

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND FIFTY-SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 14 April 1988, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Dávid Meiszter (Hungary)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 457th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

Today, the Conference is receiving three distinguished visitors appearing on the speakers' list for today who will be addressing us at the opening of this plenary. I should like to extend a warm welcome, on behalf of the Conference, to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria, Mr. Petar Mladenov, the Vice-Chancellor and Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria, His Excellency Mr. Alois Mock, and His Excellency the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland, Mr. Henryk Jaroszek.

His Excellency Mr. Petar Mladenov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria, was appointed to this position in 1971 and has participated in each regular session of the General Assembly of the United Nations since 1972. He has also had a distinguished political career, being at present a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, as well as of the Politburo of the Central Committee. He was also a member of the sixth, seventh and eighth Bulgarian parliaments.

His Excellency Mr. Alois Mock joined the Federal Chancellery of Austria in 1961, dealing initially with European economic questions, and later was a member of the Austrian delegation to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development in Paris. He has had a distinguished political career, having been elected in 1979 as Federal Party Chairman of the People's Party. Also in 1979 he presided over the European Democratic Union, and he has chaired the International Democratic Union since 1983. He has held his present position as Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs since January 1987.

His Excellency Mr. Henryk Jaroszek, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland, has been actively involved in disarmament problems for many years. He has been Permanent Representative to the United Nations Office at Geneva, to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, and to the United Nations in New York, and became Chairman of the First Committee of the General Assembly in 1976. He is well known to the Conference, since he addressed us in 1983, 1984 and 1986.

Distinguished delegates, before we go on with the traditional processes of our Conference, let me take the liberty of expressing my personal feelings of pleasure and satisfaction at the fact that today I have had the honour of welcoming here three outstanding visitors. They represent countries that are bound with my own by fraternal ties of close alliance, and by good-neighbourly relations that are often quoted as exemplary. In addition, I can highlight the fact that all three countries contribute to a great extent to common efforts in the field of disarmament and security, both in the European and in the global context.

In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference continues its consideration of the reports of the ad hoc subsidiary bodies, as well as of the special report to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

(The President)

As announced at our last plenary meeting, I shall put before the Conference for decision today a draft mandate for an ad hoc committee on item 3 of the agenda, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters", introduced by the Group of 21. The draft mandate is contained in document CD/515/Rev.4, which has been circulated to delegations. In accordance with our practice, after the list of speakers has been exhausted, the Conference will hold a brief informal meeting to consider that document and, immediately afterwards, we shall resume the plenary meeting to take up the proposed mandate.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Bulgaria, Austria, Poland, the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, Australia, the United States of America, China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

I give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria, His Excellency Mr. Petar Mladenov.

Mr. MLADENOV (Bulgaria) (translated from Russian): Comrade President, we are particularly pleased to see you, the representative of the Hungarian Peoples' Republic, in this prestigious post. Permit me to wish you success in the discharge of your lofty duties as President of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of April. I should like also to express our warmest wishes to Under-Secretary-General Martenson, the Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva, the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Komatina, and his deputy, Ambassador Berasatequi.

I am told that the Conference is not meeting in its usual room. This decision by the United Nations Secretariat was adopted without objections by the Conference. And this is quite understandable, because an important political act is taking place today - the signing of the "Geneva package" of agreements, which we hope will create the conditions for solving the problems of national reconciliation within Afghanistan and political settlement around it.

Since this is my first visit here, please forgive me if my statement does not fully match up to the high professional standards to which this forum is accustomed. However, I can assure you that I will sincerely and frankly put forward my country's position on the fundamental issues which are the subject of your noble activities.

The People's Republic of Bulgaria highly esteems the Conference on Disarmament, this unique forum called upon to play an important role in the disarmament process, which is for its part the key to resolving the cardinal issue of our age - the prevention of the catastrophe of war and the survival of mankind. Today the Conference, and international politics as a whole, are confronted by a historic challenge. We consider that it is necessary to overcome the stereotype of sterile battles of words, it is necessary to begin substantive negotiations, it is necessary to reach practical agreements. It

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is time to bring into play the multilateral mechanism of disarmament, it is time to give it the necessary impulse - that is how we construe the common task before us all.

The topical problems of peace, security and disarmament were at the focus of attention at the session of the Committee of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, held at the end of March this year in Sofia. Since the documents of the session have already been circulated I will touch on its outcome only very briefly.

The Sofia session discussed priorities for the further promotion and consolidation of positive trends in the international situation. In this connection the participants were highly appreciative of the Treaty Between the USSR and the United States on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, and issued an appeal for a consistent increase in the efforts of each and every State, while utilizing all the positive developments that had made the signing of the Treaty possible, so as to make the disarmament process irreversible.

It was emphasized that the conclusion of an agreement between the USSR and the United States on a major - 50 per cent - reduction of their nuclear strategic offensive weapons, together with compliance with the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972, and no withdrawal from it within an agreed period, would be a decisive step in this area.

Stress was placed on the need to conclude new agreements on the further reduction of military arsenals, the elimination of nuclear, chemical and other weapons of mass destruction, the establishment of military balance at ever lower levels and elimination of the threat of war in Europe and throughout the world.

The session participants drew special attention to the inadmissibility of attempts to "offset" the loss of weapons systems subject to elimination under the INF Treaty. Such actions would lead to a new spurt in the arms race.

The Foreign Ministers of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty voiced their countries' firm intention to seek substantial reductions in armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe between the Atlantic and the Urals. In order to reduce the risk of surprise attack, they consider it important that particular attention should be paid to those types of armaments which form the foundation of the offensive power of troops, including tactical nuclear arms. Historically conditioned asymmetries and imbalances could be eliminated, on a basis of reciprocity, by the party that for one reason or another was ahead in a given type of weapon.

The subject of these negotiations would be armed forces and conventional armaments and military equipment, including dual-purpose systems. In an endeavour to accommodate our partners' wishes we agreed that the nuclear component should be the subject of separate negotiations. The States parties

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to the Warsaw Treaty remain ready to conduct such negotiations concurrently with negotiations on conventional armaments, and reaffirm their stated ultimate aim, namely the complete elimination of nuclear weapons in Europe.

The session gave rise to a number of ideas of great potential aimed at stimulating the disarmament dialogue, removing still existing layers of mistrust and prejudice and ensuring forward movement on all fronts in disarmament through mutually acceptable concrete steps.

One such idea is the proposal for an early exchange of data on the numerical strength of armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe. In our view this would make it possible to obtain a clear picture of the real balance of forces in Europe, put an end to the exhausting arguments about figures and agree rapidly upon decisions and take the appropriate steps.

Our countries have frequently emphasized, and this was repeated again at the session, that they are ready for even greater openness on military matters, a new approach to issues of monitoring and verification and implementation of the idea of comparing military doctrines on the basis of the principle of reasonable sufficiency.

The participants at the session reviewed various aspects of disarmament and security issues in Europe, and put forward a variety of approaches providing for more rational solutions to specific issues of a structural and geographical nature. The merits of the package method, which envisages simultaneous reductions in various types of armaments where parties enjoy superiority, were pointed out. Examples are bomber aircraft and tanks. Mention was also made of the fact that particular attention should be paid to individual regions - northern and southern Europe, as well as the central zone, taking into account their geostrategic characteristics. All these issues were examined through the prism of lessening military confrontation and improving the psychological climate.

Great stress was laid in the proceedings on the need to make even broader use, for the purposes of the security and disarmament dialogue, of the scientific achievements and intellectual capacities of our countries and nations, to promote general interest in these issues, and to educate people in a spirit of peace, friendly relations, non-violence and co-operation in order to eliminate the nuclear threat and ensure the progress of civilization.

The session of the Committee of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty adopted an Appeal to NATO member States and to all States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. It presents systematically the Warsaw Treaty positions on the whole range of issues in the pan-European dialogue on security and disarmament, while taking maximum account of the wishes of our partners. In essence, this document is a broad and positive programme for interaction, and we hope that it will meet with a constructive response.

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We all understand that in order to successfully build a nuclear-free and non-violent world, good intentions are not enough - collective efforts are needed, a realistic global programme is needed. This must encompass military, political, social, economic, humanitarian and ecological aspects. Its implementation will bring about a genuinely comprehensive system of international peace and security on the basis of the Charter of the United Nations, within the framework of the world organization and with its most active participation.

This is a major objective that will not be attained easily. It is necessary to balance the interests not just of two or three but of hundreds of participants in international affairs. However, there is no alternative. With each wasted moment the knots of difference draw even tighter. As M.S. Gorbachev said graphically, it is necessary to think and act in a new way - history is pushing us to make haste, tomorrow may be too late, and there may not be a day after tomorrow. Under the dark thermonuclear cloud which hangs equally ominously above countries both large and small, neither cunning military strategy, nor new and exotic weapons, nor games of hide-and-seek can be of help. There is only one way to salvation: renunciation of the anachronistic reliance on nuclear deterrence, and nuclear disarmament.

The need for a new outlook has been eloquently expressed by a well-known American scientist: "We should restructure ourselves in the direction which has ensured the development of life over billions of years. We have to return to unity, though not at the subconscious, instinctive level we have grown above, but at a completely new level of consciousness. It is for our generation to make this leap forward."

The fact that peace is indivisible is something that we feel particularly keenly in our immediate geographical surroundings, the Balkans. The situation in that region is subject to the influence of both the recent positive changes in Europe and various ups and downs.

The Belgrade meeting of Balkan Foreign Ministers held on 24 and 25 February last is generally recognized to have made a definite contribution to improving the European situation. Bulgaria proposed at that forum a number of measures for lessening military confrontation, measures that have a specific Balkan dimension and take into consideration the general situation in Europe. We proposed that agreement should be reached on the exchange of information concerning national military doctrines with a view to enhancing their strictly defensive orientation, on transforming the line of contact between the two military and political alliances into a zone of confidence, on a multilateral freeze on military outlays, followed by reductions, and on a number of other measures. We also proposed the drafting of a concrete agreement not to allow the deployment of weapons, troop units and warships in the Balkans, following their reduction in other parts of Europe.

We stated in Belgrade our firm conviction that the idea of turning the Balkan peninsula into a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear and chemical weapons, is still extremely relevant today. In making

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such an assertion we did not wish to renew the polemics on the usefulness of creating such zones throughout the world. But we know full well that the presence of nuclear weapons near our borders in neighbouring countries, weapons capable of reducing our cities to ashes, does not reassure us, but greatly alarms us. The presence of such weapons is a precondition for mutual suspicion and fear. And fear and suspicion, as we know, are bad advisers. It is easy to imagine where an escalation of fear and suspicion might lead.

The truth is as follows: in the new conditions, particularly following the December 1987 Washington Treaty, favourable prerequisites are being created for the practical introduction of nuclear-free status for the Balkans, in other regions of Europe and the world. This opportunity must not be missed. Equally, there is no room for doubt that should the most modern weapons make their appearance in the Balkans, this would turn the peninsula into an arena of real military confrontation. This would severely undermine the stability of the rest of Europe and the prospect of achieving lasting peace on the continent.

So far as the People's Republic of Bulgaria is concerned, we see broad scope for joint action with all European States in the field of confidence-building, security and disarmament.

Bulgaria has participated in the work of the Conference on Disarmament since the establishment of the Committee of Ten. We have seen all the ups and downs in the work of this multilateral negotiating body, which has significant results to its credit. But it is precisely against this background that we cannot but be alarmed that over the past decade the Conference has been unable to elaborate a single multilateral agreement. It is as though a vicious circle has been created.

Here is an example in this respect: for years it was alleged that the Conference was not in a position to conduct disarmament negotiations because of the confrontation between the USSR and the United States, between East and West. Today there are those who maintain that it cannot fulfil its role in this field since intensive Soviet-American talks are under way. If the first allegation had some logic to it, we feel the second thesis is totally biased.

The Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria considers that bilateral and multilateral disarmament negotiations can and should be complementary options. It is necessary to find ways and means of harmonizing them to the utmost.

Our basic attention continues to be focused on the complex of nuclear disarmament issues. It is true that the Soviet Union and the United States bear particular responsibility in that field, and that all eyes are turned in their direction. This, however, does not mean that the other nuclear States bear no responsibility, or that non-nuclear States have no right - or are exempt from the duty - to participate in the solution of a problem of fateful importance for all nations. If we look at the question of nuclear weapon

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tests, we can see that this is a typical example, where the voice of each State - from the super-Power to the smallest Pacific island - has its value and importance.

The People's Republic of Bulgaria states once again that the prompt elaboration of a draft multilateral treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests would correspond to the interests of all States and would provide an extremely important impetus for nuclear disarmament. This final goal may be reached in various ways. The important thing is to strive sincerely to attain it. In this context we support the proposal that the Conference should seek agreement on the basic elements of international verification machinery and appropriate international legal procedures to ensure compliance with the future treaty, including on-site inspection, the establishment of an international seismic and radiation monitoring system and the functions of the international bodies responsible for verification.

I have been told that so far nine foreign ministers have taken the floor during the spring part of this session of the Conference. We can note that the common element in their statements has been recognition of the need for the complete and effective prohibition of chemical weapons and their destruction.

On behalf of my Government, I should like to confirm that the People's Republic of Bulgaria is not developing, does not manufacture and does not possess chemical weapons. There are no foreign chemical weapons on our territory. In addition, I can state that the key precursors of chemical weapons listed in schedule 2 in annex VI of the draft convention are not produced in the chemical industry of the People's Republic of Bulgaria. I should also like to recall here a decree adopted by the Council of Ministers of my country on 30 December 1986 placing restrictions on exports of certain chemicals which are intended for peaceful purposes but which can also be used for manufacturing chemical weapons.

Objectively speaking, the Conference is on the threshold of concluding a convention banning a whole class of weapons of mass destruction. The threat of the proliferation of chemical weapons, as well as the planned production of new, extremely dangerous versions of the "quiet death", make the task of ridding mankind of these barbarous weapons even more pressing. Concluding work on the convention is a first priority for the Conference. Rapid successful completion of this work will have an invaluable political and moral impact on the other areas of disarmament.

The Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria attaches great importance to the role which the Conference should play in preventing an arms race in outer space. The danger that weapons will be deployed in outer space becomes more tangible each day. To counter this danger it is necessary to respect existing agreements strictly and speedily devise new measures which would firmly block the arms race in this direction.



(Mr. Mladenov, Bulgaria)

On the basis of this approach we support the proposal for the institution of a system of international monitoring of the ban on the deployment of weapons of any kind in outer space. A central role in such a system could be played by an international outer space inspectorate, which would have access to all objects designed to be launched and stationed in space.

The situation following the conclusion of the Soviet-American Treaty on the total elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles opens up new prospects for strengthening the security of non-nuclear States. Until nuclear disarmament is achieved, non-nuclear States, Bulgaria included, which present no nuclear threat to other countries are fully entitled to expect guarantees against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Negotiations on this item of the Conference's agenda have been under way for nine years now. We are convinced that the time has come for bolder approaches which would shift the negotiations out of stalemate. The United Nations General Assembly has urged us to do so. There are already interesting proposals on this subject. Positive movement in this direction would have significant impact on the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime. In various forums the People's Republic of Bulgaria has repeatedly and very seriously raised the question of limiting and reducing naval confrontation and extending confidence-building measures to seas and oceans. We consider this issue to be increasingly relevant and urgent.

The problems of naval disarmament require a prompt reaction on the part of the world community. A suitable initial step to reduce tension in this area would be the rapid identification of confidence-building measures, which should in the first place be extended to areas where the volume of shipping is intense or the likelihood of conflict is high. This issue was assigned priority in the documents of the Sofia session of the Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Treaty States. These documents state that it is necessary to start negotiations involving the participation of major naval States, especially nuclear States, and other interested States, on the restriction and reduction of naval activities in agreed waters, the limitation and reduction of naval armaments and the extension of confidence-building measures to seas and oceans to ensure the safety and freedom of navigation.

Our country is preparing to participate in the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament - the most representative world forum in that sphere. We expect that, on the basis of a thorough analysis, the special session will identify the main approaches to disarmament and the strengthening of security, provide a positive impetus to all related bilateral and multilateral negotiations, and examine the question of improving the negotiating and consultative machinery in this field, and first and foremost that of enhancing the effectiveness of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. The participants in the Sofia session of the Committee of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty attach particular importance to the session. They clearly and unambiguously stated their attitude to the tasks before it and expressed the wish that the concluding document of the session should be as substantive and concrete as possible.

(Mr. Mladenov, Bulgaria)

We would like the Conference on Disarmament to be a rational and efficiently functioning body capable of finding generally acceptable solutions within reasonable time limits to the tasks it has before it. Awareness of its lofty mission, breadth of vision and new thinking, motivated by higher goals of importance to the whole of mankind, and not only by the customary motifs of strategic analysis, should guide us in our disarmament dialogue.

The Procrustean bed of these motifs has turned out to be fatal for the adoption of a number of long overdue positive decisions. A global political approach should be paramount in this important area. In the words of the President of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Todor Zhivkov, "the prevention of nuclear war and mutual destruction require us to raise ourselves above the restricted outlook of class and national interests, above ideological and other differences. In the nuclear age it is necessary to take action on a planetary scale, to proceed from the fact that we must live with one another and not one against the other".

We are convinced that this is precisely the kind of outlook which can give the Conference on Disarmament an opportunity to justify the hopes peoples have vested in it.

The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria for his important statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to my next speaker, the Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Austria, His Excellency Mr. Alois Mock.

Mr. MOCK (Austria): Mr. President, may I first of all thank you for the friendly words addressed to me and my country. It is a special pleasure to see you, Mr. President, in the Chair of this Conference - the representative of a country with which Austria shares a long common history and has established model relations of good-neighbourliness and friendship between States with different social and political systems.

I also wish to thank, through you, the former President of the Conference, Ambassador von Stülpnagel of the Federal Republic of Germany, for his dedication and his ambitious approach to the work of the Conference.

It is a great honour for me today to address the Conference on Disarmament, which my country considers to be a unique forum for today's as well as tomorrow's disarmament negotiations on a global scale. I welcome this opportunity to present the views of Austria on disarmament and arms control, and especially on specific disarmament issues which are discussed in this body.

The Conference on Disarmament provides the unique global multilateral negotiating forum for disarmament issues and is, therefore, of great political importance to all States. The special place which the Conference on Disarmament holds among the various disarmament forums in the eyes of an increasing number of States shows their awareness that their security concerns should find expression within a multilateral framework.

(Mr. Mock, Austria)

Austria, being situated in the centre of the continent with the greatest stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the greatest density of conventional armaments, follows your negotiations closely and with particular interest. Although Austria is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament, it is a candidate for membership and stands ready to contribute to the best of its ability to the progress of the negotiations of this Conference.

One of the outstanding international events of 1987 was the signing of the agreement on the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev.

This agreement is a milestone on the way towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. The Austrian public and the Austrian Government have taken note with great satisfaction of this agreement by which, for the first time, a whole category of nuclear weapons has been eliminated. We have followed the negotiations closely, not with the attitude of a curious bystander but of an interested party.

As you are aware, the security policy of Austria is based on the principle of permanent neutrality. As a neutral country we do not participate in military alliances. But we are conscious of the fact that the security policies of the two huge alliances between which the Austrian territory is situated has an impact on our own security. The maintenance of a stable equilibrium between the two alliances lies therefore in the Austrian national interest.

Stability can only be increased in a political climate in which States do not think it necessary to amass more and more armaments to protect their security. Confidence-building is therefore an essential part of practical disarmament politics. The fact that it was possible to find solutions to the complex questions of verification will engender more of that necessary confidence and open the door to further disarmament agreements between the two major military Powers.

No State can be more aware than Austria of the importance of the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union for the development of the international community toward a stable order in which international problems can be solved in the interest of all concerned. The State Treaty of 1955, the basis on which Austrian independence was re-established after the Second World War, is testimony to that philosophy.

Our presence in Geneva today allows us to be witness to an important event that exemplifies the validity of that philosophy. An unrelenting negotiating effort under the auspices of the United Nations has resulted in a consensus on the basis of which the Afghan people may find a chance to exercise its right of self-determination. This success enhances the reputation of the United Nations, its Secretary-General Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar and Under-Secretary-General Cordovez, and also contributes to the climate of détente between East and West. Thus a door may have been opened to the settlement of other regional conflicts.

(Mr. Mock, Austria)

Austria has always taken the view that disarmament is a step by step process by which the global equilibrium of military strength should be finally established at as low a level as possible.

We are, therefore, looking forward towards the next step following the conclusion of the INF agreement. In that spirit the whole world is looking forward to the meeting of the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union in Moscow. We are convinced that the negotiators here in Geneva will spare no effort to solve the remaining issues on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty which will be one of the major items to be dealt with in Moscow. The questions of verification arising with respect to that treaty pose an even greater challenge to the political and technical imagination of the negotiators than those that had to be solved for the conclusion of the INF agreement. The time has come when mutual verification of contractual obligations will be considered more and more as an important element of international co-operation rather than as an unwelcome intrusion into matters of national sovereignty.

In the context of negotiations on the strategic arms reduction treaty the essential questions of present-day strategic thinking have come to the surface. The link between the reduction of strategic weapons and the arrangements envisaged with regard to continued observance of the ABM Treaty goes to the heart of strategic doctrine. The time has come for these basic questions to be discussed in the appropriate forums and, in time, negotiated at the appropriate level.

I now wish to comment briefly on the Vienna Follow-up Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Progress and results so far achieved at that conference are less than encouraging.

Some progress has been registered in the area of military security, where the current task is to find an agreement on the mandates for two sets of future negotiations: one in the field of conventional arms control and disarmament, the other in the field of confidence-building and security-building measures. In this respect, today's general East-West climate exerts a positive influence on the course of the Vienna talks.

Only a few days ago some participating States ceased to insist that the so-called dual-capable systems should be included in the mandate of the negotiations on conventional arms control and disarmament. I consider this a constructive and positive move which might well succeed in removing an important obstacle to an agreement.

In all other fields, even in basket II, which had been of a less controversial nature at previous CSCE meetings, consensus has so far been possible only on a few items.

Although the Vienna meeting has had to work its way through a difficult phase, I certainly see a chance that it will finally yield a substantial concluding document, which will enhance respect for the Helsinki Final Act and further strengthen the CSCE process. I expect a set of new precise

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obligations in all areas of the CSCE: for the first time we have a chance to establish a co-operative system to monitor the implementation of the CSCE commitments in the human dimension. The negotiating structures in the field of military security, which seem close to agreement, should be capable of introducing new momentum into both conventional arms control and disarmament and the improvement of confidence-building measures.

As I said before, I consider substantial results from the Vienna follow-up conference possible in all baskets. I am also convinced that the neutral and non-aligned States will continue to fulfil their mediating role in order to help achieve this aim. If there is sufficient progress at the Conference in the weeks to come, the neutral and non-aligned States will, with their best efforts, try to elaborate a comprehensive draft of the Vienna concluding document. The Foreign Ministers of the neutral and non-aligned group will be meeting for that purpose in Vienna on 12 and 13 May.

One of the major issues on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament is the global elimination of a particularly inhuman and horrifying weapon. I am speaking of the efforts to conclude a chemical weapons convention.

