

Department for Disarmament Affairs

New York, 1988

The United Nations
**DISARMAMENT
YEARBOOK**



Volume 12: 1987

NOTE

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UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATION

Sales No. E.88.IX.2

03750H

ISBN 92-1-142136-5

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EDITORIAL NOTE

The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook contains a review of the main developments and negotiations in the field of disarmament taking place each year, together with a brief history of the major issues. The series started with the 1976 edition.

The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook makes no claim to present fully the views of States Members of the Organization, or even of the Powers directly concerned. The substantive debates in the various disarmament bodies are summarized and a representative sample of statements is presented. Thus the views of all Member States are not covered. For further information on the official positions of States, the reader should consult the *Official Records of the General Assembly*, referred to throughout the text, and other sources. For the definitive text of General Assembly resolutions quoted in *The Yearbook*, the reader should consult the *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 53 (A/42/53)*.

For an overview of the work of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, readers may consult *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1985* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.85.IX.6). For a more detailed account of the work of the Organization, they may consult *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1), *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1970-1975* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.76.IX.1) and the previous volumes of *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, which are referred to in footnotes throughout the text simply as *The Yearbook*, together with the appropriate volume number. The complete references are: *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 1: 1976 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.77.IX.2); vol. 2: 1977 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.4); vol. 3: 1978 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.79.IX.2 (clothbound) or E.79.IX.3 (paperbound)); vol. 4: 1979 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.80.IX.6 or 7); vol. 5: 1980 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.81.IX.3 or 4); vol. 6: 1981 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.82.IX.6 or 7); vol. 7: 1982 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.IX.7); vol. 8: 1983 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.84.IX.3); vol. 9: 1984 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.85.IX.4); vol. 10: 1985 (Sales No. E.86.IX.7); and vol. 11: 1986 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.87.IX.1).

It should be noted that in the preparation of this as well all previous volumes of *The Yearbook* identified above, the Secretariat of the United Nations has taken into account General Assembly resolution 2758 (XXVI), of 25 October 1971, entitled "Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations"

ABBREVIATIONS and ACRONYMS

ABM	anti-ballistic missile
ACABQ	Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
ASAT	anti-satellite
ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nations
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CAS	Committee on Assurances of Supply
CCD	Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
CD	Conference on Disarmament
CDE	Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe
CMEA	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
EC	European Community
ENDC	Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament
ENMOD	Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques
EURATOM	European Atomic Energy Community
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GLCM	ground-launched cruise missile
GTS	Global Telecommunication System
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM	intercontinental ballistic missile
IDFD	international disarmament fund for development
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INF	intermediate-range nuclear forces
INFCE	International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation
INSAG	International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group
ISMA	international satellite monitoring agency
LRINF	longer-range intermediate-range nuclear forces
LRTNF	long-range theatre nuclear forces
MIRV	multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	non-governmental organization
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPANAL	Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SDI	Strategic Defense Initiative
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SLBM	submarine-launched ballistic missile
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
TNCD	Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament
UNCPICPUNE	United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNITAR	United Nations Institute for Training and Research
WHO	World Health Organization
WMO	World Meteorological Organization

INTRODUCTION

IN ENCOURAGING CONTRAST WITH OTHER RECENT YEARS, 1987 saw the culmination of an important disarmament negotiation with the signing, on 8 December, of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, by President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. Although not directly in the United Nations purview, the negotiations leading to the Treaty, as well as various other arms limitation and control efforts, especially those involving the two major Powers, have been repeatedly encouraged in resolutions of the General Assembly. Appropriately, therefore, this twelfth volume of *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook* devotes a separate chapter—chapter VI—to this most important achievement and United Nations actions relating to it, and reproduces the text of the Treaty in appendix VII. When it enters into force, the new instrument will mark the second time since the Second World War that an arms regulation agreement has involved true disarmament, that is, the actual elimination of existing weapons.¹ Upon the occasion of the signing, the Secretary-General of the United Nations stated: “It is the first time that an agreement has been reached that would actually reduce the awesome stocks of nuclear weapons in the world. It is most gratifying that patience, dedication and goodwill have prevailed over the difficulties and obstacles that were encountered in achieving this agreement.”

At the multilateral negotiating level, in his message to the Conference on Disarmament early in the year, the Secretary-General recalled some reassuring developments during 1986, but noted that they had “not yet changed the sombre realities facing us all. Concrete disarmament agreements still elude us and the gap between words and deeds has not narrowed. . . . The responsibility resting on your Conference in matters of vital importance for the future of mankind can hardly be exaggerated.” During its substantive session, however, the 40-nation Conference continued to experience differences in positions and approaches on such long-standing agenda items as a nuclear-test ban and others relating to the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It was unable as well to reach agreement on its items on radiological weapons and a comprehensive programme of disarmament. At the same time, the intensive ongoing negotiations for an agreement banning chemical weapons took place in a spirit of compromise and marked considerable further progress, leaving only a few areas—some important ones among them—where consensus still must be

¹ The other instrument is the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, which entered into force on 26 March 1975. Chapter XIII and appendix I provide further details.

found. In order to conclude the new international instrument, it also remains to draft legal treaty language.

In its session in May, the United Nations Disarmament Commission utilized subsidiary bodies to enable it to deal in limited time with seven substantive agenda items. It recorded some progress in its deliberations on the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and had a constructive exchange of views on new items on conventional disarmament and on verification of compliance with agreements, including, in the latter instance, how the United Nations might best contribute to this essential aspect of future arms regulation.

The remaining most noteworthy event in the disarmament context was the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, which took place, with the participation of 150 States, at United Nations Headquarters in New York from 24 August to 11 September. The Conference adopted by consensus a Final Document, which includes an action programme whereby the participants reaffirmed their commitments in the fields of disarmament and development and their determination to adopt appropriate measures to implement them. They also agreed to assess their political and security requirements and the level of their military spending and its economic and social consequences.

In his report on the work of the Organization, submitted to the General Assembly at its forty-second session, the Secretary-General assessed the overall situation in the field of disarmament, stating at the outset that disarmament achieved through balanced arms reductions with adequate verification was an essential element in the dynamic process of building peace and had rightly been in the forefront of diplomatic activity during the past year. New attitudes and revised policies had brought new life to a long, sterile disarmament scene, he noted, and "for the first time there appears a good and early prospect of a net reduction in nuclear weapons".

During the session, the Assembly again dealt comprehensively with disarmament and related international security issues through its First Committee, which, after its debate and thorough consideration of 79 draft resolutions and decisions, recommended 63 of them for adoption; in adopting them, the Assembly agreed upon a record number of 25 by consensus, including several on important substantive issues. These numbers reflect a greater consolidation of proposals and more consensus adoptions of resolutions than in other recent years. This shows that Member States were able to achieve some progress in harmonizing their positions in 1987.

The work of the major forums mentioned above and of various others dealing with disarmament matters as well as the basic positions espoused by States and groups are summarized in *The Yearbook*, generally in issue-oriented chapters.

The Department for Disarmament Affairs has produced *The Yearbook* annually since 1976. In keeping with established practice, specialized contributions from the International Atomic Energy Agency in chapters XI and XII, and from the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, in chapter XXI, are included. Appendices II through VI were contributed by

the United Nations Environment Programme, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the World Health Organization and the World Meteorological Organization. Appendices I, VII and VIII were prepared in-house from available information and provide, respectively, the status of multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements as of the end of the year, the text of the new bilateral Treaty already mentioned, and voting patterns on the resolutions and decisions on disarmament and related questions adopted by the General Assembly at its forty-second session, including page references where their texts appear. In addition, a list of resolutions showing their title and chief sponsor immediately follows the "Contents".

The Yearbook series is intended primarily as a reference collection. Consequently, it is somewhat issue-specific and oriented towards professionals and serious students in the field. It is also a source of reliable information on international matters of global interest to educational institutions and researchers in peace and security, anyone interested in particular disarmament issues and the various constituencies of the United Nations World Disarmament Campaign.

P A R T O N E

Comprehensive approaches to disarmament

CHAPTER I

United Nations disarmament bodies and their activities in 1987

Introduction

ACCORDING TO THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, one of the purposes of the Organization is “to maintain international peace and security” (Article 1). The Charter empowers the General Assembly to consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of those goals, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and to make recommendations regarding them to the Members of the Organization or to the Security Council or to both (Article 11). “In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources”, the Security Council is charged with the task of formulating plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments (Article 26).

The Charter thus envisages disarmament and the regulation of armaments as elements in the establishment of an international security system. The first explosion of an atomic weapon only weeks after the signing of the Charter and the possibility that other weapons of mass destruction would soon be introduced clearly enhanced the significance of the disarmament element in that system beyond the level envisaged by the drafters. Accordingly, during the next four decades the question of disarmament was discussed at every session of the General Assembly, in numerous subsidiary bodies and in a variety of forums outside the United Nations. In seeking to discharge its responsibilities in the field, the United Nations has used several different approaches. The number of issues addressed as part of the disarmament agenda has also multiplied.¹

Within the framework provided by the Charter to deal with disarmament and related international security problems, the General Assembly and the Security Council have repeatedly altered the institutional arrangements cre-

¹ For a brief history of disarmament efforts under United Nations auspices, see *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1985* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.85.IX.6). For more extensive presentations of the developments in the field in specific periods, see *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1) and *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1970-1975* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.76.IX.1). For summaries of yearly developments regarding specific disarmament issues since 1976, see earlier editions of *The Yearbook*.

ated to this end. The most recent developments arose from the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in 1978, also referred to as the tenth special session.²

The present chapter describes the institutional framework or “machinery” within which United Nations disarmament efforts are now pursued. It briefly refers to the development of that machinery and to a number of the predecessors of the present disarmament bodies which figure in subsequent chapters. The chapter further gives an overview of the work the three principal disarmament bodies have done in 1987, giving special attention to deliberations on the role of the United Nations in disarmament. It also deals with the preparations for the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which will take place in 1988, and with the activities of two *ad hoc* disarmament bodies established for specific purposes.

Disarmament machinery

General Assembly

The General Assembly is composed of the representatives of all Member States. As indicated above, it can consider and make recommendations on any questions relating to international peace and security, except when a dispute or situation is currently being discussed by the Security Council. Since the 1950s, the Assembly and its subsidiary bodies have in practice exercised the main influence in the field of disarmament. According to the Final Document of the 1978 special session, the General Assembly is and should remain the chief deliberative organ of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and should make every effort to facilitate the implementation of disarmament measures. Furthermore, it should be informed of all disarmament efforts outside its aegis without prejudice to the progress of negotiations.³ The Assembly is thus a permanent forum for disarmament deliberations and the main source of both initiatives and recommendations by the international community on the whole spectrum of disarmament-related issues. Its regular sessions ordinarily take place between September and December annually.

First Committee

The First Committee of the General Assembly, consisting of all Member States, is one of the seven Main Committees of the Assembly and is subject to its rules of procedure. As decided in the 1978 Final Document, the First Committee deals only with disarmament and related international security

² The Final Document of the Tenth Special Session appears in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III. It is reproduced *in extenso* in *The Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, appendix I; it was also published by the United Nations as a booklet (87-16283).

³ *Ibid.*, paras. 114-115.

questions.⁴ It approves relevant draft resolutions and recommends them to the Assembly for adoption. Like the other Main Committees, the First Committee elects a Chairman, two Vice-Chairmen and a Rapporteur. It holds its sessions from October to November or December.

Special sessions of the General Assembly

In 1978 and 1982, the General Assembly convened two special sessions devoted entirely to the question of disarmament. In 1978, the first of those special sessions adopted by consensus a 129-paragraph Final Document,⁵ which included an introduction, a declaration, a programme of action and a section on international disarmament machinery. The Final Document proposed a wide range of disarmament measures intended to enhance the security of all nations at progressively lower levels of armaments and stressed the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, in accordance with the Charter. The Concluding Document of the second special session on disarmament, in 1982, also referred to as the twelfth special session,⁶ was largely procedural in nature. The validity of the 1978 Final Document was unanimously reaffirmed, with all Member States solemnly committing themselves to it and pledging to respect the priorities in disarmament negotiations as agreed to in its Programme of Action. The launching of the World Disarmament Campaign (see chapter XX) was one of the tangible accomplishments of the session. For the follow-up of the special sessions on disarmament, see chapter II; for the decision to hold a third special session in 1988, see below.

Disarmament Commission

The Disarmament Commission provides a subsidiary forum for deliberation on disarmament issues as mandated by the General Assembly, when the Assembly is not in session. It is a successor to the earlier Disarmament Commission, established in 1952, which, although active in the 1950s, did not meet after 1965. According to the 1978 Final Document, which re-established it, the Disarmament Commission is a deliberative body and a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, whose function it is to consider and make recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament and to follow up the relevant decisions and recommendations of the special sessions. The Commission reports annually to the General Assembly. Like the First Committee, it is composed of all Member States of the Organization.⁷

⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 117.

⁵ See footnote 2.

⁶ The Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly appears in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Special Session, Annexes*, agenda items 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13, document A/S-12/32; it is reproduced *in extenso* in *The Yearbook*, vol. 7: 1982, appendix I.

⁷ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, para. 118.

It meets in New York for a substantive session of approximately four weeks, usually in May-June.

Ad hoc committees

The General Assembly has at times established *ad hoc* committees in order to deal with specific disarmament matters. For the past several years there have been two such committees, namely, the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference and the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean. For the activities of the *Ad Hoc* Committees in 1987, see below.

Conference on Disarmament

The Conference on Disarmament is, in the language of the 1978 Final Document, the "single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum" of the international community.⁸ Its membership of 40 States includes all the 5 nuclear-weapon States and 35 others.⁹ The membership of non-nuclear-weapon States is reviewed at regular intervals. The Conference on Disarmament, which meets in Geneva and is known by the acronym "CD", was constituted in its present form in 1978. It held its first session in 1979, carrying forward the negotiating efforts of its predecessors, namely, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament or CCD (1969-1978), the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament or ENDC (1962-1969) and the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament or TNCD (1959-1960). From 1979 to 1983, the Conference on Disarmament was known as the Committee on Disarmament. To avoid repetition, the phrases "the multilateral negotiating body in Geneva" and "the Geneva body" are frequently used in this volume to refer to any one of the above-mentioned bodies.

The Conference on Disarmament has a unique relationship with the United Nations. It is not a subsidiary body of the General Assembly. It defines its own rules of procedure and develops its own agenda, taking into account the recommendations made by the General Assembly. In accordance with the agreement reached at the 1978 special session, the Conference works on the basis of consensus. It reports to the General Assembly annually or more often, as may be appropriate. The Secretary-General of the Conference is appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, following consultations with the Conference, and also acts as his personal representative. The budget of the Conference is included in that of the United Nations, and the Conference holds its meetings on United Nations premises and is serviced by United Nations personnel. The work of the Conference is conducted in plenary

⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 120.

⁹ The members of the Conference on Disarmament are: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sweden, USSR, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

meetings or under any arrangement agreed upon by its members. Non-members may submit written proposals or working documents and may, upon invitation, participate in the discussions on substantive items on the agenda. The chairmanship rotates among all members, on a monthly basis. The Conference meets annually in Geneva for approximately six months, usually when the Assembly is not in session.

In 1979, the Geneva body agreed on a permanent agenda consisting of ten areas:

1. Nuclear weapons in all aspects.
2. Chemical weapons.
3. Other weapons of mass destruction.
4. Conventional weapons.
5. Reduction of military budgets.
6. Reduction of armed forces.
7. Disarmament and development.
8. Disarmament and international security.
9. Collateral measures; confidence-building measures; effective verification methods in relation to appropriate disarmament measures, acceptable to all parties concerned.
10. Comprehensive programme of disarmament leading to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

From that so-called decalogue, the Conference on Disarmament adopts an annual agenda and programme of work. For its 1987 agenda, see page 17.

United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs

The role the United Nations Secretariat plays in disarmament matters derives from the general functions of the Secretary-General as defined in the Charter and developed over the years through the decisions of the General Assembly and other disarmament bodies. Pursuant to resolution 37/99 K, section V, of 1982, which sought to strengthen the efforts of the Organization in the field of disarmament, the former Centre for Disarmament was transformed, on 1 January 1983, into a department headed by an Under-Secretary-General reporting directly to the Secretary-General.

Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies

The Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies was established by the General Assembly at the 1978 special session to advise the Secretary-General on various aspects of studies on disarmament to be made under the auspices of the United Nations. For further information on the Advisory Board and its activities in 1987, see chapter XXI.

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) was established on 1 October 1980 as an autonomous institution within the frame-

work of the United Nations. It undertakes independent research on disarmament and related security issues and works in close relationship with the Department for Disarmament Affairs. The Institute is located in Geneva and is financed partly by voluntary contributions from Governments and other sources and partly from the regular budget of the United Nations. UNIDIR is governed by a board of trustees composed of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies (see above) and the Director of the Institute. For further information on UNIDIR, see chapter XXI; for a summary of its 1987 activities, see the annex to that chapter.

International Atomic Energy Agency

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an autonomous intergovernmental agency, was established in 1956. It has responsibility for international activities concerned with the peaceful uses of atomic energy. With the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in March 1970, the Agency was entrusted with the task of concluding safeguards agreements with the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to cover all nuclear materials and their uses. In addition, full parties to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) undertake to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA. The Agency reports annually to the General Assembly and, as appropriate, to the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council. The General Conference of IAEA has responsibility for the policies and programmes of the Agency and is composed of all its member States, including the five nuclear-weapon States. Thirty-four countries are represented on the Board of Governors, which is the policy-making body of the Agency. For more information on IAEA and its activities in 1987, see chapter XII.

Specialized agencies and other organs of the United Nations system

Some of the specialized agencies and other organs of the United Nations system, including the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), also carry out disarmament-related activities. For reports on such activities by those organizations in 1987, see appendices II to VI of this volume.

Activities of principal disarmament bodies in 1987

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission

In 1987, the Disarmament Commission held its substantive session from 4 to 27 May under the chairmanship of Mr. Dimiter Kostov of Bulgaria. In the

course of the session, the Commission held 11 plenary meetings and adopted at the end of its session its report to the General Assembly.¹⁰

As before, the Commission had on its agenda an item on the consideration of various aspects of the arms race with a view to elaborating a general approach to negotiations on nuclear and conventional disarmament. Another long-standing item concerned the reduction of military budgets and aimed at, *inter alia*, concluding work on the last outstanding paragraph of the document "Principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of the freezing and reduction of military budgets", a text which had been incorporated into the Commission's report to the General Assembly in 1986, reflecting the stage reached on that subject.¹¹ Yet another item, which had also been on the agenda of several sessions, concerned the question of South Africa's nuclear capability. Two more items, which had first appeared in 1985, dealt with a review of the role of the United Nations in disarmament and the question of naval armaments and disarmament. Two new items on the 1987 agenda concerned issues related to conventional disarmament and the question of verification in all its aspects. The wording of the substantive agenda items was as follows:

4. (a) Consideration of various aspects of the arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, in order to expedite negotiations aimed at effective elimination of the danger of nuclear war;
- (b) Consideration of the agenda items contained in section II of resolution 33/71 H, with the aim of elaborating, within the framework and in accordance with priorities established at the tenth special session, a general approach to negotiations on nuclear and conventional disarmament.
5. Reduction of military budgets:
 - (a) Harmonization of views on concrete steps to be undertaken by States regarding a gradual, agreed reduction of military budgets and reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries, noting the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly;
 - (b) Examination and identification of effective ways and means of achieving agreements to freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain, in a balanced manner, military expenditures, including adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned, taking into account the provisions of General Assembly resolutions 34/83 F, 35/142 A, 36/82 A, 37/95 A, 38/184 A, 39/64 A, 40/91 A and 41/57 with a view to concluding its work on the last outstanding paragraph of the "Principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of the freezing and reduction of military budgets".
6. Substantive consideration of the question of South Africa's nuclear capability as requested by the General Assembly and the Chairman of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* (resolutions 37/74 B, 38/181 B, 39/61 B, 40/89 B and 41/55 B, and document A/CN.10/4).
7. Review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament.
8. Naval armaments and disarmament.
9. Substantive consideration of issues related to conventional disarmament, including the recommendations and conclusions contained in the study on conventional disarmament.

¹⁰ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/42/42)*.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, *Forty-first Session (A/41/42)*, para. 28.

10. Consideration of the question of verification in all its aspects, including principles, provisions and techniques to promote the inclusion of adequate verification in arms limitation and disarmament agreements and the role of the United Nations and its Member States in the field of verification.¹²

On 4 May the Commission decided to establish a committee of the whole to consider item 4. This task was later entrusted to a contact group, which would consider the item and report back to the Committee of the Whole. The Commission further decided to establish a consultation group to deal with agenda item 5 and to make recommendations thereon to the Commission.

In addition, the Commission decided to establish four working groups to deal with various items and make recommendations on them: Working Group I for item 6, Working Group II for item 7, Working Group III for item 9 and Working Group IV for item 10. The Chairman of the Commission decided to follow the practice adopted in the previous year and to hold, under his responsibility, substantive and open-ended consultations on agenda item 8.

On 4, 5 and 6 May, the Commission held a general exchange of views on all agenda items. On 27 May it considered the reports of Working Groups I, II, III and IV, the report of the Committee of the Whole on item 4, the report of the Consultation Group on item 5, and the report of the Chairman on item 8. The deliberations and report of Working Group II are dealt with in this chapter, which also contains a brief summary of the general exchange on the role of the United Nations, particularly as it addressed institutional aspects. The work of the Contact Group is discussed in chapter V and that of the Consultation Group in chapter XVII. Working Groups I, III and IV are dealt with in chapters X, XVI and II, respectively. The Chairman's report on item 8 is covered in chapter III.

By resolution 41/59 O of 1986, the General Assembly had once again requested the Disarmament Commission to continue its consideration of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament as a matter of priority at its substantive session in 1987, with a view to the elaboration of concrete recommendations and proposals, as appropriate, and to submit a report on the subject to the Assembly at its forty-second session.

In his opening address, the Chairman said that at a time when the role of the United Nations in strengthening international peace, security and disarmament was gaining wider recognition, the Disarmament Commission must be maintained and strengthened. He regretted that the Commission had not yet been fully utilized for accomplishing tangible results on a number of significant issues.

In the opinion of the United States, the objective of the Commission's efforts must lie in achieving greater understanding rather than in seeking to submerge differences between opposing sides. That was the essence of the international dialogue; without it there could be no increase in understanding and no possibility of dealing with the root causes of international turmoil. In that spirit, the United States would support the work of the Commission

¹² *Ibid.*, *Forty-second Session (A/42/42)*, para. 6.

and its appropriate Working Groups. The Soviet Union stated that the United Nations had a special role to play in efforts to reduce the military threat and to curb the arms race. The potential of the Organization had to be used more effectively than in the past by, *inter alia*, making fuller use of the Security Council and the General Assembly, as well as the mediation of the Secretary-General. The Soviet Union further called for the revitalization of the entire disarmament machinery and believed that the Commission's finalization of concrete recommendations and proposals on the United Nations role in the field of disarmament would promote that objective.

China stressed that the political will of all countries was crucial to the United Nations role in disarmament. The possibility that such a role could be improved and strengthened by working on the technical, procedural or organizational aspects of the issue should not be neglected. It noted that numerous concrete proposals to improve the work of the United Nations in disarmament had been submitted and stated that they should be fully discussed at the 1987 session to see which were suitable for implementation.

Belgium, speaking on behalf of the twelve member States of the European Community, indicated that, in their view, the already existing proposals should provide a good basis for the Commission's work and discussion during the session. The item was a priority issue, given the need to increase the effectiveness of the Organization in dealing with the problem of disarmament. Canada expressed the hope that the result of the Commission's deliberations on the item could be considered by the third special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. The Federal Republic of Germany viewed multilateral efforts in the field of disarmament as a necessary and positive complement to bilateral negotiations. Japan emphasized that common perceptions existed in such areas as the special sessions on disarmament, rationalizing and streamlining the work of the First Committee and strengthening the role of the Secretary-General, and that they should provide fertile ground for concrete recommendations and proposals. New Zealand thought that a close examination of the negotiating, deliberative and research machinery of the United Nations in the field of disarmament would add particular substance to the item.

Bulgaria stressed that the contribution of the United Nations to the process of moving towards a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world should be progressively strengthened. According to Czechoslovakia the role of the Organization in disarmament was indisputable—its role, that is, not only as a distinct body, but also as the centre of an entire system, including the specialized agencies. Poland regretted that the existing United Nations mechanisms were not fully used by all Member States. To be successful, it stated, the disarmament activities of the United Nations had to be supported by all the nuclear-weapon Powers, permanent members of the Security Council, which bore a special responsibility for peace and international security. Romania emphasized that if the desire to enhance the United Nations role in the field of disarmament and to make the existing multilateral disarmament machinery more effective was really genuine, then all delegations would show the necessary political will to make progress. The achievement of concrete

results was the one and only standard by which the credibility and efficiency of the Commission should be measured.

Austria, stressing the importance of the role of the United Nations in disarmament, held that serious thought should be given to reducing the number and, possibly, the length of resolutions, as suggested by the President of the General Assembly at the forty-first session. Finland, speaking on verification, stated that it had a special interest in increasing the role of the United Nations in that field and recalled its suggestion for establishing a United Nations verification data base.

Yugoslavia stressed that it was inappropriate to blame multilateral negotiating mechanisms for the lack of results in the field of disarmament, since there were other factors involved. There was a need, in the first place, to restore and reaffirm the principles and objectives embodied in the 1978 Final Document and to ensure that the forthcoming third special session would be in a position to adopt concrete decisions that would contribute to further strengthening the United Nations and would reaffirm its central role in the field of disarmament.

India believed that the lack of progress in multilateral disarmament was due to the absence of political will and that it was erroneous to blame the institutions for failure. Consequently, the Commission should play a role in devising means to strengthen the collective commitment of Member States to the process of multilateral disarmament, in conformity with the 1978 Final Document.

Nigeria noted that beginning with the 1985 session of the Commission, steady progress had been maintained on the item and urged that it be given priority attention in 1987. Ghana called for greater commitment by Member States to ensure the effective use of the existing multilateral disarmament machinery. Similar views were expressed by Bangladesh, the Lao People's Democratic Republic and Sri Lanka.

Working Group II, under the chairmanship of Mr. Paul Bamela Engo of Cameroon, held three formal meetings and an informal one between 12 and 22 May. In carrying out its work, the Group had before it 28 documents, listed in its report to the Commission,¹³ including a conference room paper by the Chairman on findings, recommendations and proposals. The Working Group decided to consider all the documents on an equal footing.

On 14 May the Working Group decided to establish an open-ended contact group, which would be co-ordinated by Mr. Richard Butler of Australia, to consider the proposals submitted to the Commission as well as the views put forward in the course of the deliberations on the item and to determine what further steps should be taken. The Contact Group held four meetings between 19 and 22 May. On 22 May, the Co-ordinator submitted to the Working Group a working paper which had been considered by the Contact Group. At the same meeting, the Working Group decided to annex the paper to its report to the Disarmament Commission in the belief that it

¹³ *Ibid.*, sect. IV, para. 43.

might assist in future deliberations and work on the item.¹⁴ The paper reviewed both political and machinery aspects of the Organization's role and, under the second category, set forth procedural recommendations concerning the work of the First Committee. The Working Group further recommended to the Disarmament Commission that the Commission accord priority at its 1988 substantive session to the work to be done on the review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament with a view to formulating concrete recommendations and proposals, as appropriate.

In a closing statement on 27 May, Belgium, speaking on behalf of the twelve member States of the European Community, noted with satisfaction that some measure of agreement now existed on the document issued by the Contact Group, though it regretted that a common text had not been adopted. New Zealand also viewed the result as a step forward. The Soviet Union held that the discussion on the item had been productive, while China regretted that the political will of States was inadequate. Poland considered that much more could be obtained from the existing machinery, provided Member States were determined to use it effectively. Cameroon and the German Democratic Republic called for a strengthening of the role of the United Nations in disarmament. Cameroon held that the question of security was crucial for all States and its link with development was also important.

Consideration by the Conference on Disarmament

In 1987 the Conference on Disarmament held its session in two parts, as is customary, from 3 February to 30 April and from 9 June to 28 August. During this period the Conference held 51 formal plenary meetings and 23 informal meetings.¹⁵ The following member States assumed the presidency of the Conference: China for February, Cuba for March, Czechoslovakia for April and the recess between the first and second parts of the session, Egypt for June, Ethiopia for July and France for August and the recess until the beginning of the 1988 session. At the end of the session, the Conference submitted a report on its work to the General Assembly.¹⁶

On 3 February the Conference reaffirmed the 10 areas within which it had decided, in 1979, to deal with the question of the cessation of the arms race and disarmament (see page 11). Within that framework, the Conference adopted the following agenda, which was the same as the previous year's:

1. Nuclear test ban.
2. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.
3. Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters.
4. Chemical weapons.
5. Prevention of an arms race in outer space.
6. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, sect; IV, annex II.

¹⁵ CD/787, appendix II, vols. I-IV.

¹⁶ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/42/27)*.

7. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons.
8. Comprehensive programme of disarmament.
9. Consideration and adoption of the annual report and any other report as appropriate to the General Assembly of the United Nations.¹⁷

At the same meeting, the President of the Conference made a statement to the effect that the Conference would intensify its consultations on the item dealing with the comprehensive programme of disarmament (see chapter IV). He also noted that there was no need to re-establish the *Ad Hoc* Committee on that item. The Conference then agreed upon a programme of work for the first part of its session to ensure that adequate time would be devoted to consideration of all the items on the agenda; it did likewise on 16 June for the second part of its session. Later, the Conference re-established its *Ad Hoc* Committees on the following items: chemical weapons (chapter XIII), assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States (chapter IX), radiological weapons (chapter XV) and the prevention of an arms race in outer space (chapter XIV).

A number of States which were not members of the Conference were invited to participate, upon their request, in the discussions on the substantive agenda items. The countries which thus took part in plenary meetings and/or *Ad Hoc* Committees were: Austria, Bangladesh, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Holy See,¹⁸ New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Senegal, Spain, Switzerland,¹⁸ Turkey, Uruguay, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe. The Conference reaffirmed its decision that its membership might be increased by not more than four States, to be nominated as follows: two by the group of 21,¹⁹ and one each by the socialist²⁰ and the Western States,²¹ so as to maintain balance. It did not, however, take a decision on the matter in 1987.

On 11 June, in the first address ever delivered to the Conference by a head of State, President Alfonsín of Argentina stated that all knew that mankind could be annihilated if a nuclear war were to start, and all knew how little had been done to eliminate that threat. He noted the enormous disproportion between the magnitude of the danger the world faced and the meagre capacity to neutralize it that the world had shown so far; he felt that that was one of the most dramatic features of the times, one which the Conference faced every day. President Alfonsín took the opportunity of his visit to reiterate the importance Argentina attached to the work of the Conference and its commitment to its success.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 7.

¹⁸ Non-member of the United Nations.

¹⁹ The term "group of 21" refers to the non-aligned and neutral non-nuclear-weapon States members of the Conference on Disarmament not associated with the major blocs. They are: Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

²⁰ The term "group of socialist States" refers to the "Eastern European States" members of the Conference on Disarmament, which are: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania and USSR.

²¹ The "Western" members of the Conference on Disarmament are: Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, United Kingdom and United States.

Believing that there was a growing awareness that nuclear brinkmanship was intolerable, India stated that the Conference should play a seminal role in efforts to prevent the world from sliding over the edge of the abyss. Sweden noted that it had been said that disarmament might be destabilizing, but the obvious answer was that the risks of disarmament faded in comparison with the dangers of a continuing arms race. The Conference's foremost duty was to prevent the destruction of civilization through nuclear war. China underscored the fact that the composition of the Conference embodied the principle of equal participation by sovereign States in the discussion and settlement of the question of disarmament and felt that its role should be increasingly strengthened rather than weakened or limited. China stressed that bilateral talks should not be used as an excuse to obstruct multilateral talks.

Czechoslovakia expressed the conviction that all States, large, medium-sized and small, irrespective of their social systems, could play a positive role in the pursuit of the goals of disarmament, provided that they showed decisive political will to do so. It emphasized that the establishment of a comprehensive system of international peace and security, as proposed by the socialist States, should be taken into account in the practical work of the Conference, primarily in the deliberations on the complex of issues relating to nuclear disarmament, prevention of an arms race in outer space and the prohibition of chemical weapons. Bulgaria, on behalf of a group of socialist States, stressed that the broad, representative nature of the Conference, the participation in it of States from all continents, a variety of socio-economic systems and different military and political alliances and of non-aligned and neutral, nuclear and non-nuclear States pointed to the important role which the Conference should play in negotiations on the cessation of the arms race and disarmament.

The Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union felt that informing the Conference promptly about the state of bilateral negotiations, particularly on questions on the Conference's agenda, could be a first step towards establishing the principle of complementarity of bilateral and multilateral negotiations. He suggested that the Conference consider adopting a more intensive schedule of work, for example, meeting year-round with two or three recesses. Given the fact that negotiating machinery was running at a rate significantly slower than that of the arms race, he felt that the Conference could in time become a permanent universal body for disarmament negotiations.

In a message to the Conference, the President of the United States stressed that the issues being dealt with at the Conference were complementary to those being addressed bilaterally between the United States and the Soviet Union. He went on to say that the promise of Reykjavik—of a world with significantly reduced levels of nuclear weapons—had become an indicator of what was possible. He also believed that one of the most important tasks facing the Conference was to elaborate a comprehensive, effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons.

France asserted that the work being done by the Conference in the field of chemical weapons was second to that of no other forum in seriousness of

approach. The United Kingdom was also encouraged by the progress being made in the Conference regarding a convention on chemical weapons, feeling that its work could lead to a treaty of both immediate and historic importance. Belgium laid emphasis on the need for the Conference to be solidly anchored in the realities of the world-wide balance of power and to keep its efforts directed towards the convergence of the main political forces.

The question of the relationship between bilateral and multilateral negotiations was considered by the Conference mainly in the context of its discussions on the agenda item on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament (see chapter V). Many delegations referred to the third special session, scheduled for 1988. They expected that the session would review the effectiveness of the existing disarmament machinery and voiced opinions about how that review would apply to the Conference's proceedings.

The Conference attempted to reach agreement on improving its functioning and, to that end, set up an informal group of seven members, chaired by Mr. Fan Guoxiang of China. Subsequently, the Group's proposals on the establishment of subsidiary bodies and the writing of the Conference's annual report to the General Assembly were considered by the Conference at an informal meeting. Though no action was taken on the proposals, China was of the view that they represented the basis for future work. In emphasizing the recommendations concerning report-writing procedures, Australia expressed the hope that those proposals would stay alive and that the Conference would act on them without further delay. India felt that the proposals should be considered as a whole and that any attempt to have report-writing receive priority over other issues of concern would fail to meet the objective of improved and effective functioning of the Conference.

The representative of France, in a closing statement as President for the month of August and the inter-sessional period, noted that there were indications of increased interest on the part of the international community in the work of the Conference and an overall movement in the field of disarmament, of which the work of the Conference was a part.

Consideration by the General Assembly

The General Assembly held a general debate²² in its plenary meetings between 21 September and 9 October, during which a considerable number of Member States addressed disarmament questions.

The First Committee held a procedural meeting on 15 September and the rest of its session between 1 October and 25 November. Mr. Bagbeni Adeito Nzengeya of Zaire was elected Chairman, Mr. Carlos José Gutierrez of Costa Rica and Mr. Maher Nashashibi of Jordan were elected Vice-Chairmen, and Mr. Kazimierz Tomaszewski of Poland was elected Rapporteur. The Committee held 57 meetings; however, it completed the consideration

²² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Plenary Meetings, 4th to 33rd meetings.*

of the agenda items concerning disarmament questions at its 45th meeting, on 16 November.

On 18 September the General Assembly decided to allocate 26 of its agenda items to the First Committee. The following 22 items allocated to the First Committee concerned disarmament:

1. Implementation of General Assembly resolution 41/45 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco).
2. Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions: report of the Conference on Disarmament.
3. Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty: report of the Conference on Disarmament.
4. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East: report of the Secretary-General.
5. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia: report of the Secretary-General.
6. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects: report of the Secretary-General.
7. Conclusion of effective international arrangements on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament.
8. Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament.
9. Prevention of an arms race in outer space: report of the Conference on Disarmament.
10. Implementation of General Assembly resolution 41/54 on the immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests: report of the Conference on Disarmament.
11. Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa:
 - (a) Report of the Disarmament Commission;
 - (b) Report of the Secretary-General.
12. Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament.
13. Reduction of military budgets:
 - (a) Report of the Disarmament Commission;
 - (b) Report of the Secretary-General.
14. Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament.
15. General and complete disarmament:
 - (a) Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons:
 - (i) Report of the Conference on Disarmament;
 - (ii) Report of the Secretary-General;
 - (b) Objective information on military matters: report of the Secretary-General;
 - (c) Conventional disarmament: report of the Disarmament Commission;
 - (d) Nuclear disarmament;
 - (e) Naval armaments and disarmament: report of the Disarmament Commission;
 - (f) Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes: report of the Conference on Disarmament;
 - (g) Conventional disarmament on a regional scale;

- (h) Notification of nuclear tests;
 - (i) Review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament: report of the Disarmament Commission.
16. Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly:
- (a) Regional disarmament: report of the Secretary-General;
 - (b) World Disarmament Campaign: report of the Secretary-General;
 - (c) United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa: report of the Secretary-General;
 - (d) Freeze on nuclear weapons;
 - (e) Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament;
 - (f) United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament: report of the Secretary-General;
 - (g) Implementation of General Assembly resolution 41/60 I on a nuclear-arms freeze;
 - (h) United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America: report of the Secretary-General.
17. Third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament: report of the Preparatory Committee for the Third Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (item 64).
18. World Disarmament Conference: report of the Secretary-General.
19. Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session:
- (a) Report of the Disarmament Commission;
 - (b) Report of the Conference on Disarmament;
 - (c) Status of multilateral disarmament agreements: report of the Secretary-General;
 - (d) Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies: report of the Secretary-General;
 - (e) United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research: report of the Director of the Institute;
 - (f) Review and appraisal of the implementation of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade: report of the Secretary-General;
 - (g) Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war: report of the Conference on Disarmament;
 - (h) United Nations disarmament studies:
 - (i) Report of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies;
 - (ii) Report of the Secretary-General;
 - (i) Disarmament Week: report of the Secretary-General;
 - (j) Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament: report of the Conference on Disarmament;
 - (k) Prevention of nuclear war: report of the Conference on Disarmament;
 - (l) Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session: reports of the Secretary-General;
 - (m) Implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session:
 - (i) Report of the Disarmament Commission;
 - (ii) Report of the Conference on Disarmament;
 - (iii) Verification in all its aspects: report of the Disarmament Commission;
 - (n) Comprehensive programme of disarmament: report of the Conference on Disarmament.
20. Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace: report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean.

21. Israeli nuclear armament: report of the Secretary-General.
22. Relationship between disarmament and development: report of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development.²³

In addition, four agenda items on related security questions were allocated to the First Committee, namely, the items on the question of Antarctica, the strengthening of security and co-operation in the Mediterranean region, the review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, and a comprehensive system of international peace and security.

In accordance with the programme of work it adopted on 1 October, the First Committee held a general debate and heard statements on specific disarmament items from 12 October to 3 November. It considered and took action on draft resolutions on disarmament items from 4 to 16 November.²⁴

The First Committee's recommendations on disarmament items were considered by the General Assembly and the corresponding draft texts were adopted in two plenary meetings on 30 November. Altogether, the Assembly adopted 62 resolutions on disarmament, 26 of them without a vote, and took two decisions without a vote: a procedural one and, on 21 October, a substantive one.²⁵

During the general debate in the First Committee, many delegations addressed questions pertaining to disarmament machinery and, generally, the role of the United Nations in disarmament. One of the dominant themes of the discussion was the significance of the forthcoming third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. (For a brief summary of the discussion on that aspect, see below.)

At the outset of the Committee's work, its Chairman during the forty-first session of the General Assembly, Mr. Siegfried Zachmann of the German Democratic Republic, noted that increasing attention had been focused on the question of the Committee's methods of work. In the previous year and again in early September 1987, he had convened unofficial meetings for the purpose of further examining possible ways and means of improving the effectiveness of the Committee's work. The consultations had revealed that although some significant divergences of viewpoint on specific issues remained, there also appeared to be an emerging convergence of views on certain aspects. Accordingly, he suggested that further consultations be conducted on the subject with a view to enabling the Committee to take decisions on the matter by the close of the session.

Burkina Faso stated its view that the record of disarmament efforts within the framework of multilateral institutions was disappointing. In the same vein, Brazil noted that—although it did not want to derogate from the important work that the Conference on Disarmament had done over the years—

²³ A/C.1/42/1.

²⁴ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, First Committee*, 3rd to 45th meetings, and *ibid.*, *Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, *Forty-second Session, Plenary Meetings*, 46th, 84th and 85th meetings.

the Geneva body had not produced any visible international agreements to reverse the arms race and reduce the risk of armed conflicts.

Egypt considered that the tendency to separate the various bodies concerned with disarmament—the First Committee, the Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament—was disturbing. Although each had a specific role, the difference in the nature of their work did not warrant their separation, as reflected in the view that the resolutions adopted by the First Committee did not affect the work of the Conference on Disarmament. Egypt also believed that the increase in the number of resolutions adopted by the First Committee every year did not express constructive participation and had affected the Committee's credibility. Moreover, it was concerned about the tendency of multilateral bodies to think themselves unable to discharge some of their responsibilities in areas that were being negotiated bilaterally. That position had also been reflected in the First Committee's work.

Australia agreed that the Committee's methods of work had become rigid, but suggested that the solution did not lie in poring over rules of procedure, but in resisting the temptation to score narrow political points. That would require vision and tolerance, exercised for the greater good. It was the responsibility of Member States to forge international co-operation on arms control and disarmament, because it was essential to collective survival. Canada also felt that the time was ripe to improve the Committee's procedures and hence the quality of its work. It welcomed the emerging convergence of views on improvements. Denmark, speaking on behalf of the twelve member States of the European Community stated that the Twelve were convinced that the United Nations must play a central role in the quest for disarmament. In their view, it was the extent of meaningful consensus that was important and not the number of resolutions submitted and voted upon. The Twelve also stressed the fundamental importance of consensus as the rule for decision-making in the Conference on Disarmament.

The Soviet Union expressed support for Norway's proposal to raise the level of political participation in meetings of main United Nations bodies and to hold periodic meetings of the Security Council at the foreign-minister level. It believed that United Nations involvement in dealing with the problem of the elimination of nuclear weapons could be facilitated by using the potential of the Security Council as the body which, under Article 26 of the Charter, was responsible for drawing up plans for establishing a system for the regulation of armaments. The Soviet Union was also in favour of convening, after the necessary preparations, a special meeting or meetings of the Security Council, possibly at the foreign-minister level, to discuss objectives in the field of nuclear disarmament. Czechoslovakia urged intensification of the work of the Conference on Disarmament through organizational changes. Among other things, it believed that the Conference should work throughout the year, with only a few short recesses.

Austria noted that the United Nations had over the years established impressive machinery for channelling disarmament efforts, but regretted that that machinery was not utilized to its full capacity. Finland believed that there was a need to review the United Nations disarmament machinery with regard

to procedural questions, working practices and the composition of some of the main disarmament bodies. Rationalization and innovation in those fields could permit the Organization's resources to be more effectively focused on the central issues of international disarmament.

On 27 October, 52 mostly non-aligned States, later joined by 13 others,²⁶ submitted a draft resolution entitled "Review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament". It was introduced on 4 November by Cameroon, which stated that it was encouraged by the progress made on the subject at the 1987 substantive session of the Disarmament Commission. It laid emphasis on the Commission's view that thorough and realistic reforms were required to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of various multilateral forums engaged in the arms control and disarmament process. Cameroon also noted with satisfaction that the political climate had improved and that there was a more business-like attitude towards the matter, and it expressed the hope that the Commission would maintain that momentum.

On 9 November the Committee approved the draft without a vote. On 30 November the General Assembly adopted it, also without a vote, as resolution 42/38 O. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 39/151 G of 17 December 1984, 40/94 O of 12 December 1985 and 41/59 O of 3 December 1986,

Bearing in mind that the primary purpose of the United Nations is to maintain international peace and security,

Reaffirming its conviction that genuine and lasting peace can be created only through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example, leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Reaffirming further that the United Nations, in accordance with its Charter, has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament,

Recognizing the need for the United Nations, in discharging its central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament, to play a more active role in the field of disarmament in accordance with its primary purpose under the Charter to maintain international peace and security,

Taking into account the part of the report of the Disarmament Commission relating to this question,

1. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to continue its consideration of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament as a matter of priority at its next substantive session, in 1988, with a view to the elaboration of concrete recommendations and proposals, as appropriate, taking into account, *inter alia*, the views and suggestions of Member States as well as the aforementioned documents on the subject;

2. *Requests further* the Disarmament Commission to submit its report on the subject,

²⁶ The sponsors were: Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Brunei Darussalam, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Gabon, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, New Zealand, Niger, Panama, Philippines, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sudan, Suriname, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukrainian SSR, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Zaire, Zambia.

including findings, recommendations and proposals, as appropriate, to the General Assembly at its forty-third session;

3. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament: report of the Disarmament Commission"

On 27 October, Czechoslovakia and the Ukrainian SSR submitted a draft resolution entitled "Implementation of United Nations resolutions in the field of disarmament". On 10 November they submitted a revised draft which was introduced by the Ukrainian SSR the next day. In the revised version, the words "United Nations" were replaced by the words "General Assembly" and slight changes were made in operative paragraph 1. In its introduction, the Ukrainian SSR noted that despite the growing number of resolutions adopted annually, their practical effect remained far from satisfactory. All Member States should make every effort to facilitate consistent implementation of General Assembly resolutions in the field of disarmament, in accordance with paragraph 115 of the 1978 Final Document. The draft invited all Member States to exchange their views on ways and means of improving the situation and requested the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly each year on the subject.

On 11 November the First Committee approved the revised draft by a recorded vote of 100 to 2, with 23 abstentions.

Six delegations explained their positions on the draft. Explaining its negative vote, the United States recalled that General Assembly resolutions were recommendations, neither more nor less. In its view, the draft purported to accord all resolutions on disarmament a special quasi-binding status among other Assembly resolutions. The United States pointed out that there was no basis in the Charter for such a proposition.

Among the States that abstained in the vote, Australia noted that while it supported most disarmament resolutions, it did not see value in a resolution that called for the implementation of a whole class of resolutions. It could not support provisions that called on it to implement resolutions it had opposed. The United Kingdom found it difficult to understand the aim of the draft. It agreed that General Assembly resolutions were important expressions of opinion, but also considered it clear that they, whether carried by consensus or not and whether on disarmament or other subjects, were not legally binding. It also saw little value in the proposed annual report by the Secretary-General.

Three States that voted affirmatively also explained their positions. The Byelorussian SSR expressed the view that in enhancing the effectiveness of the United Nations, the implementation of resolutions adopted by consensus would be of particular use. In its opinion, States should also be expected to pay attention to the resolutions that were voted upon and to consider themselves morally bound to determine their future action by them. China considered that the main thrust of the draft was positive in that it called upon all Member States to make an effort to facilitate the implementation of General Assembly resolutions. However, its affirmative vote did not affect the positions which it had maintained regarding certain disarmament resolutions. India stated that it had voted in favour on the understanding that operative paragraph 1 could apply only to resolutions that it had supported.

On 30 November the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 128 to 2 (Israel and United States), with 24 abstentions (mostly Western States), as resolution 42/38 J. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling paragraph 115 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, which states, *inter alia*, that the General Assembly has been and should remain the main deliberative organ of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and should make every effort to facilitate the implementation of disarmament measures,

Mindful of the fact that the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament could be strengthened substantially through an increased effort by Member States to implement faithfully General Assembly resolutions in the field of disarmament,

Convinced of the importance of treating recommendations of the General Assembly in the field of disarmament with due respect in accordance with the obligations assumed by Member States under the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Deems it important* that all Member States make every effort to facilitate the consistent implementation of General Assembly resolutions in the field of disarmament, and thus show their resolve to arrive at mutually acceptable, comprehensively verifiable and effective disarmament measures;

2. *Invites* all Member States to make available to the Secretary-General their views and suggestions on ways and means to improve the situation with regard to the implementation of General Assembly resolutions in the field of disarmament;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly, on an annual basis, a report regarding the developments in the field of arms limitations and disarmament, which would include all relevant information provided by Member States concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolutions in the field of disarmament, as well as their views on possible avenues to improve the situation in this respect;

4. *Calls upon* all Member States to render every assistance to the Secretary-General in fulfilling the request contained in paragraph 3 above;

5. *Decides* to continue its consideration of the issue of the implementation of General Assembly resolutions in the field of disarmament at its forty-third session.

On 27 October, Austria, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Denmark, Jordan, the Ukrainian SSR, Uruguay and Venezuela submitted a draft resolution entitled "Report of the Disarmament Commission", which was introduced on 29 October by the representative of Bulgaria, the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission during its 1987 session. He noted that the draft contained, as usual, a number of basic elements concerning the role and mandate of the Disarmament Commission as a deliberative body in the field of disarmament. By it, the General Assembly would note the progress achieved on some of the agenda items during the 1987 session; the Chairman referred specifically to verification in all its aspects, the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, conventional disarmament, and naval armaments and disarmament. In addition, the Assembly would request the Commission to submit a substantive special report at its third special session devoted to disarmament, and the Secretary-General to provide to the Commission and its subsidiary bodies certain facilities and services, which at the 1987 session had been considerably curtailed.

On 9 November the Committee approved the draft without a vote. In that connection, the United Kingdom explained that, in its view, the request for "full provision . . . of interpretation and translation" should not be read to imply that every informal meeting held during the Commission should be

serviced in that manner. It also believed that the lack of verbatim records had not hampered the Commission's work, and therefore stated its position that nothing in the draft constituted a request that those records be resumed.

On 30 November the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution, also without a vote, as resolution 42/42 G. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the Disarmament Commission,

Emphasizing again the importance of an effective follow-up to the relevant recommendations and decisions contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament,

Taking into account the relevant sections of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly, the second special session devoted to disarmament,

Considering the role that the Disarmament Commission has been called upon to play and the contribution that it should make in examining and submitting recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament and in the promotion of the implementation of the relevant decisions of the tenth special session,

Recalling its resolutions 33/71 H of 14 December 1978, 34/83 H of 11 December 1979, 35/152 F of 12 December 1980, 36/92 B of 9 December 1981, 37/78 H of 9 December 1982, 38/183 E of 20 December 1983, 39/148 R of 17 December 1984, 40/152 F of 16 December 1985 and 41/86 E of 4 December 1986,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Disarmament Commission;
2. *Notes* that the Disarmament Commission has yet to conclude its consideration of some items on its agenda, but notes also with appreciation the progress achieved on some of these;
3. *Recalls* the role of the Disarmament Commission as the specialized, deliberative body within the United Nations multilateral disarmament machinery that allows for in-depth deliberations on specific disarmament issues, leading to the submission of concrete recommendations on those issues;
4. *Stresses* the importance for the Disarmament Commission to work on the basis of a relevant agenda of disarmament topics, thereby enabling the Commission to concentrate its efforts and thus optimize its progress on specific subjects in accordance with resolution 37/78 H;
5. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to continue its work in accordance with its mandate, as set forth in paragraph 118 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, and with paragraph 3 of resolution 37/78 H, and to that end to make every effort to achieve specific recommendations, at its 1988 substantive session, on the outstanding items on its agenda, taking into account the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly as well as the results of its 1987 substantive session;
6. *Also requests* the Disarmament Commission to meet for a period not exceeding four weeks during 1988 and to submit a substantive special report, containing specific recommendations on the items included in its agenda, to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, as well as a report to the Assembly at its forty-third session;
7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Disarmament Commission the report of the Conference on Disarmament, together with all the official records of the forty-second session of the General Assembly relating to disarmament matters, and to render all assistance that the Commission may require for implementing the present resolution;
8. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to ensure full provision to the Commission and its subsidiary bodies of interpretation and translation facilities in the official languages, and to assign, as a matter of priority, all the necessary resources and services to this end;
9. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Report of the Disarmament Commission"

Two different draft resolutions entitled "Report of the Conference on Disarmament" were submitted.

On 27 October, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and the United Kingdom submitted one draft which was later also sponsored by Australia and Portugal. On 3 November it was introduced by the Netherlands which stated that it was not the intention of the sponsors to give an evaluation of the work that had been undertaken by the Conference, but to reflect the state of affairs and to confirm that discussions and negotiations had reached a certain stage, as indicated in the report of the Conference. A lot of hard, constructive work had been undertaken in the Conference, which found expression in the report. The report also summarized differences of view, carefully worded in language which had been agreed to in Geneva. The sponsors held that the Conference deserved to have its report meet with consensus in the Assembly and called upon all delegations to help dispel any possible impression of a division between what had been agreed upon in Geneva and what subsequently would be recommended by the Assembly. On 11 November the sponsors submitted a revised draft which contained changes in two preambular paragraphs as well as a new second preambular paragraph and new operative paragraphs 2 and 3. In introducing the revisions that day, the Netherlands noted that the sponsors wished to achieve consensus and were pleased with suggestions that had been made to improve the text.

On 27 October, Algeria, Bangladesh, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Kenya, Madagascar, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Romania, Sri Lanka, the Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia and Zaire submitted another draft resolution entitled "Report of the Conference on Disarmament" which was later also sponsored by Burma. In introducing it on 6 November, Yugoslavia expressed the conviction of the sponsors that the Conference on Disarmament should be directly involved in negotiating the priority issues of disarmament. However, its report that was submitted to the General Assembly in 1987 showed that that was not yet the case: the Conference had again been unable to initiate substantive negotiations on the most important disarmament issues. The sponsors held that, owing to what they considered to be the selective approach of some members to the questions the Conference should discuss, that body was in effect being denied the possibility of fulfilling its mandate. They could not accept the reasoning that the completion of bilateral negotiations on certain disarmament issues was the prerequisite for conducting multilateral negotiations on them. The sponsors hoped for full support for the work of the Conference and its role in the negotiating process.

On 13 November, Yugoslavia orally revised the draft by adding a new operative paragraph 6, requesting the Conference to submit a special report on the status of its negotiations and its work to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament.

In connection with the action on the two draft resolutions in the First Committee, 10 delegations explained their positions on both drafts or on one of them.

Among those addressing the two resolutions, Argentina, Burma, the Soviet Union and Venezuela gave affirmative votes on both. The Soviet Union expressed a preference for the draft introduced by Yugoslavia, seeing in it a reaffirmation of political will to use fully the Conference's potential and to step up its work in the most important areas. As for the draft introduced by the Netherlands, although it did not contain provisions to which the Soviet Union would object, it did not raise with sufficient clarity the question of enhancing the effectiveness of the Conference on Disarmament. The Soviet Union noted, nevertheless, that the draft stated that in the field of disarmament considerable and urgent work remained to be accomplished. Both Burma and Venezuela had sponsored the draft introduced by Yugoslavia, which they regarded as a substantive document, an assessment of the work of the Conference. They believed that the drafts were not incompatible with, but indeed supportive of, each other. Burma held that the one introduced by the Netherlands was procedural and had only general provisions. Venezuela noted that in the previous year it had abstained in the vote on a draft corresponding to the one introduced by the Netherlands. The current text no longer contained the elements that it had found unacceptable. Argentina would have preferred a single draft resolution that would represent the consensus in the Committee and avoid the necessity of voting. In the circumstances, it found acceptable elements in both drafts.

In explaining its affirmative vote for the draft introduced by the Netherlands, Nigeria recalled that in its view, the corresponding 1986 text, which was later adopted as resolution 41/86 P, had not addressed matters of interest to the majority of members of the Conference on Disarmament. Nigeria considered that the current draft was merely procedural. As it did not contain contentious concepts or principles, Nigeria voted for the text.

Australia explained its affirmative vote for the first draft and its abstention in the vote on the second one. It had also hoped that a single text could be adopted by consensus. In its view, the text introduced by Yugoslavia drew selectively on arguments and proposals made and conclusions reached by consensus in the process of drawing up the 1987 report of the Conference on Disarmament—an approach which it considered distorted. Australia had sponsored the draft introduced by the Netherlands and believed that it provided for the appropriate action by the Assembly on the matter.

Sri Lanka for its part, explained its abstention in the vote on the first draft and its affirmative vote on the second one, which it had sponsored. It would also have preferred a single resolution on the subject. The draft introduced by Yugoslavia better reflected its expectations for the Conference's future work. The draft introduced by the Netherlands contained elements which Sri Lanka welcomed, but, in its opinion, the text still presented a somewhat partial picture. Had it provided more specific encouragement to the Conference to fulfil its responsibilities, Sri Lanka would have supported it.

The two sponsors, the Netherlands and Yugoslavia, explained their abstentions on each other's drafts. The Netherlands believed that a procedural consensus resolution would have been justified after the hard work done and

the consensus reached in the Conference on Disarmament. Various paragraphs in the second draft did not reflect the Netherlands views and it had difficulties with the argument that the existence of the Yugoslav draft in itself would prevent some from voting in favour of the procedural draft it had introduced. It called on all delegations to reflect on the best ways and means of recognizing the work done in the Conference and of restoring consensus. Yugoslavia believed that the revised version of the first draft represented a step forward, but it still did not satisfy Yugoslavia's reservations. It considered that the General Assembly should not be satisfied with the request that the Conference on Disarmament intensify its work in accordance with paragraph 120 of the 1978 Final Document. Instead, it should stress the priority issues of disarmament and request the Conference to negotiate on them. That was necessary because the Conference should play an important role in multilateral negotiations on disarmament.

The United States explained its abstention in the vote on the draft introduced by the Netherlands and its negative vote on that introduced by Yugoslavia. It recalled its view that, because the report of the Conference on Disarmament was a consensus document and the resolution concerning it should foster co-operation, the resolution should be a simple and business-like document. The United States felt that the second draft attempted to superimpose the views of certain States on what was collectively developed and agreed upon by consensus among the participants in the Conference. The United States could not support the first draft, either. Although it considered that draft's approach more constructive, it still fell short of the goal of a strictly procedural resolution.

On 13 November the First Committee approved the revised draft introduced by the Netherlands by a recorded vote of 87 to none, with 32 abstentions. On 30 November the General Assembly adopted it by a recorded vote of 127 to none, with 28 abstentions (non-aligned States and United States), as resolution 42/42 K. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling the relevant portions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, in particular paragraph 120 of the Final Document,

Bearing in mind that considerable and urgent work remains to be accomplished in the field of disarmament,

Convinced that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, should play a central role in the implementation of the Programme of Action set forth in section III of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session,

Having considered the report of the Conference on Disarmament, which the Conference adopted by consensus,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Conference on Disarmament on its 1987 session;
2. *Reaffirms* the role of the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community;
3. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its work in accordance with the relevant provisions set forth in paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session;
4. *Also requests* the Conference on Disarmament to submit a report on its work to the General Assembly at its forty-third session;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Report of the Conference on Disarmament"

On 13 November the First Committee approved the draft introduced by Yugoslavia, as orally revised, by a recorded vote of 104 to 5, with 14 abstentions. On 30 November the General Assembly adopted it by a recorded vote of 135 to 5 (Western States, including France, United Kingdom and United States), with 15 abstentions (mostly Western States), as resolution 42/42 L. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 34/83 B of 11 December 1979, 35/152 J of 12 December 1980, 36/92 F of 9 December 1981, 37/78 G of 9 December 1982, 38/183 I of 20 December 1983, 39/148 N of 17 December 1984, 40/152 M of 16 December 1985 and 41/86 M of 4 December 1986,

Having considered the report of the Conference on Disarmament,

Convinced that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, should play the central role in substantive negotiations on priority questions of disarmament and on the implementation of the Programme of Action set forth in section III of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

Reaffirming that the establishment of *ad hoc* committees offers the best available machinery for the conduct of multilateral negotiations on items on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament and contributes to the strengthening of the negotiating role of the Conference,

Deploing the fact that, despite the repeated requests of the General Assembly and the expressed wish of the great majority of members of the Conference on Disarmament, the establishment of an *ad hoc* committee on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and on nuclear disarmament, as well as on the prevention of nuclear war, was once again prevented during the 1987 session of the Conference,

Expressing its deep concern and disappointment that the Conference on Disarmament has not been enabled, this year either, to reach concrete agreements on any disarmament issues to which the United Nations has assigned greatest priority and urgency and which have been under consideration for a number of years,

1. *Notes with satisfaction* that further progress has been made in the negotiations on the elaboration of a draft convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, and urges the Conference on Disarmament to intensify further its work with a view to completing negotiations on such a draft convention;

2. *Calls upon* the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its work, to further its mandate more earnestly through negotiations and to adopt concrete measures on the specific priority issues of disarmament on its agenda, in particular those relating to nuclear disarmament;

3. *Once again urges* the Conference on Disarmament to continue or to undertake, during its 1988 session, substantive negotiations on the priority questions of disarmament on its agenda, in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and other resolutions of the Assembly on those questions;

4. *Calls upon* the Conference on Disarmament to provide the existing *ad hoc* committees with appropriate negotiating mandates and to establish, as a matter of urgency, the *ad hoc* committees under item I of its agenda, entitled "Nuclear-test ban", on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament and on the prevention of nuclear war;

5. *Urges* the Conference on Disarmament to undertake, without further delay, negotiations with a view to elaborating a draft treaty on a nuclear-test ban;

6. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to submit a special report on the status of its negotiations and its work to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament;

7. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to submit a report on its work to the General Assembly at its forty-third session;

8. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Report of the Conference on Disarmament".

On 26 October, Iraq and Jordan submitted a draft resolution entitled "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session" which was introduced by Iraq on 3 November. In its introduction, Iraq recalled that the Conference on Disarmament had been established to provide an opportunity for all Member States of the United Nations to contribute effectively and positively to negotiations on disarmament. Its rules of procedure affirmed that fact and referred very clearly to the right of non-members to present relevant documents and studies to it. In addition, articles 32 to 36 granted non-member States the right to contribute to the preparatory work of the Conference in connection with important questions. The consensus provision in the rules of procedure was not meant to confer on a member State the right to transform the Conference into a closed club, where a member could exploit the Conference for its own purposes. The draft urged States not to abuse the consensus rule so as to prevent States not members from exercising their right to participate in the work of the Conference.

At the time that action was taken on the draft in the First Committee, four delegations explained their positions on it.

The Islamic Republic of Iran explained its negative vote on the draft. In its view, it would have been more appropriate had the sponsors merged their text with others so as to reduce the number of resolutions. Iran believed that the fact that the rules of procedure of the Conference on Disarmament were questioned in the draft would indirectly harm the credibility of the negotiating body. It further objected to the use of terms such as "misuse" in operative paragraph 2 and declared that the rules could not be altered to suit the wishes of a single country.

Sweden and the United Kingdom explained their abstentions. Sweden reaffirmed its support for the participation of all States in the work of the Conference, but noted that participation was to be decided upon by the Conference itself, while the draft implied that non-members had the right to participate in the work of its plenary session. Sweden also reiterated its view that a further report by the Secretary-General on the matter would not add much to the Conference's yearly report to the General Assembly on its work, and pointed out that the Secretary-General's report submitted on that subject in 1987²⁷ consisted of a reference to the relevant paragraphs of the Conference's report. The United Kingdom stated that it had no wish to prevent non-members from expressing views in plenary meetings, particularly when the concerns of those States were under discussion. Nevertheless, it believed that the entire question was a matter for the Conference itself to decide.

France stated that by voting in favour, it wished to stress its agreement with the general objective of the draft resolution. It believed that all Member States of the United Nations should have the right to speak in plenary meetings before the Conference on Disarmament, but emphasized its reservations re-

²⁷ A/42/552.

garding the formulation of operative paragraph 2 (see below). In its view, it would have been preferable to express the wish that members of the Conference would respond favourably to requests by non-members to speak in plenary meetings of the Conference.

On 13 November the Committee approved the draft by a recorded vote of 103 to 1, with 13 abstentions. On 30 November the General Assembly adopted it by a recorded vote of 137 to 1 (Iran), with 14 abstentions (mostly Western States), as resolution 42/42 B. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 39/148 L of 17 December 1984, 40/152 J of 16 December 1985 and 41/86 J of 4 December 1986,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General on this subject submitted pursuant to resolution 41/86 J,

Noting with concern that the problem identified in the above-mentioned resolutions has not been alleviated,

Firmly convinced that all States have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations,

Bearing in mind paragraph 28 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in which it affirmed that all States have the duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament and that all States have the right to participate in disarmament negotiations, as well as paragraphs 120 (g) and (h) of the Final Document,

Recalling further its resolution 38/183 F of 20 December 1983, in which it called upon the Governments of all States to contribute substantially, *inter alia*, to halting and reversing the arms race, particularly in the nuclear field, and thus to reducing the danger of nuclear war,

1. *Reiterates once more* the right of all States not members of the Conference on Disarmament to participate in the work of the plenary sessions of the Conference on substantive questions;
2. *Urges* States members of the Conference on Disarmament not to misuse the rules of procedure of the Conference so as to prevent States not members from exercising their right to participate in the work of the Conference;
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its forty-third session on the progress made in the implementation of the present resolution.

On 27 October, Cameroon submitted a draft resolution entitled "Rationalization of the work of the First Committee". On 4 November, Australia, the Bahamas, Cameroon, Canada, the Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, the Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, the Federal Republic of Germany, Guinea, Ireland, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Somalia, Togo, Zaire and Zambia submitted a revised draft resolution which was later also sponsored by the Netherlands. It contained several changes in operative paragraph 1.

In introducing the revised draft the same day, Cameroon stated that the United Nations was an instrument, and could not achieve its objectives in disarmament without the appropriate exercise by Member States of political will. At the same time, States should be prepared to fix the instrument when it needed fixing. Cameroon believed that there was a need to reform the First Committee's method of work and approach. The draft contained recommendations to that end, which were complementary to the ongoing review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament being carried out by the Disarmament Commission. The sponsors believed that a rational approach

to the Committee's work was long overdue and appropriate action was required. Cameroon then mentioned specifically some of the reforms that the sponsors had in mind, including careful organization of agenda items, the merging of draft resolutions through organized, informal consultations and avoidance of the proliferation of unnecessary, repetitious and overlapping draft resolutions.

On 9 November, Ghana proposed an oral amendment to operative paragraph 1. On 11 November the sponsors submitted a further revised draft resolution which again contained changes in operative paragraph 1.

At the time that action was taken on the draft in the First Committee, seven delegations explained their decisions to abstain.

Bangladesh simply stated that its abstention should not be interpreted as meaning that, in its view, there was no scope for rationalizing the work of the First Committee. Brazil was in broad agreement with virtually all the measures suggested in the draft, but felt that it was not the most appropriate vehicle to convey such a measure to the members of the First Committee themselves. By adopting the draft, they themselves would be in the awkward position of violating the recommendation in paragraph 1 (b), to the effect that recommendations on procedural matters should be adopted as decisions, not as resolutions. Brazil therefore felt that a decision would be more appropriate. Mexico shared Brazil's opinion. It believed that rationalization was of the highest importance and deserved thorough consideration. In its view, the appropriate forum for that consideration was the Disarmament Commission.

Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Venezuela and Yugoslavia all agreed that the Disarmament Commission should continue to deal with the subject and make recommendations on it to the General Assembly. While Pakistan appreciated the concerns that motivated the sponsors, it felt that the Committee should avoid any hasty decision that might prejudice or hamper the Commission's deliberations. Sri Lanka considered the draft's evolution somewhat confusing and would also have preferred to discuss its substance in a less hurried atmosphere. Venezuela felt that in order to be viable and effective, the draft should be adopted by consensus in the Committee. It believed that the best way of achieving the rationalization of the work of the Committee was through self-control on the part of delegations. Yugoslavia wanted to give the Disarmament Commission time to complete its work and believed that the issues raised in the draft should be considered further within the Commission during its 1988 session.

On 12 November the First Committee approved the draft by a recorded vote of 103 to none, with 24 abstentions. On 30 November the General Assembly adopted it by a recorded vote of 134 to none, with 20 abstentions (non-aligned States and China), as resolution 42/42 N. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming that, in order for the United Nations to discharge effectively its central role and primary responsibilities in the field of disarmament and related security questions, the necessary political will of States as well as the effective functioning of existing machinery must be demonstrated,

Convinced that the existing machinery for the consideration of disarmament and related international security questions within the framework of the United Nations can and should be reinforced through concrete measures to increase its effectiveness and efficiency,

Emphasizing the need to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of the activities of the First Committee as the key organ of the General Assembly for disarmament and related international security questions,

Acknowledging the valuable proposals already introduced with the above-mentioned goal in mind, including those of the group of former and present chairmen and other officers of the First Committee,

Taking into account the report of the Disarmament Commission,

1. *Decides* to adopt the following recommendations concerning the work of the First Committee:

(a) The agenda of the First Committee should be rationalized by grouping or merging related items to the extent possible in order to provide greater organizational clarity and without prejudging their substance;

(b) Recommendations on procedural matters should be adopted as decisions, not as resolutions;

(c) In the interest of maximum effectiveness and efficiency, draft resolutions on the same subject or under the same agenda items should be merged, whenever possible;

(d) A period of time for discussion and for organized informal consultations among delegations should be allocated in the programme of work of the First Committee;

(e) The First Committee should have a single general debate on all disarmament questions during which delegations may speak on specific issues, in order to ensure the best use of time and resources available;

(f) The deadline for the submission of draft resolutions on disarmament items should be advanced further to the extent feasible with a view to allowing sufficient time for consultations before proceeding to take action upon them;

2. *Requests* the First Committee to implement the above-mentioned recommendations at the forty-third session of the General Assembly.

Activities of other disarmament bodies in 1987 and consideration by the General Assembly

Preparatory Committee for the Third Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament

By resolution 41/60 G of 1986, the General Assembly decided to convene its third special session on disarmament in 1988 and to establish an open-ended preparatory committee for it. The Assembly requested the Preparatory Committee to prepare a draft agenda for the special session, to examine all relevant questions relating to that session and to submit its recommendations and a progress report to the Assembly in 1987. It also requested the Preparatory Committee to meet for a short organizational session before the end of 1986 to set the date for its substantive session.

In accordance with the resolution, the Preparatory Committee held an organizational meeting on 5 December 1986 under the chairmanship of the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs to decide upon the dates of its first substantive session. The Committee agreed to schedule that session from 26 May to 5 June 1987. Decisions concerning the election of the Chairman and other officers were postponed, pending consultations.

During its substantive session in 1987, the Committee held nine meetings under the chairmanship of Mr. Mansur Ahmad of Pakistan. Following the practice of the Preparatory Committees for the first and second special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Committee decided, at its first meeting, to allow representatives of non-governmental organizations and peace and disarmament research institutions to be present at its meetings. It also decided to invite IAEA and specialized agencies interested in disarmament to take part in its work as Observers.

In the course of its session, the Preparatory Committee agreed upon a set of recommendations concerning the organization of work of the third special session, which it submitted in its report to the Assembly.²⁸ The Committee recommended, *inter alia*, a provisional agenda, which included the following substantive items:

9. Review and appraisal of the present international situation, especially in the light of the vital objective of terminating the arms race and the pressing need to achieve substantial progress in the field of disarmament.
10. Assessment of the implementation of the decisions and recommendations adopted by the General Assembly at its first and second special sessions devoted to disarmament:
 - (a) Report of the Conference on Disarmament;
 - (b) Report of the Disarmament Commission;
 - (c) Resolutions of the General Assembly in the field of arms limitations and disarmament;
 - (d) Status of negotiations on arms limitations and disarmament in bilateral and various multilateral forums.
11. Consideration and adoption of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.
12. Assessment of developments and trends, including qualitative and quantitative aspects, relevant to the disarmament process, with a view to the elaboration of appropriate concrete and practical measures and, if necessary, additional principles, taking duly into account the principles and priorities established in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament.
13. Consideration of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and of the effectiveness of the disarmament machinery.
14. United Nations information and educational activities in the field of disarmament, including measures to mobilize world public opinion in favour of disarmament:
 - (a) World Disarmament Campaign;
 - (b) Other public information activities.

The Committee also recommended that the special session take place before the forty-third regular session of the General Assembly, in 1988. The special session would follow the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, on the understanding that it would, in so far as possible, adopt decisions on matters of substance by consensus. The Committee believed that it would be desirable for Member States to be represented at the special session at the highest possible political level.

With respect to its future work, the Preparatory Committee recommended that it hold its third session (its second substantive session) from 25 January to 5 February 1988 at United Nations Headquarters in New York.

²⁸ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 46 (A/42/46)*, sect. III, paras. 15-26.

By resolution 41/60 G, Member States were invited to communicate to the Secretary-General their views on the agenda and other questions relating to the special session, and the Secretary-General was requested to transmit them to the Preparatory Committee. Subsequently, the Committee issued a document containing the replies of 34 States.²⁹

In their responses, Member States in general welcomed the fact that a third special session devoted to disarmament would be held shortly. Although they recalled that the second special session had not been successful, they felt that the third special session would be able to accomplish useful work because the international situation had become more favourable to disarmament.

Both Argentina and Egypt believed that the session should move forward from the consensus reached in 1978, and Argentina emphasized the need for reaffirmation of the principles, priorities and targets agreed to in the Declaration and Programme of Action of the 1978 Final Document and the adoption of concrete courses of action. Belgium stated that the session should serve the purpose of enabling the international community to draw up a list of recommendations to be considered for the future in arms control and disarmament. New Zealand hoped that the session would allow all Member States to reassess the multilateral disarmament process and the disarmament machinery of the United Nations. The United States believed that although the session would be a deliberative, not negotiating, forum, it could contribute to international peace and security by focusing attention on practical measures that could be implemented in the short and long term. Finland stated that the particular task of the session would be to enhance the central role of the United Nations in future multilateral disarmament endeavours.

In the view of the Soviet Union, the session would provide an opportunity to use the substantive provisions of the 1978 Final Document as a basis for achieving a nuclear-free world and forging a link between those provisions and the goal of establishing a system of comprehensive security. Mongolia also believed that the main purpose of the session should be to consider and adopt measures to promote the limitation and reduction of arms, especially nuclear arms, to prevent an arms race in outer space and to guarantee comprehensive security for all. Mexico likewise stressed the importance of nuclear disarmament and stated that the Assembly should consider appropriate and practical measures which could be adopted for the prevention of nuclear war.

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A great number of delegations commented on the prospects and preparations for the third special session in the course of the debate in the First Committee during the forty-second session of the General Assembly.

Among them, Sweden believed that the special session would take place at a crucial point in time and could become a major event in multilateral

²⁹ A/AC.230/2 and Corr.1 and Add.1-10.

disarmament. As events were unfolding, it might be able to register significant progress in nuclear disarmament, but its main purpose should be to generate, not register, progress. The agenda envisaged for the session would make possible a substantial and forward-looking discussion and concrete measures of disarmament. India noted that a decade had passed since the first special session had been held, but that the results of the international community's efforts since that time had fallen short of expectations. The third special session would provide a collective opportunity once again to impart the necessary political impetus to multilateral efforts towards disarmament. India also felt that the outcome of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development (see chapter XVIII) generated a spirit of optimism regarding the forthcoming special session.

Nigeria hoped that the session would provide a forum for breaking new ground and could also serve as input to the bilateral arms negotiations between the super-Powers. The opportunity further to solidify the achievements of the first two special sessions should not be allowed to slip away. In the same vein, Brazil hoped that the First Committee, the Preparatory Committee and the Conference on Disarmament would seize the great opportunity for confidence-building and constructive action presented by the third special session. It might be a long time before conditions as favourable as the existing ones would be offered again.

Romania believed that the special session should solemnly reaffirm the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and set forth measures to involve the multilateral forums even further in a meaningful debate. Mongolia held that in preparing for the session, the international community should, first and foremost, recognize the fact that thus far very little had been done to achieve the fundamental objective of disarmament and to meet the goals and fulfil the tasks set forth in the 1978 Final Document. In its view, the major objective of the session would be to prepare a firm basis which would help make the 1990s a decade for building a nuclear-free and non-violent world.

The United States believed that the third special session would come at an opportune time for pursuing the goal of a more secure world, and it looked forward to participating in the session's work fully and vigorously. Similarly, Italy welcomed the session as a significant opportunity for widening the mutual understanding among Member States on all the main questions related to the disarmament process. With a view to avoiding the constraints that had weighed heavily on the 1982 special session, Italy urged that a forward-looking yet realistic approach be adopted in 1988.

On 27 October, Algeria, Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Colombia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Japan, Madagascar, Morocco, Nigeria, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Romania, Sri Lanka, the Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia, Venezuela, Viet Nam and Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution entitled "Convening of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament" which was later also sponsored by the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia and the Netherlands.

In its introduction of the draft on 4 November, Yugoslavia stressed that the international community attached exceptional importance to the special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which represented a unique opportunity for all Member States to participate directly in defining the guidelines for further joint action in the field of disarmament. In the current circumstances, when new vistas for strengthening multilateralism were opening up, the third special session was assuming special significance. It should make a comprehensive assessment of the developments in the area in the past few years and ascertain to what degree the goals set at the earlier sessions had been accomplished. At the same time, it should politically encourage and generate the ongoing process of negotiations and provide fresh impetus for multilateral negotiations on the most important issues of disarmament. By the draft, the General Assembly would decide that the third special session would be held from 31 May to 25 June 1988. The Preparatory Committee would be requested to consider substantive issues related to the special session for incorporation in the document or documents to be adopted at that session and thus lay solid foundations for successful deliberations and the outcome of the session.

In a comment on the draft during the debate in the First Committee, Denmark, speaking on behalf of the twelve member States of the European Community, stated that the Twelve welcomed the decision to convene a third special session devoted to disarmament and supported the draft. They looked forward to the session as a significant opportunity for balanced and constructive deliberation with a view to widening the understanding among Member States on all the main questions related to the disarmament process. The session would take place within the framework of a constructive international dialogue and at a time when the intensive bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union had given rise to expectations that real progress might be achieved in the reduction of nuclear arsenals. The session would need careful and thorough preparations and demand a realistic approach as well as flexibility and commitment to ensure its overall success. The Twelve believed that the best result would be achieved if consideration were concentrated upon carefully selected subjects.

In a similar comment, the Sudan expressed the view that the third special session should examine the results of the first two special sessions and, in accordance with the last paragraph of the Final Document of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development (see chapter XVIII, annex), review the relationship between disarmament and development.

At the time that action was taken on the draft in the First Committee, three States explained their positions on it.

India felt that the third special session would be taking place in an international environment which was perhaps more hopeful than at any time since the first special session. In its view, the agreement in principle on intermediate-range nuclear forces between the United States and the Soviet Union (see chapter VI) was a modest, yet important, first step in disarmament, which might open the way to more important steps. At the multilateral level,

it was possible that a convention on chemical weapons would be concluded in 1988. The climate of disarmament negotiations was positive and conducive to more meaningful multilateral efforts, and India hoped that the new opportunity opening up before Member States would be used to infuse greater multilateralism into the disarmament process.

The United Kingdom noted that certain elements in the preamble to the draft did not adequately reflect its approach to security, arms control and disarmament issues, and questioned whether those elements were necessary in a procedural document. None the less, it was looking forward to participating actively in the third special session, where it expected all points of view and approaches to be adequately reflected. It also expected that the session would take proper account of developments since the first and second special sessions, including the evolution of new areas of common ground and principle.

The United States made several observations on the preambular and operative paragraphs of the draft (see below). With regard to the third preambular paragraph, it noted that the 1978 Final Document, however important, had remained a static document, while events had not stood still. International realities might no longer be accurately represented in a document reflecting the situation obtaining in the late 1970s. As to the fourth preambular paragraph, it shared the conviction that nations must turn from the military to the peaceful solution of their disputes. However, in its view it was disingenuous to imply criticism of actions taken by States to meet necessary military requirements in the exercise of their right, under the Charter of the United Nations, to individual or collective self-defence. Concerning the fifth preambular paragraph, it did not agree with the implication that nations could secure peace solely through disarmament. In its view, arms limitation was merely one element—albeit an important one—of the broader efforts to that end. International peace and security would be ensured only if all States faithfully abode by the purposes and principles embodied in the Charter. With regard to operative paragraph 3, the United States hoped that the Preparatory Committee would conclude the necessary preparations at its January session. Finally, it expected that the Secretariat would make every effort to comply with the requests in operative paragraphs 7 and 8 on the basis of existing resources. The United States intended to participate constructively in the work of the Preparatory Committee and would act in the same spirit at the third special session itself.

On 16 November the First Committee approved the draft without a vote. On 30 November the General Assembly adopted it, also without a vote, as resolution 42/40. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the decision, contained in paragraph 66 of the Concluding Document of its Twelfth Special Session, the second special session devoted to disarmament, concerning the convening of the third special session devoted to disarmament,

Reaffirming its resolution 41/60 G of 3 December 1986, in which it decided to convene its third special session on disarmament in 1988 and to establish an open-ended Preparatory Committee for the Third Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament,

Reaffirming the validity of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, and its conviction that disarmament remains one of the essential objectives of the United Nations,

Expressing its concern at the continuation of the arms race, which aggravates international peace and security and also diverts vast resources urgently needed for economic and social development,

Reiterating its conviction that peace can be secured through the implementation of disarmament measures, particularly for nuclear disarmament, conducive to the realization of the final objective, namely, general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Having considered the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Third Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament,

1. *Decides* that the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament shall be held from 31 May to 25 June 1988 at United Nations Headquarters in New York;

2. *Endorses* the report of the Preparatory Committee for the Third Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament and the recommendations contained therein;

3. *Endorses also* the recommendation of the Preparatory Committee that it meet in New York from 25 January to 5 February 1988 in order to consider substantive issues related to the session for incorporation in the document or documents to be adopted at the third special session devoted to disarmament, and any remaining organizational and procedural matters, with the understanding that the Preparatory Committee, at that session, would determine the need for a subsequent session;

4. *Expresses its appreciation* to the members of the Preparatory Committee for their constructive contribution to its work;

5. *Requests* the Preparatory Committee to submit its final report to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament;

6. *Requests* all Member States engaged in bilateral, regional or multilateral negotiations on disarmament issues outside the framework of the United Nations to submit appropriate information on such negotiations to the General Assembly in accordance with paragraph 27 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly before the third special session devoted to disarmament;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to prepare necessary documentation, including background material, as may be requested by the Preparatory Committee for the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to render to the Preparatory Committee all necessary assistance for the completion of its work;

9. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session an item entitled "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament"

Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean

By resolution 2832 (XXVI) of 1971, entitled "Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace", the Indian Ocean, within limits to be determined, was designated for all time as a zone of peace. In 1972, the General Assembly established the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean to study practical measures to achieve the objectives of the Declaration. The number of mem-

bers in the Committee has increased, at various subsequent dates, from 15 to 49.³⁰

Since 1973, consideration of the issue in the General Assembly has generally centred on the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee. Bilateral Soviet-American talks were initiated in 1977 to pursue possible limitations on military activities in the Indian Ocean; they were suspended in February 1978 and have not been resumed. The issue was also discussed at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in 1978. In 1979, the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States, which the members of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, the great Powers and the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean attended, was held in New York. The Meeting recommended that a conference on the Indian Ocean be held, and proposed that the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean undertake the preparatory work for it.

Also in 1979, the General Assembly decided to convene the Conference on the Indian Ocean in 1981 at Colombo, Sri Lanka, inviting the permanent members of the Security Council and major maritime users of the Indian Ocean to participate in it. However, ever since 1979 the *Ad Hoc* Committee has been unable to make definitive progress in preparing for the Conference or in finalizing its dates. Although some progress on procedural matters as well as substantive issues has been made, the differences in approach between States have remained wide, preventing the Committee from completing its work.³¹

In 1986, the work of the Committee revealed again that the positions of States on the question had not changed. Non-aligned and Eastern European countries were in favour of convening the Conference at Colombo not later than 1988, while Western States continued to stress that an amelioration of the prevailing political and security climate in the Indian Ocean region was essential for the success of the Conference. By resolution 41/87, the *Ad Hoc* Committee was requested to complete the preparatory work for the Conference during 1987, taking into account the political and security climate in the region, in order to enable the opening of the Conference in Colombo not later than 1988.

In accordance with resolution 41/87, the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean held two sessions in 1987, from 23 March to 3 April and from 22 June to 10 July at United Nations Headquarters in New York, under the chairmanship of Mr. Nissanka Wijewardane of Sri Lanka. During the sessions, the Committee held 17 formal meetings as well as a number of informal

³⁰ Following the appointment of Zimbabwe as a member of the *Ad Hoc* Committee by the President of the General Assembly in 1987, the Committee is composed of the following 49 Member States: Australia, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Poland, Romania, Seychelles, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, Uganda, USSR, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

³¹ For details, see *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1970-1975* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.76.IX.1), chap. XI; *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1985* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.85.IX.6), chap. VII; and earlier volumes of *The Yearbook*.

meetings. The Working Group, which continued to work under the mandate given to it in 1985, held a total of 11 meetings.

During the course of the sessions, the Committee agreed to consider further the draft framework of the provisional agenda and the draft provisional rules of procedure for the Conference at a time nearer its opening. On 3 April, Sri Lanka introduced, on behalf of the non-aligned States members of the Committee, a working paper entitled "Stages of the United Nations Conference on the Indian Ocean".³² On 26 June, the German Democratic Republic introduced, on behalf of a group of socialist States members of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, a working paper entitled "Confidence-building measures in the Indian Ocean".³³ Sri Lanka also made a formal offer to host one of the sessions of the *Ad Hoc* Committee in 1988 at Colombo. While some welcomed and supported that offer, others expressed reservations on holding sessions of the *Ad Hoc* Committee outside New York.

In June the Working Group continued its discussion of substantive issues under the chairmanship of Mr. Nihal Rodrigo of Sri Lanka. To facilitate the work of the Group, the Chairman prepared and presented to it an informal paper which contained a list of 20 points. All delegations agreed that the paper should help structure future discussion in the Working Group. The Group made progress in its meetings during the sessions of the *Ad Hoc* Committee in 1987.

On 10 July the Committee adopted by consensus its report to the General Assembly,³⁴ which contained a draft resolution that the *Ad Hoc* Committee recommended to the Assembly for adoption.

In concluding statements at the final meeting of the *Ad Hoc* Committee's session, on 10 July, India and China voiced regret that the Committee had been unable to complete preparatory work for the Conference, but welcomed Sri Lanka's offer to host a session of the Committee. Sri Lanka expressed the hope that its offer would be accepted. The German Democratic Republic urged progress in the preparation for the Conference, hoped that controversial and one-sided formulations could be avoided so that tangible results could be achieved and welcomed the Sri Lankan offer. The Soviet Union regretted the postponement of the Conference and the fact that the Committee had not recommended a stronger draft resolution. The United Kingdom was pleased with the consensus on the Committee's report, expressed reservations regarding the holding of sessions in Colombo and noted that the recommended draft resolution expressly indicated that a decision was still to be taken on the matter at the Committee's first session in 1988. The United States endorsed the comments made by the United Kingdom.

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³² A/AC.159/L.74.

³³ A/AC.159/L.75.

³⁴ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 29 (A/42/29)*.

A number of non-aligned and socialist States addressed the question of holding the Conference on the Indian Ocean in the course of the debate in the First Committee during the forty-second session of the General Assembly.

Bangladesh stated that as a member of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, it would work towards convening the proposed Conference in Colombo in 1988, but, if the preparatory work were not completed in time, the Conference should be convened at a date not later than 1990. It expressed its appreciation to Sri Lanka for offering Colombo as the venue for the preparatory session. Democratic Yemen stressed its intention to promote the efforts of the countries of the region to bring peace and security to the area and believed that the adoption of tangible measures to declare the Indian Ocean a zone of peace would make a great contribution towards eliminating threats and fostering stability.

Indonesia was concerned about the continued escalation of great-Power rivalry in the Indian Ocean and its vicinity, a region adjacent to South-East Asia. In its view, the interrelated complex issues concerning the political and security climate in the Indian Ocean could best be addressed and resolved through the early convening of the Conference on the Indian Ocean. The United Republic of Tanzania deplored what it considered deliberate attempts to frustrate all efforts to hold the Conference and to protract its preparation *ad infinitum*. Nevertheless, it was optimistic that the Conference would ultimately be convened.

