

UNITED NATIONS

SECRET

APR 1 1983

CONFIDENTIAL



# SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS

THIRTY-EIGHTH YEAR

**2429<sup>th</sup>** MEETING: 31 MARCH 1983

NEW YORK

---

## CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2429) .....	1
Adoption of the agenda .....	1
Letter dated 16 March 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Chad to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15643) .....	1

## NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/ . . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

## 2429th MEETING

Held in New York on Thursday, 31 March 1983, at 3.30 p.m.

*President:* Sir JOHN THOMSON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland):

*Present:* The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Togo, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zimbabwe.

### Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2429)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. Letter dated 16 March 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Chad to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15643).

*The meeting was called to order at 5.45 p.m.*

### Adoption of the agenda

*The agenda was adopted.*

**Letter dated 16 March 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Chad to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15643)**

1. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the decision taken at the previous meetings on this item [2419th and 2428th meetings], I invite the representatives of Chad and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to take places at the Council table; I invite the representatives of Benin, Democratic Yemen, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ivory Coast, Niger, Senegal, Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic and the United Republic of Cameroon to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Barma (Chad) and Mr. Treiki (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) took places at the Council table; Mr. Soglo (Benin), Mr. Al-Alfi (Democratic Yemen), Mr. Khalil (Egypt), Mr. Ibrahim (Ethiopia), Mr. Boule (Gabon), Mr. Coumbassa (Guinea), Mr. Rajaie-Khorassani (Islamic Republic of Iran), Mr. Essy (Ivory Coast), Mr. Oumarou (Niger), Mr. Sarré (Senegal), Mr. Abdalla (Sudan), Mr. El-Faital (Syrian Arab Republic) and Mrs. Mairie (United Republic of Cameroon) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.*

2. The PRESIDENT: I should like to inform members of the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Ghana in which he requests to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite that representative to participate in the discussion, without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Hayford (Ghana) took the place reserved for him at the side of the Council chamber.*

3. Mr. NATORF (Poland): We have before us a matter that directly concerns two countries: the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Chad. Both countries are members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

4. The position of my delegation on this issue is based on the following considerations. First, the African continent has been suffering from many problems which could be defined, first of all, as vestiges of colonialism. We look with admiration upon the efforts of the nations of that continent aimed at overcoming the legacy of colonialism and underdevelopment. Those efforts require an atmosphere of co-operation and stability in relations among African States. Secondly, more than once we have witnessed external, neo-colonialist efforts to spoil that atmosphere by exploiting the social and political contradictions that plague this great continent, border disputes included. This has been reflected recently in malicious manoeuvres to disrupt the OAU and to foment an international anti-Libyan campaign. My country is resolutely opposed to all destabilizing neo-colonialist actions based on the ancient Roman principle of *divide et impera*. It is the feeling of my delegation that the situation prevailing between Libya and Chad was unnecessarily dramatized by many and the debate artificially extended in the Council as well. Thirdly, the issues that may arise in the African continent should be solved, first and preferably, through bilateral negotiations and within the OAU.

5. On the basis of these considerations, my delegation welcomed the statement made by the representative of Libya [2419th meeting] expressing the readiness of his Government to discuss the border dispute between the two countries both on a bilateral level and in the OAU. Such an approach is fully compatible with the principles

of the Charter of the United Nations. We are pleased to note that this country, with which we are bound by amicable relations, takes a constructive stand on this issue.

6. The efforts of the OAU, with the indispensable support of Libya and Chad, should be supported by the Council, as they would lead to the elimination of conflicts and tensions in the African continent.

7. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

8. Mr. EL-FATTAL (Syrian Arab Republic) (*interpretation from Arabic*): Nearly five weeks ago, the Council heard a considerable number of delegations voicing in turn words of right, voicing words intended to call the attention of the world to the plots being hatched against a young Arab State, a State which conveys the message of the masses struggling for freedom, progress and peace, a State which has pledged to persevere in its revolution against backwardness, dependence, exploitation and hegemony. Thanks to its vitality and on the basis of the harsh experiences it has had to undergo throughout its recent history, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has been able to prove to the world that a developing State can muster its abilities for reconstruction and advance along an independent path in accordance with the interests of its people and the interests of the Arab nation.

9. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has been and still is a target for the enemies of progress. Why did they choose the Jamahiriya? To us, the Arabs, the answer is obvious and simple: the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has not hesitated to defend its pristine Arab character and its African identity, firmly adhering to its vanguard role, embodied in confrontation and steadfastness, and refusing to bargain at the expense of the Arab nation and the African nations. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya continues to be a thorn in the side of the defeatists, profiteers, speculators and henchmen of imperialism. From the very moment when their aggressive intentions were unveiled before the Council, the imperialist circles have engaged in political incitement against Libya, to the extent of attempting to cast doubt on Libya's sovereignty over its own territory. With the failure, or the freezing, of the attempts to use force and aggression against Libya, that country, the victim of continuous aggression and foreign military and non-military intervention, has been portrayed as the aggressor and not the object of aggression.

10. They claim that the Jamahiriya commits acts of aggression. They also claim that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya occupies territory and expands, and thus jeopardizes peace and security. But all of us here know that the United States imperialist onslaught against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya is escalating on all fronts. Is it logical that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, which constantly champions the rights of oppressed peoples, should be the aggressor, while the echoes of its complaint of last month [S/15615] against the provocations of the United States and its allies still ring in our memories? Did the Council

not hear at that time, in this very chamber, a virulent, menacing campaign directed against that country by the imperialistic Power? Is it not strange for the Council now to hear that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya is responsible for the military and political tensions in Chad and that it poses a threat to peace? Has the Council forgotten that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya made a generous contribution to the restoration of peace to Chad; indeed, it placed all its potentialities at the disposal of an African State, so keen were we Arabs that its territorial integrity and independence should be safeguarded. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya is accused of posing a threat to peace and security in the entire area. Has it been forgotten that the United States naval and air forces constantly violate the territorial waters and airspace of Africa, especially the territorial waters and airspace of Libya? Claims against Libya are unjustified. The representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya declared here:

"I believe that the Council's competence is clear in accordance with Article 33, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United Nations which stipulates the following:

"The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security,

—if such a dispute exists; but even Habré's representatives did not say that peace and security are being endangered at all: there is no dispute between Chad and Libya—[and here I underline this fact once more: there is no dispute between Chad and Libya]—

'shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice'." [2419th meeting, para. 73.]

11. Yet Libya is accused of occupation and expansion and of jeopardizing international peace and security.

12. Libya's willingness to enter into consultations with Chad over the contentious issue indicates that the crisis is artificial. Indeed, this artificially created crisis aims at prejudicing both Libya and Chad alike.

