



# General Assembly

Fifty-fifth session

Official Records

Distr.: General  
16 March 2001  
English  
Original: Russian

---

## Fourth Committee

### Summary record of the 21st meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Thursday, 9 November 2000, at 10 a.m.

*Chairman:* Mr. Semakula Kiwanuka . . . . . (Uganda)  
*later:* Mr. Vassallo (Vice-Chairman). . . . . (Malta)

## Contents

Agenda item 86: Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects (*continued*)

---

This record is subject to correction. Corrections should be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned *within one week of the date of publication* to the Chief of the Official Records Editing Section, room DC2-750, 2 United Nations Plaza, and incorporated in a copy of the record.

Corrections will be issued after the end of the session, in a separate corrigendum for each Committee.

00-73656 (E)



*The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m.*

**Agenda item 86: Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects** (*continued*) (A/54/670 and A/54/839; A/55/138-S/2000/693, A/55/305-S/2000/809, A/55/502 and A/55/507 and Add.1)

1. **Mr. Tomka** (Slovakia) said that his delegation fully supported the views expressed by the representative of France on behalf of the European Union and its associated countries, although it would like to make some additional comments.

2. The experience of the United Nations had shown that, although conflicts had a variety of forms, peacekeeping operations were still one of the key instruments for conflict resolution. The report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (“Brahimi report”, A/55/305-S/2000/809) offered inspiration for a meaningful reform of United Nations peacekeeping activities and clearly confirmed that the work of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations was moving in the right direction in its efforts to enhance their effectiveness.

3. Establishment of a clear and achievable mandate was one of the key elements enabling the United Nations to act effectively and efficiently in conflict situations. At the same time, an achievable mandate for peacekeeping operations could be created only through close and interactive cooperation between the decision-making and executive components of the United Nations.

4. People around the world who had found themselves in conflict situations often turned to the United Nations for help, and action should be taken whenever possible. However, to avoid problems after the deployment of a peacekeeping operation, troop contingents must be adequately trained and equipped. His delegation shared the view that Member States should enter into effective cooperation in training troops and providing them with necessary equipment. In that regard, the Secretariat should also find ways and means to assist Member States where necessary and facilitate such cooperation. Slovakia, which had experience in demining activities and had a training centre for peacekeeping operations, was ready to cooperate with other Member States.

5. Another issue that affected the ability of Member States to participate in United Nations peacekeeping activities was reimbursement for their participation in such operations. Delays in reimbursements significantly restricted the ability of the United Nations itself to establish a desired peacekeeping mission. His delegation believed that budget concerns should not eliminate peacekeeping missions from the very beginning, and it was to be hoped that in the near future a mechanism to ensure stable, equitable and transparent financing for such missions would be found. Slovakia would continue to play an active role in efforts aimed at the consolidation and reinforcement of United Nations peacekeeping activities to promote peace, security and prosperity.

6. **Mr. Smith** (Australia) said that the unprecedented attention currently being given to the deficiencies in United Nations peacekeeping activities and the general consensus on the need to strengthen the Organization’s peacekeeping capacity provided a real opportunity for such reform.

7. Australia was currently the sixth largest contributor of personnel to peacekeeping operations. In his statement at the current session of the General Assembly, the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs had referred to five key lessons learned from Australia’s participation in the United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET); some of which were also key elements of the Brahimi report. First, military intervention must be used only as a last resort. The need for a peacekeeping operation was in itself an admission that diplomacy had failed. Second, where the United Nations was deployed, there must be a clear peace plan and reasonable prospects of achieving peace. Third, peace operations must have a mandate from the Security Council that was appropriate to the task before them. Also, there must be some flexibility so that, if conditions changed, the Security Council could adjust the mandate in a timely manner. Fourth, deployment must take place quickly once the Security Council took a decision. In accordance with the recommendations of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, Australia had introduced a system of reserve lists of available civilian police. Fifth, United Nations peacekeeping operations must have a clear exit strategy.

8. The issue of resources was crucial. His delegation had long argued for a restructuring of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations; its strategic and planning

capacity should be maintained at a level that could support at least three peacekeeping operations simultaneously. An increase in resources must be accompanied by the establishment of a more effective system for their utilization. His delegation underlined the importance of a comprehensive resource management plan as a tool for the efficient management of United Nations staff involved in peacekeeping operations over the longer term.

9. In conclusion, his delegation wished to confirm that Australia was strongly committed to seizing the opportunity to bring about major changes in the way the United Nations carried out its responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. While there might be differences of opinion on the details of some of the recommendations in the Brahimi report, he urged all Member States to join Australia in working to address the problems which the report identified.

10. **Mr. Cunningham** (United States of America) said that in order to meet the challenges facing the United Nations and the international community in the twenty-first century, its responses must be quicker, more coherent and better organized. That was why implementing the recommendations in the Brahimi report was essential. Recently in some quarters, concern had been expressed about the impact of the implementation of some of those recommendations on development funding or other aspects of the Organization's work. In the view of his Government, however, there was no connection between the two things. If the United Nations became more capable in the area of peacekeeping, it would also be more effective in all its activities and would attract greater international support.

11. His delegation shared the views concerning improvements in peacekeeping contained in the report of the Special Committee and the Brahimi report and believed that at least the most important of them should be put into practice without delay.

12. Unless decisive action was taken, those that threatened peacekeepers across the globe might conclude that the United Nations lacked the will and cohesion to perform that important function. It was essential to support peacekeepers, who risked their lives in many parts of the world, by devising the most effective peacekeeping system possible. The pursuit of ideal solutions must not prevent meaningful action.

13. It must be kept in mind that peacekeeping, at its core, was about preventing and healing the impact of conflict on human lives and providing their countries with an opportunity for reconciliation and peaceful development. Peacekeeping was also essential for development, as in Mozambique, where effective peacekeeping had contributed to the stability that had produced the highest economic growth rate in Africa.

14. **Mr. Shinkaye** (Nigeria) commended the foresight of the Secretary-General in constituting a Panel on Peace Operations, which demonstrated his willingness to admit that all was not well with the Organization's peacekeeping operations and his readiness to take necessary steps to improve the situation.

15. The whole question of peacekeeping operations had elicited different reactions from different groups, and it was appropriate for the Fourth Committee and the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations to discuss the various recommendations with a view to arriving at decisions aimed at improving the capacity of the Organization in the maintenance of international peace and security.