The Soviet Union favoured the convening of the Conference in 1988 and stressed that it wanted to see the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. Early implementation of the Declaration to that effect would be helped by establishing international guarantees for the safety of shipping in the Indian Ocean and the seas, straits and gulfs adjacent to it, by solving the problem of the safety of air communications and by developing collective measures against terrorism in the sea lanes and air lanes of the Indian Ocean, it believed.

On 2 November the representative of Sri Lanka, who was Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean, introduced the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee containing the draft resolution recommended by the Committee. He noted that the Committee had been able to recommend a consensus draft resolution and that its Working Group had made progress. He summarized briefly the contents of the draft, by which the General Assembly would recommend that the Committee complete the remaining preparatory work during its subsequent sessions in order to enable the convening of the Conference at Colombo at an early date, but not later than 1990, in consultation with the host country.

At the time that action was taken on the draft resolution, seven delegations explained their positions on it.

Bangladesh endorsed the content of the draft, which was less than what it had hoped for, but—in its view—worthwhile in order to gain the broader support reflected in the consensus in the *Ad Hoc* Committee. Democratic Yemen criticized what it considered obstruction of the objectives of the Conference. It had agreed to postpone the Conference yet again, but considered its holding necessary and urged further efforts to that end. The German

Democratic Republic shared the concern over the dangers of an increasing militarization of the Indian Ocean region, in particular a massive naval buildup in the Persian Gulf. It welcomed all activities undertaken by the countries of the region and by other States aimed at scaling down tensions and creating a climate of stability and security.

The Islamic Republic of Iran believed that the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean, a region witnessing the heaviest military buildup by foreign navies, deserved special attention. It condemned the presence of foreign navies in the Persian Gulf, which was a natural extension of the Indian Ocean. Pakistan joined in the consensus despite the fact that the draft fell short of its expectations. It particularly stressed the importance of the security of the littoral and hinterland States, which had two aspects: first, threats emanating from within the region, which were rooted in the ambitions of powerful regional States and, secondly, extraregional threats arising from the foreign military presence in the Indian Ocean region.

The Soviet Union considered the establishment of zones of peace in various regions to be important to the building of a comprehensive system of international peace and security and shared the concern regarding the developments in the Indian Ocean. Sri Lanka restated its disappointment at the postponement of the Conference and renewed its offer to host at Colombo in 1988 the second of the three sessions of the *Ad Hoc* Committee.

On 16 November the First Committee approved the draft resolution contained in the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean without a vote. On 30 November the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution, also without a vote, as resolution 42/43. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, contained in its resolution 2832 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, and recalling also its resolutions 2992 (XXVII) of 15 December 1972, 3080 (XXVIII) of 6 December 1973, 3259 A (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3468 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/88 of 14 December 1976, 32/86 of 12 December 1977, S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, 33/68 of 14 December 1978, 34/80 A and B of 11 December 1979, 35/150 of 12 December 1980, 36/90 of 9 December 1981, 37/96 of 13 December 1982, 38/185 of 20 December 1983, 39/149 of 17 December 1984, 40/153 of 16 December 1985, 41/87 of 4 December 1986 and other relevant resolutions,

Recalling further the report of the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean and the exchange of views in the Committee;
2. *Takes note* of the discussions on substantive issues in the Working Group established in accordance with the *Ad Hoc* Committee's decision of 11 July 1985;
3. *Emphasizes* its decision to convene the Conference on the Indian Ocean at Colombo, as a necessary step for the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace adopted in 1971;
4. *Renews* the mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Committee as defined in the relevant resolutions, and requests the Committee to intensify its work with regard to the implementation of its mandate;
5. *Requests* the *Ad Hoc* Committee to hold three preparatory sessions in 1988, each of a duration of one week, one session of which could be held at Colombo in accordance with a decision to be taken by the *Ad Hoc* Committee at its first session in 1988;

6. *Requests* the *Ad Hoc* Committee, should the preparatory work not be completed to enable the convening of the Conference in 1988, to complete the remaining work during its subsequent sessions in order to enable the convening of the Conference at Colombo at an early date, but not later than 1990, in consultation with the host country;

7. *Notes* that the *Ad Hoc* Committee will, during its preparatory sessions in 1988, give serious consideration to ways and means of more effectively organizing work in the *Ad Hoc* Committee to enable it to fulfil its mandate;

8. *Requests* the *Ad Hoc* Committee to submit to the Conference a report on its preparatory work;

9. *Requests* the *Ad Hoc* Committee to present a report on its work to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament;

10. *Requests* the *Ad Hoc* Committee to submit to the General Assembly at its forty-third session a full report on the implementation of the present resolution;

11. *Requests* the Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee to continue his consultations on the participation in the work of the Committee by States Members of the United Nations which are not members of the Committee, with the aim of resolving this matter at the earliest possible date;

12. *Requests* the Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee to consult the Secretary-General at the appropriate time on the establishment of a secretariat for the Conference;

13. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to render all necessary assistance to the *Ad Hoc* Committee, including the provision of summary records, in recognition of its preparatory function, as well as verbatim transcripts for a possible meeting at Colombo.

Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference

In 1971, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2833 (XXVI) aimed at convening a world disarmament conference open to all States, following adequate preparation. In 1973, the Assembly established the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, which was mandated to examine all the views and suggestions of Governments on the convening of a conference and related matters. In its annual reports submitted to the Assembly,³⁵ the *Ad Hoc* Committee has repeatedly expressed the view that in spite of differences of opinion that have delayed progress towards convening a world disarmament conference, such a conference could be a useful forum for disarmament efforts.

Forty non-nuclear-weapon States are represented in the Committee.³⁶ The basic positions of countries or groups concerning the convening of a conference, as expressed in the *Ad Hoc* Committee over the years, have not undergone essential changes. The Eastern European countries and those non-aligned States that have referred to the issue have continued to call for a conference, noting the importance of universal participation and adequate

³⁵ *Ibid.*, *Twenty-ninth Session through Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 28* (A/9628 and A/10028 and Corr.1, and A/31/28 through A/42/28); in addition, the *Ad Hoc* Committee submitted special reports to the Assembly at its tenth special session, in 1978 (*ibid.*, *Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 3* (A/S-10/3 and Corr.1), vols. I and II), and at its twelfth special session, in 1982 (*ibid.*, *Twelfth Special Session, Supplement No. 4* (A/S-12/4)).

³⁶ Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire and Zambia.

preparation. China has in recent years expressed conditional support for the idea. Although the United States and other Western countries have not questioned the idea in principle, they have emphasized in the last few years that the international situation has not been conducive to undertaking preparations for such a conference. Nevertheless, the *Ad Hoc* Committee's mandate has been renewed each year and the item has been retained on the agenda of the General Assembly.

In 1986, as in previous years, there was no agreement among the nuclear-weapon States on convening a world disarmament conference. While the Soviet Union continued to support the idea and China voiced conditional support, France, the United Kingdom and the United States held the view that the current international climate was not conducive to holding such a conference and favoured curtailing or suspending further meetings of the *Ad Hoc* Committee. The General Assembly, in renewing the mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Committee by resolution 41/61, deferred the question of convening meetings of the Committee to the forty-second session of the Assembly.

More precisely, the Assembly recommended that the Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference undertake consultations with the representatives of the nuclear-weapon States, as well as with all other States, in order to remain currently informed of the development of their positions on the question of convening a world disarmament conference. It further requested the Secretary-General to report to the Assembly at its forty-second session on the results of those consultations.

By a letter dated 28 August 1987, Mr. Nissanka Wijewardane of Sri Lanka, Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, conveyed to the Secretary-General information concerning the consultations he had undertaken in accordance with resolution 41/61.³⁷

The replies indicated that the Western nuclear Powers had not changed their positions on the question. France briefly confirmed its earlier position. The United Kingdom believed that, in view of the existing international climate, no useful purpose would be served by preparing for the holding of a world disarmament conference. It therefore doubted the usefulness of further meetings of the *Ad Hoc* Committee. The United States continued to view a favourable international environment as an indispensable prerequisite for a successful world disarmament conference. Therefore, it believed that it would be premature and counter-productive to convene such a conference under current circumstances. For that reason and in view of the budgetary restrictions on the United Nations, the United States did not believe a world disarmament conference could fulfil its objectives.

The Soviet Union stated once again that as a matter of principle it supported the idea of convening a world disarmament conference. It invited the nuclear Powers that had not yet responded favourably to the idea to take a more constructive position. China recalled that it had always advocated the convening of an international conference to discuss disarmament. If the ma-

³⁷ The Chairman's letter and the replies received from 10 Governments were annexed to the Secretary-General's report on the question (A/42/542 and Add.1).

jority of the Member States were in favour of a world conference to discuss how the two super-Powers should take the lead in drastically cutting their armaments, it would be ready to support the idea.

The five non-nuclear-weapon States that had replied to the Chairman, Bulgaria, Mexico, the Philippines, Poland and Sri Lanka, all expressed support for convening a world disarmament conference.

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On 27 October, Burundi, Peru, Poland, Spain and Sri Lanka submitted a draft resolution, entitled "World Disarmament Conference" in the First Committee. In introducing it on 9 November, the representative of Sri Lanka, who had been Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, stated that the draft reflected the result of activities which flowed from the implementation of resolution 41/61. By it, the Assembly would renew the mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, request it to continue to maintain close contact with the representatives of the nuclear-weapon States in order to remain currently informed of their positions on the question of convening a world disarmament conference, and request the *Ad Hoc* Committee to submit a report to it at its third special session devoted to disarmament. For that purpose, the Committee would be requested to hold one session in 1988 of two days' duration for the preparation and adoption of its report. The Chairman pointed out that the draft made no specific provision to include in the provisional agenda of the General Assembly's forty-third session the item entitled "World Disarmament Conference" in order to allow the Assembly at its third special session to make its own recommendations on that subject.

On 16 November the First Committee approved the draft without a vote. On 30 November the General Assembly adopted it, also without a vote, as resolution 42/41. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2833 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, 2930 (XXVII) of 29 November 1972, 3183 (XXVIII) of 18 December 1973, 3260 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3469 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/190 of 21 December 1976, 32/89 of 12 December 1977, 33/69 of 14 December 1978, 34/81 of 11 December 1979, 35/151 of 12 December 1980, 36/91 of 9 December 1981, 37/97 of 13 December 1982, 38/186 of 20 December 1983, 39/150 of 17 December 1984, 40/154 of 16 December 1985 and 41/61 of 3 December 1986,

Reiterating its conviction that all the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations and that all States should be in a position to contribute to the adoption of measures for the achievement of this goal,

Stressing anew its conviction that a world disarmament conference, adequately prepared and convened at an appropriate time, could provide the realization of such an aim and that the co-operation of all nuclear-weapon Powers would considerably facilitate its attainment,

Recalling that, in paragraph 122 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, it was decided that, at the earliest appropriate time, a world disarmament conference should be convened, with universal participation and with adequate preparation,

1. *Takes note with satisfaction* of the report of the Secretary-General on the world disarmament conference;

2. *Expresses its gratitude* to the Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference for his consultations with the representatives of the nuclear-weapon States, as well as with all other States, as requested in resolution 41/61;

3. *Renews* the mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Committee;

4. *Requests the Ad Hoc Committee to continue* to maintain close contact with the representatives of the nuclear-weapon States, as well as with all other States, in order to remain currently informed of their positions on the question of convening a world disarmament conference, and to consider any relevant comments and observations that might be made, especially having in mind paragraph 122 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session;

5. *Also requests* the *Ad Hoc* Committee to report to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament;

6. *Further requests* the *Ad Hoc* Committee to hold one session in 1988 of two days' duration for the preparation and adoption of its report to the third special session devoted to disarmament.

Conclusion

In 1987, all the principal disarmament bodies once again addressed the question of enhancing the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and increasing the efficiency of the existing machinery for deliberations and negotiations on disarmament. The Disarmament Commission continued its consideration of its specific agenda item concerning that subject. It did not reach consensus on it, however, and while some delegations felt that the document which the Commission produced was a step forward, others regretted that more progress had not been achieved. The Commission recommended to the General Assembly that the consideration of the item be continued and accorded priority at its 1988 session, and by resolution 42/38 O the General Assembly unanimously endorsed that recommendation.

The Conference on Disarmament also discussed, on the margin of its substantive work, such general questions as increasing the effectiveness of its functioning and the relationship between bilateral and multilateral negotiations. As in the previous year, the two resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on the Conference differed from each other in that the one submitted by non-aligned countries—resolution 42/42 L—deplored the fact that the establishment of some subsidiary bodies had not been possible during the 1987 session, while the other, submitted by Western countries—resolution 42/42 K—briefly took note of the report of the Conference.

During its forty-second session, the General Assembly decided by resolution 42/40 that its third special session devoted to disarmament would be held from 31 May to 25 June 1988 and requested the Preparatory Committee to consider substantive issues related to the session for incorporation in the document or documents to be adopted at the session. The Committee held its first substantive session in 1987 and agreed on a set of recommendations concerning the special session. The Assembly's First Committee—which deals with disarmament and related international security questions—held an extensive debate on the question of the rationalization of its work. By resolution 42/42 N, the Assembly decided to adopt a number of recommendations

on the subject and requested the First Committee to implement them at the forty-third session.

During its two sessions in 1987, the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean was unable to make definitive progress in the preparations for the envisaged Conference at Colombo and to finalize dates for its convening. The Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference undertook consultations with the representatives of the nuclear-weapon States, as well as with all other States, in order to remain informed of the development of their positions on the question of convening a world disarmament conference, but reported that there was no agreement among the nuclear-weapon States on the matter.

Follow-up of the special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament

Introduction

IN TWO SPECIAL SESSIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, the first held in 1978 (known as the tenth special session, or the first devoted to disarmament) and the second held in 1982 (the twelfth special session, or the second devoted to disarmament), the international community has made special efforts to reach agreement on a strategy for the future course of disarmament. The two special sessions provided an opportunity to discuss the full range of questions related to the arms race and the possibilities of limiting and reversing it. The Final Document of the Tenth Special Session,¹ usually referred to in this volume as the 1978 Final Document, was adopted by consensus and is generally considered the guide for all disarmament efforts within and outside the United Nations. While the twelfth special session did not reach consensus on a final document,² it did end with the unanimous reaffirmation of the validity of the 1978 Final Document.

Since the thirty-third session of the Assembly, which followed shortly upon the first special session, the item "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session" has figured on the agenda of each subsequent session. The thirty-seventh session, in 1982, added another standing item: "Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly".

The two agenda items on the follow-up of the special sessions, together with a third recurrent item comprehensively called "General and complete disarmament" (the subject of chapter III), have served as the framework for proposals on a wide range of disarmament issues. Many of the proposals introduced under these general items have been debated side by side with related ones raised under more specific items. In fact, the three general items have given rise to so many draft resolutions each year that they have significantly added to the programme of work of the First Committee.

A list of the proposals approved by the First Committee in 1987 under the two follow-up items is given on page 61.

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III.

² The Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly appears in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Special Session, Annexes*, agenda items 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13, document A/S-12/32.

By resolution 41/60 G, adopted at its forty-first session, the General Assembly decided to convene its third special session on disarmament in 1988 and to establish a preparatory committee for it. By resolution 42/40, adopted at its forty-second session, the General Assembly decided to hold the special session from 31 May to 25 June 1988. That action is discussed in chapter I.

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1987

In 1987, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 41/86 Q, adopted in 1986 under the agenda item on the review of the tenth special session, the Disarmament Commission had for the first time on its agenda an item on verification in all its aspects (for the full wording of the agenda item, see p. 14). Many members spoke on the question in the Commission's general exchange of views in plenary meetings.

The United States believed that the inclusion of the item on the Commission's agenda marked recognition of the importance of the verification question. There had been some advances in understanding the need for sound and effective verification measures, especially on-site inspection, and in that connection the United States referred to the Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. It was also encouraged by the work being done on verification in the bilateral negotiations on nuclear and space issues and by the understandings reached regarding on-site inspection in the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a chemical weapons ban. It was, therefore, altogether proper for the Disarmament Commission to make a constructive contribution to understanding and developing the role of verification in arms reduction agreements.

The Soviet Union, as well as other socialist States, emphasized that verification must be effective. That meant, the Soviet Union stated, that it had to contribute to confidence-building and arms limitation and provide objective information on how disarmament agreements were being implemented. It was necessary to take into account the specific contents of an agreement and to employ an optimal mix of different techniques and forms of verification, using both national technical means of control and international procedures, including on-site inspection. Referring to the bilateral negotiations in Geneva on medium-range missiles, the Soviet Union stated that it stood for working out very strict verification procedures, which, if implemented, would provide a kind of yardstick for verifying future agreements on other categories of weapons. In the multilateral field, it felt the Disarmament Commission could make an important contribution to the development of common approaches to the principles, methods and means of verification. Romania recalled that in the past it had submitted concrete proposals for creating within the United Nations a mechanism for the verification of disarmament agreements.

China held that the general acceptance of effective international verification provisions would be conducive to confidence-building and contribute

decisively to the disarmament process. Intense efforts were still required to expand, enrich and work out in detail for implementation the fundamental principles for verification.

Canada was gratified that the two basic General Assembly resolutions on verification, 40/152 O and 41/86 Q, initiated by Canada itself and adopted without a vote, had been fruitful. It hoped that the Disarmament Commission would succeed in drawing up some important guidelines on the issue. It noted that some States had suggested the need for a general international verification organization with responsibility for monitoring compliance with multilateral agreements. Such proposals had sometimes called for the formation of an international body responsible for a particular type of verification technology, for example, monitoring by satellite. Other States had proposed an international verification body for monitoring a specific agreement, such as a chemical weapons convention. Proposals for international bodies to verify specific agreements often looked to IAEA as a working model. Such specific treaty-oriented bodies could provide a practical solution to verification questions and perform very useful work in the monitoring of certain agreements. Canada favoured moving steadily towards the eventual creation of a general international verification organization, once agreement had been reached on the desirability of establishing such an institution.

Belgium, speaking on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community, stressed the importance that the Twelve attached to the principle of effective verification of arms limitation accords. The Federal Republic of Germany referred to the experience gained at the negotiations on chemical weapons in the Conference on Disarmament, which provided insight into one particular type of verification and, at the same time, its ramifications for other fields of arms limitation and disarmament. Japan emphasized the need to give consideration to all verification technologies existing or under development. New Zealand welcomed the increasing indications, emerging from recent disarmament discussions, of a greater acknowledgement of the importance of verification.

Finland pointed out that there was a long series of proposals—including the Soviet-American Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations of 1961—to develop a role for the United Nations in the field of verification. Having a special interest in enhancing such a role for the Organization, Finland had suggested, in 1986 in the First Committee, the creation of a verification data base within the Secretariat's Department for Disarmament Affairs and UNIDIR. It believed that the possibilities for establishing a data base should be studied in detail and suggested that a technical feasibility study could be carried out by the Secretariat in co-operation with UNIDIR. Political judgements, Finland stressed, would continue to rest with Member States. Austria attached great importance to verification as a prerequisite for any meaningful disarmament agreement. Considering the growing convergence of the views of the Soviet Union and the United States on verification and the contributions made by other delegations, notably Canada, Austria believed that the Disarmament Commission could do substantial work

in the verification area, and thus make an invaluable contribution to disarmament negotiations.

Yugoslavia stated that every agreement on arms limitation and disarmament should contain appropriate verification measures, which should be dictated by the purpose, scope and nature of the agreement itself. It was only in such a context that the discussion could bear fruit. Separating verification from specific agreements could impede efforts to achieve concrete measures of disarmament. Similarly, India held that a discussion of the many aspects of verification could hardly be carried out in the abstract. Verification was not an end in itself, but rather a means towards an end—the end being disarmament agreements. In that connection, India referred to the offer contained in the Mexico Declaration of August 1986, concerning assistance in the verification of a possible Soviet-American moratorium on nuclear-weapon testing as a prelude to a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.³

Pakistan stressed that verification should be conceived and constructed in the spirit of political trust and confidence. The normalization of international relations, especially between the major Powers, could not only give impetus to disarmament agreements, but also ease the levels of verification considered adequate. Indonesia pointed out that while enhanced monitoring capabilities had solved many technical problems inherent in verification, problems of a political nature remained more intractable. Indeed, Indonesia had a strong impression that some claims of non-verifiability might in reality simply be a pretext to prevent or postpone agreement. In other instances, lack of verification procedures had frustrated attempts to substantiate allegations of non-compliance with existing agreements, which had led to charges and counter-charges that not only undermined those agreements, but had also been used to question the very concept of arms limitation.

The Lao People's Democratic Republic made clear that while it supported the principle of strict verification, including on-site inspection, it rejected those approaches that made of verification a pre-condition for the very starting of negotiations on disarmament. Uruguay stated that the Disarmament Commission had the task of contributing to a consolidation of a historic shift in position on the question of verification, a matter on which divergences of view had, until recently, seemed irreconcilable.

Following the exchange of views, the Disarmament Commission considered the item in a working group (Working Group IV) under the chairmanship of Mr. Douglas Roche of Canada. The Group had before it the replies of member States to the Secretary-General regarding verification in all its aspects, submitted in accordance with resolutions 40/152 O of 1985 and 41/86 Q of 1986,⁴ and a number of documents⁵ and several working papers submitted by delegations. The Group held eight meetings between 11 and 22

³ See *The Yearbook*, vol. 11: 1986, chap. III, "Consideration by the General Assembly, 1986", and chap. VIII, annex.

⁴ See A/41/422 and Add.1 and 2 for the replies of 17 Governments (including one on behalf of the European Community) in 1985 and A/CN.10/87 and Add.1 and 2 for the replies of 9 Governments in 1986.

⁵ A/CN.10/89 (Chairman of Working Group I), A/CN.10/91 (Finland), A/CN.10/93 (Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR and Czechoslovakia) and A/CN.10/97 (Cameroon).

May, and at its last meeting it prepared its report, which was incorporated into the Disarmament Commission's report to the General Assembly.⁶

During the course of its deliberations, the Group made progress on some substantive points. After reaffirming the continued relevance of the basic principles on verification enunciated in the 1978 Final Document⁷ and agreeing that they should be elaborated upon and added to in order to gain the benefits of the experience which had accrued since 1978, the Working Group was able to reach agreement on a number of such points concerning the principles.⁸

The Group agreed that a compilation of possible methods, procedures and techniques, including those which formed part of existing arms limitation and disarmament agreements, could be useful in facilitating a consideration of verification as an integral part of negotiations. It also agreed that the United Nations had an important role to play in the context of verification of compliance with agreements, which was in accordance with its central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament, as expressed in paragraph 114 of the Final Document. For example, the United Nations might draw upon experience and expertise, including that derived from specialized agencies, IAEA, existing agreements in the field, peace-keeping operations and investigations undertaken by the Secretary-General, in order to provide assistance, advice and technical expertise to negotiators of agreements. Furthermore, given the fact that distribution of technical verification capabilities was uneven, the United Nations should examine the possibility of compiling and managing a verification data base. Member States and relevant international organizations would be invited to contribute a wide range of information pertaining to arms limitation and disarmament, including information on confidence-building measures. The data base could include a catalogue of verification provisions, procedures, and methods as well as a catalogue of experts upon whom Members might call for assistance in designing verification systems.⁹

At the conclusion of its deliberations, the Group recommended to the Disarmament Commission that work should be continued by the Commission at its next substantive session, in 1988, as a matter of critical importance in the negotiation and implementation of arms limitation and disarmament agreements.

In concluding statements in a plenary meeting, several member States, in particular Canada, China, the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union, expressed satisfaction at the progress made by the Working Group. Belgium, speaking on behalf of the Twelve, welcomed the progress, but regretted that a number of essential proposals for a practical approach to verification had not been included in the report of the Working Group.

⁶ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/42/42)*. The report of Working Group IV, contained in paragraph 46 of the Commission's report, consists of 12 integral paragraphs.

⁷ *Ibid.*, *Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, paras. 31, 91 and 92.

⁸ *Ibid.*, *Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/42/42)*, para. 46, integral para. 7.

⁹ *Ibid.*, integral paras. 8-11.

Consideration by the Conference on Disarmament, 1987

Though the question of follow-up did not figure in the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament in 1987, statements in plenary meetings¹⁰ throughout the session were replete with references to the 1978 Final Document. A large number of States spoke in connection with the item on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, a subject dealt with in chapter IV. Delegations took the opportunity to express their expectations with regard to the convening of the third special session devoted to disarmament.

Sweden, speaking early during the debate, stated that the special session should reconfirm the conviction of the international community that there was no task more urgent for mankind than the achievement of nuclear disarmament. It hoped that the session would address such crucial questions as conventional disarmament, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the naval arms race and the need for confidence-building on a global level. The United Kingdom pointed out that the session would take place against a better international background and in a more realistic and practical spirit than had the second special session. It believed that there was currently much common ground on subjects worthy of discussion, including conventional reductions and principles to be applied for truly effective verification and compliance. The Netherlands was of the view that the third special session should learn from past disappointments and that a more realistic approach aimed at practical progress could be more productive than the grand designs often favoured in the past.

For the most part, the comments made on the subject of follow-up focused on the special session's consideration of the role of the United Nations and the effectiveness of the disarmament machinery, in particular, the Conference on Disarmament. Thus, Egypt expressed the view that the special session represented an opportunity for the Conference to confirm its credibility by presenting at that session specific draft treaties on arms limitation and disarmament. A number of States, including India, Indonesia, Kenya, Nigeria and Peru, took a similar position. Yugoslavia stated that the group of non-aligned and neutral States of the Conference was looking into ways of contributing to the special session. Morocco felt that that much remained to be done before the Conference fulfilled the objectives originally assigned to it, considering that it had neither elaborated an international instrument nor achieved even partial disarmament measures.

Bulgaria urged the Conference, on the eve of the third special session, to try to move forward on as many issues on its agenda as possible. It felt that since the work of the Conference was going to be reviewed, the best possible thing for it to do would be to begin producing concrete results. The Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union made several suggestions concerning the future of the Conference, which are mentioned in chapter I. Speaking on behalf of a group of socialist countries, Bulgaria said that improving the machinery for the functioning of the Conference was an urgent matter. Those

¹⁰ CD/787, appendix II, vols. I-IV.

countries felt that it was necessary to create the conditions for significantly accelerating the work of the Conference and for making it more business-like and target-oriented. They shared the view that in the future the Conference might become a permanent body for negotiations on disarmament.

Australia also addressed the question of doubts about the effectiveness of the Conference's work, but underscored the progress achieved on the substance of certain items. Canada believed that the third special session would reaffirm the critical role of the Conference in the multilateral process of arms control and disarmament negotiations. Nevertheless, it also felt that the ultimate test of the Conference was its ability to make progress on significant arms control and disarmament measures and urged it to use the time up until the third special session to move ahead on major issues.

The representative of France, speaking as President for the month of August, called attention to the flexible negotiating network in disarmament that was emerging, composed of links with particular characteristics: the Geneva nuclear and space talks, Vienna, New York and the Conference itself. The President felt that it was up to the international community to ensure the simultaneous development of those various sets of negotiations. That, in his view, would be the very crux of the third special session. He also noted the agreement reached among all States that verification was an essential component of any disarmament accord and must, therefore, be kept apart from inevitable political differences and become the subject of very rigorous practical consideration.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1987

Two collective agenda items entitled "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session" and "Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly" were on the agenda of the General Assembly in 1987. Consideration of the follow-up of the two special sessions took place and proposals were put forward within the framework of those two items. Altogether, the Assembly adopted 25 resolutions submitted under them.

The General Assembly had before it a compilation, prepared by the Secretary-General, of the reports of six Governments on measures they had taken or intended to take in implementation of resolution 40/152 L, entitled "Review and appraisal of the implementation of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade".¹¹ It also had a note by the Secretary-General transmitting the response of the Soviet Union pursuant to resolution 41/86 O, operative paragraph 7, by which the Assembly had invited States engaged in disarmament and arms limitation negotiations outside the United

¹¹ A/42/436 and Add. I, containing the replies of: Byelorussian SSR, Cuba, German Democratic Republic, Mexico, Ukrainian SSR and USSR.

Nations to keep the Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament informed of their progress.¹²

In his report on the work of the Organization,¹³ the Secretary-General noted that the United Nations could make a significant contribution in the area of verification, a topic commented upon frequently by delegations during the Committee's work and included under a sub-item of the item on the tenth special session. He believed that the forthcoming third special session devoted to disarmament could, with thorough preparation, provide a valuable opportunity to consider how the Organization's potential in that regard could be realized.

In the course of the general debate in the First Committee,¹⁴ many delegations referred to follow-up of the special sessions on disarmament in commenting upon sub-items of the two follow-up items, citing the 1978 Final Document, or remarking upon the forthcoming special session on disarmament (discussed in chapter I).

The topic of verification drew a considerable amount of comment. The representative of Bulgaria, speaking in his capacity as Chairman of the Disarmament Commission, pointed out that during the year the Commission had been able to reach consensus on texts in a number of important areas in the field of verification and to make substantive progress on that subject. The representative of France, speaking in his capacity as Chairman of the Conference on Disarmament for August and the recess until its 1988 session, noted that there had been further clarification of the subject in that body during 1987. He felt that the convergence of views on verification was of central importance for future efforts, not only within the framework of the Conference, but also with respect to other ongoing negotiations.

The Soviet Union highlighted the importance of strengthening confidence, stressing that the proposals submitted by socialist countries encompassed all major components of disarmament, verification and confidence-building. It called for serious dialogue on the question of opening up military bases for inspection and verification. It reminded the Committee that it had proposed hosting a conference in 1988, with the participation of representatives of the general public and non-governmental organizations, for the purpose of devoting attention to the problems of monitoring compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements.

Canada was convinced that confidence-building measures, such as openness, transparency and verification, constituted the building blocks of future arms control and disarmament agreements. Effective measures of verification, comprising national technical means, international technical means and international procedures such as on-site inspections, constituted the primary mechanism whereby compliance with arms control undertakings was demonstrated, and thus they contributed to a general strengthening of confidence among States. Canada believed that verification must be seen as a partnership,

¹² A/42/584.

¹³ A/42/1.

¹⁴ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, First Committee*, 3rd to 42nd meetings, and *ibid.*, *Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

like the arms control process itself, and the conduct of verification activities must be accepted as a necessary and normal part of the relations between parties to agreements.

Cameroon observed that the development of measures designed to promote confidence among States and strict respect for agreements was indispensable in the quest for disarmament, security and development. Pakistan was pleased that the importance of verification in disarmament negotiations was becoming more widely recognized and felt that the Disarmament Commission's recommendations on the question could serve as useful guidelines in future disarmament negotiations.

A number of States spoke of a possible role for the Organization in the field of verification. Finland recalled its proposal in the Disarmament Commission for creating a verification data base that would be compiled and managed by the United Nations, and Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia referred in favourable terms to it in their comments on the subject. Bulgaria suggested that it would be useful if UNIDIR would prepare an analytical study of ways and means of setting up an international verification mechanism within the United Nations. Indonesia likewise believed that the role of the Organization in providing assistance, advice and technical expertise and in offering facilities for compiling and managing a verification data base should be fully explored. In Sweden's view, it was important to consider how to make optimal use of the United Nations system in international verification of disarmament agreements. Development of that role was likely to benefit both verification and the Organization. The Soviet Union envisaged establishing machinery for broad international control over compliance with agreements, stating that such machinery could be considered as a central link in complementary measures of disarmament, verification and confidence-building.

During the debate, States referred to the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament in remarking upon a particular proposal or item. Iraq cited paragraph 28 of the Document in affirming its position that all States had the right to participate on an equal footing in disarmament negotiations, and it insisted that the international bodies concerned with disarmament and the maintenance of international peace should be accessible to those States that desired to contribute to such negotiations. In commenting upon the basic principles of verification which the Disarmament Commission had elaborated upon, Bulgaria noted that they added to the relevant provisions of the Final Document. While stating that negotiations on chemical weapons were in an advanced stage, Morocco pointed out that the effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction was cited as one of the most urgent measures of disarmament in paragraph 75 of the Final Document.

As in previous years, many draft resolutions were submitted by delegations under the sub-items of the two collective agenda items on follow-up. Under the item on the twelfth special session, 12 drafts were introduced and 11 adopted. Under the item on the tenth special session, 17 drafts were introduced and 14 adopted. The 25 resolutions adopted under the two items are discussed in this volume as follows:

- (a) In this chapter, beginning on the page shown—
- (i) 42/39 A (Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the twelfth special session of the General Assembly), page 62;
 - (ii) 42/39 F (Consideration of guidelines for confidence-building measures), page 64;
 - (iii) 42/39 I (United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament), page 65;
 - (iv) 42/42 E (International co-operation for disarmament), page 66;
 - (v) 42/42 F (Verification in all its aspects), page 69;
 - (vi) 42/42 M (Implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session), page 72.
- (b) In other chapters, chapter number shown—
- (i) 42/39 B (Freeze on nuclear weapons), chapter V;
 - (ii) 42/39.C (Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons), chapter VII;
 - (iii) 42/39 D (United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia), chapter XX;
 - (iv) 42/39 E (Regional disarmament), chapter XVI;
 - (v) 42/39 G (World Disarmament Campaign), chapter XX;
 - (vi) 42/39 H (Implementation of General Assembly resolution 41/60 I on a nuclear-arms freeze), chapter V;
 - (vii) 42/39 J (United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa), chapter XX;
 - (viii) 42/39 K (United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America), chapter XX;
 - (ix) 42/42 A (Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war), chapter VII;
 - (x) 42/42 B (Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session), chapter I;
 - (xi) 42/42 C (Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament), chapter V;
 - (xii) 42/42 D (Prevention of nuclear war), chapter VII;
 - (xiii) 42/42 G (Report of the Disarmament Commission), chapter I;
 - (xiv) 42/42 H (Disarmament Week), chapter XX;
 - (xv) 42/42 I (Comprehensive programme of disarmament), chapter IV;
 - (xvi) 42/42 J (United Nations disarmament studies), chapter XIX;
 - (xvii) 42/42 K (Report of the Conference on Disarmament), chapter I;
 - (xviii) 42/42 L (Report of the Conference on Disarmament), chapter I;
 - (xix) 42/42 N (Rationalization of the work of the First Committee), chapter I.

In addition, two draft resolutions entitled, respectively, “Obligations of States to contribute to effective disarmament negotiations” and “Constructive review and implementation of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly”, as well as a draft decision entitled “Verification”, which were introduced in the First Committee and later withdrawn, are discussed in this chapter. A third draft resolution, entitled “World Disarmament Campaign: actions and activities”, which was also introduced and later withdrawn, is discussed in chapter XX. All the draft resolutions were adopted by the General Assembly on 30 November.¹⁵

On 23 October, Cyprus submitted a draft resolution entitled “Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Forty-second Session, Plenary Meetings, 84th meeting.

Session of the General Assembly”, which it introduced on 2 November. The draft called upon the Security Council to comply with Article 26 of the Charter and hold a session to consider the escalation of the arms race, with a view to bringing it to a halt. Believing that the Council had never dealt with the question of disarmament and had ignored resolutions adopted by the General Assembly calling upon it to do so, Cyprus hoped to bring to the attention of the Council its responsibility to act according to the Charter.

The First Committee approved the draft resolution on 11 November by a recorded vote of 103 to 1, with 21 abstentions. At that time two States explained their positions on the text.

The United States voted against the resolution because it did not believe that the United Nations should or could play a central role in nuclear-arms reduction negotiations, though it felt that the Organization provided a unique arena for discussing important international issues and the views of Member States were fully taken into account in the bilateral arms control negotiations. The Security Council had the potential to play a crucial role in maintaining international peace and security, but, in the opinion of the United States, it was incapable, institutionally, of assuming a pre-eminent role in nuclear-arms reductions. Moreover, Security Council debates would merely duplicate discussions already being held in United Nations disarmament bodies and the creation of new machinery under the Security Council would duplicate the ongoing responsibilities of the Department for Disarmament Affairs.

The United Kingdom abstained because, although it firmly supported the security system established by the Charter, under which the Security Council had the primary role in the maintenance of international peace and security, it had reservations about the appropriateness of the General Assembly directing the Security Council to take specific action. It also doubted the need to establish new bodies in the United Nations system to address disarmament issues.

The General Assembly adopted the draft resolution on 30 November by a recorded vote of 129 to 1 (United States), with 23 abstentions, as resolution 42/39 A. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 34/83 A of 11 December 1979, 35/156 J of 12 December 1980, 36/97 K of 9 December 1981, 37/100 E of 13 December 1982, 38/73 H of 15 December 1983, 39/63 K of 12 December 1984 and 40/151 A of 16 December 1985,

Expressing the growing alarm of the world community over the dangers of the arms race, in particular the nuclear-arms race, and its adverse social and economic consequences,

Noting that the present state of the international situation requires that the disarmament principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations become part and parcel of any collective efforts aimed at ensuring a truly safe world, including those undertaken by the Security Council,

Reaffirming that the United Nations under its Charter plays a central role and bears main responsibility in the area of disarmament and the strengthening of international security,

Recalling paragraph 13 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in which the Assembly acknowledged that genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example,

Recalling that under Article 26 of the Charter, the Security Council is responsible for

formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee, plans for establishing an arms regulation system,

Noting the fact that the Security Council, which is vested under the Charter with the principal responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, has not yet conducted any examination of the question of the adverse effects of the arms race, especially in the nuclear field, on international peace and security, as provided for in the relevant General Assembly resolutions,

1. *Calls upon* the Security Council, in particular its permanent members, within the framework of its main task, to contribute to establishing and maintaining international peace and security with the least possible diversion of world human and economic resources to armament, and to take the necessary steps for the effective implementation of Article 26 of the Charter of the United Nations with a view to enhancing the central role of the United Nations in facilitating solutions to the issues of arms limitation, primarily in the nuclear field, and disarmament, as well as the strengthening of international peace and security;

2. *Recommends* that the nuclear-weapon States, which at the same time are the five permanent members of the Security Council, hold joint meetings and provide regular information to the General Assembly, as well as to the Conference on Disarmament, about the state of affairs as regards the range of issues related to disarmament, especially in the nuclear field, prevention of a nuclear war and the status of the current agreements in the field of arms limitation and disarmament, and about progress at those negotiations which include the participation of the nuclear Powers;

3. *Recommends* that the Security Council consider the question of establishing, under Article 29 of the Charter, such subsidiary bodies as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions to facilitate a solution to disarmament issues;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its forty-third session a report on the implementation of the present resolution within the framework of the agenda item entitled "Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly".

On 27 October, the Federal Republic of Germany submitted a draft resolution entitled "Consideration of guidelines for confidence-building measures", which was later revised and ultimately sponsored by an additional eight States: Byelorussian SSR, Cameroon, Canada, Costa Rica, Greece, Hungary, Poland and Sweden. By the original version, the General Assembly would consider that recent developments in the field of disarmament could facilitate reaching consensus on the draft guidelines for confidence-building measures as contained in the Disarmament Commission's 1986 report¹⁶ and would call upon the Preparatory Committee for the Third Special Session to include the consideration of such guidelines in the provisional agenda of that session.

On 10 November the Federal Republic introduced a revision, in which minor changes had been made in the second preambular paragraph and the single operative paragraph had been entirely revised. The sponsor explained that after consultations, it had decided that the Disarmament Commission had a good chance of finalizing the draft guidelines the following year. Consequently, the operative paragraph had been changed from a request to the Preparatory Committee to a request to the Disarmament Commission that it consider the guidelines with a view to finalizing the draft. Behind the Federal Republic's commitment to the guidelines lay its conviction that confidence-building measures had the potential to contribute significantly to the enhancement of peace and security and to facilitate the attainment of disarmament

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Forty-first Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/41/42), annex II.

measures. That potential was already being explored in various regions. The guidelines did not, of course, exclude the simultaneous application of other security-enhancing measures nor did they detract from the need for more far-reaching arms control and disarmament measures. Rather, they were a most useful corollary to those measures, as had been acknowledged in the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document. It hoped that the unanimous adoption of operative guidelines would be the point of departure for new co-operative disarmament thinking.

At the time of voting in the First Committee on 12 November, the sponsors, responding to a request received from a number of delegations, orally revised the draft by adding to the third preambular paragraph the words "and for promoting and facilitating the attainment of disarmament measures". The Committee thereupon approved the draft resolution, as orally revised, without a vote, and on 30 November the General Assembly adopted it, also without a vote, as resolution 42/39 F. The resolution reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 41/60 C of 3 December 1986, as well as the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

Considering that growing positive and concrete experience with confidence-building measures could facilitate reaching final consensus on the draft guidelines for confidence-building measures, as contained in the 1986 report of the Disarmament Commission,

Noting with satisfaction that the concept of confidence-building as an important instrument for the strengthening of international peace and security and for promoting and facilitating the attainment of disarmament measures meets with growing acceptance among States,

Requests the Disarmament Commission to consider, at its 1988 session, the "Draft guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level", with a view to finalizing them in the most expeditious manner to be determined by that body.

On 27 October, Algeria, Argentina, the Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, the German Democratic Republic, Greece, Indonesia, Kenya, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, the Sudan, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe submitted a draft resolution entitled "United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament". The same States, later joined by Ethiopia, the Federal Republic of Germany, Liberia, Sri Lanka and Tunisia, submitted a revised draft in which references to an assessment of the programme, to be carried out by the Secretary-General, were deleted. In introducing the revised draft on 3 November, Nigeria recalled that the fellowships programme had been established during the first special session to meet the needs of Member States in the sphere of disarmament. It noted with pleasure that the general opinion in the First Committee was that the programme had been a success and that it had, as envisaged, turned out an appreciable number of public officials in the field of disarmament, particularly from the developing countries. By the draft resolution, the General Assembly would decide to rename the three programmes whose consolidation it had called for in 1986 "the United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services programme".

At the time that the First Committee was considering the draft resolution, it had before it a report of the Secretary-General on the fellowships programme

containing information on the background of the programme and on its implementation and the selection of the 20 fellows in 1987.¹⁷ It also contained a statement to the effect that the General Assembly's decision, taken by resolution 40/151 H, to expand the forms of assistance available to Member States under the programme by including a regional disarmament training programme and a disarmament advisory services programme had not yet been implemented in view of the financial situation of the Organization. In addition, the Committee had before it a statement on the programme budget implications of the draft resolution, according to which no additional appropriation would be requested if the draft resolution were adopted.

On 10 November the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 129 to 1. The three States that explained their votes—Japan and the United Kingdom, which voted affirmatively, and the United States, which voted against—all expressed their support for the programme, but felt that it would be premature to rename it at that time since it had not been possible, in the current situation, to start the new programmes of regional training and advisory services. The United States, which voted against on financial grounds, pointed out that operative paragraph 2 of the draft explicitly endorsed the increased spending levels for that activity that the General Assembly had adopted in 1985, in spite of the fact that, even with the increased financing, the 1987 programme could accommodate only 20 fellows, rather than the scheduled 25.

On 30 November the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 156 to 1 (United States), as resolution 42/39 I. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its decision, contained in paragraph 108 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, to establish a programme of fellowships on disarmament, as well as its decisions contained in annex IV to the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly, the second special session devoted to disarmament, in which it decided, *inter alia*, to continue the programme and to increase the number of fellowships from twenty to twenty-five as from 1983,

Noting with satisfaction that the programme has already trained an appreciable number of public officials selected from geographical regions represented in the United Nations system, most of whom are now in positions of responsibility in the field of disarmament affairs in their respective countries or Governments,

Recalling its resolutions 37/100 G of 13 December 1982, 38/73 C of 15 December 1983, 39/63 B of 12 December 1984, 40/151 H of 16 December 1985 and 41/60 H of 3 December 1986,

Recalling further that, in its resolution 40/151 H, it decided to consolidate the disarmament fellowship programme with the newly established regional disarmament training programme and disarmament advisory services programme under the Department for Disarmament Affairs, in the Office of the Under-Secretary-General of the Secretariat,

Noting with satisfaction that the programme, as designed, has enabled an increased number of public officials, particularly from the developing countries, to acquire more expertise in the sphere of disarmament,

¹⁷ A/42/693. The 20 States whose nationals participated in the programme in 1987 were: Australia, Bolivia, Burundi, German Democratic Republic, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Mali, Netherlands, Nigeria, Panama, Philippines, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Ukrainian SSR, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Believing that the forms of assistance available to Member States, particularly to developing countries, under the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament will enhance the capabilities of their officials to follow ongoing deliberations and negotiations on disarmament, both bilateral and multilateral,

1. *Reaffirms* its decisions contained in annex IV to the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly and the report of the Secretary-General approved by resolution 33/71 E of 14 December 1978;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to implement the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament, including the advisory services and training programmes, within existing resources;

3. *Expresses its appreciation* to the Governments of the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America for inviting the 1987 fellows to study selected activities in the field of disarmament, thereby contributing to the fulfilment of the overall objectives of the programme;

4. *Commends* the Secretary-General for the diligence with which the programme has continued to be carried out;

5. *Decides* to rename the three programmes consolidated pursuant to paragraph 3 of resolution 40/151 H "the United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services programme";

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its forty-third session on his assessment of the operations of the programme.

On 27 October, Czechoslovakia submitted a draft resolution entitled "International co-operation for disarmament", which it later revised and introduced on 11 November. The main objective of the draft resolution, Czechoslovakia stated, was identical with that of the General Assembly's Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament, adopted in 1979. The draft resolution was intended as an appeal to the international community to redouble efforts aimed at the implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the first special session, with full regard to new developments and positive changes in the approaches to the issues of disarmament and international security, the influence of which was already visible. Czechoslovakia pointed out that the essential requirements for making international co-operation in the field of disarmament more effective were contained in the eighth to twelfth paragraphs of the preamble.

At the same meeting the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 90 to 18, with 11 abstentions. On 30 November the draft was adopted by the General Assembly by a recorded vote of 118 to 18 (Western and associated States), with 14 abstentions, as resolution 42/42 E. The resolution reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Stressing again the urgent need for an active and sustained effort to expedite the implementation of the recommendations and decisions unanimously adopted at its tenth special session, the first special session devoted to disarmament,

Recalling the Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament of 11 December 1979 and its resolutions 36/92 D of 9 December 1981, 37/78 B of 9 December 1982, 38/183 F of 20 December 1983, 39/148 M of 17 December 1984, 40/152 I of 16 December 1985 and 41/86 K of 4 December 1986,

Stressing the vital need to proceed to balanced, mutually acceptable, comprehensively verifiable and effective measures towards halting the arms race and attaining disarmament,

particularly in the nuclear field, for the preservation of peace and the strengthening of comprehensive international security,

Bearing in mind the vital interests of all States in the adoption of concrete effective disarmament measures, which would, through conversion, release considerable material, financial and human resources to be used for peaceful purposes and, with the assistance of the respective international machinery, particularly for overcoming economic underdevelopment in the developing countries,

Convinced of the need to strengthen constructive international co-operation based on the political goodwill of States for successful negotiations on disarmament, and on the increased openness in military matters in accordance with the priorities established in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

Stressing that international co-operation for disarmament should, as a matter of priority, be aimed at averting nuclear war through the gradual elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, the discontinuation of nuclear-weapon tests, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and conventional disarmament on a global scale, taking into account the characteristics of the different regions, and at confidence-building as an indispensable component of relations among States,

Considering that the progress towards a nuclear-weapon-free world can be executed stage by stage in terms of both participation and armaments to be covered, with the steady strengthening of international security and stability,

Believing that a broader internationalization of all disarmament negotiations would be an important factor contributing to their success,

Noting with satisfaction an increased dynamism of the efforts of the international community to avert the nuclear threat and to make a genuine breakthrough in the field of disarmament,

Emphasizing that the two nuclear-weapon States possessing the most important nuclear arsenals should continue and further expedite their negotiations with a view to curbing the nuclear-arms race while mutually refraining from launching weapons into outer space,

Believing that all nuclear-weapon States should make their national contributions to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free world,

Conscious that in the nuclear space age the reliable security of all countries in all spheres of international relations can be ensured only by political means, through the joint efforts of all States,

1. *Invites* all States further to increase co-operation and to strive actively for meaningful disarmament negotiations on the basis of reciprocity, equality, undiminished security and the non-use of force in international relations, so that they may prevent the qualitative enhancement and quantitative accumulation of weapons, as well as the development of new types and systems of weaponry, especially weapons of mass destruction, and secure a meaningful and all-embracing disarmament process;

2. *Stresses* the importance of strengthening the effectiveness of the United Nations in fulfilling its central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament;

3. *Emphasizes* the necessity of refraining from the dissemination of any doctrines and concepts that may endanger international peace and security by justifying nuclear war;

4. *Invites* all States to consider, in a spirit of co-operation, ways and means to achieve a broader internationalization of the current disarmament negotiations;

5. *Declares* that the use of force in international relations as well as in attempts to prevent the full implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples constitutes a phenomenon incompatible with the idea of international co-operation for disarmament;

6. *Reiterates its profound conviction* that outer space should be excluded from the sphere of military preparation and used exclusively for peaceful purposes, for the benefit of all mankind;

7. *Appeals* to States members of military groupings to promote, on the basis of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and in a spirit of co-operation and openness, the gradual mutual limitation of their military activities as well as the reduction of their armed forces and armaments, thus creating conditions for their dissolution;

8. *Calls upon* all Member States and the international organizations concerned to continue to cultivate and disseminate, particularly in connection with the World Disarmament Campaign, launched by the General Assembly at its twelfth special session, the second special session devoted to disarmament, the idea of international co-operation for disarmament;

9. *Calls upon* the Governments of all States to contribute substantially to halting and reversing the arms race, particularly in the nuclear field, and thus to reducing the danger of nuclear war and to strengthening international peace and security.

On 27 October, Bulgaria, Canada, Finland and Sweden submitted a draft decision entitled "Verification", which was introduced by Finland on 4 November. The purpose of the draft decision was to facilitate further and more concrete consideration by the Disarmament Commission of the idea of establishing a United Nations verification data base, a proposal submitted by Finland in the Commission. By the draft decision, the General Assembly would request the Secretary-General to submit to the Commission at its next session a preliminary report on existing capabilities and facilities within the United Nations Secretariat relevant to the establishment of a computerized data base for purposes of verification of compliance with international arms limitation and disarmament agreements. The sponsors believed that such a data base could assist Member States in verifying compliance with agreements to which they were parties and could serve as a channel for the distribution of confidence-building information. Finland stressed that the role of the data base would be essentially technical in nature, with political judgements about compliance continuing to rest with the sovereign States concerned, and that the preliminary report to be requested would be prepared by the Department for Disarmament Affairs within existing resources.

On 11 November, Finland stated that it had become apparent to the sponsors that the draft could not command a consensus within the Committee. Since they realized that the report called for in the decision would be of assistance to the Disarmament Commission only if it were perceived by all to be helpful, they had decided not to press the draft decision to a vote.¹⁸

On 27 October, 30 States, later joined by 2 more,¹⁹ submitted a draft resolution entitled "Verification in all its aspects", which was introduced by Canada on 3 November. The object of the draft, Canada stated, was to seek to continue the progress made at the last session of the Disarmament Commission; consequently, the draft incorporated the Commission's recommendation that it continue to consider verification "as a matter of critical importance in the negotiation and implementation of arms limitation and disarmament". Moreover, since verification had been identified by the Commission as an essential element of all arms limitation and disarmament agreements, the Secretary-General was requested to bring the resolution to the attention of the Assembly at its third special session.

On 9 November the First Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote, and on 30 November the General Assembly adopted the draft,

¹⁸ See A/42/754, paras. 15 and 16.

¹⁹ Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of Greece, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Samoa, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom and Uruguay.

also without a vote, as resolution 42/42 F. The resolution reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 40/152 O of 16 December 1985 and 41/86 Q of 4 December 1986,

Conscious of the urgent need to reach agreements on arms limitation and disarmament measures capable of contributing to the maintenance of peace and security,

Convinced that, if such measures are to be effective, they must be fair and balanced and acceptable to all parties, their substance must be clear and compliance with them must be evident,

Noting that the critical importance of verification of and compliance with agreements is universally recognized,

Reaffirming its conviction, as expressed in paragraph 91 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, adopted by consensus at that session, its first special session devoted to disarmament, that in order to facilitate the conclusion and effective implementation of disarmament agreements and to create confidence, States should accept appropriate provisions for verification in such agreements,

Reiterating its view that:

(a) Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate and effective measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and to ensure that they are being observed by all parties;

(b) The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement;

(c) Agreements should provide for the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations system in the verification process;

(d) Where appropriate, a combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures should be employed;

Recalling that:

(a) In the context of international disarmament negotiations, the problem of verification should be further examined and adequate methods and procedures in this field should be considered;

(b) Every effort should be made to develop appropriate methods and procedures that are non-discriminatory and that do not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of other States or jeopardize their economic and social development,

Believing that verification techniques should be developed as an objective means of determining compliance with agreements and appropriately taken into account in the course of disarmament negotiations,

Noting with satisfaction that part of the report of the Disarmament Commission relating to this question,

1. *Calls upon* Member States to increase their efforts towards achieving agreements on balanced, mutually acceptable, comprehensively verifiable and effective arms limitation and disarmament measures;

2. *Encourages* all States that have not already done so to communicate to the Secretary-General, not later than 31 March 1988, their views and suggestions on verification principles as invited by the General Assembly in its resolution 41/86 Q;

3. *Urges* individual Member States and groups of Member States possessing verification expertise to consider means by which they can contribute to, and promote the inclusion of, adequate and effective verification measures in arms limitation and disarmament agreements;

4. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to conclude its consideration of verification in all its aspects at its 1988 substantive session, in the context of pursuing general and complete disarmament under effective international control, as a matter of critical importance in the negotiation and implementation of arms limitation and disarmament, with a view to the elaboration of concrete recommendations and proposals, as appropriate, regarding verification in all its aspects, including principles, provisions and techniques to promote the inclusion of adequate verification in arms limitation and disarmament agreements and the role of the United Nations and its Member States in the field of verification, and to report on its deliberations, conclusions

and recommendations to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament and at its forty-third session;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to prepare for the Disarmament Commission at its 1988 substantive session a compilation of the views received from Member States on the issue;

6. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to bring the present resolution to the attention of the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament;

7. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Verification in all its aspects"

Three draft resolutions concerning the implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session were submitted by the German Democratic Republic, on 21 October, a group of non-aligned and developing countries (see below), on 27 October, and the Federal Republic of Germany, on 27 October, respectively. The text of the German Democratic Republic was merged²⁰ with that of the non-aligned and developing countries, which was then adopted, and the text of the Federal Republic was withdrawn.²¹

In introducing its draft entitled "Obligations of States to contribute to effective disarmament negotiations" on 2 November, the German Democratic Republic stated that in the nuclear and space age, the problems facing mankind could be solved only by political means, by result-oriented negotiations. The text explicitly indicated the need for bilateral and multilateral disarmament negotiations to complement and stimulate each other. In particular, it underlined the need for the Soviet Union and the United States to conclude an agreement on the elimination of their land-based intermediate- and shorter-range nuclear missiles; to reach deep cuts in their strategic offensive arms, while maintaining and strengthening the anti-ballistic missile Treaty régime; and to achieve progress in all agreed areas. It also invited the Conference on Disarmament to concentrate its work on the substantive and priority items on its agenda and to proceed to negotiations on a nuclear-test ban, on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, on the prevention of nuclear war and on the prevention of an arms race in outer space without further delay, as well as to finalize the draft convention on the prohibition of all chemical weapons and on their destruction.

In introducing its draft resolution entitled "Constructive review and implementation of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly" on 29 October, the Federal Republic of Germany stressed that the perception of priorities, prerequisites and interrelationships in the realization of the principles and programme items of the Final Document had been enhanced over the past 10 years. Given the dynamic character of the subject-matter, it would be a mistake, the Federal Republic stated, to rely exclusively on the tools provided by the 129 paragraphs of the Final Document for the implementation of its objectives; it should be permissible to use other approaches in a complementary manner whenever and wherever their use would be helpful. By the text, the General Assembly would express its belief that a broad and comprehensive approach to security, which took due account of the legitimacy of individual and collective self-defence and of the necessity

²⁰ See A/42/754, paras. 5 and 6.

²¹ *Ibid.*, paras. 20 and 21.

that military potentials should not exceed defensive needs, was required for implementation of the Final Document. The Assembly would also call for consideration of the new developments that had taken place since 1978; and would request that specific attention be paid to those areas where first substantive results had been reached and further progress could be expected.

In introducing the text entitled "Implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session" on 6 November on behalf of Algeria, Bangladesh, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Madagascar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tunisia, Venezuela and Viet Nam and, later, Burma, Yugoslavia affirmed the sponsors' belief that the Final Document provided a valid, comprehensive basis on which the international community could launch action towards halting and reversing the arms race. It also noted their conviction that it was necessary—precisely because of recent positive trends—to give a new push to disarmament talks. The sponsors earnestly hoped that the draft resolution would encourage disarmament negotiations on all levels: in the United Nations, at the Conference on Disarmament, and on the bilateral and regional levels.

Intensive negotiations were held among the sponsors of the three draft resolutions in an effort to arrive at a single text acceptable to all of them, but it proved possible to merge only the texts of the German Democratic Republic and the non-aligned countries. On 11 November, Yugoslavia introduced a revision of the original non-aligned draft in which the seventh preambular paragraph had been expanded by incorporating the idea that all States had the right to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament. The revised text was sponsored by the earlier group of States, joined by the German Democratic Republic and, later, by Bulgaria and Mongolia.

The German Democratic Republic withdrew its draft resolution, thanking the representative of Yugoslavia and the original sponsors for their co-operation in combining the two texts. The Federal Republic of Germany withdrew its draft, stating that the time and effort devoted to the negotiations over combining the three drafts represented a worthwhile investment: areas of common ground and areas where differences had been narrowed had been identified, and it had become clear where basic differences continued to exist. That understanding was an essential basis for further talks between parties involved and would be useful in the process of preparing for the third special session on disarmament.

On 12 November the First Committee approved the revised draft introduced by Yugoslavia by a recorded vote of 115 to 12, with 3 abstentions, and three States explained their affirmative votes.

The Islamic Republic of Iran stated that it had sponsored the revised draft on the understanding that the statement that all States had the right to contribute to efforts in disarmament did not imply that any change should be made in the rules of procedure of any disarmament negotiating body. Both Australia and New Zealand voted in favour because of what they considered to be substantial improvement in the text over that of the previous year. Australia, however, outlined some of the deficiencies that it felt the draft still

contained: the suggestion in the third preambular paragraph that no concrete results had been achieved since the 1978 special session ignored areas where progress had been made; the language in the fourth preambular paragraph ignored the fact that peace and security could be maintained by the balance of forces, at least until complete disarmament was achieved, and was at variance with the concept, expressed in the Final Document, of general and complete disarmament as the ultimate objective of the disarmament process; and the call implied in operative paragraph 4 for the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations on all agenda items was unrealistic. New Zealand suggested that, in the future, the sponsors of the two merged texts agree on a common text before introducing drafts in the First Committee.

On 30 November the General Assembly adopted the revised draft resolution by a recorded vote of 142 to 12 (Western and associated States), with 3 abstentions, as resolution 42/42 M, which reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Having reviewed the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session, the first special session devoted to disarmament, as well as the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly, the second special session devoted to disarmament,

Recalling its resolutions S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, 34/83 C of 11 December 1979, 35/46 of 3 December 1980, 35/152 E of 12 December 1980, 36/92 M of 9 December 1981, 37/78 F of 9 December 1982, 38/183 H of 20 December 1983, 39/148 O of 17 December 1984, 40/152 N of 16 December 1985 and 41/86 O of 4 December 1986 and its decision S-12/24 of 10 July 1982,

Deeply concerned that no concrete results regarding the implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session have been realized in the course of the more than nine years since that session,

Convinced that international peace and security can be ensured only through general and complete disarmament under effective international control and that one of the most urgent tasks is to halt and reverse the arms race and to undertake concrete measures of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, and that, in this respect, the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States have the primary responsibility,

Noting with satisfaction that the two leading nuclear-weapon States have reached an agreement in principle on the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles,

Convinced that the conclusion of a treaty on the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles would positively affect the overall negotiations on disarmament,

Stressing once again that the active participation of Member States in effective disarmament negotiations is necessary for discharging their responsibility to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, that all States have the right to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament, that it is more than ever imperative in the present circumstances to give a new impetus to negotiations on disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament, at all levels and to achieve genuine progress in the immediate future, and that all States should refrain from any actions that have or may have negative effects on the outcome of disarmament negotiations,

Reaffirming that the United Nations has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament,

Stressing that the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, which was unanimously and categorically reaffirmed by all Member States at the twelfth special session as the comprehensive basis for efforts towards halting and reversing the arms race, retains all its validity and that the objectives and measures contained therein still represent one of the most important and urgent goals to be achieved,

1. *Invites* all States, particularly nuclear-weapon States and especially those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, to take urgent measures with a view to

implementing the recommendations and decisions contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, as well as to fulfilling the priority tasks set forth in the Programme of Action contained in section III of the Final Document;

2. *Calls upon* all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, to take urgent measures in order to promote international security on the basis of disarmament, to halt and reverse the arms race and to launch a process of genuine disarmament;

3. *Calls upon* the two leading nuclear-weapon States to intensify and pursue their negotiations with determination and taking into account the interest of the entire international community, in order to halt the arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race, to reduce substantially their nuclear arsenals, prevent the arms race in outer space and undertake effective measures of nuclear disarmament;

4. *Calls upon* the Conference on Disarmament to proceed urgently to negotiations on the questions of disarmament on its agenda;

5. *Calls upon* the Disarmament Commission to intensify its work in accordance with its mandate with a view to making concrete recommendations on specific items on its agenda;

6. *Invites* all States engaged in disarmament and arms limitation negotiations outside the framework of the United Nations to keep the General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament informed on the status and/or results of such negotiations, in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session;

7. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session"

Conclusion

Again in 1987, delegations to United Nations disarmament bodies considered the matter of follow-up to the two special sessions on disarmament. In their statements, many reaffirmed that the Final Document of 1978 represented a valid basis for further efforts in the field. A considerable amount of attention focused on the forthcoming third special session on disarmament and its review of the operation of the disarmament machinery.

In accordance with resolution 41/86 Q, adopted in 1986 under the agenda item on review of the tenth special session, the Disarmament Commission considered the subject of verification in all its aspects, reaffirming the relevance of the basic principles on verification enunciated in the Final Document and agreeing upon certain points that add to them.

Twenty-five resolutions were adopted under the collective items on follow-up, six of which are covered in this chapter. Two of the resolutions deal with verification and the related topic of confidence-building. A draft resolution requesting the Disarmament Commission to conclude its consideration of verification in all its aspects and to report on its deliberations to the General Assembly at its third special session was sponsored by 32 States and adopted by consensus. A second draft resolution, which calls upon the Disarmament Commission to finalize its guidelines on confidence-building measures, was also adopted by consensus. The other four draft resolutions, adopted by recorded vote, concern respectively the role of the Security Council in the field of arms limitation and disarmament, the programme of fellowships on disarmament, international co-operation for disarmament, and implementation of the resolutions of the tenth special session.

CHAPTER III

General and complete disarmament

Introduction

BUILDING UPON THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, the General Assembly first explicitly stated in 1959 that the final objective of the United Nations disarmament efforts was general and complete disarmament under effective international control. To reach that goal, the Organization has endeavoured to proceed along two parallel paths, pursuing both the long-term objectives of achieving comprehensive disarmament measures and the short-term aim of agreeing on more limited steps.¹

During most of the 1950s, the long-term approach dominated, which envisaged the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armaments, by stages, in accordance with a co-ordinated, comprehensive programme. From 1955 on, in parallel with that approach, proposals were put forward for partial measures which could take effect in the short-term. The latter approach was supported by the argument that if one could take some limited steps soon, that would increase confidence among States and thus create an atmosphere conducive to the conclusion of comprehensive agreements.

The 1959 decision of the General Assembly was contained in resolution 1378 (XIV), which stated, *inter alia*, that "general and complete disarmament under effective international control" was the goal of the United Nations disarmament efforts and that measures leading to that goal were to be worked out and agreed upon in the shortest possible time. In 1961, the comprehensive approach was given added impetus by the USSR-United States joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations (the so-called Zorin-McCloy agreement),² which was favourably received by the General Assembly.³ Elaborate proposals reflecting the comprehensive approach were submitted by both countries in 1962⁴ to the negotiating body in Geneva, at that time the ENDC. Those proposals were extensively discussed in following years, but no consensus was reached.

¹ See *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1), chaps. 3-6, and *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1970-1975* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.76.IX.1), chap. I.

² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 19, document A/4879.

³ See *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970*, chap. 4.

⁴ *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962*, document DC/203, annex 1, sect. C (ENDC/2) (Soviet Union) and sect. F (ENDC/30 and Corr.1) (United States).

By 1963, with the conclusion of the partial test-ban Treaty, the emphasis again shifted towards reaching agreement on limited measures, some of which were: a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons, and the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed.

In 1969, the General Assembly by resolution 2602 E (XXIV) requested the multilateral negotiating body in Geneva, then the CCD, to work out a comprehensive programme dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control, while continuing its negotiations on collateral measures. The question of the comprehensive programme of disarmament is dealt with in chapter IV.

General and complete disarmament as the ultimate goal of disarmament efforts was unanimously reaffirmed at the first and second special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, held in 1978 and 1982 respectively, but there was no concrete progress in the matter. Non-aligned, socialist and Western States have repeatedly declared their commitment to that objective. There is much scepticism, however, about its feasibility in the foreseeable future, particularly in the absence of an atmosphere of general trust, which is a prerequisite for general and complete disarmament. An increasing number of States feel, therefore, that it would be more productive, if only as an interim measure, to shift the emphasis to limited steps that might eventually facilitate the conclusion of more comprehensive arrangements.

There is no doubt, however, that the term “general and complete disarmament” has provided the General Assembly with a useful agenda item under which a variety of matters—including items it would be hard to accommodate otherwise—may be considered.

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1987

As in 1986, the Disarmament Commission had on its agenda the item “Naval armaments and disarmament”, pursuant to a General Assembly resolution adopted under the agenda item on general and complete disarmament. The United States continued to object to the Commission’s consideration of naval armaments as a separate issue and abstained from participating in any discussion of the subject.

The Soviet Union, in a general exchange of views, expressed the belief that it was necessary to immediately limit the spread of nuclear armaments in the oceans and to withdraw such armaments from certain areas. On a mutual basis with the United States and other nuclear Powers, the Soviet Union was ready to introduce the practice of notification of the absence of nuclear weapons on board naval vessels that were stationed in agreed areas of nuclear-free seas and oceans. The Soviet Union was also willing to consider possible ways of reducing the nuclear component of naval forces both in the overall context of their limitation and in the framework of negotiations on the reduction of nuclear weapons. In addition, it advocated meaningful so-

lutions to the question of ensuring guarantees, political as well as legal, of sea communications, military and technical confidence-building measures and the non-use of force at sea. Within that framework, it was also prepared to consider the question of preventing terrorism, piracy and other offenses.

A number of members spoke in favour of active consideration of naval issues. In particular, Bulgaria, together with other Eastern European States, expressed the view that the discussion and identification of possible naval disarmament and confidence-building measures should be more concrete. Bulgaria envisaged a process which would begin by limiting naval activities, reducing the number of ships on active duty, and curbing naval armaments, including nuclear ones, particularly those in the navies of the United States and the Soviet Union, with the subsequent involvement of other major naval Powers. Yugoslavia stressed that the strengthening of security in the Mediterranean and in other seas and oceans could be achieved only through disengagement of foreign military forces and discontinuance of military activities, with gradual limitation of the naval fleets of the super-Powers in those regions and their eventual withdrawal.

New Zealand emphasized that naval disarmament must be considered within the overall context of the strategic balance and global and regional security. That did not exclude the possibility of discussing regional naval arms limitation measures, which, however, should reflect the interests of all States in the region. Moreover, such discussion should be clearly based on the rules of international law, including those encompassed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.⁵ The freedom of the high seas and the right of innocent passage were instances of such maritime law. In that connection, New Zealand drew attention to the Treaty of Rarotonga,⁶ which upheld the sovereign right of each of its parties to decide for itself whether to grant or deny access to its ports and airfields by foreign ships and aircraft, or to grant or deny other navigational clearances not covered by the rights of innocent passage, archipelagic sea-lane passage or transit passage of straits. In conformity with its own non-nuclear policies, New Zealand did not permit the entry into its ports of vessels bearing nuclear explosive devices.

Finland stated that there was an obvious need for curbing the arms buildup in general and for increasing efforts in the domain of naval arms control. The strategic importance of sea-based weapons systems had been growing, it noted; a significant proportion of the world's nuclear capacity was at sea; and the increasing role of sea-based strategic forces enhanced the importance of stability and predictability in the naval area. Naval exercises, patrols and other naval or air operations had expanded in Northern Europe and in the Baltic Sea in recent years and might become a source of concern to the Nordic countries. In October 1986, the President of Finland had addressed the need for naval arms control and maritime confidence-building measures in Northern

⁵ *Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea*, vol. XVII, document A/CONF.62/122; subsequently issued as a United Nations publication (Sales No. E.84.V.3).

⁶ For the text of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga), see *The Yearbook*, vol. 10: 1985, appendix VII.

Europe. The United Nations study on the naval arms race⁷ formed a solid basis for discussion by the Disarmament Commission, Finland stated, and it added that the emphasis in the study on confidence-building measures was justified. The Commission should focus on measures such as multilateral agreements regarding incidents on and over the high seas, prior notification of naval exercises and a greater openness in naval matters.

China hoped that, on the basis of what had been done in 1986, the Commission's work on the issue could be expanded in both scope and depth. Austria indicated that it had no strong views on how the Disarmament Commission should deliberate on the issue of naval armaments and disarmament, but was convinced that it must deal with the item.

Both Ghana and Indonesia urged the Disarmament Commission to build on the progress already made. Indonesia suggested that the Commission continue its examination of the desirability and practicability of measures for naval arms limitation and disarmament as well as for the extension of confidence-building measures to seas and oceans. The Commission, it stated, should pursue the feasibility of negotiating a multilateral agreement on the prevention of incidents on and over the high seas, corresponding to the existing bilateral agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States. There also appeared to be a need to survey the practical possibilities of modernizing the laws of sea warfare. Apart from achieving effective measures of naval disarmament, another important objective should remain the investigation of possible ways in which naval organization, capabilities and experience could contribute to improved and more effective ocean management policies for the peaceful uses of the world's seas in the years ahead, for the benefit of mankind as a whole.

According to Pakistan, the most destabilizing aspects of the naval arms race related to the geographic dispersal and proliferation of nuclear armaments in the seas and the oceans, and the issue which required immediate action pertained to the deployment of nuclear weapons on submarines and other naval vessels. Pakistan believed that measures to implement nuclear disarmament should be taken in the first instance by the major naval Powers, at both the global and regional levels. Sri Lanka underscored the ongoing efforts to realize the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace through, *inter alia*, convening in 1988 the Conference on the Indian Ocean at Colombo, called for in General Assembly resolution 41/87. Similarly, Bangladesh stressed that it was committed to the concept of making the high seas safe for peaceful use, as evidenced by its abiding interest in creating a zone of peace in the area of the Indian Ocean. Cuba viewed naval armaments and disarmament as an issue of high priority.

Following the conclusion of the general exchange of views, the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission decided to follow the same course of action as in the previous year and to conduct substantive, open-ended consultations on the question. Subsequently, he delegated the conduct of the consultations to Mr. Ali Alatas of Indonesia. Seven consultative meetings were held between

⁷ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.86.IX.3.

11 and 22 May. In carrying out its work, the open-ended Consultation Group had before it several documents and working papers, including a 1986 paper by the Chairman on the item.⁸ The meetings resulted in a number of substantive findings and recommendations, which were incorporated into a working paper by the Chairman.⁹ In addition to referring to some of the points made in the general exchange of views and outlined above, the Chairman's paper noted that naval forces were not independent of other military forces and that they should be considered in their general military context. The delegations participating in the substantive consultations gave their approval to the paper, which, in their view, could form the basis of further deliberations on the subject. A brief report on the item on naval armaments and disarmament drafted by the Chairman of the Commission was incorporated into the Commission's report to the General Assembly.¹⁰

In closing statements in plenary meetings, Belgium stated, on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community, that they were in favour of practical and realistic naval confidence-building measures, to be taken in both a global and a regional framework, by consensus, with a view to strengthening security. China thought that the item had received useful consideration and that efforts should continue to achieve confidence-building measures and actual disarmament measures. The Soviet Union expressed the hope that at the next session of the Commission it would be possible to agree, with the participation of the United States, on recommendations that would serve as a basis for beginning concrete negotiations on such issues as confidence-building measures, providing for the security of sea communications, and combating terrorism and piracy.

Consideration by the Conference on Disarmament, 1987

The question of general and complete disarmament is not an item on the annual agenda of the Conference. However, its terms of reference contain a specific reference to the subject in the so-called decalogue (see page 11) that precedes the annual agenda, item X of which is entitled "Comprehensive programme of disarmament leading to general and complete disarmament under effective international control". Because the item on the comprehensive programme was included in the 1987 agenda, members of the Conference also referred frequently to general and complete disarmament under effective international control as the ultimate goal of disarmament efforts.

During the 1987 session of the Conference,¹¹ for example, Indonesia noted that it was by no means certain that the achievements of some recent disarmament efforts had brought the Conference closer to the goal of general and complete disarmament. For its part, Zaire stated that all efforts towards

⁸ Document A/CN.10/83 (Chairman), A/CN.10/90 (Finland), A/CN.10/92 (German Democratic Republic and Soviet Union) and A/CN.10/101 (Sweden).

⁹ A/CN.10/102.

¹⁰ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/42/42)*, para. 44.

¹¹ CD/787, appendix II, vols. I-IV.

general and complete disarmament should be focused within the Conference.

Comments were made on the conditions necessary to promote general and complete disarmament. Thus, in a message addressed to the Conference, Mr. Gustáv Husák, President of Czechoslovakia, stated that the goal of general and complete disarmament could not be achieved without broad international co-operation, confidence, reasonable compromises and respect for the principles of reciprocity, equality of commitments and refraining from acts threatening the security of any party. Italy expressed the view that the achievement of general and complete disarmament in a framework of stability, transparency of intention and capability and of general respect for the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations was the basic condition for true peace.

Other statements emphasized the link between the comprehensive programme of disarmament and the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament. Argentina recalled paragraph 109 of the 1978 Final Document, in particular the commitment to elaborate a comprehensive programme of disarmament in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament would become a reality. India also noted that relationship.

Specific references were made to achieving the goal of general and complete disarmament as a gradual process. Spain, a non-member, stated that until it became possible to reach that ultimate objective, arms limitation and reduction agreements could and must prevent an arms race by maintaining security at the lowest possible level of armament and in an equilibrium deterring aggression. Another non-member, Viet Nam, expressed its support for step-by-step disarmament and a realistic approach to that process.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1987

During the forty-second session of the General Assembly,¹² many delegations referred to the concept of general and complete disarmament under effective international control as a goal to be achieved or as the context in which to work towards specific, interim, measures.

The Bahamas observed that though the need for general and complete disarmament became all the more urgent when one considered the documented costs of the arms race, only token progress had been made towards it. Both militarily significant States and developing countries, the Bahamas believed, produced alibis for contributing to the escalation of the arms race; the former should shake off the desire to imitate the super-Powers and the latter should turn their attention to building other infrastructures. Colombia affirmed that it was up to everyone to decide to make general and complete disarmament the firmest purpose of international policy and that it was the indispensable function of multilateral organs of disarmament, particularly the Conference on Disarmament, to see to the interests of the international community and guarantee its security. In the view of Yugoslavia, if the process of nuclear

¹² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, First Committee, 3rd to 41st and 44th and 45th meetings.*

disarmament were to succeed and the common goal of general and complete disarmament were to be achieved, it would be necessary that all States participate. Bilateral negotiations did not exclude, but rather complemented, multilateral negotiations. Therefore both types of negotiations should evolve side by side.

India and Togo referred to the Soviet-American agreement in principle on the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range nuclear weapons (see chapter VI) in the context of general and complete disarmament. India stated that what was needed was a new way of thinking based on the realization that nuclear weapons could not lead to security and that security must be common, shared and indivisible. It hoped that that new thinking lay behind the forthcoming agreement, for only then could it generate the momentum necessary for reaching the accepted goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. In Togo's view, if the agreement were to have a genuine and lasting impact on the process of general and complete disarmament, it would have to inaugurate a new concept of security without nuclear weapons. It should serve as a valuable stepping-stone to subsequent negotiations dealing successively with tactical and strategic nuclear weapons, conventional and other weapons, projects for the militarization of space, nuclear tests and regional conflicts.

The issue of objective information and openness in military matters was considered under the item on general and complete disarmament. Pursuant to resolution 41/59 B of 3 December 1986, the Secretary-General reported to the Assembly the information he had received from Member States concerning the measures they had adopted to contribute to greater openness in military matters in general and to improve the flow of objective information on military capabilities in particular.¹³

While discussing the significance of confidence-building in the process of disarmament, the Soviet Union stated that the most important instruments of confidence were openness and *glasnost*. It insisted that openness should not be considered an end in itself, but rather an instrument for building confidence. In disarming, States opened themselves up by eliminating those areas of activity that were primarily concerned with secrecy. The purpose of openness, the Soviet Union declared, was to remove sources of suspicion and create an atmosphere of clarity and predictability conducive to real disarmament. It believed that it would be possible to make a realistic comparison of overall military spending within two or three years, after the Soviet Union had completed a radical pricing reform.

The Soviet Union recalled that the Warsaw Treaty States had put forward a proposal for consultations with the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in order to compare the military doctrines of the two alliances, analyse their character and engage in joint consideration of the direction in which they should evolve to dispel the mutual suspicion and mistrust that had been built up over the years, to arrive at a better understanding of each other's intentions and to ensure that military thinking and

¹³ A/42/435. Replies were received from: Bulgaria, Denmark, Sweden and United Kingdom.

the doctrines of the military blocs and their adherents were based on defensive principles. The United Kingdom, asserting that it and its allies were as open as possible about their military resources and postures, stated that it would welcome the Soviet proposal to compare military doctrines if that meant discussing the numbers, structures and dispositions of the armed forces themselves.

The United States also spoke on the relationship of confidence and transparency to the disarmament process. For disarmament measures to provide the enhancement of security intended for all parties, it was necessary that there be adequate verification to establish a high degree of confidence that all parties were in full compliance. If the promise of greater transparency were implemented and maintained among some societies that had previously been closed to outside scrutiny, the United States believed, there would be a double benefit to arms control. First, it would be easier to obtain information on the activities of States and would facilitate the solution of questions of compliance. Secondly, greater openness could lead to a more informed debate within a society on arms control positions and military actions. The United States was convinced that free and open public debate could contribute to the attainment of meaningful arms limitation measures and progress in disarmament.

The question of naval disarmament was also considered under general and complete disarmament. Indonesia stated that discussions in the Disarmament Commission had resulted in a fruitful exchange of views on possible measures and had confirmed that the naval arms race merited closer scrutiny by the international community. In the view of many Member States, Bulgaria believed, there were good prospects for constructive consideration of extending confidence-building measures to the seas and oceans. It cited, as examples of such measures, the prior notification of fleet exercises, transfers and manoeuvres; the inviting of observers; restrictions on cruising and patrol activities of naval formations; limitations on the levels and intensity of naval exercises, including those of amphibious forces; and the prohibition of fleet exercises or manoeuvres in international straits and adjacent regions and of the use of live ammunition during exercises in areas of traditional sea lanes. Those issues could be considered not only in a general context, but also in regional contexts—the Indian and the Pacific oceans, the Mediterranean Sea and the seas of Northern Europe.

Sweden noted that both nuclear and conventional aspects of naval armaments had attracted increased international attention. Recalling work already accomplished in the Disarmament Commission, it stated that the Conference on Disarmament should be entrusted with the task of negotiating concrete measures to increase world-wide security at sea. It believed that the following measures should be considered: abandoning the practice of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons on board any ship; agreeing upon limitations on sea-borne nuclear missiles and bringing ashore all tactical nuclear weapons; confirming the legitimate claim of coastal States to reasonable seaboard security; ensuring that the freedom of navigation and other peaceful uses of the sea would not be infringed upon by military

activities; concluding a multilateral agreement on the prevention of incidents at sea; and negotiating confidence-building measures at sea.

Fifteen draft resolutions and one draft decision were approved by the First Committee and adopted by the General Assembly¹⁴ under the item “General and complete disarmament”. The Assembly’s consideration of these resolutions and decision is discussed in this volume as follows:

- (a) In this chapter, beginning on the page shown—
 - (i) 42/38 I (Objective information on military matters), page 84;
 - (ii) 42/38 K (Naval armaments and disarmament), page 86;
 - (iii) 42/38 M (Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements), page 87.
- (b) In other chapters, chapter number shown—
 - (i) 42/38 A (Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations), chapter VI;
 - (ii) 42/38 B (Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons), chapter XV;
 - (iii) 42/38 C (Notification of nuclear tests), chapter VIII;
 - (iv) 42/38 D (Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations), chapter VI;
 - (v) 42/38 E (Conventional disarmament), chapter XVI;
 - (vi) 42/38 F (Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons), chapter XV;
 - (vii) 42/38 G (Conventional disarmament), chapter XVI;
 - (viii) 42/38 H (Nuclear disarmament), chapter V;
 - (ix) 42/38 J (Implementation of General Assembly resolutions in the field of disarmament), chapter I;
 - (x) 42/38 L (Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes), chapter V;
 - (xi) 42/38 N (Conventional disarmament on a regional scale), chapter XVI;
 - (xii) 42/38 O (Review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament), chapter I.
- (xiii) Decision 42/407 (General and complete disarmament), chapter VI;

Three draft resolutions, entitled respectively “Confidence-building and increased openness in military matters”, “Confidence-building measures at sea”, and “Free exchange of views on disarmament and related security issues”, which were introduced in the First Committee and later withdrawn, are also discussed in this chapter. Four additional draft resolutions that were withdrawn are discussed in topical chapters: “General and complete disarmament: nuclear disarmament” is dealt with in chapter V, and “Transfer of conventional armaments”, “Confidence-building and security-building measures and conventional disarmament” and “Confidence-building and security-building measures and conventional disarmament in Europe” are dealt with in chapter XVI.

On 27 October, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, the Ukrainian SSR and the USSR submitted a draft resolution entitled “Confidence-building

¹⁴ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Plenary Meetings*, 84th meeting, for the adoption of the 15 draft resolutions.

and increased openness in military matters". In the preamble, the General Assembly would express the view that openness in the military and political sphere was intended to eliminate sources of suspicion and contribute to genuine disarmament and that increased openness with regard to military activities and military expenditure could contribute to confidence-building; recognize the need to continue efforts towards a realistic comparison of military budgets in order to limit them to levels of reasonable sufficiency; and express the belief that the policy of confidence-building could be stimulated by international agreement on defensive strategy and reasonable sufficiency, which presupposed that the structure of a State's armed forces would be sufficient to repel, but not carry out, attacks. In the operative part, the Assembly would invite all Member States to transmit to the Secretary-General their views concerning principles and ways and means of ensuring confidence and furthering openness in military matters.

On 26 October, Australia, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Samoa, Spain, Swaziland, Turkey and the United Kingdom submitted a draft resolution entitled "Objective information on military matters", which was introduced by the United Kingdom on 6 November. The sponsors of the draft believed that objective information on military matters would help to establish an atmosphere of greater confidence, in which the likelihood of an outbreak of conflict would be reduced, and hoped that in the near term States that had withheld such information would be in a position to provide objective and reliable military data. The draft would invite States to consider measures such as the use of the standardized reporting instrument to give practical effect to the principles of openness and transparency.

On 10 November, the same States plus Portugal submitted a revised text, which was later sponsored by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Greece, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union and the United States. In introducing the revision on 11 November, the United Kingdom stated that following intensive consultations, it had been possible to incorporate into the original draft resolution some of the elements in the draft submitted by socialist countries on confidence-building and openness in military matters and to accommodate other suggestions as well. The revision had been drafted with the intention of commanding the widest possible support in the Committee and the sponsors hoped that it would be adopted by consensus.

The Soviet Union drew the attention of the Committee to the new operative paragraph 4 (see below), which contained one of the main provisions of the draft of the socialist countries. It also noted that upon the conclusion of radical reforms of price formation in the Soviet Union, it would be possible realistically to compare overall military expenditures. As the revised draft contained provisions that reflected the socialist approach to the question of openness in military matters, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union would join the sponsors of that draft

and withdraw their own text.¹⁵ The Soviet Union added that the formulation of the revision did not predetermine its attitude to the existing system of standardized reporting.

At the request of India, a recorded vote was taken on the draft resolution "Objective information on military matters". The Committee then approved the draft by a vote of 100 to none, with 12 abstentions (non-aligned States). On 30 November the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 133 to none, with 12 abstentions, as resolution 42/38 I. The resolution reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling paragraph 105 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, which encourages Member States to ensure a better flow of information with regard to the various aspects of disarmament to avoid dissemination of false and tendentious information concerning armaments and to concentrate on the danger of escalation of the arms race and on the need for general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Recalling its previous resolutions on the subject,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General prepared in conformity with resolution 41/59 B of 3 December 1986,

Recognizing that the adoption of concrete, confidence-building measures on a global, regional or subregional level would greatly contribute to a reduction in international tension,

Believing that the adoption of such measures would contribute to greater openness and transparency, thus helping to prevent misperceptions of military capabilities and intentions, which could induce States to undertake armaments programmes leading to the acceleration of the arms race, in particular the nuclear-arms race, and to heightened international tensions,

Believing that objective information on military capabilities, in particular of nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, could contribute to the building of confidence among States and to the conclusion of concrete disarmament agreements and thereby help to halt and reverse the arms race,

Convinced that greater openness on military activities, *inter alia*, through transmittal of relevant information on these activities, including on the levels of military budgets, would contribute to increased confidence among States,

Taking into account the work undertaken in the Disarmament Commission on the reduction of military budgets,

Noting that an increased number of States have provided annual reports on military expenditures in conformity with the international system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures under the auspices of the United Nations,

1. *Reaffirms its firm conviction* that a better flow of objective information on military capabilities would help relieve international tension and contribute to the building of confidence among States on a global, regional or subregional level and to the conclusion of concrete disarmament agreements;

2. *Recommends* that those global, regional and subregional organizations that have already expressed support for the principle of practical and concrete confidence-building measures of a military nature on a global, regional or subregional level should intensify their efforts with a view to adopting such measures;

3. *Recommends* that all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, should consider implementing additional measures based on the principles of openness and transparency, such as, for example, the international system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures, with the aim of achieving a realistic comparison of military budgets, facilitating the availability of objective information on, as well as objective assessment of, military capabilities and contributing towards the process of disarmament;

¹⁵ See A/42/669/Add.1, paras. 32 and 33.

4. *Invites* all Member States to transmit to the Secretary-General, not later than 15 April 1988, their views concerning ways and means of ensuring confidence and furthering openness and transparency in military matters for submission to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament;

5. *Requests* the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament to take into account all the provisions of the present resolution in its deliberations;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament on the implementation of all the provisions of the resolutions on the subject;

7. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Objective information on military matters"

On 27 October, Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic and the Lao People's Democratic Republic submitted a draft resolution entitled "Confidence-building measures at sea", which Bulgaria introduced on 6 November. Bulgaria stated that the sponsors had taken into account the fact that the area of confidence-building measures at sea was one in which there existed an opportunity to reach early and generally acceptable agreements, and that they had also noted that Member States were becoming more aware of the importance of confidence-building in strengthening security and stability and in creating favourable conditions for progress in the field of disarmament, including naval disarmament. By the text, the General Assembly would request the Disarmament Commission to continue its consideration of the question of naval armaments and disarmament in 1988 with a view to facilitating the identification of possible measures in that field, and would further request it to devote more attention to the early identification of specific confidence-building measures at sea that could become the subject of consultations and, later, negotiations. The draft was not intended as a departure from the general and comprehensive approach to the question of naval armaments and disarmament, but had been submitted on the understanding that it would complement the draft resolution "Naval armaments and disarmament", introduced by Sweden (see below).