13. We are indeed aware that the machiavellian principle underlying American strategy is "divide and rule"; we are also aware that that strategy is based on the threat or use of force. Suffice it to recall, as an example, that tension has resulted in our area from the role of the rapid development forces and the strategic alliances, foremost among which are those linking Washington and Cairo, Washington and Tel Aviv, Washington and Pretoria and others. Those, indeed, are the ones that pose threats to international peace and security in the region.

14. Is it not strange that the representative of Egypt, one of the parties to the Camp David accords, should accuse the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya of expansion and interference in Chad? We wonder why they make this

accusation. Will these accusations help that representative to recover his place within the Arab family? Is that conduct not proof that the Egyptian authorities persist in ignoring Arab rights in Palestinian and other occupied Arab territories? Can Egypt be acquitted just because it heaps accusations on a bastion of steadfastness and confrontation against imperialism and zionism? Have we forgotten that the Camp David accords ignored the rights of the Palestinian people and helped Israel to intensify its aggression and hegemony over our territory under the American umbrella? Can Egypt accuse Libya, whose sacrifices help strengthen the bastion of steadfastness and confrontation? Why does Egypt accuse Libya? What are the intensions and motives behind that?

15. Those who took part in putting the rights of the Palestinian people up for sale are trying today, through their alliance with imperialism, to conspire against the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Libya. But the people of Egypt refuse to acquiesce in this, and sooner or later they will have to rejoin the ranks of Libya, Syria and other Arab countries in order to defend every inch of Arab territory.

16. We conclude then that the question of which we are seized will not resolve the problem, but rather will lead to the creation of rifts and aggression among fraternal peoples, which is what imperialism wants. We believe that the OAU, whose unity the United States is trying to destroy, whose prestige and credibility it is trying to undermine and whose role it is trying to end, is the competent body for consideration of the question of which we are seized today. We also consider that the attempts at representing the OAU as an incompetent forum that cannot consider such issues are but a manoeuvre that serves the interest of those who are most inimical to the Africans and the Arabs. The Council has to realize all these facts and have confidence in the wisdom of those who are able to resolve regional problems in accordance with the instruments binding the parties. What we are seeking is to resolve conflicts in the third world by peaceful means and not to fall into the snare of imperialist strategy, which is aimed at destroying the bonds linking us—common bonds—as well as destroying what we are aspiring for—good, fraternal relationships.

17. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the representative of Ethiopia. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

18. Mr. IBRAHIM (Ethiopia): Sir, first of all I should like, on behalf of my delegation and on my own behalf, to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency for the month of March. With your vast experience, ability and diplomatic skill, we are certain that you will guide the work of the Council to the satisfaction of all.

19. I should also like to pay a well-deserved tribute to your predecessor, Mr. Troyanovsky, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, for the brilliant manner in which he presided over the Council's proceedings during the month of February.

20. The item on the agenda today concerns Chad and Libya, two neighbouring African countries. It is indeed with great reluctance that we ask to be allowed to participate in the Council's discussion of this item. At the outset, we find it imperative to make it absolutely clear to the members of the Council, as well as to all others concerned, that by our participation we do not in any way desire to widen the scope of the dispute between the parties. Nor do we wish to side with one or the other of the two sisterly countries. We shall not, therefore, deal with the substance of Chad's complaint against Libya.

21. Chad has been confronted with calamities of one kind or another for far too long. Libya, an object of external manipulation itself, was in fact before the Council with its own complaint only a few weeks ago [S/15615]. In different ways, these two countries are examples of the diverse and complex problems that plague Africa. They are both struggling to overcome the debilitating effects of colonialism. They share a common history and pursue similar national goals. As neighbours, they are also bound by geography and destined for ever to live together, with no alternative but to harmonize their overall relations on the basis of good-neighbourliness and co-operation.

22. At the heart of the contention between Chad and Libya lies a boundary dispute. As we all know, boundary disputes are mainly a legacy of the colonial era and as such are widespread throughout Africa, Asia and Latin America. They are numerous and, unfortunately, have often caused wars. Our own national experience in the subregion called the Horn of Africa is an extreme case of expansionism and non-acceptance of the existing boundaries which resulted in wars of aggression and untold suffering.

23. On balance, however, we are gratified, indeed encouraged, to observe that most of the African, Asian and Latin American States have resolved or contained their boundary disputes through the evolution of rational and mutually acceptable approaches either bilaterally or through regional arrangements. This is a trend which must be upheld and strengthened. There have been few if any instances in which public debates such as the one held by the Council on this item on 22 March [2419th meeting], or even this one today, have contributed to the resolution of such disputes. We therefore urge the members of the Council and all others concerned not to prolong the present debate.

24. We understand the concerns of Chad and commend it for its faith in the United Nations, demonstrated by its request for a meeting of the Council; but we should also not lose sight of the complementary and important role played by the OAU, specifically in its efforts to resolve the very question now before the Council. The principles of the inviolability of State frontiers and respect for the territorial integrity of States are universally accepted international norms embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and explicitly reaffirmed in the regional instrument, the Charter of the Organization of African Unity. Moreover, they are basic tenets of the Movement

of Non-Aligned Countries. We emphasize these facts if only to show that there is no dispute over the principles involved.

25. The fact that the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, meeting in its first session at Cairo in July 1964, solemnly declared, in resolution AHG/Res.16 (I) [S/15649, annex XII], that all member States pledge to respect the borders existing on the achievement of national independence is of the utmost importance in the search for a solution of the dispute between Chad and Libya. Neither the members of the Council nor the parties to the dispute can fail to recognize the full weight and importance of this African principle, which provides the key to solution of the present problem.

26. It is also a fact that the OAU has been and continues to be seized of this question. Actually, the question of Chad is regarded by many as a test case for the OAU. We believe that the OAU has not been afforded the opportunity to exhaust the possibilities open to it in its search for a resolution of the problem. The question of the national unity and territorial integrity of Chad is also on the agenda of the next session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, which is scheduled to take place soon. In our view, both the Council and the parties concerned have a duty to protect and enhance the complementary role of that African organization in matters which are primarily African both in origin and in substance.

27. The Charter of the United Nations itself encourages this view. Article 33, paragraph 1, provides that:

"The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice."

We therefore urge the parties to the issue at hand to exercise maximum restraint and to avail themselves of all peaceful means and in particular to give their regional organization, the OAU, a chance to exhaust its possibilities and finalize the efforts it has undertaken in this respect. Meanwhile, we wish to express the hope that the Council will exercise maximum caution in the discharge of the responsibility entrusted to it and that it will make use of the occasion to demonstrate its confidence in and respect for the OAU by acting on the basis of Article 33, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations, which enjoins the Council to call upon the parties to settle their disputes by such means.

28. Mr. CHAMORRO MORA (Nicaragua) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Mr. President, as a non-aligned country, Nicaragua deeply regrets that two non-aligned countries find themselves at opposite ends of the matter now before the Council.

