 636
Rental of premises	748
Rations	990
Non-military personnel, salaries, travel, etc. . .	1 777
Miscellaneous and contingencies	200
TOTAL	5 611
II. Reimbursement of extra costs of Governments providing contingents	
Pay and allowances	8 300
Contingent-owned equipment	750
Death and disability awards	100
TOTAL	9 150
GRAND TOTAL	14 761

48. The above costs of UNFICYP for the next six-month period, which will have to be covered by voluntary contributions, do not reflect the full cost of this operation to Member and non-member States. In fact, they exclude the regular cost that would be incurred by the troop contributors if their contingents were serving at home (i.e., regular pay and allowances and normal material costs), as well as such extra and extraordinary costs as the troop contributors have agreed to absorb at no cost to the United Nations. The troop-contributing Governments have informed me that the costs of UNFICYP absorbed by them are of the order of \$29.3 million for each six-month mandate period.

Accordingly, the full costs of UNFICYP to Member and non-member States for the next six-month period are estimated at approximately \$44.1 million.

49. In order to finance the costs to the Organization of maintaining the Force for a period of six months after 15 December 1980 and to meet all costs and outstanding claims up to that date, it will be necessary to receive voluntary contributions to the UNFICYP Special Account totalling \$95.1 million.

VII. OBSERVATIONS

50. The foregoing pages provide a comprehensive account of both the peace-keeping and peace-making aspects of the United Nations operation in Cyprus during the past six-month period. These aspects are interrelated. UNFICYP has continued to perform its indispensable peace-keeping functions along the cease-fire lines and in the area between the lines, as well as humanitarian functions. Its activities, with the co-operation of the parties, have contributed to keeping the situation in the island calm. It is necessary, in this connexion, to bear in mind that the cease-fire in Cyprus is not and, in present circumstances, cannot be self-sustaining. As noted in the survey report, its maintenance requires a continuous contribution by UNFICYP which strains the present resources of the Force.

51. I have continued to pursue the mission of good offices entrusted to me by the Security Council. A substantial forward step was achieved when the intercommunal talks were formally resumed on 9 August, after a hiatus of more than one year. The talks entered their substantive phase on 16 September. They have proceeded in a friendly and business-like atmosphere. The third cycle of the talks, which is now under way, is scheduled to be completed on 10 December. The parties have stated their initial positions on the four items of the agenda (see paragraph 41 above), and there have been the first substantive responses. Some common ground has been indicated on certain practical questions. While progress so far has been slow, the discussions have been on the whole constructive, and it is to be hoped that an acceptable arrangement has at last been found for a sustained, serious and result-oriented joint exploration and negotiation of both the basic problems confronting Cyprus and the approaches to their solution.

52. One of the problems that the interlocutors will no doubt have to face at some point is the difficult issue of how and where to start the actual give-and-take which is the essence of an effective negotiating process. In this connexion, it is relevant to recall that the high-level accord of 19 May 1979 specified that certain matters are to be given priority or special importance as regards reaching agreement and implementation.

53. My Special Representative has kept me fully informed about the proceedings. At the same time, as part of the exercise of my good offices, it is my intention also to continue to maintain direct personal contact with the parties from time to time, with a view to reviewing periodically the progress of the talks and, as appropriate, exploring procedures that might facilitate the conduct of the negotiations. While a complex negotiating process such as the present one must, of

necessity, proceed with careful deliberation, it must also, if it is to maintain its credibility, produce concrete results.

54. During the past months I have also continued my efforts to devise an acceptable formula for establishing an investigating body to trace and account for missing persons of both communities. I hope that the current intensive consultations will make it possible to move towards an acceptable and practical solution of this humanitarian problem.

55. The financial situation of UNFICYP has continued to be a cause for growing concern during the period under review. The deficit of the UNFICYP Account, including the current period, is now of the order of \$80.3 million. The claims of the troop contributors, which represent in some cases only a fraction of the actual costs incurred by those Governments in maintaining their contingents, have been paid only up to March 1976. It is my earnest hope that Governments will respond generously to my appeals for voluntary financial contributions and that Member States which have not contributed in the past will find it possible to review their positions in that regard.

56. As mentioned earlier in this report, I established in May 1980 a Secretariat survey team in response to the growing and very serious concern of the troop-contributing Governments over the disproportionate financial burden that they have been carrying. In its report, the team has indicated certain courses of action which, if implemented, would result in reducing the cost of UNFICYP to both the United Nations and the troop contributors. These suggestions seem to me to be generally sound, and I intend, if the Security Council should decide to extend the mandate of UNFICYP, to proceed along the lines indicated, in consultation, as appropriate, with the Governments concerned and with the parties in Cyprus. In particular, I have appealed to the parties to co-operate with my Special Representative in devising arrangements under which they would absorb a fair share of the costs pertaining to the Force, including the costs of utility services, and otherwise facilitate its functioning.

57. In the light of the situation on the ground and of political developments, I have concluded once again that the continued presence of UNFICYP remains necessary, both in helping to maintain calm in the island and in creating the conditions in which the search for a peaceful settlement can best be pursued. I therefore recommend to the Security Council that it should extend the mandate of UNFICYP for a further period of six months. In accordance with established practice, I have undertaken consultations on this subject with the parties concerned and shall report to the Council on these consultations as soon as they have been completed.

58. This report provides yet another opportunity for me to express my appreciation to the Governments contributing contingents to UNFICYP, both for the outstanding performance of the troops which they have placed under United Nations command and for bearing the considerable financial burdens involved. I also wish to place on record my gratitude to the Governments making voluntary financial contributions for their support of this important United Nations peace-keeping operation.

59. In concluding this report, I wish to express my warm thanks to my Special Representative in Cyprus, Mr. Hugo Gobbi, to the Commander of the Force, Major General James J. Quinn, and to the officers and men of UNFICYP and its civilian staff, who have continued to discharge with exemplary efficiency and devotion the important and difficult responsibilities entrusted to them by the Security Council.

[Map, "Deployment of UNFICYP as of November 1980." See end of volume.]

ANNEX

Report of the Secretariat survey team for the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus

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I. ESTABLISHMENT AND TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. On 3 June 1980 the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that he had set up a Secretariat team to carry out, in close co-operation with the Force Commander, a review of the establishment, strength and functioning of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) with a view to assessing the scope for possible economies (S/1972, para. 4). The team was composed as follows: Mr. George L. Sherry, Director, Office of the Under-Secretaries-General for Special Political Affairs, Chairman; Mr. George Lansky, Special Adviser, Field Operations Division, Office of General Services; Mr. Gregory Issaevitch, Assistant Director, Office of Financial Services; Commandant Conrad Crean, Military Liaison Officer, and Mr. Giandomenico Pizzo, Political Affairs Officer, Office of the Under-Secretaries-General for Special Political Affairs, Secretary. The terms of reference of the team were as follows:

"1. The Secretariat survey team will carry out a detailed review of the establishment, strength and functioning of UNFICYP in order to assess the scope for possible economies in the operation of the Force.

"2. The team will give particular attention to the effect of reductions in the over-all cost of UNFICYP on the ability of the Force to carry out the functions entrusted to it by the Security Council in its resolution 186 (1964) and its subsequent resolutions on Cyprus. The team may, among other things, make an assessment of the effects on UNFICYP of various illustrative percentage, budgetary and/or manpower reductions.

"3. The team will conduct its work in close co-operation with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and with the Commander of UNFICYP. Through its chairman, the team will maintain contact with the working group set up by the troop-contributing countries for this purpose. In particular, the team may receive from the working group papers and other communications designed to facilitate its work.

"4. The team will report its findings and recommendations to the Secretary-General in July 1980."

2. The team met first in New York during the months of May and June. On 17 June it arrived in Cyprus to conduct its survey in close co-operation with the Force Commander, Major-General J. J. Quinn. The team spent some nine days visiting the different contingents and units of the Force and their areas of operation and consulting the military element at headquarters of UNFICYP at Nicosia. Consultations were also held with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. H. J. Gobbi, and senior civilian and military members of the headquarters staff. The survey team wishes to record its appreciation for the invaluable co-operation and assistance that was afforded to it during its stay in Cyprus. Both at United Nations Headquarters and while in Cyprus the survey team maintained close contact with the working group set up by the troop-contributing countries. It also had occasion to consult with the Government of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot community.

II. FUNCTIONS AND STRENGTH OF UNFICYP

3. The function of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus was originally defined by the Security Council in its resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 in the following terms:

“... in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions”.

That mandate, which was conceived in the context of the confrontation between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities and between the Cyprus National Guard and the Turkish Cypriot fighters, has been repeatedly reaffirmed by the Council, most recently in its resolution 472 (1980) of 13 June 1980. In connexion with the events that have occurred since 15 July 1974, the Council adopted a number of resolutions, some of which have affected the functioning of UNFICYP and, in some cases, have required UNFICYP to perform certain additional or modified functions. Accordingly, UNFICYP continues to supervise the cease-fire lines of the National Guard and of the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot Forces, and uses its best efforts to preserve the military *status quo* and to prevent the recurrence of fighting. It also continues to provide security for civilians engaged in peaceful activities in the area between the lines, in accordance with its normalization functions. UNFICYP continues to discharge its functions with regard to the security, welfare and well-being of the Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the northern part of the island. UNFICYP also visits on a regular basis Turkish Cypriots still residing in the south. In addition, UNFICYP functions in support of the relief operations co-ordinated by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. It also discharges certain functions handed over by the International Committee of the Red Cross at the time of the withdrawal of its delegation from Cyprus in June 1977.

4. In pursuance of the above functions, the peace-keeping task of UNFICYP in military terms consists of monitoring any violation of the cease-fire and of the cease-fire lines and in seeking to restore the *status quo ante* when violations occur. Accordingly, the Force needs the capability to react promptly and effectively to any movement forward, encroachment or provocative improvement of fortifications by the parties along the lines which, if not checked, would lead to counter-measures by the opposing side and thus to further escalation. As it has not been possible, despite persistent efforts, for UNFICYP to arrive at an agreement with either protagonist as to the delineation of the lines and the use and control of the buffer zone, UNFICYP supervises, by loose mutual consent, two unmarked, constantly disputed cease-fire lines. At the same time, and in addition to its military tasks proper, UNFICYP, under its mandate, is obliged to perform a number of humanitarian and economic tasks in the area between the lines as well as north and south of it in its efforts to help bring about a return to normal conditions. Many of these tasks devolve on UNFICYP because personnel of the Cyprus Government and of the Turkish Cypriot community are not in a position to exercise their normal functions in certain areas. Accordingly, UNFICYP soldiers provide security coverage for agricultural and other civilian activities within the buffer zone, assist in the maintenance and improvement of water and power lines and sewage services that cross the area between the cease-fire line, are engaged as necessary in fire-fighting and in the eradication of contagious diseases, provide transport and medical facilities across the lines, evacuate by road transport or by helicopter civilian patients in need of medical care, make security arrangements for the performance of

religious services in militarily sensitive areas and, as indicated in paragraph 3 above, provide humanitarian assistance to Greek Cypriots and Maronites in the north and Turkish Cypriots in the south and perform certain functions previously carried out by the International Committee of the Red Cross in Cyprus.

5. Since August 1974, UNFICYP has been deployed along the cease-fire lines of the National Guard and the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot forces. These extend across the island from Kato Pyrgos in the west to Dherinia in the east, to a length of some 180 kilometres. The area between the lines varies in width from 20 metres to 7 kilometres. The UNFICYP position in this buffer zone is based on the requirements of the cease-fire called for by the Security Council in 1974. It is the position of UNFICYP that it is an essential element of the cease-fire that neither side can exercise authority or jurisdiction beyond its own cease-fire line or make any military moves beyond the lines. Maintenance of the *status quo* in the buffer zone also includes civilian activities and the exercise of property rights. In this connexion, UNFICYP discharges certain responsibilities with a view to safeguarding the legitimate security requirements of both sides while giving due regard to humanitarian consideration. It must be borne in mind that both parties have reservations regarding the role of UNFICYP in the area between the lines.

6. Though the number of incidents has steadily declined over the years, the cease-fire on the island is still challenged by the two opposing sides. A sample 10-day period during the month of June 1980 shows a total of two violations of the cease-fire by shooting, seven violations of the *status quo* by construction of new fortifications or provocative improvement of existing ones along the lines or inside the buffer zone; movements forward by military personnel, three violations of the air space and six violations of the maritime extension of the cease-fire line. The combination of static observation posts (OPs) and a mobile surveillance system enables UNFICYP to monitor the lines and provide the information necessary to identify violations and the ability to react promptly.

7. In the field of humanitarian and normalization activities, UNFICYP personnel, during the same sample period, were engaged in fire-fighting in the buffer zone some 15 times, undertook two medical evacuations by helicopter and provided general security coverage for agricultural activities in the buffer zone, including agricultural escorts and some 100 man-hours devoted to providing security assistance for the island's anti-malaria campaign. Security arrangements for other civilian activities exceeded 200 man-hours. Furthermore, three convoys, which deliver food-stuffs and fuel, as well as Red Cross parcels, to Greek Cypriots and Maronites in the north, were dispatched. During the 10-day period under review, UNFICYP personnel conducted two “runs” of oxygen and medical equipment from Nicosia south to the hospital at Nicosia north. Four times, in the same period, mail bags from the main post office in the south were delivered to the main post office in the north. Twice during the 10-day period UNFICYP visited the Greek Cypriots and Maronites in the north to deliver social welfare payments, and once UNFICYP visited the Turkish Cypriots still living in the south at Paphos, Limassol and Larnaca. Stand-by and contingency plans for both operational and humanitarian activities accounted for other manpower needs during the 10-day sample period.

8. The operational manpower requirements of UNFICYP have to be analysed in terms of the tasks outlined above and of the workload generated by those tasks; these, in turn, are affected by conditions, military and political, prevailing in the island. The strength of UNFICYP has undergone considerable fluctuations over the past few years, in consequence of changing tasks and conditions. In the second half of 1974 UNFICYP, which a few months earlier had undergone a reduction in strength, was reinforced in order to deal with the hostilities which broke out after 15 July. By August 1974, the Force was 4,444 men strong. During the first six months of 1975 the Governments of Canada and the United Kingdom withdrew part of the additional officers and men they had provided during the events of the summer of 1974, reducing the Force's strength to 3,548. Following the transfer of the bulk of the Turkish Cypriot population to the north in September 1975 and the resulting marked reduction of UNFICYP commitments in the south, the Force strength was further reduced to 3,069 officers and men in November of that year, and to 2,798 by the end of 1976. Those reductions were achieved for the most part by cutting the operational strength of each battalion to two companies. During 1977, the Finnish battalion left Cyprus without replacement; the critical financial situation of UNFICYP was a compelling consideration in deciding on that move.

Since then, the Force has remained some 2,500 men strong. The strength of the UNFICYP civilian police was reduced during the period 1974-1978 from 152 to 34.

9. The concern for a further reduction in the cost of UNFICYP is understandable in view of the relatively calmer situation prevailing along the lines, especially in comparison with the tension which characterized the years 1974 and 1975. As indicated above, this has been continuously taken into account, and a progressive reduction of the strength of the Force has been carried out over the years. It has been argued by some that the current number of minor incidents affecting the *status quo* and the cease-fire may not justify the present deployment of the Force, the implication being that the cease-fire in Cyprus could be made, as it were, "self-sustaining", even if UNFICYP were drastically reduced or removed entirely. The survey team undertook to analyse that argument with great care, since, if justified, it could conceivably make it possible to carry out the mandate at considerably reduced manpower levels and cost.

10. After discussing this aspect of the matter with the Force Commander and Chief of Staff and the five sector commanders, the survey team identified the following elements as being essential in understanding the situation in Cyprus on the ground:

(a) There is still no agreement between UNFICYP and the two sides on the full delineation of the cease-fire lines and the use and control of the buffer zone. UNFICYP has submitted to each side maps showing its own version of the respective cease-fire lines; however, it has not been possible so far to reach full agreement, and considerable stretches of the line are still supervised on an *ad hoc* basis which either side can—and does—challenge on occasion.

(b) Whenever a real disagreement concerning the cease-fire lines exists, the parties continue, to this day, in their attempts aimed at establishing their version of the lines on the ground. At every attempt, UNFICYP promptly intervenes to re-establish the *status quo*. This is all the more necessary as each move of this kind, if not dealt with promptly, almost invariably gives rise to threats of retaliatory action by the other side, with an attendant danger of quick escalation, which could easily spread tension all along the lines.

(c) Even where an understanding concerning the cease-fire lines has been reached, movements forward and encroachments occur.

(d) The contingent commanders have expressed to the survey team the view that the present system of physical presence/observation/reaction, based on a combination of static posts and patrolling, is indispensable in monitoring the activities of both sides and in promptly undertaking corrective action as required.

(e) The visible presence of UNFICYP still appears to be a necessary condition for maintaining the reasonably peaceful atmosphere now prevailing along the cease-fire lines. The survey team was informed that, especially with regard to civilian activities in the buffer zone, the presence of a new observation post or the continuing patrol of the area reduced the opportunities for tension between the two sides. By the same token the removal of the physical presence of UNFICYP personnel from some areas generates a sense of insecurity among the civilian population.

(f) Furthermore, the number of operational incidents which are reported at headquarters level, and therefore made known to United Nations Headquarters in New York, represents only a portion of many more incidents which occur along the buffer zone day in, day out, and which are dealt with and resolved at platoon or company level. These incidents can only be tackled if the Force is deployed along the lines in such a manner that a sufficient number of men can be present at any place on very short notice on a 24-hour basis.

11. In the light of the aspects of the situation listed above, the Force Commander considers, and the survey team concurs in this opinion, that the cease fire in Cyprus is not and, in present circumstances, cannot be self-sustaining. Its maintenance requires a continuous input by UNFICYP which, in fact, strains the present resources of the Force. The current degree of quiet along the confrontation line is, by and large, the result of the Force's presence and efforts in the area. In this connexion, the survey team wishes to recall the findings made by a previous Secretariat survey team, which visited Cyprus in 1969. Despite the momentous events that have convulsed the island during the past 11 years, its observations are still valid and worth quoting:

"A tour of the contingents of the Force in their various positions and deployment areas throughout the island gives the impression of a well organized, highly disciplined and economical operation

in which leadership is good, morale is high and the relations with the local authorities and population of both communities are excellent. The fact that UNFICYP is a good bargain in terms of the improvement in the situation in the island and in the wider context of international peace is emphasized by the contrast between the present relatively relaxed atmosphere in Cyprus and the tension and violence, and the resulting international concern, which prevailed only a few years ago. It should also be noted that as far as costs are concerned, UNFICYP is relatively cheap as military organizations go, because the United Nations does not pay for a wide variety of basic costs, including, in some cases, the daily pay and allowances of the contingents.

"Although the United Nations operation has provided the necessary climate and conditions for a very considerable degree of pacification and normalization of life in the island, it cannot be removed in the present circumstances without a grave risk to continuing peace in Cyprus, with all the accompanying implications for international peace. The concern for a reduction in the cost of UNFICYP is understandable in view of the present peaceful situation in the island and of the fact that the United Nations Force is not as preoccupied with day-to-day incidents as originally was the case. The fact of the matter is, however, that the actual physical presence of UNFICYP and its interposition between the parties in areas of confrontation are at present an essential condition of the reasonably peaceful atmosphere in the island, an atmosphere which is in its turn indispensable to an improvement in the political climate and to the ultimate success of the intercommunal talks. While the basic problems of Cyprus remain unsolved, it would seem highly unwise to make a reduction in the strength and effectiveness of UNFICYP on the basis of the present degree of quiet, which is in large measure a result of its presence on the island.

"Although much progress towards normalization of life in the island has been made in the past year, there are important areas in which little or no progress has been made. From the UNFICYP point of view the most serious of these is the problem of military confrontation between the forces of the two communities. This confrontation is seen in its most acute form in and around the capital city of Nicosia itself, but it exists also in a number of lesser armed confrontations in other parts of the island. It is in these areas that the greater part of UNFICYP is deployed, often in static positions boldly interposed between the military and paramilitary forces of both sides. Until the military posts on both sides in these confrontation areas are removed, the removal of the UNFICYP presence would unquestionably give rise to grave risks of renewed violence." [S/9521 of 3 December 1969, annex I, paras. 5-7.]

III. DEPLOYMENT AND METHOD OF OPERATION

12. The deployment and method of operation of UNFICYP on the ground were examined carefully by the survey team, with a view to determining whether alternative methods more economical of manpower than the present ones might be introduced. As previously indicated, supervision of the cease-fire and of the buffer zone is now based on a combined static observation and patrolling system; the mix varies according to the terrain and nature of the military confrontation prevailing in various parts of the buffer zone. This system involves static observation posts (whose number now stands at 65) that are manned 24 hours a day, 67 observation points that are manned for one or more hours a day, temporary observation posts (standing patrols) that are positioned in areas of threat and tension and mobile patrols that survey the area between observation posts, especially where such posts are not close enough to allow visual contact with one another. The Force Reserve (Armoured Reconnaissance Squadron) is deployed to the several contingents, and its Ferret scout cars carry out daily patrols of the buffer zone.

13. To carry out the mandate laid down by the Security Council, UNFICYP deploys troops mainly in the area between the lines, with base camps both in the north (Danish and Austrian contingents), in the south (British and Swedish contingents) and in the buffer zone (Canadian contingent). This enables the Force to monitor the cease-fire, to prevent minor incidents from escalating, to return to the *status quo ante* if violations occur, and, as necessary, to respond to economic and humanitarian requirements of the civilian population along the cease-fire lines and in other parts of the island where an intercommunal situation exists. As the cease-fire lines cut across

the whole island, there are areas which may be considered more "incident prone" than others. The manpower level in each OP varies according to local conditions in this regard. By and large, however, the military confrontation posture of the two opposing military sides has not relaxed during the past two years.