On 27 October, Australia, Austria, China, Finland, France, Iceland, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sweden and Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution entitled "Naval armaments and disarmament", which Sweden introduced on 9 November. In its presentation, Sweden reviewed the work of the Disarmament Commission on the question of naval armaments and explained that the draft resolution was of a procedural character. By it, the Commission would be requested to continue at its forthcoming session the substantive work on the subject that it had begun and to report on its deliberations and recommendations to the General Assembly not later than at its forty-third session. The sponsors commended the draft to the full support of the Committee.

On 10 November, Bulgaria announced that the sponsors of the draft resolution it had introduced had decided not to press it to a vote,¹⁶ since they

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, paras. 40 and 41.

believed that the provisions of the draft introduced by Sweden, if fully implemented, would bring about an effective discussion of naval armaments and disarmament, together with confidence-building at sea. Bulgaria and the German Democratic Republic thereupon joined the co-sponsors of the second draft.

At the same meeting, in a comment on the question of naval armaments and disarmament before the vote on the draft resolution, China recalled its activity in connection with the item and noted that, as in the two previous years, it had co-sponsored a draft resolution on the subject of naval disarmament. It hoped that the Disarmament Commission, at its next session, would, in accordance with the mandate given in resolution 40/94 F, further its work in depth and, while not neglecting the question of confidence-building measures, devote more attention to the question of naval disarmament.

The First Committee approved the draft resolution entitled "Naval armaments and disarmament" by a recorded vote of 128 to 1 (United States), with 1 abstention (India). The Islamic Republic of Iran explained its affirmative vote, stating that it believed that the presence of foreign navies in waters adjacent to other countries and the conduct of gunboat diplomacy posed a grave threat to international peace and security and that foreign navies must be limited to protecting and defending their national frontiers and their territorial waters.

On 30 November the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 154 to 1, with 2 abstentions. Resolution 42/38 K reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 38/188 G of 20 December 1983, by which it requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, to carry out a comprehensive study on the naval arms race,

Recalling its resolution 40/94 F of 12 December 1985, by which it requested the Disarmament Commission to consider the issues contained in the study on the naval arms race, both its substantive content and its conclusions, taking into account all other relevant present and future proposals, with a view to facilitating the identification of possible measures in the field of naval arms reductions and disarmament, pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament, as well as confidence-building measures in this field,

Recalling also its resolution 41/59 K of 3 December 1986, by which it requested the Disarmament Commission to continue, at its forthcoming session in 1987, the substantive consideration of the question and to report on its deliberations and recommendations to the General Assembly at its forty-second session,

Having examined the report of the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission on the substantive consideration of the question of the naval arms race and disarmament during the 1987 session of the Commission, which met with the approval of all delegations participating in the substantive consultations and which, in their view, could form the basis of further deliberations on the subject,

1. *Notes with satisfaction* the report on the substantive consideration of the question of the naval arms race and disarmament by the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission;

2. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to continue, at its forthcoming session in 1988, the substantive consideration of the question and to report on its deliberations and recommendations to the General Assembly not later than at its forty-third session;

3. *Also requests* the Disarmament Commission to inscribe on the agenda for its 1988 session the item entitled "Naval armaments and disarmament";

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Naval armaments and disarmament"

On 27 October, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, France, the German Democratic Republic, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Sierra Leone, Spain, the United States and Zaire submitted a draft resolution entitled "Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements". The draft was later also sponsored by Australia, the Federal Republic of Germany, Mongolia, Romania and Uruguay. In introducing the text on 30 October, the United States stated that it was encouraged that mechanisms were being developed to investigate and resolve questions about non-compliance; ultimately, the international community would have to grapple with defining its role in cases in which arms control and disarmament agreements were being unequivocally violated. The United States believed that the draft resolution was one step in the process of strengthening confidence in the viability of agreements, agreements which could play an important role in preserving peace.

On 9 November the First Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote, and on 30 November the General Assembly adopted it, also without a vote, as resolution 42/38 M. The resolution reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 41/59 J of 3 December 1986,

Conscious of the abiding concern of all Member States for preserving respect for rights and obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law,

Convinced that observance of the Charter of the United Nations, relevant treaties and other sources of international law is essential for the strengthening of international security,

Mindful in particular of the fundamental importance of full implementation and strict observance of agreements on arms limitation and disarmament if individual nations and the international community are to derive enhanced security from them,

Stressing that any violation of such agreements not only adversely affects the security of States parties but can also create security risks for other States relying on the constraints and commitments stipulated in those agreements,

Stressing further that any weakening of confidence in such agreements diminishes their contribution to global or regional stability and to further disarmament and arms limitation efforts and undermines the credibility and effectiveness of the international legal system,

Recognizing in this context that, *inter alia*, full confidence in compliance with existing agreements can enhance the negotiation of arms limitation and disarmament agreements,

Believing that compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements by States parties is, therefore, a matter of interest and concern to the international community, and noting the role that the United Nations could play in that regard,

Convinced that resolution of non-compliance questions that have arisen with regard to agreements on arms limitations and disarmament would contribute to better relations among States and the strengthening of world peace and security,

1. *Urges* all States parties to arms limitation and disarmament agreements to implement and comply with the entirety of the provisions of such agreements;

2. *Calls upon* all Member States to give serious consideration to the implications of non-compliance with those obligations for international security and stability, as well as for the prospects for further progress in the field of disarmament;

3. *Further calls upon* all Member States to support efforts aimed at the resolution of non-compliance questions, with a view to encouraging strict observance by all parties of the provisions of arms limitation and disarmament agreements and maintaining or restoring the integrity of such agreements;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide Member States with assistance that may be necessary in this regard;

5. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to bring the present resolution to the attention of the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament.

On 27 October, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy and the United States submitted a draft resolution entitled "Free exchange of views on disarmament and related security issues", which was later also sponsored by the Netherlands. In its introduction on 6 November, the United States expressed its conviction that the free exchange of views and information on security issues related to disarmament among individuals, non-governmental organizations and nations could help dispel international suspicions and build confidence in support of realistic arms control measures. By the draft, the General Assembly would urge all Member States to promote the public dissemination of information on their armaments programmes and the relationship of those programmes to the objective of arms limitation and disarmament; call upon all Member States not to interfere with the rights of their citizens to express their views freely on disarmament questions; invite the submission of views to the Secretary-General on the implementation of the resolution; and request him to bring the resolution to the attention of the Assembly at its third special session on disarmament.

The sponsors subsequently revised their draft and non-aligned countries submitted amendments to it.

The draft was revised, the United States explained, by incorporating to the extent possible the suggestions of others, including neutral, non-aligned and Warsaw Treaty countries. Among other changes, the wording of operative paragraph 4, which called upon all Member States "not to interfere with the rights of their citizens to organize and meet publicly in order to express views freely and openly on disarmament questions and related security issues" was replaced by the following wording drawn from resolution 37/100 J, adopted by consensus: "to encourage their citizens freely and publicly to express their own views on disarmament questions and to organize and meet publicly for that purpose". The word "international" had also been added before "security" throughout the text so as to avoid any misunderstanding and several of the operative paragraphs had been extensively modified.

In introducing the amendments of the non-aligned countries on 16 November, Zimbabwe stated that they applied to both the original draft and the revision and were intended to make the text more balanced. Among the proposed changes were the deletion of four operative paragraphs, three of which dealt with the dissemination of information on disarmament and related international security issues, including the circulation of publications and the participation of foreign experts in radio and television broadcasts, and the addition of a new operative paragraph by which the General Assembly would call upon Member States to facilitate the flow of a broad range of accurate information on disarmament matters with a view to furthering the objectives of the World Disarmament Campaign and the final objective of general and complete disarmament.

Later the same day, the sponsors of the original draft resolution announced their decision to withdraw it, as they felt that the proposed amendments would completely alter the character of their text.¹⁷ Consequently, no action was taken on the draft resolution.

Finally, Member States initiated a number of resolutions with elements relevant to disarmament under other agenda items of the First Committee. Two of them, resolutions 42/46 A and B, entitled "Question of Antarctica", are dealt with in chapter X. Two others, resolutions 42/92 (Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security) and 42/93 (Comprehensive system of international peace and security), are briefly dealt with in this chapter. Resolutions 42/92 and 42/93 were adopted by the General Assembly on 7 December.¹⁸

On 20 November, Algeria, Bangladesh, the Congo, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Madagascar, Mali, Nigeria, Pakistan, Romania, Senegal, Sri Lanka, the Sudan, Tunisia, Uganda and Yugoslavia submitted the draft resolution entitled "Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security". Malta introduced it on 25 November, and later that day the First Committee approved it by a recorded vote of 108 to 1, with 24 abstentions. The General Assembly adopted it as resolution 42/92 by a recorded vote of 131 to 1, with 23 abstentions, on 7 December. The passages that relate most directly to disarmament appear in operative paragraphs 3, 4 and 5:

The General Assembly,

3. *Calls upon* all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, to take immediate steps aimed at:

(a) Promoting and using effectively the system of collective security as envisaged in the Charter;

(b) Halting effectively the arms race and achieving general and complete disarmament under effective international control and, to this end, to conduct serious, meaningful and effective negotiations with a view to implementing the recommendations and decisions contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and to fulfilling the priority tasks listed in the Programme of Action set forth in section III of the Final Document;

4. *Invites* all States, in particular the major military Powers and States members of military alliances, to refrain, especially in critical situations and in crisis areas, from actions, including military activities and manoeuvres, conceived within the context of East-West confrontation and used as a means of pressure or threat to and destabilization of other States and regions;

5. *Expresses its conviction* that the gradual military disengagement of the great Powers and their military alliances from various parts of the world should be promoted;

On 20 November, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Ukrainian SSR and the USSR submitted the draft resolution entitled "Comprehensive system of international peace and security". On 23 November the same sponsors, later joined by the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mad-

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, paras. 42-46.

¹⁸ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Plenary Meetings, 93rd meeting.*

agascar and Viet Nam, submitted a revised draft, which Poland introduced the next day. After a further, oral, revision on 25 November, the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 70 to 12, with 49 abstentions. On 7 December the General Assembly adopted it as resolution 42/93 by a recorded vote of 76 to 12, with 63 abstentions. The part of the resolution that relates most directly to disarmament is operative paragraph 6:

The General Assembly,

6. *Calls upon* all States, including in bilateral and multilateral forums dealing with disarmament issues, to multiply their efforts in order to prevent an arms race in outer space and to halt and reverse it on Earth, to lower the level of military confrontation and to enhance global stability;

Conclusion

Again in 1987, delegations in various forums affirmed that the attainment of general and complete disarmament under effective international control remained the final objective of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. Besides making efforts to elaborate a comprehensive programme of disarmament (discussed in chapter IV), Members of the United Nations worked to achieve partial measures that could help bring them closer to their goal. A number of States stressed the importance of conducting negotiations on limited measures, such as reductions in nuclear arsenals, within the overall context of general and complete disarmament.

Under its omnibus agenda item, the Assembly took action on 16 draft texts covering a wide range of topics. Of the three resolutions discussed in this chapter, only the one on compliance was adopted by consensus. The second resolution, concerning objective information on military matters, was initiated by the United Kingdom and co-sponsored by Warsaw Treaty and NATO countries, including the Soviet Union and the United States, and was adopted with no negative votes. The third resolution, calling upon the Disarmament Commission to continue its substantive consideration of the question of naval armaments and disarmament, was adopted with only one negative vote.

Comprehensive programme of disarmament

Introduction

A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO DISARMAMENT has its roots in article 11 of the Charter of the United Nations, which empowers the General Assembly to consider “principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments” and to make recommendations on such principles to Member States or the Security Council or both. In 1969, the then Secretary-General, U Thant, in the context of a proposal to designate the 1970s a “disarmament decade”, expressed the view that the General Assembly could establish a specific programme and timetable for dealing with all aspects of arms limitation and disarmament.¹ The Assembly adopted resolution 2602 E (XXIV), requesting the CCD, while continuing intensive negotiations on collateral measures, to work out at the same time a comprehensive programme dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

The CCD debated the question between 1970 and 1978, and a number of specific proposals were submitted. In 1970, Ireland, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Sweden and Yugoslavia proposed a comprehensive programme in the General Assembly,² but it was not possible to reach agreement on the programme.

At the first special session devoted to disarmament, in 1978, the General Assembly gave added impetus to the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. In paragraph 109 of its Final Document,³ it provided that the Committee on Disarmament would undertake the elaboration of a comprehensive programme encompassing all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control would become a reality. It further entrusted the Disarmament Commission with the task of considering the elements of such a programme. The following year, that Commission adopted by consensus the “Elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament”,⁴ which included sections on objectives, measures, and machinery and procedures. After

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 1 A (A/7601/Add.1)*.

² *Ibid.*, *Twenty-fifth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 27, document A/8191 and Corr.1.

³ *Ibid.*, *Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III.

⁴ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/34/42)*, para. 19. The “Elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament”, as agreed upon and recommended by the Disarmament Commission, is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 4: 1979, appendix II.

examination, the General Assembly transmitted it to the Committee on Disarmament, requesting it to initiate negotiations, with a view to completing the elaboration of the programme before the next special session on disarmament. The Committee thereupon established an *ad hoc* working group to begin negotiations. It prepared for submission to the Assembly at its special session in 1982 a draft programme⁵ setting out the views of individual States or groups of States in one complex working document, in which many points of disagreement remained.

It did not prove possible to reconcile the conflicting points of view at the 1982 special session. The Assembly referred the draft comprehensive programme back to the Committee on Disarmament and requested it to submit a revised draft to the Assembly in 1983. Subsequently, the Committee submitted the document "Texts for the comprehensive programme of disarmament",⁶ which was much less ambitious than the 1982 draft, but which still contained reservations in a number of areas such as priorities, measures to be undertaken, a timetable for implementation, machinery for implementation and the legal character of the document. Consequently, the Assembly urged the Conference on Disarmament, as soon as it considered circumstances propitious, to renew its work and to submit to the Assembly, not later than at its forty-first session, a complete draft of such a programme.

In 1984 the Conference was not able to conduct substantive negotiations on the matter, and although in 1985 its *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament held a considerable number of meetings, it achieved only modest progress.

A new version of the draft programme, which the Conference on Disarmament produced in 1986, reflected progress made in such areas as nuclear weapons, conventional weapons and armed forces, related measures, and machinery and procedures. However, differences persisted among States on certain other questions. Thus, the Conference could not meet the General Assembly's request, as stated in resolution 40/152 D, for submission of a complete draft of the comprehensive programme of disarmament to the Assembly at its forty-first session. By its decision 41/421, the Assembly decided to keep open the relevant agenda item in order to allow the Conference to conclude the elaboration of the programme during the first part of its 1987 session and to submit a complete draft to the Assembly at that time.

Consideration by the Conference on Disarmament, 1987

In 1987, the Conference on Disarmament considered the agenda item on the comprehensive programme of disarmament in plenary meetings during the

⁵ *Ibid.*, Twelfth Special Session, Supplement No. 2 (A/S-12/2), appendix I.

⁶ See *ibid.*, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27 and Corr.1), paragraph 88, to which is annexed the "Texts for the comprehensive programme of disarmament submitted by the *Ad Hoc* Working Group". The annex consists of six chapters: "I. Introduction", "II. Objectives", "III. Principles", "IV. Priorities", "V. Measures and stages of implementation" and "VI. Machinery and procedures", and is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 8: 1983, appendix II.

periods from 20 to 28 April and from 3 to 7 August. On 3 February the President of the Conference made a statement to the effect that the Conference would intensify its consultations on the item and that there was no need to re-establish the *Ad Hoc* Committee on it.

In plenary meetings⁷ a number of delegations made statements in reference to the item. Mexico called for a spirit of flexibility and mutual concession so that the draft programme could be completed and submitted to the Assembly at its resumed forty-first session in accordance with General Assembly decision A/41/421. Kenya, Nigeria, Peru and Zaire also urged increased co-operation in order to conclude the programme.

Argentina stressed the need to agree on calendars for the fulfilment of the programme and for each stage of its implementation. It emphasized that the programme, particularly in regard to nuclear and space weapons, could not mean or imply any backward movement with respect to the 1978 Final Document. India and Algeria reiterated that the programme should reaffirm the priorities of that Document. Egypt and India placed emphasis on the need to resolve the question of time-frames and stages of implementation with regard to the nuclear paragraphs in the draft programme.

Bulgaria urged adoption of the programme, while Czechoslovakia stressed that the key to the programme was in the hands of those who failed to display flexibility regarding a number of priority issues, among which the nuclear test ban was an outstanding one. Mongolia emphasized that the priority task of preventing an arms race in outer space should occupy its due place in the draft programme. Romania asserted that the conclusion of the programme would represent a concrete contribution to the third special session devoted to disarmament. Yugoslavia was of the same view.

Belgium and Japan felt that the programme, by virtue of its nature, should be adopted by consensus. The Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands urged a realistic approach to the consideration of the item.

At the end of the first part of the session, the President for the month of April acknowledged that the draft programme was not ready for submission to the General Assembly at its resumed forty-first session. He noted that the positions of some countries on a number of long-standing priority issues had not changed.

Early in the summer sitting of the Conference, Bulgaria, Morocco, Romania and Sweden urged the Conference to conclude its work on the programme before the third special session. Pakistan expressed concern that some delegations had begun to question parts of the programme earlier agreed upon by consensus and to reopen issues which had appeared settled. Australia also called for flexibility and urged delegations to avoid reopening differences which had been resolved or set aside in the past.

Czechoslovakia, speaking on behalf of a group of socialist countries, outlined their approach. They stressed that a programme that did not, in its

⁷ CD/787, appendix II, vols. I-IV.

first stage, encompass the achievement of a nuclear-test ban, effective measures aimed at the prevention of nuclear war, and initial, specific measures of nuclear disarmament would not be comprehensive and would not ensure the commencement of a process of nuclear disarmament, let alone general and complete disarmament. Czechoslovakia drew attention to the comprehensive proposals of members of the socialist group, suggesting a framework for a gradual stage-by-stage approach to the elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, especially the proposal made on 15 January 1986 by the Soviet Union.⁸ Czechoslovakia also pointed to the growing significance of the question of preventing an arms race in outer space and the need to give it a more prominent place in the programme.

Poland recalled the proposals put forward by Mr. Wojciech Jaruzelski, Chairman of the Council of State of Poland, concerning nuclear and conventional disengagement in Central Europe, which it considered relevant to the programme.⁹

The *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, under the chairmanship of Mr. Alfonso García Robles of Mexico, held 27 meetings, as well as a number of informal consultations, between 12 February and 20 August. At their request, the Conference on Disarmament decided to invite the representatives of the following States not members of the Conference to participate in the meetings of the *Ad Hoc* Committee: Austria, Bangladesh, Finland, Greece, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Senegal, Spain, Turkey, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe. In addition to the documents of previous sessions, the Committee had before it four working papers, which are listed in the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee to the Conference that was submitted to the Assembly at its resumed forty-first session.¹⁰

The Committee worked on the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, bearing in mind that its mandate called for the submission of a complete draft to the General Assembly during its resumed forty-first session. The Committee took as the basis of its work the text annexed to its report that it had submitted in August 1986.¹¹ Contact groups were established to resolve existing differences concerning certain texts and consultations were also held under the guidance of the Chairman. Intensive work was carried out, particularly in the months of July and August, with a view to completing the elaboration of the programme. However, it did not prove possible to harmonize positions on a number of issues; the stage reached is reflected in the annex to another report of the Committee to the Conference, which forms an addendum to the Conference's report to the General Assembly at its forty-first session.¹²

⁸ CD/732, appendix I, document CD/649, and AJ/41/97. For a brief summary of the proposal, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 11: 1986, chapter VI.

⁹ CD/787, appendix I, vol. II, document CD/754.

¹⁰ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, Supplement No. 27, Addendum (AJ/41/27/Add.1)*, para. 4. The report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, consisting of seven integral paragraphs and an annex, is reproduced under paragraph 4.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, *Forty-first Session, Supplement No. 27 (AJ/41/27)*. The report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, to which the text is annexed, is reproduced *in extenso* under paragraph 107.

¹² *Ibid.*, *Forty-first Session, Supplement No. 27, Addendum (AJ/41/27/Add.1)*, para. 4, annex.

The *Ad Hoc* Committee's report contained the following conclusion:

In accordance with its mandate, the *Ad Hoc* Committee agreed to submit to the Conference on Disarmament the results of its work on the elaboration of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, as contained in the Annex to this report, with the understanding that delegations could not take final positions thereon until agreement was reached on outstanding points of difficulty and until the document was complete. In view of the fact that areas of disagreement remain with respect to various aspects of the Programme, and bearing in mind that the Preparatory Committee for the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament has recommended the inclusion in the agenda of the third special session of an item entitled 'Consideration and adoption of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament', the *Ad Hoc* Committee further agreed to recommend to the Conference on Disarmament that the Committee be re-established at the outset of the 1988 session, with a view to resolving outstanding issues and concluding negotiations on the Programme in time for its submission to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.¹³

Towards the end of the session some delegations commented in plenary meetings on the results of the *Ad Hoc* Committee's work.

Egypt, Pakistan and Peru felt that the 1987 session represented a step backwards in so far as it had seen the questioning of principles and priorities included in the 1978 Final Document. India again underlined its conviction that the programme must build upon the Final Document, which Sri Lanka considered as a landmark.

Bulgaria, speaking on behalf of a group of socialist States, expressed concern that the new reservations concerning the programme, deriving primarily from the position of the United States, were threatening the future of the programme.

Australia, speaking on behalf of a group of Western States and Norway (a non-member), stated that the adjustments made to the text of the programme in 1987 should be seen in the light of efforts to produce a practical guide which could realistically be put forward for a programme of action towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control. It suggested that the Conference should seek to create a programme of action which would ideally supplement and, as appropriate, look beyond the 1978 Final Document. Australia noted that delegations' positions were clearer than in previous years. Consideration of the item had accordingly been productive, and it provided a basis for achieving an agreed, effective and balanced programme.

The United States also felt that the work accomplished by the *Ad Hoc* Committee had been helpful, because the positions of delegations on critical points of disagreement in the draft programme had been clearly spelt out. In Canada's view, notable improvement had been made in the text of the draft programme, though in some parts there seemed to be a narrower area of consensus than formerly. Canada felt that, despite the brackets added in that session to indicate points on which agreement had not been reached, the fact that the Conference was seriously focusing on the programme was evidence of progress.

¹³ *Ibid.*, integral para. 7.

The Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, however, stated that it was essential that some members of the Committee modify the approach they had taken in the course of the 1987 session. He pointed out that the brackets in the draft programme had almost tripled in number during the year.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1987

As in previous years, in 1987 the question of a comprehensive programme of disarmament was addressed by delegations in the general debate in plenary meetings and in the First Committee.¹⁴ In the Committee, comments were made mainly in statements containing evaluations of the work of the Conference on Disarmament during its 1987 session.

The representative of Mexico, who had been the Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, reiterated his call for a change in the approach of some members of the Committee to enable it to resolve outstanding questions and promptly conclude negotiations on the programme. As an illustration, he cited a case in which it had been suggested that the words "the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated" be omitted from a reference to paragraph 109 of the Final Document. He recalled that at the second special session Member States had reaffirmed their determination to continue to work for the adoption of the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

Panama expressed concern over the Conference's seeming immobility and, indeed, regression. It further criticized what it considered inconsistencies and abrupt turns in behaviour on the part of some nuclear Powers and lack of respect for decisions of the General Assembly.

Peru also expressed its disappointment at the movement backwards. In its view, disarmament should be carried out in all areas and at all levels, under effective international control, allowing for the harmonization of all efforts to that end. The comprehensive programme acquired special significance, since it encapsulated and co-ordinated the efforts being made in the complex process of disarmament and served as its substantive framework. Zaire recalled that the Preparatory Committee for the Third Special Session had already recommended that an item on the programme be included in the session's agenda. The Conference on Disarmament should re-establish the relevant *Ad Hoc* Committee early in 1988 to resolve outstanding issues and to conclude negotiations on the programme in time for the special session.

Czechoslovakia was disappointed with the results of the work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee. It criticized what it saw as a tendency on the part of some States to question a number of provisions of the Final Document, primarily those concerning nuclear disarmament. If that reflected their belief that the elaboration of the programme could be blocked by a revision of the Final Document, then the prospects for substantive disarmament negotiations would

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Forty-second Session, First Committee, 3rd to 36th meetings, and *ibid.*, Sessional Fascicle, corrigendum.

continue to be limited. Romania felt that a new approach to disarmament problems was necessary and possible. A complex programme of disarmament, along the lines being considered by the Conference on Disarmament, should make it possible to take into account the interests of all countries, thus ensuring their right to equal security.

On 27 October, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela and Yugoslavia, later joined by Cuba and Romania, submitted a draft resolution entitled "Comprehensive programme of disarmament". By the text, which was introduced by Mexico on 9 November, the General Assembly would express regret that the Conference on Disarmament had been unable to complete the elaboration of the comprehensive programme in 1987, and it would urge it to resume work on the programme at the outset of its 1988 session and to submit it to the Assembly at its third special session.

The draft resolution was approved by the First Committee on 9 November without a vote and was adopted by the General Assembly on 30 November¹⁵ as resolution 42/42 I, also without a vote. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 38/183 K of 20 December 1983, 39/148 I of 17 December 1984 and 40/152 D of 16 December 1985, in which it requested the Conference on Disarmament to submit to the General Assembly at its forty-first session a complete draft of the comprehensive programme of disarmament,

Bearing in mind its decision 41/421 B of 14 September 1987, by which it took note of the report of the Conference on Disarmament, containing the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament concerning its work during the 1987 session of the Conference, and decided to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-second session the sub-item entitled "Comprehensive programme of disarmament: report of the Conference on Disarmament",

Noting that, in its report, the *Ad Hoc* Committee agreed to recommend to the Conference on Disarmament that the Committee be re-established at the outset of the 1988 session, with a view to resolving outstanding issues and concluding negotiations on the programme in time for its submission to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament,

Noting further that the Conference on Disarmament agreed to that recommendation,

1. *Regrets* that the Conference on Disarmament was unable to complete the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament in 1987 and to submit a draft thereof to the General Assembly at its forty-first session;

2. *Urges* the Conference on Disarmament to resume the work on the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament at the outset of its 1988 session with a view to resolving outstanding issues and concluding negotiations on the programme in time for its submission to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament, and, for that purpose, to re-establish its *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

Conclusion

In spite of intensive work carried out by the Conference on Disarmament in 1987 on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, areas of disagreement

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, *Plenary Meetings*, 84th meeting.

regarding various aspects of the programme remained and, indeed, increased. As the Preparatory Committee for the Third Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament had recommended that the agenda of the session include an item on the consideration and adoption of the programme, the *Ad Hoc* Committee recommended that its work be continued at the outset of the Conference's 1988 session in order to resolve outstanding issues and conclude the negotiations on the programme in time for its submission to the special session.

The General Assembly adopted resolution 42/42 I, by which it urged the implementation of the *Ad Hoc* Committee's recommendation.

P A R T T W O

Nuclear disarmament

Nuclear arms limitation and disarmament

Introduction

NOT LONG AFTER NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE FIRST DEVELOPED and certainly with the advent of the thermonuclear weapon and the recognition of its destructive power, the international community became aware that it faces the risk of the destruction of civilization. The measures proposed to avert or reduce that risk include the limitation, reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems; the cut-off of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; the restriction or prohibition of the deployment by nuclear-weapon States of nuclear weapons on the territories of other States; and a freeze on the production of additional nuclear weapons. Yet the number and destructive capability of the available nuclear weapons have continuously increased, amounting to what has been called “overkill capacity”. In addition to the 5 nuclear-weapon States, China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, from 15 to 25 other States are believed to be able to develop a rudimentary nuclear weapon, should they decide to do so.¹

In the 1978 Final Document, the General Assembly declared that it was essential for the survival of mankind to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race in all its aspects; that the ultimate goal was the complete elimination of nuclear weapons; and that the nuclear-weapon States, particularly the two major ones, had the primary responsibility for taking effective steps towards nuclear disarmament.² For many States those considerations are the corner-stone of their disarmament policies, almost to the exclusion of other aspects of disarmament and arms limitation.

There have long been bilateral negotiations on nuclear matters—particularly between the Soviet Union and the United States, but also between France and the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom—and through the years a number of agreements have been reached. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), which the Soviet Union and the United States started in 1969, led in their first phase (SALT I) to the signing of two agreements in Moscow on 26 May 1972: the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-

¹ See *Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.81.I.11), chaps. VI and VIII.

² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, paras. 47 and 48. The Final Document of the Tenth Special Session is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, appendix I.

Ballistic Missile Systems, subsequently amended by a Protocol of 3 July 1974, and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, with a Protocol attached.³ Both SALT I and the anti-ballistic missile Treaty entered into force on 3 October 1972. The primary goal of the second phase of the negotiations (SALT II), which began in November 1972, was to replace the Interim Agreement with a more comprehensive one, providing broad limits on strategic offensive weapons systems. That phase ended on 18 June 1979 in Vienna with the signing of the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II), a Protocol to be considered as an integral part of the Treaty, and a Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations on the Limitation of Strategic Arms.⁴ The SALT II Treaty has not entered into force.

In the early 1980s, the Soviet Union and the United States conducted negotiations on the reduction of their strategic and intermediate-range nuclear-weapon systems, but those talks ended in disagreement in December 1983. In 1984 no bilateral negotiations on nuclear-weapon questions took place, but towards the end of that year the Soviet Union and the United States announced their intention to enter into new negotiations on the subject. In early January 1985, the two Governments agreed that negotiations should cover a range of issues concerning nuclear and space arms—both strategic and intermediate-range—which would be dealt with in their interrelationship. The objective of the negotiations would be “to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and at strengthening strategic stability”.⁵ At their meeting in Geneva in November 1985,⁶ President Reagan of the United States and General Secretary Gorbachev of the Soviet Union agreed to accelerate the negotiations which had begun in March 1985.

The multilateral disarmament forums have been seized all along with a variety of items relating to nuclear weapons. Divergences of view, however, have hampered significant progress; for example, no *rapprochement* has taken place between the positions of the Western States, on the one hand, and those of the socialist and non-aligned, on the other, concerning the desirability of establishing a subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament as a negotiating forum in the field of nuclear disarmament.

Among the proposals in the problem area, a freeze on nuclear weapons was the focus of active debate in the early 1980s. The growing international interest in the concept of a freeze was reflected in two draft resolutions submitted by neutral and non-aligned countries during the General Assembly's

³ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 944, No. 13446 (anti-ballistic missile Treaty); vol. 1042, No. 13446 (Protocol of 3 July 1974); and vol. 944, No. 13445 (Interim Agreement).

⁴ For the text of the Treaty, the Protocol and the Joint Statement of Principles, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/34/27 and Corr.1)*, appendix III (CD/53 and Corr.1), document CD/28.

⁵ The USSR-United States statement on the Geneva meeting of the Soviet Foreign Minister and the American Secretary of State, 8 January 1985. The text of the statement appears in the United Nations publication *Disarmament*, vol. VIII, No. 1 (Sales No. E.85.IX.3).

⁶ The USSR-United States statement following the November 1985 summit was circulated as a General Assembly document (A/40/1070), and the disarmament-related sections appear in *The Yearbook*, vol. 10: 1985, chapter II.

second special session on disarmament, in 1982,⁷ but no consensus was reached on them. At the regular session later in the year, they were adopted, with a number of mainly Western States either voting against or abstaining.

In 1983, the Soviet Union proposed in the Conference on Disarmament that all the nuclear-weapon Powers should simultaneously freeze their nuclear weaponry, both in quantitative and qualitative terms.⁸ According to that proposal, a freeze could initially go into effect with respect to the United States and the Soviet Union only, on the understanding that the other nuclear Powers would follow suit. The issue has since formed a topic of considerable discussion in several forums. In the First Committee, Western States opposing the idea have generally taken the view that a freeze would reinforce existing imbalances in nuclear forces, present verification problems and impede negotiations on balanced reductions, thus diminishing the security of all concerned. The supporters of a freeze have held that it would contribute to international security by serving as a first step towards substantial nuclear-arms reductions and that it could be verified with existing techniques. Since 1985, the issue has generated less discussion, although resolutions calling for a freeze have been adopted by the General Assembly with the support of large majorities.

In 1986, the bilateral negotiations on nuclear and space arms continued and intensified. At the summit level, the two Powers met in October at Reykjavik, Iceland, and were able to agree in principle on important aspects, but did not reach agreement on the whole package of issues which was before them. Developments in the area of bilateral reductions of intermediate-range and shorter-range nuclear weapons are discussed in chapter VI.

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1987

As in previous years, the Disarmament Commission had in 1987 on its agenda an item (item 4) covering various aspects of the nuclear-arms race, nuclear disarmament, the prevention of nuclear war and also conventional disarmament. (For the full wording of the item, see page 13.) Several States took up those issues in the Commission's general exchange of views.

The United States welcomed the fact that there was major movement towards a historic agreement aimed at the elimination of both long-range and short-range intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF). It stressed that while work was under way to achieve deep cuts in strategic and intermediate nuclear forces, efforts must also be made to improve conventional stability.

The Soviet Union stated that a way must be found to harmonize national interests with those of an emerging comprehensive system of international security. The Soviet Union, for its part, was striving to find mutually acceptable solutions on the entire range of problems concerning nuclear dis-

⁷ The two proposals are discussed and reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 7: 1982, chapters II and VII and appendix I.

⁸ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27 and Corr.1)*, appendix II (CD/421), document CD/385.

armament. Its proposal for the complete and comprehensive elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000⁹ was still on the table and the crucial goal remained to radically reduce strategic offensive weapons. In an attempt to make nuclear-arms reductions possible where they could be most easily achieved, the Soviet Union had proposed resolving in the first place the problem of medium-range and short-range nuclear missiles in Europe. Its concept of genuine nuclear disarmament, it added, provided also for a solution to the problem of tactical nuclear weapons and for a considerable reduction in armed forces and all types of weapons. Wide-ranging negotiations should be undertaken to remove certain asymmetries that existed in Europe due to historical, geographical and other factors.

Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Romania and the Ukrainian SSR underscored the priority of nuclear disarmament, the contributions made by the socialist countries to break the long-standing impasse in the nuclear field and the promising progress that had been made in the field of nuclear disarmament since the 1986 session of the Disarmament Commission. Similarly, Cuba stressed the positive aspects of recent moves in the nuclear field, spearheaded by the Soviet Union.

China urged the Soviet Union and the United States to shoulder their special responsibility for taking the lead in disarmament and to reach at the earliest possible date a disarmament agreement that was really conducive to halting the arms race, lowering the arms level and easing international tensions, without compromising the security interests of other countries. Concerning the Soviet-American talks on intermediate-range missiles, China insisted that those missiles should be reduced simultaneously and in a balanced way in both Europe and Asia, until they were completely destroyed.

Belgium, speaking on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community, expressed the hope that the improved international climate might help solve some of the problems that in the past had prevented progress in the field of nuclear disarmament. The Federal Republic of Germany stated that the possibility of eliminating a whole category of nuclear weapons was an encouraging prospect and in accordance with one of its long-standing goals. Canada noted that the super-Powers had clearly made progress in nuclear-arms negotiations and that the time was ripe for an agreement. Differences still obtaining in the ongoing negotiations should be quickly resolved in the interest of transforming the spirit of Reykjavik into action.

Japan expressed the view that Soviet-American negotiations on nuclear disarmament should enhance the sense of strategic stability between East and West and contribute to strengthening world peace and security. In the negotiations for reductions of nuclear weapons, "globalism" should be fully adhered to, and in the case of the intermediate-range nuclear forces, their total elimination from Europe and Asia alike should ultimately be achieved. The security of the world should be safeguarded by taking into consideration

⁹ A/41/97. For a brief summary of the proposal, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 11: 1986, chapter VI.

an overall balance of all systems of weaponry. New Zealand also stressed the relationship between nuclear and conventional disarmament and held that greater effort was necessary to achieve a balanced set of recommendations in those two areas.

India expressed deep regret that the relevant item had remained on the agenda of the Disarmament Commission for nine years with little progress, in spite of the priority attached to it. It urged the Commission urgently to identify ways and means of dealing with that critical issue. Pakistan and Yugoslavia stressed that the consensus embodied in the 1978 Final Document provided a common basis for future action, and Pakistan hoped that the Commission would build upon it by recommending concrete measures within the context of the objective of general and complete disarmament. Ghana stated that the Disarmament Commission must conduct its deliberations in such a way as to encourage meaningful progress in the ongoing disarmament negotiations.

Bangladesh warned that the presence of nuclear weapons enhanced the destructive potentials of regional conflicts. Afghanistan and the Lao People's Democratic Republic welcomed the Soviet initiatives in the field of nuclear-arms reductions and disarmament. Sri Lanka stated that both the United States and the Soviet Union had given clear indications of a healthy interest in approaching current issues of disarmament and international security in a positive spirit, easing tensions and helping to build confidence. Nigeria urged the super-Powers to expedite their negotiations in the nuclear field. Argentina expressed the hope that a consolidation of current trends would facilitate the task of the third special session.

As at previous sessions, the Disarmament Commission decided that item 4 should be dealt with, within the framework of the Committee of the Whole, by a contact group open to all delegations and under the chairmanship of Mr. J. S. Teja of India. At its first meeting, on 11 May, the Committee of the Whole had a general exchange of views on the item.

The Contact Group held eight meetings between 11 and 22 May. It continued the work on the basis of the compilation of proposals for recommendations on that item as it stood at the end of the 1986 session of the Commission.¹⁰ It made progress towards resolving outstanding issues and arrived at agreed formulations for some recommendations, but was unable to reach a consensus on a complete set of recommendations. The precise state of its deliberations was reflected in the "Compilation of proposals for recommendations on agenda item 4", which was annexed to the report of the Committee of the Whole to the Disarmament Commission.¹¹ Those recommendations which appear in the compilation without brackets or alternatives were generally acceptable, without prejudice to the right of delegations to review them as appropriate. On the remaining ones there was no consensus.

¹⁰ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/41/42), annex I.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*, *Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/42/42)*, para. 40 and annex I.

In its report, the Committee of the Whole recommended that the Disarmament Commission continue its efforts in 1988 with a view to reaching agreement on a complete set of recommendations.

In closing statements in a plenary meeting, several delegations regretted the lack of decisive progress on issues concerning nuclear disarmament during the session. China saw that as a sign of a lack of adequate political will. The Soviet Union stated that progress could have been more significant, but that there were centres of opposition to radically improving international relations and building a nuclear-free, demilitarized, non-violent world. Poland referred to its proposal concerning the European continent, which was aimed at reducing the degree of military confrontation, removing the most destructive armaments and averting the threat of a nuclear conflict. The application of such measures would facilitate a reorientation of military doctrines so as to render them strictly defensive. Belgium, speaking on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community, recognized a desire to make progress, but doubted that it would be possible to agree on concrete recommendations on subjects which were being discussed and negotiated in other forums.

Consideration by the Conference on Disarmament, 1987

In 1987, as in previous years, the Conference on Disarmament had on its agenda an item entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". The item was considered in plenary meetings during the periods from 16 to 27 February and from 15 to 26 June.¹²

Early in the session, as it became evident that no consensus was possible on the establishment of an *ad hoc* committee to deal with the item, consultations proceeded on how to develop an organizational framework which would build on the procedures followed at the 1986 session. On 20 June, the Conference decided to hold informal meetings on the substance of the item and to reflect the discussions at those informal meetings in its report to the General Assembly.¹³ Six informal meetings were held under that arrangement. At the time of the decision, the President of the Conference read out a list of topics for the purpose of facilitating a structured discussion at the informal meetings. He stressed that the list was his own and not binding on any delegation, and noted that it was understood that members wishing to do so might raise any subject relevant to the item. The following topics were listed:

- Interrelation between bilateral and multilateral consideration of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; participation in negotiations for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; role of the Conference on Disarmament;
- Security concepts relating to nuclear weapons;
- Implementation of paragraph 50 of the Final Document;
- Interrelation between measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and disarmament measures in other areas;

¹² CD/787, appendix II, vols. I-IV.

¹³ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/42/27)*, paras. 48-68.

- Verification in relation to the purposes, scope and nature of agreements;
- Existing proposals.¹⁴

On behalf of the Western Group, France stated that, as pointed out by the President, the list of topics was not binding on any delegation and the Western group did not see in the President's statement any precedent whatsoever for positions relating to the activities of the Conference.

In his message to the Conference on 3 February, the Secretary-General of the United Nations noted that the responsibility resting on the Conference in matters of vital importance for the future of mankind could hardly be exaggerated. The goal of curbing the arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race, and moving towards substantial disarmament agreements leading to the final elimination of all nuclear weapons needed to be vigorously pursued.

Among the documents submitted in connection with the item during the 1987 session was a joint statement introduced by Argentina, India, Mexico and Sweden, which had been issued in December 1986 by the heads of State or Government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and the United Republic of Tanzania, urging the Soviet Union and the United States to recommence comprehensive talks as soon as possible to prevent an arms race in space and to terminate it on Earth, and ultimately to eliminate nuclear arms everywhere.¹⁵ Subsequently, they submitted another document calling upon the two Powers to successfully conclude their negotiations on intermediate nuclear forces.¹⁶ The Soviet Union submitted a document containing the response of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev to the joint statement.¹⁷ It also submitted another statement of the General Secretary dealing with the bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States.¹⁸ China submitted a working paper that contained proposals on various substantive aspects of the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and expressed support for the establishment of an *ad hoc* committee to consider the agenda item.¹⁹

During the 1987 session, high-level representatives of the five nuclear-weapon States addressed the Conference on questions relating to the cessation of the arms race and nuclear disarmament.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of France expressed the hope that the objective, agreed upon in the bilateral talks, of reducing strategic arsenals by 50 per cent could be achieved. He also addressed the objective of reducing intermediate-range missiles in Europe and noted that the implementation of the so-called zero option should not lead to a situation of diminished security for the continent. He recalled the conditions under which France could contribute to nuclear disarmament, namely, once the gap between the nuclear arsenals of the two major Powers and that of France had been changed in nature, the imbalance in conventional arms had been corrected and the threat of chemical weapons had been eliminated.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 49.

¹⁵ CD/787, appendix I, vol. II, document CD/739.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, document CD/758.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, document CD/759.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, document CD/742.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, document CD/767.

The Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom noted that success in arms control was linked to the much wider climate of international relations, in particular, between East and West. He stressed his Government's belief that nuclear deterrence had a role to play in preserving peace and that there was thus a need for nuclear weapons, although he considered the current level of such weapons "inflated". He was encouraged by progress in the bilateral talks in Geneva and urged an agreement on intermediate forces, which, however, should not divert attention from the need for greater efforts in the strategic field.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of China welcomed the proposals advanced by the United States and the Soviet Union to carry out a 50 per cent reduction of strategic nuclear weapons as a first step. He stressed that it was also necessary to avert conventional war and reaffirmed the role of the Conference as the only authoritative organ for multilateral disarmament talks.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union called for the total elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles in Europe and stated that agreement on that question was a prerequisite for solving the problem of eliminating strategic offensive arms and preventing the extension of the arms race to outer space. He recalled that his country had submitted a draft treaty at the bilateral negotiations in Geneva on a 50 per cent reduction in strategic arms.

The Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency considered the summit meeting in Reykjavik a historic turning-point in the arms control dialogue between the two Powers. He noted that negotiations were being held on deep reductions in offensive nuclear arms. He also recalled that the President of the United States had first proposed the "zero-zero" option for intermediate-range nuclear forces in 1981 and called for deep strategic arms reductions in 1982.

Belgium and the Netherlands welcomed the agreement in principle between the United States and the Soviet Union and noted the increasing need for arms control in the conventional field. Sweden referred to the problem of naval military buildup and proposed that seaborne nuclear weapons be included in the arms talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. India stated that pending the realization of nuclear disarmament, a convention on the prohibition of use of nuclear weapons should be concluded. It noted that such a prohibition would be only a step, albeit a vital one, towards the ultimate complete elimination of nuclear weapons. India also supported a freeze on the further production of nuclear weapons, together with a complete cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes.

In statements made at plenary and informal meetings, certain trends emerged on a number of issues relating to the agenda item. Those trends reflected well-known positions of the various groups on specific aspects.

Non-aligned and neutral States again put on record the fact that it had not been possible to establish an *ad hoc* committee on the item with an appropriate mandate. They none the less welcomed the efforts to structure the discussions on the basis of the President's list of topics (see above). Those countries also welcomed the continuation of bilateral negotiations between

the Soviet Union and the United States on nuclear and space arms and supported the principles of the Reykjavik understanding. They underlined the role and importance of multilateral negotiations and reaffirmed the provisions of the 1978 Final Document to the effect that nuclear weapons posed the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization.

Socialist countries welcomed the results of the Reykjavik meeting and the bilateral talks in Geneva. They stressed the crucial importance of bilateral negotiations, but pointed out that the total elimination of nuclear weapons could only be achieved through multilateral negotiations with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States. The Conference on Disarmament, owing to its composition, seemed particularly well suited to that purpose. Socialist States regretted that the Conference had not made substantive progress on the item and favoured the creation of an *ad hoc* committee with appropriate terms of reference. They reiterated that the doctrine of nuclear deterrence was a main driving force in the continuing qualitative and quantitative development of nuclear arms.

Western countries emphasized that security was pivotal to all arms limitation and disarmament policy and that disarmament was not an end in itself, but a tool in the service of peace and stability. The aim should be to strengthen security for all. They welcomed the bilateral negotiations in progress and stated that they should play a vital role in any nuclear disarmament process. They believed that the establishment of a subsidiary organ in the Conference was not appropriate in the circumstances and that informal meetings constituted the most suitable framework for consideration of the item.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1987

As in previous years, nuclear-arms limitation and disarmament was a major subject of debate in the General Assembly and, particularly, in the First Committee.²⁰ A pre-eminent issue was the negotiation of the bilateral Treaty on the elimination of Soviet and American intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. That topic—as stated above—is covered in chapter VI, while other aspects of the subject-matter are covered in this chapter.

The Soviet Union stated that the United Nations had been able to identify the most important problem of the times, namely, ridding the world of nuclear means of destruction. It had also indicated the way to its solution and, through its decisions, provided impetus to that end. The Soviet Union recalled its proposals for a comprehensive system of international peace and security in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, which would exclude nuclear intimidation and guarantee the security of all. It regarded nuclear weapons not as an inevitable element in stability, but as a destabilizing factor that undermined not only the security of the side against which they were aimed, but also the security of the side that possessed them. In their military and political conduct, nuclear-weapon States had to recognize that a nuclear

²⁰ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, First Committee*, 3rd to 37th meetings, and *ibid.*, *Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

war could not be won and must never be fought. United Nations involvement in the elimination of nuclear weapons could be facilitated by using the potential of the Security Council. The Soviet Union was also interested in ensuring that a nuclear-free world would not mean a return to the pre-nuclear world. It was not too early to start thinking about how security could be ensured at every stage of the disarmament process. The Soviet Union was convinced that the 1990s could become the decade of building a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world.

Concerning the bilateral negotiations on strategic weapons in Geneva, the Soviet Union believed that the implementation of the position adopted in Reykjavik concerning a 50 per cent cut in the strategic offensive weapons of the Soviet Union and the United States, in the context of strict compliance with the anti-ballistic missile Treaty, was of crucial importance. In that connection, it had submitted some clarification of its position to accommodate the wishes of the United States.

The United States stressed the significance of the developments that had taken place and believed that they lent impetus to efforts to achieve greater international stability and an enduring peace at successively lower levels of armaments, both nuclear and conventional. Following the Reykjavik summit, the United States and the Soviet Union had been involved in painstaking work in the nuclear and space talks in Geneva and in other forums. The most significant event had been the much-welcomed agreement on intermediate-range nuclear missiles (see chapter VI). In the talks dealing with strategic nuclear-arms reductions and defence and space issues, progress had been less remarkable. The first priority of the United States remained deep reductions in strategic offensive arms, and the two sides had agreed to intensify efforts to address the problems standing in the way of 50 per cent reductions in that category of weapons. The United States welcomed the draft treaty that the Soviet Union had submitted in July 1987, and it noted that further progress had subsequently been recorded, but fundamental differences remained on important specific issues, such as sub-limits. The draft treaty on United States and Soviet strategic offensive arms that had been submitted by the United States called for roughly a 50 per cent reduction to equal levels, carried out in a phased manner over seven years from the date of the treaty's entry into force.

The United States also urged that the question of nuclear proliferation not be forgotten. In that connection, it called upon those States that had not yet adhered to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty²¹ to undertake a binding commitment in support of the principles of non-proliferation as reflected in the Treaty or an equally stringent arrangement. It was simply not acceptable to have the very significant progress in reducing existing nuclear weapons offset by the spread of nuclear explosive capability, the United States declared.

France referred to recent criticism of the concept of deterrence. In its view, deterrence was the result of behaviour and mechanisms that had been established and gradually improved upon for 40 years by all the parties con-

²¹ General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex.

cerned in an attempt to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear or conventional conflict and thus to preserve security. In the ultimate analysis, what was absurd was not deterrence as such, but the costly and destabilizing accumulation of strategic weapons by the two major Powers. Rather than theorize on the inadmissibility of deterrence, the interested parties should try to introduce more responsibility, restraint and predictability into the process. Having adopted a minimal stand, France had to maintain the credibility of its strategic forces at the necessary levels.

The United Kingdom believed that its policy of defence and deterrence, which it shared with its allies, had kept the peace in Europe for over 40 years and brought benefit to the entire international community. The next priority in nuclear-arms control was a 50 per cent cut in the strategic arsenals of the super-Powers. That was an immensely significant goal for nations, which must be pursued and achieved without unjustified linkage to other areas.

China stressed that it had all along stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. In its view, the two major nuclear-weapon States, which possessed more than 95 per cent of the world's total nuclear weapons, should take the lead in nuclear disarmament. Only by doing so could conditions be created for the convening of a broadly representative international conference on nuclear disarmament, which China had proposed. As a nuclear-weapon State, China would not evade its responsibility.

Denmark, speaking on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community, stated that for the Twelve all relevant elements of the military balance—nuclear, conventional and chemical forces—were of the utmost importance. Nuclear-arms reduction remained one of the highest priorities and the United States and the Soviet Union had a crucial responsibility for achieving substantial and balanced reductions in the total level of nuclear arsenals. The Twelve hoped that recent progress in the American-Soviet nuclear dialogue would give impetus to the bilateral negotiations on strategic missile and space systems. They attached great importance to the super-Powers' reaching agreement on 50 per cent reductions in their strategic nuclear arsenals, in accordance with their earlier stated objective.

Finland welcomed the possibility of reductions in nuclear armaments, but expressed some words of caution about potential regional trends of a negative or destabilizing nature, as arms limitation agreements might influence different regions in different ways. In that context, it referred specifically to the principal military Powers' increased deployment of air- and sea-launched cruise missiles carrying either conventional or nuclear warheads; the acceleration of military research and development; and a more central role for conventional forces in the overall balance between the two alliances. Ireland stressed that progress in the field of nuclear disarmament would have a major bearing on the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation régime. Sweden stated that nuclear disarmament would not detract from, but increase, the importance of conventional and chemical disarmament. In those fields as well, progress required the constructive and committed participation of the major military Powers and of other Powers as well.

Among non-aligned countries, Egypt stressed that all countries must play an effective part in measures to eliminate nuclear weapons. The current international situation and the fact that the validity of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty would be reviewed in the near future would perhaps provide an impetus for the parties to the Treaty to prove that their practices were in accordance with its spirit. The Treaty had been concluded to prevent the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and as a step towards nuclear disarmament. It was no longer acceptable that, after two decades, the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty should continue to maintain that they had honoured their obligations simply because they had taken part in negotiations on some types of nuclear weapons.

India stressed that attention must not be diverted from the central issue, that is, nuclear disarmament. While the most effective guarantee against nuclear war would be the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, the immediate impact of a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons could not be underestimated. Such a convention would remove not only the threat of nuclear holocaust, but the legitimacy attributed to nuclear weapons as a currency of power. The idea that world peace could be maintained through nuclear deterrence—a doctrine that lay at the root of the continuing escalation in the quantity and quality of nuclear weapons and had in fact led to greater insecurity and instability than ever before in international relations—was a dangerous myth.

Indonesia stated that while there were some reassuring signs, they had not fundamentally changed the stark realities facing the international community. Those who hoped for militarily significant reductions in existing or planned strategic weapons systems or even for a slow-down in the introduction of new and more dangerous technologies had thus little grounds for satisfaction. New technologies looming on the horizon promised more advanced weapons, which would be more versatile and more devastating. Even the significance and durability of past agreements, which merely codified existing military strategies and policies, were increasingly being questioned.

Singapore noted that the two major Powers had agreed to talk and to pursue the goal of a peaceful and stable world. Whatever the outcome of that change in their relations, it would have a profound effect on all nations and on world politics. Yugoslavia stated that the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament rested with those who possessed a monopoly of destructive power. However, if the process of disarmament was to succeed and the goal of general and complete disarmament was to be achieved, it would be necessary for all States to participate actively. Bilateral and multilateral negotiations complemented each other and should therefore evolve side by side.

Venezuela noted that in 1987 the Conference on Disarmament had received from the delegations of the Soviet Union and the United States more abundant information about the progress of their bilateral negotiations. It considered that fact very important, as it constituted recognition of the Conference as the sole multilateral negotiating forum and of the close link that parties to all negotiations should maintain with it. It hoped that the flow of

information would continue on a regular basis within a structured and institutionalized system.

Following the general debate, the First Committee approved five resolutions dealing directly with the question of nuclear arms limitation and disarmament. All five were adopted by the General Assembly on 30 November.²²

On 26 October, China submitted a draft resolution entitled "Nuclear disarmament". By it, the General Assembly would urge the Soviet Union and the United States to take the lead in halting the nuclear-arms race and to negotiate in earnest with a view to reaching early agreement on the drastic reduction of their nuclear arsenals. In introducing the draft on 4 November, China stressed that the main thrust of its proposal was identical to that of resolution 41/59 F of 1986, which it had also initiated. The purpose of the draft was to reaffirm the special responsibility of the two major nuclear Powers and to push forward the whole process of nuclear disarmament.

On 9 November the First Committee approved the draft without a vote. On 30 November the General Assembly adopted it, also without a vote, as resolution 42/38 H. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 41/59 F of 3 December 1986,

Reaffirming the determination to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war as expressed in the Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations,

Convinced that the most acute and urgent task of the present day is to remove the threat of a world war—a nuclear war,

Recalling and reaffirming the statements and provisions on nuclear disarmament set forth in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, and in particular the provisions that "effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority", contained in paragraph 20, and that "In the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility", contained in paragraph 48,

Bearing in mind that the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons,

Noting that the leaders of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America agreed in their joint statement issued at Geneva on 21 November 1985 that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought" and the common desire they expressed in the same statement calling for early progress in areas where there is common ground, including the principle of a 50 per cent reduction in the nuclear arms of the Soviet Union and the United States appropriately applied,

Noting also that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America have conducted intensive negotiations on various issues of disarmament,

Noting further that the Conference on Disarmament has not played its due role in the field of nuclear disarmament,

Bearing in mind that the Governments and peoples of various countries expect that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America will reach agreement on halting the nuclear-arms race and reducing nuclear weapons, so as to start the process of nuclear disarmament,

1. *Welcomes* the agreement in principle between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

²² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Plenary Meetings, 84th meeting.*

and the United States of America to conclude a treaty on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, and calls upon the two States to make further efforts for eliminating, in accordance with the agreement in principle, all their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles at the earliest possible date;

2. *Urges* the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, further to discharge their special responsibility for nuclear disarmament, to take the lead in halting the nuclear-arms race and to negotiate in earnest with a view to reaching early agreement on the drastic reduction of their nuclear arsenals;

3. *Reiterates its belief* that bilateral and multilateral efforts for nuclear disarmament should complement and facilitate each other;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Nuclear disarmament".

On 27 October, Argentina, Bangladesh, Cameroon, the German Democratic Republic, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Romania, Sweden, the United Republic of Tanzania and Venezuela submitted a draft resolution entitled "Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament", which affirmed that the existence of bilateral negotiations on nuclear and space arms in no way diminished the urgent need to initiate multilateral negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, in accordance with the provisions of the 1978 Final Document. In introducing the draft resolution on 3 November Argentina called attention to the fact that in spite of the vital interest of the international community in nuclear-disarmament negotiations, it had not yet been possible to reach agreement in the Conference on the establishment of a subsidiary organ to concretely pursue that goal. The draft once again called on the Conference on Disarmament to establish an *ad hoc* committee when it resumed its work, early in 1988.

On 9 November the First Committee approved the draft by a recorded vote of 110 to 13 (Western countries), with 7 abstentions. In connection with the vote, New Zealand, which abstained, stated that some of the preambular paragraphs were too severely critical of the doctrine of deterrence. New Zealand recognized, however, that there was too much nuclear weaponry in the world and that it should be reduced through mutual, balanced and verifiable agreements, in a way that preserved security at each step of the process.

On 30 November the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 137 to 13, with 7 abstentions, as resolution 42/42 C. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling that, in paragraph 11 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the Assembly stated that the nuclear-arms race, far from contributing to the strengthening of the security of all States, on the contrary weakens it and increases the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war and that existing arsenals of nuclear weapons are more than sufficient to destroy all life on Earth,

Recalling also that, in paragraph 47 of the Final Document, the Assembly expressed the belief that nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization, that it is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons, and that the ultimate goal in this context is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons,

Noting that, in the Political Declaration adopted by the Seventh Conference of Heads of

State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi from 7 to 12 March 1983, it was stated that the renewed escalation in the nuclear-arms race, as well as reliance on doctrines of nuclear deterrence, had heightened the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war and led to greater insecurity and instability in international relations, and that it was also stated that nuclear weapons were more than weapons of war, that such weapons were instruments of mass annihilation,

Noting further that, in the Political Declaration adopted by the Eighth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Harare from 1 to 6 September 1986, it was stated that the idea that world peace could be maintained through nuclear deterrence, a doctrine that lay at the root of the continuing escalation in the quantity and quality of nuclear weapons, was the most dangerous myth in existence,

Believing that all nations have a vital interest in negotiations on nuclear disarmament because the existence of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of a handful of States directly and fundamentally jeopardizes the vital security interests of both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States alike,

Welcoming proposals on the complete elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world,

Considering that it is necessary to halt all testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons of all types and versions and their delivery systems as a first step in the process that should lead to the achievement of substantial reductions in nuclear forces, and welcoming in this context the Joint Declaration issued on 22 May 1984 by the heads of State or Government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and the United Republic of Tanzania, which was reaffirmed in the Delhi Declaration and the Mexico Declaration issued by the leaders of those States on 28 January 1985 and 7 August 1986, respectively,

Noting that in the Conference on Disarmament, at its 1987 session, several proposals were presented for the consideration of practical measures,

Regretting, however, that the Conference on Disarmament was unable to reach agreement on the establishment of an *ad hoc* committee on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament,

Convinced of the imperative need to take constructive action towards halting and reversing the nuclear-arms race,

1. *Reaffirms* that the existence of bilateral negotiations on nuclear and space arms in no way diminishes the urgent need to initiate multilateral negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament;

2. *Believes* that efforts should be intensified with a view to initiating, as a matter of the highest priority, multilateral negotiations in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly;

3. *Again requests* the Conference on Disarmament to establish an *ad hoc* committee at the beginning of its 1988 session to elaborate on paragraph 50 of the Final Document and to submit recommendations to the Conference as to how it could best initiate multilateral negotiations of agreements, with adequate measures of verification, in appropriate stages for:

(a) Cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems;

(b) Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;

(c) Substantial reduction in existing nuclear weapons with a view to their ultimate elimination;

4. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly at its forty-third session on its consideration of this subject;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament".

On 27 October, India and Romania submitted a draft resolution entitled "Freeze on nuclear weapons". By it, the General Assembly would once again call upon all nuclear-weapon States to agree to a freeze on nuclear weapons, which would provide for a simultaneous total stoppage of the production of those weapons and of fissile material for weapons purposes. In introducing

the draft in the First Committee on 4 November, India recalled that since the second special session on disarmament, in 1982, it had placed before the General Assembly every year a draft resolution on a nuclear-weapon freeze—a logical primary step towards halting the nuclear arms-race before reversing it, and a measure central to the objective of preventing nuclear war. The freeze should be agreed to by all the nuclear-weapon Powers, not only those with the largest nuclear arsenals. The two measures envisaged by the draft, if taken, would be practical, verifiable and readily enforceable.

On 9 November the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 113 to 12 (Western and associated countries), with 4 abstentions (Australia, China, Japan and Spain).

In connection with the vote, Japan stated that it had abstained because it had serious reservations on the proposed measures. A nuclear freeze, unless immediately followed by firm arrangements for a balanced reduction in nuclear arms, could lead to the preservation of the real or perceived nuclear superiority of one side over the other. Such an outcome would have negative effects on international security. Japan also believed that a nuclear freeze would be extremely difficult to verify. Similar views were expressed by France, which voted against the draft resolution. A freeze, France stated, would by definition make existing situations permanent. It would also give any State that had significantly increased its weapons a lasting advantage over those countries that had not made such an effort. Furthermore, it would be very difficult to verify a freeze, and the negotiations to establish one would be just as long and complex as those to reduce weapons.

On 30 November the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 139 to 12, with 4 abstentions, as resolution 42/39 B. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 37/100 A of 13 December 1982, 38/73 B of 15 December 1983, 39/63 G of 12 December 1984, 40/151 E of 16 December 1985 and 41/60 E of 3 December 1986 concerning a freeze on nuclear weapons,

Convinced that in this nuclear age lasting world peace can be based only on the attainment of the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Further convinced that the highest priority objectives in the field of disarmament have to be nuclear disarmament and the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction,

Recognizing the urgent need to halt the arms race, particularly in nuclear weapons,

Recognizing further the urgent need for a negotiated reduction of nuclear-weapon stockpiles leading to their complete elimination,

Noting with deep concern that nuclear-weapon States have not so far taken any action in response to the call made in the above-mentioned resolutions,

1. *Once again calls upon* all nuclear-weapon States to agree to a freeze on nuclear weapons, which would, *inter alia*, provide for a simultaneous total stoppage of any further production of nuclear weapons and a complete cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;

2. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Freeze on nuclear weapons"

Another draft resolution on a nuclear-arms freeze was submitted on 27 October by Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru and Sweden. By the resolution,

the General Assembly would urge the Soviet Union and the United States to proclaim, either through simultaneous unilateral declarations or through a joint declaration, an immediate nuclear-arms freeze, which would be a first step towards a comprehensive programme of disarmament. In introducing the draft on 9 November, Mexico stressed that existing arsenals of nuclear weapons were more than sufficient to destroy all life on Earth. A nuclear freeze, while not an end in itself, would constitute the most effective first step to prevent the continued increase and qualitative improvement of nuclear weaponry while negotiations took place. The application of systems of surveillance and verification already agreed upon in connection with other disarmament measures would provide a reasonable guarantee of faithful compliance with the freeze.

On 9 November the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 114 to 13 (Western and associated countries), with 2 abstentions (China and Spain).

In connection with the vote, France and Japan, which both voted against the draft, expressed the same reservations they had with regard to the draft introduced by India. On 30 November the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 140 to 13, with 2 abstentions, as resolution 42/39 H. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling that in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, adopted in 1978 and unanimously and categorically reaffirmed in 1982 during the twelfth special session of the General Assembly, the second special session devoted to disarmament, the Assembly expressed deep concern over the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race,

Recalling also that, on those occasions, it pointed out that existing arsenals of nuclear weapons are more than sufficient to destroy all life on Earth and stressed that mankind is therefore confronted with a choice: halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament, or face annihilation,

Convinced of the urgency further to pursue negotiations for the substantial reduction and qualitative limitation of existing nuclear arms,

Considering that a nuclear-arms freeze, while not an end in itself, would constitute the most effective first step to prevent the continued increase and qualitative improvement of existing nuclear weaponry during the period when the negotiations take place, and that at the same time it would provide a favourable environment for the conduct of negotiations to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons,

Firmly convinced that at present the conditions are most propitious for such a freeze, since the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America are now equivalent in nuclear military power and it seems evident that there exists between them an overall rough parity,

Conscious that the application of the systems of surveillance, verification and control already agreed upon in some previous cases would be sufficient to provide a reasonable guarantee of faithful compliance with the undertakings derived from the freeze,

Convinced that it would be to the benefit of all other States possessing nuclear weapons to follow the example of the two major nuclear-weapon States,

1. *Urges once more* the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, as the two major nuclear-weapon States, to proclaim, either through simultaneous unilateral declarations or through a joint declaration, an immediate nuclear-arms freeze, which would be a first step towards a comprehensive programme of disarmament and whose structure and scope would be the following:

(a) It would embrace:

- (i) A comprehensive test ban of nuclear weapons and of their delivery vehicles;
- (ii) The complete cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and of their delivery vehicles;
- (iii) A ban on all further deployment of nuclear weapons and of their delivery vehicles;
- (iv) The complete cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;

(b) It would be subject to appropriate measures and procedures of verification, such as those that have already been agreed by the parties in the case of the SALT I and SALT II treaties, those agreed upon in principle by them during the preparatory trilateral negotiations on the comprehensive test ban held at Geneva and those contemplated in the document on verification measures issued at the Mexico Summit on 7 August 1986 and drawing upon the results of the work of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, in the Conference on Disarmament;

(c) It would be of an initial five-year duration, subject to prolongation when other nuclear-weapon States join in such a freeze, as the General Assembly urges them to do;

2. *Requests* the above-mentioned two major nuclear-weapon States to submit a joint report or two separate reports to the General Assembly, prior to the opening of its forty-third session, on the implementation of the present resolution;

3. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session an item entitled "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 42/39 H on a nuclear-arms freeze"

Finally, on 27 October, Australia, Austria, the Bahamas, Bangladesh, Botswana, Cameroon, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Romania, Samoa, Sweden and Uruguay submitted a draft resolution entitled "Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes". By the draft, the General Assembly would request the Conference on Disarmament, at an appropriate stage, to pursue its consideration of the question of an adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and to keep the Assembly informed of the progress of that consideration. In its introduction on 4 November, Canada stated that the draft was a reminder that the ban on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes remained a key element in any progress toward nuclear disarmament. It also pointed to an effective way of prohibiting nuclear weapons proliferation, both horizontal and vertical.

On 9 November the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote by 125 to 1 (France), with 6 abstentions (Argentina, Brazil, China, India, United Kingdom and United States). On 30 November the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 149 to 1, with 6 abstentions, as resolution 42/38 L. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 33/91 H of 16 December 1978, 34/87 D of 11 December 1979, 35/156 H of 12 December 1980, 36/97 G of 9 December 1981, 37/99 E of 13 December 1982, 38/188 E of 20 December 1983, 39/151 H of 17 December 1984, 40/94 G of 12 December 1985 and 41/59 L of 3 December 1986, in which it requested the Conference on Disarmament, at an appropriate stage of the implementation of the Programme of Action set forth in section III of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and of its work on the item entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects", to consider urgently the question of adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear

weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and to keep the Assembly informed of the progress of that consideration,

Noting that the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament for 1987 included the item entitled “Nuclear weapons in all aspects” and that the programme of work of the Conference for both parts of its 1987 session contained the item entitled “Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament”,

Recalling the proposals and statements made in the Conference on Disarmament on those items,

Considering that the cessation of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and the progressive conversion and transfer of stocks to peaceful uses would be a significant step towards halting and reversing the nuclear-arms race,

Considering also that the prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices would be an important measure in facilitating the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and explosive devices,

Requests the Conference on Disarmament, at an appropriate stage of its work on the item entitled “Nuclear weapons in all aspects”, to pursue its consideration of the question of adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and to keep the General Assembly informed of the progress of that consideration.

Resolution 42/42 M, which is entitled “Implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session” and is dealt with in chapter II, repeatedly addresses itself to the nuclear-weapon States and, in particular, the two major nuclear-weapon Powers.

Conclusion

In 1987, the major achievement in the field of nuclear-arms limitation and disarmament was the conclusion of the Treaty between the United States and the USSR on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (see chapter VI).

Within the multilateral framework, no major substantive progress was achieved. Once again, in the Conference on Disarmament, there was no agreement to set up an *ad hoc* committee for the item on nuclear disarmament, although several members welcomed efforts to structure discussion on it.

In the General Assembly, the question of nuclear disarmament received, as usual, major attention. A number of resolutions were adopted on the subject and one of them, initiated by China, was adopted by consensus, as the corresponding text had been in 1986. The others were adopted by very large majorities, but without consensus. Yet, at a time when the first treaty on the destruction of an entire class of nuclear weapons was signed by the two major Powers, those resolutions acquired new significance.

Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles

Introduction

SINCE THE 1950S, EUROPE HAS BEEN THE ARENA for a most powerful concentration of armed forces and armaments, nuclear as well as conventional, from both East and West. In many respects, the region still remains the centre of the military confrontation between the two major military Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

During the past three decades, a number of arms limitation agreements, either bilateral or multilateral, have been concluded. None, however, until 1987, had directly focused on the deployment of armaments in Europe.¹ In fact, it took many years for the two sides to bring into discussion the basic elements of the military situation in Europe. Only after the conclusion of the 1972 Soviet-American accords on strategic nuclear forces (SALT I) did some movement begin to take place. In October 1973, negotiations began in Vienna on mutual reductions of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe. The negotiations, which have not been concluded, have focused on the conventional armed forces of the two alliances. On 1 August 1975, the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe was signed in Helsinki. It included a document on confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament, in which the participating States recognized their common interest in lessening military confrontation and promoting disarmament with a view to increasing stability and security in Europe and strengthening peace throughout the world.

In 1978, there was some discussion in the multilateral negotiating body in Geneva, then called the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, on the "grey-area systems", i.e., systems of regional nuclear forces (variously referred to as "theatre nuclear weapons", "medium-range" or "intermediate-range" nuclear weapons) that, because of their range, did not fall into the category of strategic weapons and as such were not covered by the SALT

¹ For details, see *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 2nd edition: 1982 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.IX.5); and United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements*, 1982 edition (United States Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1982).

accords. In that connection, Sweden called for "the gradual and, if necessary, selective inclusion" of those nuclear systems into the framework of existing arms control negotiations.²

In a United Nations expert study, completed in 1980, the "grey-area systems" were described as follows:

In addition to these central strategic forces, both super-Powers have many weapon systems with somewhat shorter ranges. These systems (and similar weapons belonging to other nuclear-weapon States) are sometimes referred to as "grey area" weapons or, in a European context, as "Eurostrategic" weapons. If the word "strategic" is used in its ordinary military sense, then indeed most nuclear weapons can be used for strategic purposes. If "grey area" weapons are sometimes thought of as a special category, it is mainly because they could reach not only targets in countries other than those of the super-Powers but also, by forward deployment, targets on the territories of the super-Powers themselves.³

The study further pointed out that while there was no clear borderline between the "grey-area" weapons and other systems of nuclear weapons, for instance, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, it was common practice to single out medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles and medium-range bomber aircraft as particularly important for non-central strategic employment.

By the end of the 1970s there were many nuclear weapons deployed in Europe and targeted on Europe. They formed a heterogeneous array of mainly aircraft and missile systems (sometimes called Euromissiles), which, on the basis of their range and nuclear capability, fell into the category of Eurostrategic weapons.⁴ The question of modernizing some of those weapons was then either being considered or under way, with the ground-launched missile component given prominence.

At a NATO meeting in Brussels on 12 December 1979, the member States voiced their concern that the Warsaw Treaty Organization had, over the years, developed a large and growing capability in long-range theatre nuclear forces (LRTNF) that directly threatened Western Europe. In their

² CCD/PV.793.

³ *Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.81.I.11), chap. II, para. 40.

⁴ In its 1980 *Yearbook*, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) provided the following data on major Eurostrategic weapons.

State	Weapon designation	Year first deployed	Max. range (km)	No. of RVs	Yield	CEP (m)	No. deployed in 1979
<i>Missiles</i>							
USSR	SS-4	1959	2 000	1	1 Mt	2 400	390
	SS-5	1961	3 700	1	1 Mt	1 250	80
	SS-12	1969	c. 800	1	1 Mt	..	72
	SS-20	1977	c. 4 000	3	150 kt	400	c. 120 ^b
	SS-N-5	1964 ^a	c. 1 200	1	1-2 Mt	..	18
USA	Pershing IA	1962	c. 750	1	60-400 kt	450	108 ^c
	Pershing IA	1962	c. 750	1	60-400 kt	450	72 ^d
	Pershing II	(1983)	c. 1 600	1	10-20 kt	45	0
	GLCM	(1983)	2 500	1	200 kt	90	0
UK	Polaris A-3	1967	4 600	1	3x200 kt	800	64
France	S-2	1971	3 000	1	150 kt	..	18
	M-20	1977	5 000	1	1 Mt	..	64

[footnote continues on page 122

view, that was evidenced, in particular, by the deployment of the SS-20, a solid-fuelled missile, which offered significant improvements over previous systems in providing greater accuracy, more mobility and longer range, as well as in having multiple warheads. At the same time, they maintained, the Soviet Union had also undertaken a modernization and expansion of its shorter-range theatre nuclear forces. Western capabilities, on the other hand, had remained static. Accordingly, NATO's member States had decided to modernize the alliance's LRTNF by the deployment in Europe of United States ground-launched systems comprising 108 Pershing II launchers, which would replace existing Pershing IA, and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs), all with single warheads, for a total of 572 warheads. At the same time, NATO members fully supported the opening of American-Soviet negotiations on LRTNF limitations as soon as possible, so as to avert an arms race in Europe. Those two parallel and complementary approaches were later often referred to as the "double-track decision". The actual deployment in Western Europe of the new United States intermediate-range nuclear weapons would start only in 1983, as they had not yet been developed.

The Soviet Union described the SS-20, which had first been deployed in 1977, as a modernization of the SS-4 and SS-5 (liquid-fuelled missiles first deployed in 1959 and 1961, respectively). It maintained that the SS-20s were intended to replace the SS-4s and SS-5s, which had been deployed to balance United States nuclear forward-based systems; that one or two of the older missiles were removed for each SS-20 being deployed; that the new missiles carried less explosive power than the old ones; and that a rough parity existed between the two sides.

Soviet-American negotiations, 1981-1987

The bilateral talks between the United States and the Soviet Union started in Geneva on 30 November 1981. The object of the negotiations was called

State	Weapon designation	Year first deployed	Range ^a (km)	Weapon load (t)	Nuclear weapons per aircraft	Speed (Mach)	No. deployed in 1979
<i>Aircraft</i>							
USSR	Tu-16 Badger	1955	6 500	9.1	2	0.8	318
	Tu-22M	1974	9 000	8.0	4	2.5	50
	Backfire						
USA	FB-111A	1969	10 000	17.0	6	2.5	66
	F-111E/F	1967	4 900	12.7	2	2.2/2.5	156
UK	Vulcan B2	1960	6 500	9.6	2	0.95	48
France	Mirage IVA	1964	3 000	7.3	1	2.2	33

Source: SIPRI, ed., *World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1980* (London, Taylor and Francis, 1980), p. 179.

^a On board Golf-2 submarines in the Baltic.

^b The figure is for launchers. Probably only 80 of these are targeted on Western Europe.

^c Deployed in Western Europe.

^d Deployed in the Federal Republic of Germany under joint US-FRG command.

^e The maximum combat radius, which allows a mission to be fulfilled and the return of the aircraft, is less than half this maximum range.

RV = Re-entry vehicle. = Number unknown. CEP = Circular error probable.

“intermediate-range nuclear forces” (INF) by the United States and its allies (the term “long-range theatre nuclear forces” having been dropped in favour of INF), while the Soviet Union and its allies described them as “medium-range nuclear arms” or simply “nuclear arms” in Europe.

The United States position was from the very beginning known as the “zero option”, meaning that the United States would forgo the modernization of its land-based nuclear systems in Europe, if the Soviet Union were to dismantle all its SS-20, SS-5 and SS-4 missiles. That offer, first made by the President of the United States on 18 November 1981, on the eve of the talks, embodied in a clear way the decision taken by NATO in December 1979. The offer focused on land-based Euromissiles. It did not cover nuclear-capable aircraft from either East or West, nor any sea-based nuclear weapons.

By resolution 36/97 I of 1981, the General Assembly unanimously welcomed the commencement of negotiations in Geneva between the United States and the Soviet Union and trusted that such negotiations would facilitate the enhancement of stability and international security. It also stressed the need for both parties to bear constantly in mind that not only their national interests, but also the vital interests of all the peoples of the world were at stake.

No official account of the negotiations (1981-1983 and 1985-1987) exists. The two sides have, however, provided sufficient information to outline the main developments.

In February 1982, the United States tabled a draft treaty embodying its zero-option proposal, and the Soviet Union followed up with concrete proposals in May of that year. The Soviet Union called for reductions in existing medium-range weapons, both missiles and planes, to 300 units for each side, to be carried out over a five-year period. French and British weapons (including aircraft) would count in the NATO totals. The SS-20 would be retained within the established limit. No new weapons would be permitted, including the Pershing II and the cruise missiles. In December 1982, the Soviet Union was reported to have modified one basic element of its formula by proposing that a specific sublimit (equal to the number of British and French missiles) be put on the number of SS-20s targeted on Europe. In 1983, the Soviet Union further agreed that warheads on deployed missiles could be the unit of account. It proposed reducing the number of SS-20s to 140 and suggested that weapons removed from Europe would not simply be transferred to Asia.

The United States, while never renouncing the zero option, made some interim offers in 1983. They were based on the principle of equality in global allowances between the two major Powers and left the Western strike aircraft untouched, along with the British and French missiles. The last of its proposals that year envisaged a global figure of 420 warheads for each side. As each SS-20 has three warheads, that would have meant 140 SS-20s for the Soviet Union, including its deployment of SS-20s in Asia.

Shortly afterwards, when the deployment of the Pershing II missiles began in Europe in November 1983, the Soviet Union declared that it considered its further participation in the negotiations impossible. It also stated that the deployment had changed the general strategic situation, which made

it necessary for the Soviet Union to reconsider all questions related to the parallel talks on strategic arms, which had been going on in Geneva since 29 June 1982.

In 1983 the First Committee had a wide-ranging debate on nuclear-arms limitation and disarmament. It covered practically every aspect of the question, in particular, bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States on strategic arms reductions and intermediate-range nuclear forces. Having heard each side explain its stance on the two sets of negotiations, the Assembly adopted three resolutions, none of them by consensus.

While bilateral negotiation was at a standstill, the deployment of nuclear forces intensified in both Western Europe (Federal Republic of Germany, United Kingdom and Italy) and the Soviet Union. An additional new aspect of the situation was the forward-deployment of new Soviet shorter-range intermediate-range missiles in the German Democratic Republic (SS-12 and SS-23) and Czechoslovakia (SS-12) in response to the deployment of Pershing II missiles in the Federal Republic of Germany.

On 22 November 1984, the two major Powers announced that they had agreed to enter into new negotiations under arrangements to be spelt out early in 1985. Those arrangements became known on 8 January 1985, when the two Governments announced their intention to conduct negotiations on “a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms—both strategic and intermediate-range—with all these questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship”.⁵ The actual negotiations began on 12 March of that year. The anticipation of a summit meeting between the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States, which took place eight months later, in November, further contributed to the improvement of the atmosphere.

The talks on intermediate-range nuclear forces thus became a part of the new “umbrella” negotiations. The United States opening position was based on that of November 1983. While intermediate-range missiles should ultimately be eliminated globally, the United States was ready to consider interim steps, such as a balance of equal levels of warheads in a global context.

The Soviet Union proposed a bilateral freeze in Europe, with no restraints in Asia. Subsequently, on 7 April 1985, it announced a moratorium on the deployment of SS-20s until November. The Soviet side further stated on 3 June that no new SS-20s had been deployed in the European part of the Soviet Union since 1 June 1984. It also made clear that it was not seeking to have more than France and the United Kingdom combined, either in missiles or warheads; that it was prepared to eliminate the missiles subject to reduction without redeploying them anywhere; and that it would stop any deployment in Asia if there was no substantial change there. On 3 October the Soviet Union proposed a separate agreement on intermediate-range weapons, i.e., without a direct connection with the problem of space and strategic arms.

⁵ The USSR-United States statement of 8 January 1985 is reproduced in the United Nations publication *Disarmament*, vol. VIII, No. 1 (Sales No. E.85.IX.3).

Shortly before the summit meeting between President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in Geneva from 19 to 21 November 1985, the United States made a comprehensive counter-proposal, under which each side would be limited to 140 intermediate-range launchers, that being the number of United States launchers in place at that time. The United States would keep a mix of GLCMs (each GLCM launcher having four missiles) and Pershing IIs in Europe, while the Soviet Union would keep the same number of SS-20 launchers in Europe. SS-20s in Asia would be reduced proportionately. The United States would reserve the right to match the deployment in Asia, but would not do so.

The Soviet Union offered an interim freeze, beginning 1 December 1985, on American and Soviet forces. Over the next 18 months, the United States would reduce its GLCMs to 100-120, while all Pershing IIs would be removed. The Soviet Union would at the same time reduce its SS-20s, so that it would have the same number of warheads as France, the United Kingdom and the United States combined.

In the Soviet-American statement at the conclusion of the Geneva summit meeting, the two sides agreed to accelerate negotiations on nuclear and space arms and to pursue the idea of an interim agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces.⁶

On 15 January 1986, Mr. Gorbachev made a statement envisaging a programme for the step-by-step elimination of nuclear weapons, to be undertaken and completed before the end of the century.⁷ He suggested that in stage one of that process (to be completed within five to eight years), the complete elimination of the medium-range missiles of the Soviet Union and the United States in Europe, both ballistic and cruise missiles, should take place as a first step towards ridding Europe of nuclear weapons. At the same time, the United States should undertake not to transfer its strategic and medium-range missiles to other countries, while the United Kingdom and France should pledge not to build up their respective nuclear arsenals. For the first time, the Soviet Union did not claim a right to retain a force of SS-20s to match the British and French nuclear forces.

On 24 February 1986, the United States responded by calling for the elimination of all intermediate-range nuclear weapons (including SS-20s in Asia) within three years. That could be achieved, the United States proposed, either by straight reductions down to zero or by staged reductions. In the latter case, the United States offered options concerning possible areas of compromise.

Throughout 1986 the bilateral talks made significant progress. Proposals were made by the United States about shorter-range missiles in Europe and about the question of verification. On 19 September the Soviet Union stated explicitly that the French and British nuclear systems need not be included in an agreement. At the summit meeting in Reykjavik on 11 and 12 October, there was agreement in principle to keep no land-based intermediate-range

⁶ A/40/1070, annex.

⁷ A/41/97. For a brief summary of the proposal, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 11: 1986, chapter VI.

nuclear missiles in Europe. The Soviet Union would keep 100 missiles in Asia and the United States would keep the same number on its own territory. The Soviet Union indicated its willingness to negotiate on shorter-range missiles. Shortly after the summit, the United States and the Soviet Union tabled their respective new positions in Geneva. At that point, the main element of uncertainty was the question whether the Soviet Union would continue to insist, as it had done at Reykjavik, that an intermediate-range forces deal must be part of a larger disarmament package.

On 28 February 1987, General Secretary Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union was prepared to solve the question of the intermediate-range nuclear forces separately from the strategic nuclear forces and the related outer space question. He proposed separate negotiations on shorter-range nuclear forces and indicated that the Soviet Union was prepared to withdraw its shorter-range missiles from the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia. Subsequently, he suggested that tactical nuclear weapons be negotiated together with conventional weapons.

On 4 March 1987 the United States announced that it was putting a full text of a draft treaty, including almost all verification issues, on the negotiating table. It indicated that it was its intention to deal with shorter-range missiles in the treaty and not separately and that the text did not cover tactical nuclear weapons, i.e., weapons with ranges less than 500 kilometres. On 12 March the United States tabled a verification annex to its draft treaty.

On 27 April the Soviet Union submitted its own draft treaty. It proposed the elimination of Soviet and United States medium-range missiles in Europe and other measures to limit and reduce Soviet and United States medium-range missiles elsewhere. By the treaty, warheads of medium-range missiles in Europe would be reduced to zero, while 100 would be permitted on United States territory and 100 would be permitted in Soviet Asia. The Soviet Union would remove the shorter-range missiles in the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia upon the signing of the agreement.

On 12 June the foreign ministers of the NATO countries, meeting in Reykjavik, expressed their wish to see all land-based intermediate-range missiles eliminated. They also supported the global and effectively verifiable elimination of all United States and Soviet land-based shorter-range missiles (having ranges 500-1,000 kilometres) as an integral part of an agreement.

On 21 July, General Secretary Gorbachev stated that in an effort to accommodate the Asian countries and take into account their concerns, the Soviet Union was prepared to agree to eliminate all of its medium-range missiles in the Asian part of the Soviet Union. Shorter-range missiles would also be eliminated. In connection with this announcement, the United States expressed the view that the proposal simplified the problem of verification significantly.

Thus, the negotiations now covered intermediate-range nuclear forces (1,000-5,500 kilometres) as well as shorter-range nuclear forces (500-1,000 kilometres). Nuclear weapons with a range of more than 5,500 kilometres were considered to be strategic, while those with a range of less than 500 kilometres belonged to the category of tactical nuclear weapons.

On 26 August, Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany made an announcement concerning the future disposition of the Pershing IA missiles under joint United States-Federal Republic of Germany command.⁸ On that subject, the United States issued a so-called White House statement on the same day. It read, in part, as follows:

We strongly support this reaffirmation that the German Pershing IAs have not been and will not be a matter for discussion in US-Soviet negotiations, which are bilateral. . . . We, therefore, understand and support the statement of future disposition of the Pershing IAs which was made today by the Chancellor. As we understand it, the conditions for not modernizing and eventually dismantling the Pershing IAs include the following key elements:

- US-Soviet agreement on global elimination of US and Soviet INF missiles;
- Resolution of outstanding INF verification issues in a satisfactory way for all concerned;
- Ratification and entry into force of the US-Soviet INF agreement; and
- Actual elimination of these US and Soviet INF missiles in accordance with the agreed US-Soviet timetable.⁹

On 18 September in Washington, the Soviet Union and the United States announced in a joint statement "agreement in principle to conclude a Treaty". Secretary of State George Shultz and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze agreed that an additional meeting would be necessary to review the results of the work of the two negotiating teams in Geneva in all the areas of the treaty. The meeting was held in Moscow on 22 and 23 October. Intensive work was done on the remaining technical issues and by the beginning of December the treaty was ready for signature.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1987

The question of a treaty on intermediate-range and shorter-range nuclear forces received extensive consideration at the forty-second session of the General Assembly, in both plenary meetings and the First Committee.¹⁰

The President of the General Assembly, Mr. Peter Florin of the German Democratic Republic, welcomed the agreement reached in principle between the Soviet Union and the United States to conclude a treaty on the global elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range nuclear weapons as opening the way towards nuclear disarmament. He shared the view that progress in the bilateral negotiations would have a substantial influence on progress in multilateral negotiations, such as those on chemical weapons, conventional disarmament and regional disarmament measures.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations stressed the political significance of the Soviet-American treaty under negotiation. He was confident that after the treaty was signed, additional disarmament measures would be achieved in other important fields. He was particularly gratified by the decision of the two major Powers to resume talks at an early date on full-scale, stage-

⁸ See footnote 4.

⁹ United States, *Department of State Bulletin*, October 1987, p. 49.

¹⁰ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Plenary Meetings*, 4th to 33rd and 46th and 84th meetings, and *ibid.*, *First Committee*, 3rd to 31st, 33rd and 39th meetings, and *ibid.*, *Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

by-stage negotiations on the cessation of nuclear testing and to continue to pursue the goal of a treaty on 50-per cent reductions in strategic offensive weapons.

At the first substantive meeting of the First Committee, its Chairman appealed to the members of the international community to take advantage of the existing opportunity to open up new paths that could lead to better prospects for peace. At the time when both super-Powers were about to make decisive progress in slowing down the arms race, he stated, the other nations of the world should not merely stand on the sidelines. On the contrary, they should abandon the old polemics and terrible confrontations of the past and adopt constructive and concrete measures with a view to strengthening their common security. The positive events that the world was witnessing should be reflected, in particular, in the Conference on Disarmament, which should be enabled to work more effectively towards a fuller realization of its objectives.