The activities of the Conference on Disarmament in this field are confronted with a context of the utmost urgency. Hundreds and even thousands of civilians, including women and children, are being killed or wounded in large-scale chemical weapon attacks in the course of an ongoing war. The shattering pictures of poison gas victims have created an awareness of the danger of chemical weapons among the public. Victims of such weapons are being treated in Austrian hospitals. Austria firmly condemns the use of such weapons, which constitutes a flagrant violation of international law.

In view of the present use of chemical weapons and the danger of their further proliferation, a world-wide ban is of the highest priority. Our endeavours should, therefore, concentrate on stimulating the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament in order to conclude the chemical weapons convention at the earliest possible date.

This convention should lead to the elimination of all existing stocks and production facilities of chemical weapons, and thereby significantly enhance international security. Agreed verification procedures will, of course, constitute an essential element of a comprehensive and global chemical weapons convention. The issue is complex and much detailed work remains to be done, particularly in the areas of non-production and on-site challenge inspections.

The control mechanism should be devised in a way which ensures the effective and comprehensive implementation of the principle of non-production of chemical weapons. For this purpose, it seems necessary for all States to provide at the earliest possible date detailed information on their actual arsenals, their chemical weapon production facilities and all other chemical industry facilities considered as potentially falling under the future chemical weapons convention.

(Mr. Mock, Austria)

With a view to contributing to this process of confidence-building, I wish to recall that in accordance with its treaty obligations, none of the chemicals listed in schedule [I] of the annex to article VI of the so-called "rolling-text" (CD/795) are produced in Austria. I further wish to inform the Conference that the Austrian delegation will provide the following specific data on the Austrian chemical industry's production facilities. On the basis of the "matrix version" submitted under CD/CW/WP.193, Austria is ready to give detailed information concerning production facilities and chemicals listed in schedules [2] and [3] of the afore-mentioned article. Comprehensive research on data relating to both schedules is under way so that the filled-in matrix can be presented to the Conference during the first half of this year.

As regards the proposals concerning the contents of schedule [4] which have been submitted to the Conference, there will be readiness on our part for substantive co-operation and participation in an international exchange of views.

Let me add that Austria is at present examining the legislative requirements for establishing transfer and export controls on eight highly toxic chemical substances, five of which belong to the category of the afore-mentioned "key precursors", so that the necessary regulations can come into force as soon as possible.

Regarding recent proposals on various forms of ad hoc checks of the chemical industry, which are based on the principle of on-site challenge inspections, further intensive work still needs to be done. The control of chemical enterprises, particularly private ones, could affect confidential commercial information and also increase the production costs of the companies concerned.

Let me draw your attention to the fact that the International Atomic Energy Agency, for which Austria has served as the host country since 1957, practises a communication system which has taken care of some of the above preoccupations. This successful system should be studied with a view to possible lessons to be learned.

For the purposes of studying the requirements of the verification machinery of the future organization and its consequences for the chemical industry, some Austrian chemical enterprises have indicated their readiness for, and interest in, co-operating with the Conference on Disarmament by offering to serve as model facilities. The Austrian enterprises concerned are examining to what extent such a contribution is possible from a technical point of view.

Such an exercise would make it possible to test the specific verification machinery envisaged with respect to the production or non-production of chemical substances listed in the draft convention. International experts would be welcome to examine the functioning of the verification procedures.

(Mr. Mock, Austria)

The financial implications for member States of setting up the organization, and those possibly arising for the chemical industry concerned, could also be evaluated. On the basis of such an assessment, conclusions could be drawn with a view to finally determining the framework of the organization. The chemical industry, too, could study the implications and be helped to take the necessary preparatory measures to be ready at the time of the entry into force of the convention.

It is evident from my remarks that my country attaches great importance to the global elimination of chemical weapons. Let me point out in this context that the International Atomic Energy Agency has highly qualified staff who have acquired valuable experience in the field of control and verification. Enabling the new organization which is to be established under the chemical weapons convention to benefit from the experience of those experts might result in the sharing of technological knowledge and possibly in the saving of financial expense. We would hope that the international atmosphere of the Austrian capital and its available infrastructure could help to facilitate the important tasks of new organizations.

Knowing that this question is not of immediate priority, I nevertheless take this opportunity to confirm that Austria would be willing and pleased to be the host to the envisaged organization, should the international community consider such a choice conducive to the most effective implementation of the chemical weapons convention.

You are aware that it is a traditional goal of our foreign policy to increase Austria's role as an international meeting-place.

In concluding my remarks on chemical weapons, I should like to express my firm conviction that the Conference on Disarmament has a historic chance to complete a convention on the global banning of these weapons in the near future. Let no obstacles come in our way during the last stretch of this important disarmament endeavour.

Even more destructive than chemical weapons are nuclear arms. With regard to this threat, endeavours to halt nuclear testing play a crucial role.

A decisive step towards halting vertical proliferation and curbing the qualitative arms race would be the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

The problem of adequate verification of such a treaty has played an important part in the deliberations on that question. We understand - and the majority of the international community shares that view - that the question of verification of compliance within reasonable margins can be considered as technically solved.

Austria actively participates in the search for solutions of those technical questions as a member of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts examining international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events. The results achieved so far are highly encouraging, and we are

(Mr. Mock, Austria)

convinced that further progress will be made in the forthcoming sessions. The future functioning of a global seismological network is at the core of the entire verification machinery. We are confident that the utilization of the most recent technology will facilitate the achievement of the objectives envisaged.

Technological considerations, important as they are, cannot, however, in themselves produce a solution to what is a political problem. They can only ensure that the conclusion of an agreement is not obstructed by a lack of mutual trust. What is needed is the political will to conclude an agreement.

On 2 February 1987, the Austrian Federal Government launched an appeal to the Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics and the Government of the United States of America to renounce further nuclear testing pending the conclusion of a nuclear test-ban treaty. The Federal Government stated that it considers the prompt opening of negotiations on and the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty as essential steps towards curbing the nuclear arms race.

Austria further called for the mandatory and consistent observance of all existing arms control agreements. Only in that way can an acceleration of the spiral of armament be avoided and that spiral be halted.

Disarmament efforts in 1987 and 1988 and the concrete results achieved have created a constructive climate of good will, and have given hope that further progress on a bilateral as well as multilateral level can be achieved. The third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should allow us further to advance in our work and enable us to concentrate on the major disarmament issues at stake.

Special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament have a particular role in the field of multilateral disarmament endeavours. The international community shares the responsibility to make the forthcoming third special session a success. Its final document will have to contain guidelines for future efforts and define what particular steps should be taken to meet the challenges of the present and to face the future.

Therefore, the discussion might usefully concentrate on a limited number of key items. The impact of the special session on the outcome of the various ongoing disarmament negotiations can be considerable if its concluding document is clear and specific.

Austria highly appreciates the efforts of the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee, Ambassador Mansur Ahmad, the distinguished head of the delegation of Pakistan to this Conference. The paper prepared by Ambassador Ahmad and annexed to the report of the Preparatory Committee is to become the basis for the deliberations on the various subjects on which the working groups will concentrate during the special session.



(Mr. Mock, Austria)

Further consultations will have to take place before the opening of the special session. My delegation is prepared to enter into concrete deliberations in order to enhance the preparatory work done so far.

The task of scrutinizing present and future disarmament efforts includes a review of organizational questions. As you know, Austria is among those States which have been candidates for full membership in the Conference on Disarmament for several years.

In recalling the candidature of Austria for membership in this Conference I wish to express my country's expectation that the forthcoming special session will not fail to direct its attention to the fact that, since the conclusions of the second special session on the enlargement of this Conference were adopted, no progress has been achieved on this question. As the number of States particularly interested in more active participation in the work of the Conference has grown considerably in past years, the forthcoming special session is called upon to treat this question thoroughly under its item "Machinery".

We hope that the third special session will achieve a breakthrough regarding the question of participation in the Conference for all States concerned. States having a particular interest in an issue considered by the Conference should be allowed to participate in its work if their application for membership meets obstacles which cannot quickly be overcome.

In concluding, let me express my confidence that the Conference on Disarmament will continue to play a growing role in promoting disarmament and arms control, and will thereby contribute to the building of an international order based on peace, security and justice.

Berta von Suttner, the Austrian writer who won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1905, stated some 90 years ago: "The twentieth century will not come to a close unless society has abolished that biggest scourge of mankind, war, as a legal institution". Although there is little chance that her dream will become true in the remaining years of our century, we should not weaken in our efforts towards that noble goal. Disarmament is one important element in this common endeavour.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Austria, His Excellency Mr. Alois Mock, for his important statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland, His Excellency Mr. Henryk Jaroszek.

Mr. JAROSZEK (Poland): Mr. President, allow me first of all to express my deep thanks for your kind words of welcome. On my part, I sincerely wish you, as a representative of our close friend and ally, the Hungarian People's Republic, every success in discharging the responsibilities of your high office. My best wishes go also to the

(Mr. Jaroszek, Poland)

United Nations Under-Secretary-General, the Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva, Mr. Jan Martenson, to the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Komatina, and to the Deputy Secretary-General, Ambassador Berasatequi.

Permit me to express my particular satisfaction that I have an opportunity to speak at today's meeting of this Conference, which has been honoured by the addresses of two distinguished Ministers for Foreign Affairs, their Excellencies Mr. Petar Mladenov of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and Dr. Alois Mock, the Vice-Chancellor of the Republic of Austria. I have listened to their statements, as I am sure we all have, with utmost attention.

The Conference on Disarmament has entered one of the most challenging periods in its history. The current session has generated more expectations than any other. One also finds with satisfaction that rarely have there been better conditions for these expectations to be met.

This year the Conference is working in a more favourable political environment. The international atmosphere has been palpably relaxed and promising trends are gaining momentum in inter-State relations, especially between East and West. Undoubtedly, new thinking about the world's problems is already yielding positive results.

Poland, the Soviet Union and other States parties to the Warsaw Treaty have been contributing to the improvement of the international climate. They have further activated their co-ordinated foreign policy, which has always had disarmament as one of its main objectives.

Advances in the Soviet-American dialogue, particularly with regard to disarmament, have been of crucial importance. Their most meaningful manifestation was the Washington summit meeting last December, where a Treaty on the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles was concluded. As we all know, it covers an entire class of nuclear weapons. The political and psychological impact of this achievement can hardly be overestimated. What is particularly encouraging is the fact that both Powers regard the Treaty only as a point of departure for further, more substantive disarmament. Intensive talks are under way to reduce strategic weapons by 50 per cent and to strengthen the ABM Treaty. I am sure that we are all looking forward to the successful conclusion of these talks and to the signature of agreements in that respect at the forthcoming Moscow summit meeting.

Significantly, the scope of positive trends in international relations has extended to the sphere of regional conflicts. The Soviet initiatives and the efforts of the United Nations concerning Afghanistan have reached fruition on this very day with the signing of an agreement in the Council chamber. Poland welcomes this important event. The latest endeavours by the United Nations, and regional efforts to extinguish hotbeds elsewhere, have brought about new hopes. In some areas, however, conflicts are still going on in spite of calls to solve them through negotiations.

(Mr. Jaroszek, Poland)

The current policy modification which is taking place in international relations seems to be a timely move in the right direction. The arms race has posed a total physical threat to mankind. The substantive and objective global scope of the threat calls for collective efforts in order to put into effect a comprehensive system of international peace and security. Other challenges of the day, including underdevelopment, hunger, international terrorism and environmental pollution, can no longer be met by individual nations or even regional undertakings alone. Together, and only together, can we hope to find a way out.

Still, this does not mean that progress in disarmament will be free of obstacles. This matter affecting the national security interests of States is fraught with many complicated problems which will have to be overcome. It will take time, and we can understand that. What we cannot understand nor be reconciled with are attempts to nullify the results already achieved. What I am referring to are calls in some circles for measures to compensate for missiles removed from Europe under the Washington Treaty. Such a trend would take us back to the point of departure, and would deal an irreparable blow to the overall disarmament course.

