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Fifty-fifth session

52nd plenary meeting

Monday, 6 November 2000, 10 a.m.
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Official Records

President: Mr. Holkeri (Finland)

In the absence of the President, Mr. Mungra (Suriname), Vice-President, took the Chair.

The meeting was called to order at 10 a.m.

Agenda item 3 (continued)

Credentials of representatives to the fifty-fifth session of the General Assembly

(b) Report of the Credentials Committee

First report of the Credentials Committee (A/55/537 and Corr.1)

The Acting President: The draft resolution recommended by the Credentials Committee in paragraph 13 of its first report (A/55/537) reads as follows:

“The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the Credentials Committee and the recommendation contained therein,

Approves the report of the Credentials Committee.”

We shall now take action on the recommendation of the Credentials Committee as set out in paragraph 13 of its first report.

I call on the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, who wishes to speak in explanation of vote or position before the Assembly takes action on the draft resolution.

Mr. Hamzehei (Islamic Republic of Iran): My delegation would like to express its reservations regarding those parts of the first report of the Credentials Committee (A/55/537 and Corr.1) that relate to the credentials of Israel. In line with the position of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on this issue, my delegation wishes to dissociate itself from the parts of the report that refer to the approval of the credentials of Israel.

The Acting President: The Credentials Committee adopted the draft resolution recommended in paragraph 13 of its report without a vote. May I take it that the General Assembly to do the same?

The draft resolution was adopted (resolution 55/16).

The Acting President: We have thus concluded this stage of our consideration of agenda item 3.

Agenda item 14

Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency

Note by the Secretary-General transmitting the report of the Agency (A/55/284 and Corr.1)

Draft resolution (A/55/L.25)

Amendment (A/55/L.26)

The Acting President: I invite the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei, to present the report of the Agency for the year 1999.

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of speeches delivered in the other languages. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room C-178. Corrections will be issued after the end of the session in a consolidated corrigendum.



Mr. ElBaradei (International Atomic Energy Agency): The Millennium Summit in early September focused the attention of the world on a number of objectives for the new millennium: the establishment of enduring world peace, the eradication of poverty, the fight against disease and the protection of the environment. In the efforts to realize these objectives, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) plays a modest but essential role. I will speak briefly today about the three fundamental functions of the Agency: our role as a catalyst for the development and transfer of peaceful nuclear technologies, our efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to move towards nuclear disarmament, and our work to build and maintain a global nuclear safety regime.

Nuclear technologies provide preferred solutions — and sometimes the only solutions — to many economic and social problems. The IAEA, in accordance with its statute, serves as a catalyst for the development and transfer of those technologies.

In 1999, nuclear power supplied roughly one sixth of global electricity. Trends vary by region: some countries are phasing out nuclear power plants, while others have embarked on new construction or innovative research and development. While the future of nuclear power remains uncertain, it is clear that certain factors will be crucial to that future: the safety of facility operations; the demonstrated feasibility of safe and environmentally sound radioactive-waste disposal; the ability to make nuclear power economically competitive; the growing need for environmentally clean sources of energy; and public acceptance. Projections of global energy demand, which take into account the development needs of developing countries and the predicted increase in population by two billion people over the next two decades, led the World Energy Council to conclude that a total reliance on fossil fuels and large hydroelectric facilities is not sustainable, and that the current position of nuclear power needs to be stabilized, with the possibility of future expansion.

In that context, the Agency's role is to help ensure that the nuclear power option remains open, a process that requires ensuring a fair hearing for nuclear power in the comparative energy assessment debate, preserving nuclear expertise as fewer young people pursue nuclear science careers and, above all, developing innovative reactor and fuel cycle technologies.

To be successful, innovative reactor and fuel cycle technologies must be inherently safe in terms of operation and waste disposal, proliferation resistant, cost effective and adaptable to different applications and energy needs. The Agency intends to establish a task force on innovative reactors later this year to assess the technology and energy demands of prospective users, consider existing efforts in this area and determine what additional research and development should be encouraged to meet the needs of member States. Naturally, we will work in close cooperation with other national and multinational initiatives in this area.

A major part of the Agency's nuclear technology activities are related to applications other than electricity generation. Agency-coordinated research projects supported by our research and service laboratories focus on the use of nuclear techniques and radioisotopes to, inter alia, increase food production, fight disease, manage water resources and protect the terrestrial and marine environments. In the food and agriculture area, for example, insect sterilization techniques have produced significant gains in livestock production and fruit production; radiation-induced mutations have been used to produce crops with greater yield and higher quality; and direct food irradiation has been employed to preserve freshness and eliminate disease-causing organisms.

With each year, new nuclear techniques related to human health are developed. This year the Agency's programme of assistance and coordination placed significant emphasis on the validation of new nuclear tools for diagnosing drug-resistant strains of malaria and tuberculosis. Other work was related to diagnostic procedures in support of medical applications ranging from paediatrics to cardiology and the use of stable isotopes in malnutrition studies to track the intake of vitamins and other nutrients.

The management of water resources is an area of increasing worldwide concern. Today, more than one billion people are without access to clean water, and about two thirds of the global community will face clean water shortages by 2025. In addition to projects on desalination techniques, the Agency has supported extensive member State use of isotope hydrology to plot groundwater aquifers for sustainable water resource management. We also have begun to support member States' exploration of the use of advanced

electron-beam accelerators to decontaminate and disinfect waste water and drinking water.

Other Agency projects focus on an array of environmental analysis and clean-up techniques. For example, the use of ionizing radiation to clean flue gases from coal-fired plants — a technology catalysed by the Agency — is now being demonstrated or under development in Bulgaria, China, Japan and Poland. Another important recent initiative is the Agency's coordination of efforts to develop nuclear techniques for the detection of anti-personnel landmines, which continue to maim civilians in regions where conflict took place in the past.

In each of these areas of nuclear application, the Agency seeks to promote the development and application of techniques that serve the priorities of its member States, with a focus on the special needs of developing countries. Where nuclear technology is the most effective means of addressing a given problem, and where the recipient country has the necessary infrastructure, the Agency ensures that the technology is transferred safely and efficiently. In 1999, our technical cooperation programme amounted to approximately \$64 million, with more than 850 projects. The IAEA annual report for 1999, which the Assembly has before it, provides a more detailed discussion of these and other Agency achievements.

The Agency's safeguards system is designed to provide assurance that nuclear material and facilities are used exclusively for peaceful purposes. In recent years, we have strengthened our safeguards capabilities to enable us to provide assurances not only that declared nuclear material has not been diverted for non-peaceful purposes, but, equally importantly, that no undeclared nuclear material or activities exist. This comprehensive assurance, however, can be provided only for States that have in force both a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency and the complementary additional protocol. The Agency is also currently developing "integrated safeguards" — the optimum combination of traditional safeguards measures with those of the additional protocol to ensure a system that is cost-efficient while achieving a high degree of effectiveness.

Earlier this year, the sixth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was convened here in New York. The Final Document of the Conference

recognized IAEA safeguards as an essential component of the non-proliferation regime, and endorsed the strengthened safeguards measures of the additional protocol. However, the same document noted that 51 States parties to the Treaty have yet to bring comprehensive safeguards agreements into force. The additional protocol numbers are similarly disappointing: the 11 States that had additional protocols approved in the past year bring the total to 55, but so far only 17 of these have entered into force. I appeal to all States that have not done so to conclude and bring into force their respective comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols.

Since December 1998, the Agency has been unable to implement its mandate in Iraq under United Nations Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and related resolutions. As a result, we cannot at present provide any assurance that Iraq is in compliance with its obligations under those resolutions. In January of this year, with the cooperation of the Iraqi authorities, we carried out an inspection under Iraq's NPT safeguards agreement. Our inspectors were able to verify the presence of nuclear material under safeguards in Iraq. To be sure, this inspection was not designed to be, nor could it serve as a substitute for, the monitoring and verification activities mandated under the Security Council resolution. The Agency must return to Iraq if we are to provide the enhanced assurances sought by the Security Council. We continue to maintain an operational plan and capability that would allow us to resume our activities at short notice. Provided that we could verify that Iraq's past and present nuclear activities have not changed since December 1998, the Agency could move forward to a full implementation of its ongoing monitoring and verification plan.

The Agency also remains unable to verify that all nuclear material subject to safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has been declared. Fully assessing the accuracy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's initial safeguards declaration will require a series of Agency activities to be undertaken with the full cooperation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Given that the entire verification process may take between three and four years, those activities should begin immediately, if the light water reactor project provided for in the Framework Agreement between the United States of America and the Democratic People's

Republic of Korea is to proceed as scheduled. With the recent positive developments in the Korean peninsula, it is my hope that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will soon be ready to commence active cooperation with the Agency to that end. The normalization of relations between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Agency would also help us to provide important safety advice and expertise related to the light water reactor project.

In keeping with the General Conference mandate, I have continued my consultations with the States of the Middle East region regarding the application of full-scope safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East, and the development of model agreements that would contribute to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region. Regrettably, little progress has been achieved so far. Needless to say, I will continue to use all available means within my authority to move that mandate forward. Movement towards an overall settlement in the region will certainly boost my ability to make progress. At this year's General Conference, I was asked to make arrangements to convene a forum in which participants from the Middle East and other interested parties could meet to learn from the experience of other regions, including in the area of confidence-building relevant to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

The Agency secretariat continues to consult with the Russian Federation and the United States of America on methods of verifying nuclear materials excess to their military programmes. These verifications must be sufficient to assure the international community that the material has been irreversibly removed from military application. In September, the United States of America and Russia also signed a bilateral plutonium management and disposition agreement. This new agreement commits each party to the withdrawal of 34 tons of weapons-grade plutonium from its weapons programme and to early consultations aimed at concluding an agreement with the IAEA to allow Agency verification measures. I welcome this agreement as a further step towards nuclear arms control.

The third major area of Agency activity is safety — nuclear safety, radiation safety and waste safety. While safety is a national responsibility, international cooperation on safety-related matters has proved to be indispensable. The continuing positive results of international collaboration leading towards

safety upgrades at nuclear installations in Eastern Europe is an important case in point.

The international safety regime consists of three major components: international conventions, a body of internationally agreed safety standards and mechanisms for applying these standards. Conventions in the safety area aim to establish binding norms that cover activities across the entire fuel cycle. To date, the Agency has developed conventions that cover the safety of power reactors, radioactive waste and spent fuel management, early notification and assistance in case of a nuclear accident and physical security. The Agency continues to identify areas in which binding norms are needed, such as in the safety of research reactors and of fuel cycle facilities.

The Agency has also made significant progress in the past several years on updating its body of safety standards; nearly 80 new or revised standards will be produced in total. To be effective, these standards must be comprehensive, internationally agreed upon and subject to regular peer review. In my view, once agreed upon, these standards must be uniformly applied by all States, as is the case in the aviation field, which is under the auspices of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).