Speaking early in the session in the First Committee, the United States reviewed the events of 1987. It stressed that the most significant event had been the bilateral agreement in principle to conclude a treaty that would eliminate an entire class of weapons from its arsenals and those of the Soviet Union. The United States delegation in Geneva was committed to working intensively to resolve the remaining technical issues, including details of a comprehensive and effective verification régime, a very important area for the United States. There were two primary objectives for the forthcoming summit: the two leaders would sign the treaty and consider how to move ahead on the rest of their agenda. It had been agreed that the full range of issues between the two countries would be discussed, but the summit would focus on ways to achieve a treaty on 50-per cent reductions in strategic offensive forces, to be signed at a summit meeting in Moscow in the first half of 1988. That was the most important priority, and the current task was to find a way to move forward.

Also speaking in the First Committee before the signing of the treaty, the Soviet Union stressed that for the first time in the history of the nuclear age, the major nuclear Powers had succeeded in reaching agreement on the elimination of two classes of their nuclear arms, namely, medium-range and shorter-range missiles. The meeting at Reykjavik in 1986 had set the Soviet-American talks on the right track and demonstrated the practicability of nuclear disarmament. The Soviet Union hoped that the conclusion of the treaty would give a powerful impetus to the search for solutions covering the whole range of military and political problems and create favourable conditions for the development of new concepts of security no longer connected with the buildup of military power. The Soviet side viewed the agreement on medium-range and shorter-range missiles, which in itself would have historical significance in terms of genuine nuclear disarmament, as a prologue to be followed by further actions leading to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons everywhere by the end of the century. The process of implementing the treaty would provide a wealth of experience and would help build up trust in all areas of international relations.

China noted that as the question of intermediate-range nuclear forces directly involved the security of the European and Asian countries, it had all along attracted their attention and aroused their concern. In one way or another, the Asian countries had put forward their own proposals and reasonable demands, which, to a certain degree, had served as an impetus for the talks between the super-Powers. That fact showed that on the question of nuclear disarmament, which had a bearing on world peace and security, the small and medium-sized countries not only were entitled to have a say, but could also play a positive role. China noted, however, that the intermediate-range nuclear forces accounted for only a small portion of the huge arsenals of the two major Powers. For that reason, it hoped that they would not stop at the treaty, but would accelerate the pace of their arms reductions.

France emphasized that the treaty would correct a mistake of the 1970s, the deployment of SS-20s by the Soviet Union. Ten years had been required to correct it—a period involving considerable political activity, difficult negotiations, tension and even crisis, and the expenditure of vast amounts of money. The United Kingdom welcomed the agreement, which, in its view, was taking shape thanks to the firmness of the Western countries. Assuming that adequate verification arrangements were worked out, the United Kingdom stated, the agreement would help increase trust between East and West and extend confidence to other areas of arms control.

Denmark, speaking on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community, stated that the Twelve found the agreement very encouraging and hoped that the recent progress in the American-Soviet dialogue would give new impetus to the bilateral negotiations, to which the Twelve attached great importance. The Federal Republic of Germany stated that the double-zero option which was emerging was a major contribution to greater stability in Europe. Through the statement on the Pershing IA systems made by Chancellor Helmut Kohl on 26 August 1987, the Federal Republic had smoothed the way for an agreement which would implement that option. It believed that the agreement in principle had set in motion a process which must be made irreversible. That meant, the Federal Republic stressed, that further steps in other areas must follow. Arms control must cover the entire military balance of power, so that potentially destabilizing disparities and excessive potentials could be eliminated wherever they existed.

Italy stated that ever since the meeting at Reykjavik, it had sought every appropriate occasion to encourage the search for effective solutions that could favour a drastic reduction of nuclear arsenals, in particular, strategic arsenals. Japan stressed that the global elimination of intermediate-range nuclear missiles would provide the international community with the momentum to tackle the important tasks that still remained, including deep reductions in strategic nuclear weapons.

All the Eastern European States underscored the importance of the Soviet-American agreement in principle. In particular, Czechoslovakia viewed the accord as a first historic step towards nuclear disarmament and a tangible proof of its feasibility. Czechoslovakia had done its best to facilitate the adoption of positive measures towards real disarmament and was ready to

continue its efforts in the expectation that other countries concerned would proceed in the same spirit. The German Democratic Republic stated that it would continue to contribute its share to bringing about without delay a double-zero solution and reaffirmed its readiness to guarantee the required verification procedures on its territory in connection with the implementation of the future accord.

Ireland stressed that whatever degree of stability existed at the moment could not be maintained indefinitely against the background of an ever-intensifying arms race. It therefore hoped that the future treaty would not be an isolated event, but reflect a greater willingness to reduce dependence on nuclear arms and to seek security through a lessening of military confrontation. Sweden emphasized that the immediate bilateral disarmament agenda should include major reductions in strategic nuclear arsenals, purposeful negotiations on reductions in the remaining categories of nuclear weapons, irrespective of their mode of deployment, and decisive steps towards a comprehensive nuclear-test ban and the prevention of an arms race in space. The other nuclear Powers must also join the process. It was indeed a process from which no State could be excluded, as the security and even the survival of all was at stake.

India saw the agreement in principle as an encouraging sign and a step in the right direction. It would indeed be an accomplishment if it were to open the way to further, larger reductions in nuclear weaponry. Indonesia held that the future accord would have profound implications not only for Europe, but also for Asia and beyond, contributing a measure of stability and security.

Nigeria welcomed the growing spirit of understanding and mutual respect that had begun to prevail between the super-Powers. While granting the usefulness and necessity of bilateral negotiations, it emphasized that they were no substitute for multilateral negotiations. What must be avoided was the denial of a universal input in the search for solutions to issues of global concern. Such input would help ensure the universality of disarmament agreements and thus create confidence for adherence. Pakistan viewed the future treaty as significant, but could not ignore the fact that only a small proportion of the nuclear weapons possessed by the two major Powers would be eliminated. Yugoslavia stated that if the agreement was to become a turning-point, the super-Powers would have to speed up their negotiations in order to eliminate other nuclear arms within the shortest possible period.

Mexico brought to the attention of the First Committee the joint statement of 7 October by the heads of State or Government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and the United Republic of Tanzania, which read as follows:

The Six Nation Initiative for Peace and Disarmament warmly welcomes the agreement in principle of 18 September 1987 between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on the global elimination of all land-based intermediate nuclear missiles. This is a historic first step in the direction of our common goal, namely, total nuclear disarmament. We sincerely congratulate President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev for the efforts they have made in order to bridge the gap separating their views.

In our last joint statement of 22 May 1987 (A/42/319, annex), issued on the third anniversary of our Initiative, we stressed that "an agreement to eliminate all intermediate nuclear forces from Europe would be of considerable significance" since it would constitute the crossing of an important psychological threshold within the framework of the nuclear disarmament dialogue. The significance of the agreement between the two super-Powers goes beyond its objective, since historically, it will be the first agreement on the world-wide elimination of a whole category of nuclear weapons, thus reversing the trend prevailing so far in the nuclear-arms race.

The expectations of the world are now focused on the next Summit Meeting between the Leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union. Expressing the aspirations of all peoples of the world, we believe that it would provide an ideal opportunity for the realization of the next important steps towards nuclear disarmament. Specifically, it is urgent to conclude agreements on the reduction of strategic arms, the complete halting of nuclear testing and on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The recent agreement proves that, given political will, all obstacles can be removed.

We have consistently campaigned for the achievement of total nuclear disarmament. We are determined to continue our efforts and to press by all possible means for a safer world, free from nuclear arms.¹¹

In connection with the question of bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations, the First Committee considered one draft decision and three draft resolutions, one of which was withdrawn.

Action started with Romania's submission of a draft resolution entitled "Nuclear disarmament" on 13 October. By it, the General Assembly would appeal to the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States to spare no effort to conclude their treaty at the earliest possible date in 1987, and call upon all European States, as well as all interested States, to do their utmost to assist the process of negotiation and its successful conclusion. The Assembly would further call upon all States to undertake concrete measures to halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament, first of all nuclear disarmament, as well as to contribute to the policy of détente and international co-operation. In introducing the draft that same day, Romania stressed that the international community should express its keen interest in the success of the ongoing Soviet-American negotiations and demonstrate a genuine will to co-operate and to intensify efforts for the general cause of world peace and security.

The Chairman of the First Committee announced that because of the importance and urgency of the subject addressed in the draft, action would be taken on it without delay. However, it turned out that extensive consultations were needed. As a result, a week later, on 20 October, agreement was reached on a draft decision proposed by the Chairman himself. The second draft appealed to the super-Powers to continue and to conclude their negotiations in accordance with the agreement in principle reached by them. Romania expressed its satisfaction at the consensus achieved and withdrew its draft.¹²

Also on 20 October, the First Committee approved without a vote the draft decision proposed by the Chairman. In that connection, Venezuela stated that, without standing in the way of a consensus, it would not participate in the consensus because it had technical and other difficulties with the draft decision. The Federal Republic of Germany stated that it interpreted the words

¹¹ A/42/652-S/19201.

¹² See A/42/669, paras. 6 and 7.

“intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles” to mean missiles with a range of between 500 and 5,500 kilometres.

On 21 October the draft decision was adopted by the General Assembly, also without a vote, as decision 42/407. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly, on the recommendation of the First Committee, having noted the joint statement released by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the end of the meeting between the Secretary of State and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, held at Washington, from 15 to 17 September 1987, urged the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of the United States of America to spare no effort in concluding, in accordance with the agreement in principle reached at that meeting, at the earliest possible date, a treaty on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles to be signed at a summit meeting to be held in the fall of 1987 between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, as it was agreed, and to make a similarly intensive effort to achieve a treaty on 50 per cent reductions in their strategic offensive arms within the framework of the Geneva Nuclear and Space Talks.

In addition, two draft resolutions were submitted, one by a group of Western countries and the other by a group of non-aligned countries. Action was taken on both of them, because efforts to replace them by a single text were not successful.

The Western draft resolution was submitted on 16 October by Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom; it was later also sponsored by Portugal. It was entitled “Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations”, and was introduced by the United Kingdom on the same day. The United Kingdom stated that the General Assembly should offer constructive support to the two sides in their vitally important negotiations, which were just entering a crucial stage, and that that support should be expressed through a united message to them. On 9 November a revised version was submitted by the sponsors to bring the draft up to date with developments in the bilateral negotiations, as the United Kingdom explained. The following day, the draft resolution was approved by the First Committee by a recorded vote of 84 to none, with 42 abstentions (non-aligned countries). In connection with the vote, six countries explained their positions.

Among those that abstained, Nigeria stated that there were concepts in the draft that were unrelated to the vital subject it dealt with. Uruguay held that the text emphasized the security interests of States and groups of States, while the goal of all disarmament negotiations, whether bilateral or multi-lateral, should always be the maintenance and strengthening of international security. Venezuela noted that the approaches of the draft in question and the one introduced by Zimbabwe (see below) differed, although both were intended to stimulate the negotiations. The draft introduced by the United Kingdom sought to evaluate events connected with the negotiations and, in so doing, prejudged the international community’s opinion about agreements whose terms were not yet known. Zimbabwe held that the text did not reflect the depth of international concern over nuclear war and ignored important elements in the quest for nuclear disarmament, such as the issue of a test ban.

Two States that voted in favour of the Western draft and the non-aligned draft (see below) expressed concern over the failure of the Committee to merge the texts. Canada, a co-sponsor of the Western draft, stated that the Committee should find the way to speak with one voice on crucial arms limitation and disarmament questions. Ghana also feared that the existence of two drafts on the same subject might weaken the impact of the General Assembly's action.

On 30 November the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution introduced by the United Kingdom by a recorded vote of 115 to none, with 39 abstentions, as resolution 42/38 A. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling that at their meeting at Geneva in November 1985 the leaders of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America committed themselves to the objective of working out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth,

Noting that in their joint statement of 8 January 1985 the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America agreed that the subject of the negotiations was a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms, both strategic and intermediate-range, with all these questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship,

Noting with satisfaction that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America have reached an agreement on the total elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles,

Noting also with satisfaction the agreement of the two Governments that a similarly intensive effort will be made to achieve a treaty on a 50 per cent reduction in their strategic offensive arms within the framework of the Geneva nuclear and space talks,

Noting further with satisfaction that, at their forthcoming meeting, the leaders of the two countries will consider thoroughly the development of instructions to delegations on a future treaty on a 50 per cent reduction in United States and Soviet strategic offensive arms and on the observance of and non-withdrawal from the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems for an agreed period,

Believing that, through negotiations pursued in a spirit of flexibility and with full account taken of the security interests of all States, it is possible to achieve far-reaching and effectively verifiable agreements,

Firmly convinced that an early agreement in these negotiations, in accordance with the principle of undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments, would be of crucial importance for the strengthening of international peace and security,

Further convinced that the international community should encourage the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America in their endeavours, taking into account both the importance and complexity of their negotiations,

1. *Welcomes* the agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to conclude a treaty eliminating their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles;

2. *Notes with satisfaction* that President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev have agreed to meet in the United States beginning on 7 December 1987 and that a further meeting in the Soviet Union is envisioned between them in the first half of 1988;

3. *Calls upon* the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America to spare no effort in seeking the attainment of all their agreed objectives in the negotiations, in accordance with the security interests of all States and the universal desire for progress towards disarmament, in particular early achievement of a treaty implementing the agreement to reduce their strategic offensive arms by 50 per cent, which could be signed during President Reagan's visit to Moscow;

4. *Invites* the two Governments concerned to keep other States Members of the United Nations duly informed of progress in those negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, in accordance with paragraph 114 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly;

5. *Expresses its firmest possible encouragement and support* for the bilateral negotiations and their successful conclusion.

On 22 October, Zimbabwe submitted, on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, a draft resolution entitled "Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations". In introducing the draft on 4 November, it stressed the conviction of the non-aligned countries that the alternatives in the nuclear age were not peace and war, but life and death, and that that fact made the prevention of nuclear war a priority task. The draft expressed the view that international peace and security could be ensured only through general and complete disarmament under effective international control and that one of the most urgent tasks was to halt and reverse the arms race and to undertake concrete measures of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament.

On 10 November the Committee approved the draft by a recorded vote of 116 to none, with 13 abstentions (mostly Western countries). In connection with the vote, two States gave explanations. The United States had been unable to support the draft because it felt that some portions portrayed the Soviet-American negotiations in a distorted and unbalanced manner, while some others correctly reflected the approach adopted. Venezuela, which voted in favour, noted that the sponsors had been motivated by the desire to further the goal of general and complete disarmament and contrasted that intention with the motivation of the sponsors of the other draft resolution (see above).

On 30 November the General Assembly adopted the non-aligned draft by a recorded vote of 143 to none, with 13 abstentions, as resolution 42/38 D. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 40/18 of 18 November 1985 and 41/86 N of 4 December 1986,

Recalling also the Harare Appeal on Disarmament, adopted by the Eighth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries on 6 September 1986, and the final communiqué adopted in New York on 7 October 1987 by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and heads of delegation of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries to the forty-second session of the General Assembly,

Gravely concerned over the continuing escalation of the arms race, especially in nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, despite the fact that this increases the risk of nuclear war and endangers the survival of humanity,

Convinced that the alternative today in the nuclear age is not between war or peace, but between life and death, which makes the prevention of nuclear war the principal task of our times,

Further convinced that international peace and security can be ensured only through general and complete disarmament under effective international control and that one of the most urgent tasks is to halt and reverse the arms race and to undertake concrete measures of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament,

Noting that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America reached an agreement in principle, during the meeting held in Washington, D. C., from 15 to 17 September 1987, on the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles,

Convinced also that in the interest of mankind as a whole, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, in their bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations, should

continue their endeavours with the ultimate objective of achieving general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

1. *Welcomes* the agreement in principle between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to sign a treaty on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles in the autumn of 1987, to make intensive efforts to achieve a treaty on a 50 per cent reduction in strategic offensive arms within the framework of the Geneva nuclear and space talks, and to begin nuclear-test-ban negotiations before 1 December 1987;

2. *Calls upon* the two Governments concerned to intensify their efforts with the objective of achieving agreements in other areas, in particular, the areas of strategic arms and a nuclear-test ban, as a matter of urgency;

3. *Invites* the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to keep the Conference on Disarmament duly informed of progress made in their negotiations.

At the time of the General Assembly's adoption of resolutions 42/38 A and 42/38 D, the United Republic of Tanzania explained that it had abstained in the vote on the former resolution because it duplicated the latter, which it supported. The United Republic of Tanzania felt strongly that the First Committee would have to try harder to rationalize its work.

The Treaty and its signature

The Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles consists of a preamble and 17 articles. It also includes a protocol on procedures governing the elimination of the missiles systems subject to the Treaty and a protocol regarding inspections relating to the Treaty, as well as a memorandum of understanding on data, giving the locations, numbers and characteristics of each side's intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. The two Protocols and the Memorandum form an integral part of the Treaty. The text of the Treaty and the two Protocols is reproduced in appendix VII of this volume.

In the preamble, the parties express their conviction that the measures set forth in the Treaty will help to reduce the risk of outbreak of war, and they recall their obligations under article VI of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty.

The basic obligations of the two parties are embodied in article I. In accordance with the provisions of the Treaty, each party shall eliminate its intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, not have such systems thereafter, and carry out the other obligations set forth in the Treaty. (According to the Protocol on Elimination, prior to the destruction of missiles, the nuclear warheads may be removed.)

Article II provides definitions of the key terms of the Treaty. For the purpose of the Treaty, the existing types of United States and Soviet intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles are identified in article III by the designations used by both the United States and the Soviet Union for the various missiles.

Article IV provides that each party shall eliminate all its intermediate-range missiles and their launchers, as well as all support structures and support

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equipment of the categories listed in the Memorandum of Understanding associated with such missiles and launchers, so that no later than three years after the entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter no such missiles, launchers, support structures or support equipment shall be possessed by either party. In accordance with the article, the elimination will take place in two phases. Article V establishes that the elimination of shorter-range missiles will be completed not later than 18 months after the Treaty's entry into force.

Article VI sets forth the obligations of the parties upon the Treaty's entry into force and thereafter not to produce or flight-test any intermediate- or shorter-range missiles. Articles VII and VIII provide detailed criteria and rules relating to the elimination process. Article IX spells out obligations of the parties with regard to (a) the updating of the categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding and (b) notifications.

Article X states in its first paragraph that each party shall eliminate its intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and their launchers and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination. In subsequent paragraphs, it establishes general rules on elimination, notification and verification.

Articles XI to XIII define the rights and duties of the parties for the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty. For such a purpose, article XI states, each party shall have the right to conduct on-site inspections, and the parties shall implement on-site inspections in accordance with the provisions of article XI itself, the Protocol on Inspection and the Protocol on Elimination. Each party shall have the right to conduct inspections for 13 years after the entry into force of the Treaty, both within the territory of the other party and within the territories of basing countries. Each party shall have the right to conduct 20 such inspections per calendar year during the first three years after entry into force of the Treaty, 15 such inspections per calendar year during the subsequent five years, and 10 such inspections per calendar year during the last five years. Neither party shall use more than half of its total number of inspections per calendar year within the territory of any one basing country. Each party shall conduct inspections of the process of elimination, including elimination of intermediate-range missiles by means of launching, of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers carried out at elimination facilities in accordance with article X of the Treaty and the Protocol on Elimination. Inspectors conducting inspections shall determine that the processes specified for the elimination of the missiles, launchers and support equipment have been completed. In article XII, the Treaty provides that, for the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance, each party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law. Article XIII establishes a special verification commission to resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed and to agree upon such measures as might be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty.

Article XIV provides that the parties shall comply with the Treaty and not assume any international obligations or understandings which would conflict with its provisions.

Article XV provides that the Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. However, each party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject-matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to withdraw to the other party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Articles XVI and XVII deal, respectively, with amendments and ratification.

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* * *

The signing of the Treaty took place at the White House, in Washington, D.C., on 8 December.

In his statement¹³ on that occasion, President Ronald Reagan stressed that for the first time in history, the language of arms control was being replaced by the language of arms reduction—the complete and verified elimination of an entire class of United States and Soviet nuclear missiles. Under the new Treaty, on the Soviet side, over 1,500 deployed warheads would be removed, and all ground-launched intermediate-range missiles, including the SS-20s, would be destroyed. On the United States side, the entire complement of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles would be destroyed. Additional back-up missiles on both sides would also be destroyed.¹⁴ But the importance of the Treaty, the President went on, transcended numbers. The agreement contained the most stringent verification régime in history, including provisions for inspection teams actually residing in each other's territory and several other forms of on-site inspection as well. The Treaty also protected the interests of the United States friends and allies.

General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev emphasized that the signing of the first-ever agreement eliminating nuclear weapons had a universal significance for mankind, both from the standpoint of world politics and from the standpoint of humanism. For everyone and, above all, for the Soviet Union and the United States, the Treaty offered a big chance to get on the road leading away from the threat of catastrophe. It was their duty to take full advantage of that chance and move together towards a nuclear-free world, which held

¹³ This statement and the others referred to below were compiled by Novosti Press Agency and published in *USSR-US Summit, Washington, December 7-10, 1987: Documents and Materials* (Moscow, 1987).

¹⁴ When the back-up, non-deployed, missiles are taken into account, the total number of United States missiles to be destroyed exceeds 800, while the total number of Soviet missiles exceeds 1,800.

the promise of a fulfilling and happy life without fear and without a senseless waste of resources on weapons. The General Secretary expressed the hope that the date of 8 December 1987 would mark the watershed between the era of a mounting risk of nuclear war and the era of the demilitarization of human life.

On 10 December, in a joint statement issued at the end of the summit talks,¹⁵ the two leaders stressed that the Treaty was historic both for its objective—the complete elimination of an entire class of United States and Soviet nuclear arms—and for the innovative character and scope of its verification provisions. This mutual accomplishment made a vital contribution to greater stability. Their statement also covered several key areas of their bilateral negotiations, including nuclear and space talks, chemical weapons and conventional forces. With regard to strategic and space talks, they noted the considerable progress which had been made towards concluding a treaty implementing the principle of 50-per cent reductions, and agreed to instruct their negotiators in Geneva to work towards completing a treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms and all integral documents at the earliest possible date, preferably in time for signature during the next summit, to be held in the first half of 1988.

Furthermore, in an exchange of farewells, the two leaders stressed the need for a continuing dialogue. The Treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, President Reagan stated, should be viewed as a beginning, not as an end. Further arms reduction was possible. Individual agreements would not, in and of themselves, result in steady progress. That must be sustained by a realistic understanding of each other's intentions and objectives and a process for dealing with differences in a practical and straightforward manner. General Secretary Gorbachev underscored the fact that under the Treaty the two major Powers had assumed an obligation to actually destroy a part of their nuclear weapons, thus hopefully setting in motion the process of nuclear disarmament. The two sides, he added, had been able to formulate a kind of agenda for joint efforts in the future. That put the dialogue between them on a more predictable footing and was undoubtedly constructive. The United States and the Soviet Union, he concluded, were closer to their common goal of strengthening international security. Much work, however, remained to be done and they must get down to it without delay.

On the occasion of the signing of the Treaty, on 8 December, the Secretary-General of the United Nations made the following statement:

The signing today of the INF Treaty by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev constitutes a truly remarkable development that I welcome wholeheartedly. It is the first time that an agreement has been reached that would actually reduce the awesome stocks of nuclear weapons in the world. It is most gratifying that patience, dedication and goodwill have prevailed over the difficulties and obstacles that were encountered in achieving this historic agreement.

I earnestly hope that the two sides will now make progress towards significantly reducing strategic nuclear weapons, and in dealing with the other most important issues on their agenda.

I am convinced that the events of the day can have a most positive impact in the course of international relations. I wish the two leaders well in their deliberations.¹⁶

¹⁵ A/43/58, annex.

¹⁶ SG/SM/4067.

Conclusion

According to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, the basic obligation of the two parties is to eliminate those missiles and not to have such systems thereafter. The elimination of intermediate-range missiles will take place in two phases and be completed no later than three years after the entry into force of the Treaty. Shorter-range missiles will be eliminated within 18 months. Each party has the right to conduct on-site inspections for 13 years after the entry into force of the Treaty, both within the territory of the other party and within the territories of basing countries.

The Treaty is an unprecedented agreement in terms of both scope and provisions. Under it, an entire class of weapons will be eliminated from the arsenals of the two major Powers and the process will be carried out in accordance with stringent verification provisions. The Soviet Union, the United States and other States believe that the Treaty could have a positive impact not only on the relations between the two parties, but also on the security of the whole world. The conclusion of the Treaty has also been welcomed in the hope that it will enhance international stability and have a positive influence on other ongoing disarmament negotiations, multilateral as well as bilateral. The parties themselves recognize that the Treaty is just a beginning and that much remains to be done in the field of nuclear disarmament.

CHAPTER VII

Prevention of nuclear war

Introduction

REMOVING THE THREAT OF A NUCLEAR WAR, the General Assembly formally stated at its tenth special session, in 1978, was the “most urgent task of the present day”.¹ That view has been reaffirmed at each of the Assembly’s subsequent regular sessions. At the twelfth special session, in 1982, the Soviet Union made a solemn commitment never to be the first to use nuclear weapons.² President Reagan of the United States, addressing the General Assembly the following year, declared: “A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.”³ However, while there obviously exists a wide consensus on the principle, there are profound differences on its implementation.

The pledge made by the Soviet Union in 1982 was predicated on the assumption that other nuclear States would take reciprocal action. In the view of the Soviet Union and its allies, such pledges would bring about a ban on the use of nuclear weapons, open the way to nuclear disarmament and strengthen the principle of the non-use of force. In the light of the Soviet declaration and of China’s undertaking⁴ not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, socialist States have been seeking an international instrument of a legally binding character that would establish the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

The United States and its allies, on the other hand, see nuclear deterrence as an indispensable means to prevent nuclear war as well as war in general. In their opinion, a declaration on the non-first use of nuclear weapons might undermine the wider principle of the non-use of force in the Charter of the United Nations. The question of preventing nuclear war must be viewed from an overall perspective and involve an effort to reshape the conduct of States. In this context, the Western States stress the concepts of renunciation of force, restraint, balanced disarmament measures, confidence-building and reducing the risk of nuclear escalation implicit in a conventional war.

The non-aligned States strongly emphasize the importance of the prevention of nuclear war. India, supported by other non-aligned and like-minded countries, has long promoted the view that an international convention on

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, para. 18.

² *Ibid.*, *Twelfth Special Session, Plenary Meetings*, 12th meeting.

³ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-eighth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 5th meeting.

⁴ A/S-10/AC.1/17, annex, para. 7.

the non-use of nuclear weapons should be concluded. The non-aligned countries are also prominent among those wishing the Conference on Disarmament to undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war.

At the twelfth special session of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General of the United Nations expressed the view that by its very nature nuclear war could not remain limited and, once a nuclear exchange began, there would be no way to contain it within a predetermined framework. In addition to the human costs, the ecology of the world would be severely affected and the infrastructure of civilization would be shattered. In his opinion, the prevention of nuclear war was not only a moral imperative, but also a question of survival.

In 1981 and 1983, the Soviet Union initiated resolutions in the General Assembly condemning nuclear war as a crime against humanity and declaring that it was the obligation of the leaders of nuclear-weapon States to act in such a way as to eliminate the risk of the outbreak of a nuclear conflict.

In November 1985, the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States expressed at their Geneva summit meeting⁵ their conviction of the importance of preventing any war between them, whether nuclear or conventional. They also agreed that a nuclear war could not be won and must never be fought and that they would not seek to achieve military superiority.

In 1986 the General Assembly continued to pursue the goal of the prevention of nuclear war. The proposals submitted to that end reflected a somewhat increased reliance on the possibilities offered by the multilateral negotiating process within the Conference on Disarmament.

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1987

As in previous years, the Disarmament Commission addressed the question of the prevention of nuclear war under item 4 of its agenda, concerning various aspects of nuclear and conventional disarmament (for the full wording of the item, see page 13). The item was discussed in plenary meetings of the Commission as well as in the subsidiary body dealing with item 4.

In the course of the general exchange of views, the United States noted that it shared the general belief that the reduction of military forces and armaments could play an important role in achieving lasting peace, but stressed that arms control agreements should not be viewed as an end in themselves. Agreements, it stated, must be militarily significant, balanced and equitable and must contain effective verification provisions so that trust among States would develop, on the basis of strict observance by all of the obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force. If every State were strictly to adhere to that obligation, the United States pointed out, weapons would be superfluous.

⁵ The Soviet-American statement following the November 1985 summit was circulated as a General Assembly document (A/40/1070) and the disarmament-related passages appear in *The Yearbook*, vol. 10: 1985, chapter II.

The Soviet Union felt that the world had reached a historic watershed, beyond which the trend towards the steady elimination of the threat looming over it would become irreversible. The Soviet Union, for its part, was striving to find mutually acceptable solutions to the entire range of problems of nuclear disarmament. In that process, it was guided by its awareness of the imperative need for a new way of thinking about the very complex problems of security, a perspective that would lead to the creation of a comprehensive system of international security.

It was China's view that the international environment remained forbidding, with tensions far from being solved and the dangers of war still looming. In the modern world only the super-Powers, China added, were capable of waging another world war. Both had, however, expressed the belief that nuclear war could not be won and must never be fought. That being the case, China stated, they should act logically and take the lead in reducing their armaments, particularly their nuclear armaments, so as to create conditions under which other nuclear Powers could participate in the process of nuclear disarmament. From the very first day that China had become a nuclear-weapon State, it had undertaken not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, at any time and under any circumstances.

Poland, referring to the prevention of nuclear war as the most urgent and important problem facing mankind, suggested that in the absence of total nuclear disarmament, practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war should include: acceptance of the principle of the non-first use of nuclear weapons by all the nuclear Powers; a freeze by all the nuclear-weapon Powers on the production and deployment of nuclear weapons and on the production of fissionable material for military purposes; a moratorium on all nuclear tests; and the prevention of the militarization of outer space.

Pakistan held that in order to reduce the dangers of nuclear confrontation, the nuclear Powers should undertake, among other measures, never to be the first to use nuclear weapons, to agree to ultimately prohibit the use of nuclear weapons, to provide legally binding assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and to conclude, as a matter of priority, a treaty banning all nuclear testing.

India called attention to the fact that the Disarmament Commission had already recognized the threat of destruction by nuclear war as one of the greatest perils facing the world. The Commission must, therefore, try urgently to identify ways and means of dealing with that critical issue.

Yugoslavia recalled that a compilation of proposals for recommendations on nuclear disarmament, the prevention of nuclear war and a general approach to negotiations on nuclear and conventional disarmament was still before the Disarmament Commission (see chapter V). Substantial differences of view on the various proposals persisted, Yugoslavia noted, and it found it surprising that certain positions that had been acceptable to all at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in 1978, were no longer acceptable to some States. Yugoslavia strongly felt that the common basis contained in the Final Document of that session should not be called into question.

Nigeria regretted that the Conference on Disarmament had been unable to establish a subsidiary body with an adequate mandate in the priority area of the prevention of nuclear war. It appealed to the nuclear-weapon States, in particular the two major Powers, to be more flexible on the question so as to make it possible for the Conference to carry out its mandate.

After the conclusion of the general exchange of views, the question of the prevention of nuclear war was taken up in a contact group, the Commission's subsidiary body on item 4. The work of the Contact Group is discussed in chapter V.

In concluding statements in a plenary meeting, several delegations briefly reviewed the discussion which had taken place on issues of nuclear disarmament and stressed that it was urgent to reverse the nuclear-arms race and thus reduce the risk of nuclear war.

Consideration by the Conference on Disarmament, 1987

The item entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters" was considered in plenary meetings⁶ of the Conference during the periods from 16 to 20 March and from 6 to 10 July. During the session, consultations were held under the guidance of the successive Presidents of the Conference to consider an appropriate organizational arrangement to deal with the item, including proposals for the establishment of a subsidiary body, but no agreement could be reached. On 28 July the Conference took a decision on a draft mandate for an *ad hoc* committee submitted by the group of 21.⁷ On that occasion, the main groups within the Conference once again expressed their views on how the Conference should handle the subject.

Western countries expressed their disappointment at the fact that the draft mandate was once again put to a decision. They continued to consider that the proposed mandate would not facilitate a discussion of the item, and thus they were unable to associate themselves with a consensus on the question. At the same time, Western countries stressed the importance they attached to the item and recalled that they had on numerous occasions, both in the Conference on Disarmament and in the General Assembly, underlined their readiness to have a thorough discussion and exchange of views on the subject. They also noted their readiness to make renewed efforts to develop an appropriate format for an in-depth examination of the agenda item. They further emphasized that they attached the greatest importance to concrete policies and actions to prevent all wars, including nuclear war.

China considered that the Conference on Disarmament should intensify its work on the item and establish a subsidiary body. It felt that the proposed mandate was a reasonable one and expressed its support for it. It also agreed that in the mean time the Conference could carry on its work on the item in other forms.

⁶ CD/787, appendix II, vols. I-IV.

⁷ *Ibid.*, appendix I, vol. I, document CD/515/Rev.3.

Socialist countries, considering that the prevention of nuclear war was an issue of the highest priority, believed that concrete negotiations could and should be undertaken to elaborate measures. Noting that a number of proposals had been put forward, they held that there was a solid basis to start negotiations and that a subsidiary body should be established for that purpose. They expressed their full support for the mandate proposed by the group of 21, which they considered realistic. In their view, it could constitute a basis for joint productive work.

The non-aligned and neutral countries, members of the group of 21, expressed their deep regret at the inability of the Conference to set up an *ad hoc* committee under the item. They noted that, in deference to the position of other delegations, they had put forward a non-negotiating mandate that would permit a thorough consideration of all aspects—legal, political, technical and military—of all the proposals before the Conference. They believed that such consideration would not only contribute to a better understanding of the subject, but also pave the way for negotiations for an agreement on the prevention of nuclear war. Such an objective, in their view, could not be achieved through discussions in plenary or informal meetings. They were disappointed that, despite the urgency of the subject and the flexibility they had displayed, the Conference was not able to justify its own mandate, as reflected in paragraph 120 of the 1978 Final Document.

During the course of the debate in plenary meetings, members of the group of 21 reaffirmed their conviction that the greatest peril facing the world was the threat of destruction from a nuclear war and that, consequently, the removal of that threat was the most acute and urgent task of the day. While nuclear-weapon States had the primary responsibility for avoiding nuclear war, all nations had a vital interest in negotiations on the matter in view of the devastating consequences that the use of nuclear weapons would have.

The non-aligned and neutral countries considered it unacceptable that the security of all States and the very survival of mankind should be held hostage to the threat of a nuclear holocaust. They did not believe that history proved that fear of destruction served to prevent war; accordingly, they rejected the theory of nuclear deterrence. They recalled that on several occasions the use of nuclear weapons in conflicts where only conventional weapons were being used had been advocated on the grounds that a limited use of nuclear weapons would not be challenged because of fear of escalation.

Noting that studies indicated that even a limited nuclear war would have far-reaching and irreversible ecological consequences, including nuclear winter, members of the group of 21 held that conventional arms could not under any circumstances be equated with nuclear weapons. In their opinion, the Charter of the United Nations could not be invoked to justify the use of nuclear weapons in the exercise of the right of self-defence against an armed attack not involving the use of nuclear weapons. The group of 21 continued to believe that the surest way to remove the danger of nuclear war lay in the elimination of nuclear weapons and that, pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament, the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should be prohibited.

Cuba considered that the urgency of the prevention of nuclear war had been enhanced by the intensification of the arms race and advances in weapons technology. India recalled the draft convention on the subject that it had submitted in 1982 (resolution 37/100 C, annex) in order to provide a concrete and practical basis for the long-standing proposal of the non-aligned countries. The text was based on the principle that the use of nuclear weapons would constitute a direct violation of the Charter, and that any State using weapons would be considered as acting contrary to the laws of humanity and committing a crime against humanity. In stressing the significance of the subject, Nigeria noted that in the name of deterrence, the super-Powers' nuclear weapons had attained a degree of sophistication that was capable of triggering a global nuclear winter.

Socialist countries also underscored the urgency of the task of preventing nuclear war. Referring to a communiqué issued by the Warsaw Treaty Organization in May 1987,⁸ they stressed the need for a new way of thinking, a new approach to the issues of war and peace and disarmament, and the abandonment of the concept of nuclear deterrence. While recognizing the deterrent character of nuclear weapons, those delegations considered that the doctrine of nuclear deterrence was a constant threat to strategic stability and that it fuelled the arms race.

The military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the socialist countries emphasized, was subordinated to the task of preventing war, whether nuclear or conventional. It was defensive in nature and based on the concept that recourse to military means to resolve any disputes was inadmissible in the nuclear age. Poland pointed out that the Jaruzelski plan⁹ for curbing the threat of any armed conflict in Europe and building confidence on the continent had the reorientation of military doctrines so as to render them strictly defensive as one of its stated objectives. Members of the Warsaw Treaty were resolved never to initiate military action unless they were themselves the target of an armed attack and never to be the first to use nuclear weapons. They stressed that they had no territorial claims on any State and did not view any State or any people as their enemy.

Socialist countries drew attention to the programme proposed by the Soviet Union¹⁰ for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction by the year 2000 and the prohibition of space strike weapons. They emphasized anew the importance of commitments on the non-first use of nuclear weapons and reiterated their support for a convention to prohibit the use of those weapons. They also expressed readiness to consider confidence-building measures, for instance, to prevent accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and to reduce the possibility of surprise attacks.

The establishment of a comprehensive system of international security, based on the principle that it was no longer possible to build one's security

⁸ *Ibid.*, vol. II, document CD/755.

⁹ *Ibid.*, document CD/754.

¹⁰ CD/732, appendix I, document CD/649; the statement was also circulated as a General Assembly document (A/41/97).

at the expense of others' security, was proposed by the socialist countries. Such a system of security, they believed, would lead to a nuclear-free and non-violent world. The Soviet Union spoke in favour of a comprehensive approach to disarmament whereby the elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction would be accompanied by reductions in armed forces and conventional arms, with the corresponding reductions in military expenditures. It was convinced that such measures would build confidence and improve the political and economic situation in the world.

Western delegations underlined their position that the title of the agenda item, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters", reflected the comprehensive nature of the subject-matter: the prevention of nuclear war could not be isolated from the prevention of war in general. The question at issue was how to maintain peace and international security in the nuclear age. In that connection, they noted that the joint communiqué issued in November 1985 by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev emphasized the necessity of avoiding any war between the United States and the USSR, whether nuclear or conventional. While they welcomed efforts to achieve the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, the Western countries noted that large numbers of people continued to be killed in conventional wars.

The Western States held that deterrence, which was not just a Western phenomenon, had made a significant contribution to East-West stability. Nuclear weapons, they believed, continued to be a basic element in the balance needed to maintain peace and security, given the existence of serious imbalances in the conventional, chemical and nuclear fields. For the time being, there was no alternative to the Western concept for the prevention of war—the strategy of deterrence based on an appropriate mix of adequate and effective nuclear and conventional forces, each element being indispensable. At the same time, Western countries reiterated that none of their weapons would ever be used, except in response to armed attack, and they emphasized that strict compliance by all States with the Charter of the United Nations was a key element in the prevention of nuclear war.

The Federal Republic of Germany declared that the paramount political aim of NATO was to reliably prevent war in Europe, be it conventional or nuclear. For the implementation of that strategy, NATO was dependent on a balanced arsenal of conventional and nuclear weapons, but the role of nuclear weapons must be reduced to the absolute minimum in quantitative and qualitative terms.

The United States stressed the importance of confidence-building measures as a method of preventing not only nuclear war, but war in general. Among additional efforts to that end, it mentioned that the United States and the Soviet Union had activated a third direct communications system or "hot-line" circuit and had negotiated on the establishment of nuclear risk reduction centres in Washington and Moscow.

China believed that the effective prevention of nuclear war called for a stable international environment. To safeguard peace and security, it was imperative to oppose power politics, check aggression and expansion and

eliminate regional trouble-spots. It underlined that all countries should respect and observe the Charter of the United Nations and renounce the use or threat of force in international relations and settle disputes by peaceful means. China recalled that it had always held that the fundamental way to eliminate the nuclear threat lay in the complete and total destruction of all nuclear weapons. It recommended that once nuclear-weapon States had made pledges of non-first use and given unconditional security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States, an international convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons should be concluded, with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States. China further considered that conventional as well as nuclear war should be prevented.

Speaking as the President of the Conference for the month of August, the representative of France stated that the discussion on the subject should not become an ideological confrontation, but should lead instead to joint thinking about conditions of security. On the subject of the prevention of nuclear war, the dialogue must continue along the road of reason.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1987

At the forty-second session of the General Assembly, the question of the prevention of nuclear war continued to receive considerable attention in the First Committee's debates and deliberations.¹¹ In particular, non-aligned and socialist countries frequently addressed the issue.

India attached the highest priority to the question. It noted that nuclear weapons had been postulated as instruments to maintain peace, although no scientist or strategist had been able to distinguish between the nuclear weapons intended for use as a deterrent and those intended for offensive use. The 1978 Final Document stated unequivocally that removing the threat of a nuclear war was the most acute and urgent task of the day. In that context, India urged all States, especially nuclear-weapon States, to consider securing the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons and the prevention of nuclear war through an international agreement, thereby ensuring that the survival of mankind would not be endangered. It regretted that the Conference on Disarmament had not found it possible to establish an *ad hoc* committee to consider, let alone negotiate, such a measure.

Kenya believed that the first step towards preventing nuclear war and halting the arms race would be the early conclusion of a comprehensive treaty on the complete prohibition of the testing of all types of nuclear weapons in all environments by all States. Morocco hoped that the new spirit prevailing in the bilateral negotiations would extend to the multilateral negotiations, making it possible for the Conference on Disarmament to carry out its mandate.

Venezuela held that the most effective way to prevent nuclear war would

¹¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, First Committee, 3rd to 31st and 38th meetings, and ibid., Sessional Fascicle, corrigendum.*

be to totally eliminate nuclear stockpiles. Nuclear weapons could not be considered as instruments of war; they were, in fact, instruments of genocide, the use of which would constitute a crime against mankind. Thus, the nuclear Powers should undertake, through a binding international instrument, the commitment not to resort to the threat or the use of nuclear weapons.

Bulgaria strongly supported the idea of establishing a comprehensive system of international peace and security, the corner-stone of which would be the curbing of the arms race, the achievement of disarmament and a world free of nuclear weapons. That was a task beyond the reach of any single State or group of States, and it could be achieved only through the international community's collective efforts, based on a new way of thinking and a new approach to international affairs. Czechoslovakia stated that the members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization were making a persistent effort to eliminate the possibility of the outbreak of a nuclear war or any other war. In its view, if stability was to be ensured at all stages of the disarmament process, it was necessary to proceed consistently from the principle of reasonable sufficiency at the lowest possible level of nuclear and conventional armaments.

The Soviet Union stated that the United Nations had a major role to play in promoting confidence, strengthening it and making it irreversible. Strengthening confidence meant consolidating the United Nations, enhancing its significance and authority, and translating its Charter into real life. A first step in the complex process of compiling a lexicon of confidence and openness could be taken by implementing the Secretary-General's proposal to set up, within the Organization, a multilateral centre for reducing the threat of war. It would also be advisable, the Soviet Union stated, to establish direct lines of communication between the United Nations Headquarters and the capitals of the States that were permanent members of the Security Council, as well as the location of the Chairman of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

The United States recalled the signing, on 15 September 1987, of the United States-Soviet Agreement to establish nuclear risk reduction centres in the two countries. In the preamble of the Agreement, the two sides reaffirmed "their desire to reduce and ultimately eliminate the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, in particular as a result of misinterpretation, miscalculation or accident". On the occasion of the signing of the Agreement, President Reagan had pointed out that the risk reduction centres would help further lessen the chance of conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. The centres would be connected by satellite and would be equipped to exchange textual and graphic information quickly. Under the Agreement, notifications of ballistic missile launches would be made, and there was the possibility of additional exchanges of material.

Following the general debate, three resolutions on the prevention of nuclear war were approved by the Committee and later adopted by the General Assembly.¹²

On 21 October, Cuba, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary and Romania, later joined by Bulgaria, submitted a draft resolution entitled "Non-

¹² *Ibid.*, Forty-second Session, Plenary Meetings, 84th meeting.

use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war". It concerned the question of declarations by the nuclear-weapon States to the effect that they would not be the first to use nuclear weapons. In its introduction on 2 November, the German Democratic Republic stressed that the draft called upon all nuclear-weapon States to follow the example of China and the Soviet Union and make such declarations. The text also contained a request to the Conference on Disarmament to elaborate an international instrument of a legally binding character laying down the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

On 10 November the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 94 to 17 (Western countries), with 10 abstentions.

In connection with the vote, two States that voted negatively explained their positions. Australia stated that it did not believe that the aim of preventing nuclear war would be advanced by *a priori* and unverifiable declarations about the non-use of nuclear weapons. Similarly, New Zealand saw the draft as an attempt to address nuclear weapons in isolation without taking into account other, balancing, considerations, such as a need for agreement on massive reductions in conventional weapons. In its view, the draft would not encourage an accommodation of different approaches to security.

Among those that voted in favour, Finland stated that nuclear war was nowhere professed to be an element of rational policy; thus, nuclear weapons should never in any circumstances be used. Sweden saw unilateral declarations by nuclear-weapon States as an important element in efforts to reduce the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war. It hoped that all nuclear-weapon States would find it possible to make such declarations. The establishment of an overall balance in conventional forces at lower levels would facilitate such commitments, it believed. Nigeria supported the general thrust of the draft in spite of the fact that the concepts implied in the last preambular paragraph pertained more to the doctrines of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization than to the United Nations.

On 30 November the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 125 to 17, with 12 abstentions, as resolution 42/42 A. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling that, in accordance with paragraph 20 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority and that this commitment was reaffirmed by the Assembly as its twelfth special session, the second special session devoted to disarmament,

Recalling also that, in paragraph 58 of the Final Document, it is stated that all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, should consider as soon as possible various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, the prevention of nuclear war and related objectives, where possible through international agreement, and thereby ensure that the survival of mankind is not endangered,

Reaffirming that the nuclear-weapon States have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and for undertaking measures aimed at preventing the outbreak of nuclear war,

Convinced that it is possible and necessary for mankind to block the way to a nuclear catastrophe and that the renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons is a most urgent measure to this end,

Stressing that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,

Recalling that in the Political Declaration adopted at the Eighth Conference of Heads of States or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Harare from 1 to 6 September 1986, all nuclear-weapon States were called upon to enter early into an internationally binding commitment not to be the first to use or to threaten to use nuclear weapons,

Emphasizing that for the sake of international peace and security, military concepts and doctrines must be of a strictly defensive character,

1. *Considers* that the solemn declarations by two nuclear-weapon States made or reiterated at the twelfth special session of the General Assembly, concerning their respective obligations not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, offer an important avenue to decrease the danger of nuclear war;

2. *Expresses the hope* that those nuclear-weapon States which have not yet done so would consider making similar declarations with respect to not being the first to use nuclear weapons;

3. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations on the item "Prevention of nuclear war" of its agenda and to consider, *inter alia*, the elaboration of an international instrument of a legally binding character laying down the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war"

On 27 October, Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Cameroon, Colombia, the Congo, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Romania, the Sudan, Uruguay, Venezuela and Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution entitled "Prevention of nuclear war", which was later also sponsored by Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic and Viet Nam. In introducing the draft resolution on 3 November, Argentina focused on the provision whereby the Assembly would again request the Conference on Disarmament to establish an *ad hoc* committee to undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures which could be negotiated and adopted individually for the prevention of nuclear war.

On 10 November the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 108 to 3 (France, United Kingdom and United States), with 14 abstentions (Western and associated countries).

In connection with the vote, two States that voted affirmatively explained their positions. Australia expressed its strong support for the establishment of an *ad hoc* committee on the issue in the Conference on Disarmament. It would have preferred, however, to see the resolution give due recognition to the fact that the best way to prevent nuclear war would be to prevent all wars. Sweden stated that it fully endorsed the operative part of the draft, but noted that the preambular part contained elements that did not fully reflect international developments in the field and the more positive atmosphere in the First Committee debate in 1987.

On 30 November, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 140 to 3, with 14 abstentions, as resolution 42/42 D. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Alarmed by the threat to the survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing nuclear-arms race,

Deeply concerned by an increased danger of nuclear war as a result of the intensification of the nuclear-arms race and the serious deterioration of the international situation,

Conscious that removal of the threat of nuclear war is the most acute and urgent task of the present day,

Reiterating that it is the shared responsibility of all Member States to save succeeding generations from the scourge of another world war, which would inevitably be a nuclear war,

Recalling the provisions of paragraphs 47 to 50 and 56 to 58 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly regarding the procedures designed to secure the avoidance of nuclear war,

Recalling also that at the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi from 7 to 12 March 1983, it was stated that nuclear weapons were more than weapons of war, they were instruments of mass annihilation, and that at the Eighth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Harare from 1 to 6 September 1986, it was stated that the accumulation of weapons, in particular nuclear weapons, constituted a threat to the survival of mankind and that, therefore, it had become imperative that States abandon the dangerous goal of unilateral security through armament and embrace the objective of common security through disarmament,

Recalling further its resolutions 36/81 B of 9 December 1981, 37/78 I of 9 December 1982, 38/183 G of 20 December 1983, 39/148 P of 17 December 1984, 40/152 Q of 16 December 1985 and, in particular, its resolution 41/86 G of 4 December 1986, in which it expressed its conviction that, in view of the urgency of the matter and the inadequacy or insufficiency of existing measures, it was necessary to devise suitable steps to expedite effective action for the prevention of nuclear war, and once more requested the Conference on Disarmament to undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war,

Having considered that part of the report of the Conference on Disarmament on its 1987 session relating to this question,

Noting with grave concern that the Conference on Disarmament was once again unable to start negotiations on the question during its 1987 session,

Taking into account the deliberations on this item at its forty-second session,

Convinced that the prevention of nuclear war and the reduction of the risk of nuclear war are matters of the highest priority and of vital interest to all people of the world,

Also convinced that the prevention of nuclear war is a problem too important to be left to the nuclear-weapon States alone,

1. *Notes with regret* that, despite the fact that the Conference on Disarmament has discussed the question of the prevention of nuclear war for several years, it has been unable even to establish a subsidiary body to consider appropriate and practical measures to prevent it;

2. *Reiterates its conviction* that, in view of the urgency of the matter and the inadequacy or insufficiency of existing measures, it is necessary to devise suitable steps to expedite effective action for the prevention of nuclear war;

3. *Again requests* the Conference on Disarmament to undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures that could be negotiated and adopted individually for the prevention of nuclear war and to establish for that purpose an *ad hoc* committee on the subject at the beginning of its 1988 session;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Prevention of nuclear war".

On 27 October, Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Romania and Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution entitled "Convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons", which was later also sponsored by Madagascar and Viet Nam. By it, the General Assembly would reiterate its request to the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiations, as a matter of priority, with a view to reaching agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use

of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, taking as a basis the draft convention annexed to the text. In introducing the draft on 4 November, India recalled that all nuclear-weapon States supported the proposition that a nuclear war must not be fought; the approach of the draft was to make of that understanding a legally binding commitment. A decision by all nuclear-weapon States to forswear the use of nuclear weapons would inevitably serve as a catalyst for a qualitative change in attitude towards the maintenance of nuclear stockpiles and would remove the status attached to them as currencies of power.

On 10 November the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 103 to 17 (Western countries), with 5 abstentions. In that connection, three States explained their positions.

Among those voting in favour, China stated that it had done so because of its continuing support for the concept of the non-use of nuclear weapons. It stressed that all nuclear-weapon States, particularly those with the largest arsenals, should commit themselves not to use nuclear weapons in any circumstances against non-nuclear States or nuclear-weapon-free zones, and that they should conclude an international convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, to which all nuclear-weapon States should be parties. China added that at a time when nuclear-weapon stockpiles were so large, such a prohibition could not by itself eliminate the danger of nuclear war or guarantee international peace and security for all countries. Therefore, existing nuclear arsenals must be drastically reduced and all nuclear weapons must ultimately be destroyed. Sweden stated that it was time to study how moral reprobation of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons could be translated into a binding international agreement as part of a process leading to general and complete disarmament. It had, however, reservations with regard to the sixth preambular paragraph (see below) and the text's interpretation of the Charter of the United Nations.

New Zealand, which voted against, held that the draft lacked the necessary balance. The overriding need, it stressed, was to achieve substantial reductions in nuclear weapons as quickly as possible. It would also be important in that process to pay more attention to the place of regional security arrangements in ensuring international stability.

On 30 November the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 135 to 17, with 4 abstentions, as resolution 42/39 C. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Alarmed by the threat to the survival of mankind and to the life-sustaining system posed by nuclear weapons and by their use, inherent in concepts of deterrence,

Conscious of an increased danger of nuclear war as a result of the intensification of the nuclear-arms race and the serious deterioration of the international situation,

Convinced that nuclear disarmament is essential for the prevention of nuclear war and for the strengthening of international peace and security,

Further convinced that a prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be a step towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons leading to general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling that in paragraph 58 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, it is stated that all States should actively participate in efforts to bring about conditions in international relations among States in which a code of peaceful conduct of nations in international affairs could be agreed upon and that would preclude the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Reaffirming that the use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity, as declared in its resolutions 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961, 33/71 B of 14 December 1978, 34/83 G of 11 December 1979, 35/152 D of 12 December 1980 and 36/92 I of 9 December 1981,

Noting with regret that the Conference on Disarmament, during its 1987 session, was not able to undertake negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, taking as a basis the text annexed to General Assembly resolution 41/60 F of 3 December 1986,

1. *Reiterates its request* to the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations, as a matter of priority, in order to reach agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, taking as a basis the draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons annexed to the present resolution;

2. *Further requests* the Conference on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly at its forty-third session on the results of those negotiations.

ANNEX

Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

The States Parties to this Convention,

Alarmed by the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons,

Convinced that any use of nuclear weapons constitutes a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity,

Convinced that this Convention would be a step towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons leading to general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Determined to continue negotiations for the achievement of this goal,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The States Parties to this Convention solemnly undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances.

Article 2

This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.

Article 3

1. This Convention shall be open to all States for signature. Any State that does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification or accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

3. This Convention shall enter into force on the deposit of instruments of ratification by twenty-five Governments, including the Governments of the five nuclear-weapon States, in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The depositary shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention, as well as of the receipt of other notices.

6. This Convention shall be registered by the depositary in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article 4

This Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall send duly certified copies thereof to the Government of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this Convention, opened for signature at _____ on the ____ day of _____ one thousand nine hundred and _____ .

Conclusion

In 1987 the General Assembly continued to pursue the goal of the prevention of nuclear war in the firm belief that resort to nuclear war would threaten the very existence of mankind. In the First Committee debate, regret was widely expressed that the Conference on Disarmament during its 1987 session had once again been unable to establish a subsidiary body to consider effective measures, including the elaboration of an international instrument of a legally binding nature, for the prevention of nuclear war. The three resolutions adopted by the General Assembly focused on the problem of allowing the Conference not only to discuss the question, but also to negotiate on concrete aspects of it. The texts essentially reaffirmed the Assembly's actions of the previous year, and the voting patterns were almost identical.

CHAPTER VIII

Cessation of nuclear-weapon tests

Introduction

1957 EFFORTS AIMED AT THE COMPLETE CESSATION of nuclear-weapon tests, prompted initially by political and military considerations, but also by anxiety about the possible effects of radioactive fall-out from such tests, have been pursued since 1954 as an independent item on the nuclear disarmament agenda. A first step towards this objective was taken with the conclusion in 1963 of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water,¹ often referred to as the partial test-ban Treaty. In the preamble, the original parties, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, stated that they sought to achieve “the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time” and expressed their determination to continue negotiations to that end. By the end of 1987, the Treaty had 115 parties. Two nuclear-weapon States, China and France, are not among the parties, but, since 1980 and 1974 respectively, they have in fact conducted only underground tests. In 1986, China stated formally that it would not conduct atmospheric tests in the future.²

The preamble of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons³ recalls the objective set out in the partial test-ban Treaty. By so doing, the non-proliferation Treaty has contributed to the prominence given to the test-ban issue in various disarmament forums. At the three Review Conferences of the parties to that Treaty—held in 1975, 1980 and 1985—a comprehensive test ban was considered an essential element in the implementation of article VI of the Treaty, by which the parties undertook to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.

In 1974 the Soviet Union and the United States signed a bilateral Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests,⁴ known as the threshold test-ban Treaty, and in 1976, the Treaty on Underground Nuclear

¹ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480, No. 6964. The text is reproduced in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 2nd edition: 1982 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.IX.5).

² Address by Premier Zhao Ziyang of the State Council of the People's Republic of China on 21 March 1986, circulated as a United Nations document (A/41/230-S/17937 and Corr.1).

³ General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex. The text is reproduced in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*.

⁴ Circulated in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/9627)*, annex II, document CCD/431.

Explosions for Peaceful Purposes,⁵ known as the peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty. The former instrument limits permitted nuclear-weapon tests to a maximum yield of 150 kilotons, while the latter prohibits: (a) any individual nuclear explosion exceeding the 150 kiloton yield; (b) any group explosion with an aggregate yield exceeding 150 kilotons unless the individual explosions can be identified and measured by agreed verification procedures; and (c) any group explosion with an aggregate yield exceeding 1,500 kilotons. As of the end of 1987, the Treaties had not formally entered into force, but it was generally understood that both Powers were in fact adhering to their provisions.

In 1977, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States began trilateral negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-weapon test-ban treaty, which was expected to cover nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes in a separate protocol. The last progress report⁶ on those negotiations was submitted to the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva in 1980, and although it indicated considerable progress, the trilateral negotiations have not been resumed since then.

In the 1978 Final Document, the General Assembly identified the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests as a most important initial measure in working towards the highest priority requirement of nuclear disarmament.⁷ Since then, growing attention has been given to the issue, as a comprehensive test ban has been regarded increasingly as the *sine qua non* for halting and reversing the nuclear-arms race.

In July 1982, the United States announced that while it still considered a comprehensive test ban an ultimate goal, it was not prepared to resume negotiations because, in its view, the international situation was not propitious. It would, however, participate in further work on verification and compliance. The United States has continued to emphasize the need for prior clarification of questions in those areas and to regard the negotiation of deep, verifiable reductions in existing nuclear arsenals as of greater priority than a test ban. The United Kingdom's position has also reflected concern about questions of verification and the scope of a treaty, particularly with regard to nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

Also in 1982, the Soviet Union requested that an item entitled "Immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests" be placed on the agenda of the General Assembly. In that connection, it submitted a document entitled "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests",⁸ and since then it has repeatedly expressed its readiness to enter into negotiations to that end.

With a view to addressing the already long-standing problem of the verification of a ban, the multilateral negotiating body in 1976 established

⁵ Circulated as a General Assembly document (A/31/125). The text is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 1: 1976, appendix III.

⁶ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/35/27)*, appendix II (CD/139), document CD/130.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4), sect. III, paras. 45-51.

⁸ A/37/243 and resolution 37/85, annex; see *The Yearbook*, vol. 7: 1982, chap. X.

the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. The Group continues to work and report to the Conference on Disarmament on this question.

In the 1980s, the Conference on Disarmament has been the main forum involved in efforts to reach a comprehensive test ban. In 1982 and 1983 it was able to reach agreement on the establishment of a subsidiary body with a limited mandate to examine verification and control questions, but not to actually negotiate a treaty. The Conference made no tangible progress in those years, however, because of disagreement over that mandate, and, for the same reason, in 1984, 1985, and 1986 it was not able to agree to establish such a body.

While the socialist States and the group of 21 in the Conference held the view that all questions relating to verification had been adequately studied and the actual negotiation of a treaty must be undertaken, in the opinion of most Western members, consideration of those questions was far from exhausted and the question of scope—the treatment of peaceful nuclear explosions once a comprehensive test ban was concluded—would also have to be examined and some understanding reached before negotiations could begin. In 1985 the Western members proposed a programme of work with a view to fostering practical progress in that context. As in other recent years, however, the Conference could not agree to establish a subsidiary body to consider the nuclear-test-ban item, since the group of 21 and the socialist States, on the one hand, and Western States, on the other, continued to hold divergent opinions regarding its mandate, notwithstanding repeated attempts at finding compromise.

From 1983 to 1986, the General Assembly adopted 15 resolutions on the question of a nuclear-test ban, but only 2 of them without negative votes. The debates reflected continuing disagreement regarding the way the test-ban objective might best be achieved. Most resolutions called for action on the part of the negotiating body; others concerned the possibility of converting the partial test-ban Treaty into a comprehensive instrument or called for the notification of future nuclear tests.

Nuclear-weapon testing has continued since the conclusion of the partial test-ban Treaty in 1963—most of it by the two major Powers—because the States in question have felt that in the existing circumstances their security interests are promoted by developing new weapons, further refining existing ones or, occasionally, confirming the effectiveness of their stocks.

An attempt was made to break this pattern in July 1985, when the Soviet Union announced that starting on 6 August of that year it would unilaterally halt all nuclear explosions until 1 January 1986, or even beyond that date provided the United States would also refrain from carrying out nuclear explosions. Its action was welcomed in the hope that it would give further impetus to the ongoing international efforts to conclude a test ban. In 1986, the Soviet Union renewed its unilateral moratorium four times with a view to enhancing confidence and facilitating the bridging of differences.

However, together with other countries, the United States continued to regard the agreed reduction of numbers of nuclear weapons on the basis of a negotiated, binding treaty as a more urgent issue. At the same time, the United States continued to demand more precise means of verifying and measuring limitations on permitted tests. In July 1985 it unconditionally invited the Soviet Union to send experts to visit a site and observe and measure the yield of a test explosion in order to enhance confidence in compliance-monitoring techniques. In July 1986 an agreement was reached between the Soviet Union and the United States to start bilateral talks on verification issues related to nuclear testing. The talks, focusing particularly on verification and measurement methodology, took place during the remainder of the year.

At the same time, on the multilateral level, several initiatives for halting nuclear testing were made. However, reservations about the urgency of the issue continued to be voiced by a few States, which believed that a lasting improvement in international security did not depend primarily on the early cessation of nuclear testing. Various views were expressed on the significance of a moratorium on nuclear explosions, as a unilateral measure or by mutual agreement.

The Soviet Union announced in February 1987 that it would no longer maintain its nuclear-test moratorium, and it conducted a nuclear-test explosion on 26 February of that year. However, as a result of further contacts, the two Powers announced on 17 September their intention to resume bilateral negotiations by 1 December on a staged approach towards further limitations on nuclear tests as a part of a process of nuclear disarmament, and they commenced those negotiations on 9 November.

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1987

The question of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban has never appeared as a separate item on the Disarmament Commission's agenda. Nevertheless, as had been the case in previous years, it received due attention at the Commission's session in 1987, usually as part of the consideration of the several issues under the item on nuclear disarmament (item 4, see page 13).

In the general exchange of views in plenary meetings, the Soviet Union reaffirmed its proposal for full-scale negotiations on the subject and at the same time advocated a step-by-step movement towards solution of the problem by reducing the yield and number of explosions. Czechoslovakia stated that one positive result of the Soviet moratorium on nuclear tests had been the beginning of the Soviet-American talks in Geneva on the cessation of tests. After several rounds, it appeared that some measures aimed at the limitation of nuclear explosions as well as the ratification of the Soviet-American Treaties of 1974 and 1976 could be achieved. Poland listed a moratorium on all nuclear tests among practical priority measures for the prevention of nuclear war. Mongolia and the Ukrainian SSR also underscored the importance of achieving a ban on nuclear-weapon tests.

New Zealand deeply regretted that once again, at its 1987 session, the Conference on Disarmament had failed to establish an *ad hoc* committee on

a nuclear-test ban. A ban on all testing by all States in all environments for all time, New Zealand stated, presented a practical, verifiable and balanced way of halting the nuclear-arms race, restricting the quantitative and qualitative development of nuclear weapons and demonstrably strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation régime. New Zealand also regretted that France persisted in maintaining a nuclear-testing programme in the South Pacific against the manifest wishes of all independent and self-governing countries of the region. Japan considered the conclusion of a nuclear-test-ban treaty as the priority item in the field of disarmament and wished to see the Conference on Disarmament resume substantive work on that issue.

Regarding proposed negotiations in the Conference on the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, India hoped that the Commission could bring its authority to bear on some of the States that had rejected the idea of negotiations on the basis of "arbitrary and shifting arguments". Nigeria appealed to the nuclear-weapon States and, in particular, the super-Powers to make their positions more flexible so as to facilitate the negotiating task of the Conference on Disarmament.

After the general exchange of views was concluded, the item on the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament was entrusted to a contact group for the formulation of recommendations. The Contact Group continued its work on the basis of the "Compilation of proposals for recommendations on agenda item 4" as it existed at the end of the 1986 session of the Disarmament Commission (see chapter V above) and made progress towards resolving some outstanding issues. However, it was unable to reach agreement on any of the draft texts on the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, and all of them remained in brackets to signify the lack of consensus.⁹

Consideration by the Conference on Disarmament, 1987

In 1987, the Conference on Disarmament devoted the periods between 16 and 27 February and 15 and 26 June to the consideration of the item entitled "Nuclear test ban". In addition, it held a number of intensive informal consultations on the establishment of an *ad hoc* committee on that item.

Several proposals were put forward for a possible compromise mandate for such a committee, including those advanced by the representative of Czechoslovakia in his capacity as President of the Conference for the month of April and by the group of 21, but none of them enjoyed the support of all delegations and were therefore not officially submitted to the Conference for a decision. Apart from the proposals presented informally, eight members¹⁰ of the group of States (mainly non-aligned and neutral) that had co-sponsored General Assembly resolution 41/46 A in 1986 submitted, during the second

⁹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/42/42)*, annex I, sect. I, recommendation 7 and "Text to be added at the end of recommendation No. 7".

¹⁰ Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela and Yugoslavia.

part of the session, a formal proposal for a draft mandate,¹¹ based on the corresponding provisions of the resolution. However, that proposal was also not put to a decision by the Conference. Thus, since no subsidiary body was established to deal with the item, its substantive aspects were considered entirely in plenary meetings¹² as well as in documents of the Conference.¹³

The relationship between a nuclear-test ban and nuclear disarmament, the role of the Conference on Disarmament in the context of resumed Soviet-American bilateral contacts on the issue, and ways and means of creating an effective verification system for a future treaty were among the subjects most frequently referred to by delegations in their statements during the session.

In his message to the Conference, the Secretary-General of the United Nations stressed that no efforts could be spared in the elaboration of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban and that, to that end, fresh and perhaps innovative proposals were needed that would lend a decisive impetus to the Conference's efforts and complement other endeavours in the field.

Early in the session, in connection with the first United States nuclear test in 1987 and the related termination of the Soviet Union's unilateral moratorium, the group of 21 and the group of socialist countries made statements in plenary meetings in which they both regretted the testing and restated their call for a bilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, asserting that it would constitute an important interim measure in working towards a comprehensive nuclear-test ban.

The two major nuclear Powers referred repeatedly to the item in plenary meetings. The United States reiterated that a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing continued to be its long-term objective, which must be viewed in the context of a time when it and its allies would not need to depend on nuclear deterrence to ensure international security and stability. In its view, that condition could not come into being without deep reductions in nuclear arms, substantially improved verification capabilities, expanded confidence-building measures and a greater balance in conventional forces. Accordingly, the United States was seeking effective and verifiable agreements with the Soviet Union on limiting nuclear testing on a gradual basis. Its aim was first to create conditions for the ratification of the 1974 and 1976 Treaties and then to immediately engage in negotiations on ways to implement a step-by-step programme of limiting and ultimately ending nuclear testing, in parallel with a programme to reduce and ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons. It called upon the Conference to undertake actions which could complement, and not compete with, the bilateral efforts, and expressed its willingness to support the establishment of an *ad hoc* committee with an appropriate non-negotiating mandate. In stressing the importance it attached to the effective verification of arms control agreements, including those on nuclear testing, the United States recalled that for many years it had devoted much effort as well as

¹¹ CD/787, appendix I, vol. III, document CD/772.

¹² *Ibid.*, appendix II, vols. I-IV.

¹³ *Ibid.*, appendix I, vol. II, documents CD/743 (socialist States), CD/746 (German Democratic Republic), CD/753 (Canada), CD/756 (socialist States) and CD/763 (Norway), and *ibid.*, vol. III, document CD/775 (Australia and New Zealand).

technical and financial resources to developing and sustaining verification capabilities. It strongly endorsed the work of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events.

The Soviet Union, for its part, stressed that banning nuclear-weapon tests remained for it a priority independent measure for curbing the arms race and subsequently eliminating nuclear weapons. It believed it had demonstrated its commitment to that goal in deed by its 18-month unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions. In order to achieve early progress, the Soviet Union was ready to explore all possibilities and to participate in bilateral, trilateral and multilateral forums. In particular, in its bilateral talks with the United States, it had agreed to proceed in the context of full-scale negotiations on a step-by-step basis, leading to a complete ban. In that connection, the Soviet Union was ready to consider, as a first step, measures conducive to early ratification of the 1974 and the 1976 Treaties, as well as measures to limit the yield of nuclear explosions to one kiloton and to reduce to a minimum the number of such explosions. The Soviet Union believed, however, that bilateral efforts alone could not provide a final solution to the problem and stressed that the preparation of a comprehensive treaty within the Conference should be undertaken concurrently. To that end, it submitted, together with the other socialist members, a document entitled "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests",¹⁴ which, it believed, could constitute a good basis for substantive negotiations within an *ad hoc* committee. The text of the proposal is reproduced in the annex to this chapter. Later in the session, the Soviet Union further proposed that the Conference set up a special group of scientific experts to submit recommendations on the structure and functions of a system of verification for any possible agreement not to conduct nuclear-weapon tests. It also suggested that an international system of global radiation safety monitoring, involving the use of space communication links, be established.

The United Kingdom stressed the importance it attached to reductions in nuclear weapons, which, in its view, should not exclude constraints on nuclear testing as well. It believed that the step-by-step process discussed at the bilateral level was the right way to make substantive and lasting progress in that area, as it took full account of real security concerns. It considered that the Conference should also contribute to that process through the Group of Scientific Experts and by addressing in an *ad hoc* committee the remaining problems, including scope and verification. The United Kingdom also indicated that the President's informal proposal for a mandate for such a committee (see above), combined with an appropriate programme of work, would have been acceptable to it.

France, for its part, did not consider the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing a pre-condition for progress towards nuclear disarmament. It maintained that, on the contrary, the cessation of tests could become significant at the end of a long-term process resulting in real and effective nuclear

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. II, document CD/756.

disarmament. France further stressed that it had conducted less than one tenth of the number of nuclear explosions conducted by the two major nuclear-weapon States, had not carried out tests over 150 kilotons and saw no reason to agree to the "planned obsolescence of its deterrent". It also believed that in a world in which the number of nuclear warheads were reduced by half, the problem of reliability of the remaining weapons could only become more important. Consequently, it was not in a position to participate in work whose objective was the negotiation of an agreement to which it could not subscribe.

China reiterated that once the two States with the largest nuclear arsenals had taken the lead in halting the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and in drastically reducing their nuclear arsenals, it would be prepared to take corresponding measures. It further stated its willingness to participate in a subsidiary body on the item and announced that it would be flexible with regard to that body's terms of reference.

Members of the group of 21 were convinced that early conclusion of a treaty on the complete prohibition of testing of all types of nuclear weapons in all environments by all States would constitute a significant contribution to efforts to end the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of such weapons, as well as to prevent their proliferation.

Sweden, for one, regretted that the goal of achieving a comprehensive test ban was being put off by some to a distant future, to be preceded by the elimination of nuclear weapons. It wondered what the purpose of a test ban would be, once nuclear weapons had been abolished. Citing the latest statistics on nuclear explosions published by the Swedish Defence Research Institute, Sweden pointed out that the total number of such explosions had decreased from 55 in 1984 to 30 in 1985 and 21 in 1986, which showed, in its view, that unilateral measures in the field of disarmament did make a difference. It was pleased to note an improved political climate on the test-ban issue.

Egypt was of the view that a nuclear-test ban was a necessary first step in the attempt to prevent the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and to achieve nuclear disarmament. It was concerned that some nuclear-weapon States insisted on testing on the pretext of maintaining their nuclear deterrent capability. In its view, such an argument was not valid. Sri Lanka referred to a publication on the problem area¹⁵ which drew the conclusion that a comprehensive test ban, together with measures to reduce significantly the size of existing nuclear arsenals and to limit the characteristics of new nuclear-weapon systems, could constrain nuclear capabilities and help to create a new political atmosphere in which the danger of nuclear war would be greatly reduced.

Several non-aligned and neutral countries commented on the bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and the United States on the issue of nuclear testing and their relevance to the multilateral efforts in the area. Pakistan felt that any partial measures should be adopted in the context of a legally binding

¹⁵ Palme Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, *Toward a Comprehensive Test Ban* (Boras, 1987).

commitment to conclude, within a short and pre-determined time, a comprehensive ban, covering all nuclear explosions by all States in all environments for all times. In its view, bilateral talks did not offer an acceptable substitute or alternative to negotiations in the Conference. A comprehensive test ban, being multilateral in nature, ought to be negotiated multilaterally. Sweden also maintained that a partial agreement that left room for continued testing would be insufficient. For any such agreement to be meaningful, it must include a clear commitment to reach a comprehensive test ban at an early, specified date, and provide for substantial reductions and real constraints on the ability to develop nuclear weapons. A number of countries, including Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, India and Pakistan, called on the two participants in the talks to inform the Conference regularly of their progress.

Many non-aligned and neutral members stressed the primary role that the Conference should play in achieving a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. They called for the immediate commencement of negotiations in an *ad hoc* committee with an appropriate mandate, based on their proposals submitted in previous years.¹⁶ India, in particular, expressed on several occasions its fear that the setting up of a committee without a mandate to initiate multilateral negotiations of a treaty would defeat the very objective the Conference wished to achieve and might only create an illusion of movement. Other members, including Pakistan and Sweden, repeatedly expressed their belief that disagreement over certain aspects of a mandate must not prevent the Conference from beginning substantive work on the agenda item.

Following the eight delegations' submission of a draft mandate for an *ad hoc* committee in the latter part of the session (see above), Mexico stressed that the draft's formulation "with the objective of carrying out" allowed for different interpretations: it permitted members to interpret the objective as either "immediate" or "long-term", and thus to accept the text without abandoning their positions. Several members of the group of 21, including Argentina, India, Mexico and Sweden, reaffirmed their belief that the issues of verification and compliance could no longer be regarded as an obstacle to early achievement of a comprehensive test ban. They drew attention to the proposals contained in the document on verification measures issued at the Mexico summit of the heads of State or Government of six States on 7 August 1986.¹⁷

A group of Western countries emphasized in statements and in documents submitted during the session¹⁸ the high priority they continued to attach to the item and the fact that they shared the hope of commencing substantive work in an *ad hoc* committee without further delay. Japan considered the achievement of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban a priority and wished to see the Conference resume substantive work on the issue. In that connection, it referred to three factors: general expectation in the Conference that substantive

¹⁶ For the latest version (1986), see CD/732, appendix I, document CD/520/Rev.2.

¹⁷ Attachment to document A/41/518-S/18277. The document is reproduced in *The Year-book*, vol. 11: 1986, chapter VIII, annex.

¹⁸ CD/787, appendix I, vol. II, documents CD/753 and CD/763, and *ibid.*, vol. III, document CD/775.

work on the issue would begin, a shared perception of the subject-matter, and recognition of the importance of verification and willingness to participate in its implementation.

Australia noted some convergence of positions and appealed for the prompt resumption of substantive work in the Conference, so that by the time the treaty was ready and open for signature and implementation, the international community would possess technical means of verification to bring the treaty into immediate action. The Federal Republic of Germany felt that the documents submitted on the issue in 1987 amply substantiated the claim that significant progress towards common concepts and methodology had been achieved. The time had come to discuss, among other things, those common concepts within an *ad hoc* committee to be established at the earliest possible juncture.

In that connection, Western delegations maintained that the draft mandate that they had submitted in 1984¹⁹ as well as the draft programme of work submitted in 1985²⁰ continued to provide a viable framework in which to commence and carry out the substantive examination of many issues relating to a comprehensive test ban. The group was ready to consider positively any initiative to solve the mandate question in order to start practical work. In that spirit, members of the group expressed their readiness to consider the informal proposal made by the President of the Conference for the month of April as a basis for developing a consensus. They felt, however, that the draft mandate submitted by the eight non-aligned and neutral delegations did not involve a new approach, and they emphasized the need for further consultations on the matter.

Western States expressed their satisfaction with the bilateral discussions on nuclear testing. They felt that a gradual approach offered the best chance for early progress in that area. According to Italy, the problem of a comprehensive test ban could not be discussed separately from other issues concerning disarmament and strategic stability. It held, therefore, that positive results would best be achieved through a step-by-step approach and that a solution would be easier if substantial and balanced reductions in the number and quality of offensive weapons could be agreed upon and implemented. For the Netherlands, a comprehensive test ban remained an important tool to slow down the nuclear-arms race, but could never be a substitute for deep cuts in nuclear arsenals. It hoped that the two major nuclear Powers would continue to explore the possibilities of reducing the tests, both quantitatively and qualitatively, in relation to the reduction of arsenals. Japan recalled its 1984 proposal for a step-by-step approach, whereby those nuclear tests that were currently verifiable would be prohibited, and as progress was made in verification technologies, the scope of prohibition would be expanded, finally arriving at a comprehensive prohibition.

Western delegations also emphasized the importance of verification for

¹⁹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/39/27)*, appendix II (CD/540), document CD/521.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, *Fortieth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/40/27 and Corr.1)*, appendix II (CD/642), document CD/621.

a nuclear-test ban and the need to address all its aspects in a practical and goal-oriented manner. Australia called attention to its proposal, made in 1986,²¹ that the Conference decide to establish a permanent global seismic monitoring network and pointed out that that could be achieved by keeping the network to be established for the second global experiment of the Group of Scientific Experts permanently operational. Australia, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan as well as two non-members, New Zealand and Norway, stressed the efforts undertaken on a national level to contribute to a possible verification system for a nuclear-test ban.

Socialist States continued to regard the cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests as an important independent measure in curbing the nuclear-arms race. They considered that a comprehensive ban was a high priority measure designed to put an end to the development, manufacture and refinement of nuclear arms and to bring about their reduction and elimination. Socialist countries held that extensive negotiations should be started without further delay to work out pertinent accords and stressed that all avenues should be explored to that end, including, *inter alia*, bilateral, trilateral or multilateral negotiations, appropriate interim measures, the start of preparatory work to establish an international monitoring network to verify compliance with a comprehensive test ban and the convening of a conference of the parties to the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty to consider possible amendments to convert it into a comprehensive ban. Socialist States further maintained that the Conference on Disarmament should play a more active role with regard to the item. Reaffirming their belief in the need to proceed promptly to negotiations on that item, they expressed the wish that all sides would display a readiness for compromise, which would enable the Conference to establish an *ad hoc* committee and commence substantive work. In two working papers circulated during the 1987 session,²² they offered their concrete suggestions regarding a possible mandate, structure and programme of work for such a committee.

According to Hungary, the General Assembly resolutions adopted on the issue had shown a certain convergence of views—a fact that called for appropriate follow-up in the Conference. That body must, therefore, set up an *ad hoc* committee and proceed to practical work without delay, Hungary maintained. The aim should be to prepare a treaty that would effectively ban all test explosions of nuclear weapons by all States everywhere and would contain provisions, acceptable to all, to make it impossible to circumvent the ban by conducting nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The German Democratic Republic was ready to participate in goal-oriented discussions on the issue, including all related aspects, but warned that they should not be a mere repetition of the practices in which the *Ad Hoc* Committee of 1983 had indulged. Poland was also in favour of promptly establishing a subsidiary body on the item, which could undertake business-like work on the scope, compliance and verification of a treaty.

²¹ CD/732, appendix I, document CD/717.

²² CD/787, appendix I, vol. II, documents CD/743 and CD/746.

As mentioned above, during the second part of the Conference's session, members of the socialist group submitted a document entitled "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests".²³ By putting forward that proposal, which they felt could serve as a sound basis for work, the sponsors hoped to stimulate an early start of substantive, full-scale negotiations at the Conference. They expressed their readiness to go as far as their partners were prepared to go in the thorough elaboration of all the necessary specific arrangements on test-ban verification, and they considered, in that context, that the co-operative measures suggested in the verification document attached to the Mexico Declaration of 7 August 1986 could constitute an important step towards a verification system for a comprehensive test ban.

Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Czechoslovakia and Poland made a number of individual statements in further elaboration of the "Basic provisions", in particular its verification proposals, including declarations of location of test sites, the setting up of an international inspectorate and mandatory on-site inspections. Later in the session, members of the socialist group expressed their support for the draft mandate that the eight non-aligned and neutral delegations had submitted, as well as for the new initiatives advanced by the Soviet Union concerning the setting up of a special group of scientific experts to deal with the structure and functions of a verification system for a test ban and the establishment of an international system of global radiation safety monitoring. At the same time, the socialist States appreciated the efforts of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts and favoured the continuation of its work in order to prepare for a large-scale experiment in seismic verification.

In 1987, the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts held its twenty-third and twenty-fourth sessions from 2 to 13 March and from 27 July to 7 August, respectively, under the continuing chairmanship of Dr. Ola Dahlman of Sweden. In their two progress reports,²⁴ the experts informed the Conference of their work on the design of a modern international system for the exchange of seismic data for the verification of a nuclear-test ban. They envisaged that the system would encompass the exchange of waveform (Level II) data and an up-to-date communication system, including satellite links. The experts also informed the Conference of their further preparations for a large-scale experiment on seismic data exchange, planned for 1988.

The work of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts received favourable review from practically all the members of the Conference, which adopted its two progress reports by consensus.

Speaking for the group of socialist countries in a closing statement at the end of the session, Bulgaria expressed its conviction that the time was ripe to remove all the artificial barriers preventing effective work by the Conference in preparing a draft nuclear-test ban. The socialist States were convinced of the need to establish an *ad hoc* committee and expressed support

²³ See footnote 14.

²⁴ CD/787, appendix I, vol. II, document CD/745, and *ibid.*, vol. III, document CD/778.

for the draft mandate submitted by the group of 21.

The closing Western view, conveyed by Japan, was that the search for a mandate that would enable the Conference to start substantive and practical work on the item should be pursued in 1988 and that the initiative taken by the President for the month of April should be implemented.

In speaking on behalf of the group of 21, Algeria expressed disappointment over the continued lack of progress on the item, to which it attached special priority. Brazil, Egypt, Mexico, Pakistan and Sweden also noted the efforts made by the group of 21 to pave the way for an understanding with other groups and regretted what they considered the lack of flexibility on the issue shown by some members.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1987

In his 1987 report on the work of the Organization,²⁵ the Secretary-General of the United Nations pointed to the desirability of early agreement on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, which for many years had been seen in the United Nations as a measure having cardinal importance. He went on to observe that testing directed at developing new weapons or perfecting those deployed would mitigate the value of eliminating one type of missile and perpetuate competition and mistrust.

Although the main debate on the test-ban question took place as usual in the First Committee,²⁶ the widespread importance attached to it was made evident by the large number of non-nuclear-weapon States which singled it out in the plenary general debate as well,²⁷ invariably indicating support for the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing. Representing all regions and political groupings, some of the speakers were Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Democratic Yemen, Ecuador, Ethiopia, the German Democratic Republic, Greece, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden and Zimbabwe. Among those which dwelt at some length on the issue were Australia and New Zealand, which announced their intention to submit draft resolutions and stressed the need to break the impasse in the Conference on Disarmament; Bulgaria and Mongolia, which were encouraged by the forthcoming bilateral negotiations that the major nuclear Powers had announced would commence by the beginning of December; and Fiji and Papua New Guinea, which opposed nuclear testing by France in the Mururoa Atoll in the South Pacific. France, for its part, responded to that objection by stating that it had a legitimate right to conduct nuclear tests in its own territory when they did not disturb peace and security or affect health or the environment.

In the First Committee, the United States recalled that during the September meeting between Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Shev-

²⁵ United Nations booklet, DPI/916; the report was initially issued as a General Assembly document (A/42/1).

²⁶ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, First Committee*, 3rd to 33rd and 43rd meetings, and *ibid.*, *Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, *Forty-second Session, Plenary Meetings*, 4th to 33rd meetings.

ardnadze, the two Powers had agreed to begin full-scale, stage-by-stage negotiations on nuclear-testing issues before 1 December 1987. The first order of business in those negotiations would be to agree on verification measures leading to ratification of the 1974 threshold test-ban Treaty and the 1976 peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty. It went on to note that they had also agreed to “proceed to negotiating further intermediate limitations on nuclear testing leading to the ultimate objective of the complete cessation of nuclear testing as part of an effective disarmament process. This process, among other things, would pursue, as the first priority, the goal of the reduction of nuclear weapons and, ultimately, their elimination”.²⁸

In addition, the United States supported the establishment of a subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament to consider issues related to a nuclear-test-ban treaty, such as scope, verification and compliance, and the continuation of the work of the Conference’s Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. The United States also recalled its invitations to Soviet officials and scientists to visit its test site, both on a reciprocal basis and without any conditions, in the interest of examining methodologies for estimating the yield of test explosions, and noted that those invitations had yet to receive a response.

Similarly, for the Soviet Union, an important outcome of the Ministers’ meeting had been the agreement to begin, even before 1 December 1987, full-scale, step-by-step talks with the ultimate purpose of totally banning nuclear tests. It also affirmed that the first step would be to achieve ratification of the 1974 and 1976 Treaties. The Soviet Union and the United States would then seek further interim limitations on nuclear testing, utilizing joint verification experiments in the process. At the same time, the Soviet Union stressed that it continued to deem it possible to reach agreement on an immediate cessation of all nuclear explosions, and noted that it had consistently sought full-fledged negotiations on the subject, both in the Conference on Disarmament and with the United States, bilaterally, and that it could also agree to a trilateral approach. It recalled, in that connection, the document entitled “Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests”, which the socialist countries had put forward in the Conference on Disarmament (see the annex to this chapter).

The Soviet Union also announced its support of the Assembly’s appeal in resolution 41/59 N, on the notification of nuclear tests, and later submitted to the Assembly²⁹ data on the tests it had conducted since resuming them in February 1987. Finally, it referred to its test-calibrating experiment being carried out jointly by Soviet and American scientists using non-nuclear underground explosives, and noted that its experiment had been observed by American congressmen, but that there had been no reciprocal invitation for it to observe American nuclear explosions. Later, on 27 October, the Soviet Union confirmed that the stage-by-stage bilateral negotiations would start on 9 November in Geneva.

²⁸ A/43/58, annex.

²⁹ A/42/541/Add.1.

France indicated again that when the three well-known conditions relating to the non-development of defensive systems, current conventional and chemical imbalance, and the disparity between arsenals had been met, there could be due participation and true nuclear disarmament. Until then, it had to maintain the credibility of its strategic forces at the necessary levels, which required that it continue nuclear testing. France also noted that in 1987 it had welcomed several heads of State or Government of the South Pacific to the Mururoa testing site and was also ready to welcome political and governmental officials from the five coastal Pacific Andean countries. Moreover, it stated that no other nuclear-weapon State had offered comparable environmental safety guarantees in respect of its testing activities.

Denmark, speaking on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community, stated that they had taken note of the Soviet-American agreement to initiate bilateral, stage-by-stage negotiations that would make the ratification of the 1974 and 1976 bilateral Treaties and further intermediate limitations possible, leading to the ultimate objective of the complete cessation of nuclear testing. Denmark also recalled that the Group of Scientific Experts established by the Conference on Disarmament was considering various technical problems concerning verification, and stated that the Twelve were looking forward to the experts' continuing their useful work.

Australia welcomed the Soviet-American agreement to commence full-scale, stage-by-stage negotiations on nuclear testing, leading to its ultimate cessation. With narrowing differences evident in the Conference on Disarmament, Australia also hoped that a way could be found that would lead towards the collective negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Such an achievement would powerfully demonstrate the effectiveness of multilateral negotiations.