Poland and its allies want to believe that common sense will prevail and that such calls will not be heeded. We trust that the positive transformations in international relations have created a climate which will also be favourable for the current session of the Conference on Disarmament. The Conference must be allowed to play an independent and active role in the growing momentum of disarmament efforts.

The Conference on Disarmament has been designated as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body of the United Nations. Its predecessors were able to make important strides towards curbing the arms race and promoting disarmament by working out a number of well-known and important international instruments.

It is only natural that the creation of the Conference was accompanied by great expectations and hopes, which, regrettably, have not yet been met. There is a sharp dissonance between those expectations and the reality of today. The results achieved over a decade now are really very modest. What are the reasons for this highly deplorable situation?

The Conference can accomplish as much as all its members want to. We are perfectly aware that the lack of specific results does not necessarily reflect the weakness of this Conference as such. It means, above all, the lack of political will on the part of several member States. Without such a will any progress in negotiations remains a pipe-dream.

The Warsaw Treaty Organization, of which my country is a member and in which I personally have the honour to hold the position of the Secretary-General of its Political Consultative Committee, has on numerous occasions very clearly demonstrated its determination to act concretely for real progress in disarmament, increasing mutual confidence and strengthening of détente.

(Mr. Jaroszek, Poland)

The communiqué issued last year following the Berlin session of the Political Consultative Committee of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty offered a broad spectrum of disarmament initiatives. The States concerned expressed their determination to do "everything in their power so as to achieve concrete accords, bilateral and multilateral, with the aim of removing nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction by the end of this century." In the same communiqué the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty expressed their readiness to eliminate imbalances and asymmetries in the armed forces maintained by the two alliances in Europe, including their northern and southern flanks. Preparations for talks on conventional disarmament and the strengthening of confidence and security in Europe are in progress within the framework of the Vienna meeting on the basis of the Warsaw Treaty Organization's Budapest Appeal of June 1986 and the subsequent NATO response. The idea of appropriate modifications of military doctrines so that they could be reciprocally recognized as strictly defensive has again come from the side of the Warsaw Treaty. Last month in Sofia the Committee of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, in an Appeal to the NATO member States and all States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, to which the distinguished Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria referred in detail, called for the exchange of data on armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe of the members of the Warsaw Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The Conference on Disarmament has been duly informed about these initiatives, and could play an important role in promoting them. As you will recall, last October, in Prague, the Committee of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty elaborated a set of proposals aimed at enhancing the efficacy of the Conference. The proposals, dealing with both the agenda and the organization of work, are still on the table, waiting for a hopefully positive response.

The failure of the Conference to produce concrete disarmament agreements cannot be the sole factor in evaluating the work of this body in recent years. Bearing in mind all the conditions which have been affecting its proceedings, we take a positive view of what the Conference could accomplish. Such a view is based on the following premises:

Firstly, the Conference has made tangible progress in advancing the "rolling text" of a convention on the total elimination of chemical weapons;

Secondly, the activities of its ad hoc committees as well as its plenary sessions have played an important role in the clarification of positions of States, in the preparation and co-ordination of actions which have proved complementary to bilateral negotiations, and in providing information for public opinion.

Turning to the current as well as future activities of the Conference, I want to make several specific observations.

(Mr. Jaroszek, Poland)

The current session seems to be of paramount importance in the perspective of the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which in barely six weeks will start reviewing the state of global disarmament and the condition of the United Nations disarmament machinery. Today, the Conference has a final chance to prove its credibility and to live up to the Final Document of the first special session. The time remaining is very short, but it is long enough to make a decisive move forward.

This thought takes me to the problem of chemical weapons. It is here that the Conference is closest to the fulfilment of its mandate. Really impressive headway has been made towards elaborating a convention on the elimination of chemical weapons. There are, of course, some outstanding difficulties which still need to be overcome. New possibilities in this respect emerged last year. The Soviet Union and the other States parties to the Warsaw Treaty came out with new proposals, first of all concerning verification. Regrettably, these bold and far-reaching ideas have not always met with due attention on the part of some States concerned. However, chances for a breakthrough still exist, and here they are the most pronounced.

We strongly believe that the early finalization of work on the convention for the total elimination of these weapons should be approached on the highest-priority basis. In its capacity as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on this topic, Poland will spare no effort to reach that end.

In order to further facilitate work towards a convention and contribute to the strengthening of confidence in the process of negotiations, my Government wishes to inform the Conference that none of the key precursors is manufactured in Poland.

Of the chemicals listed in schedule [3], the following are produced exclusively for peaceful purposes, and each of them at one plant: phosphorus trichloride, phosphorus oxychloride, phosgene and hydrogen cyanide.

Poland has been traditionally of the opinion that the question of nuclear disarmament, the prevention of nuclear war and the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests should remain on the top of the Conference's agenda. We stand persuaded that no one can legitimately argue against any constructive measure designed to forestall a nuclear war, for the simple reason that such a war could pose a threat of the total physical annihilation of mankind. This body owing to its experience and its composition, is exceptionally well placed to embark on business-like negotiations on nuclear issues. All the nuclear Powers and the majority of the so-called "threshold nuclear States" are represented here. Such negotiations would in no way compromise the process of bilateral talks. Quite to the contrary: they would complement them.

Poland firmly believes that prevention of an arms race in outer space should be firmly established among the Conference's priorities. It is beyond any doubt that the extension of the arms race to outer space would inevitably unleash a new, more intensive, more costly and much more fatal round of the arms race on Earth. As a corollary, progress in disarmament would be rendered

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almost impossible. The Conference on Disarmament is an eminently qualified organ to contribute to the maintenance of outer space as a domain for exclusively peaceful co-operation among all nations. A lot of useful work in this respect has already been accomplished by the Ad hoc Committee on this topic. It is high time, however, to negotiate specific international accords.

Poland has always attached major importance to the Conference on Disarmament and believes, therefore, that the negotiating mandate of this forum should be strengthened and further developed.

Naturally, the question of efficacy cannot be passed by. In this respect we would like to reiterate once again our full commitment to the proposals set forth last October by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty. In particular, Poland stands for year-long sessions of the Conference with two or three short breaks, for the more intensive utilization of groups of experts, and for the broadest possible participation of non-member States in the work of the Conference.

Obviously, the Conference on Disarmament forms a very sensitive part of the disarmament machinery. On the one hand, it co-creates a climate and rhythm of efforts for disarmament. On the other hand, as a feedback, its effectiveness is considerably dependent on progress made on other forums. Hence, proper attention should be paid to all endeavours which hold out prospects of positive disarmament solutions.

As we all know, in this regard Poland has also recently made its own genuine contribution, a plan to decrease armaments and increase confidence in Central Europe, which is commonly known as the Jaruzelski Plan. Its contents and objectives have already been presented by the Polish representatives at this forum and circulated as official documents of the Conference. What is worth drawing attention to is the favourable reception of the plan in many capitals.

Its ideas have objectively turned out to be strictly interconnected with many disarmament and security topics which are at present subjects of different negotiations. While reflecting the national security interests of Poland, they respond to various concerns recently voiced in Europe. We note with satisfaction that the exchange of views provoked by the plan has already proved helpful in narrowing gaps and looking for common ground on such problems as the evolution of military doctrines, the elimination of asymmetries through package solutions or the reduction of armed forces to levels sufficient for self-defence and the prevention of war.

The plan does not suggest final solutions, it merely points to possible options. Therefore, it is open in nature, and joint efforts are needed to find the best ways of transforming its ideas into reality.

We continue working towards further improvement of the Polish initiative. Soon, I believe, we will be ready to share with our partners the results of new studies in this respect.

(Mr. Jaroszek, Poland)

In conclusion, I feel obliged to stress that the plan only emphasizes Poland's traditional involvement in and dedication to seeking a peaceful and secure world. To the best of our ability we will constructively work here, in Geneva, and in other negotiating forums to ensure that positive trends in the disarmament field are systematically developed and their positive effect made irreversible.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland, His Excellency Mr. Henryk Jaroszek, for his important statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador von Stülpnagel.

Mr. von STULPNAGEL (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. President, let me express my pleasure and satisfaction at seeing you in the Chair of the Conference on Disarmament. Your patience and skill and diplomatic commitment will lead us, I am sure, to a good outcome of our spring session.

In my intervention today I have the honour to speak on behalf of a group of Western countries, and on the subject of chemical weapons.

Transparency is a concept countries of the West have advocated in the field of arms control and disarmament for a long time. This is also true with regard to our negotiations on a global ban on chemical weapons. A number of contributions have been made by Western delegations towards this end.

In particular I would like to recall the working paper submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on 8 March 1983 (CD/353) and its revision of December 1985, which for the first time provided detailed data on the number of companies in the chemical industry producing specific key precursors. Likewise I would like to draw particular attention to the publication submitted by the United States in July 1986, entitled "Chemical stockpile disposal programme", which included detailed information on the location and composition of the American CW stockpile as well as on plans for its destruction. To these very important steps towards increased transparency we might also add the workshops organized by members of the Western Group within the framework of our negotiations. I would only like to mention the workshop in Tooele, Utah in 1983 as well as the verification workshops hosted by the Netherlands in 1986 and by my country in 1984.

We consider the multilateral provision of data prior to the signing of a convention on chemical weapons, so aptly invoked this morning by the Foreign Minister of Austria, not only a confidence-building measure but also a necessary prerequisite for drafting an effective convention, as well as ensuring its early functioning. We welcome the fact that, in submitting its memorandum on multilateral data exchange on 18 February this year, the Soviet Union has also accepted this view.

We thus consider it timely to conduct such an exchange. For this purpose we propose the provision by all States participating in the negotiations of data according to the format which is included in the working document which I

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have the honour to present today. As can be seen from the document, which has been distributed, the data which are required to be provided multilaterally are clearly tailored to the needs for working out an effective convention, which will have to function immediately upon early entry into force.

In conclusion, I would like once again to urge all delegations to the Conference on Disarmament to participate in this not only desirable but indispensable step prior to the signing of the convention, and to submit to this Conference on a voluntary basis the data to be provided according to our document. I am convinced that the provision of such information will have a positive effect on the course of the negotiations.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Rose.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Comrade President, my delegation would like to join you in your kind words of welcome expressed to the distinguished guests who have delivered speeches at today's session, which we have followed with great interest. The presence of His Excellency Foreign Minister Petar Mladenov of Bulgaria, His Excellency Vice-Chancellor Alois Mock of Austria and His Excellency Deputy Foreign Minister Henryk Jaroszek of Poland, just like the visits of their colleagues in February and March this year, underscore the growing importance being accorded by many States to the work of the Conference on Disarmament. This is also, in our opinion, a significant contribution to the preparations for SSOD-III. In their statements our honoured guests strongly emphasized the need to continue the work on the convention on a chemical weapons ban in a purposeful and speedy manner. My statement today is also devoted to this subject, but before proceeding I would like to express our deep satisfaction at the signing of the agreement concerning Afghanistan which will take place in a few hours in this building, as this will be an historic event which reaches beyond the region concerned and is also promoting a favourable international environment for disarmament.

At its forty-second session the United Nations General Assembly unanimously urged the Conference on Disarmament to reinforce further its efforts with a view to the final elaboration of a convention on the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction.

