

20 April 2001

Original: English

---

**Disarmament Commission**

**2001 substantive session**

9-27 April 2001

Agenda item 4

**Ways and Means to Achieve Nuclear Disarmament  
(Chairman's Working Paper)**

**I. General Overview: Importance of Nuclear Disarmament in  
International Peace and Security**

1. The end of the cold war has set an auspicious environment for nuclear disarmament. Progress has been made by the international community through efforts at all levels, including unilateral measures, and bilateral, regional and multilateral actions, agreements and arrangements aimed at the reduction of nuclear weapons.
2. Despite the achievements in the field of nuclear disarmament, the continued risk for humanity represented by the possibility that nuclear weapons could be used, whether accidental, unintentional or unauthorized, remains of great concern. The complete elimination of nuclear weapons and the realization of a nuclear-weapon-free world will remove forever the threat posed by these weapons.
3. Any use or threat of use of force would constitute a violation of the Charter of the United Nations. The Commission recalls the advisory opinion of July 1996 of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons which concluded that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.



4. Collective efforts are underway to define and structure global and regional security arrangements. All States share a common interest to intensify the concerted efforts to promote the total elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. These objectives have been reaffirmed in various fora, including the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, annual sessions of the General Assembly, and more recently by the Millennium Summit. In its Declaration, the Heads of State and Government resolved to strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons.

## II. **Inter-relationship between Nuclear Disarmament, International Peace, Security and Stability**

1. In the post cold war environment, disarmament and security related issues facing the international community cannot be solved separately and require a comprehensive approach, as well as the involvement of all States, nuclear and non-nuclear, big and small.
2. The nuclear disarmament process is closely intertwined with the international security situation. A peaceful, secure, stable international environment based on mutual trust is essential for the advancement of the nuclear disarmament process.
3. Maintaining the global strategic balance and stability constitutes the basis and precondition for progress in the nuclear disarmament process, thus the enhancement of international peace and security and the promotion of nuclear disarmament mutually complement and strengthen each other.
4. There is an interrelationship between nuclear disarmament and regional security. In this regard, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned constitutes an important contribution to the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, to the achievement of nuclear disarmament and to global efforts aimed at achieving the ultimate objective of eliminating nuclear weapons under strict and effective international control. The establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones should be regarded as a matter of priority for its inter-relation with nuclear disarmament and international peace and security.
5. The positive outcome of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States, in the final document of the Conference, to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI of the Treaty is recognized.

6. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) has been signed and ratified by an increasing number of countries, although thirteen more ratifications are needed for its entry into force.
7. The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty has contributed to ensuring strategic stability in the world as an important element for a stable and progressive development of the entire disarmament process.

### III. Achievements and Current Developments in Nuclear Disarmament

In the process of nuclear disarmament, whose pace has been accelerated in recent years, many tangible results have been achieved at various levels.

#### a. *Unilateral*

1. Significant progress has been made in reducing nuclear weapons through unilateral reduction measures taken by the nuclear-weapon States (China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America), including the close-down and dismantling of nuclear-weapon-related facilities. The nuclear-weapon States have declared that none of their nuclear weapons are targeted at any State.
2. The declared moratoria on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions continue to be observed pending entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
3. Efforts have been made to make nuclear disarmament measures irreversible, in particular, through the destruction of weapons and weapons systems, and the management and disposition of fissile material for their production.
4. Some States have taken an initiative to unconditionally forego the first-use of nuclear weapons and the use or threatening to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.
5. A unilateral declaration of nuclear-weapon-free status, taken into consideration existing specific conditions, was supported and welcomed. In the context of nuclear-weapon-free zones in general, the nuclear-weapon States through unilateral and multilateral instruments stated their support for such arrangements which are freely arrived at by the States of the regions concerned.