14. The team, in co-operation with the Force Commander, looked into the possibility of withdrawing some or even most of the observation posts and relying to an increased extent on patrolling. It found that patrolling alone would, in most cases, be less effective than the present system, which enables a given military unit—company or platoon—to familiarize itself with a given area, with the location of the cease-fire lines, with the military personnel of both sides and with the complex network of local agreements concerning access, land cultivation etc. Quite apart from the military aspect, it is necessary to bear in mind that a permanent United Nations presence, such as is provided by observation posts, plays a vital role in facilitating civilian activities, especially farming, in the buffer zone. Reducing or eliminating static posts and instituting more frequent, regular and random patrols would require an amount of manpower comparable to that which is committed under the present combined system, and would result in increased demands on transport, vehicle maintenance etc.

15. As regards humanitarian activities, static observation posts could, of course, be replaced by UNFICYP escorts, which would require the same or greater commitment of manpower. At present, escorts are used regularly in areas which are out of sight of UNFICYP observation posts or where farmers cultivate only intermittently. Using helicopters as an alternative to observation posts or conventional patrols would be helpful, especially in daytime, but prohibitively expensive, and would have to be negotiated with the parties.

16. The team's conclusion was that a surveillance system relying mainly on patrolling was likely to be as expensive as or more expensive than the present one. The problem is compounded by the lack of roads within or parallel to the buffer zone which would allow vehicular access to replace the observation functions of the observation posts. A patrol system would therefore make it necessary to improve the existing UNFICYP patrol track, which in some places (notably the western part of sector I and substantial stretches in other sectors) is non-existent, rudimentary or impassable in winter. Turning the track into an all-weather road, at the present price levels, if a properly prepared route were in existence—which in many places it is not—would cost approximately £C 1.6 million. On this basis the cost of the entire project would be in excess of £C 10 million (including engineering surveys, drainage, levelling, blasting in some areas, bridging and culverts, labour costs, land costs, maintenance and access roads). In the conditions prevailing in Cyprus, a project of this kind would take over four years to complete. In view of the six-month duration of the normal UNFICYP mandate, it would be difficult to justify a financial commitment of this kind.

17. The survey team sought the advice of the Force Commander and the contingent commanders on the question of using sophisticated surveillance devices to reduce manpower needs. The team found that some equipment of this kind, including night-vision, bloomed-lens binoculars, was standard equipment of some of the troop-contributing armies and available to their UNFICYP contingents. However, in the conditions prevailing in Cyprus, it was felt that there was simply no substitute for the physical presence of a United Nations soldier to prevent cease-fire violations and other incidents and to promote normal conditions.

18. The survey team also looked into the possibility of a more radical change in the operating method of the Force. This would involve, in effect, forgoing the comprehensive maintenance of the military *status quo* and ignoring minor changes along the cease-fire lines, such as the odd trench or bunker improvement, the prevention and correction of which, it was argued, require relatively heavy manpower commitments. Under the suggested alternative system, UNFICYP would concentrate on part-time rather than full-time surveillance, seeking to deal with serious encroachments into the buffer zone, as well as significantly provocative military behaviour. It could be argued that in any case UNFICYP does not have the capability to prevent a major attack if either party chose to mount one. It has even been argued by some that the "intimate presence" of UNFICYP may tend to encourage incidents, such as recent instances of verbal abuse or stone throwing, since the parties feel safe from retaliation or significant escalation.

19. In the opinion of the survey team, the approach outlined above, though perhaps feasible in other peace-keeping situations, simply would not work in the conditions prevailing in Cyprus. While minor cease-fire violations may not be important by themselves, they are almost invariably followed by more significant violations, which, in turn, give rise to threats of retaliation by the other side. It is, in fact, the practice of the parties in some areas, whenever an UNFICYP battalion is rotated and replaced by less experienced troops, to "test" the incoming soldiers by calculated minor violations, as if to see how far each side can go and still "get away" with improvements in its positions. Furthermore, any changes, if undetected by UNFICYP for some time, would be treated by those concerned as "established practice", making it increasingly difficult to eliminate them once they became entrenched. Therefore, quite apart from the clear terms of the mandate ("use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting") there is, in fact, no practical alternative to maintaining the military *status quo*: violations, if not nipped in the bud, may tend to escalate rapidly, beyond UNFICYP capability to handle them effectively with its present strength.

20. Something akin to this method could conceivably be envisaged if military observers—who would presumably detect major violations, or be called in on complaint of the parties—were in a position to call upon a substantial reserve force to rush to the scene and interpose between the two sides once a serious incident happened or if escalation seemed to be threatened. This would entail a switch from a pre-emptive to a reactive posture for the Force and would be an expensive and risky way of dealing with the situation in Cyprus, which moreover would not necessarily result in manpower or financial savings. Here, as in the case of the approach outlined in the preceding paragraph, the fact is that it is more economical to prevent clashes than to confront them.

21. Of course, if the attitudes of the parties should undergo a significant change, certain approaches that have not heretofore been feasible could become so, and it might even be possible to envisage changing UNFICYP into a combined military observer-peace-keeping force operation, making possible substantial reductions in strength. The prerequisites for an operation of this kind would have to include most of the following:

(a) Agreed, delineated and marked cease-fire lines:

(b) A cease-fire agreement under which complaints of cease-fire violations would be investigated by UNFICYP, whose findings would be accepted by the parties; to this end, UNFICYP would be granted complete freedom of movement and access along the cease-fire lines, including the use of helicopters and/or fixed-wing aircraft; if possible, completion of the all-weather patrol track:

(c) An undertaking by both sides placing the area between the lines under exclusive UNFICYP observation and control as regards both security matters and civilian activities:

(d) An agreed procedure for visiting and humanitarian support of elements of either community residing in the area controlled by the other community:

(e) If possible, a thinning-out of the forward defended localities of the parties and their partial or complete withdrawal from the immediate vicinity of the marked cease-fire lines, resulting in a less provocative military posture:

(f) A firm commitment, effectively enforced by the parties, to prevent incursions and other cease-fire violations by personnel under their authority:

(g) Agreements, if possible, concerning Varosha and the Nicosia international airport.

22. In the opinion of the survey team, the above requirements could, in practice, be more easily met if some progress were made towards an easing of the present political confrontation, especially if it were found possible for the parties to make some relatively minor political gestures and territorial adjustments. It should be noted in this connexion that a resettlement of Varosha under United Nations auspices would initially require the deployment of some 90 UNFICYP military and additional civilian police personnel. Similarly, reopening the Nicosia international airport under United Nations control would, in all probability, imply full UNFICYP responsibility for security, requiring the deployment, at least initially, of a full infantry company (instead of the present platoon), as well as a civilian police unit. However, these figures are deceptive, since achievement of either one or both of these agreements would, in fact, signify that the Cyprus problem was well on its way to significant progress or even to a solution. A development of this kind

might make it possible in due course to change UNFICYP to a military observer/peace-keeping force, or even to a military observer/civilian police mission, with a view to its ultimate withdrawal.

23. As of now, the political positions of the two sides in relation to the broader problem of Cyprus have a *direct impact* on their positions in relation to the military confrontation and therefore affect the military environment in which UNFICYP has to operate. These positions of the parties go far to explain their attitudes concerning the buffer zone, including their views about any delineation of the cease-fire lines or their demarcation on the ground. Of course, in practice and on an *ad hoc* basis, both sides have tended to co-operate with UNFICYP far more closely than might be inferred from their official positions. This, in itself, is a tribute to the effectiveness of UNFICYP in handling a very volatile and difficult situation, but it does not argue in favour of any drastic reduction or restructuring of the Force. The parties would be unlikely to co-operate with each other as they now co-operate with UNFICYP, which they know they can do without prejudicing their political positions.

IV. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

24. The survey team also examined in detail the organizational structure of UNFICYP, with a view to determining whether a more economical arrangement could be devised. The team found that this could theoretically be done, but perhaps only at the expense of those political characteristics of UNFICYP which distinguish it as a multinational peace-keeping force. These are the very characteristics that have ensured the Force's effectiveness in helping to maintain calm in the island and facilitating the search for a political settlement.

25. The major components of the Force as at present constituted are an international headquarters, five major (and two minor) national contingents, a support regiment and two civilian police units. The major national contingents man the five operational sectors (from west to east—Danish, British, Canadian, Swedish and Austrian). Each contingent provides for this purpose an infantry battalion, numbering from 314 to 468, all ranks. Each battalion comprises a battalion headquarters, a headquarters company which includes administrative/support services and two line companies. Normal national military organization calls for a battalion to comprise four or five companies. Limiting the number of companies to two, as has been done in UNFICYP (see paragraph 8 above), does not entail any significant reduction in the battalion headquarters and administrative support system, the structure and size of which are relatively inelastic.

26. This accounts for the higher than usual ratio of headquarters and administrative personnel to operational personnel in UNFICYP. This ratio could be improved by reducing the number of contingents, since each of the remaining battalions could function efficiently with three or four line companies instead of the present two. Some of the options listed in section VII of this report are based on this approach. It should, however, be realized that the multinational character of the Force would be adversely affected if the number of contingents were further reduced, and it would become more difficult to ensure a proper political balance.

27. As regards financing, reducing the number of contingents may or may not reduce the costs to the United Nations of the Cyprus operation. Some troop-contributing Governments, notably the United Kingdom and Canada, absorb at their own expense all or a major part of the cost of their UNFICYP contingents. Eliminating their battalions would reduce the cost borne by those Governments without producing significant savings for the United Nations.

28. Another logical alternative would entail reducing further the strength of each battalion, and some of the options in section VII are based on this approach. However, as indicated above, battalion headquarters and administrative support services are relatively inelastic. It would, therefore, be necessary in most cases to reduce the number of operational men, with a consequent further increase in the ratio between headquarters administrative and operational personnel, which would be uneconomic and undesirable.

29. Finally, one may seek greater uniformity in the organization and structure of the several battalions, some of which appear to require a larger proportion of administrative and support personnel than others. This approach also turned out, on closer analysis, to provide limited scope for economies. For example, the Canadian contingent, with 228 operational men on the cease-fire lines, has a

"tail"—i.e., administrative/support services—of 146 men, in addition to its battalion headquarters of 98 men. However, the team found that the battalion provided by Canada is a complete regular army combat unit, with full supporting services, most of the cost of which is absorbed by the Canadian Government at no expense to the United Nations. Since it uses its own support services, the Canadian battalion does not utilize the services of the UNFICYP support regiment, thus reducing the burden on that severely strained element of the Force.

30. In certain other cases, the team found that differences in size between battalions reflect differences in national military organizational patterns and traditions, which, by and large, have to be accepted as part of the price for maintaining a multinational force. However, the team considered that where such differences result in substantial additions to the over-all size of a battalion, steps might be considered to correct the disparity, unless the troop-contributing Governments in question were prepared to absorb the extra cost.

31. Another aspect of the organizational structure of UNFICYP to which the survey team gave attention concerns the UNFICYP civilian police (UNCIVPOL). The functions of UNCIVPOL have undergone substantial changes since the events of 1974, especially in view of the present military and population distribution patterns which have minimized the incidence of intercommunal contact among civilians. Accordingly, the strength of UNCIVPOL, which had been increased from 144 to 152 during the 1974 events, has since been cut to 34. UNCIVPOL now performs, by and large, a supporting humanitarian and economic role for the benefit of the members of the two Cypriot communities. Members of UNCIVPOL distribute social welfare benefits and pensions to Greek Cypriots and Maronites in the north, accompany UNFICYP military personnel on humanitarian visits to Greek Cypriots in the north and Turkish Cypriots in the south, and work in co-operation with the local police authorities with regard to intercommunal problems and criminal activities in the buffer zone. UNCIVPOL has two component units, the Australian unit, 20 policemen, which works with the British, Canadian and Danish contingents, and the Swedish UNCIVPOL unit, 14 policemen, which operates in support of the Swedish and Austrian contingents. The survey team found that while the personnel of the two UNCIVPOL units carry out important functions, some of these do not necessarily require police training and could, if needed, be taken over by military personnel. Financial considerations would necessarily play a major role in this regard.

V. CO-OPERATION WITH THE PARTIES

32. In examining the activities and method of operation of UNFICYP, the survey team was struck by the extent to which manpower requirements and costs depend on the co-operation extended to UNFICYP by the parties. UNFICYP is a peace-keeping force and avoids any combat role, subject, of course, to its right to use force in self-defence as a last resort, a right which it has not had occasion to exercise since 1974. Accordingly, UNFICYP peace-keeping functions are mainly discharged by the effect of its physical presence, by persuasion and by occasional interposition.

33. An effective working relationship and clear channels of communication have been established between UNFICYP and both the National Guard and Turkish forces; meetings are held at the Chief of Staff level on a regular basis or as the situation requires, as are meetings of sector commanders. When incidents occur, these are investigated and the results forwarded to both sides on a daily and weekly basis. In most cases, UNFICYP protests of violation of cease-fire are accepted by the parties concerned. In a few other cases, especially in areas where the location of the cease-fire line is disputed, negotiations—some of them protracted—may be needed or standing UNFICYP patrols may have to be deployed. Naturally, manpower levels must provide the capability to deal with incidents as they occur.

34. The freedom of movement of the Force is an essential element in this regard, since restrictions on the use of roads controlled by one or the other of the parties cause delays, sometimes considerable, in bringing in elements of the Force to deal with incidents. This, in turn, causes increased operating costs and manpower requirements, since if UNFICYP personnel cannot be rapidly moved to the scene of an incident they have to be so deployed as not to depend on road transport. Restrictions on freedom of movement, chiefly in the north, also affect the costs of UNFICYP economic activities.

35. The most conspicuous examples of restrictions on the freedom of movement of the Force in the north which have a direct bearing on its costs include:

(a) In the Danish contingent sector, UNFICYP is not permitted to use the road connecting Xeros to Skouriotissa or other roads that cross the cease-fire lines there. Instead, it has to use the longer route running from Xeros to Morphou, Pano Zothia and then westward to Skouriotissa;

(b) The number of vehicles allowed to use the Nicosia-Famagusta road during any given day is restricted, obliging UNFICYP to use the longer Nicosia-Larnaca-Famagusta road;

(c) The route open to UNFICYP vehicles when visiting the liaison posts in the Karpas imposes a detour, requiring additional timing and mileage in certain cases;

(d) There are restrictions on the timing, types of vehicles and procedure for the use of the roads and check-points in the north, which further hamper UNFICYP personnel movement in the area.

36. In addition, there is the problem of the four UNFICYP liaison posts in the Karpas which play a direct role in the humanitarian functions exercised by UNFICYP on behalf of the Greek Cypriots in that area. These liaison posts are situated in villages which at one time were populated by Greek Cypriots; however, as these Greek Cypriots have moved to the south, few are left in the immediate vicinity of the UNFICYP liaison posts. The present arrangement causes considerable inconvenience and additional transport costs to UNFICYP. If a liaison post could be established at Rizokarpaso or Ayia Trias, the main villages now inhabited by Greek Cypriots in the area, UNFICYP would be in a position to reduce the number of such posts from four to two.

37. During its visit to Cyprus, the survey team, referring to persistent past efforts of UNFICYP, brought the above problems again to the attention of the Turkish Cypriot community. The team pointed out that a co-operative attitude by the Turkish Cypriot authorities in this regard would make it possible to rationalize the deployment and functioning of the Force in the north, withdrawing or reducing a number of UNFICYP facilities and installations. This might include, in addition to two of the liaison posts in the Karpas, one observation post at Famagusta (Othello Tower) and certain facilities along the Athna road, which would help reduce the financial and manpower burden on UNFICYP.

38. Another aspect of the impact which the co-operation of the parties may have on the costs of UNFICYP concerns the nature of the humanitarian activities of the Force and the responsibility for meeting the costs involved. The team determined that significant elements of these humanitarian activities in reality were services rendered to the Government of Cyprus and/or to the people of Cyprus of both communities. A substantial portion of the manpower requirements and of the costs incurred by the Force is directly or indirectly attributable to these services. While the resulting manpower and financial commitments come within the broad and flexible terms of the UNFICYP mandate, the primary interest of the Government of Cyprus in the continuation of those services and commitments appeared manifest to the survey team. Among the activities in question, the following may be cited:

(a) Security coverage for agricultural activities in the buffer zone;

(b) Security coverage for Cypriot workers or technicians in the buffer zone;

(c) Making fire-breaks and fire-fighting in the buffer zone;

(d) Hydatid eradication;

(e) Maintenance of water and power lines that cross the buffer zone;

(f) Transporting civilian patients to medical facilities across the line and medical evacuations;

(g) Delivery of medical supplies and equipment across the cease-fire lines;

(h) Transporting mail bags from north to south and south to north.

(i) Assisting both communities in the development of electricity, water and sewage-disposal services, including security and other support for activities sponsored by the United Nations Development Programme;

(j) Livestock transfers and related problems in the cease-fire line area;

(k) Recovery, where possible, of personal and commercial properties from the buffer zone;

(l) Making security arrangements for the performance of religious ceremonies in churches or cemeteries in the buffer zone;

(m) Humanitarian assistance for the Greek Cypriots and Maronites in the north and the Turkish Cypriots in the south:

(i) Supply convoys;

(ii) Transfers to the south;

(iii) Social welfare payments;

(n) Monitoring the restoration of industrial activities in the buffer zone and monitoring warehouses and other commercial buildings in the buffer zone.

39. Preliminary estimates worked out by the team indicated that the above tasks involved UNFICYP in the deployment of military personnel and UNFICYP civilian police who, if employed solely on peace-keeping tasks, could make possible savings in the manpower needs of the Force. Those services have hitherto been carried out at the expense of the United Nations and of the troop-contributing Governments, but in view of the financial situation affecting UNFICYP, the team felt that it would be difficult to justify a continuation of the practice.

40. In addition, the survey team noted that UNFICYP was being charged by both sides for water, electricity and garbage and sewage disposal. The amounts involved are of the order of \$500,000 per six-month period. The team considered that services of this kind might appropriately be rendered to UNFICYP free of charge, bearing in mind in particular, the extensive assistance rendered by UNFICYP to both sides in the upkeep of those services in various parts of the island.

41. During its visit to Cyprus, the survey team on 26 June brought this matter to the attention of the Government of Cyprus, with the object of considering ways in which that Government might henceforth, under appropriate modalities, assume financial responsibility for the costs incurred by the United Nations under the above headings, in a manner consistent with the provisions of paragraph 6 of resolution 186 (1964), with a view to relieving the serious financial situation confronting UNFICYP.

42. It was understood that the matter would be brought to the early attention of those concerned and would be further negotiated with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

VI. UNFICYP FINANCIAL SITUATION

43. The arrangements relating to the financing of UNFICYP were laid down by the Security Council in paragraph 6 of resolution 186 (1964), in which the Council

"*Recommends that the stationing of the Force shall be for a period of three months, all costs pertaining to it being met, in a manner to be agreed upon by them, by the Governments providing the contingents and by the Government of Cyprus; the Secretary-General may also accept voluntary contributions for that purpose*".

44. In accordance with the Security Council resolutions, the Secretary-General has issued regular and special appeals to all Member States or members of specialized agencies to make voluntary contributions to defray the costs of the Force. As of 23 July 1980, pledges of such contributions from 64 Member States and one non-member State totalled \$261.7 million, of which \$258.4 million have been paid. (The details of the pledges made and payments received are outlined in appendix I.)

45. In order to provide contingents for UNFICYP, the troop-contributing Governments divert from national duty troops and other resources at an ongoing cost to them currently estimated by them at \$25.5 million for each six-month period. This figure includes (a) the troops' regular pay and allowances and normal material expenses for which, under existing arrangements, the United Nations is not required by the troop contributors to reimburse them; these therefore constitute costs of maintaining the Force which are being financed directly by the troop-contributing Governments and (b) certain extra and extraordinary costs that they incur in respect of UNFICYP for which, under existing arrangements, the troop contributors would be entitled to claim reimbursement from the United Nations but which they have agreed to finance at their own expense as a further contribution to the United Nations operation in Cyprus.

46. The costs to be borne by the United Nations for the operation of UNFICYP, by major categories of expense, for the periods from the inception of the Force in March 1964 to 15 December 1980 are as follows (in thousands of United States dollars):

I. <i>Operational costs incurred by the United Nations</i>	
Movement of contingents	7 847
Operational expenses	32 678
Rental of premises	7 208
Rations	21 477
Non-military personnel, salaries, travel, etc.	27 263
Total	96 473
II. <i>Reimbursement of extra costs to Governments providing contingents</i>	
	257 882
GRAND TOTAL	354 355

47. It will be evident from this table that approximately 73 per cent of the total cost of UNFICYP to the Organization consists of obligations to the troop-contributing Governments in respect of their contingents. The remainder constitutes operational costs incurred by UNFICYP for the necessary logistic support of the Force, including salaries and allowances of civilian staff and movement of troops between their home countries and Cyprus. The current cost of UNFICYP to the United Nations runs at the rate of approximately \$14.6 million per mandate period. If to this figure one adds the \$25.5 million per mandate period that are absorbed by the troop-contributing Governments, the resulting total—\$40.1 million—represents the aggregate cost of this peace-keeping operation.

48. Voluntary contributions in the amount of \$258.4 million have so far been paid to the UNFICYP Special Account, and of the total of \$3.3 million of outstanding pledges, the amount of \$0.1 million is expected to be paid in the future. In addition, voluntary contributions from public sources, interest earned on investment of temporarily undischarged funds and other miscellaneous income received by the Account have totalled about \$7 million. Accordingly, some \$265.5 million have so far been made available to the UNFICYP Special Account towards meeting the costs of UNFICYP to the United Nations for the periods through 15 December 1980. The difference between this figure and the 1964–1980 costs of approximately \$354.4 million is \$88.9 million. Unless additional contributions from existing or new pledges are received before 15 December 1980, this figure represents the UNFICYP Special Account deficit as of that date.

49. In view of the nature of the financial arrangements in relation to UNFICYP, payments to the troop-contributing Governments in respect of their extra and extraordinary costs for which they seek to be reimbursed by the United Nations can only be made as and when voluntary contributions or other income are received, and after the operational costs incurred directly by the United Nations have been met. During the past several years, the receipts of the UNFICYP Special Account (i.e., voluntary contributions plus interest and other miscellaneous income) have lagged behind costs (United Nations operational costs plus the reimbursement claims of the troop contributors). The aggregate deficit has been rising steadily at an average rate over the past five years of \$3.9 million per mandate period.