Agency safety services, such as our operational reactor safety assessments, design reviews and regulatory reviews, also continue to make a significant contribution to promoting a global nuclear safety culture through peer review and information exchange.

The Agency also continues to focus international attention on the threats to public health arising from so-called orphan radioactive sources — that is, sources that are no longer under the control of national authorities. In the past year, assistance was provided to several Member States. Regrettably, five people died during this same period in Thailand and Egypt as the result of accidents involving radiation sources. We have worked extensively to strengthen the ability of Member States to respond to such emergencies, focusing on infrastructure upgrades, the development of national registries of radioactive sources, and the enhancement of regulatory structures. In addition, we have intensified education, training, and information exchange among regulators, users and manufacturers, and we recently circulated to all States and relevant international organizations a Code of Conduct on the

Safety and Security of Radiation Sources and Radioactive Materials.

But perhaps one of the most pivotal issues in the current debate over nuclear technology is the safety of managing spent fuel and radioactive waste. While experts are confident that geological disposal is safe, technologically feasible and environmentally responsible, the public at large remains skeptical, and the volume of high-level waste continues to build. A number of countries are engaged in geological disposal projects. Research is also active on waste disposal methods that are reversible, to allow retrieval of the waste at a later date, if desired. Researchers are also focusing on waste transmutation and other techniques to reduce the activity or volume of long-lived waste. The Agency continues to maintain international focus on the waste issue in order to accelerate progress towards demonstrated solutions and to bridge the gap in perception between technical experts and the public at large.

The foregoing review of portions of the Agency's programme makes it clear that the scope of IAEA activities continues to grow — whether that growth is occasioned by a new assignment for verification of nuclear arms control measures, a request by a developing country for help with water resource management, or the need for safety assistance at a fuel cycle facility. But in a continuing environment of zero real growth budget, which the Agency has adhered to for over a decade, some of these priority demands cannot be accommodated, or can be accommodated only through an increasing and excessive reliance on extra-budgetary resources — a reliance which has a negative impact on our ability to implement our programmes with the expected effectiveness and efficiency.

I should also mention that the Agency is finding it increasingly difficult to recruit and keep qualified staff. Given our need for highly specialized technical personnel and the limited pool of resources, recruitment and retention is especially problematic for scientific staff, as well as in fields such as information technology. This situation will only continue to intensify as United Nations salaries and conditions of employment continue to lose their competitiveness with the private and public sectors.

The Common Service must become more flexible in order to respond to the needs of its organizations and

support their reform efforts in human resources management. In that respect, the proposal by the Secretary-General, on behalf of all heads of United Nations system organizations, for a review of the International Civil Service Commission deserves serious consideration, with the ultimate aim of strengthening the international civil service and restoring the competitiveness of the Common System.

We have continued to look for ways to meet the growing demands on Agency resources. We are using a five-year medium-term strategy to improve the planning, implementation and evaluation of our activities. Our new results-based approach to programming and budgeting focuses more on outcomes — the real changes produced for our Member States — than on outputs, such as the number of meetings or publications, to ensure a more rigorous prioritization. An emphasis on a “one-house” approach to all our activities ensures better coordination of our diverse programmes, better use of our resources and a more streamlined secretariat structure.

In conclusion, let me say that the IAEA continues to play a key role in ensuring that the benefits of nuclear technology are shared globally, that peaceful nuclear activities are conducted safely, and that the international community is provided with a credible framework for curbing nuclear-weapon proliferation and moving towards nuclear disarmament. Naturally, our ability to continue to carry out these functions effectively depends on Members' political commitment and financial support, which I hope and trust will continue to be forthcoming.

Finally, I would like to conclude by expressing my sincere appreciation to the Government of Austria, which continues to be a generous and gracious host to the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The Acting President: I give the floor to the representative of Nigeria to introduce draft resolution A/55/L.25.

Mr. Mbanefo (Nigeria): Allow me at the outset to express appreciation to the Director General for his comprehensive report on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It is noteworthy that under his leadership, the Agency has continued to fulfil its three major mandates, namely to serve as a catalyst for the development and transfer of technology, a recognized authority in nuclear safety, and an instrument for the verification of nuclear non-proliferation.

I am particularly delighted to note that these efforts have served in large measure to meet humanity's global objectives of freedom from fear and freedom from want — the major challenges facing it. In this connection, I also note with satisfaction the confidence placed in the Agency in the Final Document of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which reaffirmed its contribution to sustainable development, non-proliferation and safety.

Nigeria attaches great importance to the objectives of the Agency and has demonstrated on several occasions its political commitment and support for international peace and security and global non-proliferation efforts, especially those directed at curbing the spread of nuclear weapons and all forms of weapons of mass destruction. These objectives informed its decision to become a member of the Agency in 1964. Nigeria is therefore most honoured to introduce, in its capacity as Chairman of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), draft resolution A/55/L.25, on the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The draft resolution before us is a reflection of the important issues raised earlier in the report presented by the Director General and the relevant resolutions adopted mainly by consensus at the forty-fourth session of the General Conference of the IAEA. I should therefore like to briefly highlight the main contents of this draft.

The text has 18 preambular paragraphs and 14 operative paragraphs and reiterates the importance that Member States attach to the agreement reached on the amendment of article VI of the statute. It seeks expansion of the membership of the Board of Governors from 35 to 43 members. Draft resolution A/55/L.25 dedicates an operative paragraph to encouraging all States members of the IAEA that have not yet ratified this amendment to do so. Similarly, a paragraph is devoted to the amendment of Article XIV.A of the statute, which provides for biennial budgeting by the Agency and urges those Member States that have yet to ratify this amendment to do so.

The draft draws attention to the increasing relevance of the non-proliferation regime; to the safeguards agreements, especially as they have a direct bearing on verification and confidence-building in general; and, particularly, to the need for the Agency to

maintain and strengthen the effectiveness and cost-efficiency of the integrated safeguards system, in conformity with the statute of the Agency. It further stresses the importance of the Model Additional Protocol approved on 15 May 1997.

The draft resolution also reiterates the concern of the international community in the field of nuclear energy with regard to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Iraq. It expresses concern about the Agency's inability to verify the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration of nuclear material by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and, therefore, about the inability to conclude that there has been no diversion of nuclear material in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It calls upon that country to fully comply with its safeguards agreement with the Agency. With regard to inspections in Iraq, the text stresses the need for full implementation of all Security Council resolutions and for providing the necessary access to enable the Agency to carry out its mandate.

Attention is also drawn to the entry into force on 24 October 1996 of the Convention on Nuclear Safety and notes with satisfaction the outcome of the first review meeting of the contracting parties to the Convention. It looks forward to safety improvements in areas that are found deficient. With respect to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, it appeals to States that have not yet become parties to do so.

The draft resolution under consideration is a product of strenuous work. The consensus was reached after consideration of many proposals made by different delegations in Vienna. In this regard, Nigeria has taken cognizance of the genuine contributions of all delegations, which facilitated the achievement of this transparent and balanced text. Undoubtedly it is a factual and accurate representation of the main issues dealt with by the Agency during the period under review. At this juncture, let me express appreciation to the sponsors of this draft resolution and particularly to the two Vice-Chairmen of the Board of Governors, Austria and Poland.

I would equally like to express our appreciation for the support and cooperation received in Vienna and here in New York from the secretariats of the

International Atomic Energy Agency and of the United Nations.

The Acting President: I now give the floor to the representative of Egypt to introduce the amendment to draft resolution A/55/L.25, contained in document A/55/L.26.

Mr. Aboulgheit (Egypt) (*spoke in Arabic*): I would like at the outset to express warm thanks to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei, for his excellent presentation of the annual report of the Agency for 1999. It also gives me great pleasure to congratulate him on his distinct contribution to the development of the programmes and activities of the Agency during the past three years. This contribution has been reflected in the increasing role played by the Agency in the peaceful applications of nuclear energy in various fields in the service of humanity, and in improving the relevant infrastructure.

The delegation of Egypt presented to the forty-fourth session of the General Conference of the IAEA a comprehensive review of all the fields in which it is cooperating with the Agency and of the role that we are trying to play at both the regional and international levels within the framework of the Agency's own role and programmes. From this perspective I would like to address a number of topics to which Egypt attaches particular importance.

The Agency is playing a prominent role in drawing up technical criteria to ensure the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and in contributing to technical cooperation programmes that promote the use of nuclear technology in a number of countries. This, however, should not lead us to ignore another important aspect of the Agency's work, which stems from its responsibility as one of the main pillars of the non-proliferation regime.

Egypt attaches great importance to the attainment of the objectives of non-proliferation and to ensuring nuclear disarmament all over the world. We think that in order to achieve progress in this respect, particularly in the Middle East region, this issue should be considered on an urgent basis, because of its potential positive impact on stability in the region as a whole. Within the framework of these efforts, Egypt has sought since 1974 to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Since 1980 the General Assembly has made an appeal for the creation of such a

zone under a series of resolutions adopted by consensus.

In response to this unanimous show of support by the international community for the establishment of such a zone, in April 1990 President Mohamed Hosni Mubarak called for the establishment of a Middle East zone free from all weapons of mass destruction. This initiative was an extension and a natural development of Egypt's constant call for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

In support of these efforts, and because of the importance of this subject, Egypt, through the IAEA, has called year after year for the comprehensive safeguards system of the Agency to be applied to all nuclear facilities in the Middle East. These efforts and appeals are not simply an Egyptian or an Arab demand; they are an international endeavour in which all other countries, regardless of their various alliances and orientations, join us. The international community expressed its position through the consensus adoption of the Final Document of the Sixth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which was held in 2000.

The document welcomed the admission of all countries of the Middle East, except for Israel, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It stressed the importance of Israel's adherence to the Treaty and of subjecting all its nuclear facilities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)'s comprehensive safeguards in order to attain the ideal objective, that of ensuring universal adherence to this Treaty in the Middle East.

Thus, last week, the First Committee adopted a resolution under item 76 concerning the danger of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. The resolution was adopted by a majority of 139 votes; operative paragraph 2 stressed the importance of Israel's adherence to the NPT. It mentioned Israel by name and called upon that country to subject its nuclear facilities to the IAEA comprehensive safeguards system. I would like to point out that my statement does not represent an attack on Israel; nor is it a criticism, although Israel imagines it as such and reiterates that view in its statements before the international body; rather, it is a call for a comprehensive and lasting peace based on firm foundations. We think that it is high time for Israel to act positively in this connection and to respond to the international will by joining the NPT and by

subjecting its nuclear facilities to the comprehensive safeguards system of the Agency. It should also give up its old-fashioned doctrine of deterrence.

