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## Substantive session of 2000

Coordination segment

### Provisional summary record of the 22nd meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 12 July 2000, at 3 p.m.

*President:* Mr. Pfanzelter (Vice-President). . . . . (Austria)

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Panel discussions on examples of integrated and coordinated support by United Nations country teams in implementing cross-cutting conference goals

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*In the absence of Mr. Wibisono (Indonesia), Mr. Pfanzelter (Austria), Vice-President, took the Chair.*

*The meeting was called to order at 3 p.m.*

**Panel discussions on examples of integrated and coordinated support by United Nations country teams in implementing cross-cutting conference goals**

*Bolivia: Collaborative action for drug control*

1. **The President** recalled that the Economic and Social Council had stressed the importance of national strategies for the implementation of the goals of major United Nations conferences. Those strategies must receive well-coordinated and integrated support from the organizations of the United Nations system. Following the twentieth special session of the General Assembly, the Council had recommended that Member States should consider drug control as a cross-cutting issue, since drug abuse and trafficking were linked to social and economic considerations.

2. **Mr. Telleria** (Vice-Minister of Alternative Development of Bolivia) said that Bolivia was surrounded by five countries, one of which (Peru) was also a producer of coca and the other four of which (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Paraguay) were involved in the trafficking of precursors for the manufacture of cocaine. Coca was produced in two departments of Bolivia: La Paz, where most of the coca grown was for legal purposes, with the exception of some 2,300 hectares of land used to produce excess coca that was diverted for illicit purposes; and Cochabamba, where most of the illicit production took place, primarily in the Chapare region.

3. Owing to the increase in international demand for cocaine, the land area devoted to coca production had increased significantly beginning in the 1970s, rising from about 12,300 hectares to a peak of about 52,000 hectares in 1989. That increase had affected Bolivia's economy. In 1989, coca and cocaine production had accounted for 8.5 per cent of the country's gross domestic product (GDP), and exports of coca and cocaine had represented 87.3 per cent of the volume of Bolivia's legal exports. However, only 1 per cent of the value of those exports had remained in the country; the rest of the profit had gone to international drug traffickers.

4. The Bolivian authorities had begun taking steps to address the problem in the mid-1970s. Their efforts since then could be divided into three stages. The first stage had begun in 1987 with the adoption of Act No. 1008 on the regulation of coca and controlled substances, which had served as a frame of reference for efforts to combat drug trafficking. The Act designated legal and illegal areas for coca production, and provided for cooperation with producers with a view to the voluntary reduction of coca production; mandatory eradication only in areas where coca production was illegal; cash compensation for voluntary eradication of excess production; the use of only manual (non-chemical) means of eradication; and the implementation of alternative development programmes. Cash compensation for voluntary eradication had amounted to \$350 per hectare in 1987 and had subsequently risen to \$2,000 between 1988 and 1993 and \$2,500 between 1994 and 1997. That policy had generated a vicious circle whereby producers had voluntarily reduced production, obtained compensation and then used the money to plant more coca. However, between 1986 and 1996, the land area devoted to legal crops had increased from 40,000 to 92,000 hectares, while the area used for coca cultivation had increased by only about 7,000 hectares, from 41,300 in 1987 to 48,000 in 1998, whereas the increase had previously amounted to some 4,000 hectares a year.

5. In 1997, as the country had begun the second stage of its efforts, it had faced problems such as the loss of international credibility with respect to the probable success of its war on drugs, low levels of international financing and the threat of decertification by the United States Government.

6. On the domestic front, four representatives of coca producers had been elected to the Chamber of Deputies, demonstrations in favour of the coca producers had enjoyed wide popular support and a number of myths had gained currency, such as the idea that illegal drugs caused problems only for their users, that the reduction of coca cultivation increased poverty, that coca producers were being victimized by the Government, that anti-drug efforts had been imposed by the United States of America and that those efforts invariably violated human rights.