50. As a result of this situation, the United Nations has had no alternative but to fall behind more and more in meeting its obligations in respect of the reimbursement claims of the troop contributors. The last disbursement under this heading, made in June 1980, enabled the Organization to meet those Governments' claims up to March 1976. This means that the troop-contributing countries not only absorb at their own expense considerable costs incurred by them in maintaining their contingents but are, in effect, financing the deficit of the UNFICYP Special Account, since their claims in respect of their reimbursable expenses are met only after lengthy delays, which are made increasingly costly by the effects of inflationary developments. If, furthermore, it is taken into account that the troop-contributing countries are also, in many cases, substantial voluntary contributors to the UNFICYP Special Account, it will be realized that those Governments carry a disproportionate burden in keeping UNFICYP in operation.

51. In analysing the financial condition of UNFICYP, the survey team has reached the conclusion that the deficit financing of the Force is creating an increasingly unmanageable situation, especially

in view of the fact that there seems to be little prospect of sizeable additional voluntary contributions becoming available for the support of UNFICYP. There is an evident need to reduce substantially the \$3.9 million gap between UNFICYP costs and revenues incurred during each mandate period, so as to slow down the uncontrolled growth of the deficit in the Special Account and the resulting lengthening of the time-lag between the expenses incurred by the troop contributors and payments to them in respect of their claims. Furthermore, the team notes that reductions in the costs borne by the troop contributors for which they do not claim reimbursement from the United Nations would tend to ease the burden carried by those Governments as effectively as would a reduction of the UNFICYP deficit.

52. In order to achieve a reduction of the UNFICYP deficit, and of the financial burden carried by the troop contributors, the survey team envisages two sets of measures:

(a) Increasing UNFICYP revenues by negotiating arrangements under which the Government of Cyprus would assume a fair share of the costs for services that have hitherto been rendered to it at UNFICYP expense and inviting that Government (and to a lesser degree the Turkish Cypriot community) to waive certain payments (e.g., for electricity and other utilities) for which UNFICYP has hitherto been billed (see section V);

(b) Reducing both UNFICYP costs and the expenditures absorbed by the troop contributors by instituting manpower reductions in the Force to the extent that this may be feasible without seriously impairing the ability of UNFICYP to carry out the provisions of its mandate (see sections VII and VIII). Manpower reductions will thus have to be envisaged both in order to limit UNFICYP costs proper, for which the troop contributors claim reimbursements from the United Nations, affecting the deficit of the UNFICYP Special Account, and in respect of costs absorbed by troop contributors at their own expense. As indicated above, the costs expected to be borne by the United Nations currently amount to approximately \$14.6 million per mandate period, while those absorbed by the troop contributors amount to approximately \$25.5 million per mandate period.

53. In analysing the different options which would reduce the manpower and the cost of UNFICYP, it should be borne in mind that at times percentage reductions in manpower do not correspond to similar financial percentage savings. In the case of troop contributors which provide contingents at no cost to the Organization, a reduction in manpower may represent a saving for the Government concerned but not necessarily for the United Nations. The costs to the United Nations on a man-month basis of the various contingents in respect of which Governments claim partial or full reimbursement from the United Nations vary from \$100 to \$1,500.

VII. OPTIONS FOR A REDUCTION OF THE FORCE

54. In pursuance of its mandate, the survey team examined a number of approaches to bringing about reductions in the over-all cost of UNFICYP, bearing in mind the effects of such reductions on the continued ability of the Force to carry out the functions entrusted to it by the Security Council. Specifically, the team looked into the possibility of making reductions while *a*) maintaining the present posture of the Force, i.e., keeping its operational strength along the cease-fire lines essentially unchanged, or *b*) modifying the present posture of the Force. The team also examined *c*) the effects of UNFICYP of various illustrative across-the-board percentage, budgetary and/or manpower reductions.

Options based on present operational strength of the Force

55. (a) *Rotating contingents every 9 or 12 months.* In the case of contingents composed of volunteer personnel (Austria, Denmark, Sweden), this system would affect contractual and legal arrangements and might impair these Governments' ability to recruit. The financial implication of this option would be to reduce the over-all transport costs by 25 to 50 per cent per mandate. In itself this represents a minimal amount of the over-all cost of the Force.

(b) *Withdrawal of one contingent, with the addition of one rifle company to each flanking contingent or of two companies to one such contingent.* The major effects of this option would be to reduce the number of battalion headquarters to four, while maintaining the same number of infantry companies and therefore operational men

According to which contingent was withdrawn, this option would entail a manpower saving of 6 to 10 per cent. The cost reduction would range from no savings at all to some \$5 million, that is to say, up to 12.5 per cent of the total UNFICYP cost. The option also implies that one or two of the troop-contributing countries would have to be prepared to increase their commitment to the Force upon one Government's withdrawing its contingent. The survey team has had no indication that any of the troop-contributing countries are at this time interested in withdrawing from UNFICYP.

(c) *Withdrawal of two contingents with an offsetting increase of four rifle companies by the three remaining contingents.* This option would reduce the existing high ratio between battalion headquarters personnel and operational companies by reducing the number of contingent headquarters to three, the minimum required for command and control purposes in view of the length of the ceasefire lines. According to which contingents would leave UNFICYP, this would entail a manpower reduction of 10 to 16 per cent. The approximate reduction of costs would be between \$1 and \$10 million, depending on which contingents were withdrawn and which country would provide two extra companies. These figures represent 2 to 24.5 per cent of the cost of UNFICYP.

(d) *Alternating national contingents.* If the three-sector concept under *c* above were acceptable, and if two contributors were prepared to provide battalions with four or five companies each, contingents could alternate every mandate. This option would require the Force to rely on six operational contingents. An efficient ratio between headquarters and operational personnel would thus be established. Such an arrangement would result in a 10 per cent reduction of the present establishment during any given six-month mandate. The financial implications would be the same as in option *c* above, with some additional costs for housing services of rear and advance parties, storage facilities and maintenance teams.

(e) *Multinational battalions.* This option would similarly allow the Force to retain the same number of rifle companies on the line while combining the headquarters and some support elements of two contingents. A combination of the two Scandinavian contingents and/or the two Commonwealth contingents could be envisaged. A combined battalion headquarters and support company would administer four rifle companies, two from each nation or, alternatively, four rifle companies from one nation during a six-month period and four rifle companies from the other nation during the second six-month period. This concept would produce slightly lower manpower savings than would *b* and *c* above, as some duplication of appointments would be unavoidable for national reasons. The international character of the Force would remain unaffected. There would be some problems relating to military and legal practices, pay, diet, equipment, maintenance, welfare and military training. The cost reduction would be approximately \$2.6 to \$3.2 million, that is, 6.5 to 7 per cent of the over-all cost of the Force, depending on the contingents involved.

(f) *Offsetting the cost incurred by the Force in the performance of its humanitarian tasks.* The bulk of these activities, which the Force carries out under its mandate, consists of services rendered to the Cyprus Government and to the people of Cyprus of both communities. The absorption of these costs by the two sides would enable UNFICYP to continue its task on the same level as heretofore (see section V).

Options involving a change in the present structure of the Force

56. (a) *Withdrawal of one battalion without offsetting increases.* This option would entail a manpower reduction of some 12 to 20 per cent, depending on the contingent withdrawn. The Force Commander believes that this solution is not feasible, considering that the Force is already stretched thinly. It would mean the loss of some 200 to 260 men of the 1,150 now deployed along the confrontation line and a reduction in the number of manned observation posts from 65 to less than 50. The resulting increased need for patrolling would further reduce the ability to man the static observation posts. Some essential peace-keeping requirements could not be met. This option would entail a cost reduction of approximately \$3.5 to \$8.6 million.

(b) *Withdrawal of specific units of the Force*

(i) *The Force reserve.* This unit, 119 men strong, consists of an armoured reconnaissance (scout car) squadron. Operation-

ally, five of its six scout car troops, each consisting of four vehicles, are allotted to the several contingents on a daily basis. The sixth troop is held at the squadron headquarters for mechanical overhaul of vehicles and on stand-by for Force contingency plans. This includes protection of the United Nations protected area (where UNFICYP headquarters is located), relief of embassies at Nicosia and evacuation of civilians in an emergency. The survey team explored the possibility of providing the contingents with suitable vehicles to enable them to take over the patrolling task now performed by the Force reserve. This, of course, would make it necessary to curtail drastically various contingency plans for which the Force reserve has been trained. The reduction would imply a manpower cut of 5 per cent but would result in additional costs for vehicles and specialists. Any savings would benefit the United Kingdom, which has been providing the armoured reconnaissance squadron at no cost to the United Nations.

(ii) *Air Unit.* The provision of helicopter lift is based upon a set requirement for a specific number of hours of flying time for the resupply of those observation posts which are not accessible by other means, for emergency medical evacuation, liaison, as well as for stand-by capability for troop movements in case of emergency. The present air support of the Force is provided by the British Army Air Corps Flight, equipped with four Alouettes, and by the 84th Squadron RAF, equipped with four Whirlwinds. The survey team considered that retaining the AAC Flight with the addition of two Alouettes and withdrawal of the Whirlwinds would be marginally more cost-effective than the present arrangements. However, the lifting requirement for resupply purposes to some of the more inaccessible OPs along the lines would have to be borne in mind. The United Kingdom authorities have been requested to carry out an analysis of aircraft available against tasking requirements.

By withdrawing the Force reserve and the 84th Squadron RAF, the operational costs of the Force would be reduced by some \$2.3 million; that is to say, 5.6 per cent of the aggregate cost of UNFICYP to the United Nations and to the troop contributors.

(iii) *Piecemeal reduction of operational commitments.* The survey team looked into the possibility of a reduction of individual posts and limited tasks throughout the Force. A number of specific suggestions were analysed with regard to all contingents which would lead to a manpower reduction of some 150 men and to a cost reduction of some \$2.3 million. This approach would imply a reduction in the number of observation posts manned on a 24-hour basis, a reduction of the contingency planning to which a number of officers and men of UNFICYP are now assigned, a limitation in some of the non-military tasks now performed by the Force and, in general, a stretching of the Force to its operational limits.

(c) *Military observer mission or combined military observer-peace-keeping force.* Changing UNFICYP into an operation of this kind would depend on certain political prerequisites, which, in turn, would presuppose significant changes in the parties' positions and in the conceptions they hold about the military posture required of them. The prerequisites are outlined in paragraph 21 above. The resulting manpower savings could eventually amount to as much as 50 per cent. Cost reductions would be less than that, since additional aircraft and land vehicles would be required.

Illustrative across-the-board percentage reductions

57. The troop-contributing Governments have expressed an interest in a study of the effects of illustrative percentage reductions on the structure and operational effectiveness of the Force. The following, based on an analysis provided by the Force Commander, outlines the effects of 10, 15 and 20 per cent manpower reductions, assuming maintenance of the present five-contingent arrangement:

(a) A 10 per cent cut in sector I (Danish contingent) would necessitate the withdrawal of the platoon now located at Kokkina and of the observation posts around it, or, alternatively, the maintenance of some observation posts around Kokkina, with the reduction of one or two others in the sector. A 15 per cent cut would imply

that all elements of sector 1 currently deployed in the north be repositioned in the south. (However, a move of this kind would entail a considerable write-off in capital investments at Xeros and Limnitis camps, which would have to be replaced by new facilities in the south.) A 20 per cent reduction of the contingent would curtail the number of remaining observation posts, thus leaving no visual contact between them in an area where patrolling cannot readily be done, and would eliminate the capability for humanitarian assistance to both sides.

(b) In sector 2 (British contingent), a reduction of 10 per cent would require the curtailment of humanitarian and economic activities, which are the most extensive in the entire area of confrontation (the *Morphou citrus area*), and would preclude continued UNFICYP surveillance of the arms imported by the Cyprus Government in 1972. A 15 per cent reduction would erode the ability of UNFICYP to patrol the area between observation posts in an area where, owing to the configuration of the terrain and the vegetation, visibility is limited. This would particularly affect the ability of UNFICYP to deal with encroachments (the forces of one side are now trying to encroach over an area of 5,000 metres by 1,500 metres). A 20 per cent reduction would require a cut in the number of observation posts, which are already some 4,000 metres apart, and would further erode the ability of the contingent to deal with any encroachment by either party.

(c) In sector 4 (Canadian contingent), a 10 per cent reduction would affect the capability of UNFICYP in relation to contingency plans, which would include, in a severe emergency, the relief of embassies, security of the United Nations protected area and Nicosia airport. A 15 per cent reduction would, in addition, make it impossible for the contingent to perform any humanitarian task and necessitate a reduction in the number of observation posts, although some mobile patrols could still be carried out. A 20 per cent reduction would necessitate the reduction of headquarters administrative manpower at present provided for the sector's support services. It will be appreciated that all other contingents are supported administratively by the UNFICYP support regiment.

(d) In sector 5 (Swedish contingent), the most extensive of the sectors, observation posts are stretched to control the fertile "golden triangle", as well as the sensitive Louroujina salient and the mixed village of Pyla. A 10 per cent reduction would imply a re-examination of the support facilities in the headquarters company. A 15 per cent reduction would, in addition, force a cutback in humanitarian and economic activities; a 20 per cent reduction would eliminate that capability and, in addition, erode the sector's ability to carry out any mobile patrolling.

(e) In sector 6 (Austrian contingent), a 10 per cent reduction could be achieved by withdrawals from the Famagusta area, both at Varosha and the old city of Famagusta. A 15 per cent cut would require that the observation posts along the sovereign base area road (Athina line) be abandoned, while a 20 per cent reduction would require in addition a withdrawal of the liaison posts in the Karpas.

VIII. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

58. In reviewing the considerations outlined in the preceding sections of this report, the survey team found that the scope for major economies was limited. It will be recalled that, in the opinion of the Force Commander, the reductions that were completed in 1978 brought the operational strength of the Force to near the minimum consistent with the implementation of the mandate. At the same time, it was evident to the team that the financial problems facing UNFICYP and the burden placed on the troop contributors made it imperative to take steps to achieve an improvement of the situation.

59. The course of action outlined below has the concurrence of the Force Commander. It is based on the assumption that the overall situation in Cyprus will remain, by and large, unchanged for the time being, that the Security Council will continue to extend the mandate of the Force on the same basis as at present, that the parties will continue to co-operate and may be persuaded to improve their co-operation with UNFICYP, that the present troop contributors will continue to make available contingents for service with UNFICYP and that voluntary contributions will continue to be received at approximately the same level as heretofore. Naturally, if the political situation in the island should improve substantially—for example, if an agreement were reached on the resettlement of Varosha under United Nations auspices and on initial practical mea-

asures to promote goodwill, mutual confidence and the return to normal conditions—some of these recommendations may, happily, be overtaken by events (see paragraphs 21 and 22 above). Conversely, a further deterioration of the situation is, at least theoretically, also possible; if this should happen, the Secretary-General may be expected to report on it to the Council.

60. The course of action envisaged by the survey team is intended to take into account the necessity of continued implementation of the mandate entrusted to UNFICYP by the Security Council, as well as the need for economies and the views of the troop contributors in this regard. The team, of course, is aware that some of these criteria may be hard to reconcile in practice. Its recommendations are based on a combination of elements drawn from the options outlined in the preceding section of this report. The survey team recommends the following course of action:

(1) *Across-the-board reductions*

A moderate across-the-board reduction in manpower levels, distributed as follows: Danish contingent, 24-34; British contingent, 20-25; Canadian contingent, 32-40; Swedish contingent, 27-34; Austrian contingent, 10-18; UNFICYP headquarters (including international staff), 2-7. This would also result in certain savings in headquarters support services. In order to allow for flexible, and, in certain instances, phased implementation, the above figures provide, in each case, for a range of reductions. Reduction: 115-158.

(2) *Withdrawal of certain units*

(a) *Force reserve.* The survey team considers that if manpower cuts are undertaken in order to reduce the costs of UNFICYP to the United Nations and to the other troop contributors, it would be fair to consider steps, if desired by the Government of the United Kingdom, to reduce the British commitment as well, since that Government provides the largest contingent at no cost to the United Nations, as well as logistic support. The team found that the British battalion in sector 2 and the support regiment are fully employed and, indeed, severely strained. This leaves the armoured reconnaissance squadron (Force reserve), an important and very effective element of the Force (see paragraph 56 b i). While the team is unable to recommend the withdrawal of this key unit, it considers that if a reduction of the British commitment were felt to be imperative, there would be no alternative to such withdrawal, which would produce no savings for the United Nations. Reduction: 119.

(b) *Air support.* If a reduction of the British commitment were desired, it may also be necessary to consider withdrawal of the 84th Squadron RAF Flight, (Whirlwind helicopters). The team was informed that, if the choice had to be made, and subject to the survey requested of the British authorities, the Army Aviation Flight (strengthened by two Alouette helicopters) should be retained by UNFICYP. Helicopters are expensive to operate, but they are essential for resupplying otherwise inaccessible observation posts in sector 1 and for certain important command and control and humanitarian functions (see paragraph 56 b iii). Reduction: 32-34.

(3) *A one-year experimental reorganization*

This could involve alternating two of the contingents at six-month intervals, each of the troop contributors concerned providing an augmented contingent (consisting of a battalion headquarters and four line companies) for one of the two mandate periods in a year, or the withdrawal of one contingent with the addition of two rifle companies to another contingent. While either of these options would be technically feasible and would produce sizeable economies, the survey team has noted that this approach raises a number of unanswered questions and therefore suggests that, if adopted, either solution should be undertaken initially on an experimental basis, subject to review after one year's operation. The team also recognizes that, for a variety of important reasons, the troop-contributing Governments concerned may be reluctant to undertake a reorganization on the scale indicated. It would evidently be for those Governments to weigh the relative importance of the factors involved, bearing in mind, in particular, the financial implications. Reduction: 110-130.

(4) *Co-operation of the parties*

(a) *Negotiating arrangements under which the Government of Cyprus would assume a fair share of the costs of economic and humanitarian services that have hitherto been rendered by UNFICYP free of charge.* For example, the UNFICYP civilian police (Australian and Swedish units) perform functions that come almost exclusively under the heading of humanitarian and economic services for the benefit of the members of the two communities, at

an aggregate cost to the troop contributors and the United Nations of more than \$500,000 (see paragraph 39-42 above).

(b) Negotiating arrangements under which the two sides would absorb the costs of water, electricity and garbage and sewage disposal that are currently billed to UNFICYP (see paragraph 40 above).

(c) Negotiating arrangements with the Turkish Cypriot community to facilitate UNFICYP operations in the north by reducing or eliminating certain restrictions on its deployment and freedom of movement (see paragraphs 35-37 above).

The recommendations outlined above, with their financial implications, are summarized in the table in appendix II.

61. The course of action outlined in paragraph 60 above would, if fully implemented, entail a total manpower reduction ranging from 376 to 441 men, i.e., 15 to 18 per cent of the present strength of the Force. The budgetary implication would be a reduction of some 15.2 to 16.8 per cent of the \$40 million aggregate cost of the operation borne by the UNFICYP Special Account and by the troop contributors, that is to say, some \$6.1 to \$6.7 million. Of these amounts, some \$4 to \$4.3 million would represent a direct reduction of the costs absorbed by the troop-contributing Governments, while some \$2.1 million to \$2.4 million would appear as a reduction of the UNFICYP Special Account deficit, which, as described above (paragraph 50), is now, in effect, financed by the troop-contributing countries themselves. (However, the withdrawal of one contingent—see paragraph 60 (3) above—would give rise to extra costs to the Government providing the two replacement companies.) The approximate figures referred to in this paragraph do not reflect additional contributions for the support of the UNFICYP Account, or waiver of amounts billed, to be negotiated with the Cypriot authorities (see paragraph 55 *f* above).

62. The reduction envisaged by the survey team would allow UNFICYP, with the co-operation of the parties, to continue to perform its major functions, although this would mean stretching the Force to its limits. The team is also aware that the manpower reductions suggested in this report would not make life easier for the officers and men of the Force, who have discharged their demanding responsibilities with dedication and courage and who rightly feel that UNFICYP—the senior peace-keeping force now in operation—can be regarded as a model of efficiency and economy. In the last analysis, the success of UNFICYP in fulfilling its peace-keeping role depends on the United Nations troops in the field and on the willingness of the parties to co-operate with the Force.

63. The survey team considers in this connexion that the time may have come for another effort to persuade the parties to undertake a modification and relaxation of their military posture, which appears to be increasingly out of proportion with any reasonable military requirements. In the opinion of the team, the military and political realities in Cyprus are such that the security requirements of the parties can be met without maintaining the present deployment along the cease-fire lines. Indeed, a reduction in density of the parties' forward defended localities on both sides and some mutual withdrawals could go far to reduce the tension prevailing in the island. It should be possible for farmers to be able to venture into the buffer zone to cultivate their fields, under UNFICYP arrangements and control, without requiring constant observation and escorts. All it would take is a more relaxed attitude on both sides towards innocent civilian activities that cannot conceivably harm their interests. Any movement in the direction of a less virulent military confrontation would enable UNFICYP to consider more substantial reductions in strength than can safely be envisaged at present, and perhaps even a change in the nature of the Force, resulting in significant savings to the United Nations and to the troop contributors and, more importantly, in progress towards the achievement of the purposes of this operation as laid down by the Security Council.