Nonetheless, Egypt will enthusiastically continue to work towards ensuring the application of the IAEA's comprehensive safeguards in the Middle East, without exception. We support all efforts aimed at strengthening the safeguards system, because it is the main international mechanism for verification. The IAEA is working to develop and support the safeguards system through the adoption in May 1997 of an additional model protocol for the safeguards agreements — I mean the 93 + 2 system — which Egypt supports — a system which provides the necessary legal basis for developing the Agency's ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities and nuclear materials. We think that the Agency plays an important role in urging countries to sign and implement the comprehensive safeguards agreements in accordance with article III, paragraph 1 of the Treaty, which is the basis for ensuring that the Agency verify that nuclear materials are not diverted from their declared activities. Moreover, this is the gist of the IAEA's verification activities, carried out in accordance with the non-proliferation regime.

I would like to reaffirm that any renunciation of our responsibilities or our commitment to apply the comprehensive safeguards system will have negative and dangerous consequences on the credibility of the safeguards system as a whole and the pioneering role played by the Agency in this respect.

Therefore, the Egyptian delegation has introduced an amendment to operative paragraph 5 of the draft resolution concerning the report of the IAEA, contained in document A/55/L.26. Our amendment stresses the integrated role played by the Agency in carrying out safeguards activities and the importance of the comprehensive safeguards system, to say nothing about the additional protocols concerning those safeguards.

Mr. Albin (Mexico) (*spoke in Spanish*): The Mexican delegation wishes to express its thanks to the Director General, Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei, for his introduction of the report on the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for 1999.

Mexico wishes to state its satisfaction with the positive results of the Sixth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

(NPT) carried out this year. There can be no doubt that the adoption by consensus of the final document by the States Parties to the Treaty is one of the outstanding events in the field of disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. Of particular importance for the international community is the unambiguous commitment of the nuclear-weapons States to eliminate totally their nuclear arsenals, with a view to achieving nuclear disarmament.

Bearing in mind that one of the International Atomic Energy Agency's main functions is the application of verification measures on nuclear materials and equipment, the fulfilment of this commitment is of particular importance. Our satisfaction with the success of the NPT Review Conference also extends to our recognition of the important role played by the International Atomic Energy Agency in the application of safeguards, non-proliferation, technical cooperation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Mexico will continue to support this work of the Agency in those sectors.

The improved fulfilment of the verification responsibilities that the international community has entrusted to the IAEA requires a strengthened safeguards system. Mexico is satisfied at the increasing number of countries which have acceded to the Model Additional Protocol to the Agreements between States and the IAEA for the application of safeguards. At present, Mexico is carrying out an internal consultation process to facilitate a decision on our country's accession to the Model Additional Protocol.

Last year saw an increase in the cooperation links between Mexico and the Agency. Under the project entitled "Improvement of Radioactive Waste Management", Mexico's nuclear sector, headed by the Energy Ministry, has begun to formulate a national radioactive waste policy that meets the current needs of the sector and Mexico's international commitments. With IAEA support, Mexico's national nuclear research institute is carrying out work to rehabilitate the site currently occupied by the radioactive waste storage centre. This is a priority activity of the national nuclear sector.

With regard to regional cooperation activities, Mexico has reaffirmed its commitment to collaborate with Latin America by being the first country of the region to ratify the Regional Cooperative Arrangements for the Promotion of Nuclear Science

and Technology in Latin America (ARCAL). We express our satisfaction at the support given by the IAEA to this programme. We are convinced that the implementation of regional cooperation agreements will work to the benefit of the Agency's general objectives. We urge the other States members of this mechanism to ratify the Agreement and to apply, within this framework, the criteria that have been proposed by the Agency's Board of Governors as part of the IAEA's new technical cooperation strategy.

In the area of nuclear safety, we look forward to renewed efforts by States to promote a universal culture of nuclear safety to include the promotion of binding legal instruments and safety standards and measures to apply these instruments and standards. We encourage all interested countries to work for a framework of understanding to ease the concerns of States that find their national security affected by the passage of ships carrying radioactive nuclear waste. Although work has begun in this field, much ground remains to be covered.

In conclusion, my delegation expresses its gratitude to the Director General and secretariat of the IAEA for their efforts to comply fully with the mandates entrusted to them by the States members of the Agency. We are aware that the success of their work depends, in addition to the political support of States, on adequate financing. In this connection, we encourage all States to meet their financial commitments to the Agency on time.

Mr. Bossière (France) (*spoke in French*): I have the honour to address the Assembly on behalf of the European Union. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe associated with the European Union — the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia — and the associated countries Cyprus and Turkey, as well as Liechtenstein and Norway in their capacity as countries of the European Free Trade Association members of the European Economic Space, join in this statement..

At the outset, on behalf of the European Union, I wish to congratulate the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei, for his work over the past year. The Union has leant its full support to initiatives to enhance the effectiveness of the Agency, with regard both to its programmes and activities and to its management.

The European Union supports the work of the Agency, undertaken in accordance with the resolution adopted at the forty-second session of its General Conference, to prepare a system of integrated safeguards. We pay tribute to the desire of the Director General to complete the necessary conceptual framework for the implementation of this programme by the year 2001. This system is designed to avoid redundancy and useless overlap in measures provided for in the traditional guarantees and in those of the enhanced system. It should allow the yield and effectiveness of these safeguards to be improved, while reducing the costs to the Agency through the progressive spread of these enhancement measures in States parties.

In this connection, we emphasize that new measures are not merely additional steps to be applied in a mechanical and systematic manner. We welcome the efforts of the secretariat to identify effectiveness in the context of budgetary neutrality, as well as the possibilities for a reduced volume of routine inspections from which States that have signed and satisfactorily implemented the Additional Protocol should eventually benefit.

The European Union attaches great importance to respect for the agreements entered into under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It continues to be concerned by the fact that, despite efforts undertaken by the IAEA, practically no progress has been made since 1994 to implement the Agency's safeguards Agreement with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in particular with regard to verification of the initial declaration. Once again, the European Union urges to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea fully to respect its safeguards Agreement and to cooperate with the Director General as soon as possible. I should also like to express the hope that recent developments in relations between the two countries of the Korean peninsula will also help to resolve such issues.

The situation in Iraq is also a matter of concern to the European Union, since, over nine months after the adoption of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999) of 17 December 1999, monitoring has yet to resume in Iraq. We call on Iraq fully to cooperate with the new Commission and with the IAEA. We insist that Iraq comply fully with all Security Council resolutions that concern it; at the appropriate time, provide the IAEA with the access necessary to enable the Agency to

implement its mandate, which was reconfirmed in resolution 1284 (1999); and give unreserved cooperation to the Agency with a view to updating a technically coherent picture of its clandestine nuclear programme, as prepared in 1998. Although a routine inspection in January made it possible effectively to monitor the physical inventory of nuclear material, in accordance with the safeguards Agreement signed by Iraq under the NPT, such monitoring cannot replace the activities to be undertaken by the Agency pursuant to the relevant Security Council resolutions.

The European Union is gratified that the IAEA has used this time to maintain its capacity to resume inspections. Moreover, we welcome the work of Mr. Hans Blix at the head of the new Commission and will lend him our full support in implementing all provisions of resolution 1284 (1999).

Improved control of the risks of proliferation is essential to the maintenance of international peace and security. Meeting the requirements of non-proliferation and security, as well as those of nuclear safety, will contribute to establishing the climate of confidence that is necessary to develop the peaceful uses of the atom. Safety must be a constant concern and continually improved in all areas. One cannot emphasize enough the sole responsibility of States engaged in nuclear activities of any kind to their own population, their neighbours and the international community.

The European Union would also like to emphasize the importance of the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. The regular holding of review meetings by the contracting parties supports a more evenly shared culture of safety throughout the world. We wish to ask all States to ensure that they ratify these Conventions and to speed up the entry into force of the Joint Convention. With regard to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, we await with interest the report of the second review meeting in the hope that improvements will be made in the area of safety, particularly in all domains where the first review meeting noted that such improvements could be made.

It remains necessary to make an effort to ensure that safety reaches internationally acceptable levels in all nuclear installations. To achieve this, cooperation on the part of all is necessary. The European Union

also welcomes the key role that the Agency plays in this crucial area by providing States with support for national regulations, information and necessary assistance to States that so request. Moreover, the publishing of documents — the Safety Series — makes it possible for there to be more cohesive and stricter practices. In particular, the Operational Safety Review Team (OSART), the International Regulatory Review Team (IRRT) and the Integrated Safety Assessment of Research Reactors (INSARR) are making important contributions in this area.

The European Union would particularly like to reiterate to the Agency its support for its activities in the area of radiation source safety and the security of radioactive material. A code of good practices would be a good idea in order to rectify the lacks in this area, in which major shortcomings in the management of sources have resulted in serious radiological accidents. This past May and June the Agency carried out a wide-ranging air reconnaissance operation in order to find radioactive sources that had been abandoned in the Republic of Georgia.

Since its establishment, the Agency's mission has been to provide assistance and aid to member States for the development of peaceful applications of nuclear energy, the third pillar of the Agency's role. The Review Conference of the Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty also clearly acknowledges the importance of the work of the IAEA as the principal international organization relating to the transfer of technology. As with all other activities of the Agency, this depends upon economic situations and the resultant budget constraints. It must be conducted rigorously, guided by the constant concern for maximum effectiveness and considered more as a sort of catalysing element than as a permanent form of subsidy.

The European Union has had numerous opportunities to support the efforts of the Agency, particularly under the guidance of the Agency's Director General, Mr. ElBaradei, to eliminate any laxity in managing technical cooperation. We firmly believe, however, that the IAEA cannot act in isolation. The simultaneous commitment of recipient States is of paramount importance, both in the financial area and in follow-up. In this respect, we fully support the concept of model projects and their implementation. The European Union appreciates, in particular, the attention that the IAEA has given to the establishment, in those

countries that receive technical cooperation, when necessary, of legislation and rigorous regulation in the area of radiation protection and safety, as well as of authorities that can ensure that such legislation is respected.

We also welcome the drawing up of measures to reinforce technical cooperation within the context of the overall economic activities of recipient countries and their congruity with the guidelines adopted in the sectors to which it is connected. The European Union also recommends the regular review of how a project has been carried out and an assessment of its results.

The high level of voluntary contributions from member States of the European Union to the Technical Cooperation Fund, which in 1999 reached approximately 40 per cent of the pledges collected, shows the vigorous support that the European Union gives to the Technical Cooperation Programme.

The European Union will continue to fully cooperate with its partners to achieve the goals of the Technical Cooperation Fund. It considers that the technical assistance provided by the Agency should be fully brought in line with national development programmes and that it is up to the recipient States to ensure this. Moreover, the recipient countries must make a significant contribution in order to demonstrate the importance that the States themselves attach to these projects. We note with regret that the Programme's recoverable expenditures were largely underpaid last year and call upon all recipient States to meet their financial obligations and repay their loans fully and on time. The European Union also believes that it is in the interest of recipient States and of the Agency to ensure good coordination between activities of technical cooperation of the Agency and those of other organizations, with a view to ensuring synergy and avoiding overlap.

