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Agenda items 20 (d) and 46

Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian and disaster relief assistance of the United Nations, including special economic assistance: emergency international assistance for peace, normalcy and reconstruction of war-stricken Afghanistan**The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security****Security Council
Fifty-sixth year****Identical letters dated 14 May 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Afghanistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council**

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit the text of a statement dated 11 May 2001 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic State of Afghanistan (see annex).

The annex to this letter concerns the document entitled "The conceptual approaches of Kazakhstan to resolving the situation in Afghanistan" (A/55/916-S/2001/419, annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 20 (d) and 46, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) A. G. Ravan **Farhâdi**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



**Annex to the identical letters dated 14 May 2001 from the
Permanent Representative of Afghanistan to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the
Security Council**

14 May 2001

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, expressing its high appreciation for the efforts deployed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, would like to hereby declare in principle its readiness to attend, under the aegis of the United Nations, the proposed peace negotiations with the Taliban in Almaty, as contained in “The conceptual approaches of Kazakhstan to resolving the situation in Afghanistan” of 26 April 2001 (A/55/916-S/2001/419, annex).

Proclaiming its agreement to the talks, the Islamic State of Afghanistan, however, in the light of the opening paragraphs of the document, is surprised by the notion expressed in the unnumbered third paragraph, namely that “the lack of positive results in bringing about an Afghan settlement is linked to the determination of the warring Afghan sides to settle the conflict solely by military means”.

The above negates the facts, for, unlike the Taliban, the Islamic State of Afghanistan indeed has incessantly sought a non-military solution to the conflict during the past six years, having announced its resolve for a peaceful settlement of the crisis on various occasions. Hence, in this context, equating the Islamic State of Afghanistan with the Taliban is not only far from reality but, in fact, not fair. The report of the Secretary-General (A/54/378-S/1999/994), in which he indicates that the Islamic State of Afghanistan “repeatedly made clear to my Special Envoy and to the United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan that they are willing to talk with the Taliban in order to reach a solution to the country’s problems”, repeated also by the President of the Security Council on 22 October 1999, provide credible testimonies. The President of the Security Council made it clear again on 7 April 2000 (S/PRST/2000/12) that the Islamic State of Afghanistan “is willing to talk with the Taliban”. It is sufficient to say that the same sentiment has been echoed by the United Nations on numerous other occasions as well.

What is evidently clear is that Afghanistan has fallen prey to Pakistan’s geopolitical adventures, a matter not expressed with precision in the Kazakh Foreign Ministry document.

It is further worth mentioning that the popular armed resistance by the people of Afghanistan, in defence of their country’s independence, noble human principles and magnanimous values, and the peace and security of the region against the obscurantist forces, which owe their origin to Pakistan, as well as against the politico-ideological agenda of extremist forces throughout the region, will be praised by the neighbouring States of Afghanistan, including the Central Asian countries. In the absence of such resistance, in the event of total occupation of Afghanistan by the Pakistan-Taliban-bin Laden axis, fostering without the people of Afghanistan the sort of steadfast and resolute campaign of liberation needed to prevent the expansion of these obscurantist and terrorist forces in Central Asia would be a difficult task requiring an enormous undertaking.

The Islamic State of Afghanistan wishes to express the following response, the numbers corresponding to the Arabic-numbered paragraphs and succeeding sections of the aforementioned document:

1. Regarding paragraph 1 and its succeeding sections, the Islamic State of Afghanistan welcomes the endorsement by the Republic of Kazakhstan of the Secretary-General's position with regard to Afghanistan, the incursions by Islamic fighters into the territory of Central Asian countries and the danger of the spread of the conflict. The Islamic State of Afghanistan also fully supports the convening of a special meeting of the Security Council devoted to consideration of the situation of Afghanistan and Central Asia.

2. The Islamic State of Afghanistan fully appreciates the views expressed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan in this paragraph about the economic reconstruction and development of Afghanistan.