7. In late 1997, Bolivia had adopted the Dignity Plan for 1998-2002. The Plan sought to eliminate all illicit coca production by the end of 2001. It had been

based on a national dialogue with members of civil society and the academic and religious communities, and was structured around the four pillars of alternative development, prevention and rehabilitation, eradication and interdiction. Compensation for voluntary eradication was provided to communities, rather than individuals, for the implementation of economic and social development projects. The level of compensation, which had stood at \$2,500 per hectare in January 1988, would be reduced gradually to \$500 in December 2001 and to zero beginning in 2002.

8. As a result of the Plan, the country's estimated potential cocaine production had been reduced by 130 tons, to 70 tons in December 1999. Between 1997 and 2000, the land area used for coca cultivation had been reduced from 45,800 to 18,300 hectares, some 6,300 hectares of which were used for illicit coca cultivation. At the same time, alternative development programmes had increased the area used for legal crops from 96,000 hectares in 1997 to 108,500 hectares in 1999. A net reduction in illegal coca cultivation of about 80 per cent had been achieved. At the international level, Bolivia had regained its credibility and currently benefited from programmes and projects to consolidate its achievements and from international cooperation, particularly on the part of the United Nations and countries such as the United States of America and Spain. Domestically, the Dignity Plan enjoyed wide popular support and had dispelled the myths that had hindered earlier efforts.

9. The third stage of Bolivia's anti-drug efforts had begun on 1 January 2000. There was a need to extend their coverage, since, out of the target group of 42,000 families in La Paz and Cochabamba, only 12,000, or 29 per cent, had thus far benefited directly from the programmes. In 1999, the coca economy had accounted for 1 per cent of GDP, and illegal exports had been equivalent to 7.3 per cent of legal exports; although those indicators had improved greatly since 1989, they had not yet reached zero. More time and resources would be needed to ensure that Bolivia's achievements were not reversed. The resources required for the four areas of action under the Dignity Plan amounted to some \$223 million for alternative development, \$19.2 million for prevention and rehabilitation, \$32.7 million for eradication and \$16 million for interdiction, for a total budget of about \$291 million.

10. **Mr. Bastiaans** (United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP)) said that Bolivia's experience was an example of a very successful national drug control strategy. Four main factors had contributed to the success of that strategy, especially in the last three years. First, the strategy set clear goals and deadlines for their achievement. Second, the strategy was part of the country's broader social and economic development agenda, which was based on the four pillars of opportunity (provision of infrastructure and credit), equity (poverty eradication), institutionality (anti-corruption efforts and strengthening of the judiciary) and dignity (anti-drug efforts). Third, the strategy had been adopted shortly after the election of a new Government. Fourth, the strategy had been based on the results of a national dialogue which had revealed a national consensus that the illicit cultivation of coca was harming Bolivia's long-term development prospects and international image.

11. Alternative development must be backed up by interaction among the various elements of the drug control programme: coca eradication, the prevention of drug abuse and drug law enforcement. So far, the programme had succeeded in that respect. Illicit drug cultivation had been reduced by over 80 per cent over the past three years, leaving about 4,300 hectares for coca production in the Chapare region and 2,300 hectares in the Yungas region. Of a potential total of 70 tonnes of cocaine produced in 1999, the Government had seized 9.8 tonnes, an estimated 14 per cent of capacity. In 1998, seizures had amounted to 11.7 tonnes, or eight per cent of a total production of 150 tonnes. The upward trend indicated more effective drug law enforcement.