My statement has highlighted the diversity and the richness of Agency activities. Moreover, we have pointed out the increase in costs caused by the broad responsibilities that it must meet. We encourage the Director General and his teams to continue their efforts to find ways to make savings at the management level, to identify priority tasks and to eliminate overlap with a view to reducing the dependency of the Agency on extra-budgetary financing. In particular, the necessary reinforcement of safeguards will probably entail additional expenditures during its initial phase. It

would preferable for that financing to be carried out from the regular budget and for each State to make an equitable contribution in keeping with its means but without any excessive discount to such activities, which are in the interests of all.

The European Union notes that it attaches fundamental importance to the content of IAEA programmes, for which it pays approximately 34 per cent of the regular budget. On this essential point of programmes and budgets, we have welcomed with interest the new step proposed by the Agency in preparing activities for the 2002-2003 biennium.

In conclusion, the Agency has earned the trust of the international community as a competent authority in monitoring respect for safeguard agreements relating to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Simultaneously, it is playing an essential role in promoting the safe utilization of nuclear techniques for peaceful purposes in member States that have chosen to use such techniques.

Similarly, the European Union and the associated States that have joined in this statement reiterate to the Agency their support and firm will to continue to participate energetically in its activities.

For several years the European Union has supported the initiation of negotiations on and the rapid conclusion of, a multilateral international treaty prohibiting the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive nuclear devices. The European Union is ready to entrust a monitoring role to the Agency within the framework of such a treaty.

Mr. Moura (Brazil) (*spoke in Spanish*): On behalf of the delegations of the countries of the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR) — Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay — and of the associated countries, Bolivia and Chile, I would like to express our satisfaction with the report introduced by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). We reaffirm our permanent active commitment to the objectives of the international community with regard to non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the promotion of the peaceful uses of atomic energy, guaranteeing the right of all States to research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

In this connection, we regard the Agency's Technical Cooperation Programme as being of great importance. In particular, on the basis of our own experience as recipient countries and in some cases exporters of nuclear materials and energy, we support the actions to guarantee the exchange of materials, equipment and technology for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

In our statement at the last session of the General Assembly, we urged the Agency, with regard to verification, to give the highest priority to the true integration of safeguards measures, and not merely to their increase. The countries of MERCOSUR and Bolivia and Chile reiterate their commitment to the new concept of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards, since safeguards play a clear function of transparency and mutual confidence amongst countries.

However, we would like to refer to the formula for financing safeguards adopted at the Agency's recent General Conference, which will involve a greater contribution for the countries of our region. The countries of MERCOSUR and Bolivia and Chile will encourage the periodic assessment of the costs of the safeguards and when necessary propose adjustments with a view to achieving the highest level of cost-benefit in their implementation in the light of the economic development of member countries.

We would also encourage the Secretariat to introduce greater efficiency in the use of the resources allocated to safeguards. In addition, we consider that the application of the Additional Protocol should be neutral with respect to the cost of safeguards.

The Agency also has special responsibilities with regard to the promotion of technical cooperation, for which it must have sufficient human and financial resources, with a proper balance between its promotion and regulatory activities.

With regard to the consideration of future programmes and budgets of the Agency, we support the position that there should be strict compliance with the zero real growth policy.

We believe that the Agency's activities should be carried out on the basis of transparency and the implementation of internationally accepted standards of nuclear safety and the physical protection of nuclear materials.

Nuclear safety is also of special importance in connection with the dissemination of information about the peaceful uses of nuclear energy among the public in our countries and its acceptance by public opinion. We believe that the use of nuclear energy in our region is closely linked with the adoption and implementation of adequate safety measures which will increase reliability and respect for the environment, thus guaranteeing greater acceptance of nuclear energy by our peoples.

The transportation of nuclear waste by sea is a source of constant concern, because of the possible dangers to the health of the coastal peoples and for the environment of the transit countries. In this context, we emphasize the need for cooperation and coordination in the relevant forums with a view to strengthening the norms regulating the transport of such waste by sea.

Lastly, we wish to underline the role of the Agency as a promoter of the peaceful use of nuclear energy and as a central protagonist of the international regime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Mrs. Aragon (Philippines): Nuclear power holds the promise of safe and affordable energy, as well as improved agricultural productivity, safer foods and drinking water, and better human health for the continued growth and progress of our globalized world. At the same time, nuclear power still bears the potential for massive terror and destruction.

In all these instances, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) plays an important and challenging role. We would like to thank the Agency for its report, a report that succeeded in painting a clear picture of what the Agency has done and intends to do in carrying out this role. It is a significant and challenging role that the Agency has carried out quite well. The Philippines notes with satisfaction the continuing efforts of the IAEA in advancing the cause of non-proliferation, safety in the application of nuclear technology and technical cooperation in support of the peaceful uses of atomic energy, which are preconditions to enhancing world peace and safety. With the successful conclusion of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Agency's work in implementing the safeguards provisions of the NPT becomes even more important.

It is in this context that we welcome the two comprehensive safeguards agreements and eight

Additional Protocols that have been signed during the past year, and the progress achieved in developing integrated safeguards approaches for various types of nuclear facilities. The Philippines likewise welcomes the high technical cooperation implementation rate, as well as the Agency's efforts to update and foster national implementation of safety standards.

The Agency's activities to ensure and promote the safe use of nuclear energy are particularly important to those of us in Asia. While there has been no significant increase in the number of nuclear power plants in other parts of the world, in Asia planning for the expansion of nuclear power continues, and the use of nuclear power is likely to grow over the short term. We are confident that the Agency will ensure that the growth of nuclear power generation in our region is both safe and peaceful.

In the area of peace and stability, the Agency has also made its contribution, which has helped in achieving dramatic progress in opening up channels of communication and in broadening the dialogue in north-east Asia. While there is much to be done, the Philippines believes that what has been achieved so far has been in no small measure because of the dedicated and committed work of the Agency.

Even though the IAEA has already done much, there is still more work ahead for it. The Philippines welcomes and supports the request made by member States during the forty-ninth regular session of the General Conference last year for the Agency to help countries assess the role of nuclear power in the light of global environmental challenges and energy needs. We are glad that there was agreement that such assistance should include facilitating access to relevant information about the importance of nuclear power in achieving sustainable development in developing countries and in mitigating greenhouse gas emissions.

As an archipelago, the Philippines gives particular importance to the marine environment. We continue to support the Agency's efforts to monitor marine radioactive contamination of the marine environment in cooperation with other United Nations agencies. The Agency is helping develop and accumulate knowledge that could provide a basis for the rapid assessment of the impact of any possible future releases from accidents that might occur at coastal nuclear facilities or nuclear waste sites, or from the ocean transport of spent fuel or high level waste.

The Agency has also used new remote measurement systems, with which it has confirmed that global fallout from atmospheric bomb testing is still the main source of anthropogenic radionuclides in the oceans, although levels have declined substantially.

The Agency has not let the dynamic changes in the world go by without seeking to reform itself. The Philippines welcomes its efforts to adopt measures that would make it better understand the needs of member States and to ensure a more efficient and effective response to them. We believe that the Agency is moving in the right direction with its new approach to the programme and budget formulation process, as well as with the decision to introduce results-based programming to the fullest extent possible for the 2002-2003 biennium.

In this regard, we would like to emphasize that, in view of the numerous demands placed upon the Agency, the limitations imposed by its budget and the need to preserve IAEA efficiency, it is imperative to pursue greater care in maintaining the delicate balance between its regulatory and promotional activities while discharging its mission.

In today's dynamic and interdependent world, many different and useful ways are being found to peacefully use and apply nuclear energy. Although the Agency was a child of the cold war, it has grown and matured, and we are confident that it will be able to successfully face today's many and diverse challenges.

Mr. Krokmal (Ukraine): It is with great pleasure that the Ukrainian delegation takes part once more in the annual debate on the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) this time for 1999. I would like to thank Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei for his comprehensive introduction of the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the General Assembly. The main developments in the Agency's activities during the current year are highlighted in the report and the statement made by the Director General. Ukraine feels it is important to underscore that the Agency's work has promoted further peaceful uses of nuclear energy in accordance with articles 1 and 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

The NPT 2000 Review Conference once again stressed the need to unite efforts worldwide in curbing the nuclear arms race and further promote international security by universally adhering to the Treaty. Having

signed a protocol additional to the Safeguards Agreement on 15 August this year, Ukraine took the next logical step to move towards the goals of the NPT and the Safeguards Agreement. We believe it will contribute to making further progress towards the universal application of the safeguards regime, given the level of nuclear activity in Ukraine.

We reiterate the significant role that the Agency plays in assuring the fulfilment of obligations by member States under article 3 of the Treaty. We call upon all members of the Agency that have not done so to sign a protocol additional to their Safeguards Agreement as soon as possible.

The application of the highest safety standards in terms of design and operation of peaceful nuclear installations is yet another major responsibility of the Agency. In the last decade the Agency has extensively developed and promoted nuclear safety standards and has carried out multidimensional tasks, ranging from facilitating national legislative processes to promoting reliable technologies, good regulatory practices and staff training in member States. We commend the Agency for organizing the First Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, in April 1999, which we believe will help improve safety performance among member States.

I would like to draw the Assembly's attention to the historic decision by the Government of Ukraine to close by 15 December 2000 the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. We consider this step a valuable contribution by Ukraine to mitigating and minimizing the Chernobyl disaster, despite the fact that the closure of the Chernobyl station presents a number of challenging problems, with a new range of socio-economic ramifications for my country.

As a follow-up to the Director General's recent visit to Ukraine, another step was taken towards promoting safety within the framework of the Technical Cooperation Programme for the 2001-2003 cycle. Two additional projects have been agreed upon: support for the decommissioning of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant and the characterization, management and physical protection of radioactive material from the shelter at the Chernobyl station. This is an example of how the coordinating role of the Agency in international cooperation helps in a practical way to resolve problems of major concern to the international community. Ukraine has achieved

considerable progress in improving its safety record, as well as in establishing a recognized legislative and regulatory base.

I would like to inform the Assembly that in the year 2000 Ukraine ratified the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, and has acceded to the Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy.

The Agency's efforts against illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and other radioactive sources are widely acknowledged. We attach importance to cooperating with the Agency under the Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Material, and to exchanging information with the Agency's illicit trafficking database. Ukraine joins other States in supporting efforts to draft an international convention on the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism. Ukraine, as a party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, supports the draft resolution calling on countries that have not yet done so to accede to the Convention in order to strengthen our efforts to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and other radioactive sources.

The technical cooperation pillar of the Agency's activities can hardly be overestimated. The report of the Agency to the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons proves that the Agency is meeting its commitments under article IV of the Treaty. Ukraine believes that the Agency's productive technical cooperation in the nuclear field indeed provides for the development of Member States in terms of the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world.

