

**Security Council**

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**Letter dated 11 May 2001 from the Permanent Representative of
Burundi to the United Nations addressed to the President of the
Security Council**

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith the "Memorandum on the peace process in Burundi: the security challenge" (see annex).

On the eve of the Security Council's visit to Central Africa, this document will help the members of the Council to better understand the impact of security problems on the peace process in Burundi, as well as the regional dimension of the Burundi conflict.

I should be grateful if you would have the memorandum circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Marc **Nteturuye**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



Annex to the letter dated 11 May 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Burundi to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

**Memorandum on the peace process in Burundi:
the security challenge**

I. General context

In dealing with the political and security crisis that erupted in Burundi in October 1993, the Government of President Buyoya has, ever since his return to power in July 1996, emphasized efforts towards a negotiated settlement.

Following an initial attempt at negotiation in Rome (under the auspices of San Egidio) with the chief armed group known at the time (the Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie (CNDD)), the Government then began the Arusha negotiations in June 1998 in a subregional framework, which was later extended to the entire international community. These talks, which included the Government, the National Assembly, and 17 accredited political parties and political movements in exile, reached a decisive stage on 28 August 2000 with the formal conclusion of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi. This outcome resulted from the united efforts of the Facilitator, Mr. Nelson Mandela, who mobilized regional cooperation, and the entire international community, along with the collaboration of the Burundian parties concerned.

President Mandela, who succeeded the late Mwalimu Julius Nyerere as Facilitator, had immediately recognized the appropriateness of the request, which the Government of Burundi had repeated many times to his predecessor, that the two armed groups which had been excluded thus far should be allowed to take part in the Arusha negotiations. These were the Front pour la défense de la démocratie (FDD), which had broken off from CNDD, and the Forces nationales pour la libération (FNL), which had broken off from the Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu (PALIPEHUTU).

Currently, these two groups form the core of the active armed rebellion on the ground, and are also present in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the United Republic of Tanzania. Despite his efforts to bring them into the final phase of the Arusha talks,

President Mandela has not yet succeeded in genuinely involving these two groups in a credible negotiation process. This process was to complete the political agreement concluded in Arusha on 28 August 2000 by supplying the essential component which is missing from that Agreement and which is required for its implementation; namely, the ceasefire protocol.

Subsequent efforts made by the Facilitation with the active collaboration of South African Vice-President Jacob Zuma and, more recently, of Gabonese President Omar Bongo have not shown significant progress, despite facilitation efforts by the late President Laurent Désiré Kabila and President Joseph Kabila of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in organizing two meetings between the Burundian President and the head of FDD in Libreville in January and April 2001. The Government of Burundi has approached all these meetings with a desire to begin serious negotiations aimed at the speedy conclusion of a ceasefire agreement with the two groups, either together or separately. However, neither group seems willing to negotiate. They have used every possible pretext to miss meetings, or they have come to meetings with evasive arguments to prevent the discussion from beginning and making headway.

It must be acknowledged today that a war mentality still prevails in the two armed groups. They seem to favour the option of a military victory. The representatives of the international community present at the signing of the Arusha Agreement, and particularly the heads of State of the region, made a point of lending their support to the Agreement through their signature or their presence. This support included, very explicitly, their commitment to taking collective action to induce the armed groups to take part in the negotiations and to cease hostilities with a view to reaching a ceasefire agreement. Unless the armed groups heeded the solemn appeal issued by these international partners, they would be subject to the coercive measures specified in the Agreement (see

article 2 of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi).¹

One month after the Arusha Agreement was signed, the participants in a regional summit meeting in Nairobi issued the same call to the armed groups, urging them to negotiate if they wished to avoid sanctions. Seven months later, this second call has not been heeded. The only response from FDD and FNL has been to intensify their attacks in the country and to strengthen their war machine. Today, the security situation in Burundi has deteriorated to such an extent that the Arusha Agreement cannot be implemented. Instead of making progress towards peace immediately after the conclusion of the Agreement, the country has, since then, been plunged even deeper into civil war. This situation urgently requires action by the international community. The armed groups cannot continue to ignore, with impunity, the call addressed to them in Arusha, Nairobi and other international forums. They must be forced to negotiate or to suffer the consequences already enunciated. In this regard, the efforts of the region, of President Mandela's facilitation and of Burundi itself are not enough.