16. As a troop-contributing country, Nigeria was concerned about the safety of United Nations peacekeepers, and as an African country, about the many problems facing peacekeeping operations in its continent. In that regard, his delegation welcomed the recommendations contained in the Brahimi report, in particular those seeking to protect and maintain the integrity of peacekeeping forces, assure rapid deployment once the relevant decisions were taken, and provide necessary facilities and resources to improve the chances for success of an operation.

17. The importance of the recommendations contained in the Brahimi report could not be overemphasized, particularly since the number of conflicts appeared to be growing and not diminishing. Considering that United Nations forces would continue to be needed to deal with those crises, it was essential for the Organization to take the necessary steps to meet those challenges. For that reason, his delegation highly appreciated the report of the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, which showed what his Department was doing to implement the Special Committee's recommendations.

18. United Nations peacekeeping activities could only be successful if a holistic strategy was adopted. The principle of resolving conflicts through peaceful

means, before they degenerated into a conflagration, should be emphasized. In that regard, he welcomed the strengthening of early warning systems for conflict prevention. Furthermore, considering that poverty was the main reason behind almost all conflicts, Nigeria also supported the involvement of the Bretton Woods institutions and other United Nations organs in conflict prevention and post-conflict disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation programmes. Through their activities, designed to enhance development and reduce poverty levels, those organizations could significantly contribute to conflict prevention and post-conflict rehabilitation.

19. His delegation was of the view that a clear and achievable mandate was vital to the success of any peacekeeping mission, which must allow the peacekeepers to defend themselves and the people under their control, and to deal effectively with those who threatened the peace process.

20. Furthermore, his delegation called for the involvement of troop-contributing countries at the earliest possible stage of a peacekeeping mission, in order that they might be provided with all the information required to make informed decisions.

21. While the primary role in the maintenance of international peace and security rested with the United Nations, Nigeria believed that the regional organizations could also provide valuable assistance to the Security Council in formulating the right strategy for action in conflict areas. A good example was the cooperation between the Security Council and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which contributed to a greater appreciation on the part of the Council of the issues involved in Sierra Leone. The peacekeeping operations undertaken by ECOWAS, with the help of its Military Observation Group (ECOMOG), in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau had proven essential in maintaining peace and security in the subregion. Nigeria urged that such regional initiatives should receive support from the United Nations. Experience had shown that subregional and regional organizations could work together with the United Nations in furtherance of international peace and security.

22. Delays in reimbursement to troop contributing countries remained a deep concern for all such countries, especially developing countries. He urged the Secretariat to expedite action on the processing of

claims and the reimbursement of countries contributing personnel and equipment to peacekeeping operations.

23. His delegation wished to emphasize the importance of the rapid deployment of peacekeeping operations upon the adoption of the relevant Security Council resolution. Since the concept of contingent-owned equipment was an indispensable element of rapid deployment capability, it urged the Secretariat to link that concept as soon as possible to the United Nations standby arrangements system. Where it was critical, the Secretariat should maintain a minimum stock of operation start-up kits. Nigeria also emphasized the importance of third-party loans of operational equipment to Member States participating in peacekeeping operations, particularly as most of the troop-contributing countries from the Third World lacked such equipment.

24. In view of the increasing complexity of United Nations peacekeeping operations and the resulting need for professional military, police and civilian staff, Nigeria called for the necessary mechanism to be introduced for recruiting, training and deploying the most qualified personnel to the field. His delegation supported the Special Committee's recommendation for a comprehensive review of the management structure and the recruitment processes of the staff in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. That would improve the planning, deployment and management of peacekeeping operations. This review should, however, take into consideration the need for equitable geographical and gender representation. There was also a need to provide adequate protection and security for both the military and the civilian staff of peacekeeping operations.

25. A restructuring of the Security Council would, in the view of his delegation, enhance the stature of the Council as the organ entrusted with the responsibility of maintaining international peace and security. Nigeria therefore urged that the necessary reforms of the Council be carried out as soon as possible, so that all Member States had a sense of participating in carrying out the mandate of the United Nations as laid down in the Charter.

26. The issue of peacekeeping operations was extremely important, since the final elimination of conflicts did not yet seem possible. Nigeria therefore appreciated the efforts of the Special Committee and the Secretary-General to improve all aspects of

peacekeeping operations and would continue to offer them its full support.

27. **Mr. Sharma** (India) said that his delegation associated itself with the statement made by the representative of Jordan on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and expressed appreciation for the report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. He felt it necessary, however, to focus special attention on the Brahimi report. That report, along with the reports of the Secretary-General on its implementation and on the resource requirements, needed to be studied together with the enquiry reports on Rwanda and Srebrenica and the Agenda for Peace of 1992 and its supplement, issued in 1995, since the recommendations of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations sometimes differed from the views of the two Secretaries-General, whose views, in particular those of Mr. Boutros-Ghali, had evolved as experience had accumulated.

28. A peacekeeping operation, however complex, was and must be, distinct from post-conflict peace-building. That had always been the position of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. The peace operations recommended by the Panel were a return to the concepts of the Agenda for Peace, which had not been accepted by the General Assembly and from which even the former Secretary-General, basing himself on experience, had distanced himself. Focusing on strengthening the Secretariat "on an emergency basis", as if the solution to the crisis was to add staff, was a dangerous simplification of a complex problem. The problems facing peacekeeping operations were systemic in nature and could not be corrected by an emergency infusion of extra personnel. If it fed that illusion, the Secretariat might find that, when crises recurred, the entire blame fell on it.

29. In analysing peacekeeping operations one was immediately struck by the number of crises caused by the fact that peacekeeping operations had not been deployed or had been terminated because of the action taken by the Security Council. In the situations in Rwanda, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo the Council had failed to react in time to the needs of countries in crisis. That had happened because of a lack of the political will needed to take the necessary measures. That systemic problem, which was at the heart of the crisis in peacekeeping, could only be corrected by reforming the Security Council itself and transforming it into a more representative organ.

Currently the Security Council's agenda was dominated by issues relating to the situation in Third World countries but decisions on setting up peacekeeping operations depended overwhelmingly on the wishes of the permanent members, among which there was not a single developing country.

30. Once a decision was taken to set up a peacekeeping operation, the Security Council gave it a mandate, tasks and resources, but that process was guided less by the real needs than by considerations of what the permanent members would accept. The Secretariat was inclined to offer advice based on what the Council wanted rather than on what was objectively needed. A problem that bedevilled many complex peacekeeping operations from the start was the concept of operations prepared by the Secretariat. Although it was not acknowledged, those concepts were sometimes drawn up in military establishments outside the Secretariat. If that practice continued, strengthening the Secretariat's capacity would be meaningless.