29. We are concerned because this kind of dispute results only in the erosion of the unity of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and strengthens the aspiration of the imperialists to divide the third world. We are also concerned because the OAU today more than ever needs unity in its ranks, and we believe that all its members must spare no effort to strengthen that regional body, which, because of its universal nature, constitutes a model of what some of us would like to have in our own regions, particularly when continental Powers that do not have the same problems or share the same aspirations do not participate in their deliberations.

30. We have considered the complaint submitted by Chad. We have tried to keep up to date on the events, and we have calmly examined the nature and details of the matter in dispute. We believe that there are two fundamental aspects that deserve special attention. The first is the alleged occupation of the territory of Chad by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in the Aouzou Strip. In this connection, purely juridical arguments have been put forward by both sides, and we believe that basically this is a problem in which this body does not really have a substantive role to play. The second aspect concerns "the repeated acts of aggression" that Libya has allegedly perpetrated against Chad, according to the letter from the representative of Chad requesting the convening of the Council. In this connection, we have conducted some research on the basis of the means available to us, and if we are to be candid we must say that it has not been possible for my delegation to establish with certainty the existence of repeated acts of aggression or even threats of aggression.

31. There is no evidence that the present situation on the border between Chad and Libya now poses or might pose any danger of confrontation.

32. Africa, like our Latin America, does not need confrontations or disputes. Its peoples have suffered centuries of poverty, plunder and exploitation. Today, as in the past, it is necessary to struggle to overcome the barriers that keep us in ignorance, misery and underdevelopment.

33. We believe that renewing bilateral contacts, as well as reactivating and giving new impetus to existing machinery that has already been used in the past, could lead to the definitive solution of the differences that might exist and, in this manner, could avoid exacerbating the situation that might otherwise lead to a truly dangerous state of affairs.

34. The moment at which this agenda item has come before the Council is a particularly sensitive one. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has been the subject of a continuous, sustained and persistent campaign of aggression on the part of the United States within the framework of its violent and warlike imperialist strategy against free, revolutionary and progressive peoples. What the United States has done to the Libyans is to make them the targets of their attacks in the economic, political and

military fields. Moreover, cynically, it has disparaged the leaders of the Libyan revolution.

35. The Reagan Administration's order to the North American petroleum companies to cease operations in Libya, the aggression of August 1981 in the Gulf of Sidra against Libyan airplanes, the dispatch of the aircraft-carrier *Nimitz* to the Gulf area and the sending of AWACS aircraft to neighbouring countries to spy on Libyan territory, the allegation of acts of aggression against neighbouring countries and the perverse story of an alleged assassination attempt against President Reagan with the support of the Libyan leaders—all of these things are to be viewed within the framework of the strategy of imperialism.

36. In the view of my delegation, the present situation, despite the will of those responsible, could be part of that same pattern and be for the benefit of those same interests.

37. The constant acts of conspiracy by the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) directed against vanguard forces should not be made more fruitful because of our differences.

38. We are pleased with the willingness of both sides to resolve their differences by peaceful means, and we know that those intentions are sincere. Nicaragua, which enjoys the friendship of the people and Government of Libya, far from feeling that Libya poses a threat to the peace and security of the area or that it may be a danger to the stability of the region, believes that it is Libya's own stability and security that are constantly being jeopardized by imperialist aggression, and we do not hesitate to express once again our full solidarity with it.

39. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

40. Mr. RAJAIE-KHORASSANI (Islamic Republic of Iran): I take refuge in God from Satan the Outcast, in the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful.

"And soon will the unjust aggressors know what vicissitudes their affairs shall take."<sup>1</sup>

41. My delegation has been following the Council's debates very attentively. I have not yet found myself fully convinced of the absolute necessity for convening the Council.

42. From the procedural point of view, everything is perfect. Some Member States have insisted that at least a debate on the problem of Chad, as defined in the agenda item under consideration, is necessary or may be helpful; hence the meeting of the Council. It is not really the procedural aspect which is of particular concern to my delegation. It is, rather, the actual substance of the matter which, if I am allowed to say so, with all respect sounds unrealistic or may be very artificial and superficial.

43. I wish I were wrong, but, on the other hand, if we find in our deliberations and common endeavour some elements of truth, in my delegation's view, we should all then be sorry to see that a meeting of the Council has been requested in order to serve a purpose slightly different from the objective which is openly expressed. Manipulation of the Council should not be tolerated under any circumstances.

44. The present situation in Chad is no different from what it was last month or two months ago. No one can deny the existence of rather perennial problems in the area. The Libyan contention as to the occupation of some Libyan territory by Chad is not something new. Political differences between the two countries have not been escalated so significantly as to make the call for a meeting of the Council particularly reasonable.

45. My brief experience in the United Nations tells me that a meeting of the Council is usually due to some very important and urgent events, not simply to perennial political problems or border differences, which cannot be settled in a meeting of the Council anyway. Otherwise, the Council would be meeting permanently about Palestine.

46. All of us know of much more serious political and military developments in parts of the world in the face of which the Council maintained its patience, tolerance and self-restraint. And to see all of a sudden the convening of the Council to debate some perennial, routine problems demonstrates that something more than the professed objectives has been intended. That is the theme of my delegation's statement this afternoon, and I hope that my contribution will be helpful and effective.

47. *The Washington Post* of the 18 February informs us that the United States intended to increase its aid to some countries which have happened to have rather cold relations with Libya, among them Egypt, for instance, and the Sudan.

48. *The Wall Street Journal* of 18 February informs us of an interview by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Sudan in which he proclaimed the readiness of his country to go to war against Libya.

49. Mr. Vernon Walters, a former senior official of the CIA, had been in the area on 18 February, according to *The Wall Street Journal*.

50. In an article in *The New York Times* of 28 February, entitled "Chad Senses Menacing Libya Shadow", we read the following:

"The editorial noted that Mr. Habré, in a recent visit to Khartoum to confer with President Jaafar Nimeiri of the Sudan, had made it clear that Chad and the Sudan were prepared to fight Colonel Qaddafi."

51. We also remember very well the presence of the airborne warning and control system aeroplanes

(AWACS) and the Sixth fleet, which is a pretty powerful combination, and some "commodities" of the same nature and use in the area, in particular around Libyan waters.

52. But in spite of all that, we observe that a case has been brought here against Libya. Let us therefore pray that some good permanent members of the Council have not been using the entire international body in order to divert international attention from a threat or plot that probably is being skilfully cooked up against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

53. If my prayers come true, there are still further good reasons for those who are behind the scenes of the entire orchestra. They want deliberately to undermine and destroy the position of Libya in the OAU. They desire also to see the OAU weakened and, in fact, broken down. Some are also trying to find excuses and justification in order to increase military aid, even selling more AWACS and more sophisticated aeroplanes, which some poor third-world countries would be ostentatiously happy to possess. Further shipments of arms to the area need additional excuses, and what would be better than a very important Council meeting for convincing some permanent members that the situation is awfully dangerous in that part of the world?