In conclusion, with these comments the Ukrainian delegation welcomes the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the General Assembly for the year 1999. As a traditional co-sponsor of the draft resolution on the Agency's report, my delegation remains committed to the Agency's goals. We believe that this year's draft resolution will reflect in a balanced and comprehensive manner the support of the international community for the work of the Agency.

Mr. Punj (India): The Indian delegation has taken note of the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) presented by the Agency's Director General, Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei. As a founding member of the Agency, India continues to play an active role in the work of the IAEA. We are particularly happy that the mechanism of the Scientific Forum, held to coincide with the annual General Conference of the IAEA, has now been institutionalized.

In its overview, the annual report makes a reference to the Medium-Term Strategy, which was developed in 1999 to form the basis for the formulation of programme proposals for the period 2001-2005. In this regard, India would like to emphasize that the IAEA was created with the main objective of accelerating and enlarging the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. This is the central pillar on which the Agency should rest, while giving due consideration to safeguards measures to prevent the use of Agency assistance for military purposes and to safety standards for the protection of health and the minimization of danger to life and property.

Safety and safeguards are indeed important and necessary support activities for enlarging and accelerating the contribution of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. However, they should not become activities that overshadow the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Primacy must be accorded to technology. This is the only way we can faithfully interpret the time-tested Statute of the Agency.

Our delegation supports the priority assigned to the potential role of nuclear energy in sustainable development in the Medium-Term Strategy, which is in line with the recommendations of the Scientific Forum held during the 1999 General Conference of the IAEA. The Agency programme should include the role of innovative nuclear reactors and fuel cycles in promoting sustainable development. We appreciate the Director General's efforts in trying to establish a task force for that purpose. We feel strongly that it will be worthwhile for the Agency to support this programme as part of the regular programme of the Agency.

In the context of the sustainability of nuclear power, it is appropriate for the Agency to address the issue of various nuclear fuel cycle options. A discussion by experts on the merits and problems of the

closed fuel cycle versus the open fuel cycle with its associated technical, financial and environmental aspects could form a meaningful part of the Medium-Term Strategy. In view of our limited uranium resources and in order to ensure long-term energy security, India has opted for a closed nuclear fuel cycle policy involving a fast breeder reactor programme and thorium utilization and associated fuel reprocessing and refabrication plants. A closed fuel cycle is also important for the safe management of the environment, as it greatly reduces the quantity of high-level wastes.

Recognizing the importance of the role of nuclear energy, especially in developing countries, India, along with the Group of 77, has been requesting a nuclear technology review along the lines of the nuclear safety review, and to have it discussed as part of the dedicated agenda in the Board and in the General Conference. We are happy that the Director General has heeded our request and has also appointed standing advisory groups for nuclear energy and nuclear science and applications.

Even in countries that are currently witnessing a slow-down in their nuclear power development programmes, it is likely that a reversal will occur due to two factors. First, there has been a substantial increase in oil prices, and, secondly, there is the commitment to the Kyoto Protocol. For a large country like India, with its need to increase its per capita electricity consumption substantially, rapid growth in nuclear electricity generation capacity is of vital importance.

In India our strong policy emphasis on nuclear power is based on the operation of nuclear power plants in a safe and reliable manner. The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board of India stringently monitors all activities in this regard. It is a matter of satisfaction that since the last General Assembly, two more state-of-the-art, indigenously designed power reactor units have reached criticality — one unit in Karnataka State and another in Rajasthan State. Another reactor unit is due to reach criticality shortly. Construction work on the two indigenously designed 500 megawatt pressurised heavy-water reactor units at Tarapur is in full swing. The preparation of the detailed project report for the construction of two 1,000 megawatt VVER reactors at Kudankulam, in technical cooperation with Russia began in April 1999 and is expected to be completed next year. Site-related activities have already commenced.

The capability to provide the technology resources for our nuclear programme has been derived mainly from our strong research and development programme. India's efforts in developing the advanced heavy water reactor, which will facilitate thorium utilization, go towards developing innovative reactor and fuel cycle designs for the sustainable development of nuclear energy. The growth in installed power generation capacity will, of course, continue with plants using state-of-the-art-design thermal and fast reactors with an emphasis on improved safety.

In this context, we appreciate the initiative of President Putin, announced at the recent Millennium Summit, by which he recognized that the most rapid energy-production growth in the next century will take place in the developing countries. He has also said that to diminish ecological degradation caused by greenhouse gases and to save global fossil reserves for non-electricity uses by present and future generations there is a need to develop new nuclear technologies which are also proliferation-resistant.

The IAEA, with its comprehensive membership covering almost the entire world, and, more important, the developing Member States, have a collective responsibility to find technological solutions to such problems. For its part, India, as always, strongly supports those efforts and will actively participate in such initiatives.

Our research and development programme has continued to lay emphasis on areas such as medicine, agriculture and industry. Some work in those areas has also been taken up under the aegis of the Regional Cooperation Agreement programme for Asia and the Pacific. As a founder member of that programme, India is a strong supporter of the programme and has hosted several events, including the meeting of national coordinators of the Agreement early this year.

India has consistently supported the technical cooperation activities of the Agency and pays its annual contribution to the Technical Cooperation Fund regularly and in full. We are concerned that there is a widening gap between pledges and actual contributions, and we urge all member States, especially the major donor countries, similarly to pledge and pay in full.

Simultaneously, the Agency should orient its technical cooperation programmes in such a way as to promote self-reliance among developing countries

rather than reliance on developed countries. We have called on the Agency to identify centres of excellence for human resources development under the programme of technical cooperation for developing countries, and have offered our training facilities to scientists and engineers from developing countries. In that regard, in a signal event, India this year signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the IAEA on cooperation in connection with the Agency's regional and inter-regional training events, and with individual and group fellowship training programmes carried out as part of the technical cooperation activities of the IAEA. The Memorandum of Understanding is an important milestone in our relationship with the IAEA, and it formalizes our longstanding offer to make the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre a centre of excellence/regional resource unit under the Agency's programme of technical cooperation for developing countries.

There is a need to see an improvement in the quality of the implementation of safeguards. Much has changed in technology since 1971, when the new inspection regime was put in place. This should be reflected in the quality and quantity of inspection efforts, with corresponding reductions in cost. The argument that increases in safeguards need to be accommodated automatically because they are mandatory requirements under agreements, as required under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), raises the question of the differences between statutory activities and mandatory activities. With promotion being the primary statutory aim of the IAEA, we wonder why only 5.9 per cent of the IAEA budget goes for an important activity such as nuclear power. On the other hand, there seems to be no holding back of resources for safeguards activities, with a call now for the extrabudgetary contribution also to be incorporated into the regular budget. Such actions would further hurt promotional activities.

We reiterate our appreciation of the Agency's efforts to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear materials. Yet in our neighbourhood, clandestine acquisition of sensitive technology and materials is known to have occurred. Preventing this requires the commitment of States members of the Agency. Both on the issue of physical protection measures and on export controls, India follows a stringent law-based system, which is borne out by its exemplary record.

As we move into the new millennium, it is time to pause, to rethink our strategies and to examine our options. We need a fresh look at the importance of nuclear power, brushing aside the shroud of prejudice and apprehension. Let us pool our collective wisdom and scientific knowledge and work together under the aegis of the IAEA to address the challenges of global development through the deployment of nuclear technologies, overcoming the barriers that stand in the way. In that context, a welcome step was the industry forum organized by the Agency in January this year with the aim of harmonizing and focusing promotional efforts being made by the private sector, Governments and intergovernmental organizations in the field of nuclear power.

Mr. Kumalo (South Africa): My delegation would like to thank the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei, for his comprehensive report on the work and activities of the Agency in 1999. We wish also to express our appreciation for the outstanding performance of the Agency under his leadership.

On the occasion of the fifty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations, and in the context of the Millennium Assembly, it is appropriate to reflect on some of the main achievements of the IAEA and on the challenges facing the international community regarding its work. In May this year, the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), for the first time in 15 years, adopted a consensus report on the review of the Treaty over the past five years, which set an agenda for the next review period, until 2005. It was particularly significant that the Conference reaffirmed that the IAEA was the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring compliance with its safeguards agreements with individual States. The implementation of a new integrated optimal safeguards system should therefore take place as a matter of urgency. Although the Agency is in the process of developing such a system, it will require fresh thinking to integrate the rigid, highly quantitative elements of the old system into a new, flexible, non-mechanical, qualitative approach, as allowed by the additional protocols.

It is often said that safety and security are gained at a cost. It is certainly not any different when referring to the safeguards system. The entry into force of

additional protocols will no doubt further increase the Agency's burden, as will the outcome of the trilateral initiative among the Agency, the United States of America and the Russian Federation.

Since all of these activities are important for strengthening the non-proliferation regime, an innovative solution for the safeguards budget will have to be found soon. Such a solution should take into consideration the abolishment of shielding the burden on the developing countries should not be increased further. It is South Africa's sincere hope that the significant concession made by the developing countries in September this year will be balanced by a long-term political and financial commitment by the donor countries to the Technical Cooperation Fund that will be able to fulfil the real and urgent needs of the developing States members of the IAEA.

The primary function of the IAEA is to encourage and assist in research, development and the practical application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes throughout the world. South Africa commends the Agency for the initiatives and activities undertaken during the past year in this field. In particular, we wish to mention the role of the IAEA in assisting South Africa in the review of the technical and economic feasibility, safety and nuclear non-proliferation aspects of the pebble bed modular reactor. The Agency's report, following its investigations, will inform our further decision-making process on the possible expansion of nuclear power generation in South Africa.

South Africa considers the Agency's assistance to developing countries, under its Technical Cooperation Programme to be very important. In this connection, it is significant to recall that the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) accentuated the continued relevance of the programme. The Conference also welcomed the Agency's new strategy for technical cooperation, which seeks to promote socio-economic impact within its core competencies by integrating its assistance into the national development programme of each country with a view to ensuring sustainability through expanding partnerships in development, model project standards and the use of country programme frameworks and thematic plans. In the case of South Africa, the Technical Cooperation Programme has been significantly increased due to a number of successful proposals for the 1999-2000 cycle, while existing

projects are delivering outstanding results. Our country programme framework has also been completed and submitted to the Agency.

In a regional context, the application of nuclear technology has in many instances brought viable solutions to some of the problems the African continent faces. Africa has greatly succeeded in tailoring a communal approach to the peaceful uses of nuclear science through the work and activities of the African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology. In this regard, I also wish to extend a word of appreciation to the IAEA for its involvement with that organization.

Although South Africa is pleased that an interim solution for the funding of technical cooperation projects has been found, we continue to believe that this solution should be considered only temporary. Contributions from major donor countries will still be required, and South Africa urges these countries to fulfil their obligations in full and on time to ensure the successful implementation of this important function of the Agency. The challenge of securing an assured and predictable basis for the Technical Cooperation Fund lies ahead. It will continue to be an important issue for developing countries members of the IAEA in the coming years.