APPENDIX I

Pledges and payments to the UNFICYP Special Account for the period 27 March 1964 to 15 December 1980 as at 23 July 1980

(United States dollar equivalent)

Country	Total pledges	Payments received
Australia	2 319 889	2 319 889
Austria	3 065 000	3 065 000

Country	Total pledges	Payments received
Belgium	3 355 146	3 355 146 ^a
Botswana	500	500
Canada	—	—
Cyprus	2 416 359	2 416 359
Democratic Kampuchea	600	600 ^b
Denmark	3 885 000	3 885 000 ^c
Finland	900 000	900 000 ^c
Germany, Federal Republic of	18 500 000	18 500 000
Ghana	76 897	76 897
Greece	16 950 000	16 950 000
Guyana	11 812	11 812
Iceland	53 157	53 157
India	40 000	40 000
Iran	144 500	94 500
Iraq	40 000	30 000
Ireland	50 000	50 000
Israel	26 500	26 500
Italy	6 381 645	6 347 128
Ivory Coast	60 000	60 000
Jamaica	31 033	31 033
Japan	2 840 000	2 840 000
Kuwait	115 000	115 000
Lao People's Democratic Republic	1 500	1 500 ^c
Lebanon	3 194	3 194
Liberia	13 321	11 821
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	50 000	50 000
Luxembourg	90 711	90 711
Malawi	5 590	5 590
Malaysia	7 500	7 500
Malta	1 820	1 820
Mauritania	4 370	4 370
Morocco	20 000	20 000
Nepal	800	800
Netherlands	2 518 425	2 518 425
New Zealand	71 137	71 137
Niger	2 041	2 041
Nigeria	10 800	10 800
Norway	5 868 265	5 868 265
Oman	8 000	8 000
Pakistan	41 791	41 791
Philippines	11 500	11 500
Qatar	21 000	21 000
Republic of Korea	16 000	16 000
Senegal	4 000	—
Sierra Leone	46 425	46 425
Singapore	7 500	7 500
Somalia	1 000	1 000
Sweden	6 120 000	6 120 000 ^c
Switzerland	4 589 844	4 589 844
Thailand	2 500	2 500
Togo	1 020	—
Trinidad and Tobago	2 400	2 400
Turkey	1 839 253	1 839 253
United Arab Emirates	10 000	10 000
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	56 483 902 ^d	56 483 902 ^d
United Republic of Cameroon	13 567	13 567
United Republic of Tanzania	7 000	7 000
United States of America	122 400 000 ^e	119 221 177
Uruguay	2 500	2 500
Venezuela	18 000	18 000
Viet Nam	4 000	4 000 ^f
Yugoslavia	40 000	40 000
Zaire	30 000	30 000
Zambia	38 000	28 000
TOTAL	261 691 714	258 401 854

^a Payment has been made or will be made by means of an offset against the Government's claims for reimbursement of its costs.

^b Contributions received in 1964.

^c Contributions received in 1967.

^d Maximum amount pledged.

^e Maximum amount pledged. The ultimate contribution will be dependent on contributions of other Governments.

^f Contributions received in 1964-1966.

APPENDIX II

Course of action recommended by the survey team

Action	Financial savings (approximate) (Thousands of United States dollars)			
	Manpower savings	UNFICYP Special Account	Costs absorbed by troop-contributing Governments	Total
A moderate across-the-board reduction ...	Danish 24-34 British 20-25 Canadian 32-40 Swedish 27-34 Austrian 10-18 UNFICYP hqs 2-7	276-390 - - 84-105 293-368 52-94 2-7	29-42 297-372 451-564 222-280 61-109	305-432 297-372 535-669 515-648 113-203 20-70
	115-158	705-957	1 060-1 367	1 785-2 394
Withdrawal of certain units:				
Force Reserve	119		1 770	
Air support	32-34 (approx.)		466-565	
			2 236-2 335	2 236-2 335
A one-year experimental reorganization (alternation of two contingents)	110-130	1 400	670	2 070
Co-operation of the parties:				
(a) Cypriot authorities' contribution to meet the costs incurred by UNFICYP in the performance of its economic and humanitarian tasks				
		Added income (and/or cost reductions) to be negotiated with the Cypriot authorities		
(b) Waiving billings for utilities services				

DOCUMENT S/14275/ADD.1

[Original: English]
[11 December 1980]

In my report of 1 December 1980 [S/14275, para. 57], I recommended that the Security Council should

extend the stationing of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months, and I indicated that I would report to the Council on my consultations with the parties concerned on this subject as soon as possible. I am now in a position to inform the Council that the parties concerned have signified their concurrence in the proposed extension.

DOCUMENT S/14276

Letter dated 28 November 1980 from the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[28 November 1980]

Upon instruction from the Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of a letter from the Secretariat dated 24 November 1980 concerning the American aggressive acts against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

I would be grateful if the afore-mentioned letter were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Awad S. BURWIN
Chargé d'affaires a.i.
of the Permanent Mission
of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
to the United Nations

LETTER DATED 24 NOVEMBER 1980 FROM THE SECRETARIAT FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

In a letter that was issued as a Security Council document on 6 August 1980 [S/14094], the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has previously drawn the attention of the Council and the attention of the non-aligned countries to the aggressive acts committed by the American administration against the people of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, acts such as the provocations by American military ships and airplanes and their violations of Libyan territorial waters and air space as they conduct

on a daily basis listening, jamming and reconnaissance operations. These aggressive acts are compounded by the huge masses of American military airplanes and war ships that roam the Mediterranean Sea close to Libyan shores, and by the vicious media campaigns aimed at discrediting and distorting the image of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

We wish to draw once more the attention of the Security Council to its responsibility towards the continuing provocative and aggressive acts conducted by the United States of America against the people of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. The American administration has escalated its provocative acts against the Libyan people by continuing its reconnaissance operations violating our territorial waters and air space in premeditated provocative acts, and by establishing more naval and air bases on Egyptian land close to Libyan borders and territorial waters. This provocative and aggressive act has reached the extent of sending American aggression forces—the Rapid Deployment Forces—to Egypt and conducting aggressive manoeuvres on Egyptian land close to our borders, manoeuvres supervised by the commander of the American aggression forces.

We believe that the concentration of these naval and air bases in Egypt close to our borders and the above-mentioned aggressive manoeuvres are part of preparations and plans for aggression against us, because these military exercises by the American aggression forces and the bases established close to our borders are directed primarily against us. We do not believe that they have any objective other than preparing

for aggression against us. We also note that these preparations and manoeuvres are accompanied by a vicious propaganda campaign aimed at distorting the facts about our people, deceiving the public opinion and creating a climate for aggression. We very well know that the international community and the peace-loving people will not be deceived by this vicious campaign conducted by the American officials and the American media.

These manoeuvres started on 16 November and concluded on 22 November. During these manoeuvres, in which naval and air forces participated, military planes and ships violated Libyan air space and territorial waters. This unlawful and provocative behaviour by the American administration confirms what we have made plain in our letter about the premeditated aggressive intentions against the people of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya through the continued provocations and violations of its air space and territorial waters, a matter which can lead to the collapse of peace and security in this sensitive part of the world. The United States will be held responsible for this collapse of peace and security.

With regard to this dangerous situation, the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya wishes to submit these facts to the Security Council and retain the right, provided for by international law and the Charter of the United Nations, to take whatever measures that will enable it to defend itself against these provocative acts. The logic of force which characterized these acts and provocations must be faced by the same logic by the Libyan people.

DOCUMENT S/14277

Letter dated 28 November 1980 from the representative of Senegal to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[28 November 1980]

In my capacity as Chairman of the African Group for the month of November, I have the honour to forward herewith for necessary action copy of a letter dated 28 November 1980, addressed to me by the representative of the African National Congress in respect of death sentences passed by the South African Supreme Court on three members of the African National Congress.

I would appreciate it if you could circulate the text of this letter and its enclosure as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Massamba SARRÉ
Permanent Representative of Senegal
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Letter dated 28 November 1980 from Mr. Johnstone Makatini addressed to the Chairman of the African Group

I am instructed to convey to the African Group through you our people's and organization's grave concern over the intended hanging of Messrs. Ncimbithi Johnson Lubisi, 28, Petrus Tsepo Mashigo, 20 and Naphtali Manani, 24, the three ANC freedom fighters who were

recently sentenced to death by the South African Supreme Court for their part in the fight against *apartheid*.

It will be recalled that the three, together with six others, were accused of having conspired with the ANC membership in the planning of the attack on a bank in the white Pretoria suburb of Silverton last January and of having conspired or taken part in a grenade raid on a police station in northern Transvaal.

We are convinced that this trial, verdict and sentence, have the potential of seriously aggravating the already explosive situation prevailing in South Africa. Through its judiciary, the *apartheid* régime has used this case in order to pursue its attempts toward creating a legal precedent enabling it to impose capital punishment on any opponent of *apartheid*, including those who may not have been directly involved in the commission of any violent action. For example, some of the convicted were not in South Africa at the time of the Silverton bank siege, when three ANC freedom fighters—who demanded the release of Nelson Mandela—were, together with two white female hostages, killed by the racist police.

It is therefore clear that the régime is bent on the indiscriminate use of the death sentence in its vain attempt to stem the tide of revolt in South Africa. We are convinced that only swift action can halt this trend which has already been characterized by 67 hangings in 1977 and 131 in 1978; all of the victims were black, excepting one white.

It is for this reason that we request you, on behalf of the ANC and the entire oppressed and struggling people of South Africa, to draw the attention of the Security Council to this grave situation which

can only further aggravate the threat to international peace and security.

It will be recalled that the Security Council, in the face of a similar case, held consultations and mandated the President to use his good offices to alert world opinion and to save the life of a patriot who was facing a death sentence.

We humbly request the same in the case of the above-mentioned.

(Signed) Johnstone MAKALINI
Chief Representative
of the African National Congress

DOCUMENT S/14278*

Letter dated 28 November 1980 from the representative of Israel to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[1 December 1980]

I wish to draw your urgent attention to yet another attempt by PLO terrorists to massacre Israeli children.

On the evening of 25 November 1980, shots were fired on a bus full of children returning from a birthday party to their homes at Kedumim. Two adults accompanying the children were wounded and some of the children were grazed by flying glass.

The following day, the news agency run by the PLO announced that organization's responsibility for this attempted outrage (as quoted by Reuters from Damascus).

This incident, which providentially was not successful, is yet another in the long chain of PLO attacks on defenceless children, who have always been considered a favourite target by the PLO. It evokes grie-

some memories of dozens of attacks by the PLO over the last 12 years on Israeli children from such places as Avivim in 1970, Ma'alot in 1974, Nahariya in 1979 and Misgav Am in April of this year, as well as on Jewish children elsewhere, as at Antwerp in July of this year.

Brutal and cowardly attacks of this kind, whether successful or not, reveal the true character and aims of the PLO, which masquerades at the United Nations and elsewhere under the banner of a "national liberation movement".

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yehuda Z. BUCM
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

* Circulated under the double symbol A/35 669-S/14278.

DOCUMENT S/14279*

Letter dated 1 December 1980 from the Chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[2 December 1980]

I have the honour to transmit to you, for the attention of the General Assembly and the Security Council, the text of a statement issued by me in connexion with the sentences imposed by the Pretoria Supreme Court on 26 November 1980 on nine freedom fighters, which include death sentences on three men.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and the statement circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) B. AKPORODE CLARK
Chairman of the
Special Committee against Apartheid

ASSEX

Statement issued on 26 November 1980 by the Chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid

1. On behalf of the Special Committee against Apartheid, I condemn the brutal sentences imposed by the Supreme Court at Pretoria today against nine freedom fighters.

2. Three of them—Ncimbathi Johnson Lubisi, Petrus Tsepo Mashigo and Naphthali Manani—have been sentenced to death on

charges of high treason and attempted murder. The six others have been sentenced to terms of imprisonment ranging from 10 to 20 years.

3. The nine members of the African National Congress of South Africa were tried mainly in connexion with two incidents in the armed struggle against the *apartheid* regime to which reference was made by the Special Committee in its report to the current session of the General Assembly.

4. On 4 January 1980, freedom fighters attacked the police station at Soekmekaar, northern Transvaal, where the racist regime was furiously opposing an African community.

5. On 25 January, three freedom fighters occupied the Volkskas Bank at Silverton, a suburb of Pretoria, to demand the release of Nelson Mandela, James Mange and all other political prisoners. Police fired and killed the three men.

6. The Special Committee has repeatedly warned that the policy of *apartheid*—unless eradicated by firm international action—will inevitably lead to an escalation of violence. It has drawn attention to the grave consequences of the execution of freedom fighters.

7. The international community has recognized the legitimacy of the struggle of the oppressed people of South Africa and their national liberation movement, including armed struggle, to destroy *apartheid* and establish a democratic State through the exercise of

Circulated under the double symbol A 35 675-S 14279

* Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 22, annex I, appendix 1

the right of self-determination of all the people of South Africa, irrespective of race, colour or creed.

8. The oppressed people of South Africa have courageously demonstrated their support and admiration for the freedom fighters. The funerals of the three men killed at Silverton—Wilfred Madela, Stephen Fanie Mafoko, and Humphrey Makhubo—were attended by tens of thousands of Africans, who declared: "They are not terrorists but heroes: *Amandla (power to the people)*".

9. The freedom fighters, engaged in a legitimate struggle against

a criminal régime, are entitled to the status of prisoners of war under the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols thereto.

10. On behalf of the Special Committee, I call on all the parties to the Geneva Conventions to ensure that the Pretoria régime respects the status of freedom fighters.

11. I appeal to all Governments and organizations to launch an urgent campaign, and take all appropriate measures, to save the lives of the three men sentenced to death.

DOCUMENT S/14280*

Letter dated 1 December 1980 from the Chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[2 December 1980]

I have the honour to transmit to you, for the attention of the General Assembly and the Security Council, the text of a statement issued by me in connexion with the moves taken by the racist régime of South Africa to grant so-called "independence" to Ciskei.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and the statement circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) B. Akporode CLARK
Chairman of the
Special Committee against Apartheid

ANNEX

Statement issued on 26 November 1980 by the Chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid

1. On behalf of the Special Committee against Apartheid, I wish to draw the attention of the international community to the moves of the racist régime of South Africa to grant so-called "independence" to Ciskei.

2. Ciskei has a population of 660,000 Africans, but the South African régime considers another 1,433,000 Xhosa-speaking people outside Ciskei as Ciskeians. The territory has an area of 5,300 square kilometres and has been promised another 3,000 square kilometres: it will comprise only 2.4 per cent of the land area of South Africa. The density of resident population is 126 per square kilometre as against 25 for South Africa.

3. Ciskei is situated in one of the poorest regions of South Africa with hardly any industry and a chronic scarcity of water. It has been suffering from severe drought for several years. About 40 per cent of the total male population of working age leave the territory to find

work, and present unemployment in the urban areas is estimated at 39 per cent.

4. The moves for so-called "independence" are being made in collusion with Chief Lennox Sebe, the so-called "chief minister" of the territory. Tribal chiefs appointed by the racist régime hold two thirds of the seats in the Assembly. Numerous opponents of the unpopular "homeland" régime have been subjected to arbitrary detention and persecution under Proclamation R 252 of 1977 and many have fled the territory. Widespread students protests this year have been ruthlessly suppressed by Brigadier Charles Sebe, Ciskei's intelligence chief, who was formerly a member of the notorious South African Bureau of State Security.

5. A survey of attitudes of Ciskeians, prepared for a Ciskei government commission by Professor Lawrence Schlemmer of the University of Natal in 1979, showed that 90 per cent favoured a one-man one-vote Government in the whole of South Africa. It also disclosed that 84 per cent of those interviewed considered Chief Sebe "a man who is controlled by the South African Government".

6. With the so-called "independence" of Ciskei—coming after the so-called "independence" of the Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda—the racist régime purports to deprive 7 million Africans of their rights of citizenship and nationality. It intends to proceed further with bantustanization in order to consolidate South African white domination in most of South Africa, while relegating the African people, who constitute the overwhelming majority of the population, to client "States" which can be no more than reservoirs for cheap labour and dumping grounds for the aged and the infirm.

7. On behalf of the Special Committee, I appeal to all Governments and organizations to denounce the moves to declare the so-called "independence" of Ciskei. There must not and cannot be any recognition, direct or indirect, of the bantustans and no dealings with them.

8. The oppressed people of South Africa deserve full support, moral and material, in their struggle to destroy the criminal system of apartheid and bantustanization and to establish a democratic society based on the principle of one man, one vote in the country as a whole.

* Circulated under the double symbol A/35.676-S.14280.

DOCUMENT S/14282

Letter dated 3 December 1980 from the representative of Lebanon to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[3 December 1980]

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to your attention the latest aggression committed by Israel against my country.

Between 0050 and 0235 hours, Israeli forces landed between Es-Saadiyat and Damour. Heavy machine guns were used, and artillery shells and rockets were fired from Israeli naval vessels at the coastal area of Jiyeh. During the attack,

helicopters dropped flares and gave support to the aggressors. Preliminary reports speak of many people killed and wounded.

My Government protests strongly against these attacks, which nothing that has been said by the Israelis can justify. The continued cycle of violence exacerbates tensions in the area and can lead to a further deterioration of the situation with grave consequences for peace and security in the region and beyond.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Fakhri SAGHIYYAH
Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the
Permanent Mission of Lebanon
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/14285*

Letter dated 4 December 1980 from the representative of Luxembourg to the Secretary-General

[Original: English/French]
[5 December 1980]

I have the honour to inform you that the heads of State and Government and the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the nine States members of the European Community, meeting in the European Council, issued at Luxembourg on 2 December 1980 the following statement concerning the situation in the Middle East:

"1. The European Council reviewed the action taken by the Nine since the adoption of the Venice declaration on the Middle East [S/14009 of 20 June 1980].

"2. The Council heard the report of Mr. Thorn on the mission which he carried out on behalf of the Nine in accordance with paragraph 11 of the Venice declaration. It noted that the mission had highlighted the great interest aroused by the position taken by Europe and that, in that respect, it had been a success.

"3. The results of the mission confirmed that the principles of the Venice declaration incorporated the essential elements for a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement to be negotiated by the parties concerned. They reinforced the Nine's determination to contribute to the search for such a settlement.

"4. In that spirit, the Council approved the decision of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs to undertake consideration of the matter with the aim of clarifying and giving substance to the Venice principles. That consideration had resulted in the drafting of a report on the principal problems relating to a comprehensive settlement under the following headings - withdrawal, self-determination, security in the Middle East, and Jerusalem.

"5. The report emphasized that the measures envisaged under those four headings should form a

coherent whole and should therefore be coordinated carefully.

"6. The Council indicated its agreement on that approach.

"7. It noted that various formulas were possible to give substance to some of the Venice principles, in particular on the duration of the transitional period leading up to the electoral procedure for self-determination, the definition of the provisional authority for the vacated territories, the conditions and modalities for self-determination, the security guarantees and Jerusalem.

"8. With a view to a more thorough exploration of those formulas and in the desire to encourage a climate more favourable to negotiations, the Council considered it necessary that new contacts should be established with the parties concerned, side by side with continued discussions within the Community.

"9. The Council accordingly instructed the current Presidency to undertake those contacts, in consultation with the Ministers for Foreign Affairs.

"10. The Council also invited the Ministers to continue their discussions with due regard for developments in the situation and to report back to the Council.

"11. The Council has laid down this action programme in order to provide a more consistent platform designed to bring the parties concerned closer together."

I should be grateful if you would kindly have the text of this letter distributed as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Paul PETERS
Permanent Representative of Luxembourg
to the United Nations

Letter dated 4 December 1980 from the representative of Luxembourg to the Secretary-General

[Original: French]
[5 December 1980]

I have the honour to inform you that, at a meeting of the European Council in Luxembourg, on 2 December 1980, the heads of State and Government and the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the nine members of the European Community issued a statement on the situation in Lebanon, the text of which reads as follows:

"The situation in Lebanon, the latest developments in which continue to arouse deep concern, was again considered by the European Council.

"The Nine wish to reaffirm that the unity, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon must be fully respected. That is an essential prerequisite if the legitimate Government of Lebanon is to be able to restore peace throughout the territory. Lebanon belongs to the Lebanese and they alone are responsible for laying down the rules for their coexistence.

"In that spirit the Nine are again calling for respect for the integrity of Lebanon's frontiers and the

security of its population. Indeed, respect for Lebanon's international frontiers is one of the basic elements of security and stability in the region.

"As they stated at Venice on 13 June 1980 [S/14002], the Nine would like the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon to be enabled to carry out the mandate entrusted to it by the Security Council.

"The European Council reaffirms that one of the aims of the action by the Nine for the promotion of peace in the Middle East is the restoration to Lebanon of the integrity of its frontiers and the full exercise of its national sovereignty."

I should be grateful if you could have the text of this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Paul PETERS
Permanent Representative
of Luxembourg
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/14288*

Letter dated 5 December 1980 from the representative of Viet Nam to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[8 December 1980]

I have the honour to forward herewith the note dated 3 December 1980 addressed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China on the Vietnamese proposal to resume the third round of talks between Viet Nam and China at Hanoi during the second half of 1980, and kindly request you to have this letter and its enclosure circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) HA VAN LAU
Permanent Representative of the
Socialist Republic of Viet Nam
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Note dated 3 December 1980 addressed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China

On 6 March 1980, in the note sent by the Chinese Foreign Ministry to the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry [S/13846], the Chinese side unilaterally called off the Sino-Vietnamese talks while saying that the third round of the talks might begin at a time to be decided by the two parties in the second half of 1980.

In the notes of 8 March [S/13837, annex I] and 12 September 1980 of the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, the Vietnamese side clearly expressed its attitude to the continuation of talks between the two countries and advanced concrete proposals about the timing of the third round of the talks. However, the Chinese side categorically rejected those constructive proposals and did not honour its undertaking to hold the third round in the last six months of 1980. Obviously, it is entirely due to the Chinese side that the Sino-Vietnamese talks to resolve problems concerning the relations between the two countries have not yet resumed.

As 1980 is almost at an end, the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry requests that the Chinese Foreign Ministry scrupulously demonstrate a clear attitude towards the Chinese proposal of 6 March 1980, namely that the third round of talks be held at Hanoi during the second half of 1980. The Vietnamese Foreign Ministry requests a prompt reply.

**Letter dated 1 December 1980 from the representative of the United Arab Emirates
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: Arabic]
[9 December 1980]

In accordance with instructions from my Government, I have the honour to draw your attention to the following.