31. Recent experience had shown, most glaringly in Sierra Leone, that crises arose when contingents arrived in the theatre of operations ill-trained and ill-equipped. Unfortunately, that problem too was unlikely to go away, despite the recommendations in the Brahimi report, for a variety of reasons. First, the number of countries with professional armies which were prepared to contribute contingents to peacekeeping operations was limited, as very few developed countries wanted to put their troops at risk. Secondly, the Secretariat now believed that, at least in some situations, it was politically important to take forces for the operation from countries in the region, which might not be the optimal approach. Thirdly, training troops was a lengthy and costly enterprise and the United Nations did not have money for that.

32. The most complex problem was how to deal with violent opposition to the presence of the United Nations or to the agreement that the operation was supposed to help implement. The Panel on United Nations Peace Operations pointed out in that connection that United Nations peacekeeping forces must be prepared to confront the lingering forces of war and violence with the ability and determination to defeat them. That basic premise, from which the Panel's recommendations flowed, directly contradicted the experience of the United Nations and the troop contributors, as well as the personal recommendations of both the current Secretary-General and his

predecessor. Summing up the lessons of Srebrenica, the Secretary-General had written that when peacekeeping operations were used as a substitute for political consensus they were likely to fail, noting that peacekeeping should not be mixed with war fighting.

33. The Brahimi report was in fact recommending a fundamental change in the principles whereby peacekeepers used force. Such a change implied going back to policies which had been followed briefly and unsuccessfully before the events in Somalia had proved them to be misconceived. Accepting the recommendation would be more likely to lead to new crises, rather than to end them.

34. However, even if the United Nations continued to distinguish between peacekeeping, no matter how complex, and the use of force, there would inevitably be crises when peacekeeping missions were conducted in areas where the situation was still unsettled. In that connection, missions on the ground were able to detect impending crises at an early stage and to do so faster and more effectively than information-gathering units based in New York. In determining the tasks of peacekeeping operations and in further refining their mandates, the Security Council and the Secretariat should, therefore, consult closely with troop-contributing countries and take their advice into account.

35. The Panel had not addressed another systemic problem, which encouraged the use of force. The Council can only mandate the use of force under Chapter VII of the Charter. Article 44 of the Charter specified that the Security Council should invite countries providing armed forces "to participate in the decisions of the Security Council". The Charter required more than consultations; troop-contributing countries must be able to "participate" in the Council's decisions. The Panel, however, recommended only that there be close consultations, but there was no evidence that the Security Council seriously wished to go beyond its current procedures, which were completely inadequate.

36. All peacekeeping operations had the problem of coordination between units from different political and military backgrounds. Two developments had made the problem worse over the past few years: first, the emergence within the Department for Peacekeeping Operations of a combat approach heavily influenced by military doctrines with which most troop-contributing

countries, as developing countries, were unfamiliar, and which lent themselves more to war than to peacekeeping. Secondly, the decline in the quality of the forces made available to the Organization. There were no ready solutions to either of those problems. It was essential, however, to correct the perspective of the Department by recruiting significantly greater numbers of staff from the military establishments of developing countries.

37. The problems were real and needed to be addressed in the first instance by Member States. A larger Secretariat would, in itself, have no impact. The Brahimi report argued that no national army would ever contemplate operating with such sketchy headquarters support as that now provided by the Department to missions. However, no national Government would contemplate sending five battalions into an unstable region the size of Western Europe, and yet that was exactly the decision taken by the Council with regard to the first phase of the operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. By definition peacekeeping operations were not military operations and the support they needed from headquarters could not be compared to the needs of an army going into action against an enemy force. The Panel's argument, apparently so persuasive, was in fact specious. In 1994-1995, when peacekeeping operations had been at their peak, the size of the staff of the Department, as a percentage of the number of troops, had been lower than at present, not taking into account the proposed additional posts, and there had been no talk then of inadequate staffing levels in the Department. It should also be remembered that the Panel was at the same time requesting additional resources for the Department of Political Affairs, which had been set up in 1992 to collect and analyse information in order to alert the relevant intergovernmental organs about impending crises. Subsequently, the set of tasks assigned to the Department had been narrowed but, while the resources allocated to it had grown, it was unable to cope with those tasks. Therefore, before deciding on strengthening the Department for Political Affairs, it was necessary to clarify the heart of the problem.

38. His Government, which had contributed troops to almost every major peacekeeping operation, was by no means against strengthening the support given by Headquarters to peacekeeping. It was reluctant, however, to favour wasting the Organization's resources, reinventing peacekeeping methods that had

been tried and had failed and establishing structures that were not needed.

39. The Special Committee's repeated calls for a comprehensive review of the structure of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations had gone unheeded. Without such a review, however, it would be difficult to justify the request for 249 additional posts to backstop "peace operations". Meanwhile the Military Division, particularly the Military Planning Service, the Civilian Police Division and the Office of Operations in the Department, would benefit from being strengthened, but they should be largely manned by personnel from major troop-contributing countries. His delegation would be happy to support proposals to that end and was ready to continue its constructive engagement.

40. *Mr. Vassallo (Malta), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.*

41. **Mr. Mangachi** (United Republic of Tanzania), after associating his delegation with the statement by the representative of Jordan on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, said that peacekeeping had become more challenging, especially in the post-cold war period. Traditionally, peacekeeping entailed dealing with inter-State conflicts and aimed at establishing and policing a truce between the parties. Circumstances had changed, however, and most conflicts were intra-State in nature. The role of peacekeeping therefore also had to change. It should combine traditional peacekeeping with activities of a political or humanitarian nature and, in some cases, peace-enforcement measures or even humanitarian intervention. Such new dimensions of peacekeeping should be discussed collectively by all States, taking into account the specific circumstances of each conflict situation, always bearing in mind the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

42. His delegation supported the recommendations and proposals contained in the Brahimi report and called for their expeditious consideration. The proposal for a substantially larger, modernized and technically advanced Department of Peacekeeping Operations should be given high priority.

43. His delegation similarly supported the recommendation concerning rapid and effective deployment. Swift and timely action to resolve conflicts was of paramount importance. Time and again the Security Council had taken too long to act or failed

to act at all. Srebrenica and Rwanda were two sad examples of such inaction. Currently a lack of political will to deploy a peacekeeping force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was evident. The Security Council should revisit the matter on an urgent basis.