Another important aspect of the Agency's programme is nuclear, radiation and waste safety. Environmental considerations, safety operations and waste management practices in particular are issues that are growing in significance and increasingly becoming people's issues, business imperatives, subjects for sensitive Government debate and technological challenges. The future of nuclear energy as a source of electricity production is very much dependent on the safe operation of nuclear facilities and on the obtaining of acceptable solutions — in the minds of decision-makers and the public — for the safe management and disposal of nuclear waste. The guidance provided and the activities conducted by the IAEA with member States in this field during the past year should be commended. In this regard, South Africa welcomes the IAEA Action Plan, developed to, inter alia, achieve better control infrastructures and better information exchange among role players as well as intensified education and training.

The 2000 Scientific Forum, held during the IAEA General Conference, played an important role in bringing to the attention of Governments some of the most important scientific and technical issues in the field of radioactive waste management and in promoting awareness of the international dimension of current developments. The South African approach to this issue is a comprehensive one. A national radioactive waste management policy and strategy are currently under development. This will pave the way for signature and ratification of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.

In our view, the Agency is succeeding in the fulfilment of its mandate. The Director General's report demonstrates clearly that all important aspects in the field of nuclear technology are currently being covered by the Agency. We congratulate the Agency on addressing its objective in this way and look forward to our continued cooperation with the IAEA in the year to come.

Finally, as a traditional sponsor of the annual General Assembly draft resolution on the report of the Agency, my delegation hopes that the draft resolution will be finalized with a view to its adoption by the Assembly as soon as possible. To this end, we call on all delegations to show the maximum flexibility, bearing in mind the successful outcome of the 2000 NPT Review Conference and the recent IAEA General Conference.

Mr. Galuška (Czech Republic): As the Czech Republic has aligned itself with the position presented on behalf of the European Union and associated countries by the head of the French delegation, I would like only to touch upon some of the topics that are of particular importance to my country.

The peaceful uses of nuclear energy are inseparably connected to the implementation of safeguards and the improvement of the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). To demonstrate its full commitment to the principles of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Czech Republic signed the Additional Protocol to Safeguards Agreement on 28 September 1999, and since then the proper amendments to the relevant domestic legal act have been drafted. These will be presented to the Czech Government this year, with the understanding that the

Czech Parliament will act on them not later than early 2001. Thus, the Czech Republic will be ready to ratify and implement the Additional Protocol in the very near future.

The Czech Republic considers the consistent implementation of safeguards, together with the physical protection of nuclear materials — not only during international transport, but also with respect to all operations related to nuclear material handling in the country's territory — to be the pillars of the system for preventing the illegal trade in nuclear materials and of the struggle against nuclear terrorism.

We welcomed, and supported from the very beginning, the activities aimed at a review of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and positively viewed the informal open-ended expert meeting initiated by the IAEA Director General. The Czech Republic is convinced that with the close cooperation with Member States, positive results can be reached in terms of deepening and strengthening the Convention.

Nuclear-power generation constitutes the main part of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the Czech Republic. At the beginning of this year, the Czech Government approved the country's new energy policy strategy, which envisages further use of nuclear energy for electricity generation, thus enabling a desirable diversification of energy sources and, consequently, a substantial reduction of carbon dioxide emissions on the one hand and of the exploitation of the Czech Republic's limited fossil fuel deposits on the other.

At the same time, the Czech Government believes that the highest possible level of nuclear safety and radiation protection is the necessary precondition for the use of nuclear-power-generating facilities. To make this aim feasible, the Czech legislative and regulatory framework has been profoundly reformed over the past few years. The recodified legislation reflects our experience with the more than 50 reactor-years of operation of the Dukovany nuclear power plant's four units, current international practices — including IAEA recommendations — and, not least, the latest findings of science and research. The Czech Republic therefore has modern legislation under which the State's regulatory authority — the State Office for Nuclear Safety — is granted sufficient independence, resources and competencies to secure the highest level of nuclear

safety and radiation protection with respect to all relevant activities.

The Czech Republic fully recognizes the international dimension of nuclear safety and radiation protection issues. Through the mechanism of expert missions organized by the IAEA, we have received an independent review of the licensing process applied by the State Office for Nuclear Safety in the case of the Temelin nuclear power plant, as well as an assessment of the plant's readiness for the start-up phase. The experts stated in their final reports that the Czech Republic has a firmly defined regulatory and legislative framework in place and that the licensing process is run in line with the world's best practices. They also took a positive view of the Temelin nuclear power plant's readiness for start-up.

It goes without saying that all the partial recommendations of the missions were immediately implemented. The conclusions of both missions, as well as those of the more than 10 other missions that have taken place at the nuclear power plant over the past 10 years, are publicly available and give a clear overview of the efforts of the licence holder and the responsible governmental authorities to ensure the highest achievable level of nuclear safety for the facility.

Having said that, I would like to stress that the Czech authorities have always been ready and willing to engage in a broad-based dialogue on cross-border aspects of the safety of the Temelin nuclear power plant, including the environmental ones. We have never failed to provide honest answers to questions posed in bilateral dialogues, and we do so over and above our international legal commitments, both multilateral and bilateral.

The Czech Republic has been involved in the IAEA technical cooperation programme for many years. The basic strategy of the country's involvement is to balance the volume of technical assistance received under the Programme with the assistance provided by our country to other Member States. Specifically, the Czech Republic has been increasing both voluntary financial contributions and in-kind assistance to selected national or regional projects.

Between 1998 and 2000, the Czech Government allocated \$200,000 to a project in Ukraine, the purpose of which is to install a new system for non-destructive inspection of VVER-1000 reactor vessels, and, more

recently, \$100,000 to a two-year programme to assist the nuclear regulatory authority of Armenia in the assessment of the integrity of the Medzamor nuclear power plant's primary circuit. We believe that a similar attitude on the part of other countries could, in view of the zero-growth situation of the Agency's budget, help to expand the activities under the Programme.

At the end of my intervention, I would like to express the Czech Republic's high esteem for the IAEA Director General, Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei, and for his personal involvement and the management skills he uses in leading the Agency. I wish also to express appreciation for the results the IAEA has achieved under his leadership in promoting international cooperation in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Mr. Hoang Chi Trung (Viet Nam): It is a great honour for me to deliver this statement on behalf of the delegation of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam. At the outset, my delegation would like to thank the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei, for his comprehensive report to the General Assembly and for the outstanding performance that he and his staff have registered in the last year.

Viet Nam attaches great importance to the work of the IAEA in promoting cooperation among Member States in the field of the peaceful uses of the atom. As a developing country, Viet Nam has focused its efforts on expanding its cooperative activities with the Agency itself as well as with other Member States under the auspices of the Agency. Over the last 20 years of its membership, Viet Nam has been fortunate enough to enjoy the excellent cooperation promoted by the Agency. We have received generous assistance from the Agency and from a good number of developed countries which are more advanced in nuclear technology and applications.

On this occasion, my delegation wishes to express our deep gratitude to the experts of various nationalities, and to the international community in general, for the generous assistance they have provided and the hard work they have done in the area of nuclear applications for health, agriculture and safety. We are particularly grateful that hundreds of our experts have had the opportunity to participate in the training courses organized by the Agency in the past few years.

The ongoing technical cooperation activities carried out by the Agency to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy are of keen interest to the Vietnamese Government. Nuclear energy has been well established as the cleanest, most environmentally friendly and most efficient means of energy generation. The development of nuclear energy will further enhance the sustainable economic development of many developing countries. It is our firm belief that greater financial support and technical expertise should be allocated to efforts to assist developing countries in sharing in the benefits and uses of nuclear energy.

Viet Nam supports the work of the Agency in the field of verifying and monitoring compliance with the safeguards agreements signed by Member States in accordance with the Agency's Statute and safeguards system. At the same time, we wish to underline that the utmost effort should be made to ensure that verification activities are fully impartial and do not violate the national sovereignty of States. The verification officers must comply fully with the verification regulations and guidelines as well as with the agreements entered into by Member States with the Agency.

As regards the draft resolution entitled "Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency", contained in document A/55/L.25, our delegation finds that the draft this year is more balanced and captures the general views of Member States. Our delegation, therefore, will vote in favour of this draft resolution, if there is still a need for a vote to be taken.

In conclusion, we wish to add that Viet Nam will continue to do its best to further its cooperation with the Agency and other member countries to achieve the objectives and goals of the IAEA.

Mr. Dausá Céspedes (Cuba) (*spoke in Spanish*): I begin by expressing my delegation's sincere thanks to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei, for his introduction of the Agency's annual report.

Cuba attaches great importance to the work of the IAEA. Over the years our country has had a significant technical cooperation programme with the IAEA, with excellent results in the fields of human health, agriculture and industry and in other fields.

Within the framework of the programme of Regional Cooperative Arrangements for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America

and the Caribbean (ARCAL) many projects have been carried out, solving concrete problems in our region. This programme is the proper framework for nuclear cooperation between the Latin American and Caribbean countries. We consider that this cooperation programme can administer contributions very efficiently — and even greater contributions than are currently being received from the IAEA.

Despite the considerable results achieved, the Agency faces many challenges. We believe that at present there is an imbalance between the two fundamental categories of the IAEA's work. Cooperation and technical assistance have not benefited from the same vigour and integrity as the safeguard activities. The trend towards a real decline in financing for technical cooperation activities fails to respond to the growing needs of developing countries. These activities must not only be maintained, but strengthened and diversified.

The IAEA must maintain an ever-growing, predictable and secure fund for technical cooperation. This can be achieved only through a genuine commitment by all member States, and especially the developed countries, which can and must provide greater financial and technological support. It is unfortunate that the value of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund has been frozen for the next biennium at \$73 million, despite the imperative need to increase it. Cuba advocates maintaining a proper balance between the cooperation activities and safeguards activities of the IAEA. The latter should be made part of an effective and efficient system, and should not become an excessive burden for the poorer countries.

At the most recent General Conference of the IAEA the system of protection with regard to financing Agency safeguards was eliminated. While acknowledging the responsibility of all member States to finance safeguards, this system, which functioned for more than 30 years, took into account certain political and financial elements to determine countries' level of contributions. Accordingly, greater participation was requested of States in a better position to bear the relevant financial burden. The elimination of this protective system has meant that in practice a larger budgetary burden is being transferred to countries less able to bear it.

As regards safeguards, the question of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is becoming almost unavoidable, particularly when so much has been said and written as a result of the Sixth Review Conference, held this year. Cuba's position on the Treaty is well known. We believe that its provisions are fundamentally discriminatory and selective, as they legitimize the possession of nuclear weapons by a select club of countries. The nuclear Powers legitimized by the NPT are not even obliged to submit their nuclear installations and arsenals to IAEA safeguards. Nor does the Treaty prohibit vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, and it makes possible their continuous qualitative improvement by the nuclear Powers recognized under the Treaty. These are the basic reasons why Cuba has not yet signed or ratified the NPT.