It was with great regret that I learnt of the statement by Mr. Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, published in the French magazine *Le Nouvel Observateur* on 13 October 1980, in which he claimed that the former Shah of Iran had paid sums of money to certain sheikhs in return for their silence regarding Iran's occupation of the islands of Abu Musa, the Greater Tunb and the Lesser Tunb.

While categorically emphasizing the fallacious nature of those allegations, we believe that such statements are detrimental to the reputation of the Government of the United Arab Emirates and to harmonious brotherly relations between the Arab and Iranian Muslim peoples.

The United Arab Emirates once again reaffirms its pride in its strong historic ties with the fraternal people of Iran and its desire to preserve those ties and relations of good-neighbourliness and co-operation with a view to the restoration of security and stability in the Gulf region. While firmly committed to these principles, the United Arab Emirates is also intent on the recovery of its full sovereignty over the three Arab islands, as already affirmed in a letter to the Secretary-General dated 8 August 1980 [S/14111].

In this connexion, we can only call upon the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to make efforts to affirm its good intentions by respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the States in the region and by renouncing the method of defamation and vituperation which will not help to solve any problem. We also call upon the Iranian Government to restore to its legitimate owners what was taken away by force by the régime of the former Shah. This can be achieved through the initiation of a serious dialogue between the two countries.

The United Arab Emirates is perfectly willing to negotiate with the Iranian Government with a view to putting a final end to this problem on the basis of the recognition of the full sovereignty of the United Arab Emirates over the three above-mentioned islands in conformity with the principles and the Charter of the United Nations and of serious endeavours to promote relations of good-neighbourliness and non-interference in the internal affairs of States in a spirit of brotherly Islamic understanding.

I should be grateful if you would kindly have this letter circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Fahim Sultan AL-QASIMI
Permanent Representative
of the United Arab Emirates
to the United Nations

* Circulated under the double symbol A 35 727 S 14290.

DOCUMENT S/14291*

**Letter dated 8 December 1980 from the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the
Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People to the Secretary-General**

[Original: French]
[9 December 1980]

I have the honour to refer to the letter dated 19 November 1980 [S/14261], addressed to you by the Acting Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People concerning the outrage attack by the Israeli Government in the Palestinian territories illegally occupied by Israel.

The Israeli Government, not content with firing on the students of Bir Zeit University, has now given further proof of its arrogance and disregard for world public opinion by arresting Mr. Gabbi Baramki, President of Bir Zeit University, probably under the pretext that he allowed the students to observe a "Palestine Week".

It is obvious that the Israeli authorities have now stopped pretending that they were guided by national

security requirements on that occasion, and that they are overtly repressing any attempt by the Arab inhabitants of the occupied territories to express their political opinions. That is simply one more example of the violation by Israel of the fundamental principles of international law.

The Committee is seriously concerned about the pursuit by the Israeli Government of such a policy, which is bound to exacerbate tension in the region and constitute a serious threat to international peace and security.

I should be obliged if you would have the text of this letter distributed as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Falilou KANI
Chairman of the Committee on the
Exercise of the Inalienable Rights
of the Palestinian People

* Circulated under the double symbol A 35 728 S 14291

Letter dated 9 December 1980 from the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[10 December 1980]

I have the honour to refer to my letter dated 24 October 1980 [S/14235] regarding the action taken by the Government of Israel in respect of the Mayors of Al-Khalil (Hebron) and Halhoul whom it had illegally expelled from the occupied territories.

As is now known, the Government of Israel has insisted on maintaining its defiance of Security Council resolutions 468 (1980) and 469 (1980) and has confirmed its previous illegal decision to expel the two mayors.

On behalf of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, I wish to express our gravest concern at this continued defiance by the Israeli authorities of international opinion and of the resolutions of the Security Council. It is now more than ever clear that it should be forcefully

brought to the notice of the Government of Israel that it should abide by its obligations to the Organization.

Such defiance and the repeated display of cynicism and arrogance on the part of Israel should be strongly censured by the international community and firm action should be taken by the Security Council in insisting that the Mayors should be permitted to return to their homes and families, in accordance with the specific requests contained in Security Council resolutions 468 (1980) and 469 (1980).

I should be glad if this letter were circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Falilou KANE
Chairman of the
Committee on the Exercise of the
Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People

* Circulated under the double symbol A/35/740-S/14292.

DOCUMENT S/14295

Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for the period 13 June to 11 December 1980

[Original: English]
[12 December 1980]

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ANNEX

Map. "UNIFIL deployment as of December 1980" (see end of volume).

INTRODUCTION

1. The present report contains an account of developments relating to the functioning of the United

Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for the period from 13 June to 11 December 1980. Some of the information contained in this report was submitted to the Security Council in my special report on the incidents which occurred within and adjacent to the UNIFIL area of operation during the period extending from 18 to 20 August [S/14118]. The purpose of the present report is to provide the Council with a comprehensive picture of the activities of UNIFIL in pursuance of the mandate laid down by the Council in its resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) and extended or reaffirmed by resolutions 434 (1978), 444 (1979), 450 (1979), 459 (1979), 467 (1980) and 474 (1980). The last extension of the Force's mandate, as decided by the Council in resolution 474 (1980), was for a period of six months, until 19 December 1980.

2. The activities of UNIFIL since its inception up to 12 June 1980 are outlined in the Secretary General's periodic reports on the Force to the Security Council [S/12845, S/13026, S/13384, S/13691 and S/13994].

I. COMPOSITION AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE FORCE

A. COMPOSITION AND COMMAND

Composition

3. The composition of UNIFIL as of 11 December 1980 was as follows:

Infantry battalions

Fiji.....	619
Ghana.....	782
Ireland.....	596
Nepal (UNIFIL headquarters).....	10
Netherlands.....	848
Nigeria.....	696
Norway.....	660
Senegal.....	576

Headquarters camp command

Ghana.....	75
Ireland.....	49

Logistic units

France.....	735
Italy.....	34
Norway.....	175
Sweden.....	144
TOTAL.....	5 999

4. In addition to the above personnel, UNIFIL is assisted by 71 military observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO).

5. The following unit adjustments were effected during the period covered by this report:

(a) The French logistic unit was reinforced by a detachment of 68, all ranks, for the purpose of enhancing the security of this unit and UNIFIL headquarters;

(b) It was necessary to effect slight reductions in the strength of all battalions to allow for the deployment of the French reinforcement;

(c) The Ghanaian battalion assumed full operational responsibility for the area formerly controlled by the Nepalese battalion;

(d) The Norwegian medical company was replaced by a Swedish unit of equivalent strength;

(e) A Ghanaian work services platoon of 20, all ranks, joined the Force.

Command

6. Command of UNIFIL continues to be exercised by Major-General Emmanuel A. Erskine. Major-General Erkki Rainer Kaira, Chief of Staff of UNTSO, continues to perform general liaison functions regarding United Nations peace-keeping activities in the Middle East in addition to his normal tasks.

Rotation of contingents

7. During the reporting period, French, Ghanaian, Irish, Italian, Nigerian, Norwegian and Senegalese contingents carried out full rotations. The Netherlands and Fijian battalions are rotated at a frequency different from that of other battalions.

Casualties

8. During the period covered by this report, five members of the Force lost their lives, three of natural causes and two as a result of accidents. Thirty-four others were injured, four in firing incidents and the rest owing to accidents.

9. Since UNIFIL was established, 23 members of the Force have died in the course of operational duties. Eighteen others have lost their lives as a result of

accidents and six have died of natural causes. Seventy-eight members of the Force have been wounded in armed clashes.

Discipline

10. The discipline, understanding and bearing of the members of UNIFIL, who have continued to work in difficult and often dangerous conditions, have been of a high order, reflecting credit on the soldiers and their commanders, as well as on the countries that contribute contingents to the Force.

B. DEPLOYMENT

11. There have been some changes in the deployment of the Force since the presentation of my last report [S/13994]. It may be recalled that, following the withdrawal in May of the Nepalese battalion, the Ghanaian contingent was reinforced and a joint Ghanaian-Norwegian command was provisionally set up in the area formerly controlled by the Nepalese battalion. In the course of the present reporting period, the joint command was dismantled, and the Ghanaian troops assumed full responsibility for that area.

12. Another change was the withdrawal of the Norwegian medical company on 21 August and its replacement by a Swedish unit.

13. UNTSO military observers continued to man the five UNTSO observation posts (Lab. Hin, Ras, Mar, Khiam) along the Israel-Lebanon armistice demarcation line. In addition, five UNTSO teams assist UNIFIL in the fulfilment of its mandate: namely, a team based at Metulla, which serves as liaison to the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) in that locality and to the *de facto* forces; a team based at Tyre, serving as liaison with local representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); the Lebanese National Movement and the Lebanese Shiite armed organization AMAL; three mobile teams, whose functions are to prevent and investigate incidents.

14. The present deployment of UNIFIL is as follows (see annexed map):

(a) The Force headquarters is located at Naqoura;

(b) The Senegalese battalion is deployed in the northern part of the western sector, with its headquarters at Marakah;

(c) The Fijian battalion is deployed in the southern part of the western sector, with its headquarters at Qana;

(d) The Nigerian battalion is deployed in the northern part of the central sector, with its headquarters at Tayr Zibna;

(e) The Netherlands battalion is deployed in the south-western part of the central sector, with its headquarters at Haris;

(f) The Irish battalion is deployed in the south-eastern part of the central sector, with its headquarters at Tibnin;

(g) The Ghanaian battalion is deployed as follows:

(i) About half of the battalion in the eastern part of the central sector, with its headquarters at Kafr Dunin;

(ii) The remainder in the western part of the eastern sector, with headquarters at Blate;

(h) The Norwegian battalion is deployed in the eastern part of the eastern sector, with its headquarters at Ebel es-Saqi;

(i) The headquarters camp command, composed of Ghanaian and Irish troops, is based at Naqoura;

(j) The French logistic component is located at Naqoura;

(k) The French engineer company is located at Al-Hinniyah;

(l) The Norwegian maintenance company is located in the vicinity of Tibnin;

(m) The Italian helicopter wing is based at Naqoura;

(n) The Swedish medical company is located at Naqoura;

(o) UNTSO military observers, organized as Observer Group Lebanon and based at Naqoura, man all five UNTSO observation posts;

(p) A guard detachment is stationed in Tyre barracks; this 45-man unit from one battalion continues to be drawn on a two-week rotation basis from all infantry battalions in the Force.

(q) The military police company is based at Naqoura; it functions throughout the UNIFIL area of operation and outside of it as required.

15. The Lebanese national army battalion of 617, all ranks, continued to perform its duties in the UNIFIL area of operation. This unit is under the operational control of the Force Commander, and its members are involved in patrolling and in the manning of observation posts and check-points jointly with UNIFIL troops.

16. During the period under review, Lebanese army units attached to UNIFIL battalions in the western and central sectors were increased from one to two platoons. Furthermore, a request by UNIFIL for medical and engineering Lebanese army personnel to serve in the UNIFIL area of operation has so far resulted in the arrival of 10 engineers, who have been attached to the French engineer company. Contacts are continuing with the Lebanese authorities in regard to this and related matters.

II. ACCOMMODATION AND LOGISTICS

A. ACCOMMODATION

17. Progress continued to be made in improving accommodation facilities at UNIFIL headquarters at Naqoura. During the period under review, work was completed on the construction of three warehouses and four walk-in freezers for the French logistic battalion, as well as of two workshops for the transport section and of a sports complex. In the transport section, the computerization of the records of the vehicle fleet neared completion. Further, the sewage system was completed and an all-purpose workshop with carpentry, paint, welding and plumbing facilities was built. The increased requirement for electric power at Naqoura camp made it necessary to install four large generators. A new, high-capacity power distribution network will be established shortly.

18. The programme to build prefabricated accommodation facilities as well as workshops and warehouses in the battalion areas has continued. With the

onset of the rainy season, efforts are being stepped up to move the few remaining men at present under tents to prefabricated installations. As in the past, battalion engineers, assisted by the French engineer company as required, have erected most of these buildings on a self-help basis. Though UNIFIL is pursuing its efforts to widen the network of contractual arrangements with Lebanese firms, progress is often hindered by the prevailing tension in the area, which frequently results in the closing of roads and the imposition of restrictions on the freedom of movement to and from the area of operation. During the reporting period, Lebanese contractors were responsible for erecting a total of 47 prefabricated buildings. In addition, contracts were entered into for the construction of two workshops, three ammunition stores and for the asphaltting of approximately 8,300 square metres of access roads and parking areas.

19. As regards communications, teleprinter terminals have been installed in all battalion headquarters. The establishment of the microwave system is progressing well with four complete terminals in the UNIFIL area of deployment and one on Mt. Hermon; only two terminals are outstanding and these will be installed by the end of the present mandate period. As a result of this work all battalions will have access to the UNIFIL automatic voice telephone exchange.

B. LOGISTICS

20. Logistic support for UNIFIL continues to be provided by a headquarters logistic branch, a French logistic component, a Norwegian maintenance unit, an Italian helicopter wing and a Swedish medical company, which arrived in the area last August to replace the Norwegian unit [*ibid.*, para. 18].

21. In my report of 12 June 1980, I informed the Security Council of efforts by UNIFIL to increase purchase of supplies from Lebanese sources or through Lebanon [*ibid.*, para. 19]. Further progress has been made during the present reporting period. In regard to food supplies, all containers with dry rations from Cyprus have continued to come through Beirut harbour or Beirut international airport. Fresh rations for all units in the UNIFIL area of deployment are now supplied from Lebanese sources; only the units in Naqoura and the headquarters depend on Israel for fresh food. Containers with frozen food, however, continued to arrive at Haifa owing to the lack of suitable installations at Beirut. In the maintenance sector, contact has been made with a Lebanese firm which is able to procure spare parts and also undertake repair of components for Land Rover vehicles. Should the Council approve renewal of the UNIFIL mandate, a contract will be signed with this firm. A survey is under way to locate garage and workshop facilities capable of overhauling and rebuilding equipment which is beyond the capacity of the Norwegian maintenance company. Orders for repair and maintenance work have been placed with a number of companies at Beirut, Sayda and Tyre on a trial basis. Arrangements with Lebanese contractors were also made for the provision of other services such as laundry and cleaning.

22. UNIFIL hospital at Naqoura provided, as in the past, health services to Force personnel. In con-

junction with the battalions' medical centres, it continued to treat the local population as required. The hospital is well equipped for surgery. Laboratory and X-ray facilities have now been improved. During the period under review, the Naqoura hospital's outpatient department treated some 2,600 UNIFIL patients and 1,800 Lebanese civilians. There were also some 290 UNIFIL and 130 non-UNIFIL in-patients. The drugs used in the treatment of UNIFIL personnel and Lebanese civilians have been provided by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF).

23. A significant development in the public health area was the rehabilitation, with United Nations assistance, of the Tibnin hospital, which is expected to re-open shortly. Fourteen physicians have been recruited, some of them part-time. One hundred and four beds are available. As noted above, the battalions' medical centres continued to treat civilians as required. Concerning the dispensaries at Qana, Marakah, Ett Taibe and Chebaa, established by UNICEF in co-operation with the Lebanese Government and UNIFIL, it is worth noting that Lebanese staff are now working in all four of them, with UNIFIL medical personnel continuing to assist when requested [*ibid.*, paras. 22 and 23]. The vaccination programme for children in the UNIFIL area of operation is now run by the Lebanese Ministry of Health.

24. As in the past, UNIFIL personnel or Lebanese civilians wounded in the area as a result of shelling or accidents were evacuated by United Nations helicopter to the hospital at Naqoura. During the present reporting period, there have been 25 such evacuations. The services of Rambam Hospital at Haifa remain available for emergency cases which cannot be treated at the UNIFIL hospital. In this connexion, appreciation is reiterated to the Israeli Government for the assistance provided by Israeli health authorities for the treatment of wounded UNIFIL personnel, especially at Rambam Hospital, and also for expediting the entry and administrative processing of shipments consigned to the Force in transit through Haifa harbour.

III. FUNCTIONS AND ACTIVITIES OF THE FORCE

A. GUIDELINES AND TERMS OF REFERENCE

25. The guidelines for the operation of UNIFIL are set out in the Secretary-General's report on the implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978) [S/12611], which was approved by the Council in its resolution 426 (1978). According to that report, UNIFIL was envisaged as a two-stage operation. In the first stage, the Force was to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory to the international border. Once that was achieved, UNIFIL was to establish and maintain an area of operation. In that connexion, the Force was to supervise the cessation of hostilities, ensure the peaceful character of the area of operation, control movement and assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its authority in the area.

B. CO-OPERATION WITH UNTSO

26. Military observers of UNTSO, organized as Observer Group Lebanon continued to assist and co-operate with UNIFIL in the performance of its tasks

under the institutional and operational arrangements described in my reports of 12 January 1979 [S/13026, para. 14] and 12 June 1980 [S/13994, paras. 26 and 27]. During the period under review, there were no changes in the operational assignments linking UNTSO and UNIFIL.

27. During the period under review, continuous efforts were made towards the reactivation of the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission (ILMAC) in accordance with resolution 467 (1980), in which the Security Council requested the Secretary-General, *inter alia*, to convene a meeting, at an appropriate level, of ILMAC to agree on precise recommendations and further to reactivate the General Armistice Agreement conducive to the restoration of the sovereignty of Lebanon over all its territory up to the internationally recognized boundaries. As indicated in my last report [*ibid.*, para. 28], steps were taken immediately by me and, upon my instructions, by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO to implement that provision.

28. Following initial discussions with the parties, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO proposed a meeting at Naqoura on 14 July preliminary to the convening of ILMAC. This meeting did not take place, however, as agreement could not be reached on its venue and nature. Further discussions were held with the parties, during which Israeli representatives maintained the position that ILMAC was no longer valid but indicated that they would welcome a meeting with representatives of the Lebanese Government. The Chief of Staff of UNTSO informed the Israeli authorities that the Lebanese Government considered the 1949 General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Lebanon as still valid and that ILMAC constituted the framework under which the Lebanese Government could authorize its representatives to meet with representatives of the Government of Israel. It was further indicated to the Israeli authorities that, in the absence of a decision by mutual consent of the signatories, or by the Security Council or the General Assembly, the position of the United Nations was that the General Armistice Agreement and ILMAC remained valid. It was further pointed out that the Security Council had reaffirmed the validity of the General Armistice Agreement and had called upon the parties to take the necessary steps to reactivate ILMAC. In this context, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO proposed on 18 November that the meeting be held on 1 December at Naqoura. On 25 November, the Lebanese authorities replied, indicating that they agreed to the proposed date for the preparatory meeting of ILMAC at Naqoura. They requested the presence of the ILMAC Chairman throughout that meeting. On 26 November the Israeli authorities replied, stating that they held that ILMAC was no longer valid, and, as far as Israel was concerned, the proposed meeting could therefore not be regarded as preliminary meeting of ILMAC. They added, however, that this should not stand in the way of a meeting between Israeli and Lebanese representatives at the appropriate level, and that they agreed, therefore, to meet with the Lebanese representatives on the date and at the venue suggested.

29. In these circumstances, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO convened the meeting at Naqoura on 1 December. In this connexion, it may be recalled that he has a dual capacity as head of UNTSO and Chairman

of ILMAC. The meeting, presided over by him, was conducted in a business-like manner. Israel and Lebanon were represented by senior military officers. The Israeli delegation reiterated its position that Israel no longer recognized ILMAC since, in its view, the Armistice Agreement had expired in 1967. The Lebanese delegation held that the Armistice Agreement was still in force and it was their aim, through that and future meetings, to reactivate ILMAC and to implement the Armistice Agreement fully. The representatives also discussed the situation in southern Lebanon, particularly along the border. In that connexion, the Lebanese representative complained about the establishment of IDF positions in southern Lebanon and incursions by IDF personnel into Lebanese territory, and the Israeli representative stated that Israel had no design on Lebanon. The Chief of Staff of UNTSO is keeping contact with both sides with a view to arranging another meeting in the near future.

C. CONTACTS WITH THE PARTIES

30. Contacts with the parties concerned have been maintained both at United Nations Headquarters and in the area, with a view to further implementing the UNIFIL mandate. In addition, UNIFIL has maintained close contacts with the United Nations Co-ordinator of Assistance for Reconstruction and Development of Lebanon, Mr. Iqbal A. Akhund, and actively participated in meetings of the joint Co-ordinating Committee and its working group set up by Mr. Akhund at Beirut. Co-operation between Mr. Akhund's office and UNIFIL has been strengthened in the light of the agreement signed on 14 October between UNICEF and the Council for Development and Reconstruction on the execution of projects relating to water supply and the repair and construction of schools and hospitals in southern Lebanon. These projects will be executed by UNICEF in close co-operation with UNIFIL and under the over-all co-ordination of the United Nations Co-ordinator.

31. As in the past, the headquarters of ILMAC at Beirut functioned as a liaison office for UNIFIL and provided valuable assistance to the Force. The services of the Director of the United Nations Information Centre at Beirut, Mr. Samir Sanbar, continued to be most useful to UNIFIL.

32. General Erskine and his senior staff have been in continuous contact with the parties on matters concerning the deployment and functioning of the Force. To that end, they have continued to meet at regular intervals with high Lebanese officials, the Prime Minister and the army Commander in particular. UNIFIL continued to maintain regular contacts with the Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Meetings with other officials have also been arranged on an *ad hoc* basis, for instance with the Minister of Education to discuss educational problems affecting the UNIFIL area of operation. The Minister of Health has also been contacted on matters involving UNIFIL assistance to the Lebanese Government in that particular field. UNIFIL continued to maintain regular contacts with the Governor of southern Lebanon on questions relating to the restoration of the Lebanese civilian administrative presence in southern Lebanon, the solution of problems involving civil offences and crimes

that occasionally arise in the UNIFIL area of deployment and the provision of humanitarian assistance to the local population. Similar contacts continued to be maintained with civilian and gendarmerie authorities at Tyre, as well as in the UNIFIL area of deployment, and with the local inhabitants in general. UNIFIL remained in close touch with the senior Lebanese army liaison officer, who is now based at Qana.