The German Democratic Republic declares its unconditional support for the aim of achieving without further delay a comprehensive and global ban on chemical weapons. No type of chemical weapons may be excluded therefrom. Neither development nor production will be permitted following the entering into force of the convention. Nowhere shall there exist stocks of chemical weapons which remain exempted from verified destruction. Any delay would jeopardize the convention. This is a truth we have been forced to realize again in the past days and weeks. While we are conducting negotiations, chemical weapons are being manufactured, or preparations for production are



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under way. Chemical weapons are being used and the endeavours aimed at their proliferation are increasing. These are irrefutable facts which must be countered not only by words but also by deeds. The danger of a chemical war will be eliminated effectively only if a binding chemical weapon ban is achieved. To this end, comprehensive efforts are called for both at the negotiating table in Geneva as well as outside these negotiations.

The efforts made in the negotiating process have produced different results. A positive development is in the offing concerning the provisions on verified closure and destruction of chemical weapon production facilities. Thus, it still might be possible at this spring session to fill the gaps contained in the text of article V and in the annex thereto.

As far as article IV is concerned, prospects are emerging for an understanding on the order of destruction pursuant to principles that take into account the security interests of all sides. It has proved possible to delete most of the footnotes and brackets in the present text. It can thus be gathered that practical negotiating efforts have definitely borne fruit.

On the other hand, serious problems have come to the fore on these subjects, to which I will return later on.

Now as before, it turns out to be rather complicated to agree on provisions of article VI, specifying guarantees against the production of chemical weapons in chemical industry.

My delegation has joined in the efforts to speed up the process of finding solutions by advancing concrete proposals. It was only recently that we submitted working paper CD/CW/WP.195, entitled "Article VI: Régime for chemicals in schedule [1]". It incorporates a comprehensive formula which should facilitate an early understanding. We devote great attention to reliably verifying all activities that are connected with schedule [1] chemicals, since these are substances posing the highest risk to the convention. In handling these chemicals no "grey zones" must exist.

Another problem which has been a concern of many delegations is the protection of confidential information and data. An analysis of the latest state of affairs in the negotiations, which was presented by us in working paper CD/CW/WP.194, indicates the scale of the work so far accomplished.

Many provisions relating to protection of the confidentiality of information already have a place in the "rolling text"; others are set out in the addendum and appendix material. Some gaps still need to be filled. Further elaboration of "models of agreements" would be a practicable approach here.

In the field of challenge inspections, a solid basis has been created for working out a convention text. This foundation could be consolidated if we deepened the understanding on how to implement the agreed principles. My delegation endeavoured to make a contribution in this direction by presenting working paper CD/CW/WP.198. It includes proposals for amendments concerning

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

the guidelines on the international inspectorate, proposals which, I am glad to note, met with a positive response from other delegations. The work on this subject can give an even clearer picture of how the principles of challenge procedures, such as "access to the site", "least intrusive manner" and "protection of sensitive equipment or information", materialize in inspection activities. This, together with the provisions governing the designation of inspectors for challenge inspections, as well as the application of specific inspection instruments and methods, would create effective means to avert the danger of abusing challenge inspections.

As regards the verification mechanism of a CW convention, the provisions specifying the composition, size and decision-making powers of the Executive Council and other procedural matters still need to be elaborated. On this topic, my delegation submitted working paper CD/812 of 8 March 1988. The deliberations on this item are proceeding in a constructive manner, and the first outlines of an understanding in principle are beginning to take shape.

The efforts undertaken in the Committee, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Sujka, to draw up the final clauses of the convention, resulted in the presentation of a discussion paper setting out concrete proposals for the text, which can serve as a foundation for further elaboration on these articles.

The results and the proposals for solutions give grounds for thinking that the negotiations will be completed before the end of this year, as was demanded by the foreign ministers of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty at their recent Sofia meeting. If a green light was given by all sides involved towards this end, a carefully drawn up accord could come to fruition before then, by virtue of our joint efforts and thanks to the results produced so far, the experience gained in this process and the well-functioning negotiating machinery.

There is, however, no reason for complacency, but rather for serious concern that this objective is moving more and more out of sight. We see ourselves faced with the danger of the pace of negotiations becoming ever slower, and being thereby virtually adapted to the schedule of current and future production programmes for chemical weapons.

Time and again, too long passes before a reply is given to compromise formulae. It is due to inflexibility lasting for too long that many proposals identifying possible solutions have not reached fruition. Moreover, we are very sorry to see new concepts being introduced which question a long-existing consensus on the scope of the prohibition and move away from extensively elaborated formulae on articles IV and V. Diligence and professional expertise at the negotiating table alone cannot remove such obstacles. What is now called for are steps which strengthen the political will to conclude a convention on a CW ban and which serve to build further confidence, parallel to intensive negotiations on specific subjects. Against this background, we consider it to be imperative that political forces should be mobilized on a world-wide scale to counteract the risk of the negotiations' coming to nothing.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

It is also necessary to arouse the interest of those States not participating in the negotiations, and to stimulate their readiness to accede to the Convention. In so doing, we see, inter alia, the following possibilities: taking up confidence-building measures with the aim of preparing a convention. The Soviet Union's memorandum of 18 February 1988 on multilateral data exchange in connection with the elaboration of a convention on the complete and general prohibition of chemical weapons (CD/808) incorporates a number of valuable proposals relating to confidence-building measures. They have met with a broad positive response. Several delegations are still dealing with single problems involved. Work is being done in the German Democratic Republic with a view to recording data on the production of chemicals now set out in schedules [2] and [3], as well as on their production facilities. In that regard, my delegation suggests intensifying the exchange of views in order to reach an agreement on the details of these confidence-building measures. We support the proposal that all interested States should participate on a voluntary basis in such an exchange of data.

The same goes for the idea of conducting trial inspections. As far as this proposal is concerned, valuable considerations emerged from the Pugwash Workshop which was held in January this year. The German Democratic Republic is very much interested in these steps. At the moment it is examining the possibility of carrying out such trial inspections.

The proposed confidence-building measures could fulfil two tasks: they would enhance the confidence of all sides involved in efforts to bring about a comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons, and at the same time data and experience would be gained which were useful for implementing the provisions of the convention.

The proposals on the establishment of chemical-weapon-free zones serve the same objective. Only a few days ago, I was able, together with my colleague, Ambassador Vejvoda, to inform you of a further significant initiative in this field. In a joint declaration of 5 April 1988, the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the Social Democratic Party of Germany express their concern at the problems which have arisen since autumn 1987 and may delay or even endanger the conclusion of a convention on the general and complete ban on all chemical weapons and their destruction. The parties support the appeal addressed by the Governments of the German Democratic Republic, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany to the participants of the Conference on Disarmament to proceed with their work in a constructive spirit and to remove all obstacles along the way. The three-party initiative advocates negotiations on ridding their territories of chemical weapons or keeping their territories free of them. This proposal forms part of the overall aim of encouraging agreement on a chemical weapons ban. The elements already finalized on a CW convention should thus be inserted into the text of the regional accord. Just as in the case of confidence-building measures, though with the difference that the agreement on a chemical-weapon-free zone would be an international treaty, the initiative is an enterprise that would provide extremely important experience for the finalization and implementation

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of the global convention. We hope that this initiative will fall on fertile ground. Its source was the same line of thinking that led to the decision to withdraw the shorter-range nuclear missiles deployed on the territories of the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia before the INF Treaty enters into force.

The forthcoming special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament will be a further occasion for demonstrating the political resolve of all interested parties to bring about a CW convention at the earliest possible date. It will also give an opportunity to elucidate the prospects of multilateral disarmament efforts and to open up new avenues leading towards concrete results. We consider it to be imperative during SSOD-III to focus great attention, inter alia, on the issue of bringing about a CW convention as speedily as possible. It may lend fresh momentum to the question of relieving our negotiations from burdens and insecurities.

The Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Genscher, when addressing this body in February this year, spoke of an existing consensus in principle on the issues to be resolved in connection with the CW convention. At SSOD-III there will be the chance to build substance into this consensus in principle, to surmount existing contradictions and to simultaneously extend this consensus to all United Nations Member States. Given the relevance of these issues, we deem it appropriate to make use of the presence of leading representatives at the third special session devoted to disarmament in order to conduct a cordial and constructive dialogue.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement. I give the floor now to the representative of Australia, Ambassador Butler.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): Mr. President, may I begin by expressing to you the extreme pleasure felt by my delegation at seeing you preside over this Conference. We have great admiration for your diplomatic skills, and we view you as a good friend. My delegation is also very impressed and grateful for the presence at the Conference today of three Ministers for Foreign Affairs. It underlines to us the importance of this Conference, and I think too, I would want to echo the words said by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria with regard to how special this day is, the day on which the United Nations role in facilitating a solution to the problem of Afghanistan is being recognized. This is a good day for the United Nations.

The Conference is currently considering the draft of its report to the third special session of the General Assembly - including on its work on item 1 of its agenda, Nuclear test ban. Our report will give the special session an account of what happened in this Conference - and did not happen - on this major agenda item during the six-year period since the second special session took place.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

Because we are at this stage in the development of our report. Because others have addressed this subject in recent plenary statements and, because my delegation hopes it is not too late for action to be taken before the third special session convenes, my delegation thought it might be helpful if we offered the following remarks.

The period since the second special session has been marked by our failure to establish an ad hoc subsidiary body under item 1 of our agenda. Following each occasion of that failure - at the end of each year - we have drawn up a report on this subject. We are doing the same now with regard to the special session. While these reports have been able to be adopted by consensus it is no secret, that on each occasion, this has been only following an attritional process of negotiation. It has been like this mainly because there has been a fairly widespread interest in seeking to lay blame for our failure to reach agreement on the establishment of an ad hoc subsidiary body on a nuclear test ban.

Seeking to assign blame or trying to find out whose fault it has been may have a certain forensic interest. But as I have made clear in previous statements, it is of little real interest to Australia. I believe the same is true of many other members of this Conference. What is surely more important is to try to bridge the gaps that have served to prevent us from doing what we all say is vital - to see multilateral work under way on a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty.

The kind of jousting that has taken place has occurred on the field of various competing mandates under which it is proposed an ad hoc subsidiary body should be established. My delegation's understanding of the concept of a mandate is that it should describe the nature and purposes of the work to be undertaken. If this proposition is accepted, then confronted with a situation of conflict of mandates the innocent observer could be expected to assume that the various proposals involved are very different.

What is the reality in this Conference? The mandate that has been supported by my delegation and a group of Western member States would have a subsidiary body undertake

"substantive examination of specific issues relating to a comprehensive test ban, including the issue of scope as well as those of verification and compliance with a view to the negotiation of a treaty on the subject"

- the subject being, unambiguously, a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty.

A more recent draft mandate, provided in document CD/772, would establish an ad hoc committee

"with the objective of carrying out the multilateral negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty".

That mandate, incidentally, also provides for work to be carried out on the contents, scope, compliance with and verification, of such a treaty.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

Clearly there are differences between the two approaches represented by these two draft mandates. Under certain circumstances those differences could be seen as crucial. But are these today's circumstances? I suggest they are not. A few years ago when nothing was happening multilaterally or bilaterally on the issue of nuclear testing it was frequently argued, in this Conference, that our efforts and atmosphere were being negatively affected by the state of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Flowing from this some made the case that an absolute kind of mandate had to be adopted by this Conference as the basis for any work on an end to nuclear testing. But those bilateral circumstances have changed.

Work is now in progress, in progress today in this city, between the United States and the Soviet Union on limitations to nuclear testing. And this work is proceeding under an agreement which speaks in terms of the objective of an ultimate end to all nuclear testing.

Surely if yesterday's logic about the relationship between the bilateral and multilateral work were to be applied to today's circumstances we should also be at work in this multilateral forum towards the objective of a treaty on an end to all nuclear testing. Instead yesterday's fight is still being fought. So we are missing an opportunity which we previously insisted should be ours, and we are failing in our responsibility to those who sent us here and expect so much of us.