¹ Article 2

[...] 2. The Parties accordingly call upon armed wings of non-signatory parties to suspend hostilities and violent actions immediately, and invite such non-signatory parties to participate in or engage in serious negotiations towards a ceasefire. The Parties agree that in addition to this public invitation included herein, they will as a priority take all reasonable and necessary steps to invite such parties to participate in ceasefire negotiations.

3. The Parties pledge that in the event of belligerent parties spurning or refusing such an invitation and continuing their belligerent activities against the people of Burundi, or any section of them, the violent acts of such parties will be deemed to constitute an attack on all the Parties comprising this national platform of the Burundian people, as well as on this endeavour to establish an inclusive democratic Burundian State. In such an event the Parties agree to call collectively, through the appropriate agencies including the Implementation Monitoring Committee, upon the Governments of neighbouring States, the international agencies which are guarantors of the Agreement and other appropriate national and international bodies to take the necessary steps to prohibit, demobilize, disarm, and if necessary arrest, detain and repatriate, members of such armed groups, and further to take such steps as are appropriate against any Party which encourages or supports such activities.

The entire international community and the United Nations, particularly the Security Council, must also become more actively involved in the peace process in Burundi before it is too late. The international community's commitment to Burundi must be as manifest as its commitment to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

An increasingly evident correlation has begun to emerge between developments in the Congolese conflict and those in the Burundi conflict. The further the former moves towards peace, the more adversely this factor affects the Burundi conflict, which it aggravates.

II. The Arusha Agreement in jeopardy

The implementation of the Arusha Agreement is contingent on the improvement of security conditions in Burundi. This is abundantly clear from a number of provisions in the Peace Agreement. The following are a few examples:

- The bodies established to monitor the implementation of the Agreement and the transitional institutions provided for therein require a climate of security for their establishment and operation. The representatives of the signatory parties in exile who are to participate in these bodies or institutions cannot return and assume their functions if the state of war continues or intensifies;
- The transitional institutions provided for in the Agreement were predicated on the existence of a ceasefire. In the absence of that precondition, the design of these institutions as conceived by the negotiators of the Agreement would no longer have the same foundation and would have to be changed. Any institutional formula established in the present circumstances would therefore necessarily differ from what the Agreement provides; this means that the parties would have to renegotiate the Agreement on the basis of an entirely different scenario;
- This prospect threatens to lead to the reopening of substantive negotiations which were supposed to have been completed. Thus, there is the risk of a gradual slowdown, then the complete loss, of the momentum created by the Peace Agreement and of the hopes it had raised in public opinion and in

the Burundian population, which has been traumatized by war;

- The fundamental reforms provided for in the Peace Agreement, which were to be instituted at the beginning of the transition period, are inconceivable in the absence of a ceasefire (reform of the army and other security forces, to cite but one example);
- The return of the refugees and the reintegration and rehabilitation of the *sinistrés* also presuppose the existence of a ceasefire;
- Not only would the foundations of the transition programme be called into question by the pursuit of hostilities on the ground; the persistence of such a situation would eventually lead to an escalation of violence, and the war mentality would soon take the place of the desire for peace which the Arusha Agreement sought to promote;
- The Arusha Agreement will therefore be in danger of becoming a dead letter if hostilities do not cease and if the process leading to a ceasefire is not revived in the short term.

III. Negative impact of the implementation of the Lusaka Agreement on the Burundi peace process

There is a close correlation between the conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in Burundi. Over the past few months there have been positive developments with respect to the settlement of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, largely because of the resurgence of interest on the part of the international community and the efforts it is making to put an end to the conflict.

The Burundi conflict, for its part, is the work of armed rebel groups which for the most part develop, train, equip themselves and prepare their operations against Burundi from the neighbouring territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In the Lusaka Agreement, these groups were listed among the forces termed negative which are to be disarmed, demobilized, reintegrated, repatriated or resettled (see annex I).

As the implementation of the Lusaka Agreement progresses, these negative forces feel the fate that is reserved for them drawing threateningly closer, and those that can are seeking to escape it. This is true of the Burundian armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, such as FDD and FNL, but also of certain other armed groups allied to them, such as the ex-FAR and Interahamwe of Rwandan origin.

Since the reactivation of the Lusaka Process these groups have embarked upon a vast redeployment from the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the United Republic of Tanzania, in order thereafter to take the main thrust of the war (hitherto waged in the Democratic Republic of the Congo) towards Burundi. Over the past few months, this has been reflected in the increase in infiltratory movements and armed attacks by these groups against Burundi all along its border with the United Republic of Tanzania (see annexes II and III and the explanatory appendix).