54. My delegation is aware of the blatant and open support of the French Government. In my delegation's view, the French Government's support is rather significant. We therefore invite the attention of the Council to an important historical fact, which is that in all agreements concerning Chad and its neighbouring countries, including the Cairo and Lagos accords, both of which were signed by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and President Habré, who was then Prime Minister, it was explicitly stressed that France must leave the area fully and completely. Moreover, under the present economic circumstances, France probably also needs to deliver some of those "peaceful" Exocet missiles to maintain "international peace and security" in the area. For these and other reasons, the entire political drama, in which even the Security Council of the United Nations has been manipulated, thanks to the presence of imperialism and its lackeys in the area, is taking place, and therefore the Council meeting must have been very necessary.

55. In my delegation's view, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya is not a danger to Chad or to any other country in the area. The two countries can solve their differences peacefully. It is the master-mind of imperialism which is the greatest danger to all of us.

56. As for the position of my Government in regard to the substance of the matter, we fully support the position of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. The Jamahiriya is a revolutionary country; the Government of Libya is working hard and the Libyan people fully support their Government and régime. If others do not enjoy this privilege and do not feel immune from their dissident masses, then they should not blame Libya for that.

57. We also strongly support all liberation movements, in particular those in Africa. We believe that freedom and independence belong primarily to, and must be enjoyed by, the oppressed masses and only through them by their representative Governments, and not the reverse.

58. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has also been accused of intending to seek an Islamic Government for the people of Chad. As a Muslim representing the Islamic Republic of Iran, I cordially congratulate the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya for this praiseworthy intention.

59. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the representative of Ghana. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

60. Mr. HAYFORD (Ghana): Since my delegation had the opportunity only two days ago to express its pleasure at seeing you presiding over the Council, Sir, I will simply join with the many other delegations which, at the end of your tenure as President, have congratulated you warmly on your brilliant stewardship.

61. Ghana speaks on this issue with a sense of regret that a matter involving two sister African countries—the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, with which my country has very warm ties of friendship and co-operation, and Chad, a sister country member of the OAU and of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries—should be an issue before the Council at this time.

62. Our regret stems from Ghana's long-standing conviction that African problems must of necessity have African solutions, because regional arrangements have the best chance of success in such matters. Moreover, there are African modalities for addressing disputes between sister African countries within the framework of the OAU.

63. The dispute between Chad and Libya concerning the Aouzou Strip is of long standing, and it is well known that the OAU is fully seized of the matter. Ghana would therefore support the many delegations which have proposed that the problem be left within the OAU for settlement. In this context, it would be appropriate for the Council to refer the issue, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, back to the OAU for further attention.

64. As has been pointed out by numerous previous speakers, the dispute under consideration here will be a major subject at the forthcoming session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, to be held at Addis Ababa in June. It would therefore be appropriate to allow these regional arrangements to continue efforts for achieving an equitable settlement of the dispute.

65. In conclusion, Ghana would like to reaffirm its commitment to and belief in the peaceful settlement of disputes between States and the fullest use of regional



organizations such as the OAU in the resolution of problems between neighbouring countries.

66. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, on whom I now call.

67. Mr. TREIKI (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (*interpretation from Arabic*): Mr. President, on behalf of my country and on my own behalf, I wish to express our gratitude and appreciation to you for the excellent manner in which you have guided the Council's work during the past few days, as well as for your objectivity.

68. I believe that we have now uncovered the conspiracy that has been engineered against the Council, the same sort of conspiracy that had been engineered against my country. Those who have disregarded the Council and encouraged the aggressors to disregard United Nations resolutions are encouraging them also to persist in their occupation of Namibia, Palestine and Lebanon. I refer to those who wish to put an end to the role of the United Nations, particularly that of the Security Council. They have rejected a United Nations role in Lebanon, but have unilaterally sent their troops there in disregard of the international forces in Lebanon. They have mocked the Security Council and the United Nations. We see what is published in today's issue of *The New York Times* about the United Nations and the Council.

69. This conspiracy has turned into a farce, unveiled by the forces of good and the progressive forces within the Council.

70. During the past few days, pressures have been exerted, threats made, ambassadors summoned to Washington and pressures brought to bear against States. Unfortunately, this has taken place even in Paris. I say that most regrettably because we are linked by good bonds of co-operation with France.

71. But, as *The Christian Science Monitor* has stated, the United States has been able to win what are called francophone countries and keep them away from France. Probably—and I refer here to what we have already rejected—one should repeat that Africa is not an object to be divided among the imperialists. The time of imperialism and spheres of influence has ended.

72. Today I listened very carefully to what the representative of France said [2428th meeting]. We heard that France, a previous colonizer of Africa, still had a keen interest in Africa. An interest in Africa? Well, to be more exact, in uranium, manganese and economic colonialism. The representative of France said that France does have a responsibility and a role—a role that is embodied in interference in central Africa, "Operation Barracuda", an attempt at returning to Africa through the window after having been expelled through the door.

73. We Libyans are linked by bonds of friendship and co-operation with Italy, but we reject the notion that Italy should have a role or responsibility in our country.

We do co-operate with Italy as a neighbouring country in the Mediterranean, but we cannot accept trusteeship from any party or circle.

74. I believe that the representative of France will allow me to state Chad's view of French colonialism there. I did not make it up. This is derived from Chadian documents. The Lagos Accord on National Reconciliation in Chad of 18 August 1979 [*S/14378, annex I*—and I shall read from the French text, although I am not well versed in French because I was not subjected to French colonialism—states the following in paragraph 7:

"The Chadian Parties unanimously recognized that the continued presence of French troops in Chad is an impediment to finding a peaceful reconciliation and solution to the Chadian problems. The Chadians therefore agreed that the Transitional National Union Government when formed shall effect the withdrawal of the French troops."\*

[*The speaker continued in French.*]

75. And by whom was that accord signed? It was signed by, among others: Abdoulaye Adam Dana, of the First Volcan Army; Fatcho Balam, of the National Democratic Union; Mahamat Abba Said, of the First People's Army; Acyl Ahmed, of the Revolutionary Democratic Council; Moussa Medela, of the West Armed Forces; Aboubakar Abdel Rahane, of the Popular Movement of the Liberation of Chad; and Hissain Habré, of the Armed Forces of the North—yes, his signature is there.

76. So that is what the Chadians think of France.

[*The speaker resumed in Arabic.*]

77. I wish now to quote from a joint declaration issued on 27 May 1980 at Lagos. In its fourth paragraph, that declaration states:

"We denounce the presence of French troops in Chad and call for their immediate withdrawal and their replacement by African troops. We denounce French military intervention in Chad with the aim of dividing that country."