44. His delegation totally agreed with the observation that most of the failures had "occurred because the Security Council and the Member States crafted and supported ambiguous, inconsistent and underfunded mandates" (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 266). Peacekeeping mandates should not only be clearly defined but should also be adequately resourced. Furthermore, they should be established after consultations with the troop-contributing countries. The same principle should apply where the Security Council was planning to change a mandate in midstream.

45. Training was another important aspect that should be addressed. It was imperative that troops should be better trained before their deployment to any mission. In that connection, his delegation welcomed the proposal on the establishment of a permanent staff training college.

46. The need for cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations, including the Organization of African Unity, could not be overemphasized. Such partnerships should be enhanced, particularly in the area of capacity-building, to enable the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution to achieve its goals. In that connection, his delegation welcomed the initiatives to enhance the capacity for peacekeeping in some African countries. It also commended those donors who had made contributions to the Organization of African Unity Peace Fund.

47. He stressed the importance of preventive diplomacy. Many conflicts could be prevented if their root causes were addressed before they erupted. To that end, mechanisms should be put in place to prevent conflicts, by such means as early warning systems and confidence-building measures.

48. It was essential that peacekeeping operations should be effectively financed through predictable sources. Lastly, his delegation expressed the hope that there would be no double standards in the management of peacekeeping matters.

49. **Mr. Gatilov** (Russian Federation) said that peacekeeping operations remained one of the effective tools for the settlement of crises, but if they were to continue to be in demand, they must be firmly based on the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

50. The experience of the settlement of crisis situations over the past few years had confirmed the need for political management on the part of the Security Council at every stage of peacekeeping operations. If that principle was ignored, the inevitable result was a breakdown in the political settlement, since the Council was, in the eyes of the international community, the only body with moral authority. Any operations involving enforcement were therefore acceptable only with its agreement.

51. Given the growing demand for peacekeeping, it was imperative to establish a strong link between peacekeeping operations and efforts to achieve a political settlement of conflicts, together with a coordinated approach to crisis situations. As for the humanitarian element in peacekeeping operations, his Government could not accept the notion of humanitarian intervention, which it viewed as an attempt to bypass the Charter and settle complex problems by force. The way forward lay not in coercion but in the development of multi-functional operations, including operations with humanitarian components.

52. The early establishment of an effective system of standby arrangements would help greatly to increase the effectiveness of peacekeeping. Turning to the main topic of the discussion, the Brahimi report, he said that the Russian Federation supported the majority of the recommendations in the report, and believed that many of them were not only warranted but also urgent. At the same time, it noted that peacekeeping reforms must be carefully thought out, since otherwise they could prove to be counterproductive. In that regard, his delegation continued to have some doubts about the recommendations concerning logistics support, the procurement process and expenditure management for peacekeeping operations. It was also important to consider the financial impact of implementing the Brahimi recommendations.

53. The Russian Federation agreed with one of the main ideas in the report, that increasing the effectiveness of the peacekeeping capacity of the

United Nations should be accompanied by a strengthening of its military expertise. The Military Staff Committee, whose functions under the Charter were related to the issues raised in the Brahimi report, could assist in the resolution of those questions.

54. In the view of his delegation, the involvement of the Military Staff Committee would help maintain a balance in the division of responsibility between Member States and the Secretariat. The Charter provided a clear procedure for the use of the military analytical capacity of members of the Security Council at different stages of peacekeeping operations, allowing Member States to exercise their right not only to take political decisions, but also to determine their military component. In that connection, his delegation considered it advisable to study the possibilities of using the capacity of the Military Staff Committee under the new international conditions. In conclusion, he once again underlined the readiness of the Russian Federation to continue to play an active role in United Nations peacekeeping.

55. **Ms. Nuanthasing** (Lao People's Democratic Republic) said that her delegation associated itself with the statement by the representative of Jordan on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, and therefore would confine itself to brief comments on issues of particular relevance to it.

56. Although her country had contributed neither troops nor equipment to peacekeeping operations, it attached great importance to the agenda item under consideration, because it felt obliged to do whatever it could to assist the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security.

57. Over the past five decades, United Nations peacekeeping operations had contributed significantly to the peaceful settlement of regional conflicts and international disputes. However, many complex problems remained to be resolved, and peacekeeping operations had been characterized by both successes and failures. In the view of her delegation, serious study of those experiences would help the Organization to strengthen its capacity to react rapidly and effectively in response to crisis situations.

58. Her delegation had consistently maintained that strict observance of the fundamental principles of the Charter, especially respect for national sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of States, were requirements for the success of



any peacekeeping operation. Other essential elements were consent of the parties, impartiality and non-use of force except in self-defence. It was of paramount importance that peacekeeping operations should have clear mandates, objectives and command structures and adequate financial resources.

59. The current financial crisis in the Organization, especially in the area of peacekeeping, continued to be a matter of grave concern, and her delegation reiterated its call on all Member States to pay their assessed contributions in full, on time and without conditions. Furthermore, her delegation was concerned over the lengthy delays in reimbursing troop-contributing countries, the majority of which were developing countries, and hoped that those costs would be fully and promptly reimbursed.

60. Another important question was the enhancement of the capacity of the United Nations to respond in a timely manner to international crises, for which standby arrangements were an important tool. Furthermore, in the light of the Organization's current financial difficulties, efforts in that area should be aimed at the further development of the already existing system, rather than starting another one.

61. Her delegation had been following with great interest the Brahimi report and the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of its recommendations. Those recommendations were comprehensive and aimed at the further strengthening of the capacity of the United Nations to conduct peacekeeping operations. However, some recommendations remained unclear and needed further clarification; thus, consultations on them should continue.

62. Her delegation hoped that the deliberations of the Committee would provide effective guidance for the strengthening of peacekeeping activities both at Headquarters and in the field. It would spare no effort to contribute positively to the Committee's work.

63. **Ms. Fritsche** (Liechtenstein) said that activities to maintain international peace and security rightfully constituted the "business card" of the United Nations. She appreciated the vision of the Secretary-General in appointing a panel of outstanding experts to make recommendations concerning reforms in United Nations peacekeeping activities. Her delegation viewed the report submitted by that panel as a determined step to follow up earlier efforts to address apparent failures

in that area. The Brahimi report made it clear that reform of those activities was needed. Her delegation fully supported the Secretary-General for having already initiated a set of measures to address those shortcomings. Of course, many of the proposed recommendations required mandates from the legislative bodies, i.e., the Member States, and she hoped that they would address that task expeditiously and in a spirit of cooperation.