12. In spite of the significant increase in alternative crops since the mid-1980s, prior to 1997 alternative development had not succeeded on its own in bringing about a net reduction in coca production. The corrective measures undertaken through the Dignity Plan therefore, focused on raising living standards in Chapare, formerly the chief area of production, by improving the road infrastructure and health and education facilities, and by providing electricity and basic sanitation. Increasing numbers of farmers were now engaged in alternative production. However there was still a great need for funding and for technical cooperation; in Chapare, 50,000 families had lost their coca crops and needed access to alternative

development. Existing programmes, in order to achieve sustainability, needed support over the longer term, and alternative development programmes had to be incorporated into mainstream rural development plans. New challenges were emerging: for instance, there had been a great increase in drug abuse among young people in the period 1992-1998, and more prevention programmes were needed. Bolivia also needed a more effective money laundering control strategy. In its final phase, the Dignity Plan had to reach the hard core of coca growers, and the Government had told UNDCP that a conflict resolution programme was needed to ensure social peace in the coca production areas.

13. Turning to the UNDCP programme for 1998-2002 in support of the Dignity Plan, he explained that UNDCP, in cooperation with the Government of Bolivia, had selected four priority areas for action: alternative development, focusing on agroforestry; a vocational training programme in the non-agricultural sector; institution-building, through an inter-ministerial committee; prevention of drug abuse, especially among young people, through work in schools and by the local government ombudsmen for child cases; and a regular flow of information to the public. The strategy pursued by UNDCP in Bolivia was in line with its mandate to reduce demand and supply, and sought to ensure cooperation among projects in achieving the strategic goals of the Government. UNDCP strove for strategic and operational linkages with poverty alleviation work in the country, including integrated United Nations system programming through the common country assessment. It also carried out subregional training activities, in line with the Memorandum of Understanding signed in 1993 with Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Peru and Uruguay.

14. He explained that there were three levels of cooperation and coordination within the United Nations system and internationally. The first level went beyond the United Nations system, since there was a coordination mechanism between the Government and the international community in support of the four pillars of the social and economic development plan. It had been agreed at the Consultative Group meetings held under World Bank auspices to establish local working groups for each pillar. Between January 1998 and July 1999 UNDCP had coordinated the "dignity" group on behalf of the United Nations system. It had worked with the international community and the Government to develop agreed achievement indicators

for the country, to exchange information about projects in progress and in preparation, and to draw up position papers for presentation to the Consultative Group in Paris. At the second level, that of the United Nations system itself, a common country assessment had been drawn up under the authority of the Resident Coordinator for Bolivia, taking account of the drug control programmes in the country and explaining the need for a conflict resolution programme involving several United Nations agencies in the country. An inter-agency thematic group on conflict resolution was to be set up in the coming months. There were five examples of cooperation between UNDCP and other agencies at project level in Bolivia: with FAO on agroforestry and forestry production in Chapare and Yungas; with ILO on vocational training in Chapare; with UNICEF on the ombudsmen for children at the municipal level; with UNFPA on drug abuse curriculum development; and with UNDP in administrative support for the execution of projects nationally.

15. **Mr. Tubino** (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations) commented on the FAO project on "Management, Conservation and Rational Use of the Forestry Resources of the Cochabamba and La Paz Tropics". The project was an integral part of Bolivia's drug control strategy, and an instrument for implementing the alternative development arm of the Government's Dignity Plan. It was executed jointly by the Vice-Ministry for Alternative Development of the Ministry of Agriculture and FAO, with monitoring and financial assistance from UNDCP. FAO was responsible for administrative support and technical assistance, and UNDP had also contributed funds to the environmental education initiative in schools.

16. The project worked to ensure sustainable use of the natural resources of regions covered by the Dignity Plan, and the sustainable generation of legal income to replace income from coca. As part of a national programme, it was fully coordinated with similar initiatives through mechanisms such as the Inter-Institutional Technical Committee, which acted as its board of directors. The project, also known as "Jatun Sacha" (Big Tree) was now in its second phase, which ran from October 1997 to September 2002. Its budget had been increased to US\$ 9.4 million, owing to the marked improvement in the rate of coca eradication in the past two years, which had resulted in extra demand for alternative development. The donors contributing to

the project were the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Italy, Austria, Sweden, Ireland and UNDP, with the Government of Bolivia matching the external funds.