78. Another document was signed by the following representatives of neighbouring countries of Chad: Sadou Daoudou, Minister of State for the Armed Forces of Cameroon; the Vice-Premier of what was then the Central African Empire; Ali Treiki of Libya; Moumouni Djermakoye of Niger; Yussuf Mukhtal, Sudanese Ambassador in Lagos; and Major-General Shaikhu Iro Ado, Vice-President of Nigeria. That declaration reveals what the neighbouring countries think of the situation in Chad:

"After considering the complex situation in Chad, we note the continued intervention by foreign French troops in Chad, which could internationalize and

\* Quoted in French by the speaker.

render complex an internal problem which is amenable to solution.”

79. That is what France gave Chad. It also gave Chad a civil war in which the French army interfered for about seven years against FROLINAT [*National Liberation Front of Chad*] in northern Chad. Then France was forced to withdraw. When Nigeria sent troops to N'Djamena, France turned over N'Djamena airport to Hissein Habré, who besieged the Nigerian troops, which Nigeria was then forced to withdraw.

80. It is against that background that we must assess the objectivity of what was stated by the representative of the French Republic, a country which, I wish to underscore, is linked with my country by ties of close co-operation.

81. He spoke of agreements based on “historical responsibility”: Africa, of course, is incompetent; it has not come of age, so France has to be the trustee for African and other colonial countries. In short, he lectured us. He referred to conventions that were signed, but by whom? By France and some other colonialist countries intent upon dividing up Africa. I would mention the agreement of 1885, which sought to divide the African continent and to parcel out African territory. Is there another continent with such a mosaic-like character resulting from that sort of divisions? They even divided up certain peoples. France served Algeria pretty well, to be sure: it killed over a million Algerians, which speaks very well indeed of France. We think that our friend France should forget about the past and start with a clean slate of co-operation, not imperialism. We had hoped that at least the Socialist Party of France would take such a position, different from that of past governments.

82. Libya was a part of the Ottoman Empire. At that time, there was no Chad, no Niger; there were French colonies. France wanted to engulf the larger part of the weak Ottoman Empire, including Libya; it did not want to create such countries as Chad or Niger or any other African countries. Those countries, in the final analysis, are Libya's sister countries. France wanted to exploit that weak old empire, and Italy, too, had aspirations to colonize Libya. It was not in Libya's interest that Italy interfered with France; it was rather to halt French expansion so that it could have its share in the region, and that is just what happened. Then came the competition between the Italian and the French colonizers for the spoils. France wanted a portion of Libya to be annexed to French Equatorial Africa rather than Chad. Mussolini wanted to preserve *nostra terra*, the Italian expression including Libya as part and parcel of Italy.

83. I challenge the representative of France to state before the Council that after the Second World War, when French troops arrived in southern Libya, Aouzou was part of Chad. The Council may summon the representative of Italy, who is present here.

84. France colonized southern Libya after the war and the United Kingdom colonized the northern part. France refused to withdraw from Libya until the conclusion of an agreement permitting it to take parts of Libya and annex them to what it used to call its French African territories.

85. The Laval-Mussolini treaty (Treaty of Rome) [*S/15649, annex VII*], in fact, was agreed to by the French Parliament, but, according to France, it became null because instruments of ratification were not exchanged, but the agreement between Ben Halim and France, to which the Libyan Parliament refused to agree—that agreement, they claim, is in force. Such is the logic that is being used.

86. Throughout the Ottoman period, and the Karamanli period before it, and throughout the Italian period, France—and I mention France because of French Equatorial Africa—had no sovereignty whatsoever over the Aouzou Strip.

87. I have plenty to say concerning the legal aspect and we have many documents to substantiate that. We can submit them, and we shall do so in order that they can be distributed as official documents of the Council. But we do not think that one of the tasks of the Council is to consider legal issues, or controversies over legal interpretations, or over agreements. Libya inherited its territory from Italian colonialism—it respects the territorial integrity of other countries—and it signed the Cairo convention. But I say that we paid an extremely high price for winning our freedom. We are not at all ready to give up that freedom or even one inch of our territory. Libya sacrificed more than 1 million martyrs—that is more than half the population of Libya—between 1911 and 1932. During that period, we were fighting Fascist Italian imperialism. If some are ready to sell their sovereignty to the previous colonizer and give him bases, as well as the economy of the country and other facilities, Libya will not belong to those. Furthermore, as the leader of our revolution mentioned in Benghazi in 1973, at a liberation movement conference, Libya considers its independence incomplete unless the rest of the African continent is liberated. Liberation here is not political liberation, because independence is not a flag; it is not a particular president, but independence in the full sense of the word.

88. A few days ago, while you, Sir, were presiding over the proceedings of the Council, scores of States made statements *vis-à-vis* the American imperialist intervention against Nicaragua. The whole world denounced that intervention. The whole world also denounced the American imperialist intervention against Libya. This is the role of the Security Council. The Council, I wish to stress, cannot be turned into a stage to be used by the big imperialist Powers at their whim. They reject its resolutions concerning Palestine, southern Lebanon and Namibia. They want to manipulate the Council as a tool to cause dissent among third-world countries and their neighbours.

89. We have lived with Chad for thousands of years and shall continue to do so. As the proverb says, you can divorce your wife, but you can never divorce your neighbour. We are closer to each other than we are to France, I believe; we are brothers, unless France is an African State. We in Africa will not be deceived by what has been stated by French imperialism: that Africa is divided into white Africa and black Africa. There are no blacks or whites in Africa; we are all Africans defending our cause. We are all brothers. We shall not allow the seeds of dissension to be sown among our ranks.

90. Certain people have been impelled under pressure to say certain things that I am not going to comment on, but before concluding I wish to repeat to the Council what President Omar Bongo of Gabon said at the most recent session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, held at Nairobi:

“Africa must thank Libya for what it has done in Chad. We have all failed to provide assistance to Chad, but Libya is the only African country that was able to do so. I call on you to thank Libya and for the continuation of the Libyan forces to help the people of Chad.”

91. Former OAU Chairman Siaka Stevens had this to say:

“We are proud of what Libya has done and of the help it has provided to a neighbouring country—Chad.”

92. Libya does not usurp the resources of Africa, neither manganese, nor uranium, not even phosphate. Libya provides support. One hundred companies that have Libyan capital work in Africa to help Africa for its benefit. That is our duty. Those who fish in troubled waters cannot succeed. We have to counter their designs.