64. Liechtenstein was a small country which was not a troop contributor, since it had no armed forces. However, it was fully committed to the full implementation of all peacekeeping mandates. It had paid all its assessed contributions to the regular and the peacekeeping budget in full and on time. That practice must become the rule rather than the exception, and General Assembly resolution 55/2, adopted at the Millennium Summit, was a first and important step in that respect. The relevant financial bodies would have to follow up on the implementation of that resolution. Insufficient Headquarters support for peacekeeping activities was a particularly urgent matter, and the recommendations contained in the Brahimi report on that topic were welcome. Her delegation concurred with the view that an increase in resources for the needs of peacekeeping should not come at the expense of development. However, development and peacekeeping should not be interpreted too narrowly. Resources going to development needs could help prevent the outbreak of violence and armed conflict, while resources invested in peacekeeping could assist the quick recovery and development of a country which had experienced armed conflict.

65. One of the key elements of success in peacekeeping lay in the area of conflict prevention. Her Government was as sensitive to infringement of the principle of sovereignty as any other State, especially small States. Conflict prevention, however, did not constitute such an infringement. The concept of conflict prevention reflected a doctrinal shift, which was not at all limited to the area of armed conflict. Her delegation saw a vast potential in the United Nations system in the area of conflict prevention and, in that context, referred to its initiative for addressing conflicts based on self-determination claims. Given the proliferation of internal armed conflicts in recent years, it was of crucial importance for the United Nations to address such issues in an open-minded and constructive manner.

66. The Brahimi report formed a firm basis for reform of United Nations peacekeeping activities. However, her delegation wished to emphasize one aspect which, in its view, had not been given the necessary attention among the recommendations: the continued dramatic under-representation of women in peacekeeping and preventive diplomacy, especially at the level of special envoys and special representatives of the Secretary-General. The need to address that problem was dictated not only in the interests of “gender balance” but because women and children constituted the large majority of victims of armed conflict. Her delegation supported the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations in his appeal to Member States to put forward women candidates for participation in all components of field missions, including high-level posts. There was a need to mainstream a gender perspective in peacekeeping operations, in accordance with the decisions taken at the 1995 Beijing Conference, and it was time to take concrete action.

67. **Mr. Mmualefe** (Botswana) said that the item under discussion was central in assessing the work of the United Nations. His delegation commended the activities of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and welcomed the report of the Special Committee and the Brahimi report, which it considered as complementary.

68. His delegation fully agreed that the nature of conflict had changed over the past 50 years. The United Nations now found itself having to respond more and more often to intra-State conflicts, the causes of which were extremely diverse. In that regard, the recommendations of the Special Committee and the Brahimi report were of the utmost importance, particularly with regard to capacity-building, increased financial support and strengthened political will on the part of Member States. The collective duty of Member States to ensure peace and security called for increased support to the Department’s efforts. That could be achieved only through the willingness of Member States to participate actively in such operations. Implementing such recommendations as increased transparency and closer cooperation among the different organs of the United Nations system, complementarity of the work of Headquarters and field missions, and also recognition of the importance of fact-finding missions, standby arrangements and the role of special envoys and representatives of the

Secretary-General would make peacekeeping an effective tool in addressing current conflict situations.

69. His delegation was pleased to note from the report of the Secretary-General on implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee (A/54/670) the tremendous effort, especially on the part of the Secretariat, to address some of those recommendations. In the view of his delegation, the ongoing process of formalizing the organizational structure of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, coordination with the specialized agencies including the Bretton Woods institutions and increased cooperation with regional organizations was a step in the right direction.

70. His delegation commended the work undertaken by the United Nations in peacekeeping on the African continent, which for a long time had seemed to take a back seat. Although much remained to be done to end those conflicts, the deployment of United Nations peacekeepers had raised the hopes of many people, especially women and children, whose lives depended on the peacekeeping missions.

71. In the review of its peacekeeping operations, the United Nations must place more emphasis on preventive diplomacy and peace-building. The findings and recommendations of the Brahimi report, if fully implemented, could increase the effectiveness of those operations.

72. **Mr. Fonseca** (Brazil) said that the most fundamental element in strengthening United Nations peacekeeping operations was to ensure clear and decisive political will on the part of the Security Council, which was the key for consistent responses to conflict situations. Completing the process of Security Council reform could help as well. Although the existing Security Council was not ideal and, at a time of celebration of democracy, the legitimacy of the veto was doubtful, to say the least, the Council’s work should not be paralysed. The Brahimi report was an extremely useful tool, as it provided a clear road map for improving the capacity of the Organization and the effectiveness of its activities.

73. Everyone recognized the increasing complexity of peace operations. As a necessary consequence, the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, humanitarian agencies, development programmes and the Bretton Woods institutions must also participate actively in a coordinated strategy for such operations.

But without a strong institutional core the coordination process would inevitably be weak, and the United Nations was the only place for that core. It was essential to improve methods of decision-making, and to that end the recommendations of the Brahimi report should be implemented expeditiously. Finally, a real political commitment on the part of Member States was needed that went beyond approving the specific recommendations of the Brahimi report. Even the most farsighted decisions of the Security Council would not yield the expected results if Member States did not provide it with the necessary means of implementation. And that commitment must be evident in the first place from the permanent members of the Security Council: they should be the first to provide troops and financial resources for peacekeeping missions mandated by the Council.

74. Brazil supported the conceptual proposals contained in the Brahimi report. For the most part they related directly to previous discussions. The report responded coherently to the challenges posed by the new generation of United Nations peacekeeping operations. The report had been carefully drafted and conformed strictly to the principles of the Charter.

75. His delegation was fully reassured by the comments made by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations at the beginning of the discussion of the item. Some issues were indeed controversial: for example, fact-finding missions must be sent only with the consent of the parties and could not be imposed either by the Secretariat or by the Security Council, and the Secretariat should not be transformed into an intelligence-gathering institution. The way to avoid such distortions was through dialogue and a relationship of full confidence between the Secretariat and Member States. Obstructing the consideration of the proposals in the Brahimi report would lead nowhere.

76. His delegation endorsed the request for additional resources under the support account. It supported the proposals for reinforcement of personnel and resources for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, including the establishment of a substantive secretariat for the Executive Committee on Peace and Security and the creation of an additional post of Assistant Secretary-General. It also supported the proposals to reinforce consultation between the Secretariat, the Security Council and troop contributors, and to

improve the methods of recruitment and training of peacekeepers.