3. The views expressed on the participation of all interested States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference are fully acceptable. Indeed, the need for the *Loya Jirga*, in which true representatives of the people shall participate, is endorsed. However, the term "the Council of Elders of the Afghan tribes" is incorrect, since Afghanistan is composed of ethnic, linguistic and religious (Sunni and Shia) groups and not segmented along "tribal" lines. The aim of the *Loya Jirga* is, therefore, to assemble influential and significant persons belonging to ethnic, linguistic and religious groups, who possess adequate experience and have considerable following among their supporters/constituents.

4. The Islamic State of Afghanistan entirely agrees with the pivotal role of the United Nations in resolving the Afghan situation. In the light of the paragraph's second subsection, it is significant to speak of "the main cause of the conflict in Afghanistan" as attributable to the Pakistani open intervention, including involvement of its military and non-military personnel in Afghanistan. In this context, putting a halt to Pakistan's military assistance to the Taliban and withdrawal of all Pakistani fighters (military and civilian) from Afghanistan must be immediately sought.

5. A scrutiny of the United Nations targeted sanctions on the Taliban reveals that none of their provisions has been imposed to target the civilian population of the country. In fact, the imposition of these sanctions will eventually force the Taliban — apart from fulfilling other obligations — to also agree to peace negotiations.

6. Addressing the second subsection of this paragraph, the notion of 90 per cent of the land under the formal control of the Taliban — publicized by Pakistan — is incorrect. In many of Afghanistan's provinces, there is active resistance against the Taliban, the latter being mostly in military control of cities and highways. Realistic estimation of the control of the land places 35 to 40 per cent of the territory outside the Taliban rule, a figure rising day by day.

With a view to responding to the third subsection, it must be stated that the presence of thousands of foreign fighters, bin Laden's Al-Qaeda Brigade and Pakistani extremist groups fighting alongside the Taliban with the direct involvement of Pakistani military personnel does not legitimize the Taliban as the "government" of Afghanistan. Any appeasement and "engagement" policy with the Taliban while foreign elements and groups are involved in the occupation of

Afghanistan is against established principles of international law and the Charter of the United Nations, hence an undertaking which would legitimize aggression and occupation. In this regard, the report of the Secretary-General of 20 November 2000 entitled "The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security" provides ample evidence (A/55/633-S/2000/1106). Paragraph 23 states "that the presence of non-Afghan fighters, mainly from Pakistan, is significant". Paragraph 81 reads "It is deeply distressing that a significant number of non-Afghan personnel, largely from Pakistani *madrassahs*, are not only taking active part in the fighting, most, if not all, on the side of the Taliban, and there also appears to be outside involvement in the planning and logistical support of their military operations".

It should additionally be stated that Pakistan maintains official relations with the Taliban and, as has been the case, has facilitated a venue of contact with the Taliban. Yet during the past few years, when the Taliban's "office" in Flushing, New York, remained open, it did not contribute to the peace process whatsoever and only misrepresented the situation in Afghanistan, at times visibly negating Taliban leadership by systematically making false promises.

7. In the context of the Taliban's misogynist practices such as gender apartheid and feminization of poverty, violation of human rights, genocide and random targeting of civilians, other war crimes and crimes against humanity, not enough coverage has been provided by the world mass media. In fact, so negligible has it been that sadly most people, unaware of the situation in Afghanistan, assume the behaviour of the Islamic State of Afghanistan to be similar to that of the Taliban. Of course, the reality is by far different. Further, unlike the Taliban, the Islamic State of Afghanistan believes in toleration and moderation, coexistence and cooperation.

The Islamic State of Afghanistan highly appreciates the good intention behind the proposal by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan to act as a mediator without any self-interest. The Islamic State of Afghanistan fully supports the role of other interested countries and States with good intentions in the Afghan peace process. The Islamic State of Afghanistan has already expressed its readiness to attend the Japanese-proposed peace talks and also positively responded to the appeal by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Ruud Lubbers, for the holding of a ceasefire, both of which were immediately rejected by the Taliban.
