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THE SITUATION IN KAMPUCHEA

SECURITY COUNCIL
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Letter dated 1 March 1983 from the Permanent Representative of
China to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith the text of a statement dated 1 March 1983 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. I should be grateful if you would be kind enough to arrange for its circulation as an official document of the General Assembly, under item 23 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) LING Qing
Permanent Representative of the
People's Republic of China to
the United Nations

* A/38/50.

ANNEX

Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
People's Republic of China

1 March 1983

On 23 February 1983, the Vietnamese authorities issued a statement through the so-called "summit conference of the three Indochinese nations", announcing the "offer" of conditional, annual and partial troop withdrawals from Kampuchea and repeating their three unreasonable pre-conditions for a total troop withdrawal. This is another hoax produced by the Vietnamese authorities in order to divert public attention, cover up their criminal acts of aggression, deceive world opinion and extricate themselves from the internal and external difficulties which engulf them as their war of aggression against Kampuchea has gone on for four years.

As is known to all, the Kampuchean question is the result of Viet Nam's armed invasion and occupation of Kampuchea. The key to a settlement of the question lies in Viet Nam's unconditional withdrawal of all its aggressor troops from Kampuchea so that the Kampuchean people may decide their own destiny by themselves. Relevant resolutions adopted by the U.N. General Assembly since its 34th session and the resolution and declaration of the International Conference on Kampuchea have all given expression to this correct and reasonable position. The Vietnamese authorities have refused to implement these resolutions and, after the failure of their past political manoeuvres, have resorted to new tricks and hit upon the idea of fixing a tag of "volunteers" to their aggressor troops in Kampuchea. These are indeed cheap tricks which make a laughingstock of themselves. At the same time, they again put forward three so-called pre-conditions for the total withdrawal of their troops, slandering the just action of China and the ASEAN countries supporting the Kampuchean people's resistance to Vietnamese aggression as a threat to their security. All this has been done in order to invent excuses for their continued execution of a policy of aggression and expansion and their refusal to withdraw all their troops from Kampuchea.

As for the so-called "annual partial withdrawals"

of troops, it is nothing new either. It is just a reproduction of the deceitful "partial withdrawal" offer the Vietnamese authorities put forward last July. Although the withdrawals are now called "annual and partial", no time limit or numbers are specified, and the withdrawals are made dependent on "security conditions". How can such an announced "offer" of withdrawal be of any practical significance?

All justice-upholding and peace-loving countries and peoples wish to see a settlement of the Kampuchean question at the earliest possible date. The Chinese Government has repeatedly explained its basic position, views and proposals for a settlement of the Kampuchean question, which can be summed up as follows:

Viet Nam must first declare an unconditional withdrawal of all its troops from Kampuchea.

The Soviet Union should cease supporting Viet Nam's aggression against Kampuchea, and act in the spirit of the U.N. Charter and in compliance with the relevant resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly by urging Viet Nam to withdraw all its troops from Kampuchea.

If the Vietnamese government should decide to announce a withdrawal of all its troops from Kampuchea, the Chinese side would be willing, after the withdrawal of the first batch of Vietnamese troops, to resume negotiations with Viet Nam for the normalization of relations between the two countries. And along with the withdrawal of more Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea, the Chinese side would take practical steps to improve its relations with Viet Nam.

After the withdrawal of all Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea, it should be up to the Kampuchean people themselves to settle all their internal issues, including the kind of social system and form of government to be set up in Kampuchea. The Chinese Government respects the Kampuchean people's right to self-determination. Taking the same position as that of most other countries of the world, China wishes to see an independent, peaceful, neutral and non-aligned Kampuchea.

China seeks no self interest on the question of Kampuchea. China is willing to make a joint commitment with other countries to refrain from any form of interference in the internal affairs of Kampuchea, to respect the independence, neutrality and non-aligned status of

Kampuchea, and to respect the result of the Kampuchean people's choice made through a genuinely free election to be held under U.N. supervision.

There is a profound traditional friendship between the Chinese and the Vietnamese peoples. The Chinese people are willing to make joint efforts with the Vietnamese people to overcome the obstacles so that this friendship can be resumed and developed. The Chinese Government is ready to take effective action together with the other peace-loving and justice-upholding countries and peoples to urge the Vietnamese government to implement the U.N. General Assembly resolutions on Kampuchea so that a just and reasonable settlement of the Kampuchean issue may be realized at an early date.