Although it is not a party to the NPT, Cuba has entered into safeguards agreements with the IAEA regarding all our nuclear installations, and we strictly comply with them. In October 1999, when the Director General of the IAEA visited our country, we signed the Protocol additional to the Safeguards Agreements between Cuba and the Agency, thereby becoming the first non-signatory of the NPT to sign such a protocol.

As part of the ironclad economic, trade and financial blockade imposed on Cuba for more than 40 years now by the United States Government, our programme for the peaceful use of nuclear energy has been and continues to be the subject of various activities designed to prevent this programme from making progress. As is well known, in 1996 the United States Government adopted the infamous Helms-Burton Act, which, inter alia, asserts that the completion and operation of any nuclear facilities in Cuba, without regard to whether they are engaged in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, will be considered an act of aggression demanding an appropriate response from the United States. Other current United States laws spell out actions to boycott in various ways the Cuban nuclear programme and, in particular, technical cooperation between our country and the IAEA. Such laws even go so far as to order a reduction in the level of assistance provided by the United States to third countries by the same amount as these countries' contribution to the Cuban nuclear programme.

Cuba reiterates its strong rejection of such discriminatory activities, which clearly run counter to

the Statute of the IAEA. Despite these activities, our country will continue to develop its nuclear programme for peaceful purposes in a completely transparent manner and to work tirelessly for nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

Cuba regrets that in recent years the draft resolution on the report of the IAEA has had to be adopted by a vote. This is the sole case in the General Assembly in which such a resolution is not adopted by consensus. This cycle of confrontation must end. There never should have been such a confrontation regarding this draft resolution. It is necessary to restore the practice — which for various reasons was ignored for several years — of including in the text only questions that enjoy the support of all delegations. This would make it possible for the General Assembly to give a clear signal of unity and support for the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Cuba reiterates that it stands ready to contribute to efforts to achieve this objective.

Mr. Wulf (United States of America): I extend my thanks to Director General ElBaradei for his excellent report on the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) during the past year. I would also ask him, on behalf of the United States delegation, to convey to all of his staff our appreciation of their hard work and dedication in pursuit of the many activities the Director General described to us in his statement.

Among the strengths which the IAEA brings to its portfolio is its ability to change over time. In our evolving world, the needs and priorities of States are constantly changing. To meet these needs effectively, the IAEA must also constantly adapt, initiating or modifying its programme of work to respond to the demands of its member States. Over the past decade these demands have escalated dramatically. And the IAEA has responded — through expanded work in hydrology, new initiatives in landmine detection, a comprehensive work plan on orphan nuclear sources and extensive efforts to strengthen safeguards, to name only a few examples. This ability to adapt and change is crucial to the Agency's long-term effectiveness and relevance. Yet change, as we all know, can be difficult for any organization. Hence it is all the more commendable that this international organization, with its diverse programme and staff, is able to meet the needs for change as well as it does.

Commitment to its goals is central to the success of any institution. The fact that the IAEA is widely regarded as one of the most effective and successful international organizations is due in no small measure to the strong commitment of its staff to the Agency's work. Whether in nuclear cooperation, nuclear safety or verification, the dedication of the men and women in the IAEA Secretariat to getting the job done is clear. Many staff members routinely and willingly put in extra hours, working into the evenings and on weekends to complete the task at hand. This commitment means that nuclear cooperation helps to support the health and nutrition of people throughout the world, that this cooperation can proceed under strict and effective international safety measures and that the risk of illicit use of nuclear materials is effectively constrained.

Commitment must go hand in hand with competence to assure sound performance. The quality of the IAEA's programmes clearly reflects the many skills which the Secretariat staff brings to its work. The fact that the world community repeatedly and consistently has turned to the IAEA as a means to manage intractable problems — from the Chernobyl disaster to the nuclear challenges posed by Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea — reflects the confidence of many States that the Agency will provide a reliable means by which to respond to these problems.

The ability to adapt and change and the commitment and competence of its staff have long been hallmarks of the IAEA. Over its many years of service to the international community, the importance of the Agency's work has been widely recognized. For example, earlier this year the central role of the Agency in nuclear issues was repeatedly underscored in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The Conference recognized many of the diverse aspects of the Agency's work, as well as many of the new initiatives that it is pursuing. Among these, as the Director General noted, is the role the IAEA could play in support of the disarmament objectives of the NPT by helping to assure the international community that the removal of excess fissile materials from nuclear weapons is proceeding. This would help meet the Final Document's call for irreversibility by all nuclear-weapon States and, in particular, the call to complete and implement the Trilateral Initiative. The United

States, Russia and the IAEA are very close to agreement on the legal framework for such verification, and we hope the remaining minor differences can be readily resolved.

As the IAEA works to deal with this and the many other important issues before it, let us all keep in mind the Director General's statement that the Agency's ability to continue to carry out these functions effectively depends on States' political commitment and financial support. All IAEA members are, of course, concerned that the Agency pursue its programmes in the most cost-effective manner possible. At the same time, we remain mindful of the call by the 2000 NPT Review Conference to provide the Agency with the resources it needs to do its work. Preserving the strength and effectiveness of this vital international organization clearly serves the needs of us all.

Finally, the United States is pleased to add its name to the list of sponsors of the draft resolution on the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency. We support the present text, as agreed by consensus in Vienna.

Mr. Sun Joun-yung (Republic of Korea): Allow me to begin by expressing my delegation's sincere appreciation to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mr. ElBaradei, for his comprehensive report and for the remarkable work he and his staff have done over the past year.

Since its creation four decades ago, the IAEA has contributed significantly to strengthening the global nuclear non-proliferation regime by implementing the safeguards provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and other international agreements. At the same time, the Agency has promoted peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the economic and social development of humankind.

Let me now comment on some of the Agency's activities to which my Government attaches great importance. The Agency has been fostering international cooperation to enhance the development of peaceful nuclear technologies and their applications to meet energy demands and other human needs. Its activities extend beyond nuclear power to cover non-power applications in such diverse areas as agriculture, health and water resources management.

The use of nuclear energy has benefited the international community to a degree unparalleled in history, but not without undesirable consequences. Presently the nuclear industry is faced with the challenges of ensuring public acceptance and economic competitiveness. We therefore share the view that the future of nuclear energy may depend heavily on the successful development of safe, innovative reactors and fuel cycle technologies, including small and medium-sized reactors.

In this regard, the Republic of Korea has completed the concept design of a 330-megawatt small-sized reactor, called SMART. Our experience in developing SMART will greatly assist the Agency's plans to promote the development of small and medium-sized reactors in the future. My country is fully disposed to share its knowledge and experience in nuclear technology research and development within the framework of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme.

Nuclear safety is of paramount importance in the use of nuclear energy. While sharing the view that every country should maintain the highest possible level of nuclear safety through rigorous national measures, we also believe that international cooperation on safety-related matters is indispensable. On the one hand, each country should take concrete steps to relieve public concern about the operational safety of nuclear power plants and the disposal of radioactive waste. On the other, the IAEA should further promote international cooperation to create a set of rules and standards for nuclear safety.

For many years, my Government has made every effort to instil a nuclear-safety culture within society aimed at cultivating public acceptance. My Government is undertaking procedures to ratify the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management in the near future. We also hope for a speedy conclusion of the international discussions concerning the safety of radioactive sources and the safe transport of radioactive materials.

The IAEA safeguards system constitutes an indispensable component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. My Government has therefore consistently supported the IAEA's efforts to strengthen its safeguards system. In particular, we welcome the adoption by the IAEA of the Model Additional

Protocol in May 1997. The Protocol will significantly enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards regime, while ensuring the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. My Government signed the Additional Protocol in June 1999 and is currently undertaking domestic measures to ratify it next year. My delegation wishes to underline the importance of the universal application of the Additional Protocol.

We look forward to a timely establishment by the IAEA of an integrated safeguards system. Meanwhile, the Republic of Korea has been implementing its own national inspection system since 1997, in close cooperation with the IAEA.

Since 1993, the General Conference of the IAEA has adopted resolutions on the nuclear issue relating to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The resolution adopted at the forty-fourth session of the General Conference of the Agency, inter alia, urges the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to come into full compliance with its safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. We commend the continued impartial efforts of the Agency to resolve this issue and look forward to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's full compliance with its safeguards Agreement. As reflected in resolution GC(44)/RES/26 of 22 September 2000, we welcome the recent positive developments in North-East Asia and hope that they will provide a good opportunity to resolve outstanding issues, including the nuclear issue relating to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

My delegation welcomes the successful outcome of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which set a pragmatic nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament agenda for the next five years. We are pleased to note that the Conference reaffirmed the IAEA's role as the primary facilitator of technical cooperation and nuclear safety and as a guardian of nuclear non-proliferation. My Government looks forward to the full implementation of the benchmarks contained in the Final Document.

In order to cope with the challenges faced by the nuclear industry, we need a large pool of committed young professionals with high morals, technical competence and a strong belief in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. As part of the effort to develop such a pool, the Republic of Korea will host the second Youth

Nuclear Congress in 2002, following the first held in Slovakia last April. This Congress will serve as a forum for the young generation to understand and exchange views on the importance of nuclear energy.

In closing, my delegation would like to reassert the firm commitment of the Republic of Korea to the objectives of the IAEA and its strong support for the work of the Agency.

Mr. Kobayashi (Japan): On behalf of the Government of Japan, I offer my heartfelt congratulations to Mr. Ibrahim Othman of the Syrian Arab Republic for the excellent manner in which he conducted his presidency of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at its forty-fourth session. My thanks go as well to Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the IAEA, for his thorough presentation of the IAEA report. I also extend my Government's welcome to the Republic of Tajikistan, the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Central African Republic, which have newly become members of the IAEA.

Japan greatly appreciates the IAEA's role in fostering and strengthening international cooperation towards the peaceful use of nuclear energy, nuclear safety and nuclear non-proliferation. In order for the IAEA to continue fulfilling its universal role, Japan hopes that the amendments to article VI of the IAEA statute concerning the enlargement of the membership of the Board of Governors, as approved by the General Conference last year, will become effective promptly.

Japan will continue to cooperate fully with the IAEA in the area of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Building on the experiences it has gained thus far in this important field, the Government of Japan is currently finalizing its long-term plan for research, development and utilization of nuclear energy, which outlines its basic policy and long-term vision to fully utilize the multifaceted potential of nuclear power. Strictly observing the principles of peaceful use and safety, my Government remains committed to the advancement of nuclear-power generation and the establishment of a nuclear fuel cycle. In doing so, Japan will continue to attach great importance to transparency in its nuclear activities and intends to keep the international community, through relevant international organizations, including the IAEA, informed of its policies, as well as of the situation regarding the use of plutonium.