The Federal Republic of Germany and Italy, feeling encouraged by the understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union to resume negotiations on nuclear testing, stressed that they had long favoured a step-by-step or gradual approach to the test-ban question because experience had shown the futility of "all-or-nothing" policies. Japan similarly noted that in 1984 it had proposed in the Conference on Disarmament a step-by-step approach consisting of a ban on test explosions above a certain threshold, at a yield currently considered to be technically verifiable, and then a lowering of the threshold as verification capabilities improved, thus leading ultimately to a comprehensive test ban. It regarded that approach, which had gained the support of a number of countries, as one of the soundest and most technically feasible that had been put forward, and it hoped that it would be seriously studied in the Conference.³⁰ Japan also drew attention to the requirement for an international seismic monitoring network for verification and to the indispensable role that the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts had to play in that regard. Accordingly, the Conference must give an appropriate orientation to the experts' work. Japan felt that the General Assembly's efforts should be concentrated on the adoption of a resolution based on a broad consensus.

³⁰ See *The Yearbook*, vol. 9: 1984, chap. IX.

New Zealand believed that a test-ban treaty was the single step that would do more than any other to slow the remorseless advance of nuclear weapons development and reduce the prospect that other countries would acquire nuclear weapons. It strongly questioned the validity of the claim that testing was necessary to ensure the reliability of existing weapons and also held that the technology and techniques upon which verification of a treaty would depend were currently available.

Bulgaria looked upon readiness to work for early conclusion of a treaty on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests as proof of the defensive character of any military doctrine. Among others, it noted that the socialist countries in the Conference on Disarmament had submitted a document setting forth the basic provisions of a treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests. That document offered new approaches to the key issues, as evidenced by the comprehensive verification measures that it envisaged, ranging from announcing testing-site locations to establishing an institution of international inspectors. It added that the agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union to start negotiations should not doom the Conference on Disarmament to inaction, as bilateral negotiations and multilateral efforts for an international treaty should complement each other. The other Eastern European States also referred to the socialist initiative in the Conference and similarly called for its support in the context of complementary efforts leading to a true, international test-ban treaty.

Czechoslovakia felt that the example of the lengthy 1985-1986 Soviet moratorium and the level of technical means already achieved for verification clearly showed that the conclusion of a treaty was a realistic possibility. It called attention to the suggestion of the Warsaw Treaty countries that a special group of scientist-experts be set up to prepare without delay practical proposals for a system of verification and noted the socialist States' readiness to also consider in a constructive manner any other proposals aimed at speedy results.

The German Democratic Republic referred to the same indicators, the Declarations of the heads of State or Government of the countries of the five-continent peace initiative, including the document on verification measures issued in August 1986, and proposals of other countries and non-governmental organizations as proof that there were no technical obstacles whatsoever to a comprehensive and reliably verifiable test-ban treaty. It also observed, as had the Secretary-General and others, that continuation of testing would mitigate the value of eliminating one existing type of missile. The Ukrainian SSR emphasized that all statements to the effect that control over the non-conduct of nuclear explosions was impossible were utterly groundless. It went on to point out that most of the experts who had participated in the Moscow forum of scientists for ending nuclear tests, held in July 1986, had come to the conclusion that nuclear explosions with a yield of 20 to 30 kilotons could be reliably recorded at distances of up to 2,000 or 3,000 kilometres.

Algeria also expressed the view that bilateral negotiations should not be allowed to overshadow, but should rather boost, multilateral negotiations on a test ban, particularly in the Conference on Disarmament. It was therefore imperative for negotiations to be embarked upon urgently through the creation

of subsidiary organs in that body. It added that technological progress, accompanied by strict rules for inspection and monitoring, made it possible to establish a satisfactory threshold of verification.

Burma stated that the group of 21 in the Conference had reaffirmed, both collectively and in individual statements, the utmost importance that they continued to attach to the urgent conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, believing it would make a significant contribution to efforts to end the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons. Later, it expressed the view that a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests was a prerequisite to nuclear disarmament and an effective measure for the prevention of nuclear war. In that context, it maintained that a test ban under effective compliance procedures could curb the advancement of nuclear-weapon technology and impose equal and non-discriminatory constraints, thereby enhancing strategic stability and furthering a process of nuclear disarmament. Burma also noted the importance of public opinion, saying that the expressed concerns of the international community had been a factor leading to the first moratorium on nuclear testing, in 1958. Since that time, no other disarmament issue had been subjected to deliberations as much as the banning of nuclear tests: what was required in 1987 was a political commitment. India was another State which held that the basic question was not technical, but political.

Chile, as a coastal State on the Pacific Ocean, placed on record once again its strong protest against the nuclear tests held in the region and reiterated the position of the countries members of the South Pacific Standing Commission: they vigorously rejected the nuclear explosions in that geographical area since they constituted a grave threat to the marine environment and its natural resources. If the tests posed no danger, one wondered why they were being carried out so far from the continental frontiers of the country conducting them.

Mexico noted the strong voting record in support of the previous year's resolution 41/46 A and certain points made in it: the Assembly had adopted more than fifty resolutions on nuclear testing and had condemned tests in the strongest terms eight times since 1974. The resolution had appealed to the Conference on Disarmament to promote, at the beginning of its 1987 session, the establishment of an *ad hoc* committee with the objective of carrying out the multilateral negotiation of a treaty on the complete cessation of nuclear-test explosions. Mexico emphasized that the phrase "with the objective of" contained in the new draft mandate put forward by eight States of the group of 21 in the Conference on Disarmament could be interpreted in different ways and that delegations could therefore state for the record their own interpretations. But, because it had not been possible for the Conference to reach consensus on the draft, it was necessary for the First Committee to reiterate again in 1987, in especially strong terms, its previous calls for a solution to the problem of a mandate.

Pakistan also referred to the flexibility shown on the question of a mandate by the group of 21, which had not been reciprocated by the Western members. Yugoslavia, while welcoming the prospect of the start of talks between the super-Powers, also felt that the proposal of the group of 21 provided a good

basis for negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament. It observed that conclusion of an agreement on a test ban would provide the best proof of the readiness of the two Powers to intensify and speed up the process they had started. Nigeria took the position that the step-by-step approach to the question being contemplated by the super-Powers fell short of the objectives of a test ban and could, in fact, be counter-productive by licensing nuclear testing within a permitted yield range.

Austria compared the first seven months of 1987 with the same period in 1986, pointing out that the estimated number of nuclear-test explosions had risen from 12 to 27. It recalled its public appeal of 3 February to the Governments of the two super-Powers to renounce further nuclear testing, pending the conclusion of a treaty. Noting that for the past several sessions there had been three resolutions on the question, Austria—as a sponsor of some of them—urged that no effort be spared to combine the texts. It also viewed the agreement between the Soviet Academy of Sciences and a group of United States scientists to co-operate in monitoring tests as a step towards gaining the expertise required to do so reliably.

Finland, while holding that a comprehensive, verifiable test-ban treaty ought to be immediately negotiable, also recognized the validity of a gradual approach as long as it was firmly geared to the ultimate goal, and regarded the new Soviet-American talks as complementing the multilateral efforts of the Conference on Disarmament. It hoped that the multilateral efforts in that area would gain fresh momentum. Sweden was concerned that the mandate for the new bilateral negotiations seemed to treat a complete test ban merely as a distant goal. That was not, in its view, acceptable. Rather, there must be a clear commitment to reach a comprehensive test ban at an early, specified date. Moreover, Sweden pointed out, it was only in the multilateral forum that a multilateral test-ban treaty could be negotiated and concluded, so the two major Powers should be called upon to report their progress to the Conference on Disarmament. Sweden was concerned that in the course of the bilateral negotiations, the members of the multilateral forum could be pushed aside, fall into oblivion, or—as was the case with the partial test-ban Treaty—be asked to sign and ratify a ready-made product of modest disarmament value.

On 3 November, the point in the debate where the draft resolutions were due to be introduced, Hungary made a detailed position statement. It regarded the comprehensive cessation of nuclear-weapon tests as the central and most urgent issue for progressing towards nuclear disarmament, as had been confirmed by the Warsaw Treaty members in the communiqué of the Prague meeting of their foreign ministers on 28 and 29 October.³¹ Therefore, since the elaboration of a comprehensive treaty was more than a matter of months, work on it must be started immediately. Reasonable, partial measures that might facilitate reaching that goal would be timely, provided they were not meant as a substitute. Work at the bilateral level and the elaboration of a comprehensive treaty by the Conference on Disarmament should thus be

³¹ AJ/42/708 and Corr.1 .

undertaken concurrently, with groups of scientific experts starting parallel practical work on the structure and functions of a system of verification.

Hungary went on to note that for years it had submitted a separate draft resolution on the item on behalf of several countries. It would not do so in 1987, but it wished to make clear that that did not imply that it gave the matter less importance. On the contrary, its decision had been influenced by the favourable climate which at last seemed to make possible substantive progress towards effective multilateral disarmament and significant enhancement of the United Nations role. In addition, Hungary saw that the proliferation of resolutions—which provided an inverse index of the effectiveness of the United Nations—was continuing despite the fact that almost all delegations favoured halting the trend.

In 1987, four draft resolutions on a nuclear-test ban, as opposed to five in 1986, were introduced in the First Committee: two by Mexico, one by New Zealand and one by Australia. The first draft introduced by Mexico and the one introduced by New Zealand dealt with the Conference on Disarmament's work on a test ban; the second draft introduced by Mexico dealt with the possibility of converting the partial test-ban Treaty into a comprehensive treaty; and the draft introduced by Australia dealt with the notification of tests. The First Committee took action on all four drafts on 12 November. Two nuclear-weapon States, the Soviet Union and France, made single statements explaining their votes on all four proposals (affirmative in the case of the Soviet Union, and negative in the case of France). Czechoslovakia and Albania also made single statements explaining their affirmative votes on the four proposals. These explanations of vote are summarized below, immediately before the texts of the resolutions.

The two proposals introduced by Mexico were again submitted, as in 1986, under the item entitled "Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions". The first was also sponsored by Finland, Indonesia, Ireland, Kenya, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela and Yugoslavia and, later, by Romania and Uruguay. In introducing it on 2 November, Mexico pointed out that the question had been examined for more than thirty years, was the subject of more than fifty resolutions, and had repeatedly been assigned the highest priority. By the draft, the Assembly would appeal to the Conference on Disarmament to promote the establishment at the beginning of its 1988 session of an *ad hoc* committee with the objective of the multilateral negotiation of a comprehensive treaty; recommend that the *Ad Hoc* Committee comprise two working groups dealing with contents and scope, on the one hand, and compliance and verification, on the other; and call upon the depositaries of the partial test-ban Treaty and the non-proliferation Treaty to halt without delay all nuclear-test explosions.

Proceeding to the second draft, which was also sponsored by Indonesia, Peru, Sri Lanka, Venezuela and Yugoslavia, Mexico called attention to the fact that article II of the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty provided for a procedure for the consideration and eventual adoption of amendments to the Treaty through a conference of all its parties. The draft proposed that the non-nuclear-weapon States parties submit an amendment proposal to the depositary Gov-

ernments with a view to convening such a conference and converting the Treaty into a comprehensive instrument. Mexico noted that the Assembly had been considering that approach since 1985.

Both draft resolutions were approved by the First Committee on 12 November, the first by a vote of 116 to 3 (France, United Kingdom and United States), with 14 abstentions, and the second by a vote of 101 to 3 (the same States), with 24 abstentions. A number of States explained their positions.

Among those that voted in favour of both drafts, Argentina felt that the first one clarified the mandate to the Conference on Disarmament to initiate action. While it also voted for the second proposal, it expressed its preference for working out a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty in the Conference on Disarmament, since it was a multilateral forum in which the five nuclear-weapon States were represented. India, which explained its position on the first draft, attached critical importance to the establishment of an *ad hoc* committee and to its mandate, as in its view the commencement of negotiations was the "acid test" of commitment to the objective. In supporting the proposal, it also noted that the scope of the treaty envisaged in it was at variance with the generally accepted one, but felt that the negotiations would suitably determine the scope. In view of the probability that the negotiations would take time, it felt that, pending the conclusion of a treaty, all nuclear-weapon States should suspend the testing of nuclear weapons.

Several States that voted in favour of the first draft and abstained on the second explained their votes. Australia expressed its reservation with regard to the first text, which it supported, saying that it could be interpreted as sanctioning so-called peaceful nuclear explosions. Australia also found difficulty with the singling out of certain States' testing and the mention of a moratorium. It abstained on the second proposal because of its commitment to direct negotiations on a comprehensive treaty. New Zealand supported the first draft, with two reservations: (a) it would have liked more emphasis on the responsibilities of nuclear-weapon-States not parties to the partial test-ban Treaty and (b) there should be no possible ambiguity about the ban's application to all nuclear tests. Denmark considered the formulation of the first draft a movement in the right direction and hoped that it would be reflected in the positions taken in the Conference on Disarmament, thus enabling that body to establish an *ad hoc* committee on the question. Norway noted that the first draft specified interrelated questions which could be dealt with by a committee of the Conference. Denmark, New Zealand and Norway abstained on the second initiative because they deemed the idea of amending the partial test-ban Treaty to be neither feasible nor practical.

Among those that abstained on both drafts introduced by Mexico, Japan emphasized that it attached priority to a comprehensive test ban and to the commencement of substantive work in an *ad hoc* committee on the item. The Netherlands had difficulty with the concept of a moratorium and felt that the text did not reflect important new developments. It also felt that the approach taken in the second proposal was not realistic. Zambia abstained on both texts because of their reference to the non-proliferation Treaty, to which it was not a party.

The draft text introduced by New Zealand on 2 November and entitled "Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty" was co-sponsored by Australia, Austria, the Bahamas, Brunei Darussalam, Cameroon, Canada, Denmark, Fiji, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Liberia, Malaysia, Norway, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sweden, Vanuatu and Zaire and, later, by Barbados, Rwanda and Thailand. New Zealand noted their shared belief that a nuclear war could not be won and must never be fought and that there was an urgent need for an end to the nuclear-arms race, an immediate reduction of nuclear weapons and, ultimately, their elimination. The sponsors felt that their text offered the best approach to early conclusion of a comprehensive treaty. In the words of the text, the Conference on Disarmament should initiate substantive work at the beginning of its 1988 session. The draft identified steps that the nuclear-weapon States should take, including appropriate, verifiable, interim measures. Australia, in commenting on the draft, added that: (a) the nuclear-weapon States, especially those carrying out the most test explosions, had a fundamental responsibility for early action; (b) multilateral action also must take place if the treaty was to be comprehensive and global; and (c) because of the verification requirement, immediate steps towards the establishment of an international monitoring network were called for. Australia also noted that the text was free of declaratory or condemnatory language.

In connection with action on the draft in the First Committee, Mexico and New Zealand expressed regret that lack of time had not permitted the merging of the draft introduced by New Zealand and the first draft introduced by Mexico and hoped that such a merger would be possible in 1988. Australia, too, placed on record its great disappointment that there were still two drafts on a comprehensive test ban.

Some States explained their affirmative votes. Belgium would have liked the bilateral negotiations to be stressed even more in the text and it supported the prospect of limiting the number of nuclear tests. Canada, in announcing its co-sponsorship, emphasized that the draft resolution focused on the role of the Conference on Disarmament. Denmark, also a sponsor, stated that it felt that the proposal offered the most constructive and realistic approach. The Federal Republic of Germany stressed the importance of verification and stated that it had fulfilled the invitation made in operative paragraph 3 by establishing a seismic data centre at Gafenberg. Mexico stated that while it welcomed the new bilateral negotiations, it did not concur with the procedure they involved, which might produce results only "in the next century". Samoa, speaking on behalf of the members of the South Pacific Forum, announced their support of the proposal, noting that their region was the only one in which testing was carried out outside the territory of a nuclear-weapon State. Venezuela, while also supporting the proposal, felt that the sole activity that the Conference on Disarmament should carry out was the initiation of substantive negotiations; it was doubtful, therefore, about paragraphs 3 (a) and (c) (see below).

Among those that abstained, Argentina noted that the text did not call explicitly for the immediate initiation of negotiations. Similarly, India ob-

served that the text failed to mention the formation of an *ad hoc* committee in the Conference on Disarmament.

The United States, which voted negatively, explained that in some respects the text was in fundamental conflict with its policy on nuclear-testing limitations. It had agreed upon stage-by-stage negotiations with the Soviet Union—the first stage being to reach agreement on verification measures—and those negotiations were under way. The United States reiterated its belief that a comprehensive test ban had to be viewed in the context of a time when it would not be necessary to depend on nuclear deterrence to ensure international security. It supported, however, further work on an international seismic monitoring network. In conclusion, it regarded reducing the number of deployed nuclear weapons as a far more urgent matter than achieving a comprehensive test ban.

In recorded voting in the First Committee, operative paragraph 3 was first approved by a separate recorded vote of 114 (including United States) to none, with 15 abstentions (including France and United Kingdom). The draft as a whole was then approved by 122 to 2 (France and United States), with 8 abstentions (including China and United Kingdom).

Following the votes on the draft resolution it had introduced and the first draft introduced by Mexico, New Zealand expressed disappointment that, contrary to the desire of the overwhelming majority of Member States, four of the nuclear-weapon States had felt themselves unable to support either of the test-ban texts and two had voted against both of them. That cast doubt, it stated, on whether there was a commitment to realistic progress in the area.

The fourth draft resolution was entitled “Notification of nuclear tests” and sponsored by Australia, Austria, Cameroon, Fiji, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Samoa and Sweden. In introducing it on 4 November, Australia noted that resolution 41/59 N of the previous year had called upon States conducting nuclear explosions to provide the Secretary-General with specific data thereon. The draft before the Committee called on all States to comply with resolution 41/59 N, urging those conducting nuclear explosions to provide the Secretary-General within one week of data on each test and inviting all others to provide any other such data.

The First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 121 to 1 (France), with 8 abstentions (including China, United Kingdom and United States).

Some States that supported the draft resolution explained their positions. Argentina felt that the notifications would provide the United Nations with data of the greatest interest. Denmark shared the view that the measures in question would be conducive to conclusion of a comprehensive ban. The Federal Republic of Germany voted in favour to emphasize its commitment to the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban, which it hoped would materialize at the earliest possible date. Norway noted that through its Norwegian Seismic Array (NORSAR), it had special competence in monitoring nuclear explosions.

The United States abstained in the vote on the proposal because it was unable to support its purpose of furthering or accelerating the drive towards

a comprehensive test ban; the United States urged States to work with it to bring about the nuclear-arms reductions that would create the appropriate context for such a ban. Moreover, it noted that it routinely announced information about its nuclear explosions and did not rule out the idea of confidence-building measures involving the reciprocal exchange of information on such tests.

As mentioned above, the Soviet Union, France, Czechoslovakia and Albania explained their positions in single statements covering all four proposals. The Soviet Union announced that it would support all four drafts and that Mexico's first one, aimed at an early ban, was most in keeping with its position; it was also prepared to take practical steps to extend the 1963 Treaty to include underground tests. Moreover, it reaffirmed that it would send the United Nations information on its nuclear tests, in accordance with the fourth proposal. France, for its part, explained its four negative votes on the grounds that the texts did not treat the question of nuclear tests appropriately. In its view, the banning of nuclear tests had to be part of an effective nuclear disarmament process and could only happen when progress was such that a ban would not jeopardize international security. A test ban could not be regarded as a prerequisite, even a priority, given the need for reductions in the largest nuclear arsenals. Accordingly, France would keep its deterrent force to the minimum required to maintain its security. Czechoslovakia stated that its affirmative votes were based on the conviction that the question was one of the priorities in negotiations and that the cessation of testing was a prerequisite for a non-nuclear world. Regarding the proposal introduced by Australia, it voted affirmatively on the understanding that notification of tests did not constitute an end in itself. Albania's affirmative votes reflected its concern about the intensification of the nuclear-arms race and the continuance of testing. It had reservations, however, to the extent that the draft resolutions failed to point out that the super-Powers were responsible for that intensification and continuance, thus increasing the danger of nuclear war and the threat to the planet.

On 30 November³² the General Assembly adopted the four resolutions, as recommended by the First Committee, as follows.

The first draft resolution introduced by Mexico was adopted by a recorded vote of 137 to 3, with 14 abstentions, as resolution 42/26 A. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind that the complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, which has been examined for more than thirty years and on which the General Assembly has adopted more than fifty resolutions, is a basic objective of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament, to the attainment of which it has repeatedly assigned the highest priority,

Stressing that on eight different occasions it has condemned such tests in the strongest terms and that, since 1974, it had stated its conviction that the continuance of nuclear-weapon testing will intensify the arms race, thus increasing the danger of nuclear war,

Recalling that the Secretary-General, addressing a plenary meeting of the General Assembly

³² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Plenary Meetings, 84th meeting.*

on 12 December 1984, after appealing for a renewed effort towards a comprehensive test-ban treaty, emphasized that no single multilateral agreement could have a greater effect on limiting the further refinement of nuclear weapons and that a comprehensive test-ban treaty is the litmus test of the real willingness to pursue nuclear disarmament,

Taking into account that the three nuclear-weapon States that act as depositaries of the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water undertook in article I of that Treaty to conclude a treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear-test explosions, including all those explosions underground, and that such an undertaking was reiterated in 1968 in the preamble to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, article VI of which further embodies their solemn and legally binding commitment to take effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear-arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament,

Bearing in mind that the same three nuclear-weapon States, in the report they submitted on 30 July 1980 to the Committee on Disarmament after four years of trilateral negotiations, stated, *inter alia*, that they were “mindful of the great value for all mankind that the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon test explosions in all environments will have” as well as “conscious of the important responsibility placed upon them to find solutions to the remaining problems”, adding furthermore that they were “determined to exert their best efforts and necessary will and persistence to bring the negotiations to an early and successful conclusion”,

Noting that the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in its Final Declaration adopted on 21 September 1985, called on the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to resume trilateral negotiations in 1985 and on all the nuclear-weapon States to participate in the urgent negotiation and conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, as a matter of the highest priority, in the Conference on Disarmament,

Recalling that the leaders of the six States associated in the five-continent peace and disarmament initiative affirmed in the Mexico Declaration, adopted on 7 August 1986, that they “remain convinced that no issue is more urgent and crucial today than bringing to an end all nuclear tests”, adding that “both the qualitative and the quantitative development of nuclear weapons exacerbate the arms race, and both would be inhibited by the complete abolition of nuclear weapons testing”,

Taking note with satisfaction of the progress made in the Conference on Disarmament by the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events on the seismic verification of a comprehensive test ban,

Bearing in mind that the multilateral negotiation of such a treaty in the Conference on Disarmament must cover all the various interrelated problems that it will be necessary to solve in order that the Conference may transmit a complete draft treaty to the General Assembly,

1. *Reiterates once again its grave concern* that nuclear-weapon testing continues unabated, against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of Member States;

2. *Reaffirms its conviction* that a treaty to achieve the prohibition of all nuclear-test explosions by all States for all time is a matter of the highest priority;

3. *Reaffirms also its conviction* that such a treaty would constitute a contribution of the utmost importance to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race;

4. *Urges once more* the three depositary Powers of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water and of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in particular the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, to abide strictly by their undertakings to seek to achieve the early discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to expedite negotiations to this end, keeping the Conference on Disarmament regularly informed of their negotiations;

5. *Appeals* to all States members of the Conference on Disarmament, in particular to the three depositary Powers of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water and of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to promote the establishment by the Conference at the beginning of its 1988 session of an *ad hoc* committee with the objective of carrying out the multilateral negotiation of a treaty on the complete cessation of nuclear-test explosions;

6. *Recommends* to the Conference on Disarmament that such an *ad hoc* committee should comprise two working groups dealing, respectively, with the following interrelated questions: contents and scope of the treaty, and compliance and verification;

7. *Calls upon* the States depositaries of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, by virtue of their special responsibilities under those two Treaties and as a provisional measure, to bring to a halt without delay all nuclear-test explosions, either through a trilaterally agreed moratorium or through three unilateral moratoria, which should include appropriate means of verification;

8. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions"

Mexico's second initiative was adopted by a recorded vote of 128 to 3, with 22 abstentions, as resolution 42/26 B. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the determination, proclaimed since 1963 in the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,

Bearing in mind also that in 1968 the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons recalled such determination and included in its article VI an undertaking by each of its parties to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race at an early date,

Recalling that in its resolution 2028 (XX) of 19 November 1965, adopted unanimously, it had stressed that one of the basic principles on which the treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons should be based was that such treaty, which was then to be negotiated, should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers,

Recalling also that the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in its Final Declaration adopted by consensus on 21 September 1985, expressed its deep regret that a comprehensive multilateral nuclear-test-ban treaty had not been concluded so far and called for the urgent negotiation and conclusion of such a treaty as a matter of the highest priority,

Noting that article II of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water provides a procedure for the consideration and eventual adoption of amendments to the Treaty by a conference of its parties,

1. *Recommends* that the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water formally submit an amendment proposal to the depositary Governments with a view to convening a conference at the earliest possible date to consider amendments to the Treaty that would convert it into a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty;

2. *Requests* that the States parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water report to the General Assembly at its forty-third session on the progress of their efforts.

The General Assembly adopted the draft resolution introduced by New Zealand by a recorded vote of 143 to 2, with 8 abstentions, as resolution 42/27, which reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Convinced that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,

Convinced of the consequent urgent need for an end to the nuclear-arms race and the immediate and verifiable reduction and ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons,

Convinced, therefore, that an end to all nuclear testing by all States in all environments for all time is an essential step in order to prevent the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapons and further nuclear proliferation and to contribute, along with other concurrent efforts to limit and reduce nuclear arms, to the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons,

Welcoming the joint statement of 17 September 1987 by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America that they have agreed to commence negotiations in 1987 on nuclear-testing issues,

Recalling the proposals by the leaders of the six-nation initiative to promote an end to nuclear testing, and other recent initiatives to this end,

Convinced that the most effective way to achieve the discontinuance of all nuclear tests in all environments for all time is through the conclusion, at an early date, of a verifiable, comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty open to and capable of attracting the adherence of all States,

Reaffirming the particular responsibilities of the Conference on Disarmament in the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty,

1. *Reaffirms its conviction* that a treaty to achieve the prohibition of all nuclear-test explosions by all States in all environments for all time is a matter of fundamental importance;

2. *Urges*, therefore, that the following actions be taken in order that a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty may be concluded at an early date:

(a) The Conference on Disarmament should initiate substantive work on all aspects of a nuclear-test-ban treaty at the beginning of its 1988 session;

(b) States members of the Conference on Disarmament, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, and all other States should co-operate in order to facilitate and promote such work;

(c) The nuclear-weapon States, especially those which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, should agree to appropriate verifiable interim measures with a view to realizing a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty;

(d) Those nuclear-weapon States which have not yet done so should adhere to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water;

3. *Also urges* the Conference on Disarmament:

(a) To take immediate steps for the establishment, with the widest possible participation, of an international seismic monitoring network with a view to the further development of its potential to monitor and verify compliance with a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty;

(b) In this context, to take into account the progress achieved by the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, including the exchange of wave-form data, and other relevant initiatives by individual States and groups of States;

(c) To initiate detailed investigation of other measures to monitor and verify compliance with such a treaty, including an international network to monitor atmospheric radioactivity;

4. *Calls upon* the Conference on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly at its forty-third session on progress made;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty"

Finally, the Assembly adopted the resolution "Notification of nuclear tests", introduced by Australia, by a recorded vote of 147 to 1, with 8 abstentions. The resolution, 42/38 C, reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 41/59 N of 3 December 1986, in which it called upon each of the States conducting nuclear explosions to provide the Secretary-General with specific data on nuclear explosions conducted by them,

Noting that, despite the continuation of nuclear explosions, no such data have been submitted to the Secretary-General,

1. *Calls upon* all States to comply with resolution 41/59 N;

2. *Again urges* each of the States conducting nuclear explosions to provide to the Secretary-General within one week of each nuclear explosion such data referred to in paragraph 1 of resolution 41/59 N as they may have available;

3. *Invites* all other States to provide to the Secretary-General any such data on nuclear explosions they may have available;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to make this information immediately available to all Member States and to submit to the General Assembly annually a register of the information provided on nuclear explosions during the preceding twelve months.

Conclusion

The most noteworthy development in 1987 on the question of nuclear testing was the start of bilateral negotiations in Geneva in November. The Soviet Union and the United States agreed to conduct them on a stage-by-stage basis, aimed, first, at reaching agreement on verification measures to enable ratification by the United States of the 1974 threshold test-ban and the 1976 peaceful nuclear explosions Treaties between the two Powers. Thereafter, the two announced, they would proceed to negotiating further intermediate limitations on nuclear testing, leading ultimately to its complete cessation, as part of an effective disarmament process. In the short run, the negotiations should contribute significantly to confidence-building, even though the two parties have, in any case, been adhering generally to the provisions of the Treaties in question.

Other developments included submission of additional proposals in the Conference on Disarmament, including the "Basic provisions of a Treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests" by socialist members of the Conference. As in the past three years, the Conference was unable to establish a subsidiary body on the item because of disagreement over its mandate.

The General Assembly adopted four resolutions on the question, one fewer than in other recent years, because the socialist States dropped the separate initiative that they had traditionally put forward. For the first time, the Australian draft entitled "Notification of nuclear tests" led to a substantive response, in this case from the Soviet Union, regarding tests it had carried out during the year.

ANNEX

Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests*

A. General provisions

1. The complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests is in itself an important measure facilitating progress toward the limitation, reduction and complete elimination of nuclear arms.

2. The prohibition of nuclear weapon tests by the Soviet Union and the United States of America, the States which possess the greatest nuclear potentials, is an important step toward general and complete prohibition of such tests. They must be joined by other nuclear Powers if the main objective of the Treaty is to be attained and its universal nature genuinely ensured.

* CD/787, appendix I, vol. II, document CD/756.

3. The States Parties to the Treaty are guided by a desire to complement and develop the régime established by the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water of 5 August 1963, which would be consistent with the determination expressed in that Treaty to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, and to that end to prohibit such explosions in the only remaining environment, i.e. underground.

4. When all nuclear weapons have been completely eliminated the Treaty will serve as a safeguard against the reappearance of this kind of weapon in the future and an important element in the comprehensive system of international security.

B. Scope of the prohibition

1. Each State Party to this Treaty shall undertake to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosions at any place under its jurisdiction or control, in all environments—in the atmosphere, in outer space, under water or underground.

2. No Party shall cause, encourage or in any way participate in the conduct of any nuclear weapon test explosions anywhere.

3. Provision should be made for the formulation of a provision preventing the ban on nuclear weapon test explosions from being circumvented by means of peaceful nuclear explosions.

C. Termination of activities at nuclear weapon test ranges

I. DECLARATIONS

Thirty days after the entry into force of the Treaty, the States Parties shall declare the locations of the test ranges for nuclear weapon test explosions in their territory or under their control, including the geographical co-ordinates of nuclear weapon test sites.

II. TERMINATION OF ACTIVITIES AT NUCLEAR WEAPON TEST RANGES

On the day of the entry into force of the Treaty, each State Party to this Treaty shall terminate all activities related to nuclear weapon test explosions at its test ranges.

D. Ensuring compliance with the Treaty

I. GENERAL PROVISIONS ON VERIFICATION

Effective comprehensive verification of strict and unflinching fulfilment by the Parties of their obligations under the Treaty shall be carried out using national technical means of verification, international verification measures and on-site inspection.

II. NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION

1. For the purpose of verifying the implementation of this Treaty, each State Party to this Treaty shall use the national technical means of verification which it has at its disposal in a manner consistent with the generally recognized norms of international law, and undertakes not to interfere with such means of verification of other States Parties to this Treaty.

2. States Parties to this Treaty which possess national technical means of verification shall place the information which they obtained through those means, and which is important for the purposes of this Treaty, at the disposal of the appropriate organ established under the Treaty, and may, where necessary, place it at the disposal of other Parties.

III. INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION MEASURES

International system of seismic verification

1. For the purpose of better assuring compliance with obligations under this Treaty, the States Parties shall establish an international system of seismic verification.

2. To this end, a network of seismic stations with standard specifications shall be established on the territory under the jurisdiction or control of the States Parties to the Treaty, to ensure the continuous international exchange of level II seismic data in accordance with agreed guidelines which will form an integral part of the Treaty.

3. These stations shall operate with the participation of observers from among the members of an international inspectorate.

The number, location, main performance characteristics and general principles of operation of such stations shall be subject to agreement.

International exchange of data on atmospheric radioactivity

1. For the purpose of better assuring compliance with obligations under the Treaty, each State Party to this Treaty undertakes to co-operate in good faith in an international exchange of data on atmospheric radioactivity.

2. To this end, the States Parties to this Treaty shall establish, on the territory under their jurisdiction or control, aerosol monitoring stations to ensure the international exchange of data on atmospheric radioactivity in accordance with agreed guidelines which will form an integral part of this Treaty.

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IV. ENSURING THE NON-FUNCTIONING OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TEST RANGES

Verification that no nuclear explosions are conducted at test ranges shall be carried out by national personnel with the participation of international inspectors in accordance with agreed procedures.

V. ON-SITE INSPECTION

1. For the purpose of clarifying and resolving questions which give rise to doubt as to compliance with the Treaty and which cannot be eliminated by means of the other verification measures provided for in the Treaty, each State Party shall have the right to request an on-site inspection in the territory of another State Party, citing appropriate grounds for the request.

2. The State so requested will be obligated to grant access to the locations specified in the request for the purpose of an inspection at the site of the event whose status is unclear, in order to clarify whether it was related to a nuclear explosion carried out in circumvention of the provisions of this Treaty.

3. Criteria and procedures for requesting such inspections, and rules for conducting them, shall be elaborated, including a list of the rights and functions of the inspecting personnel.

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VI. TREATY ORGANS

1. For the purpose of effective implementation of this Treaty, there shall be established appropriate organs, including an international inspectorate, whose functions will be specified in the annex to this Treaty.

2. A method of decision-making in the Treaty organs is to be agreed upon which will ensure that decisions are taken on a mutually acceptable basis and within a short time where necessary.

E. Concluding provisions of the Treaty

1. The Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. It shall enter into force upon ratification by States, including the USSR and the United States of America.

Five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference of the States Parties to the Treaty shall be convened to review the operation of the Treaty and to consider whether it should remain in effect if other nuclear Powers have not acceded thereto over the five-year period.

2. Provision should be made for a procedure for the signing and ratification of the Treaty, for the depositary, for accession by States to, and withdrawal from, the Treaty, for amendment and for review conferences.

Strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States

Introduction

EVER SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE NUCLEAR AGE, non-nuclear-weapon States, particularly those which do not belong to one of the major military alliances, have pleaded the need for effective measures that would ensure their security against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In the view of many of those States, that need has been made all the greater by the unceasing arms race, the continuing increase in the effectiveness and lethality of nuclear weapons and the possibility that growing acceptance of limited nuclear war could increase the likelihood of such a war occurring. The issue was raised forcefully in 1968 in connection with the negotiations on the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty¹ and it has since figured almost uninterruptedly in the agenda of various disarmament forums. No agreed solution has so far been found.

In the 1978 Final Document,² the General Assembly noted the individual declarations of the nuclear-weapon Powers on the question and urged them to conclude effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.³ Three different approaches to the issue have since been proposed. The Eastern European States, on the one hand, and Pakistan, on the other, pursue largely parallel lines, both involving the idea that the Conference on Disarmament should negotiate a convention on the issue. The Eastern European approach specifically advocates the conclusion of an international convention of a legally binding character. The Pakistani proposal focuses on the need for effective international arrangements based on a common approach; besides advocating a formal convention, it recognizes the possibility of concluding alternative arrangements to the same end.

In the third approach, which has been advocated by the United States,

¹ Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex. The text of the Treaty is reproduced in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 2nd edition: 1982 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.IX.5).

² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, para. 59.

³ Two types of security assurance are generally recognized. Under a "negative assurance", nuclear Powers would commit themselves not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. This may be distinguished from a "positive assurance", whereby nuclear-weapon States would commit themselves, under specific circumstances, to come to the defence of non-nuclear-weapon States, as envisaged, for example, by Security Council resolution 255 (1968).

among other countries, differences in the nature of the security requirements of nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States are seen as hampering the feasibility of agreeing on a common formula. Instead, the United States proposes that the individual declarations announced or reaffirmed by the nuclear-weapon States in 1978 should be formalized. However, the United States has not insisted on this approach since 1979. Summaries of the unilateral pledges given in 1978 and, in several cases, subsequent reformulations are contained in the annex to this chapter.

The question of security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States is considered in the General Assembly as well as in the multilateral negotiating body in Geneva, which has established a subsidiary body to deal with it each year since 1979. No significant progress has been made, however. In the Conference on Disarmament, the positions of States on the scope, substance, form and nature of the envisaged guarantees have remained unchanged: most States agree on the desirability of an international convention, but differ about the practical implementation of the idea. Perhaps as a result of this lack of progress, the interest of delegations in the matter seems to have waned.

In 1986, consideration of effective security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States did not bring the declared goal any closer, but the General Assembly adopted two resolutions recommending that the Conference on Disarmament continue to deal with the issue in 1987.

Consideration by the Conference on Disarmament, 1987

The agenda item entitled “Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons” was considered by the Conference on Disarmament in plenary meetings during the periods from 6 to 10 April and from 27 to 31 July. On 10 February, the Conference decided to re-establish its *ad hoc* committee on the item to continue to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement. The Conference had before it a Nigerian proposal⁴ that attempted to break the impasse in achieving an internationally binding agreement to prohibit the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against most non-nuclear-weapon States. The proposal is discussed below.

The item received increased attention at plenary meetings of the Conference,⁵ though the comments tended to reiterate views already expressed. In general, members of the group of 21 stressed again that the most effective guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was nuclear disarmament and the prohibition of nuclear weapons. More specifically, Kenya, Pakistan and Yugoslavia emphasized the moral imperative for nuclear-weapon States to categorically assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the threat of nuclear weapons, while Egypt underscored the legitimacy of the

⁴ CD/787, appendix I, vol. III, document CD/768.

⁵ *Ibid.*, appendix II, vols. I-IV.

non-nuclear-weapon States' demand for assurances. Pakistan felt that security assurances, provided in an international instrument of a legally binding character, would strengthen the commitment of non-nuclear-weapon States to the non-proliferation régime by acting as a disincentive to acquire nuclear weapons. In its view, assurances must be unconditional and unlimited in scope, application and duration. It felt that the unilateral declarations that had been made so far by the nuclear-weapon States, with one exception, presented insurmountable obstacles to the elaboration of a common formula for assurances. In an effort at compromise, Pakistan restated its proposal that assurances be extended to all non-nuclear-weapon States outside the major alliance systems. Argentina strongly rejected attempts to place various conditions on the granting of negative security assurances, and it underscored its conviction that the mere possession of nuclear weapons created a climate of intimidation that definitely affected non-nuclear-weapon States.

Sweden emphasized once again that the most fundamental element of an effective negative assurance was a legally binding undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. It believed, though, that non-nuclear-weapon States should not have to make any further commitments beyond that of staying nuclear-weapon-free, a commitment that should be formalized by adherence to the non-proliferation Treaty, by participation in an established nuclear-weapon-free zone, or in other agreed ways which would give it international legal effect.

Bulgaria, on behalf of the socialist States, stressed a global approach, which encompassed the elaboration of an international legal instrument to exclude the use of nuclear weapons; the pledging of non-first use of nuclear weapons by all nuclear-weapon States and the setting up of regional arrangements such as nuclear-weapon-free zones. The socialist members continued to support the conclusion of an international instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States having no nuclear weapons on their territories against the use or threat of use of such weapons. The socialist States were convinced of the need for a fresh approach to the question and were of the view that recent developments in international politics provided a reliable basis on which to seek that new approach. Hungary suggested that the *Ad Hoc* Committee survey the latest developments relevant to its work and take advantage of the new situation.

The Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States felt that the *Ad Hoc* Committee could do useful work under its current mandate. The Federal Republic was of the view that the concrete measures proposed in the bilateral negotiations in Geneva would have an impact on the urgency, nature and scope of negative security assurances. It went on to say that agreement on a negotiated common formula for an unconditional security assurance to be given by all five nuclear States to non-nuclear-weapon States stood little chance of being translated into practice without prior agreement on stabilizing ceilings for weapons and forces. It therefore suggested that discussion on the item be closely linked with discussion on the items on cessation of the nuclear-arms race and prevention of nuclear war.

The *Ad Hoc* Committee, under the chairmanship of Mr. Paul von Stülpnagel of the Federal Republic of Germany, held 10 meetings during the second half of the session, using topics chosen by the Chairman to guide the discussion. Those topics included the consideration of new proposals in the light of recent developments in arms control and international relations as well as possibilities for interim measures and alternatives for action. Some of the relevant developments mentioned were: the agreement reached at the Geneva summit meeting of November 1985, the meeting between the leaders of the two major Powers in Reykjavik in 1986 and the ongoing Soviet-American bilateral negotiations on nuclear and space arms. In the course of the discussion, a Warsaw Treaty document on military doctrine, adopted in Berlin in May 1987,⁶ and the political undertakings to refrain from the use of force that were included in the 1986 Document of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe⁷ were mentioned as being of direct relevance to the work of the Committee. Some members of the group of 21 differed, however, in their assessment of the recent developments in the field, stating that while they were welcome in themselves, they had little or no relevance to the question of assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States and that they had no positive impact on the unilateral declarations of the concerned nuclear-weapon States.

In its paper, Nigeria proposed categorizing the non-nuclear-weapon States according to the diverse military situations they were in and put forward suggestions for the main elements that could be used to form a generally acceptable agreement. Though several delegations considered that the proposal reflected the need for all States to show more flexibility in the light of legitimate security concerns of other States, the primary responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States concerning the issue was strongly stressed during the meetings. Moreover, it was generally agreed that the proposal contained elements that required further study by the Committee.

The delegation of the Netherlands brought up a proposal that it had made in 1981 concerning the form in which the elements of a common formula or common approach could be embodied, that is, an integrated Security Council resolution containing the disparate views of the nuclear-weapon States. It also proposed, for immediate consideration, that the Conference adopt a paragraph in its 1987 report recommending a repetition of the nuclear-weapon States' unilateral assurances in a Security Council resolution. That suggestion was not taken up by the Committee.

On the whole, the Committee reiterated conclusions and recommendations already reached in previous years, emphasizing that the difficulties relating to differing perceptions of security interests on the part of nuclear-weapon States, on the one hand, and non-nuclear-weapon States, on the other, persisted and that the complex nature of the issues involved continued to prevent agreement on a common formula. The *Ad Hoc* Committee recommended that ways and means continue to be explored to overcome the dif-

⁶ *Ibid.*, appendix I, vol. II, document CD/755.

⁷ Relevant excerpts from the Document were reproduced in the United Nations publication *Disarmament*, vol. IX, No. 3 (Sales No. E.86.IX.10).

difficulties encountered in carrying out negotiations on the question and stated that it was generally agreed that the Committee should be re-established at the 1988 session of the Conference. Delegates underlined the importance of making progress on the issue in the light of the forthcoming third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. On 27 August the Conference adopted the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, which forms an integral part of the report of the Conference to the General Assembly at its forty-second session.⁸

Towards the end of the session, Pakistan stated that the Committee's work had remained unproductive. Pakistan hastened to add, however, that it would not slacken in its search for a satisfactory solution, pointing out that, without negative security assurances, the non-proliferation régime could only be weakened. Poland regretted that its hopes for a fresh, more flexible and imaginative approach to the problem had not been fulfilled. The United States, for its part, stressed that the Nigerian proposal had served a useful purpose in refocusing attention on the many difficulties involved in elaborating a common formula for assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1987

Pursuant to resolutions 41/51 and 41/52, adopted in 1986, the General Assembly had on its agenda at its forty-second session two items on security assurances: "Conclusion of effective international arrangements on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" and "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

In the debate in the First Committee,⁹ a number of States continued to advocate, as the best solution, international legally binding assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, with most of the speakers expressing preference for an international convention. Among the non-nuclear-weapon States, Kenya considered that the question was of great importance since nuclear weapons constituted the gravest threat to humanity. Furthermore, in its opinion, negative security assurances, like a nuclear-test ban, should be viewed as a positive step towards eliminating those weapons, pending other effective measures of nuclear disarmament.

In Nigeria's view, pending the attainment of total, verifiable and permanent nuclear disarmament, the means of safeguarding the security of non-nuclear States must remain an overriding concern of the international community. That was particularly so since most of those States had, under the non-proliferation Treaty, relinquished the nuclear option without a complementary commitment being made by the nuclear-weapon States to ensure that the former were not placed at a permanent military disadvantage. In its

⁸ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/42/27)*. The report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee is reproduced in *extenso* under paragraph 85.

⁹ *Ibid.*, *First Committee*, 3rd to 36th meetings, and *ibid.*, *Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

opinion, it was only fair that those who had voluntarily entrusted their security to fragile international discipline should be given legally binding assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, pending nuclear disarmament. Nigeria further acknowledged the usefulness of the unilateral declarations made by the five nuclear-weapon States, but pointed out that they had no legal effect and never could or should be accepted as substitutes for legally binding international instruments. If unilateral declarations were sufficient, it would not be necessary to negotiate international agreements on any disarmament items. Since it seemed impossible to arrive at a common formula, Nigeria would, at an appropriate stage, propose a new approach, by which non-nuclear-weapon States would be classified into categories in accordance with their peculiar security situations, with agreements to be negotiated in respect of each of the categories. Nigeria maintained that States that had not renounced the nuclear option should also be eligible for assurances.

Pakistan, Senegal and Sri Lanka considered that the objective of non-proliferation would be promoted if the non-nuclear-weapon States were given effective assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. After expressing its regret that repeated appeals for unconditional assurances had gone unheeded, Pakistan called once again upon the nuclear-weapon States concerned to review their unilateral declarations on the matter, taking into account the concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States. Sri Lanka was convinced that the fearful prospect of being subject to nuclear attack or blackmail contributed to the insecurity of non-nuclear-weapon States.

The Byelorussian SSR stressed the necessity of bringing to a successful conclusion the efforts undertaken over many years to strengthen the security guarantees for non-nuclear countries that did not have nuclear weapons on their territory. Czechoslovakia believed that the strengthening of international peace and security would be considerably facilitated by the granting of assurances, and thus it continued to regard as highly relevant the elaboration and adoption of a legally binding international document on the subject.

The representative of New Zealand referred to the security of non-nuclear-weapon States in the context of nuclear-weapon-free zones. He felt that one step towards a less nuclear and more stable world had been taken by the New Zealand Parliament when it had passed legislation providing that no nuclear weapons should be allowed into the country. He also recalled that New Zealand and other countries of the South Pacific region had created a nuclear-free zone to express their determination to keep the region free of nuclear rivalry between the nuclear-weapon States.

Two draft resolutions were submitted in the First Committee on the subject, one under each of the two agenda items.

On 26 October, under the agenda item "Conclusion of effective international arrangements on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", a draft resolution with the same title was submitted by Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, Mongolia and the Soviet Union. In introducing it on 4 November, Bulgaria

noted that the draft resolution was similar to corresponding resolutions adopted by the General Assembly over the past few years. It explained that the text was primarily procedural in character, requesting the Conference on Disarmament to continue active negotiations on the item in its *Ad Hoc* Committee. The sponsors believed that the Assembly should again appeal to all States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, to demonstrate the political will and to exercise the flexibility necessary to reach agreement concerning a common formula on the substance of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, which could become the basis for a legally binding international instrument on that subject.

On 20 October, under the agenda item "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", Pakistan submitted a draft resolution with the same title, which it introduced in the First Committee on 6 November. Pakistan was deeply disappointed that while no one had put forward any objection in principle to the concept of negative security assurances, the Conference on Disarmament had failed to register any progress in its negotiations on the subject. The sponsor believed that the unilateral declarations made by some nuclear-weapon States did not adequately meet the concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States themselves and that assurances had to be unconditional and of a legally binding character. It therefore considered it important that the General Assembly call upon the Conference to intensify its efforts to reach agreement on a common formula, which would enable it to elaborate and conclude effective international arrangements. The draft had been prepared along the lines of the resolution adopted in the previous year and it appealed to the nuclear-weapon States to demonstrate the political will necessary to reach agreement on an instrument of a legally binding character.

On 9 November the First Committee approved the draft resolution introduced by Bulgaria by a recorded vote of 87 to 18 (Western and associated States), with 15 abstentions. On the same day, it approved the draft introduced by Pakistan by a recorded vote of 122 to none, with 3 abstentions (Brazil, India and United States).

In connection with the voting in the First Committee, only Argentina explained its position on both drafts. While voting for the first time in favour of the draft resolution introduced by Pakistan, Argentina recalled its decision to not produce nuclear weapons and to carry out its nuclear programme exclusively for peaceful purposes. That decision gave it the right to request those States that did possess nuclear weapons to assume the commitment to give unconditional guarantees not to use or threaten to use them against States that had undertaken not to have and not to produce them. In addition, Argentina expressed its readiness to strive in the Conference on Disarmament to conclude international arrangements to that end. It abstained in the voting on the draft resolution introduced by Bulgaria because, in its view, the text went beyond the consideration of the question of negative security assurances and dealt with other topics that were not germane to it.

On 30 November¹⁰ the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution introduced by Bulgaria by a recorded vote of 112 to 18, with 20 abstentions, as resolution 42/31. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Convinced of the need to take effective measures for the strengthening of the security of States, and prompted by the desire shared by all nations to eliminate war and prevent nuclear conflagration,

Considering that, until nuclear disarmament is achieved on a universal basis, it is imperative for the international community to develop effective measures to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Recognizing that effective measures to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons can constitute a positive contribution to the prevention of the spread of such weapons,

Noting with satisfaction the determination of non-nuclear-weapon States in various parts of the world to prevent nuclear weapons from being introduced into their territories and to ensure the complete absence of such weapons in their respective regions, including through the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, and being anxious to encourage and contribute to the attainment of this objective,

Desirous of promoting the implementation of paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, in which it urged the nuclear-weapon States to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Recalling its numerous resolutions on this subject, as well as the relevant part of the special report of the Committee on Disarmament submitted to the General Assembly at its twelfth special session, the second special session devoted to disarmament,

Noting that the Conference on Disarmament considered in 1987 the item entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", as reflected in its report, where it is stated that discussions on the conclusions that could be drawn from the work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on this item, including consideration of the possibilities for interim measures and alternatives, once again proved inconclusive,

Noting further that during that consideration the importance of making progress on this issue was underlined in the light of the forthcoming third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament,

Recalling the proposals submitted on the subject to the General Assembly and in the Conference on Disarmament, including the drafts of an international convention, and the widespread international support for the conclusion of such a convention,

Aware that additional proposals on the substance of the issue of security assurances with respect to non-nuclear-weapon States were submitted in the Conference on Disarmament in 1987, as reflected in its report,

Aware also that the work on the substance of the effective arrangements and discussion on various aspects and elements of an interim solution revealed that specific difficulties relating to differing perceptions of security interests persisted and that the complex nature of the issues involved continued to prevent agreement on a "common formula",

Recognizing the need for fresh approaches to the solution of urgent security issues in the nuclear age, many of which relate to the security of non-nuclear-weapon States as well,

Aware of the wide support in the Conference on Disarmament for continuing the search for a "common formula", which could be included in an international legally binding instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Welcoming once again the solemn declarations made by some nuclear-weapon States concerning non-first use of nuclear weapons, and convinced that if all nuclear-weapon States were

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Plenary Meetings, 84th meeting.

to assume obligations not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, that would be tantamount in practice to banning the use of nuclear weapons against all States, including all non-nuclear-weapon States,

Considering that the non-nuclear-weapon States having no nuclear weapons on their territories have every right to receive reliable, uniform and unconditional international legal assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

1. *Reaffirms once again* the urgent need to reach agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and to find a common approach acceptable to all;

2. *Considers* that the Conference on Disarmament should continue to explore ways and means of overcoming the difficulties encountered in carrying out negotiations on this question;

3. *Appeals* to all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to demonstrate political will and to exercise the flexibility necessary to reach agreement on a "common formula", which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding nature;

4. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to continue active negotiations on this subject and to establish for this purpose the respective *ad hoc* committee at the beginning of its 1988 session;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Conclusion of effective international arrangements on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons"

Also on 30 November, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution introduced by Pakistan by a recorded vote of 151 to none, with 3 abstentions, as resolution 42/32. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the need to allay the legitimate concern of the States of the world with regard to ensuring lasting security for their peoples,

Convinced that nuclear weapons pose the greatest threat to mankind and to the survival of civilization,

Deeply concerned at the continuing escalation of the arms race, in particular the nuclear-arms race, and the possibility of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Convinced that nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons are essential to remove the danger of nuclear war,

Taking into account the principle of the non-use of force or threat of force enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations,

Deeply concerned about the possibility of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Recognizing that the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of non-nuclear-weapon States need to be safeguarded against the use or threat of use of force, including the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Considering that, until nuclear disarmament is achieved on a universal basis, it is imperative for the international community to develop effective measures to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from any quarter,

Recognizing that effective measures to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons can constitute a positive contribution to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons,

Recalling its resolutions 3261 G (XXIX) of 9 December 1974 and 31/189 C of 21 December 1976,

Bearing in mind paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in which it urged the nuclear-weapon States to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Desirous of promoting the implementation of the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session,

Recalling its resolutions 33/72 B of 14 December 1978, 34/85 of 11 December 1979, 35/155 of 12 December 1980, 36/95 of 9 December 1981, 37/81 of 9 December 1982, 38/68 of 15 December 1983, 39/58 of 12 December 1984, 40/86 of 12 December 1985 and 41/52 of 3 December 1986,

Further recalling paragraph 12 of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, contained in the annex to its resolution 35/46 of 3 December 1980, which states, *inter alia*, that all efforts should be exerted by the Committee on Disarmament urgently to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Noting the in-depth negotiations undertaken in the Conference on Disarmament and its *Ad Hoc* Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, with a view to reaching agreement on this item,

Noting the proposals submitted under that item in the Conference on Disarmament, including the drafts of an international convention,

Taking note of the decision of the Eighth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Harare from 1 to 6 September 1986, as well as the relevant recommendations of the Organization of the Islamic Conference reiterated in the Final Communiqué of the Sixteenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, held at Fez, Morocco, from 6 to 10 January 1986, calling upon the Conference on Disarmament to reach an urgent agreement on an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Further noting the support expressed in the Conference on Disarmament and in the General Assembly for the elaboration of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, as well as the difficulties pointed out in evolving a common approach acceptable to all,

1. *Reaffirms* the urgent need to reach agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

2. *Notes with satisfaction* that in the Conference on Disarmament there is no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, although the difficulties as regards evolving a common approach acceptable to all have also been pointed out;

3. *Appeals* to all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to demonstrate the political will necessary to reach agreement on a common approach and, in particular, on a common formula which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character;

4. *Recommends* that further intensive efforts should be devoted to the search for such a common approach or common formula and that the various alternative approaches, including in particular those considered in the Conference on Disarmament, should be further explored in order to overcome the difficulties;

5. *Recommends* that the Conference on Disarmament should actively continue negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement and concluding effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, taking into account the widespread support for the conclusion of an international convention and giving consideration to any other proposals designed to secure the same objective;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons"

Conclusion

In 1987, the Conference on Disarmament continued the consideration of the question of effective security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States. The Conference decided to re-establish its *Ad Hoc* Committee on the item to

continue negotiations with a view to reaching agreement. Although the item received increased attention at plenary meetings of the Conference and new proposals were submitted in the *Ad Hoc* Committee, the difficulties relating to differing perceptions of security interests on the part of nuclear-weapon States, on the one hand, and non-nuclear-weapon States, on the other, persisted and the complex nature of the issues involved continued to prevent agreement on a formula.

In the General Assembly, divergent views on the nature of the guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States as well as on the evaluation and practical significance of the unilateral declarations that had been made by the nuclear-weapon States remained. A number of delegates expressed their disappointment over the lack of progress on the subject in the Conference on Disarmament and warned that unwillingness on the part of some nuclear-weapon States to give unequivocal security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States would weaken the non-proliferation régime. In accordance with the two resolutions that the General Assembly adopted in 1987, reflecting the two main approaches to the question, the Conference on Disarmament will continue active negotiations on the subject at its 1988 session.

ANNEX

Unilateral security assurances by nuclear-weapon States

China

In the annex to a letter of 7 June 1978 from the Permanent Representative of China to the Secretary-General, China stated:

For the present, all the nuclear countries, particularly the super-Powers, which possess nuclear weapons in large quantities, should immediately undertake not to resort to the threat or use of nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear countries and nuclear-free zones. China is not only ready to undertake this commitment but wishes to reiterate that at no time and in no circumstances will it be the first to use nuclear weapons.^a

In a communication of 28 April 1982 to the Secretary-General, the Chinese Government declared:

Pending the realization of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, all nuclear countries must undertake unconditionally not to use or threaten to use such weapons against non-nuclear countries and nuclear-free zones.

As is known to all, the Chinese Government has long declared on its own initiative and unilaterally that at no time and under no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons, and that it undertakes unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries and nuclear-free zones.^b

France

On 30 June 1978, the representative of France stated:

Furthermore, as regards paragraph 59 [of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session] concerning assurances of the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States, the delegation of France would recall that France is prepared to give such assurances, in accordance with arrangements to be negotiated, to States which constitute non-nuclear zones.^c

^a A/S-10/AC.1/17, annex, para. 7.

^b A/S-12/11.

^c *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Plenary Meetings, 27th meeting, para. 190.*

On 11 June 1982, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France declared:

For its part, it [France] states that it will not use nuclear arms against a State that does not have them and that has pledged not to seek them, except if an act of aggression is carried out in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State against France or against a State with which France has a security commitment.^d

Soviet Union

On 26 May 1978, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union stated:

From the rostrum of the special session our country declares that the Soviet Union will never use nuclear weapons against those States which renounce the production and acquisition of such weapons and do not have them on their territories.

We are aware of the responsibility which would thus fall on us as a result of such a commitment. But we are convinced that such a step to meet the wishes of non-nuclear States to have stronger security guarantees is in the interests of peace in the broadest sense of the word. We expect that the goodwill evinced by our country in this manner will lead to more active participation by a large number of States in strengthening the non-proliferation régime.^e

On 12 June 1982, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union read a message from the President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, according to which the Soviet Union assumed "an obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. This obligation shall become effective immediately, at the moment it is made public from the rostrum of the United Nations General Assembly" The Soviet Union added that the question of the granting of security guarantees to the non-nuclear countries parties to the non-proliferation Treaty by the nuclear Powers "could be solved by concluding an international convention. The USSR is also prepared to conclude bilateral agreements on guarantees with States which do not possess nuclear weapons and do not have them on their territory".^f

United Kingdom

On 28 June 1978, the representative of the United Kingdom declared:

I accordingly give the following assurance, on behalf of my Government, to non-nuclear-weapon States which are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to other internationally binding commitments not to manufacture or acquire nuclear explosive devices: Britain undertakes not to use nuclear weapons against such States except in the case of an attack on the United Kingdom, its dependent territories, its armed forces or its allies by such a State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State.^g

United States

In the annex to a letter of 17 November 1978 from the representative of the United States to the Secretary of the First Committee, the United States cited a Presidential Declaration which read as follows:

The United States will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the NPT (non-proliferation Treaty) or any comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the United States, its territories or armed forces, or its allies, by such a State allied to a nuclear-weapon State or associated with a nuclear-weapon State in carrying out or sustaining the attack.^h

^d *Ibid.*, *Twelfth Special Session, Plenary Meetings*, 9th meeting.

^e *Ibid.*, *Tenth Special Session, Plenary Meetings*, 5th meeting, paras. 84 and 85.

^f *Ibid.*, *Twelfth Special Session, Plenary Meetings*, 12th meeting.

^g *Ibid.*, *Tenth Special Session, Plenary Meetings*, 26th meeting, para. 12.

^h A/C.1/33/7, annex. The Presidential Declaration was also cited by the representative of the United States on 23 June 1978 in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Ad Hoc Committee of the Tenth Special Session*, 13th meeting.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

Introduction

FOR THE LAST SEVERAL DECADES, there has been considerable support for the idea that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones would greatly assist in deterring the spread of nuclear weapons and would promote nuclear disarmament. The advocates of this concept have also argued that a nuclear-weapon-free zone would help protect the zonal non-nuclear-weapon States against the use of nuclear weapons and thus materially enhance their security. The 1978 Final Document¹ states that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned constitutes an important disarmament measure, and that the process of establishing such zones in different parts of the world should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world free of nuclear weapons.

Three years earlier, in 1975, an *ad hoc* group of governmental experts had made a study entitled *Comprehensive Study of the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in All Its Aspects*.² The Group's report contained several agreed recommendations on principles to be taken into account in creating such zones when appropriate conditions exist. It also reflected different views about several issues on which it had been unable to agree. In 1982, the General Assembly asked the Secretary-General, with the help of governmental experts, to review and supplement the previous study. This time, the experts were not able to agree on the study and no conclusions were presented.

Since 1957, various proposals have been made for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in several regions.³ While in 1959 and in 1967 agreement was reached on the denuclearization of the Antarctic⁴ and of outer

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, paras. 60 and 61.

² United Nations publication, Sales No. E.76.I.7.

³ For details, see *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1), chap. 15; *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1970-1975* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.76.IX.1), chap. V; *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1985* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.85.IX.6); and previous issues of *The Yearbook*.

⁴ The Antarctic Treaty, 1959 (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 402, No. 5778). The text of the Treaty is reproduced in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 2nd edition: 1982 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.IX.5).

space,⁵ respectively, the first such zone in a densely populated area was created by the 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco).⁶ Parties to that Treaty commit themselves to use the nuclear material and facilities under their jurisdiction exclusively for peaceful purposes, and to prohibit and prevent in their respective territories: (a) the testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means whatsoever of any nuclear weapons, by the parties themselves, directly or indirectly, on behalf of anyone else or in any other way; and (b) the receipt, storage, installation, deployment and any form of possession of nuclear weapons, directly or indirectly, by the parties themselves, by anyone on their behalf or in any other way. In 1985 the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, also known as the Treaty of Rarotonga,⁷ was concluded; by the end of 1987 that Treaty had been ratified by 9 States. *parties*

The discussion on the question of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world is continuing in the principal United Nations disarmament bodies. Many States express support for the idea, both as a general proposition conducive to nuclear disarmament and in specific regions of concern to them. It is widely felt that each zone should be modelled according to the specific characteristics of the region involved. Each year, extensive debates, leading to the adoption of several resolutions, take place in the General Assembly on the desirability and possibility of setting up nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia. In addition, there have been a number of proposals for the creation of such zones in other regions, including Northern and Central Europe and the Balkans. The establishment of denuclearized zones is also discussed in a more general context, as a potential means of serving the purposes of regional disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. In the debates, a number of delegations have expressed the view that the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones requires prior consensus among the countries concerned and can proceed only on the basis of agreements freely entered into by them and in keeping with internationally recognized principles. Delegations have also called for adequate international verification as a means of ensuring compliance with such agreements, as well as for guarantees by the nuclear-weapon States, especially the super-Powers, of the denuclearized status of the zones.

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1987

Once again the Disarmament Commission had on its agenda an item on the substantive consideration of South Africa's nuclear capability (for the exact wording of the item, see page 13), a question closely related to that of the

⁵ Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 1967 (General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI), annex). The text of the Treaty is reproduced in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*.

⁶ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634, No. 9068. The text of the Treaty is reproduced in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*.

⁷ For the text of the Treaty, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 10: 1985, appendix VII.

denuclearization of Africa. In addition, a number of delegations commented on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regional contexts during the course of a general exchange of views in plenary meetings.

For instance, Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic reiterated their proposal for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Europe, a measure that was supported by Mongolia. New Zealand stressed that efforts to constrain both horizontal and nuclear proliferation could be supported at the regional level by nuclear-weapon-free zones, and cited the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty as a case in point. Mongolia welcomed the entry into force of that Treaty, and China noted that it had signed Protocols 2 and 3 of the Treaty as a contribution to the relaxation of international tension and disarmament. Pakistan, stressing that a regional approach could substantially strengthen the security of the non-aligned and developing countries and would advance non-proliferation objectives, stated that it sought to promote a regional framework of security-building and disarmament measures by, *inter alia*, its proposals for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and simultaneous accession by itself and India to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.⁸

Addressing the question of South Africa's nuclear capability, Ghana pointed out that credible representatives of the scientific community believed that that country had detonated a nuclear device and that considerable evidence pointed to its possession of nuclear warheads. Consequently, it held that all the members of the Commission should be concerned with the question of effective action to be taken against the potential of South African nuclear proliferation and the danger posed to the international community in general and Africa in particular.

Nigeria declared that South Africa's concept of the nuclear weapon as a "weapon of last resort" posed a serious threat to the non-nuclearization policy contained in the 1964 Cairo Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, and its introduction of a policy of nuclear option blackmailed African States. That policy had led South Africa, under its *apartheid* régime, to develop and produce tactical nuclear weapons that could be adapted to enhance conventional warfare. It was regrettable, Nigeria went on, that in spite of international efforts to isolate South Africa in military-related matters, some countries still co-operated with it in the acquisition of nuclear technology. As a result, its technological capability to produce fissionable materials could increase considerably in the next few years and constitute a further threat to the security and stability of African States. The situation was compounded by the fact that South Africa was outside the non-proliferation régime, and its enrichment plants were not under the safeguards system of IAEA. Thus, the international community owed it to humanity to put pressure on South Africa to dismantle its nuclear installations.

India stated that there could be no doubt that the policies of *apartheid* as practised by the South African régime were the root cause of the conflict in the region and constituted a threat to international peace and security; it

⁸ General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex.

felt that it was indeed regrettable that the Disarmament Commission had not been able to inform the international community of its considered position on the issue. In India's view, there was a widespread conviction, supported by facts, that the racist minority régime in South Africa possessed a nuclear-weapon capability and consequently the power to threaten and impose an ideology of *apartheid*. Despite that, some of the countries which preached the virtues of the non-proliferation régime had not only turned a blind eye to South Africa's nuclear-weapons development programme, but had permitted exports of materials and services, including skilled manpower, to the unsafeguarded South African nuclear installations. Thus, by pronouncing itself in clear and unequivocal terms on South Africa's nuclear capability, the Disarmament Commission would, India believed, make an important contribution to a crucial issue.

Pakistan reiterated that it supported the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones as the most feasible means of controlling nuclear proliferation. Thus it advocated the denuclearization of Africa, a continent where South Africa's nuclear capability was increasingly posing a grave threat to the security of the African nations. Undoubtedly, Pakistan stated, the continuing economic, military and nuclear co-operation of certain countries with the South African racist régime would only frustrate the objective of the denuclearization of Africa. Similar views were expressed by Indonesia, Bangladesh, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Sri Lanka and Zaire. Yugoslavia also held that the appropriate answer to the aggressive policy of South Africa would be strong condemnation and resolute measures by the international community in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

The Soviet Union, together with other socialist countries, urged that the Disarmament Commission adopt recommendations on the item concerning South Africa's nuclear capability for submission to the General Assembly. The Commission, the Soviet Union noted, had tried to do so before, but had been unable to agree on any because of the position of some States, which, it believed, supported the nuclear ambitions of the racist South African régime.

China reaffirmed its support for the African States and the international community in their struggle against the policies of South Africa.

Belgium, speaking on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community, expressed the hope that an agreement acceptable to all would be reached at the session. Canada stated that South Africa's failure to reassure the international community of its peaceful nuclear intentions by fully adhering to the international non-proliferation régime continued to be cause for anxiety and must be remedied.

A subsidiary body, Working Group I, was established by the Disarmament Commission to deal with the question of South Africa's nuclear capability and to make recommendations thereon to the Commission. The Working Group met under the chairmanship of Mr. Juan Enrique Fischer of Uruguay and held eight meetings between 8 and 22 May, using as a basis for its work

a 1984 text.⁹ It registered significant progress, reaching agreement on a number of paragraphs, but was unable to achieve consensus on the text as a whole. As a result, in its report, it recommended to the Disarmament Commission that the work be continued by the Commission as a matter of priority at its next substantive session, in 1988, with a view to the elaboration of concrete recommendations.¹⁰

In concluding statements in a plenary meeting, Belgium welcomed on behalf of the member States of the European Community the progress that had been made, though limited. The Soviet Union regretted that the inertia of some States had frustrated the adoption of relevant recommendations, and the German Democratic Republic held that in the absence of recommendations and subsequent action, the nuclear ambitions of South Africa would not be checked. Nigeria condemned the tendency of some delegations to detract from the value and import of United Nations commissioned studies on disarmament and cited passages from specific United Nations studies on South Africa's nuclear-weapon capability. The findings of those studies had been based on reliable evidence, Nigeria stated, and their accuracy should not be doubted. New Zealand, regretting that Working Group I had failed to agree on a substantive report, noted that the delegations still seemed to be a good distance away from consensus.

Consideration by the Conference on Disarmament, 1987

The question of nuclear-weapon-free zones was discussed in the Conference on Disarmament¹¹ within the context of the agenda item concerning cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, mainly as a significant collateral measure in that field.

During the 1987 session, some members referred to specific aspects of the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones. The Netherlands noted that such zones were conducive to stability and security in the areas where they were established. It stressed that the agreements reached should be the fruit of initiatives from within the region, should be supported by an adequate verification régime and should include guarantees from the nuclear Powers. Peru held that the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones was more than a means of halting the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, as it implied mutual obligations for both the States within the zone and those outside it, particularly the nuclear Powers. China recalled its undertaking not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-free zones. Bulgaria referred to the existing nuclear-weapon-free zones as elements of a future network of regional security arrangements, which it actively favoured.

⁹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/39/42), annex XI.*

¹⁰ See *ibid.*, *Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/42/42)*, sect. IV, para. 42. The report of Working Group I is reproduced *in extenso* under paragraph 42.

¹¹ CD/787, appendix II, vols. I-IV.

Early in the session, Australia and New Zealand (a non-member) submitted a document containing the notification of the entry into force of the Treaty of Rarotonga and the final text of the Protocols to the Treaty.¹² In introducing the document, Australia observed that one and a half years after the Treaty had been opened for signature, it was in operation, thus making the South Pacific the second populated region, after Latin America, to establish a nuclear-free zone. New Zealand also noted the adherence of China and the Soviet Union to two of the Treaty's Protocols and looked forward to the eventual adherence of all the nuclear Powers. The entry into force of the Treaty was welcomed by many delegations, including Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic, Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Peru, Romania and Sri Lanka. Mongolia submitted a document welcoming the Treaty.¹³

Regarding other proposals relating to nuclear-weapon-free zones, Czechoslovakia reiterated that an important contribution towards reducing military confrontation in Europe could be made by creating a corridor free of nuclear weapons along the line of contact between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO, with adequate verification and guarantees. In the beginning, it could extend 150 kilometres on both sides. In the view of the German Democratic Republic, the corridor could considerably facilitate the elimination of the remaining theatre nuclear forces and speed up the reduction of forces and conventional armaments in Europe. The Soviet Union supported the proposal.

Kenya and Zaire urged the implementation of the denuclearization of Africa and expressed concern about assistance being given to South Africa to develop its nuclear-weapon capability. While commenting on its proposal for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, Pakistan noted that countries of that region had given undertakings at the highest level not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons and to devote nuclear programmes exclusively to the economic and social advancement of their peoples.

Bulgaria and Romania stressed the significance of the proposal for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Balkans. Indonesia stated that, together with other members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), it had for some time been engaged in drafting a treaty to establish the region of South-East Asia as a nuclear-weapon-free zone. It hoped that all nations—especially nuclear-weapon States—would accept such an agreement.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1987

In 1987 the General Assembly again had four items on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones on its agenda: (a) "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 41/45 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)", (b) "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa", (c) "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone

¹² *Ibid.*, appendix I, vol. I, document CD/633, annex IV/Rev. 1.

¹³ *Ibid.*, vol. II, document CD/744.

in the region of the Middle East” and (d) “Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia”. In addition, a separate item entitled “Israeli nuclear armament”, which had relevance for the zone in the Middle East, was considered.

During the general debate in the First Committee,¹⁴ many States, including Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Egypt, Greece, Ireland, Poland, the Syrian Arab Republic and the Soviet Union, expressed their general support for the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Thus, Democratic Yemen reiterated its support for the efforts of the United Nations to establish such zones as a step towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Morocco considered that the international community should encourage and support the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, which were considered in the 1978 Final Document as an important disarmament measure. The Syrian Arab Republic stated that there was an urgent need to establish zones in all parts of the world in order to help reduce the danger of nuclear confrontation.

Speaking on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community, Denmark noted that the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones could contribute to stability in the areas concerned, to non-proliferation and to the disarmament process in general, provided that the States concerned were prepared to participate on the basis of agreements freely entered into and in keeping with internationally recognized principles. Sharing the conviction that nuclear-weapon-free zones could make an important contribution to effective disarmament, Greece supported efforts aimed at their creation. It pointed out that the zones also served to strengthen the non-proliferation régime.

The Soviet Union considered that a first step towards negotiated agreements on defensive strategy and military sufficiency would be the supervised withdrawal of nuclear and other offensive weapons from national borders, with the subsequent establishment of sparsely armed strips and demilitarized zones along the lines of contact between military alliances. In referring to the plan for a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe, which its Foreign Minister, Adam Rapacki, had submitted to the General Assembly in 1957, Poland expressed its conviction about the basic soundness of the thinking underlying the concept of denuclearization. In its view, that thinking had been vindicated by the sustained appeal that the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones had in many parts of the world.

Malaysia, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Viet Nam referred to nuclear-weapon-free zones in the context of regional disarmament. Thus, Malaysia considered that the creation of mutual confidence among regional States through regional disarmament and the exclusion of foreign political or military interests was fundamental to the zonal concept. Iran felt that one of the ways of arresting the nuclear-arms race was through regional arrangements; in that regard, nuclear-weapon-free zones had an important role to play. Viet Nam shared that view. It noted that the implementation of zonal proposals depended

¹⁴ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, First Committee*, 3rd to 31st, 35th and 37th meetings, and *ibid.*, *Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

on the political will and joint decision of the States concerned, and that agreements had to be in accordance with generally recognized norms of international law and ensure faithful observance through suitable verification. The establishment and effectiveness of zones also depended to a large extent on the attitude of other States, particularly the nuclear Powers.

A number of countries referred to the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the context of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Egypt expressed support for the establishment of zones in different regions of the world as one of the arrangements that could help prevent horizontal proliferation. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya held similar views and stressed that the zones would contribute to consolidating international peace and security. Ireland noted that one of the important elements of the non-proliferation Treaty was the right of States to complete agreements in order to ensure the denuclearized status of their territories.

A number of States expressed some reservations concerning the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Turkey would continue to support zones if they were established with the agreement of all the States concerned and in regions where they could make a significant contribution to non-proliferation, where nuclear weapons did not exist, but it warned that zones in regions saturated with nuclear weapons of all kinds would not enhance security, unless region-wide, effective disarmament measures were carried out simultaneously. Albania found it difficult to understand why the nuclear-weapon States were so eager to persuade others to create nuclear-free zones; in its view, such interest sounded insincere and aroused suspicion.

India believed that partial measures of disarmament, such as zones, should not divert the Committee's attention from the central issue—nuclear disarmament. In view of scientific evidence that a nuclear war fought on even a minimum scale would lead to a nuclear winter, India felt that declaring an area a nuclear-weapon-free zone would not necessarily guarantee that it would remain unaffected. India held that as long as the nuclear-weapon States insisted on ensuring their security by using or threatening to use nuclear weapons and disregarded the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, no place in Earth was safe, whether it had been declared a nuclear-weapon-free zone or not.

The Soviet Union drew attention to its initiatives to strengthen trust in the north of Europe and to extend it to the Arctic.¹⁵ The Soviet Union was prepared to serve as a guarantor of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Northern Europe, should a decision to establish such a zone be taken. A number of States, including Bulgaria and Greece, advocated a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Balkans. Bulgaria felt that the time had come to undertake practical action in the matter, as called for by Bulgaria and Greece in their joint statement of 15 July 1987 addressed to all Balkan countries. Greece stated that the Balkans presented a model of regional co-operation among countries with different political and economic systems.

Several countries, including Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Poland and the Sudan, supported the proposal for a nuclear-weapon-

¹⁵ See A/42/621, annex.

free zone in Central Europe. Poland considered that that goal would be reached in Central Europe through the gradual withdrawal and reduction of nuclear and conventional arms. The German Democratic Republic felt that proposals for regional disarmament, such as a nuclear-weapon-free corridor in Central Europe, would complement and stimulate global disarmament steps.

Democratic Yemen held that the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East required the fulfilment of three conditions: (a) Israel had to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty; (b) Israel should place its nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards and cease to develop, produce or test nuclear weapons and/or acquire them by other means, and (c) Israel must not place nuclear weapons or explosive devices either in its own territory or in any of the territories currently under its occupation. Iraq, as a party to the non-proliferation Treaty, found in the provisions of the Treaty the only practical way to avert nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. Jordan, Oman, Qatar and the Sudan spoke on the subject in the same vein.

Israel recalled its position that the most effective and credible barrier to proliferation in the Middle East would be a freely and directly negotiated convention establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone, based on a system of obligations binding on all the States concerned. Israel was ready to begin such negotiations without delay or pre-conditions. It reiterated that it was not co-operating with South Africa in the nuclear field.

Many countries, mostly African, referred to the question of the denuclearization of Africa. Kenya noted that efforts to that end had continued for over two decades. Mozambique felt that the nuclear capability of South Africa was a major cause of concern and constituted a threat to peace and security in Africa and in the world at large. The United Republic of Tanzania stated that such capability had frustrated all efforts to translate into practice the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa. Similar views were expressed by Togo and the Sudan. Ethiopia voiced its disappointment at the failure of the Disarmament Commission to reach a consensus text on the nuclear capability of South Africa.

Speaking about the ongoing efforts of ASEAN to establish a South-East Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone, Indonesia noted the substantial progress made on a draft treaty for such a zone and the fact that all the nations of South-East Asia were signatories to the non-proliferation Treaty. Pakistan stated that the undertakings of the countries of the South Asian region not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons and to devote their nuclear programmes exclusively to the economic and social advancement of their people could be translated into binding commitments through a formal treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region.

A number of States welcomed the entry into force of the Treaty of Rarotonga, which established a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific, as well as the signing of two of the Treaty's Protocols by two nuclear-weapon States. The Philippines stated that the Treaty of Rarotonga reflected a popular consensus to live in a world free of nuclear weapons, and that the countries of the South Pacific and their neighbours supported efforts to keep the region nuclear-free. The Byelorussian SSR welcomed the entry into force of the

Treaty of Rarotonga, and Ireland considered the Treaty a significant arms control agreement in its own right.

A. *Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America*

Since 1979, by which time Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco had been signed and ratified by all five nuclear-weapon States, an item concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I has remained on the Assembly's agenda. The Protocol concerns the application of the Treaty to territories in the Latin American region for which extraregional States have *de jure* or *de facto* responsibility. Three of those States—the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and the United States—became parties to Additional Protocol I in 1969, 1971 and 1981, respectively.

On 27 October, a draft resolution entitled "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 41/45 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)" was submitted by the Bahamas, Bolivia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. In introducing it on 3 November, Mexico, the depositary Government of the Treaty, recalled that there were some territories in the zone which, although not sovereign political entities, were in a position to receive the benefits deriving from the Treaty through its Additional Protocol I, and that it was not fair that some of those territories were deprived of such benefits without being given the opportunity to express their opinion. By the draft, the General Assembly would once again deplore the fact that France had not yet followed its signature of Additional Protocol I with ratification and would urge it not to delay such action any further.

Five countries explained their positions at the time of the vote in the First Committee.

Among those voting in favour, Albania stated that it had reservations concerning the effectiveness of nuclear-weapon-free zones and considered that non-possession of nuclear weapons by a country did not reduce the threat posed by the nuclear warheads of the super-Powers. The United States observed that the draft singled out the one country eligible to ratify Additional Protocol I, while, at the same time, there were States in the region which were eligible to join the Treaty, but for which it was not in force. The United States urged those States to bring the Treaty and Protocol I into force; only then could those instruments make a full contribution to regional and hemispheric security. The Netherlands attached great importance to efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear arms through the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in certain regions of the world, and it was disappointed that the Treaty of Tlatelolco had not entered into force for two Latin American countries, especially as they possessed developed nuclear technologies. It stressed that as long as the zone of application of the Treaty did not cover the entire area, its effectiveness could be undermined.

Among those abstaining, France could not agree that its action should be called into question, while certain countries within the area of application had not signed or ratified the Treaty. It reiterated that it would take a decision in due course and in the light of the state of the ratification of the Treaty itself. Cuba favoured the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of agreements which were freely entered into by the States of the regions concerned and which ensured that those zones were really free of nuclear weapons. However, it could not adhere to the Tlatelolco Treaty as long as the only nuclear Power in its hemisphere maintained a military base on its territory and was hostile to it. Cuba could not renounce its right to defend its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity by weapons it deemed appropriate.

The draft resolution was approved by the First Committee on 9 November by a recorded vote of 127 to none, with 6 abstentions (including Argentina, Cuba, France and Guyana). On 30 November¹⁶ the General Assembly adopted it by a recorded vote of 147 to none, with 7 abstentions, as resolution 42/25. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2286 (XXII) of 5 December 1967, 3262 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3473 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 32/76 of 12 December 1977, S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, 33/58 of 14 December 1978, 34/71 of 11 December 1979, 35/143 of 12 December 1980, 36/83 of 9 December 1981, 37/71 of 9 December 1982, 38/61 of 15 December 1983, 39/51 of 12 December 1984, 40/79 of 12 December 1985 and 41/45 of 3 December 1986 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco),

Taking into account that within the zone of application of that Treaty, to which twenty-three sovereign States are already parties, there are some territories which, in spite of not being sovereign political entities, are nevertheless in a position to receive the benefits deriving from the Treaty through its Additional Protocol I, to which the four States that *de jure* or *de facto* are internationally responsible for those territories may become parties,

Considering that it is not fair that the peoples of some of those territories are deprived of such benefits without being given the opportunity to express their opinion in this connection,

Recalling that three of the States to which Additional Protocol I is open—the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United States of America—became parties to the Protocol in 1969, 1971 and 1981, respectively,

1. *Deplores* that the signature of Additional Protocol I by France, which took place on 2 March 1979, has not yet been followed by the corresponding ratification, notwithstanding the time already elapsed and the pressing invitations which the General Assembly has addressed to it;

2. *Once more urges* France not to delay any further such ratification, which has been requested so many times and which appears all the more advisable, since France is the only one of the four States to which the Protocol is open that is not yet party to it;

3. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session an item entitled "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 42/25 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)".

¹⁶ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Plenary Meetings, 84th meeting.*

B. Denuclearization of Africa

Since 1964, when the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa was adopted by the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the question of its implementation has been on the General Assembly's agenda. Over the years, the Assembly has called upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa as a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa" was included in the agenda of the forty-second session in accordance with General Assembly resolution 41/55 A of 1986. By another resolution adopted the same year, resolution 41/55 B, the Assembly had requested the Secretary-General to follow very closely South Africa's evolution in the nuclear field and to report thereon to the Assembly at its forty-second session.

In his report,¹⁷ the Secretary-General informed the Assembly that he had continued to follow developments in South Africa very closely and, in order to obtain information that would be of assistance in the preparation of his report, he had been in contact with IAEA and OAU. The Director General of IAEA had provided him with updated information regarding South Africa's nuclear capability. In the view of the Secretary-General, that information was relevant to the request made by the Assembly; consequently, he submitted it to the Assembly in annexes to his report.

On 27 October, Madagascar, on behalf of the Group of African States,¹⁸ submitted a draft resolution entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa", consisting of part A, entitled "Implementation of the Declaration", and part B, "Nuclear capability of South Africa". In introducing the draft in the First Committee on 3 November, Madagascar noted that part A contained the same elements that had appeared in resolution 41/55 A. Thus, the Assembly would call on all States to respect the continent of Africa as a nuclear-weapon-free zone and appeal to States to monitor South Africa's research on and development and production of nuclear weapons, and to publicize any information in that regard. By part B, the Assembly would express its grave concern that South Africa had continued its acts of aggression and subversion against the peoples of the independent States of southern Africa. It would also call for an end to all forms of military and nuclear collaboration with South Africa, and demand that South Africa submit its nuclear installations and facilities to inspection by IAEA.

On 9 November the First Committee took action on both parts of the draft. Part A was approved by a recorded vote of 129 to none, with 4 abstentions (France, Israel, United Kingdom and United States). Part B was

¹⁷ A/42/649.

¹⁸ The Group of African States is composed of: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

approved by a recorded vote of 113 to 4 (France, Israel, United Kingdom and United States), with 14 abstentions.

In connection with the voting on the draft resolution in the First Committee, seven States explained their positions on one or both parts.

Among those voting in favour of both parts, Albania stated that it was for the countries concerned to decide on the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and it expressed reservations concerning the effectiveness of such zones. Iceland, speaking on behalf of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, stated that while the Nordic countries voted in favour of the two texts, they had reservations with regard to formulations that failed to take into account the proper division of competence between the Security Council and the General Assembly. They also deplored the inappropriate and selective mentioning of individual countries or groups of countries. Finally, they felt that the Assembly, being composed of delegations representing Member States, should address itself to Governments rather than to private citizens and enterprises.

Australia voted in favour of part A, but abstained on part B because it could not accept the singling out of States by name. Japan, voting similarly, reiterated its view that an agreement to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone would foster the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, but cautioned that it would have to meet a number of conditions: it should be accepted by the countries in the region and by all other countries concerned and it should strengthen not only regional, but also global peace and security.

Three States that abstained on part A and voted against part B explained their positions. France agreed with the fundamental purposes of both drafts, but felt that part A did not make sufficiently clear the distinction between peaceful and military uses of nuclear energy, while part B did not even mention it. Furthermore, the views expressed on South Africa's possession and development of a nuclear military capability went beyond what it thought useful. The United Kingdom believed that South Africa should accede to the non-proliferation Treaty at the earliest opportunity and noted that country's recent decision to open discussion with a view to signing it. While the United Kingdom stressed that it did not collaborate in any way with South Africa in the development of its nuclear programme, it held that all States had the right to apply and develop programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It also noted that both parts of the draft contained judgements that were insufficiently substantiated or were more properly matters for the Security Council. Israel voted negatively because it was unfairly named in the text. It further noted that it had on many occasions condemned the policy of *apartheid* of South Africa, and it referred to its recent decisions drastically to curtail its relations with that country. As to its alleged nuclear collaboration with South Africa, Israel reminded the Committee that it had often categorically rejected that allegation.