In discussions of issues which will form a crucial part of the work of the third special session it is repeatedly pointed out, by all sides, that multilateral work on an end to nuclear testing is one of the central issues. If this is true and my delegation believes it is, surely it is not too late for us to act, prior to the special session, to establish an ad hoc subsidiary body on item 1 of our agenda. There can be no suggestion of indecent haste. Any good result is better than none whenever it comes.

It remains within our power to demonstrate at the special session that while the road has been difficult and it has taken too much time to traverse, we have nevertheless arrived. Like any such leap forward, generosity is required and at least a touch of mutual faith. We all know what is involved. It is not to lay blame or to seek to score a political point but to reach agreement, in the name of progress.

In the view of my delegation the draft mandate of July 1984 given in CD/521 can and should form the basis of such an agreement. Some approaches to this subject tabled during the last few years were, initially, distant from the approach of CD/521. Now they are almost identical. But the difference is crucial and support for CD/521 has grown. The approach of CD/521 has been strongly supported in the General Assembly, including at its last session where the related resolution achieved the largest positive vote ever cast on a comparable resolution.

In our consideration of the draft report to the special session on this subject some delegations have spoken in terms of certain mandates having been "submitted" to the Conference. Those terms have implied that the presentation

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

of a mandate for decision, which in the recent past sadly has meant for rejection, in some way assigns to that mandate a special status different from one which has not been formally put to decision. We Australians simply do not understand the satisfaction which might derive from submitting to a universal body ideas which it is known, in advance, will be rejected. The search for consensus must clearly be pursued more sincerely than that. Such action is also misleading and, in any case cannot lead us to a positive outcome in a body which must operate on the basis of consensus.

This point is illustrated by the draft mandate in CD/521. It was tabled almost four years ago. It has not been pressed to a decision. It has been available for acceptance on every day this Conference sat since the day it was tabled. It remains on the table and available for such acceptance today. Perhaps above all, and I want to emphasize this point, above all, it has the complete and political support of the States who advanced it and whose participation in the work of any subsidiary body on a nuclear test ban would be essential.

The overwhelming majority of members of this Conference have said already or implied that they could now accept this mandate. What would be the practical point then of any other approach? Do we want work to commence or prefer to be able to lay blame for its absence?

We hear repeatedly that our failure to work on this subject is a great failure. My delegation agrees. We know that this will be a major issue at the special session. My delegation accepts this fact. Our appeal thus is to act now, because it is not too late.

Let us go to the special session able to report that we have resolved our differences and have established an ad hoc committee of this Conference on a nuclear test ban. This would be an achievement of which we could be proud and the draft mandate given in document CD/521 can be the basis of that achievement.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Australia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Friedersdorf.

Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): Before beginning my prepared statement, I would like to extend a warm welcome on behalf of the United States delegation to our distinguished visitors, the Foreign Minister of Bulgaria, Mr. Mladenov, the Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister of Austria, Mr. Mock, and the deputy Foreign Minister of Poland, Mr. Jaroszek. Their appearance before the Conference on Disarmament is the latest in a series of such appearances by other high-level officials from many States around the world, and is a testimony to the importance of the issues with which this body deals. Our delegation has listened carefully and with interest to their statements today, and appreciates and welcomes their presence in Geneva.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

As the spring part of the 1988 session draws to a close, I would like to comment on what has been achieved during the last few months in the chemical weapons negotiations. I plan to take the floor again at the next plenary meeting to present some ideas about the future course of these negotiations.

The work on a chemical weapons ban has continued over the last several months in a business-like and constructive manner. The Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has carefully and methodically considered several important issues. New ideas and proposals have been submitted and considered. Undoubtedly, the results of this work have helped to lay the foundation for future accomplishments.

I would like to comment on the activities of each working group, as well as the work supervised by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee.

Working Group A, under the able chairmanship of Mr. Cima of Czechoslovakia, has had an extensive and detailed discussion of monitoring of the chemical industry under article VI and on co-operation for economic and technological development under article XI.

To facilitate work on article VI issues, the United States delegation presented proposals for the thresholds that will apply to the monitoring régimes for schedules [1], [2], and [3]. These proposals, which are contained in document CD/802, have generally been well received.

Some delegations, however, have expressed concern that under the United States proposal, synthesis of laboratory quantities of schedule [1] chemicals would not be subject to international monitoring. The concern apparently relates to possible clandestine activities that are aimed at development of chemical weapons. There does seem to be agreement, however, that the small quantities synthesized do not pose a threat to security in themselves.

We, too, are concerned in general with possible clandestine development of chemical weapons. However, proposals by some delegations to monitor synthesis of small quantities of chemicals do not help to enhance security. We do not support such an approach because it would be ineffective. Illegal activities at the early low-level stages of development would be easy to hide. That is a fact of life. The United States delegation remains ready, however, to consider seriously any further proposals to improve verification of the prohibition of development of chemical weapons.

Working Group A has also devoted considerable time and energy to the so-called schedule [4]. Despite very active and constructive discussions, little progress has been achieved in finding a mutually acceptable approach to this issue.

The additional schedule resulted from a widespread concern about the potential risk posed by super-toxic lethal chemicals that are produced in civil facilities and that are not covered under the schedule [1] régime. The concern extends both to the chemicals themselves and to their production



(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

facilities. After several years of discussions, we have concluded that this concern seems to be exaggerated, but should not be dismissed entirely. While it is still not clear how many chemicals and facilities in this category pose risks to security, technical discussions have shown that the problem is likely to be very limited.

In our view it is now necessary to consider alternatives to the questionable approach represented by the proposed schedule [4]. Two different problems should be considered. First, how should the convention deal with any extremely toxic civil chemical that in the future might be considered a potential chemical weapon?

One possibility for dealing with commercial chemicals that pose a high risk would be to place them under the schedule [2] régime, as proposed earlier by several western delegations. This régime already provides for strict monitoring for key precursors. It should not be too difficult to adapt it to extremely toxic chemicals.

The second problem is how to identify and monitor facilities that might be suitable for producing schedule [1] chemicals.

The concept of "ad hoc checks" proposed by the Federal Republic of Germany in document CD/791 is the only alternative approach now before the Conference for dealing with facilities that normally produce innocuous products, but that present a risk of clandestine conversion to chemical weapon production. Obviously, criteria would be needed for identifying such facilities. One possibility would be to focus on types of civil products that require chemical processes common to chemical weapon production.

The United States delegation's initial reaction to the "ad hoc checks" proposal is that it is a constructive one. We are prepared to join with other delegations in exploring this idea and any others that are introduced. Creative approaches are needed if progress is to be achieved.

Additionally, Working Group A has begun to discuss the possible content of article XI, on the issue of economic and technological co-operation. Co-operation is important for many countries, and the United States recognizes this. We are already playing a major role through efforts in international organizations and in the private sector. We believe that the future convention should not impede co-operative efforts. We continue to have doubts that a security agreement like the future chemical weapons convention should contain an obligation to engage in economic and technological co-operation.

I would now like to turn to the discussions in Working Group B, which is capably chaired by Mr. Macedo of Mexico. The principal topics have been provisions for declaration and destruction of chemical weapons under article IV, including the order of destruction, and the provision under article X for assistance in protection against chemical attack.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

Provisions regarding the destruction of chemical weapons are among the most sensitive aspects of the convention. They affect directly the existing security arrangements of States. One can expect States to proceed very cautiously in developing such provisions. None the less, over the last year positions have gradually been converging. Thanks in no small part to the skilful work of the 1987 and 1988 Working Group chairmen, understandings have been reached on the categories into which chemical weapons are to be grouped, the period for destruction of each category, and the need for levelling out of stocks before the end of the destruction period.

The United States continues to consider it important that all States possessing chemical weapons begin destruction within a year after the convention enters into force. The elimination of chemical weapons from national arsenals is a global problem. We must avoid approaches that suggest otherwise.

Further work is needed on the technical issue of how to compare binary and unitary weapons, on where the levelling out should be set, and on whether more than one such threshold will be needed, assuming States other than the United States and the Soviet Union will also declare possession of chemical weapons.

Let me now comment on the discussions of article X, which has received a major share of the Working Group's attention.

States correctly attach importance to maintaining a strong capability to protect themselves against chemical attack, even though chemical weapons will be banned. The illegal use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war demonstrates clearly that violations may occur, with horrible consequences.

Differences clearly exist, however, about how to deal with protective programmes in the future convention. Some believe that the emphasis should be on promoting assistance, others on avoiding creation of new obstacles to protective activities. In this regard, we welcome working paper CD/809 presented by the delegation of Argentina. While there are important points on which the United States position is different, we believe that this working paper has made a significant contribution to a realistic and constructive discussion.

In addition to the order of destruction of chemical weapons and article X, Working Group B also has responsibility for provisions on destruction of chemical weapon production facilities and on so-called "old stocks". I would like to touch on these two topics for a moment.

The elimination of chemical weapon production facilities is a fundamental component of a convention. In 1985 extensive consultations were held in the Committee on this complex and difficult subject. However, major differences remained.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

For the past two years, the delegations of the United States and the Soviet Union have been working diligently to develop a mutually acceptable approach to this issue and thereby to facilitate the multilateral negotiations in this area. In the most recent round of bilateral discussions, a common approach was reached. This approach is based on a carefully crafted and practical definition of a chemical weapon production facility that takes account of the concerns of both delegations.

During the two years of discussions, alternative ideas were subjected to searching examination. Each side showed a willingness to consider seriously the views of the other. Out of this process emerged a joint view that chemical weapon production facilities should be completely destroyed. This judgement applies both to the buildings and to the equipment of the facilities.

The two delegations have provided material on their common approach to the Chairman of Working Group B, for use in his consultations. It is our hope that these consultations will lead to the elaboration of the relevant provisions of the "rolling text", thus eliminating a major gap in the draft convention.

How to deal with so-called old stocks under the convention is also a complex and delicate topic, which we understand is being discussed in private consultations. While one must not exaggerate the importance of this issue, it is none the less essential that the approach that eventually emerges should not undermine the definition of the term "chemical weapon" nor create a loophole for avoiding the declaration and verification of chemical weapons. We shall look forward to learning the results of the private consultations, so that the Conference may develop appropriate provisions for the future convention.

Let me now present our views on the topics being discussed under Working Group C, which is under the outstanding and very capable chairmanship of Mr. Numata of Japan. These are the functions and interrelationships of the treaty bodies, the composition of the Executive Council, and challenge inspection.

In our view, the combined efforts of the Working Group chairmen for 1987 and 1988, Dr. Krutzsch and Mr. Numata respectively, have resulted in a much-improved text for article VIII. We would like to express our appreciation to both of them. While unresolved points remain, it is our hope that agreement can be reached during the summer. We also would like to express our appreciation to the delegation of Canada for its working paper, CD/823.

For a long time, the composition of the Executive Council was considered a forbidden subject. We welcome the efforts of Mr. Numata to explore this new territory. We appreciate also the contribution of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic in its working paper, CD/812.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

There appears to be a common view that the Executive Council must be small enough for effective work and yet represent the different interests involved in the convention. In our view an appropriate balance must be found among the interests of the international community as a whole, of the States whose existing security arrangements are most directly affected, and of those States that bear the brunt of the verification régime.

While care must be taken to achieve political balance in the Executive Council, we do not see how this goal could be reached directly. It would not be desirable or practical to try to list States according to political groups. Rather, the balance must be accomplished indirectly. In this connection, the interrelationship between the decision-making procedures and political balance must be noted. Political manipulation of decision-making would be more difficult with a requirement for a two-thirds majority than if only a simple majority were required.

Challenge inspection has long been one of the most important and difficult issues in the negotiations. This is only natural. Routine inspection is clearly not sufficient, and it is therefore necessary to develop provisions for access to some of the most sensitive locations and facilities that States have. No one should expect these negotiations to be easy.