93. In conclusion, I wish to express the gratitude of my country for the forces of good within and outside the Council that have realized the gravity of the conspiracy and of this scenario meant to divert Africa's attention. They are trying to divide the continent; they are trying to prevent the continent from meeting as one. They spoke as if they had succeeded in that attempt, but Africa, in the final analysis, will emerge victorious. The South African régime will come to an end. The economic colonization of Africa will come to an end. Uranium cannot continue to be turned into electricity to light the Elysée Palace and the Champs Elysées, while Africa is deprived of light, because Africa needs light and electricity.

94. I wish now to confirm that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya is always ready to co-operate fully with any African sister country to solve whatever dispute there may be between us, or between any two African countries. We shall never give up, even if we have to sacrifice the last Libyan in defence of our territory and our honour, whatever the result may be and whatever the reasons may be. We shall continue to support fraternal Chad within the framework of its legitimate Government, as recognized

by the OAU; we shall work towards achievement of unity and peace in Chad, and we shall maintain the best relations possible with the fraternal people of Chad, with whom Libya has many agreements of co-operation and for whom Libya sacrificed the blood of its sons in order to put an end to the civil war in Chad.

95. Thank you for your patience. I believe that you all, through an awareness of your responsibilities, have deprived the colonizers—both new and old—of an opportunity to use the Council as an instrument for their purposes and designs.

96. In the next few days the Council will be asked to take up the question of Israel's occupation of Arab territories, the killing of Arab women, the poisoning of Arab schoolgirls and the killing of children—a 17-year-old martyr was killed today. That is the responsibility of the Council. Colonialism, both old and new, wants to lead the Council into new mazes for the benefit of colonialism.

97. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of France, who has asked to speak in exercise of his right of reply.

98. Mr. LOUET (France) (*interpretation from French*): I shall try to be brief. First of all I should like to refer to a rather extraordinary sentence in the statement just made by Mr. Treiki. He told us—in fact he devoted about a third of his statement to presenting “Chad's view” [*para. 74*]. And that is what he shamelessly strove to do for 10 minutes.

99. Chad is seated at this table. It has just made a complaint against Libya, and Libya, without embarrassment, without shame, explains to us the supposedly true views of Chad, and, having done that, talks of colonialism's intervention in internal affairs. Well, Sir, you can be the judge of this, and I don't think I have much to add on this point.

100. The representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya referred to my statement of this morning [*2428th meeting*], in which I am supposed to have talked about conventions and historical responsibility. I do not think I said anything of the kind, and I very much regret that. I did not, and I should have, and I should like to thank him for having reminded me of my duty.

101. I was a little brief this morning in presenting the French view. With the Council's permission, I should like to expand a little on what I said this morning.

102. The basic principles upon which the solutions we desire should be based are those enunciated by the OAU on the inviolability of the frontiers that existed at the time of independence, respect for the territorial integrity of States and non-intervention in the internal affairs of another State.

103. In this case, there is a frontier dispute between Chad and Libya with regard to the Aouzou Strip. As far

as France is concerned, the situation with regard to the existing frontier between the two States at the time of the independence of Chad is very clear. The frontier between the two countries was indeed defined by a series of juridical acts. These were, successively, the Franco-British Declaration of 21 March 1899 and the Franco-British Convention of 8 September 1919, interpreting that declaration [*S/15649, annexes II and V*], and the exchange of letters between the French and Italian Governments of 17 December [*ibid., annex VIII*] and 25 December 1938. The Treaty of Friendship and Good-Neighbourliness between the French Republic and the United Kingdom of Libya of 10 August 1955 [*ibid., annex X*] refers to the frontier line governed by the Franco-British Convention of 8 September 1919. That frontier is precisely that which France bequeathed to Chad in 1960, at the time of its independence.

104. What I have just recalled is what the representative of France said on 17 February 1978, during informal consultations of the Council. I have done so to demonstrate to the Council, and to help Mr. Treiki understand, that France's position has not changed and that, whatever the circumstances, it remains absolutely unchanged. There is no reason for it to change and it has not changed.

105. Finally, I should like to make a third point. The representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has reminded us that it is not the role of the Council to deal with the juridical aspects of a problem. That did not prevent him from expatiating on the juridical arguments that support his case, and I have no complaint about that because I have just done exactly the same thing myself. But there is a juridical conflict between two countries. It seems to be a very clear-cut dispute; we have two letters, one from Chad and the other from Libya, which are very clear in this respect. Chad tells us that Libya has been "in military occupation of that part of Chad territory commonly known as the 'Aouzou Strip'," [*see S/15643*], and Libya states that the "Aouzou Sector is an integral part of Libyan territory" [*see S/15645*]. In circumstances such as these, it would appear that if Libya were really concerned to settle the clear-cut dispute existing between it and Chad it should, as it has done in other cases, take the matter to the International Court of Justice.

106. That was the purport of the appeal we addressed to the two delegations this morning, and which I now repeat.

107. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Chad, who has asked to speak in exercise of his right of reply.

108. Mr. BARMA (Chad) (*interpretation from French*): I really do not wish to exercise the right of reply regarding any particular statement made this morning or this afternoon in the Council, except to point out for the benefit of the representative of Benin that we have no lesson to learn from anyone in Africa—anyone, least of all the representative of Benin—with regard to legitimacy, for we all know how the present Benin régime

came to power. I should simply like to refer the representative of Benin to the extremely relevant developments mentioned with regard to the notion of legitimacy by my dear brother and colleague the representative of the Revolutionary People's Republic of Guinea.

109. We are well aware that Benin is unfortunately contributing to the destabilizing efforts undertaken by Libya against Chad, but we refuse to consider that aspect of the problem, which is very far from the real subject.

110. We agree with those who believe that the problem raised by Chad is of a juridical nature. Thus, we wonder why the Council should not shoulder its responsibilities and refer the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. Why is Libya frightened of going to the Court if it is so sure of its right, as indicated by the statement of its representative? He himself recognizes the Laval-Mussolini treaty [*S/15649, annex VII*] is void and he has other documents to be circulated as documents of the Council. After all, Chad has published its own documents for a week now.

111. I think that the members of the Council are not being taken in by this untruth. By its statement Libya showed that it is determined to perpetuate its military occupation of part of Chad's territory against all international rules.

112. I will let the Council be the judge, and I should like officially to draw the attention of the international community to the conduct of one of the States Members of the United Nations that is supposed to respect the purposes and principles of the Charter.

113. In these circumstances, there are two comments that must be made at the conclusion of this debate. First, everyone has unreservedly recognized that there does exist a frontier dispute between Chad and Libya, a dispute whose prolongation is liable to jeopardize peace in the region and, hence, international peace and security at large, whether or not the representative of Syria, who asserted that there was no dispute, likes it—and what proof he was basing himself on I do not know.

114. The statement of the representative of France, the former colonial Power, this morning [*2428th meeting*] is clear as to the ownership of what is known as the Aouzou Strip. It belongs to the Republic of Chad.