b. *Bilateral*

1. Significant reductions of missiles and their delivery systems have taken place within the framework of Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START I). All ballistic missile systems have been deactivated; both sides are in process of destroying missile launchers and bombers and the pace of reduction of deployed strategic nuclear warheads is well ahead of schedule.
2. Ratification of START II by the Russian Federation is an important step in the efforts to reduce strategic offensive weapons and is welcomed. Completion of ratification of START II by the United States remains a priority. Under START II, deployed strategic nuclear warheads will be reduced by 2/3 to 3000-3500. And once it enters into force, both sides will seek early deactivation of systems earmarked for elimination.
3. The Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of 26 May 1972 remains a cornerstone in maintaining global strategic stability and world peace and in promoting further strategic nuclear arms reductions. Continued efforts should be made to strengthen the Treaty and to preserve its integrity and validity.
4. Neither side is currently developing any new ICBMs or SLBMs.
5. All strategic systems presently deployed by the sides are deployed in passive mode, that is non-threatening and consistent with the declared intentions. The sides have put in place a system for notification of missile launches.
6. A number of measures as well as declarations by the United States and the Russian Federation cover the area of non-proliferation. Both sides agreed to permanently close 24 production reactors in both countries; US-Russia-IAEA Trilateral Initiative is addressing technical and legal measures for verifying that excess fissile material is never again used in nuclear weapons; the United States and the Russian Federation are close to concluding an agreement that will codify the principles for disposition of plutonium removed from nuclear weapons earmarked for destruction.
7. In September 1994, China and the Russian Federation committed themselves to non-targeting nuclear weapons at each other. In June 1998, China and the United States issued a joint declaration announcing the same arrangement between them.

c. *Regional*

1. Nuclear-weapon-free zones have ceased to be exceptional in the global strategic environment. To date, numerous States have signed or become parties to treaties establishing existing nuclear-weapon-free zones. With the addition of Antarctica, which was demilitarized

pursuant to the Antarctic Treaty, nuclear-weapon-free zones now cover more than 50 per cent of the Earth's land mass. The important contribution of nuclear-weapon-free zones to the strengthening of the international non-proliferation regime and to regional and world peace and security has been universally recognized.

2. The treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba continue to make contributions towards the achievement of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament objectives, particularly in the southern hemisphere and adjacent areas, and towards keeping the areas covered by those treaties free of nuclear weapons, in accordance with international law.
3. Several practical and urgent steps which are required to be taken by all parties directly concerned are called to be considered for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East. These steps include the solemn declaration that all countries will refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party, the agreement to place their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards and declaration of their support for the establishment of the zone and deposition of such declaration with the Security Council for consideration as appropriate.
4. The declared desire of all five States of the Central Asian region to finalize work on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia and the concrete steps that they had taken to that end to prepare the legal groundwork for the initiative and the progress that they had achieved in this regard are welcomed.

d. *Multilateral*

1. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was indefinitely extended at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This decision was taken together with Decision 1 on "Strengthening the review process for the Treaty" and Decision 2 on "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament".
2. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which was adopted by the General Assembly on 10 September 1996, was opened for signature in New York on 24 September 1996. The Treaty has been signed by 167 States and ratified by 76 States, including three nuclear-weapon States. Of the 44 States listed in Annex 2 to the

Treaty and required for entry into force, 31 States have deposited their instrument for ratification.

3. The 2000 NPT Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) adopted by consensus a Final Document on 19 May 2000, in which the Member States agreed on the practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Treaty. An unequivocal undertaking was made by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI of the Treaty.
4. A panel of governmental experts on missiles will convene in 2001 and 2002 to prepare a report on the issue of missiles in all its aspects.
5. In 2000, the five nuclear-weapon States issued a joint declaration announcing the non-targeting policy of nuclear weapons at any State.
6. The United Nations Millennium Declaration is welcomed, in which Heads of State and Government resolved to strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, and to keep all options open for achieving that aim, including the possibility of convening an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers.

**IV. Mechanisms Dealing with Nuclear Disarmament and Role of the United Nations:**

The United Nations being the only universal forum where all Member States can contribute to the process of disarmament supports and facilitates all efforts in that regard. In doing so, the United Nations has a central role in developing global principles of arms control and disarmament, including nuclear disarmament.

The role and responsibility of the United Nations in the field of disarmament in general and nuclear disarmament in particular are exercised through its institutional arrangements, which have been seized with the nuclear disarmament issues in accordance with their respective mandates.