77. Strengthening United Nations peacekeeping operations was a valid goal in itself. However, that process could not be isolated from its political context. Discussions on the Brahimi report somehow seemed to be contaminated by a sense of frustration that the United Nations was unable to deliver in the areas of development and poverty eradication, and that the decisions of the Security Council required greater legitimacy.

78. His delegation shared the view expressed by the Secretary-General that decisions to improve peacekeeping operations could not be taken at the expense of other pressing priorities for the United Nations. Brazil believed that determination to implement the Brahimi report would serve as a vigorous stimulus to act with the same sense of urgency in development and poverty eradication. The Brahimi report did not contradict, but rather supported that objective.

79. **Mr. Paolillo** (Uruguay) said that his delegation associated itself with the statement by the representative of Colombia on behalf of the Rio Group. It believed that peacekeeping operations would remain the normal instrument in the Organization's arsenal for action in situations where international peace and security were under threat or were being violated. From a historical point of view peacekeeping operations were still at an experimental stage, so that failures which had occurred in the past must not be taken as an indication of the inability of operations to keep the peace. For that reason the Organization must now draw lessons from the experience gained and attempt to update that mechanism so that it would work more effectively in the future.

80. Strictly speaking, the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations was also based on lessons learned. His delegation for the most part welcomed the recommendations it contained, which were intended to increase the effectiveness of peacekeeping activities both in the field and at Headquarters. In addition, it supported the measures taken by the Secretary-General to implement several of the Panel's recommendations.

81. The observation of the Panel, and also of the Special Committee, that troop-contributing countries should be kept informed of all developments relating to

the relevant operation seemed entirely appropriate. He noted the intention of the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations to keep those countries informed of developments at all stages of operations and to strengthen the dialogue and contacts between the Security Council, the Secretariat and the countries involved. His delegation hoped that the Under-Secretary-General would find appropriate means to put into practice an effective system of consultation and information for Member States, since it seemed unjust that countries whose citizens faced various kinds of danger in the course of peacekeeping activities were not involved in taking the decisions on the formulation and review of the mandates of such operations. In that connection it was not inappropriate to recall that the large majority of troops for peacekeeping operations — around 80 per cent — were provided by developing countries.

82. One of the problems discussed by the Panel was the difficulties involved in the rapid deployment of United Nations forces. Recruitment of military and civilian personnel to staff the various operations was a very difficult problem for the Secretariat, and in that connection Uruguay paid tribute to the Secretary-General and the corresponding Secretariat departments for the efforts they made each and every time they were faced with the problem of establishing and deploying a peacekeeping operation.

83. The Brahimi report contained a set of measures to expand the ability to recruit military and civilian personnel. His delegation believed that regional organizations could play an important role in organizing and coordinating activities intended to keep and restore peace. It would be worthwhile to study ways of instituting active cooperation between such organizations and the United Nations in that area. In the Brahimi report, however, the possibility of regional organizations' cooperating with the Security Council was mentioned only in passing.

84. There were no recommendations in the report on ensuring the safety of peacekeeping personnel; that was why the Secretariat was currently preparing a report on that question, to which his delegation looked forward.

85. As to the cost of implementing the recommendations of the Brahimi Panel, he said that the proposed reforms would require a substantial increase in the level of funds from the Support Account for Peacekeeping Operations. It must be noted, however,

that the Government of the major contributor continued to refuse to pay its contribution in full, on time and without prior conditions, and, until that situation changed, any hopes of implementing the reforms remained futile.

86. The Brahimi report recommended that most of the expenses for peacekeeping operations should be defrayed by the regular budget of the United Nations, but that proposal had no basis. The usual financing mechanism, which it was proposed to abandon, had functioned smoothly to date, and any problems caused had been due rather to the practice of borrowing resources from the peacekeeping budget to finance the regular activities of the Organization.

87. In fact, the report itself advanced an argument in favour of preserving the current financing mechanism: the unpredictability of operations. His delegation therefore maintained that it was necessary to use a flexible mechanism for their financing, which was the Support Account.

88. His delegation was inclined to believe that any activities within the framework of peacekeeping operations, both in the field and in the Secretariat, should be financed out of the budget for such operations. That approach not only would be consistent with the principle of "zero growth" but also would avoid a reduction in the resources allocated to other programmes on the pretext of financing peacekeeping operations.

89. **Mr. Kuindwa** (Kenya) said that the Government of Kenya reaffirmed its commitment to United Nations peacekeeping operations. Its peacekeepers were currently deployed in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Europe, and one of its sons filled the post of Force Commander of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). Together with other troop-contributing countries of Africa, his Government was convinced that the African continent had played and would continue to play a vital role in that field.

90. However, his Government continued to be deeply concerned at the reluctance of the international community to react to crises on that continent with the same speed as in other parts of the world. Africa had lost millions of innocent lives in circumstances that could have been avoided, if only the international community had responded in a timely manner and with the necessary resources. In that regard, he endorsed the Special Committee's request that the Security Council

should establish clear criteria for authorizing peacekeeping operations with an equal and uniform level of intensity and commitment, regardless of geographical location.

91. His delegation supported the Special Committee's view that peacekeeping operations should strictly observe the principles and purposes enshrined in the Charter and should not act as a substitute for addressing the root causes of conflicts. It called on the Security Council to provide United Nations missions with clear and credible mandates with proper command structure and secure financing.

92. While welcoming recent efforts by the Security Council to have meaningful consultations with the countries contributing troops for UNAMSIL and UNTAET, his delegation supported the Special Committee's call for institutionalized consultations between the Council and troop contributors and also access for the latter to briefings organized by the Secretariat for members of the Council on matters affecting the safety of their personnel. It also called for consultations between troop-contributing countries and the Secretariat during the formulation of new concepts of operations and changes in ongoing ones.

93. His delegation supported the call by the Brahimi Panel for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to be correctly staffed and flexible and to correspond in structure to a field mission headquarters. It also endorsed the Secretary-General's intention to make more frequent use of fact-finding missions, with the consent of the host country. It supported the exploration of the concept that a small amount of a mission's first-year budget should be made available to the head of the mission to finance projects that had a rapid impact on increasing the mission's effectiveness but stressed that due consultation should be held with the local authorities in an impartial and transparent manner. His delegation further requested that the details of those projects should be reflected in the relevant reports of the Secretary-General.