Available information indicates that this pressure could be accelerated and intensified in the days and the months to come unless the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the United Republic of Tanzania resolve to take steps to halt these infiltratory movements and compel these “negative forces” to exercise restraint, and such resolve is far from being apparent at present. There is thus a strong risk that the security situation will continue to deteriorate very seriously in Burundi in the coming weeks. Ultimately, this explosive situation carries with it the danger of a general conflagration in Burundi, and also in other parts of the subregion. The risk of another genocide and further large-scale humanitarian crises cannot be ruled out if nothing is done to control the escalation that is beginning, for the ideology of genocide dominates the political philosophy of the Burundian rebels, who are generally allied with the infamous Rwandan groups the ex-FAR and the Interahamwe, and inspires their actions and their methods of war. The term “terrorists and perpetrators of genocide” that is often applied to them is not unjustified, given the nature and cruelty of their actions (see annex IV).

To halt the escalation, there are three possible ways that should be combined in order to deter the Burundian armed groups and their allies from perpetuating the war mentality:

(a) Compel these groups (FNL and FDD) to cease hostilities and engage in negotiations for a ceasefire in the context of the Arusha peace process, which is still open to them;

(b) Apply to these groups the treatment reserved for the “negative forces” in the Lusaka Agreement, whichever country they chose to take the war into. This would mean, inter alia, that even if these negative forces were to shift the bulk of their war activities from the Democratic Republic of the Congo to Burundi, the provisions relating to them in the Lusaka Agreement would remain strictly applicable to them in the eyes of all the parties bound by and concerned with that Agreement;

(c) Apply the sanctions announced by the countries of the region in conformity with article 2, paragraph 3, of the Arusha Peace Agreement already quoted above.

The international community should consider ways of advancing the Arusha and Lusaka peace processes concomitantly and simultaneously in order that advances in one should not constitute a source of threat for the other.

IV. Security problems on the border with the United Republic of Tanzania and the role expected of that country

Burundi notes an absence of collaboration on the part of its neighbour the United Republic of Tanzania, whereas objective reasons should lead the two countries to cooperate closely in all areas and above all to protect security along the common border:

- The United Republic of Tanzania is the host country and one of the main sponsors of the inter-Burundian peace negotiations in Arusha;
- The United Republic of Tanzania co-signed the Agreement of 28 August 2000, and thus personally committed itself, together with the international community as a whole, to compel the Burundian armed groups to cease the violence and negotiate on penalty of being outlawed by that same international community, comprising in the first place the countries of the subregion;

- Despite that solemn moral commitment, it is apparent that the Burundian armed groups are attacking their country from Tanzanian territory and then returning with impunity from the bases from which they started after committing their infamous acts (see annexes II and III and explanatory appendix).

Burundi has long sought to make bilateral approaches towards the United Republic of Tanzania in order to make its leaders aware of the dangers the rebellion operating from its territory poses for peace, and to propose that it take the appropriate measures to remedy the situation. Apart from President Buyoya’s visits to the United Republic of Tanzania, many meetings between the leaders of the two countries have taken place at the ministerial level. Thus, between August 1999 and February 2001 the Ministers of Defence alone met four times, alternately in the United Republic of Tanzania and in Burundi. In response to these approaches, Tanzanian reactions have remained passive and without impact on the continuing hostile moves by the rebellion across the common border, as if nothing had taken place. The end result has been to create a rather disturbing climate in the relations between the two countries and to raise many questions on the part of Burundian public opinion regarding the attitude of the United Republic of Tanzania.

Given this absence of reaction to the attacks by the Burundian rebellion and the lack of pressure by the United Republic of Tanzania to prevent them, one may indeed wonder about the strength of that country’s commitment to a successful outcome to the Agreement it sponsored in Arusha.

V. Security problems relating to the conflict situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Since the start of the second war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in August 1998, that country has become the main base which enabled the anti-Burundian armed groups FDD and FNL to expand (training, equipment, participation in the fighting alongside the troops of the Congolese armed forces and the countries allied with the Government in Kinshasa). Annex I gives a clear illustration of this situation.

From their bases in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, these groups primarily utilized the Burundian refugee camps in the United Republic of Tanzania to recruit their troops. Although most of them take place from bases in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, their incursions into Burundi almost always pass through Tanzanian territory (see annex I).