At the same time it should be recognized, as pointed out by the distinguished representative of Argentina, Ambassador Cámpora, on 8 March 1988, that under the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, a number of States have already agreed to a mandatory challenge inspection régime.

The Chairman's report on challenge inspection contained in appendix II of CD/795 demonstrates that important steps have been made recently toward a common approach. At the same time it is clear that serious differences remain on each stage of the challenge inspection process: the initiation process, the inspection itself, and the follow-up.

Discussions have shown that the interrelationships of the three stages must be taken into account. Measures to protect against abuse of the right to request an inspection reflect concern that efforts might be made during an inspection to acquire information not related to verification of the convention. This is the concern, for example, behind our own proposal for a fact-finding panel.

The United States supports the August 1987 suggestion of the Soviet Union that procedures be developed for challenge inspections that will provide effective inspections and will minimize the risk of disclosure of sensitive non-chemical-weapons-related information during an inspection. We urge the Soviet delegation to develop this suggestion in a more detailed form. In this context we would note that the effectiveness of the procedures will determine the effectiveness of challenge inspection. We are prepared to consider seriously any detailed ideas that may be presented.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

In considering the conduct of challenge inspections, we support the suggestion of the Federal Republic of Germany in CD/CW/WP.191 that further attention should be given to the possible role for a representative of the requesting party. This subject was discussed at length during the Chairman's consultations in the 1987 session. It was not resolved and therefore could not be dealt with in the Chairman's report. This issue is a fundamental aspect of any challenge inspection provision and therefore requires further discussion.

We welcome the increased attention that is now being given to the provisions for follow-up to a challenge inspection. As yet, this important aspect is relatively undeveloped.

The United States believes that after evaluation of the inspection report, the challenging State should notify the Executive Council whether or not it has concluded that a violation has taken place. If the challenging State, or any other State party receiving the inspection report, concludes that a violation has taken place, it should provide the Executive Council with a statement regarding its findings, and, to the extent it deems appropriate, the course of action it plans to take pursuant to its findings. The Executive Council should provide the statement regarding the violation to all States parties and to the United Nations Security Council.

In our view a special meeting of the Executive Council should not be convened automatically each time there is a challenge inspection. Instead, the convention should allow a special meeting to be convened if a specified number of States believe it is necessary.

The question naturally arises of what actions the Executive Council might be empowered to take after an inspection.

The United States believes that the Executive Council has an important role to play after an inspection. It can and should consider and recommend actions for States parties to take to resolve concerns. While such recommendations would not be binding, they would carry behind them the very considerable political weight of the Council.

We do not believe that the Council can or should try to be a court. It cannot realistically be expected to act as an impartial judge of whether a violation has occurred. This judgment must be reserved exclusively for individual States parties.

In conclusion, I would like to touch briefly on the discussions that were held on the final articles of the convention. The United States delegation welcomes the efforts of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Sujka of Poland, to initiate work on texts for articles XII-XVI of the "rolling text". The Chairman's paper he has prepared will undoubtedly assist efforts during the summer to identify areas of agreement and issues that need to be resolved.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

In summary, we have seen in recent months how the combined efforts of all delegations have moved our negotiations forward on a broad front. As I have tried to outline today, the work of the Ad hoc Committee, under its capable Chairman and Working Group Co-ordinators, has helped to clarify areas that heretofore had been ambiguous, establish concrete provisions where before there had been only principles, and set to work on principles where before there had only been headings.

The progress made by this Conference and its Ad hoc Committee may not always be readily discernible. Sometimes the answer to one question brings with it a new question. Sometimes exploration of a subject area reveals to us how much there is still left to do in that area. But we should not fail to recognize the advances that none the less have been achieved through our joint efforts.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement.

Distinguished delegates, we have exhausted the time available to us this morning and we still have to complete the list of speakers and take up document CD/515/Rev.4. Accordingly, we will have to continue with our deliberations this afternoon. In this connection, I wish to thank the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament for kindly agreeing to delay the meeting of that important subsidiary body this afternoon so that we can conclude our business for today. The Committee will also meet in this room. I suggest now that we suspend the plenary meeting and resume it at 3 p.m. sharp.

The meeting was suspended at 1 p.m. and resumed at 3.15 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: The 457th plenary meeting of the Conference is resumed. We shall now proceed with the list of speakers for today, and later we shall take up document CD/515/Rev.4. I give the floor to the representative of China, Ambassador Fan, who is speaking in his capacity as Chairman of the Group of Seven to introduce the second report of that Group, contained in document CD/WP.341.

Mr. FAN (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. President, first of all, in my capacity as representative of China, I wish to warmly congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the CD for the month of April. The peoples of China and Hungary share a tradition of friendship, and in recent years there have been new developments in our relations of co-operation in various fields. Our work this month is very important, as we have to complete our report to the third SSOD. We are convinced that under your able guidance, the Conference will certainly conclude with positive results.

(Mr. Fan, China)

This morning the Foreign Ministers of Austria, Bulgaria and Poland came to the CD and made important statements. China shares friendly relations with each of the three countries. The Chinese delegation wishes to extend its warm welcome to the three Ministers.

(continued in English)

And now I will present my report in English. On behalf of the members of the Group of Seven, I have asked for the floor to introduce the second report of the Group on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference, which is contained in document CD/WP.341 dated 12 April 1988. This report is presented to the Conference in accordance with its request that the Group should report on the progress of its work approximately every six weeks. I understand that the report submitted by the Group will be considered at an informal meeting of the Conference.

The Group held 10 meetings during the first part of the 1988 session of the Conference. During its deliberations, the Group focused its attention on the various questions appearing in each section of the report.

The report comprises six sections, as follows:

- A. Participation of non-member States in the work of the Conference;
- B. Participation of scientific and technical experts in the work of the Conference;
- C. Non-governmental organizations;
- D. Disarmament consultative council;
- E. Time, duration and organization of the annual session;
- F. Membership of the Conference.

As was the case with the first report of the Group, contained in document CD/WP.286, the Group took into account the list of issues concerning the improved and effective functioning of the Conference contained in the informal paper circulated on 21 April 1986, as well as new ideas which emerged during the deliberations of the Group this year. In the case of sections A, B and C, the Group agreed on the suggestions being transmitted to the Conference. In addition, the Group discussed sections D, E and F. As noted in the report, in view of the limited time available, the Group was not able to conclude its consideration of the options and ideas contained in those sections. The report of the Group does not need further explanation. It is the hope of the members of the Group that the suggestions, ideas and options contained in CD/WP.341 will assist the Conference in the consideration of the subject of its improved and effective functioning.

(Mr. Fan, China)

As usual, the members of the Group and myself, as its Chairman, will be happy to clarify any point contained in the report which might need additional explanations.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Fan of China for his kind words addressed to the Chair, and I thank him in his capacity as Chairman of the Group of Seven for the presentation of the report of that Group. In this connection, I should like to note that in the timetable of meetings to be held next week, provision is made for an informal meeting of the Conference on Tuesday, 19 April, immediately after the plenary meeting, to consider that report, as well as any other aspects relating to the improved and effective functioning of the Conference. I now give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Nazarkin.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): It is an honour for me today to speak at a meeting which is notable for important statements made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Petar Mladenov, the Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Austria, Alois Mock, and the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Polish People's Republic, Henryk Jaroszek. These statements constitute important contributions to the work of the Conference.

In connection with the fact that on 13 April, the co-ordinator of Group B, the representative of Mexico, Pablo Macedo, submitted to the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons a working paper on chemical weapon production facilities, I would like to state the following. The question of chemical weapon production facilities has a long history. Discussions on this issue at the unofficial consultations in the framework of the Ad hoc Committee in 1985 showed that progress in dealing with this problem would be facilitated if a common understanding were reached by the delegations of the USSR and the United States as regards the definition of such facilities. For that reason consideration of the issue of CW production facilities has occupied an important place at the Soviet-American consultations which are being held in accordance with the agreement reached by the leaders of the two countries at their Geneva meeting in November 1985. As a result of that work on a bilateral basis a common approach was agreed which became the basis for the paper submitted by the co-ordinator of Group B, Mr. Pablo Macedo. We hope that the paper that has been submitted will contribute to the early finalization of the provisions of the draft convention on this subject.

Let me now make a few short remarks about the other issues discussed at the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The present session has achieved definite progress in elaborating a number of articles of the convention, in particular articles IV, V, VI and VIII. A greater degree of agreement has been reached as regards the provisions of article IV ("Chemical weapons") and its annexes. They have to a considerable extent been "cleansed" of square brackets and footnotes reflecting reservations. Important work has been done to clarify the principles for and order of destruction of chemical weapons. Agreement has been reached on a new, more complete, detailed text of the annex to article VI ("Activities not prohibited by the Convention")



(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

relating to production of super-toxic lethal chemicals not included in schedule 1. A useful discussion has been held on the question of ad hoc checks as a form of verification of non-production. More detailed consideration has been given to the issue of defining the concept of the "production capacity" of facilities for the purpose of the convention. A number of provisions of article VIII ("The Organization") have been updated. In particular, a new text has been elaborated on the Technical Secretariat. Rather fruitful, useful discussions have been held on other issues related to the international organization to be established under the convention. Serious work has begun on articles X and XI, devoted to issues related to the provision of assistance and economic and technical development. In working on these articles the Soviet Union proceeds from the concept that the security of the States parties to the convention should be based on collective measures to counter emergence of the threat of the use of chemical weapons, as well as the generally recognized principle of "disarmament for development". We note with satisfaction the active role the delegations of the neutral and non-aligned States are playing in drafting these articles.

Elaboration has begun of the concluding articles of the convention, in particular on such important issues as the signature, ratification and entry into force of the convention, its relationship to other international agreements, amendment, etc. The results of this discussion are included in the document prepared by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Boqumil Sujka of Poland, which reflects the viewpoints of the various delegations.

In the course of discussion of article IX (Challenge inspections) at this session, a number of delegations have expressed concern at the danger of abuse of challenge inspections and have proposed ways to prevent such abuses. This question was also raised in today's statement made by the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Max Friedersdorf. Interesting proposals have been made concerning possible approaches to the solution of this problem (for example, document CD/CW/WP.198 of 5 April this year submitted by the German Democratic Republic). In our view this document contains a number of specific ideas which could be used in drafting the relevant provisions of the convention. In this connection we would like to emphasize that we consider it especially important that measures to prevent abuse of challenge inspections should be elaborated and implemented exclusively in the context of, and not in spite of, the principle of the mandatory nature of inspection. There should be no weakening of that principle or exceptions therefrom. This is a matter of fundamental importance. We continue to believe that the paper on on-site challenge inspection prepared by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee and contained in appendix II to document CD/795 provides a good basis for finalizing this part of the convention. The most appropriate solution to the problem of alternative measures (paragraph 12 in the Chairman's document) would in our view be to use the relevant provisions of the working paper from Great Britain (CD/715). We confirm our readiness to engage in practical work to agree on a treaty text on that basis.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

Unfortunately, the spring session of the Conference has shown that on some questions not only has there been a lack of progress, but indeed a tendency has emerged of departing from the compromises already outlined as the result of some delegations' having repudiated, abandoned their previous provisions. This, as well as the slow-down of negotiations in general, causes alarm. We fully support the assessment of the status of the negotiations made by the Group of 21 in its statement on 8 March this year. We subscribe to the list of the goals of the negotiations set out by the Group, as was said in a statement issued by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 16 March this year. The statement also indicates the reasons for the slow progress. As for the Soviet delegation, it is fully determined to do everything within its power to speed up work on finalizing the convention as much as possible.