94. He endorsed the recommendation of the Special Committee that programmes for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants should be provided with adequate resources at the outset.

95. His delegation urged the Secretary-General to conduct the promised but still outstanding review of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the

other elements of the Secretariat that played a role in peacekeeping. It also supported the Special Committee's request that the review should focus on questions of the coordinated planning, deployment, management and support of peacekeeping operations.

96. His delegation noted the excellent work carried out thus far by the Training Unit. Kenyan citizens had benefited from participation in the programmes which it had conducted in cooperation with various countries. He welcomed the Unit's efforts in making available a number of texts in all the working languages and its plans to include training in cultural and gender sensitivity in future programmes.

97. His delegation reaffirmed that all the provisions of Articles 100 and 101 of the Charter should be fully observed with respect to appointments and the conduct of peacekeeping operations. Full consideration should be given to all the offers made by Member States to participate in peacekeeping operations, and the Member States concerned should be advised in writing of the reasons underlying the Department's decision not to accept their offered contribution.

98. While recognizing the efforts of the United Nations to reimburse troop-contributing countries, he reiterated his delegation's concern that the Organization still owed significant sums to many such countries. Delays in reimbursement caused hardship to all those contributing troops and equipment and reduced their ability to participate effectively in peacekeeping activities. Member States could support the peacekeeping budget by meeting their obligations under the Charter to pay their assessed contributions in full and without condition. Voluntary contributions to special funds must be seen as a supplement, not an alternative, to sources of funds for those requirements.

99. He welcomed the Secretariat's decision to send invitations to bid to all those on the vendor roster that had registered for the product category being sought and expressed the hope that priority for procurement contracts would be given to countries contributing troops, in particular those from the region or subregion where the mission was being carried out.

100. As the Secretary-General's report indicated, cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations inevitably posed considerable challenges which could not be solved without ongoing efforts by the international community. In that regard, Kenya welcomed the additional focus given to the efforts to

enhance African peacekeeping capacity by the Security Council's ministerial meeting on 29 September 1999. It commended the joint efforts of the Secretariat and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to establish a regular forum of African and non-African States for strengthening cooperation in various capacity-building areas. It was regrettable that the initiative had taken too long to materialize.

101. His delegation paid tribute to the courageous men and women who had lost their lives in the service of United Nations peacekeeping operations. It hoped that the parties concerned would ensure that United Nations personnel received the necessary protection while conducting the important work of maintaining international peace and security.

102. **Mr. Andino Salazar** (El Salvador) said that, although his delegation supported the statement to be made by the delegation of Colombia on behalf of the Rio Group, it nevertheless wished to touch on some aspects of peacekeeping operations.

103. Since the inception of the United Nations peacekeeping operations had been used as a means to eliminate serious threats to peace and had evolved substantially: from operations with limited functions used to settle conflicts between States to broader, more complex and multidisciplinary operations aimed primarily at the settlement of domestic conflicts in independent States.

104. Despite the important role of peacekeeping operations in the settlement of international and domestic conflicts, such operations had often been criticized sharply, which had resulted in doubts about the Organization's ability to fulfil its mandate. Such criticism should lead to reflection, not only on the direct responsibility of the United Nations, but also on the responsibility of Member States to guide the activities of the United Nations and on the scope and content of the mandates governing its activities in that area.

105. In that connection, his delegation welcomed the Secretary-General's initiative in establishing an expert group to undertake a thorough review in order to identify shortcomings in the current system and develop specific and realistic recommendations in order to enhance the potential and increase the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations. The report prepared by that group contained recommendations on complex problems concerning effective management,

decision-making, rapid deployment, planning, operational support, the use of modern technology, conceptual and organizational changes, fundamental principles, and political and financial support. In his delegation's view, although it was a question of essential changes in both the quality and the content of peacekeeping operations, their implementation in practice depended on support from Member States, and in particular on financial support.

106. His delegation noted that peacekeeping operations had recently become the main item on the agenda of the United Nations. Although activities in that area admittedly facilitated the achievement and strengthening of peace and security, democracy and development in Central America, in particular in El Salvador, his delegation was concerned that focusing attention on peacemaking activities was drawing on potential and resources that might be used to provide for economic and social progress in developing countries. In that connection, he drew attention to the fact that many countries were in arrears in the payment of contributions for peacekeeping operations, to financial aspects of the Brahimi report and to the initiative to review the scale of contributions for peacekeeping operations. As a country with limited material and financial resources, El Salvador could not agree to an increase in the scale of contributions from the developing and least developed countries, as such step would have a negative impact on their efforts to achieve economic and social progress.

107. As conflicts remained an unavoidable reality, the mechanism for building, supporting and strengthening peace should be safeguarded and improved. His delegation therefore considered it important to emphasize the following basic factors: peacekeeping operations should be undertaken in strict compliance with the principles of the Charter, in particular the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence of the State and non-interference in domestic affairs. Peacekeeping operations should be undertaken with the consent of the parties, with impartiality and without the use of force, except where required for self-defence. Peacekeeping operations should have a clearly formulated mandate, goal and organizational structure to ensure their legitimacy and the unequivocal support of Member States. In addition to political support, peacekeeping operations should enjoy reliable operational and financial support, to ensure that the appropriate mandates would be

discharged. All States should meet their financial obligations to the Organization without condition. Primary responsibility in that regard lay with the permanent members of the Security Council and with other developed States.

108. The United Nations as a mechanism for collective security should respond with equal attention to conflicts in whatever region they might occur. Alongside the fulfilment of its obligations with regard to the settlement of today's conflicts, the United Nations should also make efforts to develop agreed, coordinated and multidimensional policy geared towards the elaboration of a global programme for eliminating the root causes of conflicts. It was only by meeting the basic and priority needs of the majority of the population of developing countries that more stable and durable peace and security might be maintained.

109. The experience of peacekeeping operations in Central America, in particular in El Salvador, could prove useful not only for other peacekeeping operations, but also for drawing important conclusions in respect of the Organization's own role in the settlement of internal conflicts within sovereign States Members of the United Nations.

110. **Mr. Maquieira** (Chile) said that Chile had contributed to various United Nations peacekeeping operations since 1949. Currently, Chile contributed to the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) of which the Chilean helicopter and transportation division formed a part. The particular importance Chile attached to the mission was borne out by the forthcoming visit of its President to East Timor.