As my delegation mentioned in the debate in the Fourth Committee under agenda item 82, "Effects of atomic radiation", Japan's policy of promoting the safe and peaceful use of nuclear energy extends to international cooperation, both bilaterally as well as through the IAEA and other competent international organizations. As the only country to have suffered a nuclear attack, and as a country that has long been committed to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, Japan is determined to use its wealth of experience for the greater benefit of humankind.

Japan attaches particular importance to assisting the people affected by the accident at Chernobyl, and has contributed to the Chernobyl Shelter Fund. In addition, as the current chair of the Group of Seven Nuclear Safety Working Group, Japan has worked to coordinate the views of its members in such areas as the development of alternative sources of electric power and the creation of employment opportunities in the wake of the Chernobyl plant closure.

The people of the Semipalatinsk region of Kazakhstan are also a focus of concern. Last year the Government of Japan, together with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), convened the Tokyo International Conference on Semipalatinsk, at which it announced that it would extend bilateral official development assistance in the medical field. Based on an agreement it reached with the Government of Kazakhstan in March this year, it will provide medical equipment and technical cooperation to improve the health standards of people in the region. It also decided, in conjunction with the UNDP, to extend assistance for the economic rehabilitation of the region through the human development Fund and the Fund to assist women in developing countries.

Allow me to briefly highlight some aspects of the activities of the IAEA that we deem to be particularly important. The IAEA plays an important role in the area of nuclear non-proliferation through its safeguards system. The international community must further strengthen its efforts to promote the universalization of the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreements, which in our view is an integral part of the safeguards system. From this point of view, we are very satisfied with the adoption this year of IAEA resolution GC(44)/RES/19, "Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System and Application of the Model Protocol," which includes a plan of action to bring the

safeguards agreements and additional protocols into force. We call on the Director General as well as the Board of Governors and member States to implement this plan promptly.

In order to promote the conclusion of the Additional Protocol, the Government of Japan intends to make extra-budgetary contributions to the Secretariat of the IAEA. We would also like to express our readiness to host, together with the IAEA, a workshop for the Asia-Pacific region next year on the universalization of the Additional Protocol. We believe the workshop will provide the States that have concluded the Additional Protocol with an opportunity to offer their expertise to help the countries that have not yet done so to understand the significance of concluding the Additional Protocol. Japan will vigorously continue its efforts, in cooperation with all like-minded member States as well as with the IAEA, to make the Additional Protocol universal.

Japan welcomes the positive developments on the Korean peninsula that the world has been witnessing recently. Less than a week ago in this very Hall, a draft resolution jointly presented by the delegations of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea was adopted by consensus. Japan was pleased to sponsor the draft resolution, and hopes that it will prove to be yet another milestone in the process of reconciliation and cooperation between the two Koreas.

In light of these positive developments, it is all the more important for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to fully cooperate with the IAEA in the implementation of its safeguards agreement, so as to further strengthen the atmosphere of cooperation and reconciliation. We strongly hope that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will respond positively to IAEA resolution GC(44)/RES/26, "Implementation of the Agreement between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons." Japan, for its part, has been actively participating in the light-water reactor project of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, which has an important role to play in promoting IAEA activities on the Korean peninsula.

In concluding, I reiterate my Government's strong commitment to and support for the activities of the IAEA.

Mr. Soeriaatmadja (Indonesia): On behalf of the Indonesian delegation, it is a pleasure for me to express our sincere appreciation to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei, for his introduction of the Agency's report and the comprehensive statement highlighting its role and activities. The period covered by the report has confirmed that the Director General, with professionalism and dedication, has further strengthened the role of the IAEA in the field of nuclear energy.

We are particularly grateful to the Director General for drawing our attention to the Agency's three main areas of functions — as a modality for the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, as the recognized authority supporting intergovernmental efforts to strengthen nuclear safety around the world and as an indispensable instrument in moving forward the international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament agenda. Indonesia welcomes this unified approach, based on the three pillars of technology, safety and verification.

It is now universally recognized that the IAEA is the international community's principal modality for the utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Among its most important aspects is the generation of electricity to meet the growing energy demands of the future. For reasons of energy security, countries with limited fossil fuel resources should be encouraged to diversify their energy supply systems to include both renewable and non-renewable sources in ensuring national development on a sustainable basis. In the context of these considerations and the goals of the Kyoto Protocol, the Agency deserves our commendation for its efforts in providing information and training on the potential role of nuclear power under the Clean Development Mechanism.

In this regard as well, collective efforts with the assistance of the Agency should be made towards appropriate technical solutions in providing safe and reliable energy at affordable rates, especially for the developing countries. Again, we are grateful to the Agency for its assistance in introducing nuclear power through the use of small and medium-size reactors as a viable option to generate electricity.

In this regard I draw attention to the meeting between our President, His Excellency Abdurrahman Wahid, and the Director General of the IAEA in December last year. At that meeting the President affirmed his support for the peaceful uses of nuclear technology in meeting the basic needs of the people. The President also stressed that his Government has an open mind towards the utilization of nuclear energy as an alternative source in the future.

Ensuring a high level of nuclear safety throughout the world is of primary importance to Indonesia. Safety aspects must be taken into account at an early stage in the design of nuclear facilities. We agree with the widely held view that, while responsibility for the safe design, construction and operation of a nuclear installation rests with the State having jurisdiction over such an installation, cooperation among States is needed to ensure that internationally accepted levels of nuclear safety are in place everywhere. While noteworthy advances have been made, much still remains to be done. It is important that the contracting parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety at the next Review Meeting make substantial progress in areas requiring safety improvements. In this context, Indonesia recently promulgated two regulations, one on nuclear and radiation safety and the other on nuclear energy utilization, intended to facilitate implementation of the New International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources.

In its continuing quest for the further strengthening of the non-proliferation regime and for a world free from the dangers posed by nuclear weapons, Indonesia has signed the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. I should like to point out in this regard that Indonesia is among the first few countries to have ratified and implemented the Protocol. This is in recognition of the Agency's critical role in safeguarding nuclear materials and facilities to prevent their theft or diversion for military purposes, which calls for the universal conclusion of Additional Protocols.

At the regional level, Indonesia actively participated in the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN)-IAEA workshop on the implementation of the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, held in Bangkok this year, and proposed the establishment of the ASEAN

safeguards system in order to comply with the requirements stipulated in the Treaty. It is our expectation that the proposed safeguards system could make a significant contribution to further strengthening mutual trust and confidence among members of ASEAN and also reinforce provisions concerning programmes for safeguards.

As far as research reactor technology is concerned, our scientists and engineers in the National Atomic Energy Agency (BATAN) have successfully increased the capacity of the nuclear reactor in Bandung. Another research reactor was inaugurated last June by the Vice-President of the Republic of Indonesia. These complex undertakings have been successfully carried out by our own engineers after participating in various technical cooperation programmes initiated by the IAEA, for which we thank the Agency.

The Technical Cooperation Programme is one of the most valuable components of the activities undertaken by the IAEA. It has greatly benefited Indonesia in developing its human resource capabilities, scientific-technical facilities and supportive infrastructure deemed important for our national priorities in areas such as health, industry, agriculture, livestock production and environment. We have already expressed our willingness to share our expertise and scientific facilities and exchange our experiences with other developing countries. The Programme's consummation, however, will depend on the Agency's efforts to promote South-South cooperation in addition to the existing North-South framework. In this context, we appeal to the Agency to further continue to explore the possibility of introducing new and innovative programmes for the developing countries.

We also gratefully acknowledge the support extended by the Agency to Indonesia's Nuclear Energy Control Board in convening two regional workshops, the first on "Strengthening National Capabilities to Respond to Radiological Emergencies" and the second on "The Development of a Legal Framework Governing the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management and the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material". In our view, the holding of these two workshops was timely and appropriate for the Asia-Pacific region, as they contributed not only to an awareness of the problems involved, but also to developing the region's own capabilities in responding

to any radiological emergencies. We look forward to such activities in the future on various aspects of radiation safety and safeguards tailored to the specific needs of our region.

It should be emphasized that such cooperative activities implemented through effective programmes would contribute significantly to improving the scientific, technological and regulatory capabilities of the developing countries. My delegation welcomes the Technical Cooperation Strategy and the concept of "partner in development", including the country programme framework and thematic planning through the application of Model Project criteria. The adoption of these approaches by the Agency is in full conformity with the policy and strategy of the Government of Indonesia in giving a sharper focus on and greater emphasis to the advantages for the end-users and the socio-economic impact of science and technology, rather than on the output generated solely by research and development. Accordingly, our National Atomic Energy Agency has successfully developed partnerships with various ministries, provincial governments, academic institutions, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the development and application of nuclear techniques for the improvement of our people's welfare and well-being.

Let me take this opportunity to reaffirm that Indonesia has greatly benefited from the assistance received from the Agency. We look forward to further intensified cooperation through the Technical Cooperation Programme and in the framework of regional cooperative agreements.

The Acting President: We have heard the last speaker in the debate on this item today. The remaining speakers will be heard tomorrow morning.

I call on the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, who wishes to speak in exercise of the right of reply.

May I remind members that statements in exercise of the right of reply are limited to 10 minutes for the first intervention and to five minutes for the second intervention and should be made by delegations from their seats.

Mr. Hong Je Ryong (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): The delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea wishes to exercise its right

of reply with regard to the references to the so-called nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula by the Director General of the IAEA and by some countries in their statements.

As is well known, the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula is not an issue to be discussed at the United Nations. The nuclear issue is a political and military issue to be resolved bilaterally between the Democratic Republic of Korea and the United States in light of its origin, as well as in view of its nature. The nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula will be resolved when the Democratic People's Republic of Korea-United States Agreed Framework is fully implemented. It is therefore unfair and biased to request the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to implement this or that provision at the United Nations. This kind of approach will not help resolve the issue. If countries are truly interested in resolving this issue, they should encourage and promote the implementation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea-United States Agreed Framework.

Let me also briefly respond to the statement made by the South Korean representative. The reference to

the nuclear issue by the South Korean side, which knows much better than others that the issue is to be resolved between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States, gives rise to much suspicion on our part. We hope that the South Korean side will give up its notion of confrontation if it is sincere in its intention to achieve confidence and reconciliation on the Korean peninsula. We also deplore the double-faced approach of Japan to this issue and strongly urge Japan to settle the issue of its past crimes against the Korean people as quickly as possible before talking about this issue.

Programme of work

The Acting President: I should like to remind delegations that, as reflected in today's *Journal*, agenda item 44, "Global implications of the year 2000 date conversion problem of computers", will not be taken up tomorrow morning, and is postponed to a later date to be announced soon.

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.