This active presence of the Burundian rebellion in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the threat it posed to Burundian trade on Lake Tanganyika led Burundi to deploy a military self-defence operation covering the part of the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo along Lake Tanganyika, as security there was no longer ensured by the central Government of that country. This operation has recently been the object of disengagement measures and a substantial reduction in the forces engaged there, in conformity with the new environment created by the latest decisions of the Lusaka Agreement, which have been reflected in a substantial lowering of the military confrontation activities on all fronts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Although not a signatory to that Agreement, Burundi nevertheless remains strongly affected by it, as a country with security needs which found a precise response in the context of the regional process for the settlement of that conflict. The purpose of the Burundian military operation was strictly confined to self-defence, and Burundi has never had political, territorial or economic designs on the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Compelled to take security measures given the de facto absence of a governmental counterpart, Burundi did not feel itself to be in a state of belligerence against the Democratic Republic of the Congo. That is why, although it took part in all phases of the negotiations, it preferred to request observer status (which it was not given) in the Lusaka Agreement, rather than to assume a status of belligerent that it did not possess.

Since December 2000, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have initiated bilateral contacts with a view to ironing out their differences and achieving a mutually beneficial peace. At the outset the contacts were fairly promising, under the chairmanship of the late Laurent Désiré Kabila, who, while having demands to make of Burundi, appeared for his part to be desirous of offering concessions to Burundi's demands.

After the accession of President Joseph Kabila, the bilateral contacts resumed in April (expert meetings and a summit held at Libreville on 16 and 17 April, meeting of the Ministers of Defence in Nairobi on 27 April). At these latest meetings, the Congolese side gave the impression that it was no longer as willing as it had been at the outset to offer concessions in return for its constraints.

For the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi must proceed to "an immediate unilateral withdrawal of its troops from the Democratic Republic of the Congo" in return for a commitment on the part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to continuing to encourage the dialogue between the Burundian Government and FDD.

For Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo must first use its influence on FDD (and the other anti-Burundian armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo) and exert on them the pressure required in order to induce them to cease hostilities and join in the Arusha process. The Democratic Republic of the Congo should in addition cooperate in the action specified by the Lusaka Agreement against the "negative forces". Burundi is prepared to withdraw the remainder of the security operation it deployed on its border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo in return for reliable security guarantees.

VI. Burundi's commitments, expectations and requests of the international community

5.1 Commitments

Burundi wishes to reaffirm the Government's firm commitment to do everything in its power to bring about the success of the inter-Burundian peace process and promote the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement.

The Government of Burundi reaffirms its interest in seeing peace fully restored in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It will cooperate with all interested parties in attaining this objective in the framework of the Lusaka Agreement, or of a bilateral dialogue with the Democratic Republic of the Congo; in its view, this dialogue must continue until relations between Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have been completely normalized.

The Government of Burundi is in favour of the idea of organizing a conference on peace, security, stability and development in the Great Lakes region. The outcome of such a conference will depend on how well all the participants prepare for it.

5.2 *Expectations and requests*

The Government of Burundi is seriously concerned at the risk of stalemate and collapse of the peace process so painstakingly concluded in Arusha. It urgently calls on the international community and, in particular, the United Nations Security Council, to take action to give fresh impetus and encouragement to the peace process.

Accordingly, the Government of Burundi wishes to stress that the international community's respect for the role of the Facilitator, Nelson Mandela, or for that of the countries of the region, does not represent the granting of a monopoly or a renunciation of its own ability to act, since the dangers of the situation call for commitment and action by the international community. Thus Burundi expects:

- That the members of the Security Council will take the time necessary during their forthcoming visit to the region to become fully informed about the difficulties being faced by the Arusha inter-Burundian peace process in both its national and its regional dimensions, and in particular about the security problem that represents the main obstacle to the implementation of the Peace Agreement.
- That the representatives of the Security Council, in addition to meeting as planned with the signatories of the Arusha Peace Agreement, could greatly benefit from a meeting with other influential groups in Burundian society, including the army and representatives of civil society and of religious communities. President Mandela, who has just welcomed representatives of these groups in South Africa, greatly appreciated their insight, proposals and ideas on how to overcome the crisis.
- That the members of the Security Council will meet with the leaders of the Burundian rebellion in Kinshasa (FDD) and Pretoria (FNL) and send a clear message to them about the urgency of a positive response to the international community's appeal for a cessation of hostilities and the negotiation of a ceasefire. The members of the Council should convince these groups that if they refuse to comply, the international community will consider imposing sanctions against them.
- That the members of the Security Council will study concrete actions and measures with a view to supporting the region and the facilitation of the inter-Burundian peace process and helping it to break the stalemate, thereby allowing it to move forward at the same pace as, or even faster than, the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which is interrelated with it. We urge them to make every effort in their talks to convey to all their interlocutors the need to take these actions and measures quickly, in order to forestall the loss of political and social control to which the present stalemate might lead. **The issue of short-term sanctions applicable to armed groups should be included in the range of concrete measures to be considered very seriously on a priority basis.**
- That the members of the Security Council will convince the United Republic of Tanzania of the need to take into account the security concerns that Burundi has so often expressed. In that regard, Burundi proposes to the United Republic of Tanzania that a joint force to patrol their common border should be set up, and neutral observers should be stationed along that border. This same proposal was made in 1998, but the United Republic of Tanzania did not accept it.
- That the Security Council will study the possibility of extending the mandate and mission of MONUC, as provided for under the Lusaka Agreement, to enable it to meet the need to monitor the security of the common border of Burundi and the United Republic of Tanzania, and that of Burundi with the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
- That the members of the Security Council will convince the Congolese authorities of the need to pursue a bilateral dialogue with Burundi in a more positive and constructive spirit, so that the expectations of the two parties can be met and their concerns satisfied.
- That the Security Council, in that regard, will lead the Democratic Republic of the Congo to

exert the necessary pressure on Burundian armed groups with a view to the cessation of hostilities and commitment to real negotiation.

- That the members of the Security Council will ensure for the time being, following their forthcoming talks with the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, that the Congolese Government firmly commits itself to encouraging the anti-Burundian armed groups to show clear evidence of their withdrawal, in order to prevent these negative forces from crossing the border in future from the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to perpetrate further attacks on Burundi, and to see that they confine their military activities to the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
- That the members of the Council will convince the Democratic Republic of the Congo that these negative forces have no choice and that they must turn in their weapons and rejoin the Arusha peace process immediately, or take the consequences provided for under the Lusaka and Arusha Agreements.
- That Council members will finally make it clear that it is in the interest of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the subregion and the entire international community to cooperate with it so as to promote a lasting climate of reconciliation and good-neighbourliness and thus to make a significant contribution to the achievement of a lasting peace in the subregion.

Explanatory appendix to annexes*

Annexes I and II: Incursions and destabilization of Burundi by FNL, FDD and their allies based in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the United Republic of Tanzania

Democratic Republic of the Congo

A. FNL — PALIPEHUTU

In direct collaboration with the Interahamwe, the ex-FAR and the Mayi-Mayi, FNL troops have been reported in the region located between Uvira and Bukavu. They are shuttling between Burundi and the Congo across the Rusizi river. They are making incursions in the province of Bujumbura Rural and part of Bubanza.

B. FDD

One contingent of the FDD forces is in the South Kivu region between Uvira and Moliro. These attacking forces are crossing Lake Tanganyika to make incursions in the province of southern Bujumbura Rural and parts of Bururi, in Rumonge, and Makamba, in Nyanza-Lac.

Another contingent is also crossing the lake, but through the United Republic of Tanzania, generally in the Kigoma region, to attack the areas already mentioned but also the provinces of Makamba and Rutana.

Another FDD contingent is located in the Katanga, Lubumbashi, region. This group follows the border between Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, crosses Lake Tanganyika and passes through Tanzanian territory to reach its sanctuaries.

United Republic of Tanzania

Besides the fact that these hostile forces use Tanzanian territory for transit purposes, a majority of the assailants attacking Burundi are reportedly located in that country. Incursions are made into Burundi from sanctuaries situated at between 10 and 30 km from the border between Burundi and the United Republic of Tanzania.

Annex III: Worsening of the security situation following the Lusaka Agreement

Since the start of the effective implementation of the Lusaka Agreement, we have noted a significant increase in the violence.

On the ground, it did not take long to see the results. Heavily armed rebels crossed Lake Tanganyika and our long border with the United Republic of Tanzania en masse.

Thus provinces which had been relatively calm have experienced a wave of terror in March and April. That is true of the provinces of Gitega, Muramvya and Kayanza.

* Annexes I to III are not included in the present document.