a. *Mechanisms dealing with nuclear disarmament within the UN system;*

1. The General Assembly as a main deliberative organ has adopted many resolutions on the subject of nuclear disarmament and can promote and facilitate the achievement of concrete disarmament agreements in this field.
2. Special Sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament play an important role in promoting disarmament, peace, security, stability and non-proliferation. By seizing the opportunities of the present, preserving and building upon the achievements of the past and setting the future course of action in order to strengthen international peace and security, the Special Sessions devoted to disarmament play a unique role as a multilateral body in the field of disarmament.
3. The First Committee, as mandated by the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, deals exclusively with disarmament and related international security questions. Annually it discusses and takes actions on numerous resolutions and decisions on issues related to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.
4. Since its establishment in 1952, the Disarmament Commission as the specialized universal deliberating disarmament forum, has been giving valuable and practical recommendations to facilitate negotiations among States to enter into bilateral and multilateral treaties for arms control. It is a measure of the UNDC's effectiveness that in the past decade it produced five sets of guidelines on important areas, including two on nuclear issues.
5. The Department for Disarmament Affairs advises the Secretary-General on disarmament-related security matters; monitors and analyzes developments and trends in the field of disarmament; promotes the goal of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and supports the review and implementation of existing disarmament agreements; assists Member States in multilateral disarmament negotiation and deliberation activities towards the development of disarmament norms and the creation of agreements; promotes openness and transparency in military matters, verification, confidence-building measures, and regional approaches to disarmament.
6. The Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters advises the Secretary-General on matters within the area of arms limitation and disarmament. It has examined various aspects of studies and research on disarmament issues which have helped to facilitate the disarmament process, including nuclear disarmament.

7. The UN Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament provide technical servicing and substantive assistance on issues of nuclear disarmament amongst others, in order to promote transparency and confidence. They present a unique forum to the international community for discussion on regional aspects of security issues.
8. Studies conducted by the United Nations can be useful and instrumental to the more advanced consideration of various aspects of disarmament, including nuclear disarmament and to the achievement of a greater general awareness of the subject.
9. The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) was established to undertake forward-looking, sustained research and study activity by the United Nations in the field of disarmament, thus to promote informed participation by all States in disarmament efforts. On the occasion of the UNIDIR's twentieth anniversary, the Assembly reiterated the international community's need for access to independent and in-depth research on disarmament, in particular emerging problems and the foreseeable consequences of disarmament, and encouraged UNIDIR to continue its independent research on these issues.

*b. Mechanisms dealing with nuclear disarmament outside the UN system*

To further the process of nuclear disarmament, aiming at the total elimination of nuclear weapons, it would be necessary to continue to have recourse to all possible approaches as well as to all existing mechanisms, especially outside of the UN system.

1. The Conference on Disarmament, the only multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, has several nuclear disarmament related items on its agenda. During the past decade it has negotiated the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. However, during the last few years the Conference has not been able to make any progress in its work.
2. In addition to other important objectives and functions, in particular the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy throughout the world, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has a central role in the field of the implementation of comprehensive safeguards agreements signed by states in pursuit of their obligations under various legally binding instruments, including the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South



Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Roratonga) with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The importance of concluding the Model Additional Protocol is also emphasised.

3. The establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones constitutes an important contribution to the achievement of nuclear disarmament and to the global efforts aimed at achieving the ultimate objective of eliminating nuclear weapons under strict and effective international control, and thus the establishment of additional nuclear weapon-free zones should be regarded as a matter of priority for its inter-relation with nuclear disarmament and international peace and security.
4. The Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), an intergovernmental agency created by the Treaty of Tlatelolco has been successful in ensuring that the obligations of the Treaty are met and that participants strictly adhere to the Control System. In doing so it has promoted general and complete disarmament through the contribution to nuclear non-proliferation and the creation of mechanisms against receipt, storage, installation, deployment or any form of possession, directly or indirectly of nuclear weapons or nuclear devices by the parties thereof.
5. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty remains the cornerstone of nuclear non-proliferation regime and as such it should be observed in full and good faith. The full and effective implementation of the Treaty in all its aspects has a vital role in promoting international peace and security.
6. The Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO PrepCom), established by the General Assembly resolution in 1996, is mandated to establish a global verification regime envisaged in the Treaty, which consists of an International Monitoring System (IMS), a consultation and clarification process, on-site inspections and confidence-building measures. The Disarmament Commission takes note of an agreement to regulate the relationship between the United Nations and the CTBTO PrepCom signed on 26 May 2000.

## V. Ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament

In order to maintain and strengthen international peace and security, the international community needs to undertake practical steps leading to nuclear disarmament without delay and, in this regard, every effort should be made to ensure that all States are engaged in this process.

Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons  
[A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1]

Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament  
[A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1]

New Agenda Coalition [A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1]

General Assembly resolutions related to nuclear disarmament  
[A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1]

NPT and its review process [A/CN.10/2000/WG.I/WP.3 and 4,  
A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1]

Step-by-step approach to nuclear disarmament via START, FMCT and other steps, as described in the final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference [A/CN.10/2000/WG.I/WP.4, A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1]

An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties (of NPT) are committed under article VI (of NPT) [A/CN.10/2000/WG.I/WP.4,  
A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1]

Universal adherence to NPT [A/CN.10/2000/WG.I/WP.2 and 3,  
A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1]

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be observed in full and in good faith. Those countries, which have not yet acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, should do so without delay and without conditions, so as to make the treaty truly universal.  
[A/CN.10/2000/WG.I/WP.2]

Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control [A/CN.10/2000/WG.I/WP.3,  
A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1]

Regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by all States parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (C) of the 1995 decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996 [A/CN.10/2000/WG.I/WP.3, [A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1]

The conclusion of the signature and ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and its early entry into force in accordance with constitutional processes [A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.3]

Early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). [Japan, A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.2]

Strict observance of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty [A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.2]

The States which have not yet signed and ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty should do so as soon as possible, so as to promote the early entry into force of the Treaty according to its provisions. [A/CN.10/2000/WG.I/WP.2]

Moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions and any other nuclear explosions pending the entry into force of the CTBT. [A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1]

Immediate commencement of negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes or other nuclear explosive devices in the Conference on Disarmament with a view to their conclusion within five years. [Japan]

The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of Special Coordinator in 1995 and mandate contained therein, with a view to their conclusion within five years. [China, A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.2]

The Conference on Disarmament should without further delay establish ad hoc committees with appropriate mandates to undertake substantive negotiations for the elimination of nuclear weapons and related issues such as a fissile material cut-off treaty and negative security assurances. [A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.3]

The Conference on Disarmament to establish, on a priority basis, an ad hoc committee to deal with nuclear disarmament and to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament leading to the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. [[A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.2]

Establishment of a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament. [A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1]

Application of the principle of irreversibility to nuclear disarmament. [A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1]

The nuclear weapon States possessing the largest nuclear arsenals bear special responsibility for nuclear disarmament. They should continue to reduce drastically their respective nuclear arsenals on the principle of irreversibility. [A/CN.10/2000/WG.I/WP.2]

The importance of applying the principle of irreversibility to the process of nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures. [A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.2]

Early entry into force of START II and conclusion of START III, while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a corner stone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions. [Russian Federation]

Consolidation of the cessation of the nuclear arms race through the preservation of its achievements and founding principles (START, INF, ABM) [France]

Completion and implementation of the trilateral initiative between the Russian Federation, the United States of America and IAEA. [A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1]

Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States in unilateral reduction of their nuclear arsenals. [A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1]

Countries with the largest nuclear arsenals have to assume the initial responsibility for moving forward the reduction of nuclear weapons. They should revitalize unilateral and bilateral nuclear reduction processes, which should be further complemented by reductions within a multilateral framework. [A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.3]

The nuclear weapon States to stop immediately the qualitative improvement, development, production and stockpiling of nuclear warheads and their delivery systems. [A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.2]

The nuclear-weapon States to undertake the step-by-step reduction of the nuclear threat and to carry out effective nuclear disarmament measures with a view to the total elimination of these weapons. [A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.2]

The nuclear weapon States to commence plurilateral negotiations among themselves at an appropriate stage on further deep reductions of nuclear weapons as an effective measure of nuclear disarmament. [A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.2]

Increased transparency by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear weapons capabilities. [A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1]

Further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons (tactical nuclear weapons) and steps to formalize and put into effect previously agreed measures in this regard [European Union]

Elimination of all tactical nuclear weapons as part of a step-by-step, progressive effort to eliminate all nuclear weapons.

[A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.3]

Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems (de-alerting) (proposal to delete “(de-alerting)” — A/CN.10/2000/WG.I/WP.4) [A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1]

The nuclear-weapon States to de-alert and de-activate immediately their nuclear weapons and to take other concrete measures to further reduce the operational status of their nuclear weapons systems.