115. Secondly, all those who have spoken have appealed to the parties to the controversy to settle it by appropriate peaceful means, both bilaterally and regionally. This final comment should enable the Council more easily to understand the situation by tracing all the futile efforts that have been employed heretofore, both bilaterally and regionally, to find a peaceful solution to this distressing situation.

116. The Council will recall that in the course of his statement on 22 March, Mr. Idriss Miskine, Minister for

Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of Chad, stated the following:

"That is why, inspired by our desire to resolve the problem through peaceful channels, Chad is today addressing the Council in order to obtain its assistance in recovering its territorial integrity so that it may live in peace within the borders it inherited from colonization. It is requesting that Libya withdraw completely from the territory of Chad." [2419th meeting, para. 35.]

117. It was this determination to settle by peaceful means the problem of the military occupation of Tibesti by Libya that prompted Chad to seek a solution by both bilateral and regional means.

118. Bilaterally, what happened? In August 1974, Mr. Bruno Bohiadi, then Minister for Foreign Affairs of Chad, and Mr. Mahamat Yakouma, Secretary of State of the Presidency for Internal Affairs, met at Tripoli. During their stay in the Libyan capital, they met the Libyan Minister of Information and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister for Economic Affairs and the Prime Minister. In the course of their talks, the delegations of Chad and Libya referred to the problem of Libya's occupation of Tibesti.

119. The Libyan side stated that it was not the Libyan army but rather the Libyan police that was in Aouzou to ensure the security of the peoples of both countries.

120. The Chadian side asserted that there was no question that a military detachment was in Aouzou and that under no circumstances could Libya unilaterally carry out operations for the maintenance of order in that part of Chadian territory.

121. In the course of these talks, the Chadian delegation pointed out that the Libyan side showed a clear determination to minimize the problem of the occupation of Tibesti in favour of questions relating to economic co-operation between the two countries.

122. From 29 July to 5 August 1976, Colonel Mamari Djime Ngakinar, at that time Vice-President of the Higher Military Council and Minister of State for Internal Affairs, went to Tripoli at the head of a large delegation to discuss officially the problem of the occupation of Tibesti by Libya.

123. In the course of those discussions, the Libyan side stated that there was no frontier problem between the two neighbouring countries but that, if Chad considered that a problem did exist, it was prepared to discuss the matter. Libya produced two maps, including one in an Oxford atlas of 1956, dating from the time of the monarchy, which included the "Aouzou Strip" in Libyan territory. The Chad delegation objected to Libya's questioning of the border between the two countries and stated that Libya's claim was based only on the stillborn Laval-Mussolini treaty.

124. The Chad side proved that the exchange of instruments of ratification had not taken place and that, therefore, that treaty was legally non-existent. Libya maintained its position and went so far as to accuse Chad of harbouring annexationist claims on its territory.

125. The Libyan side declared that that was "an insult to the Libyan revolution" and accused Chad of ascribing imperialist designs to it. It stated that it would not tolerate such an insult and demanded a public retraction by Chad.

126. No compromise took place and it was agreed that a joint technical commission should be established to study the problem and propose solutions. As we shall see later, that commission met at N'Djamena. The two delegations went their separate ways without issuing a transcript or a communiqué. The Libyan delegation blocked the discussions because it did not want some of its statements to be recorded in a transcript that might bring out some of its contradictions.

127. The Joint Technical Commission established on the occasion of the mission of the Vice-President of the Higher Military Council to Tripoli met as scheduled from 23 to 27 June 1977 at N'Djamena. The Libyan delegation was headed by Mr. Ahmad Elatrach, Deputy Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the Secretariat of State for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation. There was only one item on the agenda of the Joint Technical Commission: "Search for ways and means of improving co-operation between Chad and Libya". In fact, the essential issue was the problem of the occupation of Tibesti by Libya.

128. The Libyan side immediately stated at the meetings that there was no frontier problem between Chad and Libya and that, even if there was, it would not prevent the implementation of co-operation agreements. It asserted that Libya's present borders were in conformity with international agreements, in particular the Laval-Mussolini treaty of 1935.

129. The Chad side argued that, although the Laval-Mussolini treaty had been signed by France and Italy, there had never been any exchange of instruments of ratification, so that the agreement had never existed legally. The legal non-existence of the 1935 treaty was particularly obvious from the fact that when, in 1955, France and the United Kingdom of Libya signed the Treaty of Friendship and Good-Neighbourliness [S/15649, annex X], they had not deemed it necessary to mention the Laval-Mussolini treaty in the list of international agreements relating to the frontiers between the territories of Tunisia, Algeria, French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa, of which Chad was an organic part before its accession to independence.

130. Paradoxically, the Libyan side stated that, between 1951 and 1969, Libya had not really been free and that, accordingly, all decisions had been imposed on it by colonialism.

131. Are we to understand by this that all international commitments contracted by Libya have been repudiated *en bloc*? In that case, the very fact that Libya belongs to the United Nations and to the OAU should be reconsidered.

132. In the face of the impasse reached in the negotiations at N'Djamena, Chad proposed a draft general agreement to govern all relations between the two countries. This was flatly rejected by Libya on the ground that that text had very wide political implications and that it preferred to refer it to the Tripoli authorities for instructions. Since those instructions never arrived, the two delegations parted, as on previous occasions, without drawing up minutes or issuing a communiqué.

133. As we pointed out before, the Libyan delegation has always refused to discuss frankly the substance of the problem, that is to say, the occupation of Tibesti, and in the course of the different meetings it always sought to minimize the problem of the frontier and has always clung to the idea of so-called co-operation with Chad. The positions of the two parties were therefore irreconcilable. That was what was done bilaterally.

134. Now let us take a look at what was done at the OAU level, since certain delegations have stated, either this morning or this afternoon, that the channels for negotiation, conciliation and mediation offered within the framework of the OAU have not been exhausted. What are the facts?

135. After the failure of the N'Djamena meeting, Chad decided to bring the matter before the fourteenth session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, held at Libreville in July 1977. On the initiative of Mr. Omar Bongo, President of the Gabonese Republic and at that time Chairman of the OAU, and *ad hoc* Committee of six members—Algeria, Gabon, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal and the United Republic of Cameroon—was established<sup>2</sup> to seek ways and means of solving this problem. The Committee, meeting at Libreville from 10 to 12 August 1977, without Libya, decided to adopt a recommendation, the gist of which is as follows.

136. The recommendation recalls, in its preamble, the relevant resolutions adopted by the OAU to facilitate the settlement of disputes between member States, in particular resolution AHG/Res.16 (I), adopted at the first session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, held at Cairo in July 1964 [*ibid.*, annex XII], which solemnly declares, *inter alia*, that "all member States pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence", and resolution AHG/Res.27 (II), adopted at the second session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, held at Accra in October 1965, in which the States members of the OAU solemnly undertake to act in conformity with article III of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity.<sup>3</sup> That article provides, *inter alia*, for the sovereign equality of all member States; non-interference in the internal affairs of States; respect for

the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence; and the peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration.