17. The project, carried out in the Chapare and Yungas regions, followed a holistic approach including the use of appropriate environmental management, efficient production systems, institution-building, participation and human development, with equal opportunities for women and youth. In the Chapare region, with an area of 3.8 million hectares, approximately 300,000 hectares of primary forest had been lost to coca leaf production and subsistence agriculture. Much of the deforested land was prone to soil erosion, because small farmers did not benefit from the timber industry and often burnt down trees. The resulting environmental degradation was compounded by the chemicals used in making cocaine, which were poured into streams and rivers. About 20 per cent of the land in the region was used for plantation cropping, the remainder being available for agroforestry and forestry production. The project sought to achieve a better balance between agriculture and forestry through proper land use and sustainable forest resource management. Seventy-two per cent of its budget was devoted to income-generating activities through 50 local producer associations working in partnership with the project. Women played an active part in the production and marketing of honey, flowers, vegetables and handcrafts. A family engaged in agroforestry and other activities under the project could earn about US\$ 235 a month, well above the poverty level of US\$ 120 which trapped 94 per cent of Bolivia's rural population.

18. The institution-building dimension of the project consisted of training about 300 technicians and 6,500 producers. Forestry units had been set up in all the municipalities, and a Forestry Technology Centre had been established. Sixty institutions had been involved in formulating the Forestry Programme for the Cochabamba Tropics, which had been approved by both public and private sector institutions. The Programme would be funded to an amount of US\$ 49 million, and would be geared to expanding agroforestry, alternative crops and livestock production in combination with forest resources management as an alternative to coca leaf production. It would cover 9,700 families, including 3,000 women, over an area of 26,000 hectares. It would also expand the harvesting of

timber and non-timber products on 100,000 hectares involving 4,000 families, thus generating 1,600 jobs, and would provide legal employment and income for a further 50,000 people.

19. The alternative development initiative supported by UNDCP and FAO also pursued horizontal cooperation with Colombia, Peru and Brazil through the mechanism of Technical Cooperation Among Developing Countries. A mission from the project had recently visited Colombia to support new alternative development schemes there.

*Ghana: Working towards poverty eradication*

20. **Mr. Fawundu** (United Nations Resident Coordinator for Ghana), introducing the members of the panel, emphasized that the various agencies of the United Nations system present in Ghana were working under the leadership of the Ghanaian Government.

21. **Mr. Ahwoi** (Minister of State for Planning and Regional Economic Cooperation and Integration) said that Ghana was pursuing its development in the context of a long-term development framework for the period 1996 to 2020 known as Ghana: Vision 2020, with a view to reducing poverty and transforming Ghana into a middle-income country through a human-centred approach to sustainable development. Vision 2020 predated the World Summit for Social Development and had earlier established objectives such as gender equality, access to basic social services, population management and full employment by it.

22. The first stage of Vision 2020 spanned the period 1996-2000 and the second, 2001-2005, was currently under preparation. Both had been planned in collaboration with development partners, including all the United Nations agencies that participated in the eight cross-sectoral planning groups set up within the programme and in some cases provided funding support.

23. **Ms. Guimba-Ouedraogo** (United Nations Development Programme) said that the shared objective of the United Nations system in Ghana was to support national efforts aimed at reducing absolute poverty by 2020, and the United Nations was supporting that objective at the policy, institutional and programme levels through concerted strategies. At the policy level, the United Nations system, including the Bretton Woods institutions, had assisted the Government in formulating the national poverty

reduction programme. The need for capacity-building, especially at the district level, had been highlighted, as had the need to address issues of geographical and gender disparities and strengthen measures to control the spread of HIV/AIDS.