[A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.2]

We have put forward an initiative to create a Global Missile and Missile Technology Non-Proliferation System (GCS). [Russian Federation]

Missile Technology Control Regime.[ A/CN.10/2001/ WG.1/Wp.1]

Establishment of a panel of governmental experts on missile to prepare a report on the issue of missile in all its aspects [55/33 A, A/CN.10/2001/Wg.1/WP.1]

A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination. [A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1]

The role of nuclear weapons in security policies should be diminished so as to minimize the risk that those weapons will ever be used and facilitate the process of their total elimination. [A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.2]

Review of strategic postures and doctrines (no first use of nuclear weapons). [A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1]

All the nuclear-weapon States should renounce the nuclear deterrence policy based on the first use of nuclear weapons, undertake unconditionally not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and conclude an international legal instrument to such effect

[A/CN.10/2000/WG.I/WP.2]

The nuclear-weapon States, pending the achievement of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, to agree on an internationally and legally binding instrument on the joint undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and to conclude an internationally and legally binding instrument on security assurances of non-use and non-threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

[A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.2]

Reducing the salience of existing nuclear weapons by removing the first-use posture from security doctrines. A global no-first-use agreement should be reached, which would include a non-use agreement against non-nuclear-weapon States [A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.3]

GA resolution on “Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons”. [South Africa]

Engagement as soon as appropriate (A/CN.10/2000/WG.I/WP.3) of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons. [A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1]

Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place fissile material no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification. [A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1]

Stressing the importance of the conclusion of the Agency’s comprehensive safeguards agreements, and also the conclusion of the model additional protocol with IAEA. [A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1]

Further development of verification capabilities which will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world [A/CN.10/2000/WG.I/WP.3, [A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1]

Reducing the risk of unauthorized, accidental or unintentional use of nuclear weapons. [A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1]

Establishment of an ad hoc committee on security assurances in the Conference on Disarmament (multilateral legally binding instrument for negative security assurances). [A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1]

Establishment of an ad hoc group on prevention of an arms race in outer space in the Conference on Disarmament. [A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1]

Consolidation (support for A/CN.10/2000/WG.I/WP.4) of existing nuclear-weapon-free zones and establishment of such new zones. [A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1]

All the nuclear-weapon States should support the efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones, respect the status of those zones and assume the relevant obligations. [A/CN.10/2000/WG.I/WP.2]

The nuclear-weapon States to support, without conditions, the establishments of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned and accede to the protocol or protocols of all the current treaties of regional nuclear-weapon-free zones if they have not done so. [A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.2]

Secretary-General’s proposal on an international conference on eliminating nuclear dangers [General Assembly resolution 55/2, A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1, A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.3]

Proposal on an international conference on nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. [54/54 G, 53/77 Y, A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1]

Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. [A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1]

In accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (SSOD-I) and the guidelines laid down by the Disarmament Commission, encourage establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, by arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region. [A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.3]

Follow-up on the legal advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. [A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1]

Proposal for the establishment of a Global Missile and Missile Technologies Non-Proliferation Control System. [A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1]

Universal adherence to international norms and conventions in the area of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems [European Union]

Unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons by altering operational aspects of the weapons should be prevented. This step would be in keeping with a no-first-use posture. For this purpose, convene an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear danger proposed by the Secretary-General and endorsed by the Millennium Summit of the United Nations. [A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.3]

Commitment by the nuclear-weapon States not to deploy their nuclear weapons outside their national territories. [A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1]

Unconditional commitment by all the nuclear weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones and conclusion of a relevant international legal instrument-security assurances [A/CN.10/2000/WG.I/WP.2, A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1]

Nuclear-weapon States to undertake to withdraw all the nuclear weapons deployed outside their territories. The nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States concerned should forego the nuclear umbrella policy and the practice of nuclear-sharing [A/CN.10/2000/WG.I/WP.2, A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.1]

Those who possess nuclear weapons should commit themselves to not deploying them outside their own national territories. A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.3]

A convention on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons should be negotiated and concluded. [A/CN.10/2000/WG.I/WP.2]

The commencement of multilateral negotiations leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination. [A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.2]

In order to move beyond political commitments into the realm of a binding legal convention, as was done in the case of biological and chemical weapons, it is necessary to negotiate, in the Conference on Disarmament, a convention on the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. [A/CN.10/2001/WG.I/WP.3]

Initiative on energy supply for sustained development of mankind, radical solution of problems posed by proliferation of nuclear weapons, and global environmental improvement, envisioning, *inter alia*, international efforts under the aegis of the IAEA to consider the issues of the nuclear fuel cycle, in particular by examining innovative and proliferation-resistant nuclear technology [Russian Federation]

## VI. Conclusions and recommendations

To be issued later