137. Paragraph 1 of the recommendation is of primary importance in that it reaffirms resolution AHG/Res.16 (I), adopted at Cairo on 21 July 1964, on the inviolability of the frontiers inherited from the colonial Powers and the fundamental principles of non-violation of sovereignty and respect for the territorial integrity of member States.

138. Paragraph 2 deals with the establishment of a sub-committee composed of jurists and cartographers to study the problem of the frontier between Chad and Libya in all its aspects. The Sub-Committee was to visit the capitals of the parties to the dispute and also to proceed to the region under dispute in order to evaluate the situation on the spot.

139. In paragraph 4 of the recommendation, the Committee appeals to Chad and Libya to refrain from taking any action liable to impede the achievement of a peaceful solution. In violation of that paragraph, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya refused, in mid-January 1978, to participate in the meeting of the expert Sub-Committee. The Sub-Committee was unable to carry out its work normally because the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya did not provide the OAU with any documentation in support of its claims to Tibesti, which it occupies by force of arms in flagrant violation of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity and the relevant OAU resolutions.

140. Similarly, as everyone knows, the Security Council had this matter before it in February 1978 [S/12553], and we know what happened to this complaint of Chad at that time.

141. We have tried to provide all this information to the Council so that we shall not be told later that Chad refused to negotiate under the auspices of the OAU or in any other way whatsoever. We have embarked on direct negotiations with Libya with no result. We submitted the problem to the fourteenth session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, held at Libreville in July 1977, and there was no result. We brought the matter before the Security Council in 1978 without any result.

142. That is why, in the face of the persistent tension between Chad and Libya born of the military occupation of Tibesti by Libya, tension which poses a grave threat to peace and security in Africa and in the world at large, Chad thought it necessary to address the Council, the organ responsible under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security, so that it can take the necessary measures to lessen tension in the region and recommend an appropriate solution to this dispute, the existence of which is today clearly established.

143. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to speak in exercise of his right of reply.

144. Mr. TREIKI (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (*interpretation from Arabic*): In view of the lateness of the hour, I will be brief. In the course of my statement, I asked the representative of France in the Council to answer my question: When the French troops arrived in southern Libya, was the Aouzou Strip part of Libya or part of French Africa, as it was called at that time?

145. I had a second question that I wished to put to the delegation of France, a permanent member of the Security Council and one of the founding Members of the United Nations. I agree that the frontiers inherited from the time of colonialism at the time of the achievement of independence should be respected. When Libya acceded to independence, happily in accordance with a United Nations resolution, and France being a Member was the Aouzou Strip part of Libya or not? I have here a United Nations map annexed to Libya's independence documents. But the representative of France was evasive concerning an answer to these two questions.

146. Chad has boundaries inherited from the time of colonialism and they should be respected. But Libya's boundaries, which also were inherited from the time of imperialism, should not be respected.

147. What would the representative of France say if one day we told him that Strasbourg was not part of French territory and that he would have to go before the International Court of Justice to prove that Strasbourg was a part of France? The French representative wants us to go before the Court to prove that today Aouzou, tomorrow Seubha, then Tripoli, and after that Benghazi are Libyan territories and that the Court, according to him, should issue an advisory opinion to that effect.

148. The representative of France said that I spoke on behalf of Chad; that is untrue. He sought to prove that France, by virtue of its responsibility, was acting with prudence. So I told him what the Chadians think of France, according to documents, conventions and agreements signed by Chadians, including Houssein Habré. This is Houssein Habré's signature on the document that I have in my hands.

149. As regards what the representative of the First Army said, I do not intend to answer him. I wish only to say the following. Most of what he said concerning what took place at the meetings is untrue, despite the fact that the dates are correct. We met with Chad to consider its claim that there was a problem with Libya. We are ready to meet again with a legitimate Government of Chad, but we will not meet with the representative of the First Army at all.

150. I wish to confirm the following. First, Aouzou is part and parcel of Libyan territory, in accordance with the United Nations resolution on the independence of Libya. We will never give up one inch of that territory, but we are fully prepared to develop the best relations with the fraternal people of Chad. Secondly, I emphasize—contrary to what the representative of Habré has said, and I am sorry to say it because that delegation does not represent any legitimacy at all in accordance with the relevant resolution of the OAU—that I did not say the Laval-Mussolini treaty was null but that it existed and will continue to exist. That was the clarification I wished to make before the Council.

151. The PRESIDENT: The representative of France has asked to be allowed to speak in exercise of the right of reply. I call on him.

152. Mr. LOUET (France) (*interpretation from French*): I do not wish to leave unanswered the two questions addressed to me by the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

153. I thought I had answered in my earlier statement by referring to the legal documents and conventions which, since the very origin of the frontiers, delimited the frontiers between Libya and Chad: the Franco-British Declaration of 21 March 1899; the Franco-British Convention of 8 September 1919; the Franco-Italian exchange of letters of 17 and 25 December 1938; and, finally, the Franco-Libyan Treaty of 10 August 1955 [*S/15649, annexes II, V, VIII and X*].

154. The reply to the question put to me is in the affirmative. Yes, the Aouzou Strip, at the time mentioned by my Libyan colleague, was a part of Chad. That is the French position. The Aouzou Strip has never been anything but a part of Chad.

155. I should like to add one last clarification: all the documents in my Government's possession in connection with the delimitation of this frontier were communicated not only to the Government of Chad but also to the Government of Libya, which is therefore fully aware of them.

156. The PRESIDENT: The representative of Benin has asked to be allowed to speak in exercise of the right of reply. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

157. Mr. SOGLO (Benin) (*interpretation from French*): The representative of Chad, my friend Mr. Barma, just referred to my country and said that it contributes to the destabilization carried out in Africa by Libya. He did not see fit to support that with facts. A wise man, it is said, says nothing that he cannot prove. My delegation categorically rejects this gratuitous accusation which is devoid of any foundation.

158. As will be recalled, after the Lagos accords, Benin was ready to send its sons to fight so that peace, harmony and reconciliation would be restored among the sons of the Chadian peoples and Benin's action throughout the long history of Chad never departed from the lines set out and decided on by the OAU as soon as the question came before it.

159. If that contributes to destabilizing Africa, if trying to achieve harmony for the people of Chad is contrib-

uting to the destabilization of Africa, then we are proud of that contribution.

*The meeting rose at 7.55 p.m.*

---

NOTE

<sup>1</sup> *The Holy Koran*, XXVI: 227.

<sup>2</sup> A/32/310, annex II, decision AHG/Dec.108 (XIV).

<sup>3</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 479, No. 6947.