33. In the area of operation, negotiations and consultations were held by members of UNIFIL with the various armed groups, as required, to ensure the smooth functioning of the Force and to reduce the risks of confrontation and armed clashes. It is relevant to mention that, during the reporting period, liaison arrangements were established with AMAL. Such arrangements are in accordance with the policy of UNIFIL to establish itself by firmness, restraint and persuasion, and to promote confidence and reach workable understandings, on a practical basis, with all of the groups in and around the area. Contacts with the various armed groups were generally undertaken by UNIFIL headquarters staff, through military observer teams, and through contacts by the battalion commanders. The battalion commanders investigated local violations of the cease-fire and all other situations involving incidents which might have led to hostile activities within the UNIFIL area of operation. The office of the Chief of Staff of UNTSO has maintained contact with the Israeli authorities as necessary on matters pertaining to UNIFIL.

D. SITUATION IN SOUTHERN LEBANON AND ACTIVITIES OF THE FORCE

34. The situation as of 12 June 1980 was described in my last periodic report. After examining that report, the Security Council, on 17 June, adopted resolution 474 (1980), in which it renewed the mandate of UNIFIL for a further period of six months and reiterated its commitment to the full implementation of the mandate of UNIFIL throughout its entire area of operation up to the internationally recognized boundaries, according to the terms of reference and guidelines as stated and confirmed in the appropriate Council resolutions. I regret to say that, in spite of intensive efforts made both at United Nations Headquarters and in the field, continuing difficulties have prevented progress in that direction. During the period under review, the activities of the armed elements (mainly the PLO and the Lebanese National Movement), the *de facto* forces (Christian and associated militias) and the IDF in and near the UNIFIL area of operation continued and, in some cases, intensified. Some of the main incidents which took place are described below.

Incidents involving the armed elements

35. The armed elements continued their attempts at infiltration into the UNIFIL area of deployment. UNIFIL troops intercepted or turned back 116 infiltrators during the second half of June, 49 in July, 42 in August, 44 in September, 59 in October, 63 in November and 11 in the first 10 days of December. Although, after a temporary upsurge in June, the number of infiltrators did not vary significantly during the following months, there was a definite hardening of

position on the part of certain groups of the armed elements towards UNIFIL and an increase in the number of incidents involving them in the UNIFIL area during and after August.

36. In August armed elements belonging to the Arab Liberation Front established a position in the vicinity of Jwayya in the Senegalese sector, and in October another position was set up by armed elements belonging to Al-Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine near Qana in the Fijian sector. The local UNIFIL units exerted their best efforts to have these positions removed. The matter was also taken up by the United Nations both with the PLO leadership at Beirut and in New York. However, at the time of reporting, the two positions have not yet been removed.

37. There were several incidents involving armed elements and UNIFIL personnel, particularly during the latter part of the reporting period. Some of the more serious incidents are outlined below:

(a) On 28 June, the Fijian battalion headquarters at Qana came under fire from unidentified armed elements; the Fijian troops returned fire and, in the ensuing exchange, each side fired approximately 200 rifle rounds.

(b) On 12 August, armed elements fired approximately 500 small arms and heavy machine-gun rounds as well as 10 rocket-propelled grenades at a Netherlands position near the village of As-Siddiqin; Netherlands soldiers returned fire with approximately 100 small arms and heavy machine-gun rounds.

(c) On 25 August, armed elements fired about 50 heavy machine-gun rounds close to Tyre barracks manned by UNIFIL troops.

(d) On 15 October, in incidents related to the discovery by Fijian troops of an armed elements position near Qana (see paragraph 36 above), there was an exchange of fire between Fijian soldiers and armed elements. Later, on 31 October, armed elements manning that position attacked the Fijian check-point near Qana with rifle fire and rocket-propelled grenades. On the same day, a group of Netherlands soldiers conducting their daily patrol in the Mazra'at al-Mushrif area in the Netherlands sector was detained for some 30 minutes by armed elements carrying heavy machine-guns and rocket-propelled grenades. The next day, a Netherlands patrol was ambushed by some 10 armed elements in the same area and their three vehicles taken away. Subsequently, the PLO apologized for this incident and offered to compensate UNIFIL for the damage done to the hijacked vehicles.

(e) On 25 October, an Irish position to the west of Bayt Yahou detected movement of intruders in the area. The intruders, suspected to be armed elements, opened rifle and light machine-gun fire on the Irish position, with 30 rounds hitting the position directly; Irish soldiers returned fire with about 100 rifle rounds. In the same incident, the intruders also directed their fire at the position set up by the *de facto* forces at Bayt Yahou, which responded with heavy machine-gun fire, some of the rounds hitting the Irish position.

(f) The latest serious incident developed shortly after UNIFIL had established a new position near Wadi Jilu in the Fijian sector, on one of the main roads of access from Tyre. On 8 December the local PLO

leadership asked that the position be removed, and this request was refused by UNIFIL. The next day a sizeable group of armed elements was brought into the area and surrounded the position. UNIFIL immediately strengthened the threatened position and deployed the force reserve in the vicinity. Following intensive negotiations, most of the armed elements withdrew and a serious clash was averted. At the time of reporting, a tense situation still prevailed in the area, and discussions were continuing to have the remainder of the group removed.

38. There were also firings by armed elements at UNIFIL helicopters on a number of occasions. On 2 July, a helicopter on a medical evacuation mission from Tibnin was fired upon by armed elements near As-Siddiqin and had to make an emergency landing after being hit by a bullet. On 23 and again on 29 September, UNIFIL helicopters on the Beirut-Naqoura run were fired at by armed elements in the Tyre area. On 14 October, a UNIFIL helicopter, having on board the Force Commander, was hit by an unidentified projectile while flying off the Tyre coastal area. On 29 November, another UNIFIL helicopter flying from the UNIFIL headquarters to the Nigerian battalion headquarters at Tayr Zibna on a medical evacuation mission was shot at by armed elements. All the firings by armed elements at UNIFIL personnel or its helicopters were the subject of protests lodged with the PLO and remedial action urgently sought.

39. In connexion with the activity of armed elements, it is relevant to mention a kidnapping incident which created tension in the UNIFIL area. On the night of 22 October, a local leader of one of the Lebanese National Movement groups was kidnapped from Aytā az-Zūt in the Irish sector. Although UNIFIL could not identify the kidnappers, the National Movement held IDF and the *de facto* forces responsible for the kidnapping, and in retaliation they abducted 14 residents of the enclave as hostages. The hostages were released unharmed after drawn-out negotiations in which UNIFIL played an important part. The fate of the kidnapped National Movement leader is still unknown.

Incidents involving the de facto forces

40. It may be recalled that UNIFIL has established, in addition to its headquarters at Naqoura, 19 positions in the enclave. Further, the five observation posts, originally set up by UNTSO in 1972 in pursuance of a consensus of the Security Council, have been maintained and are manned by UNTSO observers of Observer Group Lebanon, which is under the operational control of the UNIFIL Commander. During the period under review, the *de facto* forces continued to oppose and prevent further deployment of UNIFIL in the enclave.

41. While the special restrictions imposed by the *de facto* forces on the freedom of movement of the personnel of the Irish and Senegalese battalions (*ibid.*, para. 50) were lifted in June for the former and in July for the latter, the general restrictions applied to all UNIFIL personnel were maintained. Thus, UNIFIL personnel could move in the enclave only on Mondays, Wednesdays, Thursdays and Fridays for resupply purposes.

42. In my last periodic report [*ibid.*, paras. 40, 54 and 65], I had commented on the persistent harassment of observers of Observer Group Lebanon by the *de facto* forces. This harassment continued during the period under review. In the wake of the incidents of April, the observers were able to resume their observation duties at the five observation posts without too much hindrance, but in August the situation again began to deteriorate. Since that time, the observers were allowed to move within the enclave only on Mondays and Thursdays and only on the main road and for logistical purposes. This restriction on the observers' freedom of movement greatly hampered their operational capability and limited their ability to observe the situation in the border area. UNIFIL and UNTSO are pursuing their efforts to remedy this situation and to enable the observers fully to discharge the responsibilities entrusted to them by the Security Council.

43. In the UNIFIL area of deployment, the *de facto* forces continued to maintain the four encroachments they had established at Bayt Yahun, Ett Taibe, Jabal Basil and Rshaf [S/13691, paras. 24 and 40]. On 17 July, a group of *de facto* forces with two armoured personnel carriers and three tanks, assisted by IDF personnel, set up a new position near the village of Blate. Immediately upon learning of this development, UNIFIL exerted all possible efforts, both with the *de facto* forces and the Israeli authorities, to have the position removed. The matter was also taken up at United Nations Headquarters in New York with the Permanent Mission of Israel. However, these efforts have not so far been successful.

44. The *de facto* forces also continued to harass UNIFIL personnel and Lebanese villagers in the UNIFIL area. There were 36 cases of firing at or close to UNIFIL positions in the second half of June and 25 cases in July. During the last days of July, the *de facto* forces shelled the village of Yatar in the Netherlands sector on the stated grounds that it was harbouring "terrorists".

45. In August the level of firing by the *de facto* forces at targets inside the UNIFIL area and related incidents increased markedly. On 3 August, the *de facto* forces asserted that two of their men had been killed by a mine which they alleged had been implanted by "terrorists" and in the enclave, and in retaliation they shelled UNIFIL positions in the Netherlands, Fijian and Irish sectors the next day. On 5 August, four Netherlands battalion personnel were ambushed and abducted by the *de facto* forces in the enclave; they were released after negotiation. On 4, 5 and 6 August, the *de facto* forces again shelled Yatar, with the Netherlands position in the village returning the fire. On 11, 13 and 30 August, the *de facto* forces attempted to force their way through a Nigerian checkpoint in the vicinity of the village of Ett Taibe; in all three cases the intruders were persuaded to leave the area after negotiations. On 18 August they again shelled Yatar, as well as the village of Kafra, in the Netherlands sector. On 20 August they fired 28 mortar rounds at the villages of Haddathah and Aytaz-Zutt in the Irish sector. During the month of August, there were a total of 29 cases of firing at UNIFIL positions. In addition, on 29 August, a *de facto* forces position near Ett Taibe fired 25 rifle rounds towards a UNIFIL helicopter on a

routine mail flight, but fortunately the helicopter was not hit.

46. The incidence of firing at or close to UNIFIL positions by the *de facto* forces continued at a high level during the second half of the reporting period, reaching a peak in November. There were 33 such cases in September, 27 in October, 51 in November and 13 during the first 10 days of December. On 20 September, two rounds fired by the *de facto* forces impacted near Qana in the Fijian sector, killing one young girl and wounding another.

Exchanges of fire across the UNIFIL area

47. During the period under review, there were frequent exchanges of fire between the *de facto* forces in the enclave and the armed elements stationed in the Tyre pocket and north of the Litani River. On a number of occasions, IDF personnel joined the *de facto* forces in firing at armed element targets. Those exchanges of fire took place over and across the UNIFIL area of deployment, but occasionally shells fell or were fired at or close to UNIFIL positions. The most serious exchanges of fire are outlined below:

(a) On 13 June an exchange of fire took place over the north-eastern sector of the UNIFIL area. The *de facto* forces fired approximately 100 artillery, tank and mortar rounds mainly towards the Beaufort Castle area and the armed elements fired about 50 artillery and mortar rounds at the general area of Marjayoun. During the exchange, six artillery rounds impacted within 250 metres of two Nigerian positions.

(b) On 16 July the *de facto* forces fired 50 rounds of artillery into the Tyre area including Tyre and Ar-Rashidiyah.

(c) The heaviest exchange of fire took place between 18 and 23 August, when an estimated 2,760 rounds of artillery, mortar and tank fire were exchanged between *de facto* forces and IDF positions and the armed elements positions north of the Litani. *De facto* forces fired approximately 2,460 rounds and armed elements 300. During those exchanges, Palestinian armed elements at Beaufort Castle fired 60 heavy machine-gun rounds close to a Norwegian observation post at Khardala Bridge. During this period, on 18 and 19 August, IDF conducted a major operation against Palestinian armed elements positions in the Beaufort Castle and Arnoun areas (see paragraph 53 (a) below).

(d) On 10 September, *de facto* forces and IDF shelled Beaufort Castle, Yohmor, Quardiye and Mazra'at Ouzaiye areas, firing approximately 118 artillery, mortar and tank rounds; Palestinian armed elements responded with 10 artillery rounds.

(e) On 17 September, the *de facto* forces and IDF fired a total of 93 rounds of artillery and mortar into the Arnoun and Jarmaq areas; Palestinian armed elements fired 14 artillery and mortar rounds with three rounds impacting in the Metulla area in northern Israel.

(f) On 17 and 18 September, there were heavy exchanges of fire between Palestinian positions in the Tyre area and *de facto* forces positions in the enclave; the town of Tyre was indiscriminately shelled by *de facto* forces.

(g) The shelling was resumed on 20 September when the *de facto* forces fired into Ar-Rashidiyah and

the Palestinian armed elements responded with artillery and mortar directed at targets in the enclave. On 21 September, Palestinian armed forces fired 10 rockets towards the village of Dibil in the enclave.

(h) On 13 October, heavy exchanges of fire took place between *de facto* forces and armed elements positions when the former opened fire with artillery, tanks and mortars from Ett Taibe, Kafer Kela and El-Qlaiaa against Palestinian positions in Beaufort Castle and Arnoun areas.

(i) On 17 October, *de facto* forces from Marjayoun, Tell Dibbine, El-Qlaiaa and Ett Taibe opened artillery, tank and mortar fire on Palestinian armed elements positions in the An-Nabatiyah, Jarmaq, Mahmoudiye, Beaufort Castle, Arnoun and Rihane areas. Palestinian armed elements responded by firing five artillery rounds to the vicinity of Shama in the enclave.

(j) On 6 November, exchanges of fire between Palestinian armed elements and the *de facto* forces, assisted by IDF, were resumed when the former opened fire from positions in Beaufort Castle into the village of Deir Mimess in the enclave. This escalated into a seven-hour exchange involving artillery, mortar and rocket fire, which later spread to the western sector.

(k) From 14 to 16 November, sporadic exchanges of fire took place between *de facto* forces and Palestinian armed elements positions in the north-eastern sector. On 17, 18 and 19 November, there were more exchanges of fire between the *de facto* forces and Palestinian armed elements in the western sector. During the firing on 17 November, five rounds fired by Palestinian armed elements impacted within 10 metres of a Netherlands position in the village of Shama in the enclave; on 19 November, four rounds fired by Palestinian armed elements impacted close to the Netherlands check-point on Hamra Bridge at Buyut as-Sayyid.

Activity of the Israel Defence Forces in and near the UNIFIL area of operation

48. The activities of IDF in and near the UNIFIL area of operation markedly increased during the period under review. These activities were protested by the Government of Lebanon, whose Permanent Representative brought the matter to the attention of the Security Council and the General Assembly in several communications (see paragraph 54 below). UNIFIL and UNTSO raised the matter of IDF activities repeatedly with the Israeli authorities.

49. There were an increasing number of border encroachments along the armistice demarcation line. Those encroachments took the form of new positions, the laying of minefields, the fencing-in of strips of land and the budding of dirt tracks or asphalt roads. In all cases, the original border fence along the armistice demarcation line has remained intact. The purpose of the border encroachments appears to be to create a new defensive line forward of the armistice demarcation line.

50. The presence of IDF personnel inside the enclave increased during the reporting period. IDF gun positions were established near Marjayoun and in the coastal area. IDF personnel were often sighted in vari-

ous localities in the enclave. In August, before a large-scale operation carried out by IDF against Palestinian targets in the Beaufort Castle and Arnoun areas on 18 and 19 August (see paragraph 53 *a* below), IDF troops and vehicles were observed moving throughout the enclave. While the movement of IDF personnel were generally confined to the enclave, there were several incursions by them into the UNIFIL area of deployment. Those incursions took place on 14 and 26 June near Kafer Chouba and on 26 and 27 September between Shama and Shihin.

51. There were numerous violations of Lebanese air space by Israeli military aircraft and of Lebanese territorial waters by Israeli naval vessels. UNIFIL observed 83 air and 55 sea violations in the second half of June, 94 air and 58 sea violations in July, 90 air and 61 sea violations in August, 130 air and 125 sea violations in September, 171 air and 127 sea violations in October, 312 air and 89 sea violations in November and 134 air and 31 sea violations during the first 10 days of December. In this connexion, it should also be mentioned that drones of unidentified origin were frequently observed flying over the UNIFIL area, particularly in its northeastern sector.

52. As stated above, during some of the exchanges of firing between the *de facto* forces and the armed elements over and across the UNIFIL areas, IDF gun positions, including those set up in the enclave, joined force with the *de facto* forces and fired at armed elements positions on a number of occasions.

53. IDF also conducted a number of operations against targets outside the UNIFIL area. Some of those operations were reported by UNIFIL as follows:

(a) On 18 and 19 August, a large-scale action, involving helicopter-transported troops, jet aircraft and supporting artillery, was carried out in the Beaufort Castle and Arnoun areas. This had been preceded by a marked increase in the presence of IDF troops and vehicles throughout the enclave. I submitted a special report to the Security Council on this and related incidents [S/14118].

(b) On 27 August, Israeli jets hit Palestinian positions in and around Kasmiyah Bridge, Shabriha and Ar-Rashidiyah.

(c) On 17 September, a combined naval and air operation was directed at Palestinian targets in the Kasmiyah and Ar-Rashidiyah areas.

(d) On 17 October, IDF troops and helicopters attacked Palestinian armed elements positions between Jarmaq and Mahmoudiye across the Litani.

(e) On 7 November, IDF jets struck at various targets in the Tyre pocket and the Beaufort Castle and An-Nabatiyah areas.

54. In a situation as complex as the one in which the Force must operate, it is inevitable that incidents involving Israeli forces and Palestinian armed elements outside the UNIFIL area of operation will have a bearing on developments in that area. As in the past, such incidents have inevitably compounded the problems facing UNIFIL. This has continued to be the case whenever there have been bomb explosions and other activities inside Israel or in the Israeli-occupied territories for which Palestinian organizations claimed responsibility. The same can be said about the military operations carried out by IDF, including air and

sea attacks on targets in Lebanon outside the UNIFIL area of operation. These incidents have been brought to the attention of the Security Council and/or the General Assembly by the Permanent Representative of Israel [S/13999, A/35/293, S/14016, A/35/302, S/14081, S/14101, S/14125, A/35/412, A/35/516, S/14237, S/14247, S/14257, S/14264, A/35/652, S/14273, A/35/666 and S/14278], the Permanent Representative of Lebanon [S/14023, S/14041, A/35/317, S/14095, S/14108, S/14114, S/14120, S/14180, S/14187, A/35/471, A/35/477, S/14208, A/35/510, S/14218, A/35/534, S/14223, A/35/552, S/14232, S/14238, S/14282 and A/35/682] and the Permanent Observer of PLO [S/14146]. In addition, a number of communications on the subject have been addressed by PLO to the Secretary-General.

E. HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES

55. During the period under review, UNIFIL continued to carry out its humanitarian activities in close collaboration with the Governor of Southern Lebanon and the United Nations Co-ordinator of Assistance for Reconstruction and Development of Lebanon. Co-operation with UNICEF increased following the agreement signed on 14 October between the Council for Development and Reconstruction and UNICEF (see paragraph 30 above). The planned opening of a UNICEF liaison office at Qana, in the UNIFIL area of deployment, will bring about a closer working relationship between UNICEF and the Force. The restoration of electricity in the area of operation progressed slowly. Electric supply to Marjayoun has been restored and disruptions caused by shellings are usually overcome through joint efforts of UNIFIL and Lebanese authorities. The supply of water is a serious problem facing the population of the area. Work is in progress with considerable UNICEF assistance to alleviate this basic need. In the field of education, the Lebanese Ministry of Education was assisted in the conduct of *baccalauréat* examinations for the schools in the enclave. The examinations were held on UNIFIL premises with UNIFIL assistance. A programme of vocational training has been initiated with the help of YMCA and this programme will be expanded.

IV. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

56. Should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of UNIFIL for a period of six months beyond 19 December 1980, the cost of maintaining the Force for that period, assuming continuance of its present strength and responsibilities, are estimated at \$73,083,000 gross (\$72,361,000 net). These estimates are based on my report of 14 November to the General Assembly⁵⁸ and reflect the recommendations made by the Advisory Committee for Administrative and Budgetary Questions in its related report of 29 November⁵⁹ and endorsed by the Fifth Committee at its 48th meeting on 6 December, taking into account the new standard rates of reimbursement to the troop-contributing States established by the General Assembly in its resolution 35/44 of 1 December 1980.

⁵⁸ A/35/613 and Corr. 1, paras. 11 and 12.

⁵⁹ A/35/668, para. 20.

V. OBSERVATIONS

57. Once again I must report to the Security Council that, despite strenuous efforts at all levels, UNIFIL has been prevented from making further progress towards implementing fully the objectives of resolution 425 (1978).

58. Since the establishment of UNIFIL, I have referred repeatedly to the very great difficulties that have confronted the Force, and I have stressed that it can successfully fulfil its mandate only if it has the full co-operation of all the parties concerned. The assumption on which resolution 425 (1978) was based was that the achievement of the objectives set by it would be in the interest of all the parties concerned and that, therefore, UNIFIL would have their full co-operation in fulfilling its mandate. This expectation has unfortunately in important respects remained unrealized.

59. It bears repeating in this connexion that the situation prevailing in southern Lebanon cannot be insulated from the extremely complex developments in the region. Recent events have considerably increased tensions in the area, and the search for a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement of the Middle East problem continues to be frustrated. This has inevitably had a negative effect on the situation in southern Lebanon and on the circumstances in which UNIFIL has had to function.

60. While the leadership of the PLO has renewed its assurances of co-operation with UNIFIL, the Force has continued to be faced by attempts by armed elements to infiltrate personnel and weapons into its area of operation. There was a definite hardening of position on the part of certain armed elements during recent months. Two positions were recently set up in the UNIFIL area, and this has led to serious incidents with UNIFIL troops in their efforts to have the positions removed.