The General Assembly adopted both parts of the draft on 30 November.¹⁹ Part A, on the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, was adopted

¹⁹ See footnote 16.

by a recorded vote of 151 to none, with 4 abstentions, as resolution 42/34 A. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its first ordinary session, held at Cairo from 17 to 21 July 1964,

Recalling its resolution 1652 (XVI) of 24 November 1961, its earliest on the subject, as well as its resolutions 2033 (XX) of 3 December 1965, 31/69 of 10 December 1976, 32/81 of 12 December 1977, 33/63 of 14 December 1978, 34/76 A of 11 December 1979, 35/146 B of 12 December 1980, 36/86 B of 9 December 1981, 37/74 A of 9 December 1982, 38/181 A of 20 December 1983, 39/61 A of 12 December 1984, 40/89 A of 12 December 1985 and 41/55 A of 3 December 1986, in which it called upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa and its surrounding areas as a nuclear-weapon-free zone,

Recalling that in its resolution 33/63 it vigorously condemned any overt or covert attempt by South Africa to introduce nuclear weapons into the continent of Africa and demanded that South Africa refrain forthwith from conducting any nuclear explosion in the continent or elsewhere,

Bearing in mind the provisions of resolution CM/Res. 1101 (XLVI)/Rev. 1 on the denuclearization of Africa adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity at its forty-sixth ordinary session, held at Addis Ababa from 20 to 25 July 1987,

Having taken note of the report of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research entitled "South Africa's nuclear capability", undertaken in co-operation with the Department for Disarmament Affairs of the Secretariat and in consultation with the Organization of African Unity, as well as the report of the Disarmament Commission,

Noting the actions taken by those Governments which have taken measures to restrict co-operation with South Africa in nuclear and other fields,

Expressing regret that, despite the threat that South Africa's nuclear capability constitutes to international peace and security and, in particular, to the realization of the objective of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, the Disarmament Commission, although it made some progress during its substantive session in 1987, failed once again to reach a consensus on this important item on its agenda,

1. *Strongly renews its call* upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa and its surrounding areas as a nuclear-weapon-free zone;

2. *Reaffirms* that the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity would be an important measure to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote international peace and security;

3. *Expresses once again its grave alarm* at South Africa's possession and continued development of nuclear-weapon capability;

4. *Condemns* South Africa's continued pursuit of a nuclear capability and all forms of nuclear collaboration by any State, corporation, institution or individual with the racist régime that enable it to frustrate the objective of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, which seeks to keep Africa free from nuclear weapons;

5. *Calls upon* all States, corporations, institutions and individuals to desist from further collaboration with the racist régime that may enable it to frustrate the objective of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa;

6. *Demands once again* that the racist régime of South Africa refrain from manufacturing, testing, deploying, transporting, storing, using or threatening to use nuclear weapons;

7. *Appeals* to all States that have the means to do so to monitor South Africa's research on and development and production of nuclear weapons and to publicize any information in that regard;

8. *Demands once again* that South Africa submit forthwith all its nuclear installations and facilities to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assistance that the Organization

of African Unity may seek regarding the modalities and elements for the preparation and implementation of the relevant convention or treaty on the denuclearization of Africa;

10. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa"

Part B of the draft, concerning the nuclear capability of South Africa, was adopted by a recorded vote of 140 to 4, with 13 abstentions, as resolution 42/34 B. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on South Africa's nuclear capability,

Recalling its resolutions 34/76 B of 11 December 1979, 35/146 A of 12 December 1980, 36/86 A of 9 December 1981, 37/74 B of 9 December 1982, 38/181 B of 20 December 1983, 39/61 B of 12 December 1984, 40/89 B of 12 December 1985 and 41/55 B of 3 December 1986,

Bearing in mind the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its first ordinary session, held at Cairo from 17 to 21 July 1964,

Recalling that, in paragraph 12 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, it noted that the massive accumulation of armaments and the acquisition of armaments technology by racist régimes, as well as their possible acquisition of nuclear weapons, present a challenging and increasingly dangerous obstacle to a world community faced with the urgent need to disarm,

Recalling also that, in its resolution 33/63 of 14 December 1978, it vigorously condemned any overt or covert attempt by South Africa to introduce nuclear weapons into the continent of Africa and demanded that South Africa refrain forthwith from conducting any nuclear explosion in the continent or elsewhere,

Bearing in mind the provisions of resolution CM/Res. 1101 (XLVI)/Rev.1 on the denuclearization of Africa adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity at its forty-sixth ordinary session, held at Addis Ababa from 20 to 25 July 1987,

Noting with regret the non-implementation by *apartheid* South Africa of resolution GC(XXX)/RES/468 adopted on 3 October 1986 by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency during its thirtieth regular session,

Having taken note of the report of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research entitled "South Africa's nuclear capability", undertaken in co-operation with the Department for Disarmament Affairs of the Secretariat and in consultation with the Organization of African Unity,

Expressing regret that, despite the threat that South Africa's nuclear-weapon capability constitutes to international peace and security and, in particular, to the realization of the objective of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, the Disarmament Commission, although it made some progress during its substantive session in 1987, failed once again to reach a consensus on this important item on its agenda,

Alarmed that South Africa's nuclear facilities, particularly those that remain unsafeguarded, enable it to develop and acquire the capability of producing fissionable material for nuclear weapons,

Gravely concerned that South Africa, in flagrant violation of the principles of international law and the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, has continued its acts of aggression and subversion against the peoples of the independent States of southern Africa,

Strongly condemning the continued military occupation by South African troops of parts of the territory of Angola in violation of its national sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, and urging the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of South African troops from Angolan soil,

Expressing its grave disappointment that, despite repeated appeals by the international community, certain Western States and Israel have continued to collaborate with the racist régime of South Africa in the military and nuclear fields and that some of these States have, by a ready

recourse to the use of veto, consistently frustrated every effort in the Security Council to deal decisively with the question of South Africa,

Recalling its decision taken at the tenth special session that the Security Council should take appropriate effective steps to prevent the frustration of the implementation of the decision of the Organization of African Unity for the denuclearization of Africa,

Stressing the need to preserve peace and security in Africa by ensuring that the continent is a nuclear-weapon-free zone,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Secretary-General on South Africa's nuclear capability;

2. *Condemns* the massive buildup of South Africa's military machine, in particular its frenzied acquisition of nuclear-weapon capability for repressive and aggressive purposes and as an instrument of blackmail;

3. *Further condemns* all forms of nuclear collaboration by any State, corporation, institution or individual with the racist régime of South Africa, in particular the decision by some Member States to grant licences to several corporations in their territories to provide equipment and technical and maintenance services for nuclear installations in South Africa;

4. *Reaffirms* that the acquisition of nuclear-weapon capability by the racist régime constitutes a very grave danger to international peace and security and, in particular, jeopardizes the security of African States and increases the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons;

5. *Expresses its full support* for the African States faced with the danger of South Africa's nuclear capability;

6. *Commends* the actions taken by those Governments which have taken measures to restrict co-operation with South Africa in nuclear and other fields;

7. *Demands* that South Africa and all other foreign interests put an immediate end to the exploration for and exploitation of uranium resources in Namibia;

8. *Calls upon* all States, corporations, institutions and individuals to terminate forthwith all forms of military and nuclear collaboration with the racist régime;

9. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to consider once again as a matter of priority during its substantive session in 1988 South Africa's nuclear capability, taking into account, *inter alia*, the findings of the report of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research on South Africa's nuclear capability;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assistance that the Organization of African Unity may seek regarding the modalities and elements for the preparation and implementation of the relevant convention or treaty on the denuclearization of Africa;

11. *Commends* the adoption by the Security Council of resolutions 558 (1984) of 13 December 1984 and 591 (1986) of 28 November 1986 on the question of South Africa, with a view to blocking the existing loopholes in the arms embargo so as to render it more effective and prohibiting, in particular, all forms of co-operation and collaboration with the racist régime of South Africa in the nuclear field;

12. *Demands once again* that South Africa submit forthwith all its nuclear installations and facilities to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency;

13. *Requests* the Secretary-General to follow very closely South Africa's evolution in the nuclear field and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its forty-third session.

In connection with the item entitled "Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa", the General Assembly adopted several resolutions with some disarmament-related provisions: 42/23 C, "Comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against the racist régime of South Africa"; 42/23 D, "Relations between Israel and South Africa"; and 42/23 G, "Concerted international action for the elimination of *apartheid*".

Under the agenda item entitled "Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security", the Assembly adopted resolution 42/92, by which it called upon all States, particularly the members of the Security Council, to take appropriate and effective measures

to promote the fulfilment of the objective of the denuclearization of Africa in order to avert the serious danger that the nuclear capability of South Africa constituted for the African States, in particular the front-line States, as well as for international peace and security. The resolution was adopted by a recorded vote of 131 to 1 (United States), with 23 abstentions (mainly Western States).

C. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East

Under the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East", Egypt submitted a draft resolution in the First Committee on 21 October and introduced it on 27 October. It noted that pursuant to General Assembly resolutions of previous years on the subject, all States of the region and a number of nuclear-weapon States had conveyed their views to the Secretary-General on the establishment of a zone, and that the Secretary-General had then transmitted the communications to the General Assembly. The latest report of the Secretary-General²⁰ was before the Assembly. Egypt stated that the draft resolution contained elements on which a consensus had evolved over the years, and it stressed that all those elements remained valid and had acquired even greater urgency.

On 9 November the First Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote. Five countries explained their positions. Israel was pleased to be able to join the consensus, but stressed once again that the establishment of the proposed zone could take place only through direct and free negotiations among the sovereign States of the region, in accordance with the practices followed in other parts in the world. Iraq considered that the first essential step was for all the States of the region, especially Israel, to renounce the possession of nuclear weapons and accede to the non-proliferation Treaty. The Islamic Republic of Iran believed that the possession of nuclear weapons posed a grave threat to the peoples of the region and a menace to international peace and security. In its view, the international community must exert pressure on Israel to make it submit to IAEA safeguards and adhere to the non-proliferation Treaty. The United States expressed reservations about a preambular paragraph that emphasized the need for appropriate measures regarding the prohibition of military attacks on nuclear facilities, and Albania expressed reservations about the effectiveness of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

On 30 November²¹ the General Assembly adopted the draft as resolution 42/28, also without a vote. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3263 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3474 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/71 of 10 December 1976, 32/82 of 12 December 1977, 33/64 of 14 December 1978, 34/77 of 11 December 1979, 35/147 of 12 December 1980, 36/87 of 9 December 1981, 37/75 of 9 December 1982, 38/64 of 15 December 1983, 39/54 of 12 December 1984, 40/82 of 12

²⁰ A/42/364.

²¹ See footnote 16.

December 1985 and 41/48 of 3 December 1986 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Recalling also the recommendations for the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East consistent with paragraphs 60 to 63, and in particular paragraph 63 (d), of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

Emphasizing the basic provisions of the above-mentioned resolutions, which call upon all parties directly concerned to consider taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East and, pending and during the establishment of such a zone, to declare solemnly that they will refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party, to agree to place all their nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and to declare their support for the establishment of the zone and deposit such declarations with the Security Council for consideration, as appropriate,

Reaffirming the inalienable right of all States to acquire and develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,

Emphasizing further the need for appropriate measures on the question of the prohibition of military attacks on nuclear facilities,

Bearing in mind the consensus reached by the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East would greatly enhance international peace and security,

Desirous to build on that consensus so that substantial progress can be made towards establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Emphasizing the essential role of the United Nations in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Having examined the report of the Secretary-General,

1. *Urges* all parties directly concerned to consider seriously taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and, as a means of promoting this objective, invites the countries concerned to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

2. *Calls upon* all countries of the region that have not done so, pending the establishment of the zone, to agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;

3. *Invites* those countries, pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, to declare their support for establishing such a zone, consistent with the relevant paragraph of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and to deposit those declarations with the Security Council;

4. *Further invites* those countries, pending the establishment of the zone, not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or permit the stationing on their territories, or territories under their control, of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices;

5. *Invites* the nuclear-weapon States and all other States to render their assistance in the establishment of the zone and at the same time to refrain from any action that runs counter to both the letter and spirit of the present resolution;

6. *Extends its thanks* to the Secretary-General for his report containing the views of parties concerned regarding the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East;

7. *Takes note* of the above-mentioned report;

8. *Requests* those parties that have not yet communicated their views to the Secretary-General to do so;

9. *Welcomes* any further comments from those parties that have already communicated their views to the Secretary-General;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit a report to the General Assembly at its forty-third session on the implementation of the present resolution;

11. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East"

The item entitled "Israeli nuclear armament: report of the Secretary-General" was included in the provisional agenda of the forty-second session in accordance with resolution 41/93 of 1986, by which the Secretary-General had been requested to follow closely Israeli nuclear activities in the light of the latest available information and to submit to the General Assembly at its forty-second session an update of the 1981 *Study on Israeli Nuclear Armament*²². In the summary of the findings of his report entitled "Israeli nuclear armament",²³ the Secretary-General noted that while there was wide speculation about the matter, Israel itself had neither confirmed nor denied its nuclear capability. Although the United Nations did not have conclusive proof that Israel possessed nuclear weapons, he stated, circumstantial evidence, together with other factors cited in the report, would seem to indicate that Israel had developed the necessary technology and had the means to manufacture nuclear weapons, if it so chose.

On 23 October, Algeria, Bahrain, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen submitted a draft resolution on the item in the First Committee. In introducing the draft on 30 October, Iraq expressed its view that Israel's long-standing nuclear policy had consistently aimed at developing its nuclear capabilities and the use of such capabilities for military purposes. Iraq cited a number of press reports in support of that view and read out the summary of the Secretary-General's report. By the draft, the Assembly would, *inter alia*, condemn Israel's refusal to renounce any possession of nuclear weapons and its alleged co-operation with South Africa; call upon the Security Council to take urgent and effective measures to ensure that Israel complied with its resolution 487 (1981); and request IAEA to suspend any scientific co-operation with Israel that could contribute to its nuclear capabilities.

In commenting on the draft on 2 November, Israel stated that it considered that the Assembly's very request to investigate Israeli nuclear potential and report on it was discriminatory. It reiterated that it would not be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East and that it was committed to non-proliferation. Believing that the non-proliferation Treaty alone would not inhibit local wars—the bane of the Middle East—Israel elected the road of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, which implied free negotiations between partners and mutual arrangements. Its repeated invitation to the Arab States to negotiate a nuclear-weapon-free zone was a clear statement of policy. Israel pointed out that it had joined the consensus on the draft resolution concerning the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East

²² United Nations publication, Sales No. E.82.IX.2.

²³ A/42/581.

and had given assurances of the inviolability of nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes. Furthermore, it denied that there was any co-operation between itself and South Africa. In conclusion, Israel asked the Committee to reject the draft resolution before it in its entirety.

On 9 November the Committee took separate votes on a number of paragraphs of the draft (see the text below): it approved the seventh preambular paragraph by a recorded vote of 80 to 10, with 33 abstentions; the tenth preambular paragraph by a recorded vote of 73 to 23, with 25 abstentions; operative paragraph 2 by a recorded vote of 76 to 20, with 27 abstentions; operative paragraph 4 by a recorded vote of 72 to 25, with 24 abstentions; and operative paragraph 5 by a recorded vote of 74 to 24, with 25 abstentions. It then approved the draft resolution as a whole by a recorded vote of 86 to 3 (Israel, Portugal and United States), with 44 abstentions.

In a statement just before the vote, Israel appealed to the delegations that had decided to abstain to carefully consider the meaning of their decision.

Three delegations explained their votes. Among those abstaining on the draft as a whole, Australia expressed the view that to request IAEA to suspend scientific collaboration with Israel and to call upon all States to discontinue co-operation with Israel in the nuclear field could have implications for Israel's rights and privileges of membership in IAEA, and was thus contrary to Australia's belief in the universality of membership of international organizations. Australia was concerned at the failure of Israel to become a party to the non-proliferation Treaty or to at least accept full-scope safeguards on its nuclear facilities. Japan stated that it abstained on the draft as a whole because it contained several paragraphs on which it had reservations or could not make a judgement because of a lack of objective information. It was, however, disturbed over the persistent reports of Israeli nuclear armament and hoped that Israel would undertake the legal commitment of not acquiring nuclear weapons by acceding to the non-proliferation Treaty. Among those voting in favour of the draft resolution as a whole, Venezuela stated that the text was consistent with earlier General Assembly resolutions on the same subject. It abstained in some of the separate votes on specific paragraphs, however.

On 30 November²⁴ the General Assembly took a vote on the draft resolution. It first adopted the seventh preambular paragraph by a recorded vote of 84 to 10, with 37 abstentions; the tenth preambular paragraph by a recorded vote of 80 to 22, with 33 abstentions; operative paragraph 2 by a recorded vote of 84 to 18, with 37 abstentions; operative paragraph 4 by a recorded vote of 80 to 23, with 36 abstentions; and operative paragraph 5 by a recorded vote of 83 to 22, with 35 abstentions. The draft resolution as a whole was then adopted, as resolution 42/44, by a recorded vote of 97 to 2 (Israel and United States), with 52 abstentions. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind its previous resolutions on Israeli nuclear armament, the latest of which is 41/93 of 4 December 1986,

²⁴ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Plenary Meetings*, 85th meeting.

Recalling resolution 41/48 of 3 December 1986, in which, *inter alia*, it called for placing all nuclear facilities in the region under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East,

Recalling further Security Council resolution 487 (1981) of 19 June 1981, in which, *inter alia*, the Council called upon Israel urgently to place all its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards,

Noting that only Israel has been specifically called upon by the Security Council to place its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards,

Taking note with appreciation of the report of the Secretary-General on Israeli nuclear armament,

Noting with grave concern Israel's persistent refusal to commit itself not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons, despite repeated calls by the General Assembly, the Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency,

Taking into consideration resolution GC (XXXI)/RES/470 adopted by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in which it called upon Israel to place all its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards,

Deeply alarmed by recent information in regard to the continuing production, development and acquisition of nuclear weapons by Israel,

Aware of the grave consequences that endanger international peace and security as a result of Israel's development and acquisition of nuclear weapons and Israel's collaboration with South Africa to develop nuclear weapons and their delivery systems,

Deeply concerned that the declared Israeli policy of attacking and destroying nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes is a part of its nuclear armament policy,

1. Reiterates its condemnation of Israel's refusal to renounce any possession of nuclear weapons;
2. Reiterates also its condemnation of the co-operation between Israel and South Africa;
3. Requests once more the Security Council to take urgent and effective measures to ensure that Israel complies with Council resolution 487 (1981);
4. Calls upon all States and organizations that have not yet done so to discontinue co-operating with and giving assistance to Israel in the nuclear field;
5. Reiterates its request to the International Atomic Energy Agency to suspend any scientific co-operation with Israel which could contribute to its nuclear capabilities;
6. Requests also the International Atomic Energy Agency to inform the Secretary-General of any steps Israel may undertake to place its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards;
7. Requests the Secretary-General to follow closely Israeli nuclear activities and to report to the General Assembly at its forty-third session;
8. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Israeli nuclear armament"

Pursuant to resolution 41/12 of 1986, the General Assembly had on its agenda an item entitled "Armed Israeli aggression against the Iraqi nuclear installations and its grave consequences for the established international system concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and international peace and security", which was to be dealt with in a plenary meeting of the Assembly. On 21 December, while deciding to suspend the session, the General Assembly also decided to retain that item on the agenda of its forty-second session.²⁵

D. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia

The item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia: report of the Secretary-General" was included in the provisional agenda of the forty-second session in accordance with General Assembly resolution 41/49 of the previous year. The Assembly had before it a report of the

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 99th meeting.

Secretary-General²⁶ transmitting Member States' views on the matter, as requested in the resolution. In his report, at Pakistan's request, the Secretary-General called the attention of the States of South Asia and the nuclear-weapon States to "Pakistan's desire for early consultations designed to achieve the shared objective of preventing nuclear proliferation in South Asia".

On 27 October, Bangladesh and Pakistan submitted a draft resolution entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia". In introducing it on 6 November, Pakistan stated its belief that, pending nuclear disarmament, the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone represented an important collateral measure, which could insulate the region in question against the threat of nuclear attack and prevent the geographical spread of nuclear weapons. It would be an important partial measure in the step-by-step approach to general and complete disarmament. Pakistan's commitment to nuclear non-proliferation had been demonstrated by various proposals, which were reflected in the draft. By it, the Assembly would request the Secretary-General to ascertain the views of the regional and other concerned States and to promote consultations among them to further efforts for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia.

On 9 November the First Committee approved the draft by a recorded vote of 95 to 3 (Bhutan, India and Mauritius), with 33 abstentions. Several countries explained their positions in connection with the vote.

Among those voting against the draft, India considered that the Committee's decisions on the question had become an annual ritual. India had supported certain proposals for zones in specific regions, because they enjoyed the support of all the States of those regions. It had at the same time expressed reservations about the efficacy of such measures, particularly in the light of the new findings on nuclear winter. India pointed out that no consensus existed on the establishment of a zone in South Asia. Bhutan stressed the complexity of the matter and the need for consultations and agreement among the States directly concerned.

Among those that abstained, Indonesia stated that it subscribed to the view regarding nuclear-weapon-free zones expressed in the 1978 Final Document, and it considered that the countries of South Asia were still in the process of achieving agreement on the issue. Sweden favoured the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, but abstained as it was apparent that not all the States concerned were prepared to support the draft.

Among those voting in favour, Albania had reservations concerning the effectiveness of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Japan believed that zones would contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the peace and security of the region in question, but considered that a number of conditions should first be fulfilled. New Zealand welcomed the undertakings by South Asian States to devote their nuclear programmes exclusively to economic and social progress, and stressed that proven mechanisms existed to ensure confidence in and facilitate the development of peaceful nuclear programmes.

²⁶ A/42/456 and Add.1. Replies were received from: Bangladesh, Maldives, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.

Sri Lanka recalled its traditional support for the proposal and hoped for a convergence of views on the underlying concept.

On 30 November²⁷ the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 114 to 3, with 36 abstentions, as resolution 42/29. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3265 B (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3476 B (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/73 of 10 December 1976, 32/83 of 12 December 1977, 33/65 of 14 December 1978, 34/78 of 11 December 1979, 35/148 of 12 December 1980, 36/88 of 9 December 1981, 37/76 of 9 December 1982, 38/65 of 15 December 1983, 39/55 of 12 December 1984, 40/83 of 12 December 1985 and 41/49 of 3 December 1986 concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia,

Reiterating its conviction that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world is one of the measures which can contribute effectively to the objectives of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and general and complete disarmament,

Believing that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, as in other regions, will assist in the strengthening of the security of the States of the region against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Noting with appreciation the declarations issued at the highest level by Governments of South Asian States that are developing their peaceful nuclear programmes reaffirming their undertaking not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons and to devote their nuclear programmes exclusively to the economic and social advancement of their peoples,

Welcoming the recent proposal for the conclusion of a bilateral or regional nuclear-test-ban agreement in South Asia,

Taking note of the proposal to convene, under the auspices of the United Nations, a conference on nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia, as soon as possible, with the participation of the regional and other concerned States,

Bearing in mind the provisions of paragraphs 60 to 63 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, regarding the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, including in the region of South Asia,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General and the views of the States of South Asia contained therein,

1. *Reaffirms* its endorsement, in principle, of the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia;

2. *Urges once again* the States of South Asia to continue to make all possible efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and to refrain, in the mean time, from any action contrary to this objective;

3. *Calls upon* those nuclear-weapon States that have not done so to respond positively to this proposal and to extend the necessary co-operation in the efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to communicate with the States of the region and other concerned States in order to ascertain their views on the issue and to promote consultations among them with a view to exploring the best possibilities of furthering the efforts for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia;

5. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to report on the subject to the General Assembly at its forty-third session;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia"

At the time that the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution,

²⁷ See footnote 16.

Maldives, which supported it, expressed several reservations. It believed it would be premature at that stage to bring in specific ideas, as suggested in the fifth and sixth preambular paragraphs, and it felt that no useful purpose was served by mentioning South Asia in the last preambular paragraph.

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An item concerning Antarctica, which is related to the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones, was on the General Assembly's agenda at its forty-second session. Three draft resolutions on the subject were submitted and two adopted, as resolutions 42/46 A and B, but neither one directly addressed disarmament matters.

Conclusion

In 1987 the question of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in general and in various regions of the world was discussed in the Disarmament Commission, the Conference on Disarmament and at the forty-second session of the General Assembly. An extensive debate took place in the General Assembly on the desirability and possibility of setting up nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia, and led to the adoption of resolutions pertaining to each of those regions.

It was argued that the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones would prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons, strengthen the security of the countries concerned and contribute to confidence-building among them. While supporting the concept as such, a number of Member States stressed certain prerequisites, including the principles that the initiative should be based on agreements freely arrived at among the States of a given region; that the arrangements concerning the zones should take into consideration specific characteristics of the region in question; that such arrangements should contain provisions concerning verification of the commitments undertaken; and that the nuclear-weapon States should undertake obligations to respect the denuclearized status of such zones.

The entry into force of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty was welcomed by a large number of States as a regional arms control measure to preserve and enhance the existing security environment of the South Pacific. The signature of two Protocols to the Treaty by two nuclear-weapon States was also welcomed. While the denuclearization of Africa and the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East received general support, a number of States expressed their concern about allegations that South Africa and Israel had nuclear-weapon capability.

International co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy

Introduction

FOR MANY YEARS INTERNATIONAL DISCUSSIONS on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy—both within the United Nations and elsewhere—have reflected two divergent approaches. In the first approach, stress is laid on the potential benefits of the peaceful application of this source of energy for a variety of purposes, particularly the generation of electric power. That approach is to some extent in conflict with the approach that emphasizes the risks engendered by the spread of nuclear material, equipment and technology that might lend themselves to the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

States seeking to obtain such items (usually referred to as “recipient countries”) have traditionally emphasized their need and their inherent right to have unimpaired access to the peaceful applications of nuclear energy, while most of the actual or potential manufacturers of equipment and suppliers of material and technology (customarily called “supplier States”), wishing to avoid contributing to the spread of a nuclear-weapon capability among recipients, have advocated restrictions on international transfers, especially of nuclear know-how and installations, and have sought to impose strict control on nuclear exports.

This contradiction first arose in the mid-1950s, albeit on a limited scale. But it was not until 20 years later that supplier States first decided to adopt joint policies on nuclear exports. At that time, in the mid-1970s, a group of current and future exporters of nuclear items started consultations on joint guidelines and principles to govern their nuclear exports. The 15 States¹ concerned agreed upon criteria for the application of IAEA safeguards to exports and formulated requirements to prevent unauthorized transactions. The requirements included restrictions on re-exportation.²

In February 1980, the Conference on the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), initiated by the United States, completed a technical evaluation of data and options that it had undertaken to find less-proliferation-prone nuclear fuel cycles. Sixty-six States—both suppliers and recipients of

¹ Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland (non-member of the United Nations), USSR, United Kingdom and United States.

² See *The Yearbook*, vol. 2: 1977, chapter IX, for a detailed outline of the guidelines.

nuclear technology—took part in the evaluation, which did not, however, lead to the hoped-for result.

In June 1980, following the INFCE evaluation and in response to the need for adequate supplies of fuel and related services, the IAEA Board of Governors established the Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS), open to all IAEA members, to advise the Board on ways to ensure long-term availability of such supplies and services in accordance with non-proliferation considerations and IAEA's role. So far, the work of CAS has failed to yield a consensus on the means to achieve the purposes of both establishing the assurances sought and avoiding undue proliferation risks.

In response, recipient countries have sought to develop mutual assistance, self-reliance and co-ordinated action on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the United Nations and in other international organizations, particularly IAEA. In 1977 they proposed that an international conference be convened to promote co-operation in the peaceful applications of nuclear energy. Three years later, by resolution 35/112, the General Assembly decided to hold the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (UNCPICPUNE) and to establish a preparatory committee for the Conference. As of the end of 1986, the Preparatory Committee had held one organizational session and six substantive sessions.

By resolution 41/212 A of 1986, the General Assembly noted with satisfaction that the Preparatory Committee for the Conference, to be held in March and April 1987, had successfully concluded its work. Recalling that the Conference represented a global effort specifically for the purpose of promoting international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development, the General Assembly invited all States to participate in it at an appropriately high level.

A nuclear reactor accident at Chernobyl, in the Soviet Union, in April 1986 led to new activities in nuclear safety, notably to the swift elaboration and adoption at a special session of IAEA's General Conference of two international conventions: the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency.³

Regular session of the General Conference of IAEA, 1987⁴

The thirty-first regular session of the General Conference took place from 21 to 25 September in Vienna. The Conference was attended by 660 delegates from 100 of the 113 member States. The discussion in the general debate focused on nuclear power, nuclear safety, technical co-operation and Agency safeguards.

Many delegations noted that nuclear power constituted a major element

³ See IAEA, *Final Document, Resolutions and Conventions adopted by the first special session of the General Conference, 24-26 September 1986*, sects. I-IV.

⁴ The text for this section was contributed by IAEA.

of their national energy programmes, but public acceptance of nuclear energy had diminished. Several delegations held that the Agency could provide help to member States in the nuclear debate. Delegations also felt that proven and continued safe operation of existing plants was the best means of reassuring the public as to the viability of nuclear power. A number of delegations hoped for the implementation of the recommendations of an expert group established to assist developing countries in the promotion and financing of nuclear power programmes. The Expert Group had affirmed the vital need for added electricity production in developing countries and had stressed the importance of overcoming constraints regarding trained manpower and technical and organizational infrastructure. The Expert Group had urged IAEA to assist interested member States in evaluating the nuclear power option within its overall energy and development planning, and advocated increased emphasis on regional co-operation in energy and nuclear-power planning studies.

Delegations continued to support the Agency's expanded safety programme, which had been set up the previous year as a result of the Chernobyl accident. The programme was designed to strengthen international co-operation in nuclear safety. It was considered necessary to develop power reactors with increased inherent safety. The importance of IAEA safety activities was emphasized as well as the need to provide the Agency with sufficient financial resources to enable it to continue with the expansion of its activities and to keep abreast of new developments in this field. Several delegations raised the possibility of looking into man-machine interface problems.

Full support was given to the Agency's work with regard to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. Delegations generally commended the Agency for its continued work related to the Nuclear Safety Standards Programme (NUSS), Operation Safety Review Teams (OSART), Radiation Protection Advisory Teams (RAPAT), Assessment of Safety-Significant Events Teams (ASSET) and its Incident Reporting System (IRS).

In addressing the Agency's programme for technical co-operation activities, all speakers appreciated its growth over the years and increased effectiveness. Many delegations expressed support for the application of isotope techniques to food, agriculture, medicine and industry. Several African countries expressed their appreciation of the Agency's BICOT project for the eradication of the tse-tse fly in parts of Nigeria and looked forward to the second phase of the project. The Agency's assistance in setting up multi-purpose commercial food irradiation plants was greatly appreciated, as well as the establishment of plants for the production of radioisotopes. Latin American countries as a whole reiterated their support for and keen interest in the Regional Co-operative Arrangements for the Advancement of Science and Technology in Latin America (ARCAL). Member States from Asia and the Pacific expressed their appreciation of similar projects under the Regional Co-operative Agreements (RCA) in Asia and the Pacific and commented on the success they had had in implementing them.

Delegations underlined the necessity of maintaining the credibility of the Agency's safeguards system as one of the primary mechanisms supporting the nuclear non-proliferation régime. It was generally felt that the safeguards system must continue to expand and to be adapted to technological developments. A few delegations also stressed the need to maintain a balance between the Agency's promotional and regulatory activities.

Among the resolutions considered and adopted by the General Conference was resolution GC(XXXI)/RES/485, entitled "South Africa's nuclear capabilities". By it, the General Conference resolved to take a decision on the recommendation of the Board of Governors concerning the suspension of South Africa at its thirty-second regular session. The General Conference requested the Director General to continue to take all possible measures to ensure the full implementation of resolution GC(XXX)/RES/468, the corresponding resolution of 1986, and to report to it at its thirty-second regular session. It also requested the Director General to bring the resolution to the attention of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and decided to include in the agenda of the thirty-second regular session of the General Conference an item entitled "South Africa's nuclear capabilities". The resolution was adopted by a roll-call vote of 60 to 28, with 4 abstentions.

The General Conference also adopted resolution GC(XXX)/RES/470, entitled "Israeli nuclear threat". By it, the General Conference, *inter alia*, demanded that Israel place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards in compliance with United Nations Security Council resolution 487 (1981); requested the Director General to consider the implementation by IAEA of provisions in General Assembly resolutions 41/12 and 41/93 relating to IAEA, and to report to the Board of Governors at the next session of the General Conference on Israeli nuclear capabilities and the implementation of the resolution; and requested the Director General to bring the resolution to the attention of the United Nations Secretary-General and to include the item in the agenda of the thirty-second General Conference.

United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (UNCPICPUNE)

The United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (UNCPICPUNE) was held at Geneva from 23 March to 10 April 1987, with 106 States participating.⁵ Namibia, represented by the United Nations Council for Namibia, also attended. Other participants included intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, national liberation movements, and members of the secretariats of various United Nations bodies and offices.

The Preparatory Committee for the Conference held seven sessions in Geneva and New York between 1981 and 1986. A group of governmental experts also held four sessions between sessions of the Preparatory Committee

⁵ Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bhu-

to evaluate international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; it suggested ways and means to promote that co-operation. Furthermore, five regional expert group meetings were held in 1985 to discuss the current status of nuclear power and other peaceful applications of nuclear energy in each region. They discussed the difficulties hampering the peaceful use of nuclear energy and submitted proposals to overcome them.

In opening the Conference, Mr. Amrik Mehta of India, Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and Secretary-General of the Conference, emphasized that as long as nuclear energy was in use in some parts of the world, international co-operation was necessary to ensure, on the one hand, that nuclear technology was not abused or misused in any way, and on the other, that its benefits were made available in a safe and secure manner. He also stressed that the Conference was by no means intended as a forum to make a case for or against the use of nuclear energy. Those decisions, he said, were up to individual countries and each country had the right to choose for itself the energy sources most suited to its national interests.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations stated in his message to the Conference that international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy could reach its full potential only in a world from which its potentially destructive uses had been eliminated. The aim of the Conference, he said, must be to establish an appropriate framework for enhanced international co-operation in the field that would serve the interests of both the technologically advanced and the developing countries.

The President of the Conference, Mr. Mohamed Ibrahim Shaker of Egypt, observed that the Conference represented the first global effort under United Nations auspices designed specifically to promote international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for social and economic development. He hoped that the spirit of mutual understanding and co-operation that had prevailed during the preparatory process would be sustained and guarantee the success of the Conference.

Mr. Hans Blix, Director General of IAEA, urged the Governments and organizations represented at the Conference to formulate new ideas on how to facilitate the transfer of nuclear science and technology to promote development and how to set the right priorities. In his view, political will and resources were the most important ingredients for success in harnessing nu-

tan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian SSR, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Rwanda, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

clear technology for human betterment.

In the course of the general debate in plenary meetings, all speakers agreed on the need for more international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Several of them stressed the need for adequate safety precautions and measures to prevent abuses of nuclear technology. Among them, Canada, which had nuclear co-operation agreements with over 20 countries, including a number of developing countries, stated that Canadians were deeply concerned about the risks of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. It held that supplier nations as well as recipients had a responsibility to ensure that those risks were minimized and, where possible, eliminated altogether. Sweden emphasized the strong link between assurances of supply and assurances of non-proliferation. It held that the search for solutions must be based on the fact that neither aspect could be promoted without due regard for the other.

Among the mainly non-aligned countries that argued for unrestricted access to nuclear technology and asserted that the transfer of technology and services required for the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be on an equitable basis, Chile held that co-operation in the nuclear energy field should be subject only to technical considerations deriving from the true needs of the people. It believed that all countries must be permitted to take full advantage of the possibilities offered by nuclear energy.

Several delegations stressed the importance of non-proliferation and considered the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty⁶ an essential basis for co-operation. The Byelorussian SSR maintained that international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy would not be possible without a further strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation régime, and believed that bilateral agreements should play an important role in international co-operation to regulate the use of nuclear technology. According to New Zealand, the linkage between promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and preventing its spread to military applications was a strong and necessary one. It was convinced that the non-proliferation Treaty represented the best assurance currently available that the further spread of nuclear weapons would be subject to constraints.

A number of countries maintained that the non-proliferation Treaty was discriminatory. For example, Yugoslavia asserted that the Treaty was being used unjustifiably to limit the transfer of nuclear technologies and fuels to developing countries, while the nuclear-weapon States themselves had not complied with the Treaty's basic provisions. It stated that the problem of proliferation could not be solved by restrictions, barriers or any other unilateral measures; what was needed was to strengthen co-operation and mutual trust among all countries.

In Canada's view, non-proliferation requirements did not act as constraints in the development of nuclear programmes. Instead, they provided the political framework within which nuclear commerce must be conducted if the international community was to be reassured that such co-operation would not

⁶ General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex.

promote proliferation. Norway also believed that IAEA safeguards activities had not hampered the economic, scientific or technological development of the parties to the non-proliferation Treaty.

A number of countries noted that they were using nuclear power to help meet their energy requirements because of the high cost of oil, the scarcity of other resources, or environmental concerns. However, Austria viewed with concern the construction of nuclear power facilities and the growing risks arising from an increase in fuel reprocessing and the transport of radioactive materials. The representative of Denmark noted that public opposition to nuclear power had intensified in his country. Ireland favoured a phase-out of nuclear electricity generation, because it was convinced that nuclear power presented unacceptable risks to the public.

All speakers emphasized the importance of nuclear safety. Austria believed it imperative to consider nuclear safety, co-operation in the case of nuclear accidents, and liability for damages caused by nuclear installations as important subjects for international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Poland and the Soviet Union advocated the creation of an international system for the safe development of nuclear power. The Soviet Union stated that after the Chernobyl accident, measures had been taken nationally and internationally, and others had been recommended, to ensure safety in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the acceptance of responsibility in case of accidents.

Belgium, speaking on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community, observed that the Chernobyl accident had highlighted the need for strict safety and security measures at all stages of the construction and operation of nuclear facilities, as well as in plans to handle the consequences of nuclear accidents.

Among those that expressed concern about the transboundary effects of possible nuclear accidents, Ireland held that countries should implement their programmes in conformity with the highest possible levels of safety and in full consideration of the risks posed to neighbouring States. Turkey felt that safety issues in the event of transboundary releases had not been adequately dealt with by the two international Conventions that were adopted as a result of the Chernobyl accident.

Several speakers referred to constraints that hampered the introduction and development of nuclear energy in developing countries. India noted that difficulties experienced by those countries in promoting nuclear energy were different, depending upon the stage of their nuclear power programme and the infrastructure and resources available to them. Those constraints could arise from deficiencies in various areas: industrial, research and development support; access to technology; scientific and technical information; availability of skilled manpower and assurance of supply of nuclear materials; and equipment and fuel cycle services. It stated that IAEA had an essential role to play in helping member States overcome some of the impediments in the technical and scientific areas. In Nigeria's view, constraints facing African countries stemmed from a lack of co-operation on the part of developed countries. It suggested that international financial institutions such as the World Bank

should make long-term “soft loans” for nuclear energy development. It favoured the promotion of regional co-operation in nuclear energy programmes and the development of regional facilities for enhancing research and training in the peaceful applications of nuclear science.

The delegations generally agreed that IAEA should continue to play its central role among multinational institutions in promoting international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Many of them expressed appreciation of the Agency’s technical assistance programmes. In Finland’s view, IAEA had, during its 30 years of existence, gained pre-eminence as an organ for international co-operation, and the Conference should make every effort to support the Agency in that task. Mongolia indicated that through IAEA’s valuable assistance, the use of radioactive isotopes in health, agriculture, geological research and mining had brought many benefits to its people. Mexico felt that IAEA should play the principal role in carrying out any decisions and recommendations of the Conference.

The Conference worked in two main committees. Committee I addressed agenda item 5, concerning principles universally acceptable for international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and appropriate ways and means for the promotion of such co-operation, as envisaged in General Assembly resolution 32/50, and in accordance with mutually acceptable considerations of non-proliferation. Committee II dealt with agenda items 6 and 7, concerning, respectively, the role of nuclear power for social and economic development and the role of other peaceful applications of nuclear energy, such as food and agriculture, health and medicine, and industry, for social and economic development.

In its discussion on principles, Committee I based its deliberations on the draft set of principles submitted by non-aligned countries. It considered all the proposals and documents discussed or submitted by the Preparatory Committee relevant to those matters, as well as other proposals and documents presented at the Conference. The Committee attempted to reach agreement on the subject-matter entrusted to it, but because of differences of view, that was not possible. The texts of the main proposals on (a) principles and (b) ways and means were incorporated into the Conference’s report between square brackets, meaning that no agreement on them had been reached.⁷

Committee II discussed extensively the role of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development, hearing a total of 103 reports by delegations covering a wide range of subjects.⁸ They included the development of nuclear power programmes, peaceful applications of nuclear energy for purposes other than the generation of electricity, uses of radioisotopes and radiation techniques in industry, medicine, food and agriculture, and issues relating to nuclear safety and radiological protection. Because the Committee considered that the technical reports presented could be used in planning national programmes for the development, use and safety of nuclear

⁷ *Report of the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, Geneva, 23 March-10 April 1987 (A/CONF.108/7)*. For the texts of the main proposals, see paragraph 101.

⁸ *Ibid.*, annex III.

energy for peaceful purposes, it agreed that the technical reports should be made widely available. Accordingly, it requested the Secretary-General to consider their publication within existing financial resources. A summary of the views expressed in the reports and in the course of the discussion was incorporated into the report of the Conference.

In sum, in spite of extensive efforts to reach agreement on universally acceptable principles for international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and on appropriate ways and means for promoting such co-operation, the discussion during the Conference revealed that differences of opinion remained, and in the end, it was not possible to surmount them. On 10 April the Conference concluded its three-week session by adopting its report to the General Assembly.

At the closing meeting, Brazil, on behalf of the group of 77, stated that its members were greatly interested in and recognized the importance of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. They had urged all States to make the necessary efforts to elaborate and adopt international rules to prevent armed attacks against nuclear installations.

In his concluding statement, the President of the Conference, noting the lack of agreement on acceptable principles, said that the Conference had nevertheless provided a remarkable international forum where each country had been given the opportunity to explain its position, interests, concerns and hopes. He underlined the importance of the considerable number of national papers and scientific research studies that had been submitted. Many countries could benefit from them in preparing or applying their nuclear programmes.

The Secretary-General of the Conference concluded that the Conference had served several useful purposes. It had stimulated ideas, promoted the establishment of contacts, and disseminated valuable information that could be extremely useful not only to the participants in the Conference, but also to Governments and the public at large.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1987

At its forty-second session, the General Assembly had on its agenda two items on the promotion of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy: "Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency"⁹ and "United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy". Both items were discussed mainly in plenary meetings.¹⁰

In presenting the Agency's report for 1986, the Director General of IAEA, Mr. Hans Blix, noted that the year had been marked not only by the

⁹ IAEA, *The Annual Report for 1986* (Austria, July 1987), (GC (XXXI)/800 and Corr.1); transmitted to the members of the General Assembly by a note of the Secretary-General (A/42/458 and Corr.1).

¹⁰ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Plenary Meetings*, 42nd, 43rd and 83rd meetings.

Chernobyl accident, but also by an unprecedented level of intergovernmental co-operation within IAEA's framework. He discussed the Agency's work in three main areas—promotion of the use of nuclear energy (notably nuclear power), safety, and safeguards—as well as the Agency's administrative and financial problems.

In discussing the development of nuclear power for electricity, Mr. Blix noted that in 1986 over 400 nuclear reactors produced some 16 per cent of the world's electricity, helping to reduce dependence on oil imports and to cut emissions of sulphur, nitrogen oxides and carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. He indicated that in 1987, a few member Governments had decided not to use nuclear power or to phase it out, while others were deferring decisions about the acquisition of more plants. But the majority of IAEA's member Governments favoured expanded use of nuclear power. Mr. Blix pointed out that while most Governments maintained a positive attitude towards nuclear power development, it was clear that the Chernobyl accident had resulted in reduced public acceptance. The accident, in turn, had prompted significant action among utilities and Governments to prevent future occurrences involving radioactive releases and to mitigate the consequences of any accident.

In addressing the question of nuclear safety, Mr. Blix stated that in 1986 IAEA's programme had emphasized operational safety and improvements in power reactors. Several requests had been made for OSART missions, and during the year, IAEA had concluded the first mission to a plant in the United States. He added that new designs of power reactors with greater inherent safety were being worked on and tested. Under the Agency's auspices, the United States, the Soviet Union, the European Community and Japan were launching a co-operative scheme, the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER), which would develop a conceptual design for a fusion reactor. According to the Director General, Brazil had already benefited from the international conventions that had been adopted after Chernobyl. It had asked for and received emergency assistance after the theft of a radiation source had led to the contamination of several persons with caesium.

Mr. Blix indicated that IAEA's safeguards function had expanded considerably over the years, as more States adhered to the non-proliferation Treaty and the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and more nuclear installations and material were submitted to safeguards. He reported that by the end of 1986, there were no fewer than 485 facilities worldwide containing safeguarded nuclear material and 414 other locations containing small amounts of safeguarded material in non-nuclear-weapon States. In addition, nine facilities were under safeguards in nuclear-weapon States. Agreement had been reached on China's offer to place some of its civilian nuclear installations under Agency safeguards. Although Agency discussions with South Africa regarding the voluntary submission of its semi-commercial enrichment plant to safeguards had not advanced in 1987, Mr. Blix noted that the South African President had recently announced the Government's intention to begin discussions leading to the signing of the non-proliferation Treaty.

The Director General observed that during several years of zero growth or near-zero growth in IAEA's regular budget, the technical assistance and co-operation programme, funded by voluntary contributions, had constituted a main element of expansion in the Agency's activities. Radiation protection had become an important element in that programme. IAEA's advisory teams, which it had been sending to member States since 1984, had indicated that there were many countries where the basic radiation protection infrastructure was not in place. In that connection, Mr. Blix announced that IAEA was ready to assist such countries, at their request, to train manpower and establish regulatory rules and structures.

In conclusion, Mr. Blix called attention to the Agency's budgetary and staffing difficulties. He pointed out that late payment of some membership dues had led to the curtailment of some of IAEA's activities. Moreover, the Agency needed a budget that matched the tasks it had to undertake. He emphasized that given the Agency's duty to safeguard an increasing number of nuclear facilities and growing quantities of nuclear material, and to administer growing technical co-operation funds, the zero-growth policy risked undermining the quality, and even the implementation, of IAEA's programme. He believed that the healthy expenditure discipline that had been imposed on the Agency should be matched by a comparable payment discipline on the part of member States.

In the debate in the plenary meetings of the General Assembly, several delegations focused on nuclear safety. Austria believed that internationally binding safety standards for nuclear power installations and their mandatory control through IAEA should be the central element of any expanded nuclear safety programme of the Agency. In its view, the legitimate concerns of countries regarding the possible transboundary consequences of nuclear power technology should be taken into consideration on a regional level. Bulgaria stated that it had undertaken a number of measures to ensure the safety of existing nuclear reactors and to train personnel. In referring to the Chernobyl accident, Denmark, speaking on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community, cited transboundary effects and emphasized the importance of strengthening international co-operation at both the bilateral and multilateral level with regard to nuclear safety, radiological and physical protection and environmental compatibility.

Pakistan cautioned against any conclusion that concern for nuclear safety should inhibit greater co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. On the contrary, the Chernobyl accident only pointed to the need to have a more rational and non-discriminatory régime covering the various aspects of co-operation in the field.

Because of concerns about the safety of nuclear power installations, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Iraq, Pakistan, the Soviet Union and the Ukrainian SSR favoured the elaboration of an international agreement prohibiting attacks against all nuclear installations, including acts of terrorism. The German Democratic Republic stated that the intentional destruction of nuclear power plants or nuclear installations could lead to emission of radioactive substances that would have

severe consequences for the population in the country concerned and beyond its borders.

Austria, the Byelorussian SSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary, Pakistan, Poland and the Soviet Union advocated the elaboration of an international convention on State liability for damages caused by nuclear accidents. In Austria's view, such a convention would serve as an important incentive for Governments to promote nuclear safety on the national level. Poland believed that IAEA's active involvement in solving the question of liability for nuclear damage would constitute yet another important step in guaranteeing nuclear safety.

A number of delegations, including Czechoslovakia, Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, Poland, the Soviet Union and the United States noted with satisfaction the entry into force of the two international nuclear safety Conventions adopted by IAEA as a consequence of the Chernobyl accident and commented favourably on the bilateral agreements between States that had been generated by them. In welcoming the entry into force of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (see chapter XII), Australia, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union stated that it was imperative to increase the number of States acceding to the agreement.

Several delegations addressed IAEA's important role in the field of safeguards activities and welcomed China's decision to place part of its nuclear installations under IAEA safeguards. Australia stated that the Agency's record of co-operation in encouraging the peaceful use of nuclear energy under strict safeguards was exemplary, but that the Agency could not do the job alone. The transfer and sharing of technology and expertise would continue to depend on the willingness of member States to share in and contribute to various programmes. Bulgaria and Colombia favoured strengthening IAEA's safeguards system. Pakistan called attention to what it considered a growing imbalance between the funds allocated to technical assistance and the safeguards activities of the Agency.

Australia, Finland and Hungary welcomed Spain's accession to the non-proliferation Treaty, but expressed concern over the threshold nuclear States and hoped that they too would accede to it. Finland observed that more than 40 of the more than 130 non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty had not yet fulfilled their obligation under it to conclude a safeguards agreement with IAEA.

In discussing the Agency's role in technical assistance and co-operation, several delegations expressed support for IAEA's programmes and reported on their activities in that field. The Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Denmark (speaking for the European Community), the Ukrainian SSR and the Soviet Union stated that they continued to make voluntary contributions to IAEA's Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund, in addition to providing training courses and seminars to experts/specialists from developing countries. Apart from providing equipment and material, the German Democratic Republic continued to train scientists from developing countries. So far, 12 training courses and 16 study tours had been carried out there.

A number of countries commented on UNCPICPUNE (see above). The German Democratic Republic stated that the broad exchange of views carried out at the Conference had been useful in that it contributed to a better understanding of various positions.

Three States spoke on the subject in connection with the action taken by the Assembly on the draft resolution concerning the Conference. Czechoslovakia, in assessing the results of the Conference, noted that UNCPICPUNE was the first meeting in the history of the United Nations at which issues of nuclear energy and its impact on global social and economic development had been considered on a broad scale. Although the Conference was unable to achieve complete agreement, it provided an open exchange of opinions and resulted in greater mutual understanding.

The United States believed that one of the most noteworthy and useful outcomes of the Conference was the vast collection of valuable scientific and technical information on the use of nuclear energy for economic and social development that emerged from discussions in Committee II. It held that that exchange would prove valuable to many States in the practical application of peaceful nuclear technologies. It also asserted that one of the most significant aspects of the Conference was that it recognized, and thereby enhanced, the central role of IAEA in promoting and facilitating the use of the peaceful atom.

In the Soviet Union's view, the Conference had made a concrete contribution to defining the role of nuclear energy and to expanding international co-operation in its peaceful use. It commended the efforts made by the delegations in the Conference to achieve agreement on the major issues on its agenda. It emphasized that one of the necessary and substantive conditions for the peaceful development of nuclear energy and the expansion of international co-operation in that sphere was a further strengthening of the non-proliferation Treaty and the international non-proliferation régime.

Some delegations, such as Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic, expressed concern about the nuclear activities of South Africa and Israel. Czechoslovakia demanded that the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and IAEA be consistently implemented. The German Democratic Republic stated that concrete steps should be taken against the nuclear ambitions of South Africa and that comprehensive IAEA safeguards should be applied in that country. Moreover, those States that collaborated with South Africa must bring their influence to bear so that it would accede to the non-proliferation Treaty and place all its nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards.

In another area, Australia, Canada, Denmark (on behalf of the European Community), Finland and the United States expressed concern that political issues were being brought before the Agency. They contended that it was primarily a technical body and that political issues were extraneous to its mandate and rightfully belonged in other forums. In their view, the politicization of IAEA seriously jeopardized the Agency's invaluable work as an effective instrument for the promotion of co-operation in the peaceful application of nuclear energy. The United States emphasized the need to preserve

the serious technical character of IAEA and cautioned that the effects of politicization could prove devastating to the continued viability of a technical organization.

A number of delegations commented on the Agency's financial difficulties and appealed to all member States to honour their financial commitments to IAEA so as to ensure the Agency's continued effectiveness. Bulgaria was particularly concerned about the completion of technical assistance projects for developing countries. Finland saw a potential threat to the Agency's performance in the crucial field of safeguards inspection.

In introducing on 19 October a draft resolution concerning the 1986 report of IAEA, the Federal Republic of Germany stated that the text was the result of informal consultations among interested Member States in both Vienna and New York. The Federal Republic introduced the draft in its capacity as Chairman of the Board of Governors of IAEA and on behalf of Hungary and Iraq. The draft was similar to earlier General Assembly resolutions under the item, with some additions in the preambular part reflecting recent IAEA nuclear safety activities. By the draft, the Assembly would welcome the entry into force of the international Conventions on early notification of nuclear accidents and on emergency assistance. It would also note the entry into force of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

On 20 October the draft resolution was adopted by the General Assembly without a vote as resolution 42/6. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Having received the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the General Assembly for the year 1986,

Taking note of the statement of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency of 19 October 1987, which provides additional information on the main developments in the Agency's activities during 1987,

Recalling that this year the Agency is celebrating the thirtieth anniversary of its establishment in 1957,

Recognizing the importance of the work of the Agency to promote further the application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, as envisaged in its statute,

Also recognizing the special needs of the developing countries for technical assistance by the Agency in order to benefit effectively from the application of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes as well as from the contribution of nuclear energy to their economic development,

Conscious of the importance of the work of the Agency in the implementation of safeguards provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and other international treaties, conventions and agreements designed to achieve similar objectives, as well as in ensuring, as far as it is able, that the assistance provided by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose, as stated in article II of its statute,

Recognizing the importance of the work of the Agency on nuclear power, nuclear safety, radiological protection and radioactive waste management, including its work directed towards assisting developing countries in planning for the introduction of nuclear power in accordance with their needs,

Again stressing the need for the highest standards of safety in the design and operation of nuclear plants so as to minimize risks to life, health and the environment,

Welcoming the entry into force on 27 October 1986 and 26 February 1987 of the Convention

on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, and the fact that many States have already ratified them or consented to be bound by them provisionally pending ratification,

Noting with appreciation the entry into force on 8 February 1987 of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material,

Bearing in mind resolutions GC(XXXI)/RES/470, GC(XXXI)/RES/472, GC(XXXI)/RES/473, GC(XXXI)/RES/474, GC(XXXI)/RES/475 and GC(XXXI)/RES/485 adopted on 25 September 1987 by the General Conference of the Agency at its thirty-first regular session,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency;
2. *Affirms* its confidence in the role of the Agency in the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes;
3. *Urges* all States to strive for effective and harmonious international co-operation in carrying out the work of the Agency, pursuant to its statute; in promoting the use of nuclear energy and the application of the necessary measures to strengthen further the safety of nuclear installations and to minimize risks to health; in strengthening technical assistance and co-operation for developing countries; and in ensuring the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency's safeguards system;
4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency the records of the forty-second session of the General Assembly relating to the Agency's activities.

On 27 November, Egypt, whose representative had been President of UNCPICPUNE, submitted a draft resolution on the Conference. In introducing it, the President stated that the inability of UNCPICPUNE to reach full agreement on a complete set of principles and means for strengthening co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should not be regarded as a setback. Rather, it should be seen as an important step, as all the participants had been aware of the difficulties faced by the Conference. He stressed that the true accomplishment of UNCPICPUNE was the study of 103 technical reports dealing with several aspects of nuclear energy and its uses. The President of the Conference emphasized that the draft resolution as a whole, which contained a summary of the Conference's work, represented the consensus reached in Geneva in April 1987. He therefore suggested that the draft be adopted by the Assembly by consensus as well.

The same day, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution without a vote as resolution 42/24. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming the purpose and objectives of the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy as spelt out in its resolution 32/50 of 8 December 1977,

Recalling the provisions of its resolutions 33/4 of 2 November 1978, 34/63 of 29 November 1979, 35/112 of 5 December 1980, 36/78 of 9 December 1981, 37/167 of 17 December 1982, 38/60 of 14 December 1983, 39/74 of 13 December 1984, 40/95 of 12 December 1985 and 41/212 A and B of 11 December 1986,

Bearing in mind the importance and potential of nuclear energy for economic and social development, especially in the developing countries,

Noting with appreciation the extensive and active involvement of the International Atomic Energy Agency in promoting the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with articles II and III of its statute, and, in particular, recent measures taken to strengthen international co-operation in nuclear safety and radiological protection, including the adoption of the Con-

vention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency,

Convinced that close and effective international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in a climate of confidence is essential for the full realization of the fundamental twin objectives of ensuring that nuclear technology is not misused in any way and that its benefits are made available in a safe and secure manner,

Recalling that the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, held at Geneva from 23 March to 10 April 1987, provided a global forum under the auspices of the United Nations to consider specifically all relevant concerns on the role of nuclear power and of applications of nuclear techniques in such fields as food and agriculture, health and medicine, hydrology, industry, and scientific and technological research for economic and social development,

Having considered the report of the Conference,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, which mainly states that:

(a) The Conference recognized that nuclear energy could contribute to economic and social development and to the well-being of many countries, and urged that international peaceful nuclear co-operation should be enhanced and broadened;

(b) Extensive efforts were made by the Conference to reach agreement on "principles universally acceptable for international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and appropriate ways and means for the promotion of such co-operation, as envisaged in General Assembly resolution 32/50, and in accordance with mutually acceptable considerations of non-proliferation", but while reaffirming that these matters were of importance and of major concern, the Conference was unable to reach agreement on them;

(c) The Conference expressed the hope that its active and comprehensive exchange of views would lead to a better appreciation of respective positions on these matters and to further mutual understanding, and it also considered that the International Atomic Energy Agency and other international organizations might benefit from these exchanges;

(d) The Conference considered that the technical reports presented and the discussions that took place during the Conference on the role of nuclear power and of other peaceful applications of nuclear energy for economic and social development, could be used in planning national programmes for development, use and safety of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes;

(e) The Conference agreed that the technical reports referred to in subparagraph (d) above should be made widely available and requested the Secretary-General to consider their publication within existing financial resources;

2. *Believes* that the Conference has served a useful purpose in examining the role of nuclear energy in economic and social development, and the complex problems in the promotion of international co-operation in this vital field;

3. *Recognizes* that the technical reports presented at the Conference could be used in planning programmes for development, use and safety of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and authorizes their publication in the official languages of the United Nations within existing financial resources, and requests that arrangements be made to make them widely available;

4. *Requests* the International Atomic Energy Agency, as the central organization for peaceful nuclear co-operation, to continue its efforts, in close collaboration with the concerned specialized agencies and other relevant organizations of the United Nations system, with the specific aim of strengthening and broadening international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development;

5. *Urges* all States to co-operate fully in support of all efforts aimed at fostering international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development;

6. *Requests* the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in the annual reports of the Agency, to continue to report on the progress made in the promotion of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development, especially in the developing countries.

Conclusion

After six years of preparation, the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy took place in Geneva from 23 March to 10 April 1987. It was, however, unable to reach agreement on a complete set of principles and means for strengthening co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Nevertheless, the delegations considered that the Conference had served a useful purpose. It was believed that the numerous scientific and technical papers that were presented, reflecting specific experiences and lessons learned by both developed and developing countries, could prove useful to Governments and to the public. Accordingly, the Conference urged the publication of those reports. The Conference also made possible a comprehensive exchange of views between the supplier and recipient countries, which contributed to greater mutual understanding.

The General Assembly adopted resolution 42/6, on the 1986 report of IAEA, and resolution 42/24, on UNCPICPUNE, both by consensus. By resolution 42/24, the Assembly requested IAEA, as the central organization for peaceful nuclear co-operation, to continue its efforts in strengthening international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development.

IAEA safeguards and related activities

Introduction

THIS CHAPTER HAS BEEN PROVIDED by the International Atomic Energy Agency. It deals primarily with safeguards and related activities of the Agency during 1987 and describes the situation as of the end of the year. IAEA safeguards against the diversion of nuclear materials and other equipment or information for military and other prohibited activities have been evolving almost since the Agency's establishment in 1956, and thus their methodology has been described briefly in earlier editions of *The Yearbook*.¹

Status of safeguards

A. Safeguards agreements pursuant to the non-proliferation Treaty²

As of 31 December 1987, non-proliferation Treaty safeguards agreements had entered into force for 79 of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty at that time. The non-nuclear-weapon States having safeguards agreements in force under the Treaty are shown in annex I to this chapter.³ For the remaining non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, the relevant safeguards agreements had not entered into force at the end of 1987.

B. Safeguards in nuclear-weapon States

During 1987 safeguards continued to be applied to some of the peaceful nuclear activities in four nuclear-weapon States pursuant either to voluntary-offer agreements or to safeguards transfer agreements.

Accord has been reached in principle on the contents of a safeguards agreement pursuant to an offer made by China to place some of its civilian

¹ See, for instance, *The Yearbook*, vol. 2: 1977, chap. XI, or vol. 5: 1980, chap. XII.

² Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex. The text of the Treaty is reproduced in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 2nd edition: 1982 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.IX.5).

³ A reference to a party in this chapter, including its footnotes and annexes, does not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the secretariats of IAEA or of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country or of its authorities or of its designation or concerning the limitation of its frontiers.

nuclear facilities under safeguards. Once this agreement has entered into force, all five nuclear-weapon States will have submitted all or some of their peaceful nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards.

C. *Safeguards agreements pursuant to the Treaty of Tlatelolco*⁴

The terms of the safeguards agreements negotiated so far under the Treaty of Tlatelolco are practically identical to those of the safeguards agreements under the non-proliferation Treaty, with some variations to take account of the different provisions of the two Treaties. Three States (Colombia, Mexico and Panama) have negotiated safeguards agreements with the Agency pursuant to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

Mexico's agreement had entered into force but was suspended upon the subsequent conclusion of an agreement in connection with both the non-proliferation Treaty and the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The agreements with Colombia and Panama, which entered into force in 1982 and 1984 respectively, are still being applied, although these States have also become parties to the non-proliferation Treaty. A new agreement with Colombia, based on both Treaties, has been proposed. A new agreement for Panama awaits ratification.

D. *Safeguards agreements other than those in connection with the non-proliferation Treaty and/or the Treaty of Tlatelolco*

By the end of 1987, safeguards agreements were in force for 8 non-nuclear-weapon States which were not parties to the non-proliferation Treaty or the Treaty of Tlatelolco, namely, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, India, Israel, Pakistan and South Africa. Viet Nam, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Spain have acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty, but since safeguards agreements pursuant to that Treaty had not been concluded by 31 December, safeguards were being applied in these States under previously concluded agreements.

A safeguards agreement was concluded with Albania covering all nuclear material and facilities.

For a complete list of the status of agreements other than those in connection with the non-proliferation Treaty as of 31 December 1987, see annex II to this chapter.

E. *Safeguards agreements pursuant to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga)*⁵

The parties to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, in force as of 11

⁴ Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), 1967. United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634, No. 9068.

⁵ For the text of the Treaty, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 10: 1985, appendix VII.

December 1986, undertake to conclude with the Agency safeguards agreements along the lines of INFCIRC/153 to cover all their peaceful nuclear activities. In fact, all of them are already covered by safeguards agreements concluded pursuant to the non-proliferation Treaty.

Related activities

A. *International plutonium storage*

The concept of international plutonium storage was incorporated into the statute of the Agency in 1957 under article XII.A.5. Its aim is the international physical control of plutonium in separated form after reprocessing and before use.

In December 1978, an expert group on international plutonium storage was established, consisting of experts from 37 States members of the Agency. In late 1982, the Expert Group presented its technical report to the Director General of the Agency. The Expert Group did not reach consensus on a concept for international plutonium storage implemented under the provisions of the Agency's statute. The report of the Expert Group was submitted to the Agency's Board of Governors in 1983. Consultations were held in 1984 and 1985. In 1986 some Board members asked the Director General for an update of the plutonium data base used for the report. The update was distributed to the Board of Governors in June 1987.

B. *Physical protection of nuclear material*

In response to growing recognition of the need for physical protection against theft or unauthorized diversion of nuclear materials and against sabotage of nuclear facilities by individuals or groups, the Agency in 1972 published recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear materials in use, storage or transit. That publication, subsequently revised in 1977, has been widely used by member States as a guide for establishing their national systems of physical protection of potentially hazardous nuclear material. While physical protection is not part of the Agency's safeguards systems, it is recognized that the national systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material and of containment and surveillance measures required for safeguards purposes are also relevant to the national systems of physical protection.

In order to further enhance co-operation among States in the area of the physical protection of nuclear material, the Agency provided a forum for negotiation of an international agreement on the subject between governmental representatives. That task was completed on 28 October 1979 with the adoption of the text of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The Convention aims at ensuring that the prescribed levels of protection are applied to potentially hazardous nuclear materials during international transport. It also provides for establishment by States parties of criminal jurisdiction over certain offences involving nuclear material and for

extradition of criminals committing such offences. The Convention was opened for signature on 3 March 1980 and entered into force on 8 February 1987 following the deposit of the twenty-first instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval with the Director General of the Agency.

C. *Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS)*

In June 1980, the Board of Governors decided to establish the Committee on Assurances of Supply. Its mandate is to consider and advise the Board on:

(a) Ways and means by which supplies of nuclear materials, equipment and technology and fuel cycle services could be assured on a more predictable and long-term basis in accordance with mutually acceptable considerations of non-proliferation;

(b) The Agency's role and responsibilities in relation thereto.⁶ The Committee considered:

- The formulation of principles of international co-operation in the field of nuclear energy;
- Concepts of emergency and back-up mechanisms;
- The question of mechanisms for revising international nuclear co-operation agreements;
- The existing practical, technical and administrative problems in international shipments of nuclear materials and equipment.

While conclusions with regard to the last three topics could be referred to the Board of Governors, no definite conclusions have yet been reached with regard to the first topic.

In its session in May 1987, the Committee agreed that further detailed discussions, at that stage, seemed unlikely to produce a solution of the outstanding problems, which had been under discussion for several years, and that more time was needed for reflection in capitals before a continuation of the discussions in the Committee.

In the light of consultations to be held by the Bureau, the Chairman was requested to report to the Board of Governors not later than June 1988 and to recommend a date and a provisional agenda for the next session of the Committee.

Conclusion

The Agency applies safeguards in a large number of States that are parties to the non-proliferation Treaty, the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty of Rarotonga and in a number of States that have unilateral submission agreements with the Agency. Thus most nuclear facilities in non-nuclear-weapon States are under Agency safeguards. It must be noted, however, that the number of unsafeguarded facilities, in particular, enrichment plants, is growing.

⁶ IAEA documents GOV/1997 and GOV/OR.553.

ANNEX I

Non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty having safeguards agreements in force under the Treaty as of 31 December 1987

The following 79 non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have concluded safeguards agreements—now in force—pursuant to the Treaty.^a

Afghanistan	Holy See	Netherlands
Australia	Honduras	New Zealand
Austria	Hungary	Nicaragua
Bangladesh	Iceland	Norway
Belgium	Indonesia	Papua New Guinea
Brunei Darussalam	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	Paraguay
Bulgaria	Iraq	Peru
Canada	Ireland	Philippines
Costa Rica	Italy	Poland
Côte d'Ivoire	Jamaica	Portugal
Cyprus	Japan	Republic of Korea
Czechoslovakia	Jordan	Romania
Denmark	Lebanon	Samoa
Dominican Republic	Lesotho	Senegal
Ecuador	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	Singapore
Egypt	Liechtenstein	Sri Lanka
El Salvador	Luxembourg	Sudan
Ethiopia	Madagascar	Suriname
Fiji	Malaysia	Swaziland
Finland	Maldives	Sweden
Gambia	Mauritius	Switzerland
German Democratic Republic	Mexico	Thailand
Germany, Federal Republic of	Mongolia	Turkey
Ghana	Morocco	Uruguay
Greece	Nauru	Venezuela
Guatemala	Nepal	Yugoslavia
		Zaire

^a In 38 cases, no safeguards are applied because the State concerned does not yet have any significant nuclear activities. Full application will begin as soon as the State concerned acquires nuclear material or a plant requiring the application of safeguards.

ANNEX II

Agreements providing for safeguards, other than those in connection with the non-proliferation Treaty, approved by the Board as of 31 December 1987

(While the Agency is a party to each of the following agreements, the list mentions only the State(s) party(ies) to them.)

<i>Party(ies)^a</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Entry into force</i>	<i>IAEA document No. INFCIRC</i>
<i>(a) Project agreements</i>			
Argentina	Siemens SUR-100	13 March 1970	143
	RAEP Reactor	2 December 1964	62
Chile	Herald Reactor	19 December 1969	137
Finland ^b	FiR-I Reactor	30 December 1960	24
	FINN sub-critical assembly	30 July 1963	53
Greece ^b .	GRR-I Reactor	1 March 1972	163
Indonesia ^b	Additional core load for TRIGA Reactor	19 December 1969	136
Iran (Islamic Republic of) ^b	UTRR Reactor	10 May 1967	97
Jamaica ^b	Fuel for research reactor	25 January 1984	315
Japan ^b	JRR-3	24 March 1959	3
Malaysia ^b /United States	TRIGA--II Reactor	22 September 1980	287
Mexico ^b	TRIGA—III Reactor	18 December 1963	52
	Siemens SUR-100	21 December 1971	162
	Laguna Verde Nuclear Power Plant	12 February 1974	203
Morocco ^b	Fuel for research reactor	2 December 1983	313
Pakistan	PRR Reactor	5 March 1962	34
	Booster rods for KANUPP	17 June 1968	116
Peru ^b	Research reactor and fuel therefor	9 May 1978	266
Philippines ^b	PRR-I Reactor	28 September 1966	88
Romania ^b .	TRIGA Reactor	30 March 1973	206
	Experimental fuel elements	1 July 1983	307
Spain	Coral-I Reactor	23 June 1967	99
Thailand ^b /United States	Fuel for research reactor	30 September 1986	—
Turkey ^b	Sub-critical assembly	17 May 1974	212
Uruguay ^b .	URR-Reacto	24 September 1965	67
Venezuela ^b	RV-I Reactor	7 November 1975	238
Viet Nam ^c	Fuel for research reactor	1 July 1983	308

<i>Party(ies)^a</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Entry into force</i>	<i>IAEA document No. INFCIRC</i>
Yugoslavia ^b	TRIGA-II Krsko Nuclear Power Plant	4 October 1961 14 June 1974	32 213
Zaire ^b	TRICO Reactor	27 June 1962	37
<i>(b) Unilateral submissions</i>			
Albania.	All nuclear material and facilities	approved by Board, June 1986	—
Argentina . . .	Atucha Power Reactor Facility	3 October 1972	168
	Nuclear material	23 October 1973	202
	Embalse Power Reactor Facility	6 December 1974	224
	Equipment and nuclear material	22 July 1977	250
	Nuclear material, material, equipment and facilities	22 July 1977	251
	Atucha II Nuclear Power Plant	15 July 1981	294
	Heavy water plant	14 October 1981	296
	Heavy water	14 October 1981	297
	Nuclear material	8 July 1982	303
Chile .	Nuclear material	31 December 1974	256
	Nuclear material	22 September 1982	304
	Nuclear material	approved by Board September 1987	
Cuba . . .	Nuclear research reactor and fuel thereto	25 September 1980	298
	Nuclear power plant and nuclear material	5 May 1980	281
	Zero-power nuclear reactor and fuel therefor	7 October 1983	311
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	Research reactor and nuclear material therefor	20 July 1977	252
India .	Nuclear material, material and facilities	17 November 1977	260
Pakistan	Nuclear material	2 March 1977	248
Spain	Nuclear material	19 November 1974	218
	Nuclear material	18 June 1975	221
	Vandellos Nuclear Power Plant	11 May 1981	292
	Specified nuclear facilities	11 May 1981	291
United Kingdom . . .	Nuclear material	14 December 1972	175
Viet Nam . . .	Research reactor and fuel therefor	12 June 1981	293

<i>Party(ies)^a</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Entry into force</i>	<i>IAEA document No. INFCIRC</i>
<i>(c) Treaty of Tlatelolco</i>			
Colombia.	All nuclear material	22 December 1982	306
Mexico ^d	All nuclear material, equipment and facilities	6 September 1968	118
Panama.	All nuclear material	23 March 1984	316
<i>(d) Agreements concluded with nuclear-weapon States on the basis of voluntary offers</i>			
France	Nuclear material in facilities submitted to safeguards	12 September 1981	290
Soviet Union .	Nuclear material in facilities selected from list of facilities designated by USSR	10 June 1985	327
United Kingdom .	Nuclear material in facilities designated by the Agency	14 August 1978	263
United States.	Nuclear material in facilities designated by the Agency	9 December 1980	288
<i>(e) Other agreements</i>			
Argentina/United States.		25 July 1969	130
Austria ^d /United States		24 January 1970	152
Brazil/Germany, Federal Republic of ^d		26 February 1976	237
Brazil/United States		31 October 1968	110
Colombia/United States.		9 December 1970	144
India/Canada ^d		30 September 1971	211
India/United States		27 January 1971	154
Iran (Islamic Republic of) ^d /United States		20 August 1969	127
Israel/United States		4 April 1975	249
Japan ^d /Canada ^d		20 June 1966	85
Japan ^d /France		22 September 1972	171
Japan/United States		10 July 1968	119
Japan ^d /United Kingdom.		15 October 1968	125
Pakistan/Canada		17 October 1969	135
Pakistan/France		18 March 1976	239
Philippines ^d /United States		19 July 1968	120
Portugal ^d /United States ^e		19 July 1969	131
Republic of Korea/United States .		5 January 1968	111
Republic of Korea ^d /France		22 September 1975	233
South Africa/United States		26 July 1967	98

<i>Party(ies)^a</i>	<i>Entry into force</i>	<i>IAEA document No. INFCIRC</i>
South Africa/France	5 January 1977	244
Spain/United States	9 December 1966	92
Spain/Canada ^d	10 February 1977	247
Spain/Germany, Federal Republic of ^d	29 September 1982	305
Sweden ^d /United States	11 March 1972	165
Switzerland ^d /United States ^e	28 February 1972	161
Turkey ^d /United States ^e	5 June 1969	123
Venezuela ^d /United States ^e	27 March 1968	122

^a See footnote 3 in this chapter.

^b Agency safeguards are being applied to the items required to be safeguarded under this (these) project agreement(s) pursuant to an agreement in connection with the non-proliferation Treaty covering the State indicated.

^c The requirement for the application of safeguards under this agreement is satisfied by the application of safeguards pursuant to the agreement of 12 June 1981 (INFCIRC/293).

^d Application of Agency safeguards under this agreement has been suspended in the State indicated as the State has concluded an agreement in connection with the non-proliferation Treaty.

^e Application of Agency safeguards under this agreement has been suspended in the United States in order to comply with a provision of INFCIRC/288.

Editorial note

IAEA has informed the United Nations of two additional safeguards agreements by which the Agency has applied safeguards to the nuclear facilities in Taiwan, China. The relations between the Agency and the authorities in Taiwan are non-governmental and the agreements are implemented by the Agency on that basis.

P A R T T H R E E

Prohibition or restriction of use of other weapons

Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons

Introduction

THE FIRST ATTEMPTS TO ELIMINATE CHEMICAL AND bacteriological (biological) weapons date back to the Brussels Declaration of 1874 and the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, which banned the use of poisons and poisoned bullets in warfare, and a separate declaration of the Hague Convention of 1899 that condemned the use of projectiles for the sole purpose of diffusing asphyxiating or deleterious gases. Nevertheless, during the First World War the widespread use of chemical agents caused some 1,300,000 casualties, more than 100,000 of them fatal. Those tragic figures contributed to a new global awareness of the need to prevent chemical warfare and to the emergence of the basic instrument for its elimination, the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925.¹ The Protocol prohibits the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, as well as of bacteriological methods of warfare. As of 31 December 1987, the Protocol had 110 States parties (see appendix I of this volume).

While the Protocol makes the “use” of chemical or biological weapons illegal, it does not prohibit their development, production and stockpiling, a shortcoming which quickly led to the recognition of the need for a more comprehensive ban. Some 40 parties to the Protocol made reservations to the effect that it would not be binding on them with regard to States that failed to respect its prohibitions. Various disarmament bodies, particularly in the course of the last 15 years, have discussed the possibility of strengthening the existing prohibition and widening its scope.

Chemical and biological weapons were defined by the United Nations Commission for Conventional Armaments in 1948 as weapons of mass destruction. Until the year 1969, bacteriological (biological) weapons were dealt with by the international community together with chemical weapons. The first General Assembly resolution devoted specifically to the question of chemical and biological weapons was adopted in 1966,² and the subject of chemical and bacteriological warfare was first taken up in 1968 as a distinct issue by

¹ Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous and Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138, p. 65. The text of the Protocol is reproduced in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 2nd edition: 1982 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.IX.5). See appendix I below for details on its status.

² Resolution 2162 B (XXI).

the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC). Also in 1968,³ the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to prepare an expert study on the question, and the following year he submitted a report entitled *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use*⁴ to the General Assembly. The study contributed to the intensification of the consideration of the subject by the multilateral negotiating body in Geneva. Among the initiatives made at the time was a draft convention for the prohibition of biological methods of warfare, submitted by the United Kingdom.⁵

The following year, the Soviet Union and other Eastern European States submitted a draft convention on the prohibition of both chemical and biological weapons and on their destruction.⁶ Those States held that a separate approach to biological weapons would delay the solution of the question of chemical weapons, and that therefore both types of weapons should be dealt with together. However, the United Kingdom, the United States and several other countries favoured separate treatment. The United States announced that it was committed to effective control of both types of weapons but believed that a single instrument covering both was not feasible. It further believed that a ban on biological weapons alone could be achieved at an early date.

In 1971, agreement was finally reached on the separation of the two issues. The Eastern European States accepted separation as a first step towards the solution of the whole complex of problems and submitted a draft text of a convention⁷ on biological weapons to the multilateral negotiating body in Geneva. Subsequently, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and the United States, on the other, submitted identical drafts on the subject,⁸ and the text was annexed to the negotiating body's report to the General Assembly.⁹

In the Assembly, a majority of States expressed support for the draft biological weapons convention, many of them noting that it constituted the first measure of genuine disarmament in that it involved the destruction of existing weapons. By resolution 2826 (XXVI) of 1971, the General Assembly commended the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, which was annexed to the resolution, and requested the depositary Governments—the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States—to open the Convention for signature and ratification at the earliest possible date. The Convention was opened for signature on 10 April 1972 and entered into force on 26 March 1975, when, pursuant to its article

³ By resolution 2454 A (XXIII).

⁴ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.69.I.24.

⁵ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969* (DC/232), document ENDC/255/Rev.1; see also *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1), chap. 16.

⁶ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 104, document A/7655.

⁷ *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1971* (DC/234), document CCD/325/Rev.1.

⁸ *Ibid.*, documents CCD/337 and CCD/338.

⁹ *Ibid.*, *Supplement for 1971* (DC/234), annex A.

XIV, 22 Governments had deposited instruments of ratification. By the end of 1987, 109 States were parties to the Convention.

The operation of the biological weapons Convention has been reviewed twice, in 1980 and 1986, at conferences of the States parties convened to ensure that the purposes and provisions of the Convention are being realized. Both Review Conferences concluded with the adoption, by consensus, of Final Declarations and were accordingly regarded as successful. The Second Review Conference, which took place at Geneva in September 1986, showed in particular the importance that States parties attach to strengthening the authority of the Convention. Among other things, they agreed on the exchange of data and information to preclude ambiguities or doubts which might arise and to improve international co-operation in peaceful biological activities.

Since the early 1970s, many resolutions on chemical weapons, several of which call for a chemical weapons convention similar to that on biological weapons, have been adopted by the General Assembly. When the United Nations expert study was written in 1969, only a very few countries were known to possess chemical weapons in militarily significant quantities. Today the number possessing the capacity to produce them has increased considerably and the actual hostile use of certain chemicals has caused great concern. Furthermore, many additional countries able to manufacture rudimentary chemical weapons could now reportedly also produce nerve agents—known as “second generation” weapons—should they decide to do so.

Since 1971, the discussions on the question of chemical weapons have involved a number of complex matters, such as verification, the scope of a prohibition, the pace of its total implementation and the relationship between the Geneva Protocol and a new legal instrument. From 1972 onwards, numerous proposals have been considered in the multilateral negotiating body in Geneva, including the complete texts of draft conventions and elements of such instruments. Also, each year the General Assembly has adopted resolutions expressing the need for multilateral negotiations to continue as a matter of high priority, with a view to reaching early agreement on a comprehensive and effective convention.

The main aim of the negotiations has been an agreement to prohibit development, production and stockpiling and to lead to the destruction of all lethal chemical weapons, at the very least. Parallel to the multilateral negotiations, the Soviet Union and the United States, between 1974 and 1980, conducted bilateral negotiations, and in 1979 and 1980 the two countries submitted substantial reports to the multilateral negotiating body in Geneva on the progress they had achieved.¹⁰ They held no further talks, however, for several years thereafter.

A significant development in 1980 was the decision of the Geneva body to establish a subsidiary *ad hoc* working group on chemical weapons, with a mandate to define, through substantive examination, issues to be dealt with

¹⁰ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/34/27 and Corr.1), appendix III (CD/53 and Corr.1), document CD/48, and ibid., Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/35/27), appendix II (CD/139), document CD/112; the reports are summarized in The Yearbook, vol. 4: 1979, chap. XV, and vol. 5: 1980, chap. XIII.*

in the negotiation of a multilateral chemical weapons convention. In 1981, the *Ad Hoc* Working Group, which was re-established, set out 18 draft “elements” for inclusion in such a convention. Those elements concerned, for instance, definitions and criteria; declaration of stocks and production facilities; destruction and dismantling; verification of compliance; and the proposed treaty’s relationship with other treaties.

In 1982, at its second special session on disarmament, the General Assembly recorded no tangible progress concerning chemical weapons, despite widespread recognition of the urgent need to deal with the question. At that session the Soviet Union, however, submitted a document on the basic provisions of a convention banning such weapons.¹¹ Two years later, in 1984, the United States submitted a full text of a Draft Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.¹²

Since 1984, the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons have intensified. In that year, the Conference’s *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons was able to agree on a preliminary structure for a convention, producing a document to be used as the basis for further negotiations on the scope of the convention, definitions of chemical agents and precursors (chemical reagents that take part in the production of toxic chemicals), and the machinery to ensure compliance. As certain fundamental disagreements persisted, particularly on the question of verification, the document was received with guarded optimism, an attitude reflected in the debate in the General Assembly and its First Committee that year. During the 1985 negotiations, some progress was achieved in clarifying the areas of disagreement.

Bilateral consideration of the question was resumed at the November 1985 summit meeting between General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan. On that occasion, the two leaders submitted a joint statement¹³ reaffirming their commitment to a convention, thus creating a positive atmosphere to accelerate further efforts aimed at an international agreement.

The negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament opened in a more optimistic atmosphere in 1986, with both the Soviet Union and the United States reaffirming their commitment to intensify work to achieve an effective and verifiable convention. The *Ad Hoc* Committee made substantive progress of a political nature, but was unable to resolve all the outstanding differences in four areas related to verification and control: declaration and monitoring of stocks; elimination of production facilities; prevention of the possible misuse of the chemical industry in the future; and inspection by challenge. However, optimism prevailed and the negotiations were intense and clearly focused throughout the Conference’s 1986 proceedings. Furthermore, the two

¹¹ A/S-12/AC.1/12 and Corr.1. The document is reproduced in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/37/27 and Corr.1)*, appendix II (CD/335), document CD/294. See *The Yearbook*, vol. 7: 1982, chap. XIV, for discussion of the proposal.

¹² For the text of the draft treaty, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 9: 1984, appendix VII.

¹³ For the part of the joint statement which dealt with arms limitation and disarmament problems, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 10: 1985, chap. II.

major Powers held concurrent bilateral talks with a view to finding mutually acceptable solutions.

That year the General Assembly adopted three further resolutions on the subject (resolutions 41/58 B, C and D), one of them by consensus. All three endorsed the ongoing efforts of the Conference on Disarmament and urged it to further intensify efforts to conclude a draft convention. One of the resolutions, in addition, called for compliance with existing international obligations regarding prohibitions on chemical and biological weapons and condemned actions contravening those obligations.

Besides being involved in efforts to conclude a convention banning chemical weapons, the General Assembly has endeavoured, on several occasions, to investigate allegations of their use. In 1981 and 1982, at its request, the Secretary-General submitted expert reports on the use of chemical weapons in certain parts of the world.¹⁴ In 1984, following a fact-finding mission to the Islamic Republic of Iran, four specialists concluded that chemical weapons had been used in that country.¹⁵ Further investigations were conducted subsequently, which arrived at similar conclusions.¹⁶ In addition, the Assembly established a group of experts to devise procedures for the timely and efficient investigation of information concerning activities that might constitute a violation of the Geneva Protocol or relevant rules of customary international law; their findings were reported in 1984.¹⁷

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1987

Although, as in previous years, the Disarmament Commission did not have on its agenda a distinct item on chemical and bacteriological weapons, some States referred to the issue in the course of a general exchange of views in plenary meetings, at the beginning of the session.

The Soviet Union stated that it was guided by the principle that all armaments should be limited and reduced and that weapons of mass destruction should be eliminated. The German Democratic Republic reaffirmed its own commitment and that of Czechoslovakia to establish a zone free of chemical weapons in Central Europe, a step which would contribute to removing the danger of the possible use of chemical weapons and thus reduce the level of military confrontation.

Japan, recalling that the Conference on Disarmament was intensively involved in negotiations on a complete and effective ban on chemical weapons, noted that the positions of delegations on the main issues had become less divergent. In its opinion, a number of points should be borne in mind in the course of the ongoing negotiations aimed at reaching final agreement. First, it was important to take a balanced view of the two major objectives of a treaty banning chemical weapons, which were the destruction of both existing

¹⁴ A/36/613, annex, and A/37/259, annex.

¹⁵ A/39/210 and S/16433.

¹⁶ S/17911 and Corr.1 and Add.1 and 2 (summary of 1985 and 1986) and S/18852 and Corr.1 and Add.1 (1987).

¹⁷ A/39/488; the experts' report is contained in annex II.

stocks and production facilities, and the non-production of chemical weapons in the future. With regard to destruction, the entire process from declaration of stocks and facilities to final destruction should take place within agreed time-frames, under effective verification. With regard to non-production, it was essential to keep in mind that the treaty should not create difficulties for the world's peaceful chemical industries and should thus take a realistic approach to the chemicals to be controlled and the régimes to regulate them. Secondly, several effective verification measures should be developed, taking into careful consideration the extent of available human and financial resources and without prejudicing the legitimate activities of peaceful industries. Thirdly, the question of the executive organs of the treaty's régime, including the related financial clauses, should be taken up at an early date.

Several States expressed hope for early agreement on a chemical weapons ban. The Federal Republic of Germany held that if participants in the multilateral negotiations rose to the challenge of solving the remaining verification issues and did not tire in the process of solving the many minor, but important, details still on the agenda, then chemical weapons could be removed from the face of the Earth once and for all. If everyone tried hard to make that hope a reality, the essentials could be agreed upon before 1987 was over. Similarly, Bangladesh, Canada and Yugoslavia thought that it was possible to reach agreement soon on a chemical weapons treaty. Cuba noted that progress was being made at a speed unknown before.

With regard to biological weapons, Finland, speaking on verification within the context of the 1972 biological weapons Convention, recalled that the group of scientific and technical experts convened early in 1987, by a decision of the Second Review Conference of 1986, had recommended a regular exchange of information on matters related to the Convention.

Ad Hoc Meeting of Scientific and Technical Experts from States Parties to the biological weapons Convention

The Second Review Conference of the biological weapons Convention, convened in 1986, decided to hold in 1987 an *ad hoc* meeting of scientific and technical experts from States parties. The experts were to finalize the modalities for the exchange of information and data agreed to in the Final Declaration of the Conference by working out, *inter alia*, appropriate forms to be used.

In accordance with that decision, the *Ad Hoc Meeting* was held at Geneva from 31 March to 15 April. Mr. Bo Rybeck of Sweden was elected its Chairman. The Meeting,¹⁸ attended by 39 States parties, held seven plenary and a number of informal sessions, during which it finalized the modalities

¹⁸ Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, China, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Hungary, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland (non-Member of the United Nations), Thailand, Turkey, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Kingdom and United States.

for the exchange of information and data. A number of delegations submitted documents pertaining to the substantive agenda item of the Meeting, which read as follows:

Finalization of the modalities for the exchange of information and data by working out, *inter alia*, appropriate forms to be used by States Parties for the exchange of information agreed to in the Final Declaration, thus enabling States Parties to follow a standardized procedure in order to prevent or reduce the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts and suspicions, and in order to improve international co-operation in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities, as follows:

- (a) Exchange of data, including name, location, scope and general description of activities, on research centres and laboratories that meet very high national and international safety standards established for handling, for permitted purposes, biological materials that pose a high individual and community risk or specialize in permitted biological activities directly related to the Convention;
- (b) Exchange of information on all outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins that seem to deviate from the normal pattern as regards type, development, place, or time of occurrence. If possible, the information provided would include, as soon as it is available, data on the type of disease, approximate area affected, and number of cases;
- (c) Encouragement of publication of results of biological research directly related to the Convention, in scientific journals generally available to States parties, as well as promotion of use for permitted purposes of knowledge gained in this research;
- (d) Active promotion of contacts between scientists engaged in biological research directly related to the Convention, including exchanges for joint research on a mutually agreed basis.¹⁹

At its final plenary session on 15 April, the *Ad Hoc* Meeting adopted by consensus its report,²⁰ which contained a substantive part entitled "Modalities for the exchange of information". That part was divided into the following sections: "Exchange of data on research centres and laboratories", "Exchange of information on outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins", "Encouragement of publication of results and promotion of use of knowledge", "Active promotion of contacts", "Procedural modalities" and "Additional considerations".