24. Contributions by the United Nations agencies to institution-building in support of the poverty reduction agenda included assistance and support to the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Poverty Reduction, which provided political leadership and policy direction, the Technical Committee on Poverty Reduction, which provided technical support to the Inter-Ministerial Committee; and the National Development Planning Commission. United Nations agencies had also contributed to the establishment and effective functioning of the Partners Group on Poverty Reduction, the United Nations Development Programme being the lead agency.

25. The United Nations system had supported the Government's efforts to build consensus in Ghanaian society, bringing together urban and rural populations in a participatory approach to the common goal of Vision 2020, with special emphasis on youth, women and vulnerable groups. Civil society, the private sector and other bilateral and multilateral partners had also taken part. Priority issues included access to quality basic services, health programmes, food security, water and sanitation, good governance, sustainable income and employment generation, and education, with particular emphasis on the girl child. A Social Investment Fund had also been created to loan funds to groups which would not otherwise have access to credit, including in its mandate light infrastructure projects to open up remote areas.

26. A significant positive shift had been achieved in reducing absolute poverty, measured by calorie intake per day, and in terms of the proportion of the population living on less than \$1 per day. Despite those encouraging results, the challenges that remained to be successfully met included further reductions in rural/urban, gender and other disparities; integration of budgetary allocations into activities; greater efforts to translate planning into actions; and continued capacity-building at the district level.

27. **Mr. Mandara** (World Health Organization) noted that his report on activities and results in the health sector would use the infant mortality rate as an indicator. On the basis of Vision 2020, the Ministry of

Health had developed a strategy for health sector reform, including the goal of reducing infant mortality to 50 per 1,000 live births by 2001. United Nations agencies, including the Bretton Woods institutions, had provided support to the Ministry in the elaboration of that strategy, using a sector-wide approach. The agencies supported joint annual planning, monitoring and evaluation of health programmes and advocated and provided financial support for specific strategies such as oral rehydration therapy and the provision of safe drinking water. Those strategies had been strengthened through monthly forums of health partners chaired by the Government, Government leadership in health sector reform, effective Government-donor coordination in accordance with the United Nations Special Initiative for Africa and the establishment of a common account through which health partners channelled their funds.

28. A 10-point reduction in infant mortality, down to 56 per thousand live births, had been achieved between 1993 and 1998, and it was hoped that the target of 50 per thousand live births could be achieved by 2001. The key factors in that achievement had been a 20 per cent increase in the use of oral rehydration, a similar increase in exclusive breastfeeding of infants under six months, both between 1993 and 1998, a similar increase in access to safe water for rural communities between 1989 and 1999, and an eight-point increase in the proportion of infants benefiting from full immunization, between 1993 and 1998.

29. Ghana was still facing the challenges of a high infant mortality rate, high maternal mortality rates, a high rate of under-five mortality (107 per 1,000 live births in 1998), stagnation in child malnutrition rates, and pronounced geographic variations.

30. **Mr. Lefèvre** (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) said that the follow-up by the United Nations system to the goals established at the 1990 World Conference on Education for All had contributed to the development of education in Ghana. The targets set out at the Conference were congruent with those established in the country's education reforms initiated in 1987, and the essential principles of education for all were embodied in the Constitution.

31. Efforts by the United Nations agencies in that regard had focused on a coherent approach by all partners, including the World Bank, donor countries

and the agencies themselves, and on providing inputs for the development of policies, strategies and indicators. The following priority areas had been selected: early childhood education; access to education, particularly for girls; learning achievement through better quality and management efficiency; and adult literacy.

32. Enrolment of boys had increased from 76.5 per cent in 1991/92 to 85.5 per cent in 1998/99. For girls, the figure had increased from 71.5 to 82.4 per cent during the same period, a slightly more rapid improvement than for boys. During the same time-span, adult literacy had improved slowly from 60 to 64 per cent. While those changes represented a considerable improvement since 1990, taking into account substantial population growth, but the results still fell short of the objectives agreed at the 1990 conference.