Annex IV: Summary of damage

This wave of terror has caused tremendous damage. A good many civilians have been killed, a number of people have been wounded and the population has been displaced. Much of the population's property has been destroyed, despoiled and stolen. One distressing consequence of this state of affairs is that a great many people have died as a result of disease and famine which has been made worse by overcrowding.

Annex IV

Summary of damage

A. Damage caused by genocidal terrorists across the border with the United Republic of Tanzania

<i>Period</i>	<i>Province</i>	<i>Damage to people (civilians)</i>	<i>Material damage</i>	<i>Comments</i>
From 11 December 1996 to 16 March 1998 (1 year and 4 months)	Makamba (Lake Nyanza) Kayogoro	232 killed 72 wounded	Many goods stolen Several houses set alight and destroyed Many houses looted 27 cows stolen	Attack by G.T. coming from Tanzania and withdrawing to Tanzania
From 30 April 1998 to 17 August 1998 (3 months and 3 weeks)	Makamba	24 killed 7 wounded	72 houses set alight a large sum of money stolen 38 cows stolen	G.T. coming from and withdrawing to Tanzania, the wounded rebels were treated at Musagara in Tanzania
	Rutana	6 killed 5 wounded		
	Cankuzo	5 killed		
From 16 August 1998 to 21 October 1998 (3 months)	Makamba	3 killed 1 wounded and 2 kidnapped	36 households looted and set alight	Repeated attacks by G.T. repelled; withdrawal to Tanzanian territory
From 27 October 1998 to 4 April 1999 (5 months)	Makamba Ruyigi	139 killed 55 wounded 23 kidnapped 10,000 displaced	Many houses looted and set alight 232 cows stolen 1,963,000 Fbu stolen Many goats and sheep stolen	
From 5 April 1999 to 21 June 1999 (2 months and 3 weeks)	Makamba	75 killed 30 wounded 51 reported missing Several people displaced	Several houses burnt Many cows stolen Much money stolen 2 vehicles destroyed	Incursion from Tanzania and withdrawal to Tanzanian territory
From 26 June 1999 to 23 September 1999 (3 months)	Makamba	49 killed 26 wounded and 5 kidnapped Thousands displaced	Many cows stolen 1 primary school set alight 200 houses looted and set alight	
	Rutana	18 killed 21 wounded 4 kidnapped Many thousands displaced	96 cows stolen 100 houses set alight Field of coffee trees burnt 1 health centre destroyed	
From 24 September 1999 to 16 January 2000 (4 months)	Rutana Ruyigi	74 killed, including 2 Europeans from United Nations 73 wounded	194 houses burnt 2 health centres burnt 1 primary school burnt	The wounded were treated on Tanzanian soil
February to June 2000 (5 months)	Makamba Rutana	158 persons killed 79 persons wounded	1,334 houses burnt 1,383 houses looted	What was stolen was sold in Tanzania.

<i>Period</i>	<i>Province</i>	<i>Damage to people (civilians)</i>	<i>Material damage</i>	<i>Comments</i>
	Ruyigi Gitega	21 persons kidnapped	171 cows stolen 10 primary schools burnt 8 vehicles burnt 12 vehicles damaged 4 health centres burnt 2 health centres looted Many shops looted Much money stolen Many clothes and foodstuffs stolen 1 motorbike and more than 21 bicycles stolen	All G.T. who carried out these deeds came from Tanzania and withdrew to Tanzania afterwards.
From July to December 2000 (6 months)	Makamba Rutana	67 killed 175 wounded Many displaced	60 cows stolen Many houses burnt Many households looted	
January-April 2001 (4 months)	Rutana Ruyigi Cankuzo	29 killed 34 wounded	229 cows stolen Many houses burnt Many medicines stolen and shops looted	

B. Damage caused by genocidal terrorists across the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo

<i>Period</i>	<i>Province</i>	<i>Damage to people</i>	<i>Material damage</i>	<i>Comments</i>
Year 2000 (12 months)	Buja Rural	57 killed 104 wounded 8 missing		FNL from DRC targets the capital and its vital points.
Year 2001 until April (4 months)	Buja-Mairie (Kinama) Buja Rural (Nyabunyegeri)	Provisional figures		Escalation of violence Insecurity around the capital.

Key: FNL: Front national de libération, armed wing of PALIPEHUTU.
G.T.: Genocidal terrorists.
DRC: Democratic Republic of the Congo.
PALIPEHUTU: Parti de libération du peuple Hutu.