Mr. Winfried Lang of Austria, who had been President of the Second Review Conference, received the report for immediate distribution to the parties to the Convention.

Consideration by the Conference on Disarmament, 1987

The agenda item entitled "Chemical weapons" was considered at plenary meetings of the Conference on Disarmament during the periods from 23 March to 3 April and from 13 to 24 July.²¹ On 5 February the Conference decided to re-establish the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons with the same mandate as in previous years, namely, to continue negotiations on

¹⁹ BWC/CONF.II/EX/2, annex I.

²⁰ BWC/CONF.II/EX/2.

²¹ CD/787, appendix II, vols. I-IV.

a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, and to develop and work out a convention, except for its final drafting.²²

The new documents on the item that delegations submitted to the Conference dealt with various aspects of the Convention. France submitted a document on the non-production of chemical weapons,²³ as well as a document on the maintenance of a security balance among all parties to the convention during the 10-year period of the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons;²⁴ the United States, a document on the verification of the elimination of production/filling facilities;²⁵ Pakistan, a document on article X (assistance) of the draft convention;²⁶ Norway (a non-member), three documents on the verification of alleged use of chemical weapons;²⁷ Canada and Norway, a joint document on the verification of alleged use of chemical weapons;²⁸ the Islamic Republic of Iran, a document on the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq conflict;²⁹ Canada, a document on the verification of use of chemical weapons;³⁰ the United Kingdom, a document on preparations for the entry into force of the convention in order to ensure that its implementation would be immediately effective;³¹ and Finland (a non-member), three documents on monitoring as a means of verification.³² In addition, Canada submitted compendia on chemical weapons, comprising plenary statements and working papers from the 1986 session of the Conference.³³ Several of these papers are briefly discussed later in this section. The *Ad Hoc* Committee also had before it a report on its inter-sessional work during the period from 12 to 30 January 1987.³⁴ A number of other documents were submitted as documents of the Conference on Disarmament and/or the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons.

The negotiations on chemical weapons in the Conference were characterized by a business-like atmosphere and a genuine desire by all delegations to speed up their pace. A new intensity prevailed, as evidenced by the number and duration of meetings dedicated to the elaboration of the envisaged con-

²² See the 1987 report of the Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/42/27)*, paragraph 79, section I. The report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons, including a list of documents before it and two appendices, is reproduced *in extenso* under paragraph 79. The report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee is also available under the symbol CD/787, appendix I, vol. III, document CD/782.

²³ CD/787, appendix I, vol. II, document CD/747.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, document CD/757.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, document CD/749.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, document CD/752.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, documents CD/761 and CD/762, and *ibid.*, vol. III, document CD/776 (letter of transmittal of a research report).

²⁸ *Ibid.*, vol. II, document CD/766.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, document CD/740.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, vol. III, document CD/770 (letter of transmittal of a research report).

³¹ *Ibid.*, document CD/769.

³² *Ibid.*, vol. II, documents CD/764 (letter of transmittal of a research report) and CD/765 (letter of transmittal of proceedings of a symposium) and *ibid.*, vol. III, document CD/785.

³³ *Ibid.*, vol. III, document CD/771 (letter of transmittal of compendia).

³⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. II, document CD/734.

vention. In his message to the Conference on 3 February, the Secretary-General of the United Nations noted that the negotiations on a global chemical weapons ban had reached a crucial stage and had assumed a growing sense of urgency in the light of existing realities. He also stressed that the elements for early success were not wanting and that what was needed was the manifestation of a genuine willingness to make the necessary political compromises which would facilitate the conclusion of a convention in the course of the year.

The representative of the United Kingdom, in his capacity as Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee for 1986, reported on the work done during the inter-sessional period and on the progress achieved on some aspects of the convention. He had, in particular, detected a convergence of views on the issue of inspection by challenge.

In statements in plenary meetings, all delegations underlined the urgency of finalizing the draft convention. The United States reiterated that the negotiations on a comprehensive and effectively verifiable global ban should have the highest priority. It noted that it was the only country in the world to admit publicly that it had chemical weapons and to make public the locations of its stockpiles, and it appealed to the Soviet Union to do likewise. The Soviet Union stressed that it was essential to make every effort to complete the elaboration of the convention in 1987, and that since most of the questions of principle had been solved, it would be reprehensible to drag out the negotiations.

Algeria declared that the conclusion of an agreement for the complete elimination of chemical weapons would be a milestone in multilateral disarmament efforts and that it was essential that the ban not lead to discriminatory measures. Australia stated that the tempo of the negotiations should be increased so that the opportunity—which clearly existed—of concluding a convention might be realized. Bulgaria welcomed the momentum generated in the negotiations and stressed that it should be sustained. Sweden referred to the serious international context in which the negotiations on chemical weapons were taking place, stating that chemical weapons had been used by Iraq in the war with the Islamic Republic of Iran. It urged all countries producing or considering producing chemical weapons, unitary as well as binary, to refrain from doing so during the course of the negotiations.

Japan identified priority questions which should be addressed: the definition of chemical weapons, with a special emphasis on the general-purpose criterion; the destruction of chemical weapons, including the on-site verification of the declarations; the organs of the convention; and a challenge-inspection régime. The Netherlands stated that the negotiations had taken a decisive turn. It identified three major areas for particular attention: how to verify that the civilian chemical industry was not misused for the production of chemical weapons; how to declare and monitor existing stockpiles; and inspection by challenge.

Poland, speaking on behalf of the socialist States, emphasized the need to agree on a verification system that would provide confidence that all parties to the convention were observing its provisions. It also believed that it was

necessary to close loopholes that might either open the way for the re-emergence of chemical weapons or become a constant source of misunderstanding. Egypt stated that the convention should fully and effectively ban the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and provide for their destruction, while in no way impeding peaceful chemical activities.

One of the main developments during the 1987 session concerned the issue of verification. Towards the end of the session, the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union announced his country's readiness to accept as legally binding the principle of mandatory challenge inspections without the right of refusal. The Soviet Union held that the period between the time of a request and the arrival of inspectors at the inspection site should not exceed 48 hours. It also underlined the need to adopt measures to prevent the use of inspections by challenge for purposes incompatible with the verification of compliance of the convention. In that connection, it proposed the incorporation into the convention of a provision for payment of material compensation to a challenged State by a challenging State that abused the right of challenge. The Soviet Union invited participants in the Conference to visit the Soviet military facility at Shikhany to see standard items of its chemical weapons and observe the technology for their destruction at a mobile facility, and announced its acceptance of the invitation by the United States to visit the chemical weapons destruction plant in Tooele, Utah, as a step towards strengthening mutual confidence.

The United States welcomed the new development in the Soviet position and felt that it would open the way to speedier progress. In an earlier statement, it had warned against the unrealistic expectation that a chemical weapons convention would be in hand by the end of 1987 and had cautioned that unfounded optimism masked what remained to be done. On inspection by challenge, it reiterated its view that inspections should cover all relevant locations and facilities of a party, without distinction between private or governmental ownership.

The Federal Republic of Germany reaffirmed the need to effectively verify a chemical weapons ban and to control super-toxic lethal chemicals, which were suitable for chemical weapons. It insisted that an inspection by challenge should not be limited to declared facilities, but should cover all possible installations and all locations. Romania suggested using the formulas contained in the Document of the Stockholm Conference³⁵ for the verification provisions, especially on-site inspection, and emphasized that the monitoring system should not in any way affect the development of the civilian chemical industry or the enhancement of the technical and scientific potential of any country.

Two non-members also underlined the importance of verification. Early in the session, Finland had observed that inspection by challenge was the major unresolved issue and expressed satisfaction at the progress made in

³⁵ Excerpts from the Document, including the section entitled "Compliance and verification", appear in *Disarmament*, vol. IX, No. 3, autumn 1986 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.86.IX.10).

developing régimes for the verification of various categories of chemicals relevant to the convention. It later summarized some results of a Finnish project on the verification of chemical disarmament that had continued since 1973.³⁶ Norway stated that inspection by challenge would provide the ultimate source of confidence in the convention. In its view, the challenged State must be under the obligation to demonstrate its compliance with the provisions of the convention.

The Soviet Union held that all chemical weapons should be destroyed without the right of diverting them to peaceful purposes, and that each party to the convention should make a detailed declaration of the location of its chemical weapons stocks on its territory or under its jurisdiction 30 days after the convention's entry into force. It also agreed that parties would provide immediate access to chemical weapons stocks for the purpose of systematic international on-site verification of those declarations. In addition, it proposed that parties should, at the same time, close chemical-weapon storage facilities and prevent movement of chemical weapons except for their elimination.

In the course of the debate on various aspects of the envisaged convention, the United States welcomed the announcement by the Soviet Union that it had ceased production of chemical weapons and that it would no longer insist on the right to divert those weapons to peaceful purposes. It noted the Soviet-American agreement to have experts visit each others' sites to observe destruction procedures as one step in improving confidence between the States with the largest chemical weapons capabilities. It also deplored the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war.

Belgium stressed the importance of the international organization to be set up to implement the convention and announced its willingness to host it. Belgium stated that the need for undiminished security was of paramount importance and that it should be resolved in the context of the order of destruction of existing stocks. The United Kingdom welcomed the greater readiness recently shown by the Soviet Union to consider various aspects of effective verification, and it dwelt on the organization to administer the convention. It reiterated that it had unilaterally abandoned its chemical weapon capability in the 1950s and urged other countries to do the same.

The German Democratic Republic welcomed the Soviet Union's proposals with respect to challenge inspection and warned that the United States plans to produce binary chemical weapons would harm the climate prevailing in the negotiations on a ban. It also underlined the need to tackle questions concerning the functions of the international inspectorate, the role of the executive council, and the structure of the organization, which should be comparable with other international agencies within the United Nations system. Bulgaria was pleased to note what it considered the purpose-oriented work on the question of chemical weapons that was being carried out during the session. It recalled the proposal to transform the Balkans into a zone free of chemical weapons, a project which it supported as a partial measure towards a global solution to the problem of chemical weapons.

³⁶ See footnote 32.

Argentina believed that it would be quite possible to arrive, in a reasonable time-frame, at a convention that would eliminate the danger of chemical weapons and strengthen the security of all States without creating situations of inequality or discrimination. India attached importance to provisions in the convention concerning international co-operation for the economic and technical development of the peaceful chemical industry. Mexico underscored the fundamental importance of declaring the location of stocks upon the convention's entry into force and welcomed the Soviet agreement to do so. It was of the view that the 10-year period for destruction following entry into force should be shortened as much as possible and that most lethal chemical weapons should be destroyed first during that period. Venezuela referred to what it called the flexible position adopted by the Soviet Union with respect to a verification régime, but cautioned that the costs of operating the highly complex verification mechanism envisaged in the convention could discourage universal adherence.

China declared that it was a non-chemical-weapon State and was of the view that the future convention should, as a priority, provide for the thorough destruction of existing chemical weapons and production facilities. It should also ensure the non-production of new chemical weapons without harming or affecting the peaceful development of civilian chemical industries in all countries. It stressed that verification measures should not impair the legitimate interests of commercial enterprises and should be feasible in terms of both human and financial costs.

France stated that it did not rule out the possibility of acquiring a limited and purely deterrent capability in the area of chemical weapons and that current negotiations could not constitute a moratorium for France nor, for that matter, for any other country. It welcomed the announcement by the Soviet Union that it had started building a special plant to destroy chemical weapons. France presented its proposal³⁷ concerning the right of parties to the convention to keep security stocks to meet the threat of a party to withdraw from the convention or the refusal of a party to continue with the destruction of its stocks.

Pakistan expressed dismay at that proposal, which, in its view, would negate the main objectives of the ban, seriously undermine confidence in the observance of the convention and deepen mutual suspicion among parties. It added that it came at an inopportune time in view of the progress being made in the negotiations. The Soviet Union believed that the French proposal caused considerable difficulties at the negotiations, constituting, in essence, a call for the legalized buildup and proliferation of chemical weapons, and was contrary to the spirit of the convention under elaboration. In replying to those comments, France reiterated its view that the acquisition of a minimum, but militarily significant, chemical weapons reserve would serve as a guarantee during the 10-year destruction period.

In introducing another paper, on the non-production of chemical weapons,³⁸ France suggested that a scientific council consisting of independent,

³⁷ See footnote 24.

³⁸ See footnote 23.

eminent persons be set up, whose task it would be to evaluate the declaration of stocks, to finalize the lists of chemicals to be prohibited and monitored, to inform the consultative committee of the appearance of any new substance or new technology that might pose a risk to the convention and to propose appropriate measures and verification procedures. The United Kingdom introduced a document³⁹ containing detailed proposals on the organs and the constitution of an international organization to oversee implementation, pointing out that once negotiating problems had been resolved, the negotiators would have to move quickly to ensure that the global ban actually worked as they had intended. In introducing the document it had submitted,⁴⁰ Pakistan emphasized the need for assurances that a party which felt exposed to a chemical weapons threat would be able to count on assistance from other parties and for effective sanctions against a State which was the source of such a threat.

Mr. Rolf Ekéus of Sweden was appointed Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons, which held 29 meetings from 9 February to 26 August. In addition, the Chairman held a number of informal consultations with delegations. At their request, the Conference decided to invite the representatives of the following States not members of the Conference to participate in the work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Senegal, Spain, Switzerland (a non-Member of the United Nations), Turkey and Zimbabwe.

In accordance with its mandate, the *Ad Hoc* Committee continued the negotiation and further elaboration of the convention on the basis of the work accomplished in previous years and during the inter-sessional period, as well as on the basis of new proposals submitted by delegations and by the Chairman of the Committee. The Committee decided to retain the basic structure of the envisaged convention that it had established, although discussions continued on whether certain issues, including verification measures, would be placed under that structure or in annexes to the convention. The structure used by the *Ad Hoc* Committee is as follows:

- Preamble
- I. General provisions on scope
- II. Definitions and criteria
- III. Declarations
- IV. Chemical weapons
- V. Chemical weapons production facilities
- VI. Activities not prohibited by the convention
- VII. National implementation measures
- VIII. Consultative committee
- IX. Consultation, co-operation and fact-finding
- X. Assistance
- XI. Economic and technological development
- XII. Relation to other international agreements
- XIII. Amendments

³⁹ See footnote 31.

⁴⁰ See footnote 26.

- XIV. Duration, withdrawal
- XV. Signature, ratification, entry into force
- XVI. Languages
- Annexes and other documents.

The Committee accepted the Chairman's proposal to group issues covering the subject matter contained in articles I-IX of the draft convention as follows:

Cluster I: Issues pertaining to chemical weapons stocks;

Cluster II: Issues pertaining to chemical weapons production facilities;

Cluster III: Issues pertaining to non-production of chemical weapons;

Cluster IV: Issues pertaining to the organization and functions of the consultative committee and its organs, as well as issues pertaining to consultation, co-operation and fact-finding, including challenge inspection.

Forty-four meetings were devoted to issues under cluster I; 12 meetings to those under cluster II; 31 meetings to those under cluster III; and 29 meetings to those under cluster IV. In addition, the Chairman of the Committee undertook intensive consultations on the issue of inspection by challenge in preparation for its consideration by the Committee.

As a result of the intensive work accomplished in the framework of these clusters and on the basis of the open-ended consultations held by the Chairman himself on various other aspects of the draft convention, considerable progress was achieved in its elaboration. That progress is reflected in the appendices to the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee:⁴¹ appendix I, which reflects the current stage of the negotiations on the convention, and appendix II, which contains draft texts to serve as a basis for future negotiations.

In article I (scope), the only issue to be resolved is that of the legal scope of the convention (the question of jurisdiction or control). The political and legal implications of that concept are obvious in that the responsibility for destroying chemical weapons on the territory of a party to the convention is to be clearly defined. Regarding article II (definitions), it was agreed that it would be best to review it once agreement had been reached on other parts of the convention, particularly on article VI (activities not prohibited by the convention). Article III (declarations) and its annex were largely agreed upon. The only outstanding issue of the declaration of past transfers was basically resolved, with the one remaining problem being to decide how far back in time past transfers should be declared.

On article IV (chemical weapons) and its annex dealing with measures to be taken with respect to existing chemical weapons, much progress was achieved in 1987. The long-standing difficulties connected with the issue of destruction versus diversion of existing chemical weapons was resolved, and the current text of the draft convention clearly stipulates that all chemical

⁴¹ CD/787, appendix I, vol.III, document CD/782.

weapons must be destroyed. Furthermore, agreement was reached that parties should make early declarations of the exact location of their chemical weapons, although one delegation still has reservations in that respect. Significant progress was also achieved in the elaboration of the verification arrangements during the destruction process. They pertain to the international verification of the declaration of chemical weapons, the systematic monitoring of storage facilities and the verification of the removal of chemical weapons from the storage facilities to the destruction facilities. They include measures to secure the storage facilities, on-site inspections to verify the accuracy of the declaration of chemical weapons, the monitoring of the facilities where chemical weapons are stored pending their destruction, as well as the instruments to be used. The major problem yet to be resolved with regard to chemical weapons is that of the order of their elimination. Although some clarification of the aspects involved was achieved, it remains to reconcile fundamental security concerns of States during the ten-year destruction period.

On article V (chemical weapons production facilities) and its annex, detailed provisions were elaborated for the verification of the declarations, closure and elimination of the production facilities. However, agreement on other relevant aspects will depend on agreement concerning the exact definition of a chemical weapons production facility, which is still pending. On article VI (activities not prohibited by the convention) and its annex, some political hurdles were overcome and progress was registered in that it was agreed to include a new annex dealing with the commercial production of toxic chemicals not otherwise listed that might be relevant to the convention. Important progress was also made with respect to the modalities for revising the lists of chemicals and with respect to the identification of the factors that might influence the number, intensity, duration, timing and mode of inspections of facilities producing listed chemicals. However, more work is required on this article.

Article VII (national implementation measures) was not subject to further negotiations in 1987 due to the fact that its contents are already largely agreed upon. On article VIII, which pertains to the organizational framework for the implementation of the convention, useful work was done, especially on the question of the guidelines for the international inspectorate. A convergence of views seems to be emerging on the need to set up an international organization to oversee the implementation of the convention, and a preliminary attempt was made at sorting out in detail the powers and functions of the various organs of the future organization and their interrelationship. Furthermore, consideration was given to the elaboration of models for agreements which parties will have to conclude with the international organization regarding specific facilities to be inspected or monitored.

Under article IX (consultation, co-operation and fact-finding), work focused on the major outstanding issue of on-site inspection on challenge. As a result of intensive consultations, substantial progress was made on this crucial issue, which is reflected in a paper presented by the Chairman of the

Ad Hoc Committee.⁴² It was generally felt that it would be possible to translate that progress into treaty language. Articles X to XVI were not negotiated in 1987.

In sum, the work achieved in 1987 in the elaboration of the convention was significant. In the view of all participants, the negotiations had reached a qualitatively new dimension, which greatly improved the prospects for early conclusion of a convention. That view was reflected in the comments made by delegations at the end of the session.

The United States felt encouraged by the pace of the progress and by the fact that the negotiators had focused on the real issues and had put forward new ideas. It welcomed the pronounced trend towards dealing seriously with the security concerns that underlay the negotiations, citing as evidence the announcement by the Soviet Union that it would support the mandatory inspection by challenge provision. Brazil stated that the conclusion of a convention had become a tangible possibility. Poland believed that the convention was within grasp and stated that the momentum achieved should not be lost.

Egypt noted that clear progress had been made, but warned of the implications for the convention that the non-adherence of some States to it would have. It urged that all States abstain from producing new generations of chemical weapons. Sri Lanka believed that success in arriving at a chemical weapons ban would provide a clear example of the capabilities of the Conference on Disarmament as a negotiating organ.

Bulgaria, speaking on behalf of the group of socialist States, welcomed the progress achieved in the negotiations and stressed that the Soviet Union's new proposals, in particular its acceptance of the principle of mandatory challenge inspections without the right of refusal, provided yet further confirmation of the political will of the socialist States to accelerate the negotiations. It stated that decisions to produce binary chemical weapons were at odds with the aim of strengthening confidence at a time when the conclusion of a convention was in sight. The Federal Republic of Germany, speaking on behalf of the Western group, stated that the conclusion of a convention was no longer a distant goal but a real possibility. Algeria, speaking as co-ordinator of the group of 21, underscored the progress made towards elaborating a convention.

On 28 August, the Conference adopted the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, which is an integral part of the report of the Conference. Appendix I to the Committee's report reflects the stage of the negotiations on a convention at the end of the 1987 session. However, it is understood that the draft texts contained in it do not bind any delegation. The *Ad Hoc* Committee recommended to the Conference on Disarmament that: (a) appendix I be used for further negotiations and the drafting of the convention; and (b) other documents reflecting the results of the work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, as contained in appendix II, together with other relevant documents of the Conference, also be utilized in the further elaboration of the convention. The Conference also accepted the *Ad Hoc* Committee's recommendations that the work on the convention be resumed during the inter-sessional period.

⁴² *Ibid.*, document CD/782, appendix II, "On-site inspection on challenge"

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1987

During the general debate in the First Committee,⁴³ many delegations noted with satisfaction the progress achieved in the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention in the Conference on Disarmament and expressed the hope that the instrument would soon be concluded.

The Soviet Union believed that the negotiations had entered their final stage. The number of outstanding questions had been reduced to a minimum, and the differences on them had generally been narrowed down; all major questions on the convention had been resolved. Vigorous efforts were needed to bring the talks to a conclusion as soon as possible. The Soviet Union recalled its proposals on verification and confidence-building and its recently announced position that it was necessary to consolidate legally the principle of binding inspections by challenge without the right of denial. In its view, the Secretary-General of the United Nations would have an active role to play in controlling compliance with the convention and in investigating cases of the use of chemical weapons. The Soviet Union also referred to its proposals at the bilateral level, with the United States. The USSR had suggested that the two countries carry out an exchange of data on their chemical arsenals, which would be subject to appropriate verification, before the conclusion of the convention. Moreover, the Soviet Union had stopped producing chemical weapons and was constructing in Chapaevsk a special facility for destroying its stockpiles.

The United States also noted that advances had been recorded in the effort to negotiate a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons, and it confirmed its satisfaction with the new position taken by the Soviet Union on the question of verification, in particular its acceptance of American proposals for inspection by challenge. The United States recognized the value of the recent visit that participants in the chemical weapons negotiations had made to the chemical weapons facility at Shikhany, in the Soviet Union, and recalled that it itself had sponsored a similar visit to the United States in 1983. In its view, much work remained to be done on the convention, and it warned that some States might refuse to become parties to it. The United States condemned the illegal use of chemical weapons—which was actually taking place—and expressed support for investigations by the Secretary-General of allegations of the use of both chemical and biological weapons. It associated its own binary weapons programme with the need to correct an imbalance in the field, which was both threatening and destabilizing.

Denmark, speaking on behalf of the twelve member States of the European Community, reaffirmed their commitment to the total elimination of chemical weapons and noted that important progress had been made on certain parts of the text of a draft convention. Still outstanding was the question of verification, where it would be necessary to establish a stringent régime providing for on-site inspection on challenge when circumstances so required.

⁴³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, First Committee, 3rd to 45th meetings, and ibid., Sessional Fascicle, corrigendum.*

Denmark pointed out that member States of the European Community had imposed export controls on compounds that could be misused for the production of chemical weapons.

France repeated its proposal for establishing what it called a “provisional security balance” to enable all States, if they deemed it necessary, to possess a minimal chemical weapons capability of some 1,000 to 2,000 metric tons of stock—a small proportion of current Soviet and American stocks—under very strict constraints. Those stocks would be destroyed during the final two years of the 10-year period provided for the total destruction of stockpiles. France considered that stocks were necessary to meet possible incidents during the period of storage, to deter any party that might be tempted to deceive and to convince all non-signatory States that there was no clear advantage to remaining outside the convention. The Netherlands stressed that the use of chemical weapons was a sad reality. It welcomed the evolution in the position of some countries and particularly the wide acceptance of mandatory inspections by challenge. A major concern that would have to be addressed in the period ahead was the exchange of data before the signing of the convention. Such an exchange would serve as a confidence-building measure, encouraging States to accede to the convention.

The socialist States urged that work on the convention be accelerated so that it might be completed early in 1988. Czechoslovakia was concerned about plans to build and deploy binary chemical weapons in Western Europe as well as about France’s proposal (see above). It held that the establishment of chemical-weapon-free zones in the Balkans, Central Europe and Northern Europe would contribute to the amelioration of the situation on the continent. The German Democratic Republic, too, believed that a chemical-weapon-free zone in Central Europe would be an effective step towards the global elimination of chemical weapons. It also stated that intensified efforts would be required to finalize a chemical weapons convention, and that they should focus on solutions to the few remaining questions of a fundamental nature and on backing up the understanding reached so far on other issues, such as the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles and production facilities and guarantees of the non-production of such weapons.

Poland expressed support for the position of the Soviet Union, particularly the suggestion to adopt the principle of mandatory inspection by challenge. It held that the General Assembly had the responsibility to urge the Conference on Disarmament to improve the mandate of its *Ad Hoc* Committee with a view to speeding up the negotiations. To maintain a favourable political climate, the Assembly should also urge States not to take any action that might in any way delay the elaboration of the convention. Such a move was necessary because of the emerging danger of a new generation of chemical weapons.

Mexico recalled that 15 years had passed since the conclusion of the biological weapons Convention, in the preamble of which parties recognized the objective of achieving an effective prohibition of chemical weapons and undertook to continue negotiations in good faith to that end. Those negotiations were entering a decisive and crucial stage. Mexico agreed that appro-

appropriate verification machinery was essential to the agreement. It noted that an independent international body set up by the convention itself would be responsible for that delicate task, which it considered an optimal solution for guaranteeing the credibility of the instrument. Regarding decision-making in that body, Mexico favoured the adoption of the procedure of a two-thirds majority of members present and voting. It believed that a requirement of consensus would considerably hinder the work of the body, since each party would thus have a right of veto.

Pakistan found it disquieting that chemical weapons were being acquired by an increasing number of countries and deplored their use in violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Turning to the matter of a chemical weapons convention, it considered that the latest report of the Conference on Disarmament contained a fairly well-developed "rolling text". A number of difficult issues remained, the resolution of which would require compromises on the part of all the parties to the negotiations. Pakistan agreed that provisions on inspection by challenge would have a central place in the convention, both as a means of providing confidence in its implementation and in order to deter violation. The procedures to implement it would have to be expeditious, non-discriminatory and mandatory.

Nigeria stated that in addition to nuclear weapons, chemical weapons constituted a very dangerous weapon of mass destruction. It appealed to all members of the Conference to intensify their efforts to ensure the conclusion of the convention prohibiting chemical weapons, which would recognize the sovereign equality of all States.

The representative of Sweden, who had been Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons in 1987, believed that a political breakthrough was emerging in the negotiations and that, at the end of the 1987 session of the Conference, the convention was no longer a distant goal but a real possibility. He found it particularly gratifying that the negotiating parties had demonstrated a genuine will to achieve results by making sometimes painful compromises, an attitude which augured well for future negotiations and showed that it was possible to strike a balance between security concerns and other important national and international interests. He recommended that all Governments study the provisions contained in the draft convention, because—although the negotiations were at an advanced stage—there was still time to make adjustments.

Ireland considered that the *Ad Hoc* Meeting of Scientific and Technical Experts from States Parties to the biological weapons Convention had been a welcome demonstration of the continuing commitment of the international community to that instrument. The exchange of information would strengthen the Convention and help ensure its continued relevance.

At the time that action was taken on the draft resolutions submitted under the agenda item concerning chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, Cuba gave a general explanation of its position with regard to the non-proliferation of chemical weapons. In its view, for non-proliferation to be genuine and complete, it must be reflected in the actions of those States possessing such weapons—States currently producing and stockpiling them

and thus impeding progress in the negotiations.

Five draft resolutions were submitted under the item, three of which were subsequently adopted by the General Assembly on 30 November,⁴⁴ and two of which were withdrawn. Four of the drafts concerned primarily chemical weapons, and one, biological weapons.

On 27 October, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mongolia, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the Ukrainian SSR, the United Kingdom, Uruguay and Viet Nam submitted a draft resolution entitled "Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons". On 30 October the sponsors submitted a revised draft resolution, which was later also sponsored by Bulgaria and Indonesia. In its operative paragraph 2 (see below), the words "complete and effective prohibition of the development, production," had been inserted before the word "stockpiling".

The revised draft was introduced by Canada on 6 November. In its introduction, Canada stated that the draft took account of significant developments over the year. As a reflection of the concern that Member States shared over the existence of chemical weapons, the General Assembly would urge the Conference on Disarmament to give a high priority to negotiations on the elaboration, at the earliest possible date, of a convention on the destruction of, and on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of, all chemical weapons. The Assembly would also encourage Member States to take further initiatives to promote openness in the negotiations and to provide further information.

In addition to the draft introduced by Canada, which concerned the efforts of the Conference on Disarmament to achieve a convention on chemical weapons, three draft resolutions were submitted that concerned primarily the use of such weapons.

On 27 October, Australia submitted a draft resolution entitled "Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and to support the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention". On 9 November, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Denmark, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Kenya, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Portugal, Rwanda, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, the USSR, the United Kingdom, the United States, Uruguay and Zaire submitted a revised draft resolution, which was later also sponsored by Bulgaria. In introducing the revision on 9 November, the representative of Australia recalled that the original text had stressed his Government's commitment to the Geneva Protocol and to the early and successful conclusion of a convention for the prohibition of all chemical weapons and their destruction, and it had underlined its support for on-site verification of compliance with the convention and its belief in the importance of the role which the Secretary-General performed in support of the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol. He added that the draft had called for the further elaboration of the existing

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, Forty-second Session, Plenary Meetings, 84th meeting.

modalities available to the Secretary-General to carry out his investigations into reports that chemical and biological and toxin weapons might have been used in violation of the Protocol. He then went on to say that in consultations with sponsors of the other two drafts on the use of chemical weapons and with other delegations, a single text on the use of chemical weapons had been achieved. Elements had been drawn from the other two draft resolutions (see below) and incorporated into the Australian text. The revision contained changes in both preambular and operative paragraphs.

On 27 October, the Islamic Republic of Iran submitted a draft resolution entitled "Chemical weapons". By it, the Assembly would have, among other things, urged the Conference on Disarmament to accelerate its negotiations on a multilateral chemical weapons convention; requested the Secretary-General to initiate appropriate action on the basis of the procedures available to him for investigating the allegations of use of chemical weapons; and condemned unequivocally any actions that violated the provisions of the Geneva Protocol.

In announcing on 9 November the withdrawal of its draft,⁴⁵ Iran referred to intensive consultations that it had held with other delegations, in particular with those of Sweden and Australia, to arrive at an agreed text on the use of chemical weapons. Among the matters that it had wished to reaffirm by its own draft were the validity of the Geneva Protocol, the need for its strict observance, and the need for the elaboration of international instruments, with emphasis on the role of the Secretary-General in carrying out investigations of reported violations.

On 27 October, Australia, Belgium, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Kenya, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, the United Kingdom, the United States, Uruguay and Zaire submitted a draft resolution entitled "Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons", which was later also sponsored by France, the Philippines, Rwanda and Sri Lanka. By it, the General Assembly would have, *inter alia*, called for compliance with existing international obligations regarding prohibitions on chemical and biological weapons; urged the Conference on Disarmament to pursue vigorously and accelerate its negotiations on a multilateral convention; and called upon all States, pending the elaboration of such a convention, to co-operate in efforts to prevent the use of chemical weapons and to establish the facts in cases of reports of such use, and to be guided in their national policies by the need to curb the spread of such weapons.

On 9 November the United States announced that the sponsors of the resolution had decided to withdraw their draft.⁴⁶ The United States stressed that despite serious expressions of concern by the Assembly, instances of the use of chemical weapons continued. In the view of the sponsors, the United Nations should not relent in its efforts to halt the illegal use of such abhorrent weapons. It should also reiterate its appeal for the halting of the disquieting spread of those weapons. Since the sponsors felt that the revised draft reso-

⁴⁵ See A/42/750, paras. 8 and 9.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, paras. 16 and 17.

lution introduced by Australia fully reflected the key points that they had initially sought in submitting their draft, they hoped that the Committee would support the revision.

Some delegations commented on the drafts in the course of the debate in the First Committee. Addressing the draft introduced by Canada, the Ukrainian SSR noted that clear prospects for the successful conclusion of the chemical weapons talks at the Conference on Disarmament had emerged and the adoption of a historic international legal document was within grasp. The socialist States had given concrete evidence of their readiness to co-operate actively for the early conclusion of a convention. Speaking of the same draft, the German Democratic Republic stated that it viewed the text as an acknowledgement of the productive work done by the Conference on Disarmament and of the contributions which many States made both within and outside the negotiating process at the Conference. It was evidence of the desire of the entire community of States to press on with the drawing up of the convention and to conclude it as soon as possible.

Regarding the draft introduced by Australia, Zaire, as a sponsor of the draft, noted that the document recalled in timely fashion the provisions of the Geneva Protocol and the work of the Conference on Disarmament to achieve a convention. Zaire called for the solidarity of all States to ensure that the draft resolution would be adopted by consensus.

On 12 November the First Committee adopted the two revised drafts introduced by Canada and Australia without a vote. In that connection, some States gave explanations of vote.

The Soviet Union explained its position on the draft introduced by Canada. It expressed its satisfaction regarding the adoption by consensus of a single draft resolution whose objective was to promote the successful conclusion of negotiations on a convention. The Soviet Union stressed the complexities of the work remaining to be done, but believed that the spirit of co-operation evident in 1987 gave hope of a successful and speedy conclusion.

Among those that explained their position on the draft introduced by Australia, Brazil stated that its support for that text was to be understood as support for the speedy conclusion of a convention to ban chemical weapons and to provide for the destruction of existing arsenals. It stressed that the elimination of chemical weapons must not hamper the development of a peaceful national chemical industry in any State. Similarly, the provisions of future conventions should be applicable to every country and should not create discriminatory régimes. China stressed that, pending conclusion of a convention, it was in favour of strengthening the Geneva Protocol, including the adoption of the necessary measures to conduct an investigation into the possible use of chemical weapons. It also underlined its opposition to the spread of chemical weapons and the priority issues of destroying existing weapons and their production facilities and of guaranteeing that no new chemical weapons would be produced.

India hoped that the consensus on the draft would mean the speedy and successful conclusion of negotiations on a convention on chemical weapons. The Islamic Republic of Iran considered the adoption of the draft an important

step pending conclusion of a chemical weapons convention. It deplored the fact that there had been procrastination in negotiating such measures, and that during that period it had been subjected to chemical weapons. The Soviet Union regretted that efforts to combine the drafts introduced by Canada and Australia had not yielded results. In its view, consensus on a single resolution concerning all aspects of a ban on chemical weapons would have had even greater weight and would have promoted further progress towards implementation.

On 30 November the General Assembly adopted without a vote the two draft resolutions. The one introduced by Canada was adopted as resolution 42/37 A and reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its previous resolutions relating to the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and of their destruction,

Reaffirming the urgent necessity of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and of the adherence by all States to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed in London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972,

Taking note of the Final Document of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, adopted by consensus on 26 September 1986, and in particular of article IX of the Final Declaration of the Conference,

Having considered the report of the Conference on Disarmament, which incorporates, *inter alia*, the report of its *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons, and noting that following the precedents set over the past three years, consultations are continuing during the inter-sessional period, thus increasing the time devoted to negotiations,

Convinced of the necessity that all efforts be exerted for the continuation and successful conclusion of negotiations on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction,

Noting the bilateral and other discussions, including the ongoing exchange of views between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America in the framework of the multilateral negotiations, on issues related to the prohibition of chemical weapons,

Noting further with appreciation the efforts made at all levels by States to facilitate the earliest conclusion of a convention and, in particular, the concrete steps designed to promote confidence and to contribute directly to that goal,

Wishing to encourage Member States to take further initiatives to promote confidence and openness in the negotiations and to provide further information to facilitate prompt resolution of outstanding issues, thus contributing to an early agreement on the convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction,

1. *Takes note with satisfaction* of the work of the Conference on Disarmament during its 1987 session regarding the prohibition of chemical weapons, and in particular appreciates the progress in the work of its *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons on that question and the tangible results recorded in its report;

2. *Expresses again none the less its regret and concern* that notwithstanding the progress made in 1987, a convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction has not yet been elaborated;

3. *Urges again* the Conference on Disarmament, as a matter of high priority, to intensify, during its 1988 session, the negotiations on such a convention and to reinforce further its efforts

by, *inter alia*, increasing the time during the year that it devotes to such negotiations, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, with a view to the final elaboration of a convention at the earliest possible date, and to re-establish its *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons for this purpose with the mandate to be agreed upon by the Conference at the beginning of its 1988 session;

4. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly at its forty-third session on the results of its negotiations.

The draft resolution introduced by Australia was adopted as resolution 42/37 C. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling the provisions of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and other relevant rules of customary international law,

Recalling also the necessity of the adherence by all States to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed in London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972,

Reiterating its concern over reports that chemical weapons have been used and over indications of their emergence in an increasing number of national arsenals, as well as over the growing risk that they may be used again,

Noting with satisfaction that the Conference on Disarmament is actively engaged in negotiating a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, including detailed provisions for the on-site verification of compliance with the convention, and expressing its support for the early and successful conclusion of those negotiations,

Noting also that prompt and impartial investigation of reports of possible use of chemical and bacteriological weapons would further enhance the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol,

Expressing its appreciation for the work of the Secretary-General, and noting the procedures available to him in support of the principles and objectives of the 1925 Geneva Protocol,

1. *Renews its call* to all States to observe strictly the principles and objectives of the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, and condemns all actions that violate this obligation;

2. *Urges* all States to be guided in their national policies by the need to curb the spread of chemical weapons;

3. *Recognizes* the need, upon the entry into force of a chemical weapons convention, to review the modalities available to the Secretary-General for the investigation of reports of the possible use of chemical weapons;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to carry out investigations in response to reports that may be brought to his attention by any Member State concerning the possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons that may constitute a violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol or other relevant rules of customary international law in order to ascertain the facts of the matter, and to report promptly the results of any such investigation to all Member States;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified experts provided by interested Member States, to develop further technical guidelines and procedures available to him for the timely and efficient investigation of such reports of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons;

6. *Also requests* the Secretary-General, in meeting the objectives set forth in paragraph 4 above, to compile and maintain lists of qualified experts provided by Member States whose services could be made available at short notice to undertake such investigations, and of laboratories with the capability to undertake testing for the presence of agents the use of which is prohibited;

7. *Further requests* the Secretary-General, in meeting the objectives of paragraph 4 above:

(a) To appoint experts to undertake investigation of the reported activities;

(b) Where appropriate, to make the necessary arrangements for experts to collect and examine evidence and to undertake such testing as may be required;

(c) To seek, in any such investigation, assistance as appropriate from Member States and the relevant international organizations;

8. *Requests* Member States and the relevant international organizations to co-operate fully with the Secretary-General in the above-mentioned work;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit a report to the General Assembly at its forty-third session on the implementation of the present resolution.

On 27 October, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Guyana, Hungary, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Italy, Japan, Mongolia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Romania, Spain, Sweden, the Ukrainian SSR, the USSR, the United Kingdom, the United States and Zaire submitted a draft resolution entitled "Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction". It was later also sponsored by Ireland, Liberia and Poland.

In its introduction of the draft on 6 November, Austria recalled that the Second Review Conference had decided to hold an *ad hoc* meeting of scientific and technical experts to finalize the modalities for the exchange of information and data. Austria gave a brief account of the work of that Meeting (see above), at which experts had worked out a form to be used for exchanges. By the draft, the General Assembly would note with appreciation the results of the *Ad Hoc* Meeting.

On 12 November the First Committee approved the draft without a vote. On 30 November the General Assembly adopted it, also without a vote, as resolution 42/37 B. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2826 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, in which it commended the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction and expressed the hope for the widest possible adherence to the Convention,

Recalling its resolution 39/65 D of 12 December 1984, in which it noted that, at the request of a majority of States parties to the Convention, a second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention would be held in 1986,

Recalling that the States parties to the Convention met at Geneva from 8 to 26 September 1986 to review the operation of the Convention with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble to and the provisions of the Convention, including the provisions concerning negotiations on chemical weapons, were being realized,

Recalling also its resolution 41/58 A of 3 December 1986, in which it, *inter alia*, noted with appreciation that on 26 September 1986, the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction adopted by consensus a Final Declaration,

Noting with satisfaction that, at the time of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention, there were more than a hundred States parties to the Convention, including all the permanent members of the Security Council,

1. *Notes with appreciation* that, in accordance with the Final Declaration of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, an *Ad Hoc* Meeting of Scientific and Technical Experts from States parties to the Convention was held at Geneva from 31 March to 15 April 1987, which adopted by consensus a report finalizing the modalities for the exchange of information and data agreed to in the Final Declaration, thus enabling States parties to follow a standardized procedure;

2. *Notes* that the *Ad Hoc* Meeting of Scientific and Technical Experts from States parties to the Convention agreed in its report that the first exchange of information and data should take place not later than 15 October 1987 and that thereafter information to be given on an annual basis should be provided through the Department for Disarmament Affairs of the Secretariat not later than 15 April;

3. *Notes with satisfaction* that the first such exchange of information and data has commenced;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to render the necessary assistance and to provide such services as may be required for the implementation of the relevant parts of the Final Declaration;

5. *Calls upon* all signatory States that have not ratified or acceded to the Convention to do so without delay, and also calls upon those States which have not yet signed the Convention to join the States parties thereto at an early date, thus contributing to the achievement of universal adherence to the Convention and to international confidence.

Conclusion

The progress achieved in 1987 by the Conference on Disarmament in the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction was significant. It was widely held that the negotiations had reached a qualitatively new dimension, which greatly improved the prospects for the early conclusion of the convention. Among other things, agreement was reached that all chemical weapons would be destroyed, which means that no chemical warfare agents can be diverted to other uses. There also emerged an understanding among most of the major negotiating parties that all chemical weapons should be fully declared, also by location, and verified when the convention enters into force. Furthermore, provisions were drafted for the verification, closure and elimination of production facilities.

New efforts were taken to find a solution to the problem of preventing the clandestine production of chemicals for weapons purposes without creating undue complications for the chemical industry. With regard to the sensitive problem of international on-site inspection by challenge, political progress was noted, as understanding that there should be no right of refusal in the case of a challenge seemed close at hand. Several elements of the challenge inspection process appeared to have been agreed upon. Moreover, new consideration of the institutional aspects of a future convention showed promising progress.

Although the Conference on Disarmament still has a number of difficult problems to settle, in their comments at the end of the 1987 session, member States expressed satisfaction at the progress made.

Another reflection of the increasing convergence of views was observed in the General Assembly. Four draft resolutions were submitted in its First

Committee on the question of chemical weapons, but as a result of consultations, three of them were merged into one text entitled "Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and to support the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention", which the General Assembly adopted without a vote, as resolution 42/37 C. The fourth draft, urging the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its negotiations on such a convention, was likewise adopted by consensus, as resolution 42/37 A.

The Assembly further adopted without a vote resolution 42/37 B, on the follow-up of the Second Review Conference of the biological weapons Convention. In accordance with the Final Declaration of that Conference, an *Ad Hoc* Meeting of Scientific and Technical Experts from States parties to the Convention had been held at Geneva in March and April 1987.

CHAPTER XIV

Prevention of an arms race in outer space

Introduction

THE SPACE AGE IS SAID TO HAVE STARTED IN 1957, when for the first time a man-made object was lofted into orbit around the Earth. Since that date, the peaceful uses of outer space have been discussed in the United Nations, particularly in the General Assembly and the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and its subsidiary bodies. Those discussions have contributed to the conclusion of a number of international agreements concerning both military and peaceful aspects of the use of outer space.¹

Among those agreements, the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, known as the partial test-ban Treaty, specifically prohibits the testing of nuclear weapons in outer space. According to the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, known as the outer space Treaty, "outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means" (article II) and the parties undertake "not to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner" (article IV). Detailed norms for States' actions in this environment are included in the 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies to ensure that the Moon and other celestial bodies within the solar system, other than Earth, are used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

Preventing the militarization of outer space has become an increasingly

¹ For details, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 8: 1983, chap. XVI. The following treaties are frequently cited in debates on the prevention of an arms race in outer space: (a) Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, 1963 (United Nations *Treaty Series*, vol. 480, No. 6964); (b) Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 1967 (General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI), annex); (c) Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, 1972, known as the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) Treaty (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 944, No. 13446); and (d) Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 1979 (General Assembly resolution 34/68, annex). The texts of the first, second and fourth agreements are reproduced in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 2nd edition: 1982 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.IX.5), and their status is given in appendix I of this volume.

significant objective for the United Nations, as reflected in particular in the 1978 Final Document, which called for international negotiations to be held on the issue.² In 1981, the Soviet Union submitted to the General Assembly a draft treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space.³ Subsequently, upon the initiative of socialist States, the Assembly requested the multilateral negotiating body in Geneva to start negotiations on the text of such a treaty. At the same time, following a Western initiative, the Assembly requested the Geneva body to consider the question of negotiating effective and verifiable agreements for preventing an arms race in outer space and to give priority to an agreement prohibiting anti-satellite systems.

Since 1982, the negotiating body has had an item entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space" on its agenda. To deal with this issue, a majority of its members have advocated setting up a subsidiary body, but because of differing views over the formulation of a mandate, it took three years to do so. In 1983 the Soviet Union submitted to the General Assembly its "Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of the Use of Force in Outer Space and from Space against the Earth".⁴ While each of the major political groups submitted a draft resolution that year, the Eastern European and Western drafts were not put to a vote, and a third one, initiated by Egypt and Sri Lanka, was adopted, requesting the Conference on Disarmament to take action on the matter.

Again in 1984, the Conference was unable to agree on the formulation of a mandate for an *ad hoc* committee. In his address to the General Assembly, President Reagan indicated that the United States was prepared to discuss a wide range of issues of concern to both it and the Soviet Union, including the militarization of space. Because of the divergent approaches to the question, no fewer than four draft resolutions were introduced. Once more, only the non-aligned one was put to a vote; it was adopted by 150 votes to none, with 1 abstention, as resolution 39/59. By it, the General Assembly reiterated its request to the Conference on Disarmament and urged the Soviet Union and the United States to initiate negotiations aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space.

In 1985, the question was more than ever before a major concern both within and outside the United Nations. At the multilateral level, the main development was the setting up of a subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament under the agenda item "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", pursuant to resolution 39/59. The Conference requested the *Ad Hoc* Committee, as a first step, to examine, through substantive and general consideration, issues relevant to the subject. In the General Assembly, four competing draft resolutions were again submitted, but only the non-aligned one was put to a vote. It was adopted by 151 votes in favour to none against,

² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, para. 80.

³ A/36/192, annex. The Soviet draft treaty is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 6: 1981, appendix VII.

⁴ A/38/194. The draft treaty, also submitted to the Conference on Disarmament in 1984, is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 9: 1984, appendix VIII.

with 2 abstentions, as resolution 40/87. By it, the General Assembly sought to enable the Conference on Disarmament to intensify, as a matter of priority, its consideration of the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. At the bilateral level, the United States and the Soviet Union, at their Geneva summit meeting in November, reached an understanding regarding the initiation of negotiations on nuclear and space arms. Recognizing the importance of the bilateral approach to the issue, the Assembly, by resolution 40/87, also urged the two Powers to pursue their negotiations in a constructive spirit.

In 1986 the bilateral negotiations were accelerated, and the question of outer space was a major topic in the Reykjavik meeting in October between the leaders of the two Powers. At the multilateral level, the Conference on Disarmament re-established the *Ad Hoc* Committee dealing with the question. In the General Assembly later that year, four draft resolutions on the item were submitted, but again only a revised version of the draft submitted by a number of non-aligned countries was put to a vote. Adopted by a large majority as resolution 41/53, it requested the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its consideration of the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space in 1987 and to re-establish an *ad hoc* committee on the item.

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1987

Although the prevention of an arms race in outer space was not an item on the agenda of the Disarmament Commission, some countries referred to the issue in close conjunction with nuclear questions. This was done first within the context of a general exchange of views in plenary meetings and then in a contact group on agenda item 4, an item dealing mainly with nuclear matters (for its full wording, see page 13).

In the general exchange of views, the Soviet Union maintained that the placing of weapons in outer space would threaten prospects for progress in nuclear disarmament. Efforts to ward off the nuclear threat looming over mankind, the Soviet Union stated, must not be accompanied by a laser- and space-weapon deadlock at negotiations that affected the security of everyone. A solution to the problem, it stressed, must be sought through an agreement to strengthen the 1972 anti-ballistic missile Treaty. Such an agreement should provide for a reciprocal obligation on the part of the parties not to withdraw from the Treaty for 10 years. During that time, research on anti-ballistic missiles would be allowed, but only in laboratories. The Soviet Union was in favour of allowing scientific research on Earth—in research centres, in testing grounds and at plants. In order to decide what was and what was not allowed in outer space, it had proposed that experts agree on a list of devices that would be banned from space in the research phase. Poland recalled its proposal that a study on the consequences of the militarization of outer space be prepared in the United Nations by international experts.

China called for early conclusion of an international convention on the complete prohibition of outer space weapons. It maintained that outer space

was the common heritage of all mankind and should be developed and used for the benefit of all countries. It ran counter to the common aspiration and fundamental interests of mankind, China stressed, for any country to develop, test, produce and deploy outer space weaponry in any fashion.

Sri Lanka stated that outer space must be preserved from an arms race, which could only retard progress towards disarmament and negate efforts to promote international peace and security. Argentina saw the need for the third special session of the General Assembly on disarmament to give an impulse to the search for effective measures in the field of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

In the Contact Group on agenda item 4, the question of outer space came up in connection with the compilation of relevant recommendations. In the "Compilation of proposals for recommendations on agenda item 4" by the Contact Group, the recommendations relating to outer space remained in brackets to indicate that there was no consensus on them.⁵

Consideration by the Conference on Disarmament, 1987

During its 1987 session, the Conference on Disarmament considered the item entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space" in plenary meetings during the periods from 2 to 13 March and from 29 June to 3 July.⁶

While in previous years the establishment of an *ad hoc* committee to deal with the subject-matter took a long time, consultations undertaken at the opening of the 1987 session led to early results. On 26 February, the Conference decided to re-establish an *ad hoc* committee under the agenda item and requested it, in discharging the Conference's responsibilities as the multilateral negotiating forum, to continue to examine and identify, through substantive and general consideration, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It was also decided that the *Ad Hoc* Committee would take into account all existing agreements, existing proposals and future initiatives as well as developments that had taken place since its establishment in 1985. In other words, the *Ad Hoc* Committee's mandate was to be the same as in 1986. Agreement to continue work on the basis of that mandate was reached after intensive consultations. At the time that the decision concerning the mandate was taken, the President noted that the consideration of proposals for measures aimed at the prevention of an arms race in outer space was covered by the proposed mandate.

The Conference had before it three new documents relating to the agenda item. Argentina, India, Mexico and Sweden submitted the joint statement of 22 May 1987 made by the heads of State or Government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and the United Republic of Tanzania,⁷ which called

⁵ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/42/42)*, para. 40 and annex I, sect. I, recommendations 4 and 15, and sect. II, recommendation 4.

⁶ CD/787, appendix II, vols. I-IV.

⁷ CD/787, appendix I, vol. II, document CD/758; also issued as a United Nations document (A/42/319-S/18894).

for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Canada submitted a summary report⁸ of the Outer Space Workshop held in Montreal from 14 to 17 May 1987. The German Democratic Republic and Mongolia submitted a document entitled “Main provisions of a treaty on the prohibition of anti-satellite weapons and on ways to ensure the immunity of space objects”.⁹

In introducing the last-mentioned document, the German Democratic Republic noted that it focused on the scope of the envisaged treaty, compliance with its provisions and safeguards for the peaceful exploration and use of outer space for the good of all peoples. Various verification methods and techniques were proposed, among them, on-site inspections by challenge under the auspices of an international inspectorate. Information obtained through national means, as well as data on launch parameters and the general function of space objects, would be made available to all parties to the treaty.

In his message to the Conference, the Secretary-General of the United Nations noted that resolution 41/53 needed to be translated into a co-operative undertaking by the Conference to create conditions for negotiating agreements on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, one of the essential areas in which concerted action could be taken for strengthening international peace and security.

Many statements were made in plenary meetings in connection with the agenda item. The Soviet Union and the United States continued to raise questions about each other's space and missile programmes.

The United States was convinced that the questions of the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament and the prevention of an arms race in outer space could not be isolated from each other. Noting that there had been East-West competition for nearly four decades, it held that there was no basis for fearing the beginning of a new arms race in outer space. For 30 years, space had been utilized as a central medium in that competition. The United States criticized what it considered was blind opposition to strategic defence and believed was reflected in the attitude of those who rejected efforts to reduce reliance on the doctrine of mutual assured destruction. For its part, it had stressed the importance of negotiations and of the maintenance of stability in the area of ballistic missile defence.

The Soviet Union recalled its proposals for the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting the deployment in space of any kind of weapon and of a treaty banning the use of force in outer space and from space against Earth, and stated that they still stood. It considered that it was possible to agree on partial measures that would prevent the deployment of arms in space—measures, for instance, that would ensure the immunity of artificial Earth satellites not carrying any kind of weapon on board. It was also important to explore the possibility of banning the development of new anti-satellite (ASAT) systems and eliminating existing ones. The Soviet Union suggested that the Conference consider creating a system of international verification and study the idea of an international inspectorate that could carry out on-site inspections.

⁸ *Ibid.*, vol. III, document CD/773.

⁹ *Ibid.*, document CD/777.

France attached importance to the 1967 outer space Treaty. It expressed the view that there was no single way to destroy satellites; it would not be realistic to establish an international régime for the prohibition of anti-satellite systems, as it could only be incomplete. It urged as a matter of priority the implementation of the fundamental principles of the existing space régime, and in that context suggested the consideration of specific measures concerning the registration and notification of space objects, as well as a multilateral code of conduct applicable to space activities. The Federal Republic of Germany spoke in favour of identifying shortcomings in the existing law on outer space. It felt that it would not be expedient to examine compliance aspects of existing or intended activities in outer space before reaching unanimous agreement on definitions and interpretations.

Hungary stated that the urgency of addressing the problem of preventing an arms race in outer space had greatly increased in the face of the development of new weapons systems designed for operation in space. In its view, it was evident that the existing system of international legal instruments was not sufficient to prevent the technological arms race from moving into outer space. Bulgaria believed that the *Ad Hoc* Committee should focus its attention on the elaboration of significant measures concerning, for instance, the immunity of artificial Earth satellites and the elimination of existing anti-satellite systems. It welcomed the Soviet proposal for an international inspectorate, observing that such a body could be utilized for the verification of both an anti-satellite ban and a comprehensive prohibition of space weapons.

Sweden noted that an overview of the technical aspect of space weapons development was called for, and suggested that the Conference consider setting up an informal working group of technical experts to deal with the subject. Sri Lanka also expressed the view that the task of preventing space activities from going beyond the research stage required the establishment of a group of scientific experts within the Conference so that multilateral expertise on technical issues could be pooled. It therefore supported the Swedish proposal.

Egypt stated that action must be taken to halt the development of anti-satellite weapons, dismantle existing systems and prohibit the introduction of new weapons systems into outer space. It was also important to ensure that the existing treaties safeguarding the peaceful uses of outer space, as well as the 1972 anti-ballistic missile Treaty, were fully honoured, strengthened and extended as necessary, in the light of recent technological advances.

India noted that the Delhi Declaration of 28 January 1985¹⁰ called for the prohibition of the development, testing, deployment and use of all space weapons, and that the Political Declaration of the Eighth Summit Conference of Non-aligned Countries in Harare in 1986¹¹ called on the Conference to commence negotiations urgently and to conclude an agreement or agreements as appropriate to prevent the extension of an arms race in all its aspects into outer space. India added that for a ban on anti-satellite weapons to be com-

¹⁰ A/40/114-S/16921, annex. For the text of the Declaration, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 10: 1985, chapter II.

¹¹ A/41/697-S/18392, annex.

prehensive and effective, it should not only prohibit the testing, development and deployment of all such weapons, but also provide for their elimination. Specific protocols would be applicable to different categories of satellites.

Venezuela mentioned three possible alternative methods for achieving a complete ban on weapons in space: an amendment to article IV of the 1967 outer space Treaty consisting of the addition of the words "or any type of space weapon", an additional protocol to the Treaty, or the elaboration of a new, comprehensive treaty.

China stressed the importance of the peaceful use of outer space and opposed an arms race in that environment no matter who conducted it and what form it took. It stated that the United States and the Soviet Union, the only two countries that possessed space weapons and continued to develop them, bore special responsibility for the cessation of the arms race in outer space.

The *Ad Hoc* Committee worked under the chairmanship of Mr. Aldo Pugliese of Italy. Although an early decision had been taken to ensure that the Committee would start its work at the beginning of the annual session, substantive work could not begin immediately owing to lack of agreement on the programme of work. While members of the Western Group felt that the programme adopted the previous year was adequate for 1987, the group of 21 believed that the current session should take a step forward and called for the inclusion in the programme of a specific reference to measures.

After lengthy consultations, an agreement emerged by which the *Ad Hoc* Committee adopted the same programme as in 1986, covering three steps: examination and identification of issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, existing agreements, and existing proposals and future initiatives. At the time of the adoption of the programme of work, the Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee made a statement in which he recalled the statement made by the President of the Conference in connection with the re-establishment of the Committee (see above).

The *Ad Hoc* Committee held 18 meetings during the period from 13 March to 24 August. At their request, the Conference decided to invite the following non-member States to participate in the Committee's meetings: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and Zimbabwe.

The discussions revealed no significant change in positions held previously, although the issues relating to the item were considered in greater depth and detail. There was general recognition of the importance of the bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States. Western delegations recognized that there was a need for the Conference on Disarmament to play a role in the prevention of an arms race in outer space, but held that nothing should be done that would hinder the success of the bilateral negotiations. In their view, multilateral disarmament measures in the area could not be considered independently of developments at the bilateral level.

The group of 21 emphasized that ongoing bilateral negotiations in no way diminished the urgency of multilateral negotiations. They continued to believe that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral ne-

gotiating forum on disarmament, had the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects.

There was also general recognition in the *Ad Hoc* Committee that, as provided for in the 1967 outer space Treaty, activities in the exploration and use of outer space should be carried out in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations.

Members of the group of 21, socialist countries and China acknowledged the value of the restraints imposed by the existing legal régime, which placed some barriers on the arms race in outer space through limitations on certain weapons and military activities in that environment, but they reiterated that there were loopholes in some areas. They noted that the 1967 outer space Treaty, because of its limited scope, left open the possibility of introducing into that environment weapons that were not nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, in particular, anti-satellite weapons and space-based anti-ballistic missile systems. In their opinion, current developments in space science and technology, coupled with ongoing military space programmes, underscored the inadequacy of existing legal instruments to prevent effectively an arms race in outer space. Consequently, they stressed the urgent need to supplement and amplify the existing legal régime.

Western delegations stated that as long as the analysis of the existing legal instruments remained restricted to deploring deficiencies and no attempt was made to agree upon the real need for and an adequate approach to improving and completing a comprehensive legal régime, the work of the Committee would remain selective, deliberately incomplete and without substantial reward.

Socialist countries considered that the *Ad Hoc* Committee had accumulated a wealth of ideas and proposals and that a good basis had been established for concrete and goal-oriented work. While noting the continuing validity of their proposals for the conclusion of treaties in the area, they expressed readiness to consider partial measures leading to the prevention of the deployment of space weapons. They suggested that the first step could be the elaboration of an international agreement to ensure the immunity of artificial satellites not carrying weapons of any kind.

The importance of verification was generally recognized and was the subject of detailed discussions. Socialist countries elaborated on their proposals for the creation of a world space organization and an international inspectorate. They also held the view that it should be possible to ensure verification of compliance through a combination of national technical means and international procedures.

Western delegations maintained that verification issues required thorough examination, and they stressed the need for detailed information on national space programmes having military implications. They foresaw substantial technical, political and organizational difficulties associated with an international verification inspectorate, because virtually any space object was capable of serving as a weapon.

Non-aligned and socialist States, as well as China, supported the idea of establishing a group of experts to provide technical expertise and guidance in the field. It was believed that such a group could assist the *Ad Hoc* Committee in dealing with problems of definition. Western delegations believed that it would be useful to include experts in delegations. In their opinion, however, the Committee was not yet in a position to establish a group of experts with a specific mandate. They suggested that the Committee draw up an open-ended list of questions and, at an appropriate stage, identify those that needed further elaboration by experts under a clearly defined mandate.

Since there was general recognition of the importance of preventing an arms race in outer space and readiness to ensure that substantive work on the item would continue, in its report to the Conference on Disarmament, the *Ad Hoc* Committee recommended its re-establishment with an adequate mandate at the beginning of the Conference's 1988 session.¹²

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1987

The question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space continued to receive major attention at the forty-second session of the General Assembly. In the general debate in the First Committee,¹³ the question was addressed by many Member States.

The Soviet Union stated that the question of strategic arms reduction was closely linked to the problem of the non-deployment of weapons in outer space and observance of the 1972 anti-ballistic missile Treaty. Its position remained unchanged, i.e., the Treaty must be preserved in the form in which it had been signed and ratified. The Soviet Union had proposed that the two major Powers legally commit themselves to not exercise for 10 years the right of withdrawal from the Treaty and to comply strictly with it. It had also submitted a proposal for drawing up a list of specific devices to be banned from outer space. Such solutions would serve as a clear and reliable guarantee that, within the period when the two sides were carrying out reductions in their nuclear arsenals, neither one would have grounds for fearing that the other would try covertly to tilt the strategic balance in its favour and suddenly outdistance its rival. Unless there was agreement on strict compliance with the anti-ballistic missile Treaty, there could be no agreement on reductions in strategic offensive arms. The Soviet Union added that it was in favour of active talks at the Conference on Disarmament to solve the problem.

The United States declared that its first priority remained deep reductions in strategic offensive arms and recalled that the two sides had agreed to intensify efforts to address the problems standing in the way of 50- per cent reductions in those weapons. It regretted that the Soviet position continued to link strategic force reductions to restrictions on strategic defence that would

¹² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/42/27)*. The report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee is reproduced in *extenso* under paragraph 82.

¹³ *Ibid.*, *Forty-second Session, First Committee*, 3rd to 35th and 44th meetings; and *ibid.*, *Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

go beyond those contained in the 1972 anti-ballistic missile Treaty. The restrictions appeared to be designed to cripple the American Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), an outcome which the United States would not accept. It believed that SDI was a programme that held great promise for enhancing international security, ensuring strategic stability and, ultimately, moving away from the concept of mutual assured destruction. Strategic stability, the United States stressed, was a major objective, and it had also been the driving consideration behind its proposals for strategic arms reductions. The United States concluded that the time was ripe for moving ahead, both in reductions in strategic offensive arms and in defence and space.

France stated that it was committed to the goal of the anti-ballistic missile Treaty. In its view, the Treaty could be changed only through agreement between the parties. France hoped that its proposals regarding anti-satellite weapons and an international satellite monitoring agency would be looked into more thoroughly. Recent international developments had shown that the means necessary for such an agency to operate already existed in countries—other than the two major Powers—with a space capability. The United Kingdom believed that the prevention of an arms race in outer space could be achieved only through an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, as they, between them, possessed overwhelming military capability in space. It stressed that the Western aim was not superiority, but maintenance of a balance.

Denmark, speaking on behalf of the 12 member countries of the European Community, stated that they hoped that the two major Powers, in accordance with their declared commitment to prevent an arms race in space, would continue and intensify their search for agreements in that area. The Twelve also hoped that the *Ad Hoc* Committee on outer space would be able to make progress in its consideration of the subject, including the examination of the multilateral aspects of the question. The work of the Committee must be carried out on a realistic basis and must complement the results of the bilateral talks in Geneva.

Socialist States strongly supported the Soviet Union's proposal for the elaboration of an agreement stipulating strict observance of the anti-ballistic missile Treaty and, on that basis, the achievement of a 50-per cent reduction in the strategic offensive arms of the Soviet Union and the United States.

Czechoslovakia believed that the Conference on Disarmament should significantly step up its work on the item on outer space. The activities of the *Ad Hoc* Committee should not consist of repeated study of documents relating to outer space or of non-binding consideration of general approaches. In order to make substantive progress, the Committee should be given a clear-cut mandate to seek agreement on specific measures for the prevention of an arms race and the stationing of weapons in outer space. The German Democratic Republic hoped that the twentieth anniversary of the outer space Treaty in 1987 would prompt all States to do everything to ensure that space would remain free of weapons.

Poland was open to any constructive solution in the field, but would prefer comprehensive agreements. It was interested in widening the scope of

existing agreements, in particular the outer space Treaty. Romania supported the proposal for convening, under United Nations auspices, an international conference on the use of outer space for peaceful purposes.

Sweden stressed that an arms race in space might blow apart the existing arms limitation agreements. It was the responsibility of the United States and the Soviet Union to prevent that from occurring. The General Assembly should thus urge the two major Powers to reach an early agreement on concrete measures regarding space. The development of anti-satellite weapons was a potential threat to the vital interests of many States. Any measure restricting the possibility of carrying out anti-satellite missions in a reliable way would reduce crisis instability and thus benefit international security.

Argentina noted that there was no agreement on a multilateral legal framework for testing and deploying non-nuclear weapons or weapons other than those of mass destruction in outer space. It was concerned about suggestions that the legal framework of outer space should find inspiration in that of the law of the sea. Pointing out that the oceans were continuously being crossed by military fleets, Argentina stated that if a framework similar to that of the law of the sea were established in space, the United Nations would have failed in its goal of preventing an arms race in outer space.

Egypt urged the First Committee to make the following specific recommendations to give impetus to negotiations on the subject: (a) consideration of specific arrangements to alleviate aggravation of the issue and to prevent the extension of the arms race into outer space; (b) strengthening of the legal system relating to outer space; and (c) creation of a favourable international climate through agreement on confidence-building measures.

Indonesia held that the anti-ballistic missile Treaty should be reinforced in the light of recent technological advances. The goal of a comprehensive ban on space weapons and the promotion of outer space activities exclusively for peaceful purposes called for a substantive examination of issues, leading to effective and practical negotiations and agreements.

China stated that the arms race in outer space, if not halted in time, would inevitably trigger a spiralling escalation of offensive nuclear weapons and defensive weapons systems, thus making the process of nuclear disarmament more difficult and further destabilizing the international situation. Halting the arms race in outer space had therefore become an imperative task.

Four draft resolutions entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space" were considered by the First Committee. However, as in previous years, action was taken on only one of them.

On 22 October, Belgium, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom submitted a draft resolution by which the General Assembly would note that the work accomplished in 1987 by the *Ad Hoc* Committee on outer space of the Conference on Disarmament had contributed to a better understanding of a number of problems and to a clearer perception of the positions of various groups of States; consider that the examination and identification of issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space needed to be advanced and further developed, with a view to reaching a level of agree-

ment which would permit joint definition of the scope and specific objectives of the multilateral efforts in the field; recommend that the Conference on Disarmament, at its 1988 session, re-establish its *Ad Hoc* Committee with an adequate mandate; and stress the need to prevent the erosion of the relevant treaties in force.

In introducing the draft on 6 November, France stated that the text represented a pragmatic and concrete idea for preventing an arms race in outer space. It took into account the whole context of efforts made in the field, including the existing legal régime, civilian and military activities in outer space and their possible impact on international security and economic and social development. The draft was intended to strengthen multilateral efforts and put them on a solid footing.

In commenting on the draft, the Soviet Union stated that it would tend to consolidate a situation in the Conference on Disarmament in which the question of outer space would not move to the stage of negotiations. There was now a need to change the *Ad Hoc* Committee's mandate so that it would be able to proceed to negotiations.

On 23 October, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, the Ukrainian SSR and the USSR submitted a draft resolution, by which the General Assembly would emphasize that concrete measures with appropriate and effective provisions for verification to prevent an arms race in outer space should be adopted; call upon all States, especially those with major space capabilities, to comply strictly with existing legal restrictions, both bilateral and multilateral, in the first instance the 1972 anti-ballistic missile Treaty; emphasize the urgent need for the prohibition, halting of the development, and destruction of anti-satellite weapons, and for the prohibition of the deployment of weapons in outer space; call upon all States engaged in space activities to facilitate the development and strengthening of an international inspection system for the maintenance of peace in outer space, whose functions would include the inspection of every launch of space objects, and to transmit to representatives of the inspectorate in good time the necessary information about such launches, including their location, type of launch vehicle, general information about the object launched and relevant dates; reiterate that the Conference on Disarmament had the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects; and request the Conference to re-establish an *ad hoc* committee at the beginning of its 1988 session in order to initiate without delay negotiations for the conclusion of such an agreement or agreements.

The draft was never formally introduced in the First Committee, but the Soviet Union noted in a comment that it was oriented towards an immediate start of active negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament.

On 26 October, China submitted a draft resolution, by which the General Assembly would call upon all States, especially those with major outer space capabilities, to contribute actively to the realization of the objective of the peaceful use of outer space and to adopt effective measures to prevent an

arms race in outer space; request the Conference on Disarmament to speed up the consideration of the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects as a matter of priority and urgency, taking into account all relevant draft resolutions and proposals; request the Conference to re-establish an *ad hoc* committee on outer space with an adequate mandate at the outset of its 1988 session, with a view to initiating negotiations for concluding an international agreement or agreements on the prohibition and destruction of all outer space weapons systems and on the prohibition of the use of force or hostile actions in, to or from outer space; and urge the Soviet Union and the United States to refrain from developing, testing and deploying outer space weapons, to conduct serious bilateral negotiations on the prevention of an arms race in outer space and to keep the Conference on Disarmament properly informed of their progress.

On 27 October, Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Cameroon, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Romania, Sri Lanka, the Sudan, Sweden, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zimbabwe submitted a draft resolution, which was subsequently revised and also sponsored by Ireland. The revisions affected both the preambular and the operative parts. Both drafts were introduced by Egypt, the first on 29 October and the revised text on 16 November. On the first occasion, Egypt stressed that the draft resolution was based to a great extent on resolution 41/53 of 1986, and that it should be viewed as a compromise text that, in large measure, had already been endorsed by the First Committee. In introducing the revised draft, Egypt emphasized that the sponsors had taken into account all the constructive comments and suggestions made by other groups or delegations. It also noted that the revised draft resolution was almost identical to resolution 41/53.

Intensive consultations among the sponsors of the four drafts and other interested delegations were held with a view to reaching agreement on a single text. That objective was reached and, as a result, the first three draft resolutions were withdrawn by their sponsors.¹⁴ China indicated that it appreciated the efforts of the non-aligned countries to arrive at a text that would receive the widest possible support.

On 16 November the First Committee voted on the draft resolution introduced by Egypt. In a separate recorded vote, operative paragraph 9 (see below) was approved by a recorded vote of 116 to 1 (United States), with 10 abstentions (Western and associated countries). The draft resolution as a whole was then approved by a recorded vote of 127 to 1 (United States), with no abstentions.

In connection with the vote, Poland recalled its 1985 proposal for a study, to be prepared under the auspices of the Secretary-General, of the diverse consequences of the militarization of outer space. It was pleased to note that operative paragraph 12 of the draft took note of the fact that a study on

¹⁴ See A/42/745, paras. 5 and 6 (Western draft), paras. 7 and 8 (socialist draft), and paras. 9 and 10 (Chinese draft).

disarmament problems relating to outer space had been prepared by UNIDIR.¹⁵

On 30 November¹⁶ the General Assembly took a separate vote on paragraph 9, which was adopted by a recorded vote of 141 to 1, with 11 abstentions. It then adopted the draft resolution as a whole by a recorded vote of 154 to 1, as resolution 42/33. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Inspired by the great prospects opening up before mankind as a result of man's entry into outer space,

Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,

Reaffirming that the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind,

Reaffirming further the will of all States that the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be for peaceful purposes,

Recalling that the States parties to the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, have undertaken, in article III, to carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law and the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding,

Reaffirming, in particular, article IV of the above-mentioned Treaty, which stipulates that States parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner,

Reaffirming also paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, in which it is stated that, in order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty,

Recalling its resolutions 36/97 C and 36/99 of 9 December 1981, as well as resolutions 37/83 of 9 December 1982, 37/99 D of 13 December 1982, 38/70 of 15 December 1983, 39/59 of 12 December 1984, 40/87 of 12 December 1985, and 41/53 of 3 December 1986 and the relevant paragraphs of the Political Declaration adopted by the Eighth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Harare from 1 to 6 September 1986,

Gravely concerned at the danger posed to all mankind by an arms race in outer space and, in particular, by the impending threat of the exacerbation of the current state of insecurity by developments that could further undermine international peace and security and retard the pursuit of general and complete disarmament,

Mindful of the widespread interest expressed by Member States in the course of the negotiations on and following the adoption of the above-mentioned Treaty in ensuring that the exploration and use of outer space should be for peaceful purposes, and taking note of proposals submitted to the General Assembly at its tenth special session and at its regular sessions and to the Conference on Disarmament,

Noting the grave concern expressed by the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space at the extension of an arms race into outer space and the recommendations made to the competent organs of the United Nations, in particular the General Assembly, and also to the Committee on Disarmament,

¹⁵ *Disarmament: Problems related to Outer Space* (United Nations publication, Sales No. G.V.E.87.O.7). For a brief account of the study, see chapter XXI, annex, of this volume.

¹⁶ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Plenary Meetings, 84th meeting.*

Convinced that further measures are needed for the prevention of an arms race in outer space,

Recognizing that, in the context of multilateral negotiations for preventing an arms race in outer space, bilateral negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America could make a significant contribution to such an objective, in accordance with paragraph 27 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session,

Noting with satisfaction that bilateral negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America have continued since 1985 on a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms, both strategic and intermediate-range, and in their relationship, with the declared objective, endorsed in the joint statement of their leaders on 21 November 1985, of working out effective agreements aimed, *inter alia*, at preventing an arms race in outer space,

Anxious that concrete results should emerge from these negotiations as soon as possible,

Taking note of that part of the report of the Conference on Disarmament relating to this question,

Welcoming the re-establishment of an *Ad Hoc* Committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space during the 1987 session of the Conference on Disarmament, in the exercise of the negotiating responsibilities of this sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, to continue to examine and to identify through substantive and general consideration issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space,

Noting that the work accomplished in 1987 by the *Ad Hoc* Committee of the Conference on Disarmament has contributed to a fuller identification of issues and a better understanding of a number of problems and to a clearer perception of the various positions,

1. *Recalls* the obligation of all States to refrain from the threat or use of force in their space activities;

2. *Reaffirms* that general and complete disarmament under effective international control warrants that outer space shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and that it shall not become an arena for an arms race;

3. *Emphasizes* that further measures with appropriate and effective provisions for verification to prevent an arms race in outer space should be adopted by the international community;

4. *Calls upon* all States, in particular those with major space capabilities, to contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space and to take immediate measures to prevent an arms race in outer space in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding;

5. *Recognizes*, as stated in the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee of the Conference on Disarmament, that the legal régime applicable to outer space, as such, is not sufficient to guarantee the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the significant role that régime plays in the prevention of an arms race in that environment, the need to consolidate and reinforce that régime and to enhance its effectiveness, and the importance of strict compliance with existing agreements, both bilateral and multilateral;

6. *Reiterates* that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, has the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects;

7. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to consider as a matter of priority the question of preventing an arms race in outer space;

8. *Also requests* the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its consideration of the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects, taking into account all relevant proposals, including those presented in the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space at the 1987 session of the Conference and at the forty-second session of the General Assembly;

9. *Further requests* the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish an *ad hoc* committee with an adequate mandate at the beginning of its 1988 session, with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects;

10. *Urges* the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to pursue intensively their bilateral negotiations in a constructive spirit aimed at reaching early agreement for preventing an arms race in outer space, and to advise the Conference on Disarmament periodically of the progress of their bilateral sessions so as to facilitate its work;

11. *Calls upon* all States, especially those with major space capabilities, to refrain, in their activities relating to outer space, from actions contrary to the observance of the relevant existing treaties or to the objective of preventing an arms race in outer space;

12. *Takes note* that the study on disarmament problems relating to outer space and the consequence of extending the arms race into outer space, called for in resolution 41/53, has been prepared by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and that, after a final meeting of the group of experts held in September 1987, the report was finalized and being prepared for publication in autumn 1987;

13. *Requests* the Secretary-General to invite the views of Member States on all aspects of the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space and to submit a report to the General Assembly at its forty-third session;

14. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to report on its consideration of this subject to the General Assembly at its forty-third session;

15. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Conference on Disarmament all documents relating to the consideration of this subject by the General Assembly at its forty-second session;

16. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space"

Conclusion

In 1987 the prevention of an arms race in outer space continued to receive major attention both within and outside the United Nations. In all forums dealing with the question, whether bilateral or multilateral, concern continued to be expressed at the grave dangers that an arms race in outer space would pose for all mankind. However, there was no breakthrough during the year in efforts to ensure the use of outer space for peaceful purposes alone.

The relevant *Ad Hoc* Committee of the Conference on Disarmament was re-established in 1987 and its consideration of legal and technical matters promoted a better understanding of the issues involved. At the forty-second session of the General Assembly, a single resolution, 42/33, was adopted, by which the Assembly urged the Soviet Union and the United States to pursue intensively their bilateral negotiations and requested the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish its *Ad Hoc* Committee with an adequate mandate at the beginning of its 1988 session, with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects.

New weapons of mass destruction: radiological weapons

Introduction

THE POSSIBILITY OF THE EMERGENCE OF NEW WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION was taken into account by the Commission for Conventional Armaments in 1948, when it defined such weapons “to include atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above”.¹ At that time, “radioactive material weapons”, now known as radiological weapons (devices containing radioactive substances, which are dispersed by conventional explosives), did not exist, and they are still not known to be produced.

The matter was first raised in the General Assembly by Malta in 1969. The Assembly invited the multilateral negotiating body in Geneva—at that time the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament—to consider certain implications of radiological warfare as well as the possible military application of laser technology. At the time, however, the Conference found it difficult to see the practical usefulness of discussing measures related to radiological warfare.²

In 1975, the Soviet Union proposed that an item entitled “Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons” be included in the General Assembly’s agenda, and submitted a draft international agreement on the subject.³ As a result, the Assembly requested the Geneva body to proceed to work on an agreement. In 1977 the Soviet Union submitted a revised draft agreement,⁴ suggesting that, parallel to a general agreement, a special agreement could be concluded on each particular type of weapon. A list of types and systems of weapons to be prohibited would be annexed to the agreement and could be expanded as new developments occurred. In the view of most Western States, however, new scientific developments should be dealt with individually as they arose and appeared to have a weapons potential. They

¹ See *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1), chap. 2.

² See *The Yearbook*, vol. 1: 1976, chap. XV.

³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirtieth Session, Annexes*, agenda items 31, 34-38, 120, 122 and 126, document A/10243.

⁴ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-second Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/32/27)*, document CCD/511/Rev.1. See also *The Yearbook*, vol. 2: 1977, appendix X.

felt that some potential new weapons of mass destruction which had been envisaged fell within categories that had already been identified and should be covered in that context. These two basic positions—the Eastern European approach and the Western approach—were incorporated into the 1978 Final Document.⁵

In the multilateral negotiating body in Geneva, the positions of members have remained largely unchanged since 1978. Socialist member States have advocated the establishment of an *ad hoc* group of governmental experts to consider the question⁶ and have submitted a draft convention on the prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon⁷ and papers on infrasound weapons⁸ and potential types of weapons of mass destruction.⁹ In 1985, the Soviet Union put forward a proposal aimed at negotiations on the prohibition of any new kind of weapon of mass destruction immediately after it was identified and the simultaneous introduction of a moratorium on its development.

Each year the General Assembly has adopted a resolution on the subject. In 1985 and 1986, it called upon the Conference on Disarmament to keep constantly under review the question of the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, and urged States to commence negotiations on the prohibition of any new type of weapon immediately after its identification and to introduce a moratorium on its development. The Western States have not supported those resolutions on the grounds that there are no indications that new types of weapons of mass destruction are imminent and that there is no need for the Conference to keep the matter under constant review. They do, however, favour the holding of periodic informal meetings in the Conference on Disarmament to enable that body to follow the subject adequately.

The question of radiological weapons was revived as a separate topic in 1976. Concerned about the rapid accumulation of nuclear materials as a by-product of reactor operations, the United States suggested that the General Assembly consider reaching an agreement that would prevent the use of such materials. Since then, the issue has been under consideration in the Geneva body. In 1977 the United States and the Soviet Union began bilateral negotiations on the subject. The 1978 Final Document affirms that “a convention should be concluded prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons”.¹⁰

In 1979, the two major Powers submitted a joint proposal on major elements of such a convention¹¹ to the multilateral negotiating body in Geneva.

⁵ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, para. 77.

⁶ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/33/27)*, document CCD/564.

⁷ *Ibid.*, document CCD/559. See also *The Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, chap. X and appendix VIII.

⁸ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/33/27)*, document CCD/575.

⁹ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/34/27 and Corr.1)*, appendix III (CD/53 and Corr.1), document CD/35.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, *Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, para. 76.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/34/27 and Corr.1)*, appendix III (CD/53 and Corr.1), documents CD/31 and CD/32.

Later that year, the General Assembly decided by consensus, on a joint initiative of the two countries, to call on the Geneva body to expedite a negotiated agreement on the text of a convention and to report the results to the General Assembly at its next session. In 1980, in order to finalize a draft treaty, the negotiating body established an *ad hoc* working group on radiological weapons, which has been re-established each year since then.

In 1981 Sweden introduced a new element into the discussion by proposing that any convention banning radiological weapons should also prohibit military attacks on civilian nuclear facilities, since the resulting dissemination of radioactive substances could cause mass destruction. While members of the group of 21 widely supported that proposal, members of other political groups objected to such a linkage on the grounds that it would both broaden the scope of the envisaged convention beyond the original mandate and introduce new implications to be addressed, thus prolonging and complicating the negotiating process.

Finding an acceptable way to cover both a ban on radiological weapons in the traditional sense and the prohibition of attacks against civilian nuclear facilities has since been the main problem in efforts to negotiate a radiological weapons convention. In addition to the absence of consensus on the proposed linkage, the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Radiological Weapons has faced difficulties on such issues as defining the appropriate criteria for determining the scope of a prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities; defining radiological weapons; formulating treaty provisions on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and verification and compliance. Many delegations hold that Sweden's proposal for parts of a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons and the release or dissemination of radioactive material for hostile purposes¹² provides the best negotiating framework to address all outstanding problems. Others continue to maintain that proposals aimed at resolving the question of prohibiting attacks in the context of prohibiting radiological weapons can only bring about a stalemate in both areas.

In 1986 the General Assembly adopted by consensus resolution 41/59 A—by which it requested, as in previous years, the Conference on Disarmament to continue its negotiations on the prohibition of radiological weapons, with a view to a prompt conclusion of its work—and by a vote, resolution 41/59 I—by which it requested the Conference to reach, as early as possible, an agreement prohibiting military attacks against nuclear facilities.

Consideration by the Conference on Disarmament, 1987

During the 1987 session of the Conference on Disarmament, the item entitled “New weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons” was considered in plenary meetings during the periods from 13 to 17 April and from 27 to 31 July.¹³ The Conference also held a

¹² *Ibid.*, *Thirty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/39/27)*, appendix II (CD/540), document CD/530. See also *The Yearbook*, vol. 9: 1984, chap. XVI.

¹³ CD/787, appendix II, vols. I-IV.

number of informal consultations on the issue, in the course of which proposals were made regarding the implementation of General Assembly resolution 41/56 of 1986. By it, the Assembly had requested the Conference, *inter alia*, to keep constantly under review, with the assistance of a periodically convened group of experts, the question of new weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons with a view to making, when necessary, recommendations on undertaking specific negotiations on the identified types of such weapons. No consensus, however, could be reached on those proposals.

In their plenary statements, delegations mostly concentrated on the second part of the item, dealing with the question of radiological weapons in all its aspects.

Sweden recalled that the previous session of the Conference had taken place in the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident and drew attention to the dangers connected with all nuclear activities, civilian or military, and the geographical dimensions of the risks involved. In referring to resolutions adopted by the IAEA General Conference in 1986 that called on competent forums to deal with the prohibition of military attacks against nuclear installations, Sweden expressed regret that some countries had proposed that a convention on that matter be elaborated outside the Conference on Disarmament. In its view, the issue had relevance for disarmament efforts, given the mass destruction that such attacks would cause. Sweden urged delegations to address the outstanding substantive issues in the Conference—a task for which the draft parts of a treaty that it had submitted in 1984 could serve as a basis—instead of recommending that the item be moved from one international body to another.

In Egypt's view, the reason for the wide attention attached to the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities within the framework of the item on radiological weapons was the desire of many States to build nuclear reactors to benefit from peaceful nuclear technology, while, at the same time, avoiding becoming hostages to the dangers of nuclear radiation resulting from an attack on their facilities. Egypt was accordingly concerned about the doubts expressed regarding the competence of the Conference to consider the issue. Egypt stressed that the importance that it attached to the prohibition of attacks should not be interpreted as an attempt to diminish the significance of the prohibition of radiological weapons; the two issues, in its opinion, should be considered simultaneously.

The Federal Republic of Germany felt that after the re-establishment of a subsidiary body on the item, informal consultations would be needed to determine how best to proceed. If the forced merger of the two issues rendered the Conference unable to address those aspects of the problem which might otherwise be solvable, then the Conference should find another approach. Public opinion expected action by the Conference on the issue, the Federal Republic stressed.

The Netherlands recalled that from the very beginning it had supported the Swedish proposal to broaden the scope of the draft treaty on radiological weapons by including the issue of attacks on nuclear facilities, and it regretted that some delegations had not favoured that approach. Since the matter was

controversial, it believed that the Conference ought to discuss the possibility of a compromise, by which it would concentrate on an agreement to ban radiological weapons, while at the same time arriving at an explicit understanding that the issue of attacks would be the subject of further negotiations. Those negotiations should be held in the Conference, the Netherlands maintained, since it was the body competent to deal with attacks on installations for peaceful uses and on those for military purposes. It further believed that differences over the issue of the competence of the Conference on Disarmament, as well as over the urgency of the issue of attacks, could be addressed in such a way as not to affect the vital security or other interests of States.

According to the Soviet Union, agreement on a radiological weapons ban was being hampered by the fact that some States linked it to the prevention of attacks on nuclear facilities, while others, which were willing to agree on a radiological weapons ban, refrained from working towards obligations to prevent the deliberate destruction of facilities intended for peaceful uses. The Chernobyl tragedy, the Soviet Union stressed, clearly demonstrated that to plan the destruction of nuclear facilities would mean to plan a catastrophe tantamount in its consequences to a massive use of nuclear weapons. Therefore, it believed it was necessary to start without further delay the elaboration of an international agreement under which States would undertake not to attack peaceful nuclear facilities. A system of international legal protection would cover, in the first instance, those nuclear facilities that were under IAEA safeguards, but the Soviet Union would not object if such protection was also accorded to unsafeguarded facilities, provided they were used for peaceful purposes. It further believed that both questions—a ban on radiological weapons and the prevention of attacks on nuclear facilities—could be solved separately, although it remained flexible and was ready to explore other alternatives. What was important was the result, not the form.

Argentina felt that the Conference should start drafting an agreement that would prohibit military attacks against any nuclear facility, the destruction of which could lead to the dissemination of radioactive material. It believed that the aim of giving wide and non-discriminatory immunity to nuclear installations in case of armed conflict had won broad support from the public everywhere and from many Governments.

Pakistan felt that as attacks on nuclear facilities were the only realistic means of conducting radiological warfare, that issue should be tackled in a convention on radiological weapons or in parallel with it, and must, in fact, receive priority attention. The aim of such an agreement, in its view, should be to strengthen States' confidence in their peaceful nuclear programmes, especially in the case of developing countries. Such confidence, Pakistan stated, had been seriously eroded after the 1981 Israeli attack on an Iraqi nuclear reactor. The agreement should be comprehensive and cover all nuclear facilities, as leaving out some facilities or some stages of the nuclear fuel cycle could be interpreted as legitimizing attacks on certain facilities. Accordingly, Pakistan was opposed to the idea of establishing thresholds of any kind and did not regard mass destruction as an appropriate criterion to guide work in the area.