61. The *de facto* forces have continued to resist further deployment of UNIFIL in the enclave held by them. They have restricted the freedom of movement required by UNIFIL and UNTSO personnel, and have systematically sought to reduce the observation capacity of the posts established in the enclave, particularly along the armistice demarcation line. The *de facto* forces have also continued their attempts at encroaching upon the area controlled by UNIFIL, and they have added a fifth position to the four that they have already established inside that area. They have continued to harass UNIFIL personnel and the local population in the area.

62. Since the *de facto* forces are known to be supported and supplied by Israel, the United Nations has often sought the intercession of the Israeli authorities at various levels to curb their hostile activities. While the Israeli authorities have assisted UNIFIL in resolving certain specific problems, they have not extended to the Force the degree of co-operation it requires in other respects, citing overriding considerations of national security.

63. During the period under review, the Israeli forces have themselves stepped up their activities in and near the enclave. As described earlier in this report, they have established encroachments along the international border, increased their presence within

the enclave, repeatedly violated Lebanese air space and territorial waters and, on many occasions, have launched attacks against targets in Lebanon outside the UNIFIL area. These developments, which were strongly protested by the Government of Lebanon, have caused grave concern to the members of the Security Council. This concern was expressed to the Israeli authorities by the President of the Council at the end of October and by myself.

64. Despite the many impediments it has had to face, UNIFIL has continued in its endeavour to consolidate its position. Measures have thus been taken to improve the security of its headquarters at Naqoura and to reinforce the defence capability of the Force. Further, with the co-operation and support of the Lebanese Government, efforts have been made to increase the Lebanese presence, both civilian and military, in the UNIFIL area of operation. There has been some increase in the number of such personnel in the area, but continuing difficulties in the internal situation in Lebanon have not made it possible for the Lebanese Government to send as many troops and civilian administrators as had been hoped. In close collaboration with the Governor of southern Lebanon and the United Nations Co-ordinator of Assistance for Reconstruction and Development of Lebanon, UNIFIL has carried out a wide range of activities throughout southern Lebanon for the benefit of the civilian population.

65. During the period under review, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO has continued his efforts towards the reactivation of ILMAC in accordance with resolution 467 (1980). Following extensive negotiations, he was able to convene a meeting at UNIFIL headquarters at Naqoura on 1 December, which was attended by Israeli and Lebanese senior officers under his chairmanship. While the two parties continued to disagree on the question of the validity of the General Armistice Agreement and the meeting fell short of the objective set by the Security Council, it may be viewed in the general context as a positive development. The Chief of Staff of UNTSO is trying to arrange another meeting in the near future in his continuing efforts towards the reactivation of ILMAC.

66. Although UNIFIL has not been able fully to implement the mandate entrusted to it by the Security Council, there is no doubt in my mind that the Force is performing an indispensable service to peace, not only

in southern Lebanon, but with regard to the Middle East situation in general. It provides a vital mechanism for conflict control in an extremely volatile situation. If it were to be withdrawn, a dangerous situation would inevitably arise, which could easily escalate and have serious consequences for the cause of peace in the entire region of the Middle East.

67. For these reasons, I feel obliged once again to recommend to the Security Council that the mandate of UNIFIL be extended for a further period of six months. The Lebanese Government has informed me of its agreement to the proposed extension.

68. In making this recommendation, I am fully aware that the present situation is anything but satisfactory. It is essential that the present trend of inadequate co-operation and lack of progress should be reversed. If this is to be achieved, all the parties concerned must observe strictly the cease-fire called for by the Security Council and avoid actions which inevitably lead to violent reactions. A determined effort must be made on all sides to render possible the consolidation of the UNIFIL area. In this connexion, the five positions established by the *de facto* forces and the two positions of the armed elements should be removed. It is essential that the parties desist from using the UNIFIL area for hostile acts against each other and take reciprocal steps to reduce progressively their armed presence in the area. I earnestly hope that the parties concerned will increasingly extend to UNIFIL the co-operation it requires in implementing resolution 425 (1978).

69. In concluding this report, I wish to express my deep appreciation to the troop-contributing countries for the support and co-operation they have extended to this important peace-keeping operation. I wish also to pay tribute to the Commander of UNIFIL, Major-General Erskine, and his staff, both civilian and military, to the officers and men of the contingents of UNIFIL as well as the UNTSO military observers assigned to the area. They have carried out the important tasks entrusted to them, often in extremely difficult and hazardous circumstances, with exemplary efficiency, courage and dedication.

ANNEX

[Map, "UNIFIL deployment as of December 1980." See end of volume.]

DOCUMENT S/14296

Letter dated 15 December 1980 from the representative of Lebanon to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[15 December 1980]

1. Your report to the Security Council of 12 December 1980 [S/14295] has been carefully examined by my Government, and I am instructed to transmit to you, as well as to the Council, our utmost appreciation for the most objective review contained therein. More particularly, my Government wishes to express its total agreement with the observations with which the report is concluded [*ibid.*, paras. 57-69].

2. As the Security Council is about to meet to examine the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), I am

instructed by my Government, in the light of your report, to submit that the following problems must, once more, be addressed, in a practical manner:

(a) The security, safety and freedom of movement of the personnel of the Force and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization;

(b) The complete and immediate withdrawal of Israel, and full deployment of the Force in the totality of the area of operation, up to the internationally recognized boundaries;

(c) The cessation of all hostile activities, thus ensuring the peaceful character of the area of operation and assisting the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty and effective authority;

(d) The reactivation of the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission, and the total and unconditional implementation of the 1949 General Armistice Agreement between Lebanon and Israel.

3. In the report under consideration, it is said in paragraph 68 that "the present situation is anything but satisfactory", and that "it is essential that the present trend of inadequate co-operation and lack of progress should be reversed". While we fully share this view, and believe, as stated in paragraph 58, that UNIFIL "can successfully fulfil its mandate only if it has the full co-operation of all the parties concerned", we wish to draw your attention to paragraph 7 of resolution 444 (1979), subsequently repeated in resolutions 450 (1979), 459 (1979) and 474 (1980), which states that the Security Council

"Reaffirms its determination, in the event of continuing obstruction of the mandate of the Force, to examine practical ways and means in accordance with relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, to secure the full implementation of resolution 425 (1978)".

4. My Government feels that the time has now come to search for such "practical ways and means", not necessarily by reviewing and redefining the mandate of the Force, but by rendering it more effective and more implementable. Indeed, this is a course we have been calling for since the events of April 1979, which then led to an urgent meeting of the Security Council. In a letter addressed to you, following the Council meeting, and dated 7 May 1979 [S/13301], we said that it was "clear to us that a certain measure of 'peace-enforcing' was not precluded at the very inception of UNIFIL", which should be enabled "to enforce peace, if and when necessary, on all those—without exception—who would irresponsibly threaten its security and obstruct the fulfilment of its mission". In support of our thesis, in this same letter, we quoted the Secretary-General's report to the General Assembly of September 1978, which read as follows:

"To resort to force is the last and least desirable course for a peace-keeping force. Negotiation and persuasion must be the primary method for achieving its objectives. However, if such methods prove unavailing, the Security Council may well have to consider what other approaches are open to it under the Charter."

5. In this perspective, I am instructed by my Government to ask that the renewal of the mandate of UNIFIL be accompanied by, and probably made contingent upon, the following dispositions:

(a) Articulate the deterrent capability of the Force, implicit in its definition as "an integrated and efficient military unit", by providing it with the necessary weapons and equipment, giving it the necessary instructions, supporting it with the necessary logistical and infrastructural means—not excluding, if deemed necessary or helpful, additional personnel;

(b) Reconsider the methods of definition of the "area of operation" of the Force and its methods of deployment and movement, in the light of recent developments on the terrain. Escalation of violence by acts of aggression and hostilities outside the original area of operation, the so-called "pre-emptive strikes" and "cycles of violence", all make it imperative for the Force to enjoy a freedom of action commensurate with the objectives of its mandate, as stated in resolution 425 (1978) and defined in the Secretary-General's report of 19 March 1978 [S/12611], confirmed by resolution 426 (1978), and more particularly paragraphs 2 b and c of the said report;

(c) Accelerate the reactivation of the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission and intensify diplomatic efforts with all the parties concerned, and with all those who are in a position to assist in the establishment of a time-table for the expeditious implementation of the mandate of the Force and the unconditional observance of the General Armistice Agreement. Such a plan of action may necessitate, within the Secretary-General's prerogatives, the special commissioning, at an appropriately high level, of a working group or a special task-force in the interest of celerity and efficacy, which will identify the problems, specify solutions, conciliate and co-ordinate all the efforts that can be conducive to peace and security in the area.

6. In conclusion, allow me, in the name of Lebanon to express our deepest gratitude to you and through you to the members of the Secretariat, to the commanders and staff of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, to the officers and soldiers of the various contingents, to the observers, and last but not least to the troop-contributing countries and friendly Governments for their efforts and sacrifice to preserve international peace and security in my country and beyond. The greatest tribute that can be paid to each and all is to accent the "interim" character of the Force by ensuring the objective conditions of its success within an immediate time-frame.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ghassan TUENI
Permanent Representative of Lebanon
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/14297

Letter dated 16 December 1980 from the representative of Israel to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]
[16 December 1980]

Further to my letter of 14 November 1980 [S/14257], I wish to draw your urgent attention to still another

attempt by PLO terrorists based in Lebanon to perpetrate indiscriminate murder and violence in Israel.

On the night of 14 December, a PLO murder squad passed through the area of operation of the United Nations Interim Force in southern Lebanon and attempted to cross the border with Israel west of the village of Zar'it. They were spotted by an Israel Defence Forces patrol, and in the ensuing encounter one terrorist was killed and an Israel soldier was wounded.

True to form, the PLO immediately took responsibility for this attempted outrage in a statement issued by its news agency in Lebanon and quoted today by Radio Baghdad.

As I pointed out in my above-mentioned letter, over the last two and a half years there have been many similar attempts by the PLO to cross into Israel from

Lebanon through the Force's area of operation, with the intention of committing indiscriminate murder or of taking hostage innocent men, women and children. Also see my letters of 14 January [S/13028], 19 April [S/13261] and 9 May 1979 [S/13312], 8 February [S/13785], 7 April [S/13876], 9 April,⁶⁰ 14 April [S/13892] and 16 May 1980 [S/13947].

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yehuda Z. BLUM
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

⁶⁰ A/35/171.

DOCUMENT S/14300*

Letter dated 16 December 1980 from the representative of China to the Secretary-General

[Original: Chinese/English]
[17 December 1980]

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a note of protest addressed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China to the Vietnamese Embassy in China on 15 December 1980. I request that this note be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) LAI Ya-li
Acting Permanent Representative
of the People's Republic of China
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Note dated 15 December 1980 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China to the Vietnamese Embassy in China

The Vietnamese authorities, in their wanton, hostile anti-China activities, have repeatedly created incidents and intensified tension in areas along the Sino-Vietnamese border. For over a month, Vietnamese armed intrusions and military provocations have kept increasing in the border areas of China's Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region and Yunnan province, with serious incidents reaching more than 200.

Since late October 1980, the Vietnamese troops and armed personnel have repeatedly intruded into the border areas of Guangxi, carried out armed provocations and wantonly shelled and fired into Chinese territory, destroying many buildings, disrupting the normal productive activities of Chinese border inhabitants, killing and wounding dozens of them. The main instances are as follows:

—On 22 October, Vietnamese troops fired several hundred shots into the area of Shukou Commune, Longzhou County, and wounded three Chinese border inhabitants.

—On 5 November, Vietnamese troops kept firing at Shilang Commune, Ningming County, and Shuolong Commune, Daxin County, and wounded 12 Chinese border inhabitants.

—On 7 November, nine armed Vietnamese personnel intruded into the area of Longhang Commune, Jingxi County, for harassment and sabotage.

—On 10 November, with mortars, light and heavy machine-guns, Vietnamese troops frantically fired nearly 100 shells and several thousand rounds of bullets at Jiaou region, Pingxiang city. As a result, 11 people in the four villages of the region were wounded, a primary school caught fire, and many houses were ruined.

—On 12 November, Vietnamese armed personnel opened fire on two small fishing boats of Dongguo Commune, Qinzhou County, killing a Chinese fisherman.

—On 15 November, Vietnamese troops shelled and fired with mortars and machine-guns at the commune members of Shangyang village, Pingxiang city, who were gathering in the autumn harvest, and wounded four of them.

—Since mid-November, Vietnamese troops shelled and fired at Dongzhong Commune, Fangcheng County, almost every day and carried out unbridled provocations, killing and wounding a dozen or so, and destroyed scores of civilian houses, thus causing grave losses to the local people.

—Since mid-October, Vietnamese troops and armed personnel have frequently made incursions into the border areas of China's Yunnan province, and shelled and fired into Chinese territory, killing and wounding more than 20 Chinese border inhabitants and patrolling frontier guards. The main instances are as follows:

—On 17 October, a group of fully-armed Vietnamese soldiers brazenly intruded into the Baimahe area, Shilicun Commune, Jinping County, looting grain, killing two Chinese border inhabitants and wounding two.

—On 27 October, more than 10 Vietnamese soldiers intruded into the Maoping area, Maguan County, where they made a surprise attack on the patrolling Chinese frontier guards, thus creating another incident of bloodshed.

—On 29 October, a group of Vietnamese soldiers made incursions into the Jinchang area, Maguan County, wounding a Chinese soldier on duty.

—On 10 November, a group of Vietnamese soldiers made inroads into the Dapingzhang area of Qushui Commune, Jiangcheng County, killing two Chinese commune members and wounding four.

—On 15 November, six armed Vietnamese special agents intruded into the Maandi area, Jinping County, and forcibly took away two Chinese border inhabitants.

—On 18 November, dozens of Vietnamese soldiers intruded into Chinese territory and attacked the frontier guards patrolling in the border area of Mahpo County, killing one Chinese frontier guard.

The above-mentioned actions of the Vietnamese side fully demonstrate that it is the Vietnamese authorities who have aggravated tension along the Sino-Vietnamese border and deliberately poisoned the relations between the two countries. However, in its note to China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated 21 November 1980 [S/14279], the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry confounded right and wrong and tried to confuse and deceive public opinion by using the old trick of the thief crying "stop thief". It must be pointed out that the Vietnamese authorities are now stepping up their war of aggression in Kampuchea and intensifying the build-up of their troops along the Thai-Kampuchean border, thus threatening the peace and security of Thailand and the South-East Asian region. Now the Vietnamese side is spreading sheer lies and fabrications in an attempt to divert world attention from its aggressive and expansionist activities. Its efforts will prove to be entirely futile.

Circulated under the double symbol A/35/782/S/14300

Letter dated 17 December 1980 from the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Secretary-General

[Original: Russian]
[18 December 1980]

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the document entitled "Meeting of leading figures from the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty" adopted at the meeting of Party and State figures from the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty held in Moscow on 5 December 1980.

I request you to have this document circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) O. TROYANOVSKY
Permanent Representative of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Meeting of leading figures from the States Parties to
the Warsaw Treaty

A meeting of Party and State figures from the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty was held in Moscow on 5 December 1980. The following participated in the meeting:

—From the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic: G. Husák, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and President of the Republic; L. Štrougal, member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and Prime Minister of the Government; V. Bilak, member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party;

—From the German Democratic Republic: E. Honecker, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and President of the Council of State; W. Stoph, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and Chairman of the Council of Ministers; H. Axen, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party; H. Hoffmann, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and Minister for National Defence; E. Milke, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and Minister for State Security;

—From the Hungarian People's Republic: J. Kádár, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party; A. Denez, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party; Y. Borbandi, member of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers;

—From the People's Republic of Bulgaria: T. Zhivkov, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party and President of the Council of State; S. Todorov, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party and Chairman of the Council of Ministers; P. Mladenov, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party and Minister for Foreign Affairs; D. Metodiev, member of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party;

—From the Polish People's Republic: S. Kania, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party; J. Pinkowski, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Polish People's Republic; K. Barcikowski, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Polish United

Workers' Party and Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party; S. Olszowski, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party and Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party; W. Jaruzelski, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party and Minister for National Defence; J. Czyrek, member of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party and Minister for Foreign Affairs; M. Milewski, member of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party and Minister for Internal Affairs;

—From the Socialist Republic of Romania: N. Ceausescu, General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party and President of the Republic; I. Verdetz, member of the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party and Prime Minister of the Government; V. Kazacu, member of the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party and Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party; Ş. Andrei, candidate-member of the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party and Minister for Foreign Affairs;

—From the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet; N. A. Tikhonov, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Council of Ministers; M. A. Suslov, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party; Y. V. Andropov, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Committee for State Security; A. A. Gromyko, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Minister for Foreign Affairs; D. F. Ustinov, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Minister of Defence; K. V. Rusakov, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The participants in the meeting exchanged views on international developments in recent months. They considered that the course of events had confirmed the correctness of their analysis of the situation and the timeliness of the proposals put forward at the meeting held at Warsaw in May 1980 of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty. Those proposals had favourably affected developments taking place in Europe and other parts of the world and responded to the interests of peoples.

The participants noted with satisfaction the activation of political contacts between States with different social systems, the continuation of the dialogue on the main international problems and the fruitful consideration given by the United Nations General Assembly to the proposals of the socialist and other countries aimed at speedy implementation of effective measures to limit and terminate the arms race. All that would assist the détente process.

The socialist countries expressed their intention to continue their efforts to improve the international climate, strengthen peace, maintain a policy of détente, develop international co-operation, and seek a solution to all conflicts through negotiations. The participants in the meeting strongly advocated the development of relations with all countries, regardless of their social system, on the basis of the principles of independence, sovereignty, renunciation of the use or threat of force in relations between States, and strict respect for the Charter of the United Nations.

The participants in the meeting stressed that they sought co-operation with all progressive, democratic and anti-imperialist forces and the strengthening of the solidarity of all peoples in the struggle against the threat of war, and that they favoured a policy of peace, disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, détente and co-operation on an equal basis.

The participants in the meeting expressed their readiness to undertake constructive measures aimed at developing relations with

the United States, if the new United States Administration gave proof of a similar approach.

The countries participating in the meeting welcomed the fact that the Madrid meeting had begun its work and urged that it develop in such a way as to open up new possibilities for giving effect to the Helsinki documents and for the cause of peace and détente on the continent.

However, the participants in the meeting noted that the world situation remained tense. The arms race was becoming increasingly dangerous. In various regions of the world there remained hotbeds of military confrontation and tension. New conflicts were emerging. The situation called for increased vigilance vis-à-vis the aggressive efforts of the imperialist forces and the attempts of reactionary circles to harm the positions of socialist countries, the developing countries, and the national liberation movements.

The participants in the meeting expressed their determination to continue strengthening the unity of the socialist countries on the basis of Marxism-Leninism, international solidarity and mutually advantageous co-operation on an equal basis.

At the meeting the conviction was expressed that the united forces of all countries and peoples interested in peace, security and international co-operation would be able to ensure the consolidation of détente as the leading tendency in international development.

The participants in the meeting exchanged information on socialist and communist construction in their countries. They called for the further development of economic, scientific and technical co-operation, for the co-ordination of plans in the interests of socialist and communist construction in their countries, and for raising the level of material well-being of their peoples.

The representatives of the Polish United Workers' Party informed participants in the meeting of developments in the Polish People's Republic and of the conclusions of the seventh plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Party. Participants in the meeting expressed their conviction that Communists, the working class, and the workers of fraternal Poland would be able to overcome the difficulties that had arisen and ensure the further development of the country in the socialist direction. It was confirmed that socialist Poland, the United Workers' Party and the Polish people could rely fully on the fraternal solidarity and support of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty. The representatives of the Polish United Workers' Party stressed that Poland had been, was and would remain a socialist State and a reliable member of the common family of socialist countries.

The meeting of Party and State leaders of the socialist countries took place in an atmosphere of comradely understanding and unity of views.

DOCUMENT S/14307

Letter dated 19 December 1980 from the representative of Lebanon to the President of the Security Council

*[Original: English]
[19 December 1980]*

The Security Council had barely finished voting on resolution 483 (1980), when Israel began launching a major combined operation by air, land and sea against Lebanese villages and towns well inside the internationally recognized Lebanese boundaries and inside and beyond the area of operation of the United Nations Interim Force.

I am under instructions from my Government to protest in the strongest possible terms this new Israeli blatant aggression, which we can only read as further defiance of the international community's determination to establish peace in Lebanon, to ensure the success of the Force and, more particularly, to preserve the safety and security of both Lebanese citizens and the members of the Force.

This latest Israeli attack enhances our plea for the urgent measures that the Security Council has requested to implement expeditiously the pertinent resolutions and the General Armistice Agreement, which should lead to total cessation of hostilities, withdrawal of Israeli forces and the respect of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon.

Annexed to this letter is a detailed description of some of the events that took place on 17, 18 and 19 December 1980 which have resulted in seven persons killed and a large number of wounded, with the destruction of houses and property, particularly in the villages of Brashit, Aishiyeh, Sidon and the Tyre area.

I request that this letter be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ghassan TUFI
Permanent Representative of Lebanon
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Recent Israeli aggressions in southern Lebanon

During the night of 17-18 December 1980, at 2245 hours, an Israeli force of about 300 troops entered Brashit and other villages. Houses were searched and automatic weapons were fired at people therein, killing three persons and wounding five. The invaders demolished one house and damaged four others. The troops also attacked the villages of Majdal Silm, Shaqra, Majdal Zun and Yatter, destroying a total of eight houses.

During the raid, the village of Mazra'at Buyut es-Sayed, in the district of Tyre, was heavily shelled, with enormous damage to property resulting.

One day later, in the night of 18-19 December, at 2240 hours, Israeli helicopters overflew the Tyre area, while Israeli gunboats were cruising inside Lebanese territorial waters just off the Tyre coastline.