111. His delegation associated itself with the statement made by Jordan on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and with the statement made by Colombia on behalf of the Rio Group, but wished to elaborate on a few points in connection with the Brahimi report. Firstly, his delegation noted that the report had attracted great interest, given that many of its recommendations were also contained in the latest report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. In that connection, it should be asked why it would be so necessary to establish a special group of independent experts to identify ways of resolving problems associated with peacekeeping operations when they could be addressed within the Special Committee. The answer to that question lay in the inertia characterizing the work of the different

committees and in the fact that various important conclusions and considerations were not reflected with sufficient clarity in reports and resolutions and thus did not receive effective follow-up. The Special Committee and other auxiliary bodies of the General Assembly should draw an important lesson from that fact. It was necessary to focus on practical action, given that it was a question of vitally important issues connected with peace, security and the development of human society.

112. His delegation welcomed the Brahimi report, agreed with the majority of its recommendations and looked forward to their earliest implementation. It was his delegation's view that, in the case of a number of the recommendations, including those concerning a transitional civil administration and the feasibility of developing an interim United Nations criminal code, a more thorough examination was required. Given the extreme situations in Kosovo and East Timor, the United Nations should not only study those two issues, but also draw appropriate conclusions from the experience of those two missions. With regard to the recommendations concerning material and technical supplies, in the event of a limitation on resources it was necessary to allow for a more in-depth review of associated issues with a view to the implementation of truly effective and fully transparent measures. With regard to the recommendations concerning the establishment of a secretariat for information and strategic analysis, he noted that, in view of the urgent need to improve information analysis, the Secretariat should more precisely define its tasks, aims and structure, as well as its relations with other parts of the Organization.

113. The recommendations of the Brahimi report, which had met with the universal support of the Special Committee, should be implemented as swiftly as possible by the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General should submit a report to the Special Committee at its session in February 2001 describing the progress made in the implementation of the recommendations and identifying recommendations which required further discussion or had met with resistance, so that the Special Committee might examine them more thoroughly at that session. In conclusion, he underscored the importance of transforming the Department of Peacekeeping Operations into an effective instrument for the maintenance of international peace and security.

114. **Mr. Kwon** Tae-myon (Republic of Korea) said that, following the end of the cold war, innumerable conflicts had occurred within and between States on ethnic, religious, economic or other grounds, resulting in the deaths of more than five million people. Consequently, the role of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security had grown still further, as had the importance of peace-building operations which represented one of the Organization's key tools. However, a number of United Nations peacekeeping operations had met with serious failures, in particular in Rwanda, Srebrenica and Sierra Leone. The time had come for an accurate appraisal of the current situation and the elaboration of recommendations for eliminating existing problems.

115. He recalled that two months previously, the heads of State and Government in the Millennium Declaration had committed themselves to providing the United Nations with the resources and tools necessary for peacekeeping operations.

116. His delegation supported many of the recommendations contained in the Brahimi report, for instance those relating to the reinforcement and structural adjustment of the offices of the Secretariat related to peacekeeping operations, including the establishment of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat and the integrated mission task forces, the enlargement of the Military Division, and the establishment of a separate Civilian Police Unit and "rule of law" teams. Of course, simply enlarging the Division or increasing the number of personnel would not necessarily guarantee the success of peace operations. In carrying out the reorganization, all available means should be used to minimize budget increases, including redeployment of existing personnel.

117. He emphasized the importance of transparency in the decision-making process of United Nations peacekeeping operations and said that the strong support of the Member States, particularly troop-contributing countries, was a fundamental element of the success of such operations.

118. Countries contributing to the operations must be consulted throughout the entire process from the planning stage to the end of the operation. In the Republic of Korea, important decisions on peacekeeping operations were subject to the approval

of the National Assembly, and therefore the Government must be kept up to date on the situation in countries where peacekeepers were located. In that regard, his delegation welcomed the new mechanism currently under review in the Security Council.

119. In closing, he expressed the wish of his delegation that solid and effective measures should be taken without delay to ensure the success of future United Nations peacekeeping operations.

120. **Mr. Helle** (Observer for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)) said that, as a humanitarian organization, ICRC was often a powerless observer as situations deteriorated, crises worsened and crimes went unchecked. In that regard, it welcomed efforts to develop comprehensive approaches to conflict, where the organizations concerned were provided with clear mandates and resources commensurate with the tasks they were given. At the same time, ICRC strongly believed that humanitarian aid must be kept quite separate from political and military action and, moreover, must be seen as such by the parties to the conflict. There were cases when the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping mission led to military confrontation with one or several protagonists, which could target humanitarian organizations.

121. Accordingly, ICRC believed that one of the central elements of coordination between humanitarian organizations and the United Nations should be complementarity of mandates and activities. In particular, ICRC had traditionally protected persons deprived of their liberty. It was important that peacekeeping operations should not take any initiatives which might weaken that role. The possible confusion could be detrimental to the interests of the persons being protected.

122. In the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, it was stated that the United Nations would at times have to make a distinction between parties to a conflict (aggressors and victims), and it was suggested that impartiality should be taken as "adherence to the principles of the Charter and to the objectives of a mandate" (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 50). In that regard, ICRC stressed that for humanitarian organizations, the concept of impartiality meant endeavouring to relieve suffering without any adverse distinction and giving priority attention to the most urgent cases of distress. Lending another meaning to



the term could contribute to confusion among the parties with regard to the nature of the work of humanitarian organizations, putting at risk the safety of humanitarian workers and their access to victims.

123. ICRC felt that it was indispensable for military personnel and police and civilian personnel making up any field mission to be aware of the relevant provisions of international humanitarian law. In situations where peace had not yet been consolidated, United Nations military contingents might consider it necessary to resort to force either in self-defence or to protect civilians. Of course, they must be familiar with their obligations under humanitarian law. Furthermore, if United Nations missions were given the mandate to train local military and police forces, such training must also include humanitarian law. ICRC was pleased to note that the United Nations was taking resolute steps in that direction, and it was ready to lend its support for the training, in that branch of the law, of forces deployed by the United Nations, as it had already done in several countries. However, it must be pointed out that the responsibility for giving instruction in humanitarian law lay first and foremost with the States parties to the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols.

124. Recently, United Nations missions had faced the challenge of taking on responsibility for administering territories. An issue which seemed to have received particular attention was the definition of appropriate legal standards, especially in the area of criminal justice. Should States decide to establish or authorize a mechanism to examine the matter more closely, ICRC would be ready to share its expertise in the area of humanitarian law.

*The meeting rose at 1 p.m.*