The Soviet delegation appeals to all participants in the negotiations on a chemical weapon ban to make further efforts to identify scope for mutually acceptable solutions on questions which have not been agreed, so as to complete the work on those provisions which have not yet been the subject of formulations for the future convention. The early conclusion of the convention on the complete and general prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons would not only rid humanity of this type of weapon of mass destruction, but would also demonstrate the potentialities of multilateral efforts in disarmament, and would give impetus to further progress in this and other fields.

In conclusion, the Soviet delegation would like to thank Ambassador B. Sujka for his tireless efforts in organizing the work of the Ad hoc Committee on the prohibition of chemical weapons in an effective way, as well as the co-ordinators of the three working groups, A. Cima, S. Numata and P. Macedo, whose personal contribution to the negotiations has facilitated the search for the necessary compromises at an important stage in the elaboration of the draft convention.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement. That brings us to the end of my list of speakers for today. Does any other member of the Conference wish to take the floor at this moment? I recognize the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Mr. MASHHADI (Islamic Republic of Iran): On Tuesday, 12 April, in the plenary session, the distinguished Ambassador of Argentina read out to us a communiqué issued by the Argentine Foreign Ministry condemning the "war of the cities" and the use of chemical weapons in the war between Iraq and Iran. While the Islamic Republic of Iran fully shares the view expressed by Argentina and welcomes any humanitarian initiative to this end, unfortunately a slip in interpretation, which is an extremely rare event, prompts my delegation to make use of the right of reply to put the record straight. The original text in Spanish referred to the use of chemical weapons en la guerra entre ambos países, which means in the war between the two countries and not by the two, which was the interpretation provided to all delegations today. This case has proved to all of us the valuable and outstanding job the interpreters and translators are doing, without which our work would be

(Mr. Mashhadi, Islamic Republic of Iran)

impossible. I would like to avail myself of this opportunity to express the thanks of my Government for the humanitarian position adopted by the Argentine Foreign Ministry and, at the same time, our apologies to the Ambassador of Argentina for the inconvenience arising from the misinterpretation.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran for his statement. Are there any other delegations which wish to take the floor at this moment? I see none.

As announced at the opening of this plenary meeting, I should like now to suspend it in order to convene an informal meeting of the Conference to start our consideration of document CD/515/Rev.4.

The meeting was suspended at 3.37 p.m. and resumed at 3.43 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: The 457th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

As requested by the Group of 21, I put before the Conference for decision document CD/515/Rev.4, containing a draft mandate for an ad hoc committee on agenda item 3, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". Is there any objection to the draft mandate? I recognize the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Mr. von STULPNAGEL (Federal Republic of Germany): The Western Group is disappointed to see that once again the draft mandate contained in CD/515/Rev.4 is being proposed for decision by the Conference. This has been done without any consultation with this Group. We do not believe that the submission of this draft mandate, which calls for the establishment of an ad hoc committee on the agenda item "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters", will facilitate our work on this subject. Thus we are once again unable to associate ourselves with the proposed draft mandate.

The Western Group has stressed the significance it attaches to in-depth consideration of agenda item 3 from the time this item was placed on the agenda of the Conference. Indeed, we consider the prevention of war in any form of paramount importance. This objective is the corner-stone of the security policies of Western countries. The effective prevention of every kind of war, be it nuclear or chemical or conventional, is a matter of global concern. All States are therefore called upon to do everything in their power, as a priority objective of their policies, to prevent the outbreak of conflict.

In considering this item we should not just focus on nuclear weapons. Every day we are made painfully aware of the cruelty and inhumanity of wars fought with conventional and chemical weapons.

Nuclear disarmament must not give rise to the belief that the world has been made safe for conventional, chemical or other types of war. The goal of nuclear disarmament, which we endorse vigorously, must be to increase international security and stability. The Western Group advocates an arms

(Mr. von Stulpnaegel, Federal Republic of Germany)

control process which encompasses nuclear as well as conventional and chemical weapons, which enhances stability in all its aspects, promotes confidence, and advances by individual steps which are both stabilizing and verifiable.

The Western Group attaches the greatest importance to practical policies and actions aimed at preventing all war, including nuclear war. They note in this context the ongoing complex of negotiations and contacts between the United States and the Soviet Union, including arms control, human rights and regional conflicts.

We also draw attention to the negotiations aimed at achieving further confidence- and security-building measures, and the forthcoming negotiations on conventional stability in Europe, as well as efforts and measures undertaken in other parts of the world. Furthermore, we welcome concrete bilateral measures which have been taken, such as hot lines, nuclear risk reduction centres and incident prevention agreements.

In conclusion I would like to stress the hope that a substantive discussion of all aspects involved in agenda item 3 will prove to be possible during this year's session. The Western Group is ready for this. Equally, we continue to be willing to jointly search for and define an appropriate framework for the consideration of this agenda item within the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement. In view of this statement, I have to state that there is no consensus at present on the draft mandate appearing in document CD/515/Rev.4. Does any member wish to take the floor at this stage? I recognize the representative of India.

Mr. TEJA (India): For a few seconds a little while ago, we were beginning to feel that perhaps the mandate proposed in document CD/515/Rev.4 might enjoy consensus, but perhaps the reality was too short and we must therefore be patient.

Mr. President, earlier during the month of April, I had occasion to felicitate you and convey the assurances of the co-operation of our delegation in the discharge of your responsibilities. We have listened with attention to the statements made by His Excellency Mr. Mladenov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, His Excellency Mr. Mock, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Austria, and His Excellency Mr. Jaroszek, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland.

We, the Group of 21, would like to express regret at the inability of the Conference on Disarmament to set up an ad hoc committee on agenda item 3. We have shown ourselves ready to exchange views on this subject, here or in the General Assembly. But some delegations have not agreed with this, as their priorities seem to be different.

I do not need to emphasize the importance that our Group attaches to this item. We believe that the greatest peril facing the world is the threat of

(Mr. Teja, India)

destruction from a nuclear war, and that consequently the removal of this threat is the most acute and urgent task of the present day. While nuclear-weapon States bear primary responsibility for avoiding nuclear war, we believe all nations have a vital interest in the negotiation of measures for the prevention of nuclear war, in view of the catastrophic consequences that such a war would have for mankind. The Harare Declaration adopted at the Eighth Non-Aligned Summit also emphasized this point.

It is a matter of concern for all delegations present here that no progress has been possible on this item since its introduction as a separate item on the CD's agenda in accordance with the General Assembly resolution 38/183 G. During these years the arms race has accelerated, leading to the introduction of still more lethal warheads into nuclear weapon stockpiles.

The United Nations General Assembly has repeatedly requested the Conference on Disarmament to undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war, and to establish for that purpose an ad hoc committee on this subject.

During the 1987 United Nations General Assembly session, there were three resolutions on this subject, which were adopted with overwhelming majorities. Two of these resolutions, 42/39 C entitled "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons" and 42/42 D on "Prevention of nuclear war", were introduced by members of the Group of 21.

We remain convinced that the shortest route to removing the danger of nuclear war lies in the elimination of nuclear weapons, and that pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament, the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should be prohibited. We have welcomed the declaration of President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in November 1985 that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought", as also its reconfirmation in the Joint Statement issued after the Washington summit. Now is the time to translate this will into a binding commitment.

In deference to the position of other delegations, the Group of 21 has put forward, in CD/515/Rev.4 dated 7 April 1988, a non-negotiating mandate that will permit thorough consideration of all aspects - legal, political, technical, military - of all the proposals before the Conference. We believe that such consideration will not only contribute to better understanding of the subject but also pave the way for negotiations for an agreement on the prevention of nuclear war. Such an objective cannot be achieved through discussions in the plenary or informal meetings. We are disappointed, therefore, that despite the urgency accorded to this subject and the flexibility displayed by the Group of 21, the CD is not able to live up to its own mandate, which is reflected in paragraph 120 of the Final Document of SSOD-I. We would like to hope that the importance of the matter will lead to a rethinking on the part of those who have expressed reservations on the mandate proposed by the Group of 21.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of India for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Bulgaria.

Mr. BOJILOV (Bulgaria): On behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries I would like to make the following statement in connection with document CD/515/Rev.4, submitted by the Group of 21 for decision by the Conference. The socialist countries attach great importance to item 3 of the Conference agenda, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". For years now socialist countries have insisted that the Conference should proceed to practical work on this problem, namely to discuss and work out practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war. The positions of the socialist States are reflected in the verbatim records of the Conference. In addition, I would like to note that on 31 March 1988 in Sofia, the Committee of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty adopted an Appeal to NATO States and to all States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. The Appeal states, inter alia, that "there is a growing conviction throughout the world that nuclear war should never be unleashed and that there can be no victors in such a war, that all wars, whether nuclear or conventional, must be prevented, that the creation of a secure peace calls for the manifestation of new political thinking, a new approach to the issues of war and peace, and presupposes the total elimination of nuclear weapons, renunciation of the concept of 'nuclear deterrence' and of a policy of the use or threat of force in relations between States".

The merits of the draft mandate contained in document CD/515/Rev.4 are obvious. First, the draft mandate is goal-oriented. It provides for the Conference to establish, in discharge of its responsibility in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document of SSOD-I, an ad hoc committee under agenda item 3. The socialist countries have been open to any procedural arrangements that would allow the Conference to commence concrete work on item 3. They still believe that the establishment of an ad hoc committee offers the best available machinery for the conduct of its activities on agenda item 3. Second, the draft mandate is both flexible and comprehensive, stipulating that the Conference would request the ad hoc committee "to consider all proposals relevant to agenda item 3" and "take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives". Third, the draft mandate deals on an equal footing with all elements of agenda item 3. In other words, it would allow the ad hoc committee to consider both the issue of the prevention of nuclear war and the issue of all related matters. For these reasons, the socialist countries support the draft mandate proposed by the Group of 21 in document CD/515/Rev.4, and regret that the Conference is not in a position to accept it.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Bulgaria for his statement. I recognize the representative of China, to whom I give the floor.

Mr. FAN (China) (translated from Chinese): I wish to make some comments on item 3. As is well known, the Chinese delegation has always attached great importance to the item "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". In our view, the prevention of nuclear war concerns the security of

(Mr. Fan, China)

the whole world and is a matter of great concern for the member States of the Conference. The Chinese delegation has repeatedly stated its views in various statements and working papers. Document CD/515/Rev.4 submitted by the Group of 21 contains a draft mandate for an ad hoc committee under this item. The Chinese delegation can accept this draft. At the same time, we suggest that the CD may also consider other ways and means to commence work on this item.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of China for his statement. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? I see none.

May I now turn to another subject? The secretariat has circulated, at my request, a timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. As usual, the timetable is merely indicative and subject to change, if necessary. The chairmen of the subsidiary bodies have been consulted in connection with this timetable. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference agrees to the timetable. I see no objections.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I wish to inform members that the informal open-ended consultations dealing with the draft substantive paragraphs of the report will continue tomorrow, Friday, at 10 a.m. On that occasion, agenda items 1, "Nuclear test ban", and 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", will again be taken up. At 3 p.m. in the afternoon, item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters", will be discussed. If there are any pending questions relating to items 1 and 2 they will be considered as the first order of business in the afternoon, before the informal consultations proceed to consider item 3. The informal open-ended consultations will be held in conference room H-3. I hope that we will be able to advance our work on these questions substantially, as three of the subsidiary bodies continue with their work and, as indicated in the timetable, they will need additional meetings next week.

I would like to inform you that the Chairman of Group B will hold open-ended consultations on the issue of chemical weapons production facilities (document CW/GB/14) on Friday, 15 April at 10 a.m. in room III. I should also like to inform you that a meeting of the ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will be held in this conference room immediately after the meeting.

As I have no other business for today, I intend now to adjourn this plenary meeting.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 19 April at 10 a.m. in the Council Chamber.

The meeting rose at 4 p.m.