At 2320 hours, an infantry battalion, accompanied by helicopters, attacked the villages of Aishiyeh, Al-Jurmuq, Al-Mahmoudiyeh and Al-Dimashquiyeh, where the aggressors clashed with armed elements. The Israeli battalion then withdrew at 0435 hours on 19 December.

This morning, at 0325 hours, Israeli gunners shelled the city of Sidon for 30 minutes.

Al-Jurmuq and Aishiyeh have been subjected to continuous shelling, and preliminary reports speak of three persons killed and four wounded. Extensive jet and helicopter activity in the Nabatiyeh and Khadali Bridge areas was noticed. The Hasbaya and Bl as-Saq regions were also shelled.

**Letter dated 15 December 1980 from the Secretary-General to the President
of the Security Council**

[Original: English]
[19 December 1980]

I have the honour to refer to the United Nations peace-keeping operations established by the Security Council in the Middle East and Cyprus. I have recently undertaken a careful review of the commands of the United Nations peace-keeping operations in the Middle East and Cyprus in the light of the availability of the required personnel and, of course, giving due consideration to the effectiveness of those operations. As a result of this review it is my intention, subject to the usual consultations and to the extension by the Security Council of the respective mandates, to make the following changes:

(a) Major-General Guenther Greindl, of Austria, who is serving as Commander of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), would replace Major-General James J. Quinn as Commander of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). General Quinn will return to Ireland after more than four years of distinguished service with the United Nations. General Greindl should arrive in Cyprus at the end of February 1981 to allow for a sufficient period of overlap for the smooth transfer of responsibilities. He is familiar with the operations of UNFICYP, having served as Chief Operations Officer of that Force in 1977-1978;

(b) Major-General Erkki R. Kaira, of Finland, the present Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), would replace General Greindl as Commander of UNDOF. General Kaira is familiar with the operations of UNDOF since a number of UNTSO observers are assigned to that

Force in accordance with a decision of the Security Council. General Kaira should arrive at Damascus by 20 February 1981;

(c) Major-General Emmanuel A. Erskine, of Ghana, who served as Chief of Staff of UNTSO from January 1976 until March 1978 and has been Commander of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) since that time, would be reassigned to his former post as Chief of Staff of UNTSO, with the additional function of representing the Secretary-General for matters relating to United Nations peace-keeping operations in the Middle East. He should arrive at Jerusalem by 15 February 1981;

(d) Major-General William Callaghan, now Adjutant-General of the Irish Defense Forces, would replace General Erskine as Commander of UNIFIL. Major-General Callaghan served as Senior Staff Officer of UNTSO from November 1976 until March 1978 and as acting Chief of Staff of UNTSO from that time until January 1979 and knows well the situation in the Middle East and the operations of UNIFIL. The Government of Ireland has informed me that it is willing to make Major-General Callaghan available for a further tour of duty with the United Nations peace-keeping operations. He should arrive at Naqoura by 5 February 1981.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kurt WALDHEIM
Secretary-General

DOCUMENT S/14309

**Letter dated 19 December 1980 from the President of the Security Council
to the Secretary-General**

[Original: English]
[19 December 1980]

I have brought your letter dated 15 December 1980 [S/14308] concerning the commands of the United Nations peace-keeping operations in the Middle East and Cyprus to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They considered the matter in consultations on 17 December and agreed with the proposals contained in your letter.

The representative of China has informed me that China, not having participated in the voting on the relevant resolutions, dissociates itself from this matter.

(Signed) Donald F. McHENRY
President of the Security Council

Note verbale dated 23 December 1980 from the Mission of Cuba to the President
of the Security Council

[Original: English/Spanish]
[23 December 1980]

The Permanent Mission of Cuba to the United Nations presents its compliments to the President of the Security Council and has the honour to request him to have circulated as an official Council document the communiqué adopted at the plenary meeting of the non-aligned countries held in New York on 23 December 1980 in order to consider the situation of the two Palestinian Mayors of Al-Khalil (Hebron) and Halhoul expelled by the Israeli occupation authorities, and the situation of the three South African members of the African National Congress sentenced to death by the Pretoria racist régime.

ANNEX

Text of the communiqué

The extraordinary plenary meeting of the non-aligned countries was held in New York on 23 December 1980 to consider urgently the situation of the Palestinian Mayors of Al-Khalil (Hebron) and Halhoul, expelled by the Israeli occupation authorities, and the situation of the three South African freedom fighters, members of the African National Congress sentenced to death by the Pretoria régime.

The meeting noted with great satisfaction that the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 484 (1980) on 19 December 1980, determining that it was imperative that the expelled Palestinians, Fakh Qawasma, Mayor of Al-Khalil (Hebron), and Mohamed Milhem, Mayor of Halhoul, be enabled to return to their homes and towns and resume their responsibilities for which they were elected and appointed. The meeting expressed its solidarity with the two Mayors, currently on a hunger strike at the United Nations.

The meeting condemned Israel's violation of human rights, the

fourth Geneva Convention (1949), the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, as well as its defiance and refusal to carry out the decisions of the Security Council.

The meeting declared its full support for the Mayors and the Sharia Judge of Al-Khalil (Hebron) and called upon the Security Council to take all measures to ensure the full implementation of Security Council resolutions 468 (1980), 469 (1980) and 484 (1980).

The meeting also expressed great concern over the continued aggravation of the situation in South Africa, where the well-known intransigence of the régime has been further accentuated by its Prime Minister's repeated affirmations that there will never be universal suffrage in South Africa. The death sentence recently passed on Neimbitshi Johnson Lubisi, 28, Petrus Tsepo Mashigo, 20, and Naphtali Manani, 24—the three freedom fighters of the African National Congress accused of involvement in the fight against apartheid—is yet another act of defiance of the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, which recognize the legitimacy of the struggle of the South African people for the elimination of apartheid and the establishment of a democratic society in South Africa.

It is, in particular, in open defiance of Security Council resolution 473 (1980), which called on the Pretoria régime to terminate all political trials and urgently to release all political prisoners, including Nelson Mandela and all other black leaders with whom it must deal in any meaningful discussion of the future of the country.

In reaffirming its continued commitment to the struggle against apartheid, the meeting commended the African National Congress on the recent adoption of the declaration on the humanitarian conduct of war, and called upon the States Members of the United Nations, including members of the non-aligned movement, as well as non-governmental organizations, to take appropriate measures in order to pressure the apartheid régime to spare the lives of these freedom fighters, accord prisoner-of-war status to all captured freedom fighters and release all political prisoners.

DOCUMENT S/14316*

Letter dated 23 December 1980 from the representative of Israel to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[24 December 1980]

I have the honour to draw your urgent attention to the outrages being committed by Syrian forces against the town of Zahleh in Lebanon. On the pretext of reacting to a military encounter with local forces in which Syrian soldiers died, the Syrian army of occupation deployed in that area, as well as in other parts of Lebanon, has subjected Zahleh and its civilian population to indiscriminate shelling. According to first reports, this bombardment has inflicted scores of casualties, dead and wounded, including women and children.

International silence in the face of such an atrocity can only aggravate the danger to the population of Lebanon, and especially its Christian communities, at

the hands of Syrian troops whose brutal repression is as familiar to large segments of the Syrian population as it is to the people of Lebanon who have been experiencing Syrian occupation for several years. A similar Syrian bombardment was, on Saturday, 20 December 1980, directed against the town of Marjayoun and its vicinity in southern Lebanon, where 1,000 shells were reported to have rained down on the local population.

Since this recent example of Syrian ruthlessness was perpetrated close to Israel's northern border, Israel deems it necessary to raise its voice in protest against the Syrian bombardment of Zahleh.

As is well known, the Government of Lebanon is unable to expose and appeal against Syrian actions. This should not preclude the international community from acting to stop these outrages. The well-known

preoccupation of the United Nations with other issues cannot justify passing over in silence the fate of the helpless inhabitants of Zahleh, who are still under grave threat from Syrian armour.

I have the honour to request that this letter be cir-

culated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yehuda Z. BLUM
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/14317*

Letter dated 23 December 1980 from the representative of Jordan to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]
[24 December 1980]

I have the honour to refer to the letter of 4 November 1980 from the Permanent Representative of Israel [S/14243], in which he was unable to find an excuse for his Government's recent criminal attempt to burn the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, nor was he able to explain or deny Israeli policy to destroy Christian and Islamic holy places in the occupied West Bank of Jordan.

In discrediting himself, the representative of Israel was only able to state that "fires have occurred from time to time in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, as indeed they are liable to occur in any place of worship where hundreds of candles are in use". He claimed that "a devotional candle [was accidentally] toppled" and as a result the fire occurred and burned the southern part of Saint Gregory Chapel located in the Cave of the Cross and destroyed the priceless painting by Mardiros Altonian.

The following is a true account of the criminal act as it occurred and, as witnesses have professed, that arson was involved:

"On the night of 14 October, at 10.30 p.m., a telephone call was received by the doorman of the Armenian Patriarchate, when the main gate of the Armenian Convent (of St. James) was already closed.

"The Armenian superior of the Holy Sepulchre, Father Vagharsh Hatchadourian, called to raise the alarm that a fire was raging at the St. Helena Chapel in the Holy Sepulchre. At the same time, he had asked for help from the Greek Orthodox superior of the Holy Sepulchre, Father Daniel.

"The dormitory of the Armenian superior is in the upper gallery, in the Armenian church facing the calvary, quite far from the crypt. The smoke was so dense that it had reached the superior while he had already turned in, on the other side of the church, and three levels above the chapel.

"The chapel is the oldest part of the church, the only remnant from the Constantine period, when the cathedral was first constructed (circa 330 A.D.). It has been reconstructed twice in the present century, once in 1937, and again last year. It is situated under the roof, part of the Ethiopian Monastery.

"Now that the reconstruction work is still proceeding, excavations were done on the same level, under the Coptic Monastery, behind the altar of the St. Helena Chapel, where excavators unearthed the

remains of the Constantinian walls and many other important vestiges of the fourth century.

"The Armenians have jurisdiction over this chapel and have named it the Church of St. Gregory the Illuminator, the founder of the Armenian Church (301 A.D.). All the paintings and mosaics depict the life of St. Gregory.

"It is in the southern part of this chapel that the scaffoldings and wooden beams are stored. They have been there since excavation and rebuilding work was begun. The fire broke out there.

"When the Armenian Father Superior alerted the Patriarchate, two priests and a layman rushed to the place. They went first to the Kishla (citadel) police station, notified them of the fire and asked to call the fire brigade. When they reached the entrance of the chapel, a heavy pall of black smoke was coming up the stairs. After some hesitation, and in the absence of the fire brigade, the two priests and the layman connected the fire-extinguishing pump, which is the main level of the church, and, hoisting the hose onto their shoulders, braved the smoke and walked down the steps, in an attempt to extinguish the fire.

"The fire was under control by the time the fire brigade arrived. However, the damage had been done. The main large painting in the chapel was completely destroyed, the huge arch supporting the roof was heavily damaged and all the area was a tragic mess.

"The priests and the officials of the fire brigade discovered these important facts:

"1. That the beams were burned in the centre, where they lay on the floor of the church, and then spread upwards.

"2. There were old rags under the beams, and remains of matches.

"3. No remains of candles were found, as was claimed later.

"The fact is that no police investigation or any other official action was initiated after the fire. The representatives of the municipality came the next day to ask if any help was needed and to suggest that it was all the result of a candle left there by a pilgrim.

"The truth is that there were no pilgrims or worshippers in the church that night. The gates were closed at 7 p.m. as usual, and the Franciscan fathers had been in the area around 9 p.m. without noticing any lighted candles in any place. The scaffoldings and the wooden beams have never served as a place where candles could be lit.

"The witnesses are convinced that arson was involved. Somebody put the cloth rags under the heavy and bulky pieces of wood and lit them. The fire spread very rapidly and engulfed the invaluable painting high above the spot where it started.

"Who the criminal was, who started that fire, we cannot say at this stage. But it was most definitely a criminal act."

I respectfully request you to use your good offices in calling upon the Government of Israel to abide by

the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council on the protection of holy shrines and cultural institutions in occupied areas.

I kindly request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) HAZEM NUSEIBEH
Permanent Representative of Jordan
to the United Nations

DOCUMENT S/14318*

Letter dated 23 December 1980 from the representative of China to the Secretary-General

[Original: Chinese/English]
[24 December 1980]

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a note addressed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China to the Embassy of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam in China on 22 December 1980. I request that this note be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) LAI Ya-li
Acting Permanent Representative
of the People's Republic of China
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Note dated 22 December 1980 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China to the Embassy of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam in China

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China wishes to state as follows with regard to Sino-Vietnamese negotiations.

The Chinese Government has always held that disputes and differences between States should be settled in a fair and reasonable way through peaceful negotiations. In line with this stand, the Chinese side made great efforts to bring about the Sino-Vietnamese negotiations and promote their progress. Regrettably, owing to reasons arising from the Vietnamese side, the two rounds of negotiations already held yielded no result whatsoever.

Since the conclusion of the second round of negotiations, the Chinese side has repeatedly suggested that each side make proper

* Circulated under the double symbol A/36.56-S/14318.

use of the intersessional period to study the viewpoints and propositions of the other side so as to find a way to break the deadlock in the negotiations and seek a settlement. Should the Vietnamese side take the Chinese suggestion seriously, the third round of negotiations could have been expected to start earlier.

However, pushing their policy of opposition and hostility to China with redoubled efforts, the Vietnamese authorities have during this period further poisoned the relations between the two countries, kept intensifying tension along the Sino-Vietnamese border, and carried out reckless military provocations against the Chinese border areas. At the same time, in defiance of the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, the Vietnamese authorities have refused to withdraw their troops from Kampuchea and have done their utmost to step up their war of aggression against Kampuchea in an attempt to achieve their ambition of total occupation of Kampuchea. What is more, they have concentrated massive troops along the Thai-Kampuchean border areas and intruded into the territory of Thailand, thus posing a grave threat to the peace, security and stability of Thailand and the South-East Asian region as a whole. In the service of the Soviet policy of global hegemony, the Vietnamese authorities have acted as a tool and commando for the southward drive strategy of the Soviet Union and provided it with military bases, thus subjecting the west Pacific, particularly the South-East Asian countries, to the growing threat of Soviet military build-up. Such perverse acts of the Vietnamese authorities can in no way be glossed over by their professions of sincerity. In such circumstances and atmosphere, there is no practical significance in holding the third round of Sino-Vietnamese negotiations. The Chinese side hopes that the Vietnamese side will by deeds create conditions necessary for an early resumption of the negotiations between the two countries. Should positive factors favourable to the negotiations appear, the Chinese delegation will be ready to go to Hanoi at any time for the resumed negotiations with the Vietnamese side.

DOCUMENT S/14319

Letter dated 24 December 1980 from the representative of Tunisia to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English/French]
[24 December 1980]

I have the honour to transmit below the text of a message dated 24 December 1980 addressed to you by Mr. Chedli Klibi, Secretary-General of the League of Arab States:

"Without a doubt, you share our deep concern for the fate of the Mayors of Al-Khalil and Halhoul, Messrs. Fahd Qawasma and Mohamed Milhem, who have resorted to a hunger strike as a means of

publicizing their desire to return to their homes and families and to resume their duties in Palestine.

"The Israeli authorities' refusal to abide by the international will as expressed in the unanimous resolution adopted by the Security Council—the highest authority in the United Nations—which demands the return of the two Mayors, reaffirms once again Israel's disregard for international law, the

international organization and all principles of human rights.

"This dangerous situation, which affects the lives of Messrs. Qawasma and Milhem, should move the international conscience. It is incumbent upon all of us, individuals and States, to take the immediate initiative to undertake all measures that will ensure the safe return of the two Palestinian officials.

"We request that you work immediately through the Security Council, which is responsible for the maintenance of peace and security, to take all nec-

essary measures that would lead to the implementation of its resolutions and the return of the two Palestinian nationalists, not only to ensure their safety but also to ensure the dignity, the authority and credibility of Council resolutions."

Kindly have the text of this message distributed as a document of the Security Council.

*(Signed) Taïeb SLIM
Permanent Representative of Tunisia
to the United Nations*

DOCUMENT S/14322*

Letter dated 30 December 1980 from the representative of Israel to the Secretary-General

*[Original: English]
[31 December 1980]*

Further to my letters of 14 November [S/14257] and of 16 December 1980 [S/14297], I wish to draw your attention to yet another attempt by PLO terrorists based in Lebanon to cross the border with a view to perpetrating indiscriminate murder and violence in Israel.

On the afternoon of 25 December, a group of PLO terrorists passed through the area of operation of the United Nations Interim Force in southern Lebanon and was spotted while trying to penetrate the border with Israel near Kibbutz Hanita, close to the Mediterranean Sea. In the ensuing encounter with an Israel Defence Forces patrol, all five terrorists in the group were killed.

The PLO took responsibility for the attempted outrage in a statement broadcast on its radio in Lebanon on 27 December.

This was the third such attempt in the last six weeks. As on the previous occasions, the terrorists involved were heavily armed with hand-grenades, rocket launchers and assault rifles, mainly of Soviet manufacture.

As indicated in my letter of 16 December, one terrorist was killed in the encounter which took place near the village of Zar'it on 14 December. I now wish to add that two terrorists were captured in the same encounter. They disclosed that they had been briefed personally by Abu Jihad, one of Yasser Arafat's leading henchmen in the Al-Fatah organization, and that their orders had been to perpetrate "indiscriminate massacre" at Zar'it.


Moreover, they had been instructed to return to Lebanese territory on the completion of their criminal mission, and to hand themselves over to the United Nations Interim Force which, they were assured by Abu Jihad, would escort them back to their base at Tyre.

These recent events again demonstrate the need and duty of the Government of Israel to take appropriate measures to protect the lives and safety of its citizens.

I have the honour to request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

*(Signed) Yehuda Z. BLUM
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations*

* Circulated under the double symbol A/36/62-S/14322.



HQ UNFICYP
 HQ BRITCON
 HQ CANCON
 Force Reserve Sqn (-)
 UNFICYP Support Regt
 Engineer Det
 Signal Sqn
 Aviation Flight
 Transport Sqn
 Medical Centre
 Ordnance Det
 Workshop
 Canadian Logistic Coy
 UN MP Coy (-)
 RAF Helicopter Sqn Det

HQ SECTOR 1 (DANCON)
 HQ & SP Coy
 One Engr Sect

HQ SECTOR 2 (BRITCON)
 HQ Coy
 One Coy

HQ AUSTCIVPOL


HQ SECTOR 6 (AUSCON)
 HQ Coy
 One Coy (-)

HQ SECTOR 5 (SWEDCON)
 HQ & SP Coy
 Two Pls

HQ SECTOR 4 (CANCON)
 HQ Coy
 One Coy
 Recce Pl

一九八〇年十一月联塞部队的部署
 DEPLOYMENT OF UNFICYP AS OF NOVEMBER 1980
 DÉPLOIEMENT DE L'UNFICYP AU MOIS DE NOVEMBRE 1980
 ДИСЛОКАЦИЯ ВСООНК НА НОЯБРЬ 1980 ГОДА
 DESPLIEGUE DE LA UNFICYP EN NOVEMBRE DE 1980


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土耳其部队停火线	塞浦路斯国民警卫队停火线	联塞部队行动分界綫
Cease-Fire Lines of Turkish Forces	Cease-Fire Lines of Cyprus National Guard	UNFICYP operational boundaries
Lignes du cessez-le-feu des forces turques	Lignes du cessez-le-feu de la garde nationale chypriote	Limites des zones d'operacions de la Force
Линия прекращения огня турецких войск	Линия прекращения огня Национальной гвардии Кипра	Оперативные рубежи ВСООНК
Líneas de cesación del fuego de las fuerzas turcas	Líneas de cesación del fuego de la Guardia Nacional de Chipre	Limites de las zonas de operaciones de la Fuerza



一九八〇年十一月观察员部队的部署状况
 UNDOF DEPLOYMENT AS OF NOVEMBER 1980
 DÉPLOIEMENT DE LA FNUOD AU MOIS DE NOVEMBRE 1980
 ДИСЛОКАЦИЯ СООННР ПО ПОЛОЖЕНИЮ НА НОЯВРЬ 1980 ГОДА
 DESPLIEGUE DE LA FNUOS EN NOVIEMBRE DE 1980

- | | | |
|--|---------------------------------|--------------------------|
| △ 联合国观察所 | ○ 联合国部队的位置 | --- 巡逻线 |
| United Nations observation post | United Nations position | Patrol routes |
| Poste d'observation de l'ONU | Position de l'ONU | Parcours des patrouilles |
| Наблюдательный пункт ООН | Позиция ООН | Маршруты патрулей |
| Puesto de observación de las Naciones Unidas | Posición de las Naciones Unidas | Rutas de patrulla |

黎巴嫩南部 • SOUTHERN LEBANON
 LIBAN MÉRIDIONAL
 ЮЖНЫЙ ЛИБАН • LÍBANO MERIDIONAL



一九八〇年十二月联黎部队的部署情况
 UNIFIL DEPLOYMENT AS OF DECEMBER 1980
 DÉPLOIEMENT DE LA FINUL AU MOIS DE DÉCEMBRE 1980
 ДИСЛОКАЦИЯ ВСООНЛ НА ДЕКАБРЬ 1980 ГОДА
 DESPLIEGUE DE LA FPNUL EN DICIEMBRE DE 1980

- UNIFIL HQ
- FRONTIER
- SWAMP
- WATER
- F.A.A.R.
- OIL

- 观察所
Observation post
- Poste d'observation
- Наблюдательный пункт
- Puesto de observación
- 路障
Road block
- Poste de contrôle routier
- Заграждение на дороге
- Barrera de caminos

- 联黎部队活动范围的界限
UNIFIL operational boundaries
- Limites des zones d'opérations de la Force
- Оперативные рубежи ВСООНП
- Limites de las zonas de operaciones de la Fuerza
- 黎巴嫩单位
Lebanese unit
- Unité libanaise
- Ливанское подразделение
- Unidad libanesa

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