33. Ghana still had to improve the management of education, equalize educational opportunities for boys and girls and bring children who were not attending school, for example, street children, into the system. It also had to improve quality in education, expand access at the secondary and tertiary levels, especially for girls; and find sustainable financing solutions.

34. **Mr. Fawundu** (United Nations Resident Coordinator for Ghana) said that the goals set out by international conferences in the 1990s were fully consistent with Ghana's own vision of socio-economic development. The United Nations agencies in Ghana operated within an established national development strategy and clearly-defined goals and targets for poverty reduction and improvements in the standard of living of the population. That strategy had guaranteed national ownership of coordination efforts and helped to enhance the cohesiveness of the United Nations system in Ghana. It was a measure of the progress made in the implementation in Ghana of the United Nations reforms under way since 1997, and the United Nations could draw on the Ghanaian experience to advance those reforms throughout the system.

*Follow-up of the World Summit for Social Development: Madagascar*

35. **Ms. Rakotoariseheno** (Private Secretary to the Prime Minister) noted the progress made by the Government in the preceding five years towards the reduction of poverty and drew attention to the

concerted efforts made since 1998 in two areas. First, programmes were under way to ensure access to health and education and food security for all and to rehabilitate infrastructures at the micro level. Programmes had also been initiated to provide support to local authorities so that communities would have greater control over local affairs. Secondly, the Government was endeavouring to ensure good governance based on the rule of law. Reforms of the judicial system and the civil service, including improved training, and of commercial law, including increased access to arbitration both at the national and international levels, were under way. The autonomous provinces had also been given increased powers, as the Government continued its efforts towards decentralization. A national environmental policy had also been adopted.

36. On the level of the economy, the Government was working to reduce inflation, improve monetary management and reduce the budget deficit. It was encouraging direct foreign investment and greater economic openness, especially in the area of transborder trade. Programmes to promote the private sector and plans for increased rural development were also under way. The Government's goal was long-term development without neglecting basic structures. The United Nations system provided invaluable assistance to development efforts, as well as emergency assistance during natural disasters such as cyclones and flooding.

37. **Mr. Guindo** (Resident Coordinator, United Nations Development Programme) recalled that Madagascar was a poor country with a low human development index. The challenge for the Government and its partners was to reduce poverty and improve access to basic social services through a participatory process involving the cooperation of all segments of society working within the framework of an appropriate development policy. The 20/20 Initiative on access to basic social services was an essential tool for human development and the country team had undertaken a review of progress toward the 20/20 Initiative objectives, the results of which were available on the United Nations web site. The review showed that since 1998, increasing resources had been allocated to the social sector, although more needed to be done to reach the 20/20 goal.

38. In cooperation with United Nations partners, the Government had created a National Secretariat for Self-Promotion and Development (SNAD) in 1999 and

developed a national strategy to combat poverty. In addition, the authorities and partners from the United Nations system were working in the areas of control of population growth, education, development of the private sector and job creation, debt reduction, follow-up to major United Nations conferences and analysis of the country's vulnerability to natural disasters.

39. **Mr. Coquelin** (United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)) said that the review of progress had convinced the Government of the need to increase the resources allocated to social development. Currently 13 per cent of the Government budget was devoted to education, health, water and sanitation and concrete results had already been seen. Development partners had already reached the 20 per cent objective. The United Nations must however continue to work to convince bilateral and other partners to go even beyond the 20 per cent objective to meet development needs.

40. **Mr. Guindo** (Resident Coordinator, United Nations Development Programme) stressed the importance of teamwork and team spirit in the work of the United Nations to support the Government's efforts to ensure follow-up of the World Summit. That teamwork took place within the framework of a process founded on the clear political will of the Government and the participation of civil society, donors, Government agencies and the United Nations system. The results were clearly evident in the Government budget for 1999 and 2000. The success in Madagascar proved that when those elements were combined, much could be achieved.

*The meeting rose at 5.15 p.m.*