In summarizing the debate on the item during the first part of the session, the United Kingdom expressed pleasure that its view that it was preferable to work separately on additional protection for peaceful nuclear facilities and on radiological weapons in a classical sense seemed to be generally accepted in the Conference. It warned, however, that that course would not in itself solve the outstanding problems of either issue, particularly the complex questions involved in peaceful nuclear facilities.

On 10 February the Conference re-established the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Radiological Weapons with a view to reaching agreement on a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of such weapons. Under the chairmanship of Mr. Dávid Meiszter of Hungary, the *Ad Hoc* Committee held seven meetings from 3 April to 10 August. In addition, the Chairman held a number of informal consultations with delegations. At their request, the representatives of the following States not members of the Conference on Disarmament participated in the work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee: Austria, Finland, Greece, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Senegal, Spain, Turkey and Zimbabwe.

In accordance with the recommendation contained in the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Radiological Weapons in 1986,¹⁴ the *Ad Hoc* Committee devoted five meetings to the consideration of ways and means of how best to proceed. On 19 June, following that exchange of views, it decided to establish two contact groups: Contact Group A, to consider the prohibition of radiological weapons in the traditional sense, and Contact Group B, to consider the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities. It was further decided that each Contact Group would be chaired by a co-ordinator, that the two Contact Groups would meet simultaneously and that the *Ad Hoc* Committee would periodically review their progress. Mr. Sadaaki Numata of Japan and Mr. Hadi Wayarabi of Indonesia agreed to assist the Chairman by serving as Co-ordinators of Contact Groups A and B, respectively. On the basis of the intensive work conducted within the Groups, the two Co-ordinators presented to the *Ad Hoc* Committee on 10 August their reports, reproduced as annexes I and II to the report of the Committee,¹⁵ reflecting the current state of consideration of the issues before it.

On 25 August the Conference adopted the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, which is an integral part of the 1987 report of the Conference to the General Assembly. The *Ad Hoc* Committee concluded in its report that its work in 1987 had made a further contribution to the clarification and better understanding of the different approaches to the two subjects under consideration. The Committee further recommended that it be re-established by the Conference on Disarmament at the beginning of the Conference's 1988 session and that the annexes to its report serve as a basis for future work.

In introducing the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, the Chairman stressed

¹⁴ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/41/27)*, para. 102.

¹⁵ See *ibid.*, *Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/42/27)*. The report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, including its two annexes, is reproduced *in extenso* under paragraph 88.

that although the new procedure of dealing separately with the two aspects of the question had not done away with substantive differences, it had nevertheless proved to be a step in the right direction, would facilitate future work and would be useful in the preparations for the 1988 session of the Conference. The reports prepared by the Contact Groups, in his view, represented a valuable asset for the future work and would, he hoped, create a momentum for progress in the consideration of the two issues before the *Ad Hoc* Committee.

Late in the session, several delegations commented on the work of the Committee during the year. The United States welcomed the return to separate handling of the traditional question of radiological weapons and the question of protection against military attacks on nuclear facilities. It held, however, that the differences of view regarding the latter aspect might actually have increased since 1986. Taking the opposite view, Egypt maintained that the negotiations in the *Ad Hoc* Committee had made it clear that the Conference must examine and reach agreement on the two questions together, irrespective of whether they were considered on the basis of a unitary or dual approach.

Sweden and Pakistan reaffirmed their positions with regard to the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities, with Sweden, on the one hand, insisting on the criterion of mass destruction as a basis for future work, saying that the purpose of the treaty was to prohibit radiologically-caused mass destruction, and Pakistan, on the other, stressing the need to safeguard the peaceful development of nuclear energy. Speaking on behalf of the group of socialist States, Bulgaria expressed the conviction that negotiations on the prohibition of radiological weapons and attacks on nuclear facilities could fairly quickly lead to practical results, provided a constructive approach was shown by all parties to the negotiations. The socialist countries continued to consider that the Conference's inability for many years to complete the preparation of a convention to ban radiological weapons, a task set down in the 1978 Final Document, was significantly detracting from its authority.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1987

The question of new weapons of mass destruction and radiological weapons was mentioned by several States in the general debate¹⁶ in the First Committee during the forty-second session of the General Assembly. Pursuant to resolution 41/59 I of 1986, the Secretary-General submitted a report on the progress made on the question of a prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons, in which he referred members of the General Assembly to the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Radiological Weapons of the Conference on Disarmament.¹⁷

The Byelorussian SSR felt that current scientific and technical progress could lead to new discoveries that might present unprecedented dangers to

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, *Forty-second Session, First Committee*, 3rd to 31st and 40th and 42nd meetings; and *ibid.*, *Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

¹⁷ See footnote 15. (The report of the Secretary-General was circulated as a General Assembly document (A/42/517).)

the survival of mankind. It mentioned the following potential problems: destabilization of the military strategic situation, a lowering of the threshold of global military conflict, difficulties in the verification of disarmament, and an increase in the gap between the development of military technology, on the one hand, and international efforts to eliminate armaments, on the other. Accordingly, conclusion of a ban on the development and production of new systems of weapons of mass destruction was taking on special relevance. The Byelorussian SSR believed that military uses of advances in science and technology should be carefully considered at the General Assembly's third special session devoted to disarmament. It was convinced that prevention was the most effective and practical approach to a prohibition, and that work to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction had to be serious and specific in order to make progress. The international community should constantly monitor the situation so that the question of initiating negotiations on banning certain weapons could be raised in good time. The Conference on Disarmament could carry out such monitoring with appropriate assistance from experts. When necessary, it could make recommendations for specific negotiations on new types of weapons of mass destruction that had been identified. The Byelorussian SSR also called upon all States to renounce the practical development of new types of weapons, to begin negotiations to prohibit their development and to refrain from any actions that could lead to the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction.

Czechoslovakia expressed similar views. It believed that the work of the Conference on Disarmament would be promoted by the achievement of a joint position with regard to the definition of such weapons and by the elaboration of appropriate recommendations. It also advocated a ban on the production of non-nuclear weapons based on new principles of physics. It further noted that the topicality of a radiological weapons ban and the inadmissibility of armed attacks against nuclear power facilities had become even more evident. The situation, in its opinion, should encourage the acceleration of relevant negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament and lead to a *rapprochement* of views.

Bangladesh believed that it was possible to increase the destructive capabilities of most conventional weapons. Reason, however, dictated that scientific and technological achievements must be used for peaceful purposes. It stressed the horrendous potential of various types of weapons: radiological, particle-beam, infrasonic radiation and electromagnetic, and called for their prohibition.

Iraq pointed out that armed attacks against nuclear installations should be looked at from various perspectives. It stressed that the radiological consequences of destroying a nuclear installation would be similar to those created by radiological weapons. In its view, a ban on the production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons would have to be carried out together with measures to prohibit armed attacks against nuclear installations. Conclusion of a binding convention prohibiting such attacks would require technical studies in addition to definitions of the technical and political framework for the convention; Iraq believed that IAEA was the competent body, both tech-

nically and scientifically, to provide those studies. It called on IAEA to cooperate with the Conference on Disarmament in accelerating negotiations on the issue.

In the First Committee, three draft resolutions were submitted: one on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons and two on the specific subject of radiological weapons. The General Assembly took action on all three resolutions on 30 November.¹⁸

On 27 October, Afghanistan, Angola, Benin, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Mozambique, Poland, Romania, the Ukrainian SSR, the USSR and Viet Nam submitted a draft resolution entitled "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons". The draft was later also sponsored by Burkina Faso and the Syrian Arab Republic. It was introduced on 10 November by the Byelorussian SSR, which reiterated that the emergence of such types of weapons would sharply destabilize the strategic situation and lower the threshold at which war involving weapons of mass destruction might break out. By the draft, the Assembly would request the Conference on Disarmament to keep developments in the area constantly under review with the aim of making, when necessary, recommendations to undertake specific negotiations on the identified types of such weapons. The Byelorussian SSR stated that the sponsors had submitted draft resolutions on the subject for a number of years. The draft before the Committee was a compromise text, in which substantial changes had been incorporated in order to meet the concerns raised by other delegations, in particular, Western ones.

On 11 November the First Committee approved the draft by a recorded vote of 106 to 1 (United States), with 18 abstentions (mostly Western States). At the time that action was taken, three States which abstained in the vote explained their positions.

Australia pointed out that though reference was made in the draft to the relevant item on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, the only weapons specifically mentioned under that item were radiological weapons. Australia therefore considered that the draft was superfluous and diverted attention from higher priority tasks. The Netherlands maintained that negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on multilateral agreements dealing with weapons of mass destruction would be feasible only if they concerned well-defined and well-identified weapons. In its opinion, only if the feasibility of manufacturing weapons based on new scientific principles had been clearly established would it be possible to enter into negotiations aimed at an adequately verifiable prohibition of such weapons. The United Kingdom noted that changes had been incorporated into the text to make it less objectionable. It remained, however, convinced that there were no indications that new types

¹⁸ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Plenary Meetings, 84th meeting.*

of weapons were imminent. It believed that the subject should be kept under periodic review, not constant review, as envisaged in the draft.

On 30 November the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 135 to 1, with 18 abstentions, as resolution 42/35. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its previous resolutions on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons,

Recalling also the decision contained in paragraph 77 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, to the effect that, in order to help prevent a qualitative arms race and so that scientific and technological achievements might ultimately be used solely for peaceful purposes, effective measures should be taken to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and achievements and that efforts aimed at the prohibition of such new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction should be appropriately pursued,

Noting that in the course of its 1987 session the Conference on Disarmament considered the item entitled "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons",

Taking into consideration the section of the report of the Conference on Disarmament relating to this question,

Convinced that all ways and means should be utilized to prevent the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons,

Determined to prevent modern science and technology from leading to the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction that have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of weapons of mass destruction identified in the definition of weapons of mass destruction adopted by the United Nations in 1948,

1. *Reaffirms* on the basis of the common desire of the international community the necessity of prohibiting the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons;

2. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament, in the light of its existing priorities, to keep constantly under review, with appropriate expert assistance, the question of the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons with a view to making, when necessary, recommendations on undertaking specific negotiations on the identified types of such weapons;

3. *Calls upon* all States, immediately following the identification of any new type of weapon of mass destruction, to renounce practical development of such a weapon and to commence negotiations on its prohibition;

4. *Once again urges* all States to refrain from any action that could lead to the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons;

5. *Calls again upon* all States to undertake efforts to ensure that ultimately scientific and technological achievements may be used solely for peaceful purposes;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Conference on Disarmament all documents relating to the consideration of this item by the General Assembly at its forty-second session;

7. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to submit to the General Assembly for consideration at its forty-third session a report on the results achieved;

8. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament"

On 20 October, Hungary, Indonesia, Japan and Sweden submitted a draft resolution entitled "Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling

and use of radiological weapons”, which was later also sponsored by Australia. In introducing it on 28 October, Hungary noted that by the text the General Assembly would request the Conference on Disarmament to continue its negotiations on radiological weapons with a view to prompt conclusion of its work and to re-establish the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the subject at the beginning of 1988. Hungary pointed out that in 1987 it had been possible to identify elements for the two envisaged conventions and to draft treaty elements and, where necessary, alternatives to them. Hungary believed that the results achieved in 1987 laid a sound basis for an approach in 1988.

On 9 November the First Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote. On 30 November the General Assembly adopted it, also without a vote, as resolution 42/38 B. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 41/59 A of 3 December 1986,

1. *Takes note* of the part of the report of the Conference on Disarmament on its 1987 session that deals with the question of radiological weapons, in particular the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Radiological Weapons;

2. *Recognizes* that the *Ad Hoc* Committee in 1987 made a further contribution to the clarification and better understanding of different approaches that continue to exist with regard to both of the important subjects under consideration;

3. *Takes note* of the recommendation of the Conference on Disarmament that the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Radiological Weapons should be re-established at the beginning of its 1988 session;

4. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to continue its negotiations on the subject with a view to a prompt conclusion of its work, taking into account all proposals presented to the Conference to this end and drawing upon the annexes to its report as a basis of its future work, the result of which should be submitted to the General Assembly at its forty-third session;

5. *Also requests* that the Secretary-General transmit to the Conference on Disarmament all relevant documents relating to the discussion of all aspects of the issue by the General Assembly at its forty-second session;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled “Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons”

On 26 October, Iraq submitted a draft resolution entitled “Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons”, which it introduced on 2 November. In its introduction, it emphasized that a military attack on nuclear facilities would release radioactive material into the environment, causing radioactive contamination not only in the immediate area of the attack, but in adjacent regions. Iraq believed that the role of IAEA and the Conference on Disarmament in upholding the principles of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was important. It stated that the Israeli attack against its safeguarded nuclear facilities in 1981 constituted an unprecedented danger to international peace and security. By the draft, the Assembly would request the Conference on Disarmament to reach an agreement on the prohibition of armed attacks against nuclear facilities that would ensure the inviolability of peaceful nuclear installations and the safe use of nuclear power.

On 11 November the First Committee took action on the draft, which was approved by a recorded vote of 92 to 2 (Israel and United States), with 27 abstentions. At the time of the vote, six States gave explanations of their positions.

The Islamic Republic of Iran, Jordan, Peru and Sweden explained their positive votes on the draft. Iran drew particular attention to the fifth preambular paragraph, regarding the harmful effects of attacks on nuclear facilities, and stressed that its nuclear facilities in the south had been subjected to aerial attacks. It hoped that the general wish expressed in the draft would be respected by all Member States. Jordan declared that attacks against peaceful nuclear facilities constituted an unprecedented threat to international peace and security. In referring to operative paragraph 2, Peru stated that because of their possible repercussions on civilian populations, attacks on nuclear facilities should be examined in relevant forums from the humanitarian point of view as well. Sweden considered the issue an important one, but was critical of several elements contained in the draft and felt that there was still room for improving it.

Venezuela, which abstained, recognized the danger of a military attack on a nuclear facility, but considered it excessive to assert that such an attack would, in all cases, be tantamount to the use of radiological weapons. It considered that the question of an agreement on the prohibition of such attacks should be examined in a diplomatic conference, not in the Conference on Disarmament.

Israel explained that it voted against the draft because of its unjustified reference to Israel in the penultimate preambular paragraph (see below). Israel stressed, however, that its vote did not indicate a change in its long-held view that all States must refrain from attacking or threatening to attack nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes.

On 30 November the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 119 to 2, with 32 abstentions, as resolution 42/38 F. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 37/99 C of 13 December 1982, 38/188 D of 20 December 1983, 39/151 J of 17 December 1984, 40/94 D of 12 December 1985 and 41/59 A and I of 3 December 1986 on, *inter alia*, the conclusion of an agreement prohibiting military attacks against nuclear facilities,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General on this subject submitted pursuant to resolution 41/59 I,

Gravely concerned that armed attacks against nuclear facilities, though carried out with conventional weapons, could be tantamount to the use of radiological weapons,

Recalling also that Additional Protocol I of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 prohibits attacks on nuclear electricity-generating stations,

Deeply concerned that the destruction of nuclear facilities by conventional weapons causes the release into the environment of huge amounts of dangerous radioactive material, which results in serious radioactive contamination,

Firmly convinced that the Israeli attack against the safeguarded nuclear facilities in Iraq constitutes an unprecedented danger to international peace and security,

Recalling further resolutions GC(XXVII)/Res/407 and GC(XXVII)/Res/409, adopted in 1983 by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in which the General Conference urged all member States to support actions in international forums to reach an international agreement that prohibits armed attacks against nuclear installations devoted to peaceful purposes,

1. *Reaffirms* that armed attacks of any kind against nuclear facilities are tantamount to the use of radiological weapons, owing to the dangerous radioactive forces that such attacks cause to be released;

2. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to intensify further its efforts to reach, as early as possible, an agreement prohibiting armed attacks against nuclear facilities;

3. *Requests* the International Atomic Energy Agency to provide the Conference on Disarmament with the technical studies that would facilitate the conclusion of such an agreement;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its forty-third session on the progress made in the implementation of the present resolution.

At the time of the General Assembly's adoption of the two resolutions on radiological weapons, the United Republic of Tanzania explained that it had abstained in the vote on 42/38 F because the Assembly had already adopted by consensus 42/32 B. Moreover, it felt that the subject of the former resolution, protection against attacks on nuclear installations, would be adequately dealt with under the agenda item entitled "Armed Israeli aggression against the Iraqi nuclear installations and its grave consequences for the established international system concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and international peace and security". (No action was taken on that agenda item, which was to be dealt with in plenary meetings of the General Assembly, prior to the suspension of the forty-second session of the Assembly, on 21 December. See chapter X.)

Conclusion

There was no change in 1987 regarding a general prohibition of the development and manufacture of new weapons of mass destruction. Socialist States and many non-aligned countries again stressed that the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction would result in a sharp destabilization of the military strategic situation. Western States continued to believe that there were no indications that such types of weapons were imminent; therefore, in their view, there was no necessity for the Conference on Disarmament to take immediate action in the field. No consensus could be reached by the Conference on the implementation of the recommendations contained in resolution 41/56; a largely similar resolution, 42/35, was adopted by the General Assembly in 1987.

The question of banning radiological weapons as well as the proposal to prohibit attacks on nuclear facilities were again addressed in the Conference on Disarmament, which re-established the relevant *Ad Hoc* Committee. The Conference decided not to continue with the so-called unitary approach to those questions; accordingly, it established two separate contact groups to deal with them. Although considerable differences of view persisted regarding both subjects, the *Ad Hoc* Committee made a contribution to the clarification and better understanding of the different approaches to the issues.

The General Assembly adopted in 1987 two pertinent resolutions: by resolution 42/38 B—adopted by consensus—it requested the Conference on Disarmament to continue its negotiations on the prohibition of radiological weapons with a view to promptly concluding its work, while by resolution 42/38 F—adopted by a vote—it requested the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its efforts to reach an agreement on the prohibition of armed attacks against nuclear facilities.

P A R T F O U R

Consideration of conventional disarmament and other approaches

CHAPTER XVI

Conventional weapons

Introduction

WHILE THE PROBLEM OF THE REDUCTION of conventional armaments and armed forces was first addressed by the General Assembly during its earliest sessions, the parallel questions of nuclear disarmament and prohibiting weapons of mass destruction have dominated international disarmament efforts since then. Yet, all military conflicts since 1945 have been fought with non-nuclear weapons and the global annual military expenditure on such armaments is estimated to account for over 80 per cent of total annual military expenditure. While conventional war would not appear to threaten the survival of mankind as might a nuclear war, its potential destructiveness has greatly increased with the development of ever more powerful conventional arms.

Since the early 1980s, increasing emphasis is again being laid on the need to control the conventional arms race, without diverting priority attention from nuclear disarmament. The escalating accumulation of conventional weapons, particularly in the two major military alliances, and the apparent nuclear parity between those alliances has led to a reassessment of certain of their military strategies. Other factors adding to the interest in conventional weapons have been the growth in arms transfers; the frequency of use of conventional weapons by developing nations and their destructive and destabilizing effects, especially at the regional level; and the economic burdens arising from the acquisition of large and sophisticated armaments, particularly for the developing countries and those that do not produce weapons. There are indications that recent qualitative advances in the destructiveness of conventional weapons may blur the distinction between nuclear and conventional arms. Another argument in favour of conventional disarmament is that any war involving nuclear-weapon States might lead to nuclear conflict.

There is as yet no agreement on how conventional disarmament might be brought about. Western States as well as China hold the view that conventional and nuclear disarmament should be sought simultaneously. Other States—mostly non-aligned—express the view that conventional disarmament does not demand the same urgency as nuclear disarmament, which, in accordance with the 1978 Final Document,¹ should be given the highest priority in disarmament negotiations.

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, para. 20. The Final Document is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, appendix I.

This chapter covers three main elements, namely: (a) conventional weapons *per se*, their international transfer and the discussion of efforts to limit them; (b) the so-called regional approach; and (c) an agreement on the prohibition of certain kinds of conventional weapons.

In 1984 the Secretary-General submitted to the General Assembly an expert study on all aspects of the conventional arms race and on disarmament relating to conventional weapons and armed forces.² This was significant in that it represented the first effort at a comprehensive consideration of the subject. In the same year, the Assembly invited all Member States to inform the Secretary-General of their views regarding the study, and in 1985, 23 Member States responded to that invitation.³ By resolution 40/94 C of the following year, the General Assembly invited further comments on the study and—for the first time in United Nations history—decided to include an item entitled “Conventional disarmament” on its agenda. In 1986 the Assembly adopted without a vote resolution 41/59 C, requesting the Disarmament Commission to consider at its 1987 session the question of conventional disarmament on the basis of the recommendations and conclusions of the 1984 study. Another resolution was adopted on the general subject of conventional disarmament.

The regional approach is based on the assumption that it might be easier to find agreement on measures of conventional disarmament among States of the same geographical area than to find global solutions. A comprehensive study on regional disarmament⁴ was submitted to the General Assembly in 1980. It took the view that the number of possible measures and the scope for regional initiatives in the field of conventional disarmament were virtually unlimited.

Some States, however, are of the view that the regional approach will not yield adequate solutions. India, for one, has regarded any attempt to emphasize the regional over the global approach as “flawed”, maintaining that the arms race must be addressed on a global basis and that focusing on conventional weapons would divert attention from nuclear disarmament.

In 1985, the General Assembly urged Governments, where the regional situation would so permit, to consider regional measures aimed at strengthening security at a lower level of forces through the limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons. By resolution 41/59 M of 1986, the Assembly again expressed its firm support for regional endeavours.

The successful conclusion in 1986 of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe⁵ was regarded by many Governments as the potential beginning of a process of disarmament in Europe, the continent that has the world's largest concen-

² A/39/348. The study was subsequently issued as a United Nations publication, Sales No. E.85.IX.1, under the title *Study on Conventional Disarmament*. It is summarized in *The Yearbook*, vol. 9: 1984, chapter XXV.

³ A/40/486 and Add.1.

⁴ *Study on All the Aspects of Regional Disarmament* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.81.IX.2), para. 198.

⁵ The Stockholm Document is reproduced in SIPRI, ed., *World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1987* (Oxford University Press, 1987), appendix 10A.

tration of armaments and armed forces. The same year, the General Assembly adopted resolution 41/59 E, by which it welcomed the measures adopted at the Conference and invited all States to consider the achievement of lessening confrontation by confidence- and security-building measures.

On 2 December 1983, the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and its three annexed Protocols⁶ entered into force. The Convention and its Protocols provide for the protection of civilians and civilian objects from attacks by means of incendiary weapons, land-mines and booby traps, and prohibit entirely the use of fragments that cannot readily be detected in the human body. As the first international arms regulation agreement to be negotiated at a United Nations conference, the Convention and its Protocols represent a significant step in efforts to prohibit or at least restrict the use of certain categories of weapons. By resolution 41/50, the General Assembly urged more States to accede to the Convention. As of the end of 1987, 28 countries had deposited instruments of ratification with the Secretary-General (see appendix I).

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1987

As in previous years, the Disarmament Commission had on its 1987 agenda an item—4 (b)—concerning the consideration and elaboration of a general approach to negotiations on nuclear and conventional disarmament. In addition, for the first time it had on its agenda a separate item on conventional disarmament—item 9—in accordance with resolutions 41/59 C and 41/59 G of 1986. (For the full wording of agenda items 4 and 9, see page 13.)

In a general exchange of views at the opening of the session, several statements were made on conventional disarmament and on the related subject of confidence-building measures. The United States stressed that stability in the conventional field must be improved. Significant reductions in nuclear weapons could not be allowed to make conventional aggression more attractive or intimidation through the threat of the use of force more likely. It recalled that in December 1986 the member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had issued the Brussels Declaration,⁷ which called for talks on conventional stability in Europe. In February 1987, representatives of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization had begun meeting on an informal basis in Vienna to consider a mandate for those negotiations, whose objective would be the establishment of greater stability at a lower level of forces. At the same time, the United States believed that it was very important to build upon the agreement on confidence- and security-building measures reached in September 1986 by the Stockholm Conference. Such measures, if developed and implemented by States in other regions, could contribute to enhancing stability throughout the world.

⁶ A/CONF.95/15 and Corr.2, annex I. For the text of the Convention and its Protocols, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 5: 1980, appendix VII, or *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 2nd edition: 1982 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.IX.5).

⁷ NATO Information Service, *Texts of Communiqués and Declarations* (Brussels), p. 31.

The Soviet Union made clear that its concept of a comprehensive system of international security reflected a willingness on its part not only to renounce its status as a nuclear Power, but also to reduce other armaments to a level of reasonable adequacy. No attempt would be made to leave some weapons outside the negotiating framework. On the contrary, all armaments should be limited and reduced and weapons of mass destruction eliminated. Thus, reductions in conventional arms and armed forces should be carried out along with the banning of space strike weapons and the removal of nuclear and chemical weapons from the arsenals of States everywhere.

China emphasized that there was a close relationship between nuclear and conventional disarmament and that efforts to promote either aspect should move side by side with efforts to promote the other. The international community, it added, had every reason to ask the super-Powers, which possessed the largest and most sophisticated conventional arsenals, as well as the two major military alliances to be the first to reach agreement on drastically reducing their conventional arms—offensive conventional forces first and foremost—with a view to maintaining peace and security in Europe and the world at large. China added that its programme to reduce the number of its military forces by 1,000,000 men, which had been started in 1985, had in the main been completed.

Belgium, speaking on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community, expressed satisfaction that conventional disarmament, a subject of growing importance, had been placed on the Commission's agenda. Given the calmer international climate and recent talks between the super-Powers, the Twelve hoped that obstacles in the way of a general approach to nuclear and conventional arms negotiations would be overcome. The Federal Republic of Germany pointed out that prospects for nuclear disarmament required efforts to establish a stable balance of forces in the conventional field. In Europe, more than elsewhere, it stated, the level of conventional forces and arms was too high and showed a vast imbalance. The Federal Republic was greatly interested, therefore, in strengthening stability and security in the whole of Europe through more openness and the establishment of a verifiable, comprehensive and stable balance of conventional forces at a low level. In that connection, it noted the talks currently being held to determine mandates for two sets of negotiations: one to make further progress in the field of confidence- and security-building measures in Europe and the other, between member States of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, to establish conventional stability at low levels from the Atlantic to the Urals.

Canada as well as New Zealand warmly welcomed the increased attention focused by the international community on the subject of conventional disarmament. As progress was made in achieving nuclear-arms limitations, Canada stated, questions concerning levels of conventional weapons would become increasingly important. Japan, with reference to conventional disarmament, called for greater openness in military matters in general and for improvement in the flow of information on conventional arms in particular. It also called for compliance with the principles of the Charter of the United

Nations, such as the non-use of force in international relations and the peaceful settlement of international disputes, and the principles of the 1978 Final Document. In addition, it stressed that concrete confidence- and security-building measures could lead to progress in disarmament.

Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania affirmed in similar ways the importance they attached to conventional disarmament. They recalled that all the member States of the Warsaw Treaty Organization were in favour of undertaking effective measures in that field and that they had made detailed proposals in the form of a programme for reducing armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe. Mongolia, noting that there had been no cessation of wars waged with conventional weapons, stated that such weapons should be reduced for the sake of security. Units of Soviet troops, it recalled, had recently been withdrawn from Mongolia, an act which would promote and strengthen mutual understanding and confidence between the countries of Asia.

Finland, referring in particular to naval armaments, stated that confidence-building measures were aimed at creating conditions for arms limitation agreements, and it saw the building of confidence through such measures as a dynamic process. Less significant measures could be followed by more far-reaching ones, of either a global or regional scope. A regional approach might be particularly useful, it stated, as had been proved by the confidence- and security-building process initiated by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

Cuba supported conventional disarmament, subject to the priorities established by the United Nations with regard to disarmament. Measures for conventional disarmament, it stated, must also be based on the principles of non-intervention and respect for the sovereignty of all countries. Yugoslavia held that the conventional arms race had been stepped up in recent times, particularly between the countries that possessed the largest military arsenals. Hence there was a need to address the problem, which had become a serious concern of the international community. The termination of the nuclear-arms race remained, however, the priority task. India stressed that any attempt to promote concepts of linkage between nuclear and conventional disarmament would distort the perspective established by the 1978 special session and reaffirmed at the 1982 special session, and both it and Sri Lanka emphasized that the goals of conventional disarmament should be pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament.

Similarly, Nigeria held that the negotiations to be undertaken on conventional disarmament (in which militarily significant States should take the lead) should neither divert attention from the threat of nuclear weapons nor hold the world hostage to their progress: nuclear disarmament should not be tied to progress in conventional disarmament. Indonesia noted that the quantity of arms acquired by the developing nations, though negatively affecting their development, paled in significance when compared to the quantity acquired by members of the military blocs. It stood to reason, therefore, that negotiations on the reduction of conventional arms should focus on the main

producers and users and be set within the general framework and priorities upon which all Member States had agreed in the 1978 Final Document.

Following the general exchange of views, the Disarmament Commission established Working Group III to deal with the substantive consideration of the issues related to conventional disarmament, including the recommendations and conclusions contained in the United Nations 1984 study on conventional disarmament. Under the chairmanship of Mr. Skjold G. Mellbin of Denmark, the Group held nine meetings between 11 and 26 May. In carrying out its work, it had before it, in addition to the study, a large number of working papers, views, proposals and suggestions, which it listed in its report to the Disarmament Commission.⁸ An extensive exchange of views on substantive issues took place, but in the time available, the Group was unable to complete its work. Thus, it recommended in its report that the work on conventional disarmament be continued at the Commission's next substantive session, in 1988.

In closing statements in plenary meetings, before the adoption of the Disarmament Commission's report to the General Assembly, some additional references were made to the question of conventional disarmament. China stated that it was a matter of great significance that the item on conventional disarmament was being discussed in the Commission. The international community should give the greatest attention to nuclear disarmament, but should also attach importance to conventional disarmament. In its view, the Soviet Union and the United States should take the lead in reducing their conventional forces and weapons.

Cameroon stated that some continents, in particular Africa, suffered more than others from the problem of conventional weapons, and that conventional disarmament should thus be dealt with by taking the regional approach into account. New Zealand regretted that consensus on a substantive report had eluded the Working Group, but thought that the discussion had been useful. Belgium, speaking on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community, expressed the view that the discussion in the Working Group represented a very positive development. The Soviet Union referred to the discussion as having been productive and as constituting a good basis for future work.

Consideration by the Conference on Disarmament, 1987

Since the Conference on Disarmament did not have an item on conventional weapons on the agenda of its 1987 session, that issue was addressed, as in previous years, in connection with general comments at plenary meetings.⁹

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries, in particular Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary and Poland, repeatedly referred to the proposals in the field of conventional disarmament contained in the documents issued by the member States of the Warsaw Treaty Orga-

⁸ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/42/42)*, para. 45. The report of Working Group III is reproduced *in extenso* under paragraph 45.

⁹ CD/787, appendix II, vols. I-IV.

nization at their meetings in Moscow in March 1987¹⁰ and in Berlin in May 1987.¹¹ In that context, those States emphasized that their military doctrine was subordinated to the task of preventing war, whether nuclear or conventional, was strictly defensive in nature and was based on the concept that, under existing conditions, recourse to military means to resolve any dispute was inadmissible. They noted that the defensive nature of their military doctrine was manifested in their resolve never to initiate military action, unless they themselves were the target of an armed attack, and that they were accordingly prepared to pursue reductions in armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe to a level where neither side would have the means to stage a surprise attack or offensive operations in general. The socialist countries further referred to their proposals addressed to members of NATO to enter, by the end of 1987, into consultations in order to compare the military doctrines of the two alliances, analyse their nature and jointly discuss the patterns of their future development so as to guarantee that the military concepts and doctrines of the two blocs and their members would be based on defensive principles. Other possible subjects for the consultations, in their view, could be the existing imbalances and asymmetrical levels in certain categories of armaments and armed forces as well as the search for ways to eliminate those disparities through reductions by the side that had an advantage, on the understanding that those reductions would lead to ever lower levels.

During the session, Poland circulated two documents¹² containing its proposals for arms reduction and confidence-building in Central Europe and dwelt on them in detail in two plenary statements. It stressed that its proposals aimed at curbing the threat of armed conflict in Europe and provided for reductions in armaments, both nuclear and conventional, and for qualitative and quantitative restraints in the heart of the continent. The implementation of the plan, which was based on the principle of equal security for all parties, should result in ensured military stability at a relatively low level, Poland concluded.

A number of Western countries, including Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, also referred in their plenary remarks to the issues concerning conventional weapons. Dwelling upon the pivotal importance of ensuring security in all arms limitation and disarmament efforts, those countries underlined that the Western defence system was based on an interrelationship between conventional and nuclear armaments and that, consequently, reductions in one class of weapons should not make the use of other types of weapons more probable or lead to a lessening of the security of any State. While stressing the importance of the control and limitation of conventional weapons, which continued to absorb most of the resources spent on arms and to

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, appendix I, vol. II, document CD/748; also circulated as a United Nations document (A/42/189-S/18768).

¹¹ *Ibid.*, document CD/755; also circulated as a United Nations document (A/42/313-S/18888).

¹² *Ibid.*, document CD/754, and *ibid.*, vol. III, document CD/780.

take a heavy toll in human life in local wars, the Netherlands recalled the agreement reached among NATO States on the objective of establishing a comprehensive, verifiable and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels in the whole of Europe.

The Federal Republic of Germany felt that the opportunities emerging in the field of nuclear disarmament called for increased efforts to establish a stable balance of conventional forces in Europe, where the conventional arsenals were, in its opinion, excessive and unbalanced in favour of the Warsaw Treaty countries. It believed that in view of the devastating potential of modern conventional weapons, the effects of a conventional conflict would be immeasurably greater than the destruction caused during the Second World War. Therefore, the NATO countries strongly urged that new steps be taken towards conventional arms control. According to Belgium, the issue of conventional weapons was destined to dominate the arms control scene in the coming years, especially if agreements were reached with regard to intermediate-range nuclear forces and chemical weapons.

The United Kingdom considered it increasingly important to redress existing conventional imbalances, as the two major Powers were moving towards reducing their nuclear arsenals. It was encouraged by the declared readiness of the Warsaw Treaty countries to remedy that situation, but stressed that such willingness had to be translated into action at the negotiating table. In referring to the Warsaw Treaty Organization's proposal to begin discussions to ensure that military doctrine was essentially defensive, the United Kingdom emphasized that that was not an area for debate or abstract theorizing, but for practical and verifiable agreements affecting actual forces on the ground and their posture.

The Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, among others, referred in their statements to the discussions taking place in Vienna with a view to establishing a new forum for negotiating conventional arms control and limitation for the whole of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals, and outlined their respective positions on that matter.

In a comprehensive document issued during the session,¹³ China stressed, *inter alia*, that conventional disarmament was closely related to nuclear disarmament and therefore had to be pursued simultaneously with the latter. China further maintained that the super-Powers, which possessed the largest and the most sophisticated conventional arsenals, had to take the lead in drastically reducing them and should withdraw all their armed forces and military bases from abroad. The military forces of all countries should be used exclusively for the purpose of self-defence, China concluded.

Yugoslavia maintained that the development of conventional weapons systems made those weapons increasingly dangerous and almost as destructive as nuclear weapons, and thus threatened to lower the threshold of the eventual use of the latter. In its view, parallel to efforts for nuclear disarmament, efforts must be made to reduce conventional armed forces and weapons and to narrow the scope—through regional and international agreements—for that dimension

¹³ *Ibid.*, vol. II, document CD/767 and Corr.1.

of the arms race. Yugoslavia believed, therefore, that the complexity of the strategic equation and the actual situation in the world demanded a comprehensive approach to the totality of disarmament issues, as called for in the 1978 Final Document.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1987

A large number of Member States addressed the issue of conventional weapons and conventional disarmament in their statements in the First Committee at the forty-second session of the General Assembly.¹⁴ Many States expressed great concern at the frequency and increasing destructiveness of the conflicts fought with conventional weapons in various parts of the world, as well as the high expenditure involved in them.

Bangladesh believed that a State's maintenance of conventional capabilities in excess of its legitimate security needs could have destabilizing ramifications for a region and the world; consequently, States should not indulge in the acquisition of arms beyond perceived needs. Reductions to be carried out where excess capabilities existed should be balanced and equitable so as not to affect adversely the security requirements of any State and so as to enhance stability at a lower military level. Thailand stated that while working towards nuclear disarmament, the international community should not lose sight of the importance and urgency of conventional disarmament, keeping in mind that modern conventional weapons were in use in regional conflicts around the world and they had gained greatly in destructive power and accuracy owing to advances in technology.

Ghana noted that most conflicts since the Second World War had been waged in the developing countries and had been or were being fought with conventional weapons. It felt that the 1978 Final Document provided an adequate basis for addressing the issue and hoped that urgent attention would continue to be given to that area of the arms race, without prejudice to the scale of priorities established in the Document. Addressing the same question, Nicaragua noted that the Final Document linked conventional disarmament to the attainment of considerable progress in the nuclear field. Isolated conventional disarmament would perpetuate existing imbalance in the security of States. In that respect, special responsibilities fell to States with major arsenals and to other militarily important States.

Denmark, speaking on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community, stated that they saw an urgent need to achieve concrete results in the field of conventional arms limitation and disarmament. In their view, conventional disarmament was an integral and essential part of the overall disarmament process for several reasons, among which was the fact that expenditures on conventional arms and forces accounted for the overwhelming part of all military budgets in the world. The process of conventional dis-

¹⁴ *Official Records of the General Assembly, First Committee*, 3rd to 43rd meetings, and *ibid.*, *Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

armament should be pursued on both the global and regional levels. The Federal Republic of Germany considered that a reduction in nuclear arsenals would make it all the more urgent to correct conventional disparities.

Bulgaria noted that the practical application of the latest achievements in science and technology had led to changes, which in turn had forced a reappraisal of the political, military and economic threat posed by conventional arms. The growing deployment of automated military systems for control, command and communications had aggravated the risk that a conventional conflict could escalate into a nuclear war. It recalled that the Warsaw Treaty countries had proposed to NATO countries that they hold consultations to compare their military doctrines and bring them into alignment on the basis of purely defensive principles.

Sweden felt that without conventional disarmament, all efforts to achieve international and regional security would be jeopardized. In its view, the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly the previous year testified to a common interest in pursuing conventional disarmament through bilateral, regional and global arrangements. Sweden was particularly concerned about the rapid development of new and exceedingly indiscriminate and inhumane conventional weapons, and suggested that the international community consider a ban on the use of laser weapons for anti-personnel battlefield purposes.

Yugoslavia cautioned members not to lose sight of the importance of conventional disarmament, despite the fact that it was overshadowed by nuclear disarmament. The conventional arms race was taking place at an accelerated pace, especially between the countries that possessed the largest military arsenals. Of particular concern were those conventional weapons whose development was based on the most recent advances in science and technology and whose effects were often hardly different from those of nuclear weapons. Yugoslavia felt that the production of such weapons should be halted by resolute international action, and it urged that sufficient attention be devoted to that aspect of the arms race.

According to China, there were four reasons for focusing more attention on conventional disarmament: (a) like nuclear armament, conventional armament was a principal arena for the global arms race between the super-Powers, and the conventional arms race constituted a real threat to world peace and security; (b) as science and technology advanced, conventional weapons tended to become more and more sophisticated, and hence more and more lethal and destructive; (c) the conventional armaments of a few countries far exceeded their needs for national defence, and such arms had been used as a tool for aggression, occupation and intervention; and (d) the money spent on conventional armament was increasing rapidly; more than half of the world's military expenditure was for conventional armament. In view of that, China considered that it was necessary to carry out drastic reductions in conventional arms along with reductions in nuclear arms. The super-Powers and the military alliances should take the lead in reducing their conventional armaments, with the offensive conventional forces as a first target. Other countries should also exercise restraint so as to ensure that their military forces would not exceed reasonable requirements for defence.

A number of Member States, including Bangladesh, Belgium, the Byelorussian SSR, Denmark, Malaysia, Pakistan, Spain and the United States, referred to conventional disarmament in the context of the work of the Disarmament Commission, strongly supporting its efforts. They also expressed a hope that the Commission would reach concrete results at its next session.

A number of countries addressed the question of regional disarmament in general or in the context of certain regions, mainly Europe and Latin America. Denmark, speaking on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community, felt that the need for conventional disarmament in Europe derived from the fact that the continent had the highest concentration of arms and armed forces in the world. It was very important to achieve a reduction in the levels of conventional forces, together with the elimination of imbalances that threatened stability and security. There was also a need to build upon and expand the confidence- and security-building measures adopted at the Stockholm Conference. France recalled its 1978 proposal for a conference on disarmament in Europe and noted that that proposal had become a reality in Vienna at the follow-up meeting of the CSCE process, begun in 1975. It considered that preparation should start for a conference on conventional stability in Europe, with a view to arriving at a stable, secure and verifiable balance of conventional forces at lower levels.

The United States expressed its satisfaction with the implementation of the Stockholm Document. It also noted that discussions had begun at Vienna on a mandate for the negotiations on conventional stability that the 23 States of the military alliances were to hold. In its view, those negotiations should eliminate force disparities prejudicial to stability and security. The United States stressed that the problem of conventional weapons transcended the European continent.

Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Soviet Union also addressed the question of conventional disarmament in the context of ongoing negotiations in Vienna. The Soviet Union recalled the proposal made by the socialist countries for sweeping reductions in armed forces and armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals. It stressed that despite the urgency of curbing the conventional arms race in Europe, it should not be forgotten that the problem of the arms race was global in nature; consequently, it was only logical that it was the subject of increasing attention in the United Nations. In its view, the Stockholm Conference had moved Europe towards an integrated system that would encompass confidence-building, security and disarmament measures. Its second stage should include the gradual limitation and reduction of military activities, particularly by the two military alliances. In addition, consideration of new kinds of confidence-building measures and measures for military and strategic stability in Europe, directly related to the reduction of armed forces, conventional armaments and military expenditures, would facilitate the conclusion of agreements and lead to the establishment of a military balance at the lowest possible level.

Hungary believed that the talks among the 23 States of the two alliances that were taking place within the CSCE framework could lead to negotiations

of paramount importance for disarmament in Europe and for strengthening security and confidence. It believed that those negotiations could result in a radical reduction in East-West military confrontation.

A number of countries referred to the question of conventional disarmament in Latin America. Colombia recalled the 1974 Declaration of Ayacucho¹⁵ and viewed regional initiatives as a precious part of the disarmament process. Costa Rica pointed out that countries near whose borders local wars were being waged expressed interest in regional disarmament.

Several States referred to the problem of international arms transfers. Feeling that they had reached alarming proportions, Sweden considered that the question should be studied fully in its political and economic context. Major suppliers and recipients should explore ways of restraining the international arms trade. Australia pointed out the need for universally accepted international standards of responsible behaviour with regard to arms transfers. Sri Lanka expressed its concern about the international transfer of conventional weapons to irregular forces that could threaten the territorial integrity of States.

Eight draft resolutions dealing with conventional weapons were put before the First Committee, and five were adopted by the General Assembly on 30 November.¹⁶

On 23 October, Denmark submitted a draft resolution entitled "Conventional disarmament". On 9 November it submitted a slightly revised draft, which was later also sponsored by Zaire.

In introducing the draft on 6 November, Denmark recalled resolution 41/59 C, by which the Assembly had requested the Disarmament Commission to consider at its 1987 session the question of conventional disarmament and to take fully into account the recommendations and conclusions contained in the *Study on Conventional Disarmament*. Denmark expressed its satisfaction with the progress achieved in the Commission on the matter. By the draft, the Assembly would recommend that the Commission's report should provide the basis for further deliberations on the subject and request the Commission to include the relevant item on the agenda of its 1988 session. On 9 November, Denmark introduced the revised draft and noted the minor changes made in it.

On 12 November the First Committee approved without a vote the revised draft resolution, which was adopted by the General Assembly on 30 November, also without a vote, as resolution 42/38 E. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 39/151 C of 17 December 1984, 40/94 C of 12 December 1985 and 41/59 C of 3 December 1986,

Having examined the report of the Disarmament Commission,

1. *Takes note with satisfaction* of the report on the consideration of the question of conventional disarmament during the 1987 session of the Disarmament Commission;

¹⁵ A/10044, annex.

¹⁶ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Plenary Meetings*, 84th meeting.

2. *Recommends* that the report should provide a basis for further deliberations on the subject by the Disarmament Commission;

3. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to include in the agenda of its 1988 session the item entitled "Substantive consideration of issues related to conventional disarmament, including the recommendations and conclusions contained in the *Study on Conventional Disarmament*";

4. *Also requests* the Disarmament Commission to continue at its 1988 session the consideration of the question of conventional disarmament with a view to facilitating the identification of possible measures in the fields of conventional arms reduction and disarmament and to report to the General Assembly at its forty-third session;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to draw the present resolution to the attention of the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Conventional disarmament"

Two of the draft resolutions before the First Committee dealt with conventional disarmament in its general and regional aspects.

On 26 October, China submitted a draft resolution entitled "Conventional disarmament". In introducing it on 4 November, China noted that the draft kept intact the basic principles affirmed by resolution 41/59 G. The European region was referred to, China explained, because the issue of conventional disarmament in Europe would become even more outstanding and urgent once the agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on intermediate-range nuclear forces was concluded. The draft was aimed at promoting the international community's efforts to achieve conventional disarmament.

On 27 October, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guyana, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Romania, Uruguay and Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution entitled "Conventional disarmament on a regional scale". In introducing it on 4 November, Peru pointed out that the draft would express the Assembly's firm support for all regional, subregional and unilateral arms limitation endeavours in so far as they sought to strengthen mutual confidence and to guarantee the security of the States involved.

Later that day, the sponsors of the draft resolution introduced by Peru, joined by Sri Lanka, submitted a revised draft, which was subsequently also sponsored by El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama. In it, the words "taking into account the characteristics of each region and when the regional situation so permits" had been added to operative paragraph 2.

On 10 November the First Committee approved the draft resolution introduced by China by a recorded vote of 126 to none, with 1 abstention (India), and the draft resolution introduced by Peru, by a recorded vote of 121 to none, with 2 abstentions (Ethiopia and Ghana).

Four of the States that voted in favour of both drafts gave explanations of vote.

Australia felt that the emphasis on nuclear disarmament in the fourth preambular paragraph of the first draft (see below) had to be interpreted in the broader context of war prevention and disarmament and that the emphasis on nuclear disarmament in operative paragraph 3 of the second draft somewhat diluted the effect of the recognition contained in the draft of the concurrent

priority that should be attached to conventional disarmament. With respect to operative paragraph 2 of the latter draft, Australia expressed reservations concerning the possibility of achieving durable results through unilateral action. It attached special importance to qualitative and quantitative limitations on conventional arms transfers and to reductions in military expenditures. It believed that, together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, there should be negotiations on the balanced reduction of conventional armed forces and armaments.

Cuba, in explaining its position on the draft introduced by Peru, considered that some additional aspects should have been taken into account, including the fact that regional conventional disarmament could not be viewed in isolation from the priority of nuclear disarmament. Regional disarmament could not be achieved to the detriment of the security of any State of the region concerned and had to take into account what was happening in other regions or at the global level.

Democratic Yemen supported the draft submitted by Peru, noting that the text took into account the importance of the characteristics of each region and that the draft's provisions would apply when a regional situation permitted arrangements to be made. Democratic Yemen's affirmative vote did not imply a change in its policy with regard to negotiations with a régime in its region that it did not recognize. The Islamic Republic of Iran believed that the implementation of the draft would be practical and possible only if outside Powers committed themselves not to take advantage of the situation and not to impose their presence on a region.

Ghana, which voted in favour of the draft introduced by China, explained its abstention on that introduced by Peru. It supported the principle of regional conventional disarmament, because it believed that the regional approach could form a useful basis for global disarmament. In its view, however, a regional State could not advocate regional disarmament while maintaining a military pact with a major military Power outside the region. Such arrangements, to which, it stated, some of the sponsors of the draft were party, would not only seriously undermine the confidence essential for successful regional conventional disarmament, but also raise serious doubts about any declarations that might be made in the course of a multilateral commitment to disarmament.

On 30 November the General Assembly took action on the two draft resolutions. The draft introduced by China was adopted without a vote as resolution 42/38 G. The draft resolution introduced by Peru was adopted by a recorded vote of 154 to none, as resolution 42/38 N.

Resolution 42/38 G reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming the determination to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war expressed in the Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, and particularly its paragraph 81, which provides that together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament, and which stresses that States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reductions,

Also recalling that the same document declares, *inter alia*, that priorities in disarmament negotiations shall be: nuclear weapons; other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons; conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects; and reduction of armed forces, and that it stresses that nothing should preclude States from conducting negotiations on all priority items concurrently,

Further recalling that the same document states that effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority, and that real progress in the field of nuclear disarmament could create an atmosphere conducive to progress in conventional disarmament on a world-wide basis,

Aware of the dangers to world peace and security originating from wars and conflicts fought with conventional weapons, as well as of their possible escalation into a nuclear war in regions with a high concentration of conventional and nuclear weapons,

Also aware that with the advance in science and technology, conventional weapons tend to become increasingly lethal and destructive,

Believing that resources released through disarmament, including conventional disarmament, can be used for the social and economic development of people of all countries, particularly the developing countries,

Bearing in mind its resolution 36/97 A of 9 December 1981 and the *Study on Conventional Disarmament* conducted in accordance with that resolution, as well as its resolutions 41/59 C and 41/59 G of 3 December 1986 and the consideration by the Disarmament Commission at its 1987 session of the question of conventional disarmament,

Bearing in mind also the efforts made to promote conventional disarmament and the related proposals and suggestions, as well as the initiatives taken by various countries in this regard,

1. Reaffirms the importance of the efforts aimed at resolutely pursuing the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament;

2. Believes that the military forces of all countries should not be used other than for the purpose of self-defence;

3. Urges the countries with the largest military arsenals, which bear a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reductions, and the member States of the two major military alliances to continue negotiations through various forums on conventional disarmament in earnest, with a view to reaching early agreement on the limitation and gradual and balanced reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons under effective international control in their respective regions, particularly in Europe, which has the largest concentration of arms and forces in the world;

4. Encourages all States, while taking into account the need to protect security and maintain necessary defensive capabilities, to intensify their efforts and take, either on their own or in a regional context, appropriate steps to promote progress in conventional disarmament and enhance peace and security;

5. Requests the Disarmament Commission to consider further, at its 1988 substantive session, issues related to conventional disarmament;

6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Conventional disarmament".

Resolution 42/38 N reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming its resolution 40/94 A of 12 December 1985,

Taking note of the final communiqué of the Special Ministerial Meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries on Latin America and the Caribbean, held at Georgetown from 9 to 12 March 1987,

Taking into account its resolution 41/59 M of 3 December 1986,

1. *Reiterates* its adherence to resolution 40/94 A relating to conventional disarmament on a regional scale;

2. *Expresses its firm support* of all regional or subregional endeavours, taking into account the characteristics of each region and when the regional situation so permits, as well as unilateral measures, directed to strengthening mutual confidence and to assuring the security of all States involved, making possible regional agreements on arms limitations in the future;

3. *Further reiterates* the primary responsibility of the militarily significant States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, for halting and reversing the arms race, and the priority assigned to nuclear disarmament in the context of the advances towards general and complete disarmament.

On 27 October, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Liberia, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Zaire submitted a draft resolution entitled "Regional disarmament". In introducing it on 6 November, Belgium recalled the main points in earlier consensus resolutions on the subject, especially resolution 37/100 F, by which the General Assembly had called upon Governments and existing regional institutions to inform the Secretary-General of any steps taken regarding the establishment or strengthening, at the regional level, of institutional arrangements to promote the implementation of regional disarmament measures. The draft noted the publication of a report of the Secretary-General on regional disarmament,¹⁷ in which an account was given of the regional dimension in activities pursued by the United Nations Secretariat and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). It also contained substantive contributions made by a number of Governments. Belgium stressed that the idea of regional disarmament could be specifically applied in various parts of the world in order to contribute to strengthening peace.

Two of the sponsors made comments on the draft resolution. Zaire stated that the disarmament efforts begun by the great nuclear Powers should be strengthened by regional disarmament, which implied constructive and frank discussion at the regional level. While fully subscribing to the concept of regional disarmament, Zaire believed that the most heavily armed nations should set an example in order to create a climate that would foster true regional disarmament. Poland was convinced that global and regional disarmament were closely linked and that they should be carried out simultaneously. It believed that the regions that had the greatest density of armaments and were thus the most vulnerable to military confrontation should become a priority focus of disarmament efforts, as was the case with Europe. The draft addressed properly, though not comprehensively, the issue of regional disarmament; as a result, Poland had become one of its sponsors.

On 11 November the sponsors orally revised operative paragraph 6 of the draft resolution. At the same meeting, the Committee approved the draft, as revised, without a vote.

In connection with the Committee's action, Cuba explained its position. It welcomed some of the points made in the draft, but felt that it should have also stressed the fact that measures of regional disarmament should not ad-

¹⁷ A/42/457.

versely affect the security of the States of a region. It further noted that account should be taken of the priorities laid down by the General Assembly. In order to promote disarmament measures in certain regions, foreign military bases should be dismantled and military manoeuvres should be suspended, as such elements were damaging to the implementation of regional disarmament.

On 30 November the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution without a vote as resolution 42/39 E. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly

Recalling its resolutions 37/100 F of 13 December 1982, 38/73 J of 15 December 1983, 39/63 F of 12 December 1984, 40/94 A of 12 December 1985 and 41/59 M of 3 December 1986, relating to regional disarmament,

Reaffirming that all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, have the responsibility of halting and reversing the arms race,

Confirming the importance and potential effectiveness of regional disarmament measures taken at the initiative and with the participation of all the States concerned, in that they can contribute to the realization of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Stressing that any regional disarmament enterprise must take into account the specific conditions characteristic of each region,

Also stressing that it is for the countries themselves of a region to take appropriate initiatives in common and to prepare agreements that will allow the achievement of regional disarmament,

Further stressing that disarmament efforts in a region cannot be isolated either from the disarmament efforts in other regions or from global disarmament efforts both in the nuclear and conventional field,

Taking into account the decisions and recommendations appearing in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, particularly in paragraph 114,

Aware of those studies which have already been carried out and of the views of States which are of interest for regional disarmament,

1. *Expresses its thanks* to the Secretary-General for his report submitted pursuant to resolution 39/63 F;

2. *Notes with satisfaction* the importance of the regional measures that have already been adopted and the regional efforts undertaken in the field of nuclear and conventional disarmament;

3. *Encourages* States to consider and develop as far as possible regional solutions in the matter of arms reduction and disarmament;

4. *Invites* all States and regional institutions associated with regional disarmament efforts to report thereon to the Secretary-General;

5. *Requests* the United Nations to lend its assistance to States and regional institutions that may request it, with a view to the institution of measures within the framework of an effort for regional disarmament;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the General Assembly regularly informed of the implementation of resolutions on regional disarmament and of the activities which the Secretariat, in particular the Department for Disarmament Affairs, and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research are conducting in the field of regional disarmament;

7. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to bring the present resolution to the attention of the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament;

8. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fourth session the item entitled "Regional disarmament: report of the Secretary-General"

On 27 October, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Cuba, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Sweden, Viet Nam and Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution entitled "Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conven-

tional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects”, which was later also sponsored by the Byelorussian SSR and the Soviet Union. In connection with the item on the Convention, the First Committee had before it a report of the Secretary-General concerning the state of adherence to the agreement.¹⁸ In introducing the draft on 6 November, Sweden noted that the entry into force of the Convention and its three Protocols in 1983, less than three years after their adoption, was a very encouraging indication of the international community’s desire to develop humanitarian law in the field of disarmament and to give effect to it. The draft noted the possibility, laid down in article 8 of the Convention, of reviewing the scope and operation of the Convention and its Protocols and of setting further international standards relating to other categories of conventional weapons that were not covered. Sweden expressed its own view that some categories of weapons, such as incendiary weapons and sea mines, should be made the object of further specific restrictions. There was also a need, it believed, to elaborate a prohibition of the use of battlefield laser weapons designed for anti-personnel use.

On 9 November the Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote, and it was adopted by the General Assembly on 30 November, also without a vote, as resolution 42/30. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 32/152 of 19 December 1977, 35/153 of 12 December 1980, 36/93 of 9 December 1981, 37/79 of 9 December 1982, 38/66 of 15 December 1983, 39/56 of 12 December 1984, 40/84 of 12 December 1985 and 41/50 of 3 December 1986,

Recalling with satisfaction the adoption, on 10 October 1980, of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, together with the Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol I), the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II) and the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III),

Reaffirming its conviction that general agreement on the prohibition or restriction of use of specific conventional weapons would significantly reduce the suffering of civilian populations and of combatants,

Taking note with satisfaction of the report of the Secretary-General,

1. *Notes with satisfaction* that an increasing number of States have either signed, ratified, accepted or acceded to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, which was opened for signature in New York on 10 April 1981;

2. *Further notes with satisfaction* that, consequent upon the fulfilment of the conditions set out in article 5 of the Convention, the Convention and the three Protocols annexed thereto entered into force on 2 December 1983;

3. *Urges* all States that have not yet done so to exert their best endeavours to become parties to the Convention and the Protocols annexed thereto as early as possible, so as ultimately to obtain universality of adherence;

4. *Notes* that, under article 8 of the Convention, conferences may be convened to consider amendments to the Convention or any of the annexed Protocols, to consider additional protocols relating to other categories of conventional weapons not covered by the existing annexed Protocols, or to review the scope and operation of the Convention and the Protocols annexed thereto and to consider any proposal for amendments to the Convention or to the existing Protocols and any proposals for additional protocols relating to other categories of conventional weapons not covered by the existing Protocols;

¹⁸ A/42/580.

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General as depositary of the Convention and its three annexed Protocols to inform the General Assembly from time to time of the state of adherence to the Convention and its Protocols;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects"

On 27 October, Italy submitted a draft resolution entitled "Transfer of conventional armaments". By it, the Assembly would have stressed the need to promote measures aimed at constraining international arms trafficking; invited all Governments to intensify at a regional level their search for new, imaginative approaches to the limitation of the arms trade in parallel with conventional disarmament negotiations; and requested the Secretary-General to carry out a study on the creation of a United Nations general committee to monitor arms trade trends and to establish a code of conduct for both suppliers and buyers. In a statement on 10 November, Italy declared that the problem of the transfer of conventional armaments was an issue of great importance; however, aware of the complexity of the matter, the technical, practical and political difficulties involved and the need for further reflection and examination, it had decided to withdraw the draft.¹⁹

In commenting on the draft, Colombia stated that while historic agreements were being signed on the reduction of the world's nuclear arsenals, conventional conflicts were growing worse and illegal sales of weapons were flourishing. It felt that the international community could not continue to evade the question and that the transfer of conventional weapons should be considered in depth.

Two draft resolutions pertaining to the Stockholm Conference were also put before the First Committee.

On 27 October, Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom submitted a draft resolution entitled "Confidence-building and security-building measures and conventional disarmament". By it, the Assembly would have once again welcomed the results of the Conference and the prospect of negotiations, within the CSCE process, on confidence- and security-building measures and on conventional stability, and would have invited all States to consider the possibility of negotiating concrete agreements that would take full account of specific regional conditions and contribute to lessening confrontation and to strengthening security.

The same day, Poland submitted a draft resolution entitled "Confidence-building and security-building measures and conventional disarmament in Europe". By it, the Assembly would have welcomed the progress made in the implementation of concrete, militarily significant, politically binding and verifiable measures in Europe within the CSCE framework; encouraged all European States to continue the implementation of the decisions of the Stockholm Conference so as to increase confidence among them; and invited all

¹⁹ See A/42/669/Add.1, paras. 28 and 29.

States to consider confidence-building measures in order to contribute to equitable and balanced disarmament measures.

In a statement on 12 November, France outlined developments since the Stockholm Conference, referring to implementation of the Stockholm Document and the ongoing CSCE follow-up talks in Vienna. After submitting the draft resolution, France had held consultations with Poland with a view to producing a common text on confidence-building and conventional disarmament, but when it had become clear that it was not possible to settle questions that had not yet been settled in Vienna, it had decided to withdraw the draft.²⁰ At the same meeting, Poland stated that the achievement of substantial reductions in armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe was of fundamental importance. Encouraged by the satisfactory implementation of the provisions of the Stockholm Document, it had submitted its draft and, later, had joined in efforts to achieve a single compromise text. As that had proven impossible, it had decided to withdraw its draft.²¹ Both France and Poland stressed that their efforts to reach a common text had not been useless, and that they hoped to meet on the question of conventional disarmament the following year.

Conclusion

In 1987, questions concerning conventional weapons received considerable attention in multilateral disarmament forums. The Disarmament Commission had for the first time on its agenda a separate item on conventional disarmament. In the general exchange of views as well as in the relevant Working Group, a great number of States expressed their belief that the need for conventional disarmament was becoming more urgent. The Commission was not able to adopt recommendations on the issue, but will continue its work at its 1988 session.

At the forty-second session of the General Assembly, many States expressed increasing concern about the question of conventional weapons and conventional disarmament, particularly in the context of regional efforts, especially in Europe and Latin America. Delegations frequently referred to the first results of the implementation of the Stockholm Document, the ongoing negotiations at the CSCE follow-up meeting in Vienna, and the talks concerning the mandate of the two military alliances' future negotiations on conventional stability and the reduction of conventional arms and forces.

The General Assembly adopted five resolutions on matters related to conventional weapons. By resolution 42/38 E, adopted without a vote, it requested the Disarmament Commission to continue to consider the question of conventional disarmament. The Assembly also adopted without a vote resolution 42/30, urging States to accede to the Convention on inhumane weapons. Three other resolutions, concerning conventional disarmament in general, conventional disarmament on a regional scale, and regional disarmament, were adopted without negative votes.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, paras. 36 and 37.

²¹ *Ibid.*, paras. 47 and 48.

CHAPTER XVII

Reduction of military budgets

Introduction

PROPOSALS ON THE REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS, based on the conviction that such measures would facilitate the disarmament process and help release resources for economic and social development, were made in the General Assembly during the 1950s and 1960s.¹ In 1973, a proposal submitted by the Soviet Union led to the adoption of resolution 3093 A (XXVIII), by which the Assembly called upon the permanent members of the Security Council to reduce their military budgets by 10 per cent and to designate a portion of the funds thus saved for the provision of development assistance to developing countries. The other permanent members of the Security Council opposed the proposal for various reasons.

On the basis of resolution 3093 B (XXVIII), initiated by Mexico, the Secretary-General appointed a group of qualified experts to prepare a report on questions concerning the Soviet proposal.² While recognizing the benefits of reducing military expenditures, the report dealt with the problems of arriving at a generally acceptable conceptual definition of military budgets and of developing a standardized system of measuring and reporting the military expenditures of States. By initiating other studies and surveys on the subject in the following years, the General Assembly sought to develop such a standardized system.

In 1978, the Assembly established the *Ad Hoc* Panel on Military Budgeting. In 1980, the Panel submitted a report³ in which it found the proposed instrument for the standardized international reporting of military expenditures feasible and recommended a further study of the problems of comparing military budgets as well as those likely to arise with respect to verification.

In 1979, on a Romanian initiative, the General Assembly adopted resolution 34/83 F, in pursuance of which the Disarmament Commission started a lengthy process of examining the possibility of concluding agreements to freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain military expenditures. The year after, the

¹ The proposals are discussed in *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1), chapter 6.

² *Reduction of the Military Budgets of States Permanent Members of the Security Council by 10 Per Cent and Utilization of Part of the Funds Thus Saved to Provide Assistance to Developing Countries* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.75.I.10).

³ *Reduction of Military Budgets: International Reporting of Military Expenditures* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.81.I.9).

Assembly adopted resolution 35/142 A, by which it requested the Commission to continue its deliberations and to identify and elaborate on the principles that should govern further actions of States in that respect, keeping in mind the possibility of incorporating them into a suitable document at an appropriate stage. This has been one element in a two-pronged approach which the United Nations has followed in the matter since then.

The other element has been based on a Swedish initiative, resolution 35/142 B, by which the General Assembly sought to broaden participation of Member States in the standardized reporting system by recommending that they all use the instrument⁴ to report their military expenditures each year to the Secretary-General. It also gave the latter a mandate to carry out another study to further refine the reporting instrument in the light of suggestions received and to propose solutions to problems of comparing and verifying military expenditures. The study was submitted to the Assembly in 1982.⁵ Pursuant to its recommendation that consideration be given to constructing price indexes and purchasing-power parities for the military expenditures of States in order to facilitate valid comparisons among them, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to undertake the proposed exercise, with the assistance of qualified experts and the voluntary co-operation of States.

The dual approach derived from the Romanian and Swedish initiatives has thus consisted, on the one hand, of an attempt to identify and elaborate principles for freezing and reducing military budgets and, on the other, of an effort to broaden participation in the standardized reporting system. In 1984 and 1985 the Disarmament Commission continued working on the first-mentioned aspect, without achieving consensus. The Western States persisted in their viewpoint that the reporting exercise would increase transparency and openness in military affairs and thereby lessen mistrust and make agreement on the reduction of military expenditures more likely, while the socialist States, in particular, saw the emphasis on reporting as a diversion from the real task of reducing military budgets. In 1985, the latest expert report,⁶ dealing with the construction of military price indexes and purchasing-power parities, helped to refine the reporting system still further.

In the light of reports of ever-increasing levels of military expenditures throughout the world and the widely held view that resources freed by disarmament should and could be reallocated to economic and social development, the Disarmament Commission and the General Assembly in 1986 continued their discussions on the issue of reducing military budgets. On the one hand, the need to increase the number of States that reported their military expenditures through the standardized reporting system maintained by the United Nations was stressed, although disagreement on the question of trans-

⁴ The "Instrument for standardized international reporting of military expenditures", which is in the form of a matrix, is discussed and reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 5: 1980, chapter XX and its annex III; it has remained essentially similar since that time.

⁵ *Reduction of Military Budgets: Refinement of International Reporting and Comparison of Military Expenditures* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.IX.4).

⁶ *Reduction of Military Budgets: Construction of Military Price Indexes and Purchasing-Power Parities for Comparison of Military Expenditures* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.86.IX.2).

parency and reliability of data appeared to be less pronounced. On the other hand, the Disarmament Commission, for the first time in six years, reached consensus on a set of principles to govern the actions of States in freezing and reducing military budgets with the exception of a principle concerning transparency, for which a number of alternatives were tabled.

Consideration by the Disarmament Commission, 1987

Once again, at the 1987 session, the Disarmament Commission had on its agenda an item on the reduction of military budgets, consisting of two sub-items: harmonization of views on concrete steps to be undertaken by States for a gradual, agreed reduction of military budgets and finalization of a set of principles to govern the actions of States in meeting that goal. (For the full wording of the item, see page 13.)

In connection with the item, the Commission had before it the text entitled "Principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of freezing and reduction of military budgets", as elaborated at its 1986 session.⁷ The document consisted of 15 paragraphs, with only paragraph 7 in brackets, signifying that no agreed formulation had been achieved for that paragraph, which was envisaged to deal with transparency, i.e., the exchange of data on and comparability of military budgets. Consensus had been reached on all the other paragraphs. Consequently, the task of the Commission, as set out in General Assembly resolution 41/57 of 1986, was to continue consideration of the question of the reduction of military budgets and to conclude work on the last outstanding paragraph.

A number of States addressed the subject in a general exchange of views in plenary meetings. Romania stressed that while the task of the Commission in 1987 was limited, thanks to the progress already made, it had the value of providing an acid test of the real intentions of States to act resolutely on reducing military spending.

The Soviet Union, together with other socialist countries, reaffirmed its readiness to engage in a proportionate and commensurate reduction of military budgets and expressed the belief that that objective could best be achieved by starting talks on the subject, above all between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, with the Disarmament Commission contributing to the process. Its position was based on the assumption that appropriate verification measures, satisfactory to all sides, would be agreed upon in the course of the negotiations.

China called for a spirit of compromise on all sides in order to find a solution to the remaining difference. Indonesia, together with several other countries, urged the Disarmament Commission to conclude its deliberations on the item before the end of the session, because of the direct relevance of the reduction of military budgets to the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development (see chapter XVIII). Pak-

⁷ For the full text, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 11: 1986, chapter XVIII.

istan stressed that the recommendations evolved by the Disarmament Commission must give appropriate recognition to the security concerns of small, developing and non-aligned States and take into account regional security problems. The wide disparity between the arms expenditures of the super-Powers and those of other countries, it added, was beyond question. Thus Pakistan, together with several other countries, held that the process of reducing military budgets should be initiated by those Powers which possessed the largest military arsenals.

Several States referred to the United Nations standardized international reporting instrument. Japan thought that the function it filled should be duly taken into account in drafting the final text of paragraph 7. Canada noted that some countries had recently—for the first time—reported their military expenditures on the basis of the instrument and stressed that such reporting must become a universally accepted practice before real progress could be achieved. New Zealand, as well as Canada, called on all nations to utilize the standardized reporting system as a step towards agreement on the reduction of military expenditures.

After the general exchange of views, the item was taken up in a consultation group, which the Commission established on 4 May, under the chairmanship of Mr. Gheorghe Tinca of Romania. The Group held seven meetings between 12 and 22 May and had before it five proposals for paragraph 7, submitted respectively by: 11 Western States (Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom and United States), the German Democratic Republic, Pakistan, the Soviet Union, and Sweden.⁸

While the Consultation Group made progress towards resolving outstanding issues and arrived at agreed formulations for some recommendations, it was unable to reach a consensus on a complete set of recommendations. At the Group's final meeting, on 22 May, two new proposals for the wording of paragraph 7 were submitted, a joint one by the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union and another one by Sweden. They were not discussed, however, because of time constraints.

The Consultation Group was divided on whether the item should receive further consideration by the Disarmament Commission at its session in 1988. The Group, therefore, recommended to the Commission that it transmit to the General Assembly, for it to decide on future action, the existing text of the principles (with the understanding that, in the absence of agreement on paragraph 7, there was no final agreement on the remaining ones). The text contained, *inter alia*, two 1986 proposals for paragraph 7 that had been submitted by the Western States listed above and by Pakistan, and the two 1987 proposals submitted by the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union (jointly) and by Sweden. These remaining four alternative texts for paragraph 7 read as follows:

⁸ For the texts of the five proposals, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/42/42)*, paragraph 41.

Proposal for paragraph 7 by Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America

Before there can be meaningful negotiations on the freezing and reduction of military budgets the principles of transparency and comparability must be accepted by all parties to any negotiation. To this end, the elaboration of agreed methods of measuring and comparing military expenditures between different periods of time and between countries representing different regions and different budgeting systems is a necessary pre-condition. Thus the use of the standardized international reporting instrument by the participating States, although not sufficient in itself, is an essential first step.

Proposal for paragraph 7 by Pakistan

Before there can be meaningful negotiations on the freezing and reduction of military budgets among any group of States there should be an understanding among them concerning the need for an exchange of data and comparability of their military budgets. In this regard, the elaboration of agreed methods for measuring and comparing military budgets is essential. To this end, the use of the standardized international reporting instrument could constitute the first step.

Proposal for paragraph 7 by the German Democratic Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Greater openness on military activities, *inter alia*, through voluntary transmittal of relevant information on these activities, including on the levels of military budgets, could contribute to increased confidence among States and promote negotiations on freezing and reductions of military budgets. In the context of negotiations on the freezing and reduction of military budgets, specific methods and means for an exchange of data should be elaborated taking into account the scope, nature and purposes of the agreements being worked out as well as the differences between budgeting systems of the participating States. In this connection relevant parts of the standardized international reporting system adopted in 1980 by the General Assembly could be taken into account as one of the possible instruments.

Proposal for paragraph 7 by Sweden

Greater openness on military activities, *inter alia*, through the regular transmittal of comparable information on these activities, including on the level and magnitude of military budgets, would increase confidence between States and could promote negotiations on the freezing and reduction of military budgets. Negotiations on the freezing and reduction of military budgets require the exchange of comparable data necessary for the elaboration of an agreement. The specific methods and means for such an exchange, as well as the mutually acceptable format and contents of the data to be exchanged should be elaborated in the context of negotiations of specific agreements taking into account the scope, nature and purposes of the agreements, as well as the differences between budgeting systems of the participating States. Completion of applicable parts of the standardized international reporting system adopted in 1980 by the General Assembly should be viewed as a useful instrument in these contexts.⁹

In a concluding plenary statement, Belgium stated that the 12 member countries of the European Community were encouraged by the progress made on the question of data exchange and comparability. In their view, the item should remain on the Commission's agenda for 1988. The Soviet Union believed that the socialist countries had shown flexibility, which had created favourable conditions for successfully completing the elaboration of guidelines at the session. It felt, however, that that flexibility had generated new demands and rigid preliminary conditions for negotiations on the reduction of military

⁹ *Ibid*, last section under paragraph 41.

budgets. The wording of the agenda item indicated what issues were to be solved in the first instance: they included, first and foremost, the harmonization of views with regard to the specific steps to be taken. Some delegations, the German Democratic Republic stated, had in practice made the reduction of military budgets hostage to pre-conditions.

Consideration by the Conference on Disarmament, 1987

A few delegations addressed the question of military expenditures in plenary meetings¹⁰ during the 1987 session of the Conference on Disarmament.

Romania reaffirmed the proposals contained in the 1986 Budapest Appeal of the Warsaw Treaty States¹¹ to NATO for a 25-per cent mutual reduction in arms, troops and military expenditures by the year 2000. Prompted by a desire to make at least a modest and symbolic contribution to that goal, Romania had decided, by a referendum in November 1986, to unilaterally carry out a 5-per cent reduction in its arms, troops and military expenditures. In its view, measures of that kind might contribute to building confidence and to establishing the right climate for halting the arms race and moving on to real disarmament measures.

While comparing its military expenditures with those of the Soviet Union, the United States called for greater openness and transparency in the area of military budgets. Kenya observed that military expenditures were constantly increasing and that the nuclear-weapon States and their allies accounted for a large proportion of them. It pointed out, however, that developing countries also contributed substantially to the rise in those expenditures. That was regrettable, it stated, as resources devoted to military purposes could be usefully invested in improving the lagging social and economic sectors of those countries. Many resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, Kenya noted, expressed the desire of the world body to reduce and restrain military expenditures and to increase possibilities for reallocating released resources towards socio-economic development, particularly for the benefit of developing countries.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1987

In accordance with resolution 41/57 of 1986, the General Assembly had an item on the reduction of military budgets on its agenda in 1987. During its consideration of the subject, the Assembly had before it the report of the Disarmament Commission, discussed above, and a report of the Secretary-General containing data on the military expenditures of Member States. Of the 24 countries that had provided the information, 22 had used the international standardized reporting instrument.¹²

¹⁰ CD/787, appendix II, vols. I-IV.

¹¹ CD/732, appendix I, document CD/700 and Corr.1.

¹² A/42/573. The following countries reported data: Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, El Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Ireland, Lebanon, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States. By A/42/573/Add.1, issued in December, data from Japan were also made available.

In addressing the item on military budgets in the First Committee,¹³ some delegations also referred to the related question of objective information on military matters. That issue and the Committee's action on the relevant draft resolution are dealt with in chapter III.

Many of the States that commented on the need for reductions in military spending did so in the context of the need for conventional disarmament—mindful of the fact that, as Nepal pointed out, the bulk of global military expenditure was on conventional weaponry—and in the context of the need to allocate scarce resources to development. For a full discussion of the issues of conventional disarmament and the relationship between disarmament and development, see chapters XVI and XVIII respectively.

In Yemen's view, increasing military expenditures threatened future economic and social development worldwide. Statistics showed that annual military budgets currently totalled \$1 trillion. The spiral could be broken, Yemen believed, by prohibiting nuclear weapons and their proliferation and by preventing the spread of the arms race to outer space. Qatar stated that expenditure for research and development on arms was estimated to be four times that for research and development in areas such as medicine, agriculture and industry. Australia emphasized that the true cost of the arms race was far greater than the figure of 6 per cent of global gross national product would suggest: it was the tragic cost of what could have been achieved with the scarce capital and human resources that were dedicated to higher levels of armament by developed and developing countries alike.

China reported that cuts in its military expenditures and the large-scale reorientation of its military industry to civilian production had produced some preliminary economic benefits. It supported all proposals that genuinely contributed to the cause of disarmament, especially concrete actions leading to a drastic reduction of armaments. Singapore, referring to those measures, stated that China's example should be a model for other big Powers to follow. Peru had tried to foster the process of regional disarmament and arms limitation through a large-scale reduction of military expenditures and the promotion of measures to enhance confidence. Such steps would, it hoped, enable it to make progress in limiting its military budget and in using the resources thus released for economic and social development. In Belgium's view, it was necessary to have reliable data and statistics in order better to assess the impact of military expenditures on economic and social development.

Romania recalled that it, together with Sweden, had taken the initiative within the Disarmament Commission of identifying the principles that should govern the activities of States in freezing and reducing military expenditures. Those principles were intended to harmonize the views of States and promote the commencement of negotiations on concrete measures. During its 1987 session the Commission had not been successful in finding an acceptable formulation for the one principle it had not been able to agree upon—that related to transparency and the exchange of data. Romania hoped, however, that it would be able to finalize its work soon, in view of recent positive

¹³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, First Committee, 3rd to 31st and 36th meetings, and ibid., Sessional Fascicle, corrigendum.*

developments in the positions of some States on the question of transparency and the greater readiness in various quarters to face the need to reduce military spending.

Western States addressing the item stressed the importance of comparability of data. Turkey called upon all States concerned to make use of the United Nations standardized reporting instrument, as one available mechanism in the field. Denmark, speaking on behalf of the 12 countries of the European Community, stated that the reporting instrument had proved to be a valuable first step, making it possible for all Member States, which had different budgeting systems, to supply useful information on their military expenditures and to contribute thereby to greater transparency. The Twelve therefore urged other countries, especially those whose information on military budgets was not fully available from public sources, to make use of the United Nations reporting system.

The United States recalled that in 1982, at the second special session on disarmament, President Reagan had proposed specific steps for the development of a common accounting and reporting system for military expenditures that would permit meaningful comparisons among various countries. Such a system would provide a valuable tool in several areas of arms control and disarmament. Perhaps the greatest immediate opportunity for its use would be in building confidence in support of specific arms control agreements. The exchange of comparable information could be particularly important in dealing with matters of conventional arms control. The United States thus urged that greater attention be given to the question of transparency and called on those Member States that had indicated a willingness to provide more information on their military expenditures for the first time to do so by using the United Nations system for standardized reporting.

It was no simple matter, the Soviet Union noted, to be fair in comparing defence expenditures, since the price structures of armaments and the pricing mechanisms of various countries differed fundamentally. The defence budget published by the Soviet Union, it explained, reflected only the expenditures of the Ministry of Defence on the maintenance of armed forces personnel, logistics support, military construction, retirement benefits and some other items. Research and development financing and arms and equipment procurement were covered under other articles of the State budget. It believed that in two or three years, after a radical pricing reform had been completed in the Soviet Union, it would be able to compare data of interest both to itself and to its partners, data that would uniformly reflect expenditures by the two sides.

On 27 October, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Ireland, Nigeria, Peru, Romania, Senegal and Sweden submitted a draft resolution entitled "Reduction of military budgets", which was later also sponsored by Uruguay. The text of the draft resolution, Romania explained in its introduction on 3 November, concerned the efforts of the Disarmament Commission to identify and elaborate a set of principles to govern the further actions of States in freezing and reducing military budgets and to begin consideration of a whole series of technical aspects implied in measures for reducing military budgets. Bearing

in mind the recent developments in the area of transparency and comparability, the subject of the paragraph not yet agreed to in the Commission's text, Romania had engaged in consultations with other interested delegations with a view to achieving a consensus formulation of the remaining principle. However, as it appeared for various reasons that that was not yet possible, the Disarmament Commission would, by the draft text, be requested to continue consideration of the item on military budgets and to conclude at its 1988 substantive session its work on the principles.

On 9 November the First Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote, and on 30 November the General Assembly adopted it, also without a vote, as resolution 42/36.¹⁴

At the time that the Committee took action on the draft resolution, Denmark, on behalf of the member States of the European Community, explained their support for the text. They were of the view that the principles of transparency and comparability had to be accepted by all parties before meaningful negotiations on the freezing and reduction of military budgets could be carried out. They hoped that the Commission would be able to finalize the draft principles in 1988 and believed that it was important for the question to be included in the agenda of the third special session on disarmament.

Resolution 42/36 reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Deeply concerned about the ever-spiralling arms race and growing military expenditures, which constitute a heavy burden for the economies of all nations and have extremely harmful effects on world peace and security,

Reaffirming once again the provisions of paragraph 89 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, according to which the gradual reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis, for example, in absolute figures or in terms of percentage, particularly by nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, would contribute to curbing the arms race and would increase the possibilities for the reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries,

Convinced that the freezing and reduction of military budgets would have favourable consequences on the world economic and financial situation and might facilitate efforts made to increase international assistance for the developing countries,

Recalling that at its twelfth special session, the second special session devoted to disarmament, all Member States unanimously and categorically reaffirmed the validity of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, as well as their solemn commitment to it,

Recalling also that in the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second United Nations Disarmament Decade, it is provided that during this period renewed efforts should be made to reach agreement on the reduction of military expenditures and the reallocation of resources thus saved to economic and social development, especially for the benefit of developing countries,

Recalling further the provisions of its relevant resolutions, in which it considered that a new impetus should be given to the endeavours to achieve agreements to freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain, in a balanced manner, military expenditures, including adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned,

Aware of the various proposals submitted by Member States and of the activities carried out so far within the framework of the United Nations in the field of the reduction of military budgets,

Considering that the identification and elaboration of the principles that should govern

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, *Plenary Meetings*, 84th meeting.

further actions of States in freezing and reducing military budgets and the other current activities within the framework of the United Nations related to the question of the reduction of military budgets should be regarded as having the fundamental objective of reaching international agreements on the reduction of military expenditures,

Noting that the Disarmament Commission, at its 1986 substantive session, agreed upon the above-mentioned principles except one, on which various alternatives were proposed by Member States,

1. *Declares again its conviction* that it is possible to achieve international agreements on the reduction of military budgets without prejudice to the right of all States to undiminished security, self-defence and sovereignty;

2. *Appeals* to all States, in particular to the most heavily armed States, pending the conclusion of agreements on the reduction of military expenditures, to exercise self-restraint in their military expenditures with a view to reallocating the funds thus saved to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of developing countries;

3. *Reaffirms* that the human and material resources released through the reduction of military expenditures could be reallocated for economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries;

4. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to continue the consideration of the item entitled "Reduction of military budgets" and, in this context, to conclude, at its 1988 substantive session, its work on the last outstanding paragraph of the principles that should govern further actions of States in the field of freezing and reduction of military budgets, and to submit its report and recommendations to the General Assembly not later than at its forty-third session;

5. *Draws anew the attention* of Member States to the fact that the identification and elaboration of the principles that should govern further actions of States in freezing and reducing military budgets could contribute to harmonizing the views of States and creating confidence among them conducive to achieving international agreements on the reduction of military budgets;

6. *Urges* all Member States, in particular the most heavily armed States, to reinforce their readiness to co-operate in a constructive manner with a view to reaching agreements to freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain military expenditures;

7. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "Reduction of military budgets".

Conclusion

As in previous years, the question of the reduction of military budgets drew the attention of delegations in various disarmament bodies. Many reaffirmed that there was an urgent need for all countries to lower expenditures and to reallocate resources thus released to social and economic development. It also seemed to be generally felt that some *rapprochement* had occurred in the positions of States on the issue of transparency and comparability of military budgets, although some delegations cautioned that there should be no pre-conditions for commencing negotiations on reductions.

The Disarmament Commission did not succeed in resolving differences over the principle of transparency—the single principle of its text not yet agreed to—but further alternative versions of paragraph 7, which were submitted too late for consideration in 1987, may facilitate a harmonization of views at its next session. The General Assembly adopted by consensus resolution 42/36, by which it requested the Commission to continue its consideration of the reduction of military budgets and to conclude its work on the text of principles to govern the further actions of States in moving towards that goal.

International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development

Introduction

IN ITS EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE ITS SEPARATE GOALS IN THE FIELD of disarmament and development, the United Nations has, since its inception, become progressively involved with the relationship between these two vital issues facing the international community.¹ As early as 1950, the General Assembly recognized, by resolution 380 (V), that it was necessary for the international community to “reduce to a minimum the diversion for armaments of its human and economic resources and to strive towards the development of such resources for the general welfare, with due regard to the needs of the underdeveloped areas of the world”. Since then, the Assembly has frequently returned to the subject, and expressions of concern at the continuing military expenditures, calls for diverting resources released through disarmament to socio-economic development, and interest in examining the various issues raised by the relationship between disarmament and development have all contributed to a growing United Nations involvement.

A number of United Nations studies² have been undertaken on the relationship between these two major issues and related questions, and Member States have submitted proposals on the institutionalization of that relationship. In a large number of resolutions,³ the Assembly has expressed its concern for reducing and restraining military expenditures (see chapter XVII) and for creating greater possibilities for reallocating released resources to socio-economic development, particularly for the benefit of developing countries.

At its tenth special session, in 1978, the General Assembly mandated a

¹ For a brief account of United Nations efforts to give effect to the relationship between disarmament and development, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 11: 1986, chapter XIX, “Introduction”.

² *Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.62.IX.1); *Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures* (United Nations publication, Sales No.E.72.IX.16); *Disarmament and Development* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.73.IX.1); *Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.1); *The Relationship between Disarmament and Development* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.82.IX.1); and *Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.IX.2). Studies on the reduction of military budgets are referred to and discussed in the preceding chapter.

³ Between 1946 and 1986, the Assembly adopted 59 resolutions and 2 decisions on the subject of the relationship between disarmament and development. Included in this number are resolutions concerning the reduction of military budgets.

comprehensive study on the relationship between disarmament and development, which was completed in 1981.⁴ A major conclusion of the study was that the arms race and development were in a competitive relationship and that the world could either continue the arms race with characteristic vigour, or move consciously and with deliberate speed towards more stable, balanced socio-economic development within a more sustainable international economic and political order. It could not do both. The study addressed several recommendations to both Member States and the United Nations system.

In 1981, the General Assembly unanimously commended the study to the attention of all Member States and invited them to inform the Secretary-General of their views on the study itself and its recommendations prior to the special session on disarmament in 1982. Most responses, especially those of the developing and Nordic countries, urged immediate follow-up action along the lines of some of the recommendations.

At its regular session in 1982, the General Assembly adopted resolution 37/84, by which it requested the Secretary-General to take appropriate administrative action and urged Member States to consider appropriate measures in accordance with the recommendation of the 1981 study; determined that the question of the reallocation and conversion of resources, through disarmament measures, from military to civilian purposes should be included in the Assembly's agenda at agreed intervals, starting in 1985; and recommended that UNIDIR undertake an investigation of the modalities of an international disarmament fund for development. UNIDIR completed that task in 1984.⁵

In the mean time, in an address to the General Assembly in 1983, President François Mitterrand of France proposed that diplomatic action to give concrete expression to the linkage between disarmament and development be taken in two stages. First, France would host a meeting between the most interested States, once the major military Powers had consented to participate in it, and secondly, participating States would prepare and define the objectives of a United Nations conference on the subject. On the basis of his initiative, the Assembly adopted by consensus resolution 38/71 B, inviting Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General their views and proposals on the matter. In addition, it requested the Disarmament Commission to include an item on the subject in the agenda of its next session and to make appropriate recommendations thereon to the Assembly.

In 1984 the issue of holding an international conference on the relationship between disarmament and development was discussed intensively by the Disarmament Commission. France, India and Norway proposed in a joint draft that the General Assembly, at its next session, decide to convene such a conference under the auspices of the United Nations for the purpose of (a) reviewing the relationship between disarmament and development in all its

⁴ *The Relationship between Disarmament and Development* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.82.IX.1); the study is summarized in *The Yearbook*, vol. 6: 1981, chapter XXI.

⁵ *Establishment of an International Disarmament Fund for Development*, Geneva, UNIDIR, 1984 (United Nations publication, Sales No. G.V.E.84.0.2). The report was prepared with the guidance of a steering group comprising members from Brazil, France, Norway, Pakistan, Romania and Senegal. Four technical studies by experts were also carried out under the project.

aspects; (b) examining the impact of continuing military expenditures upon the world economy and the international economic and social situation; and (c) considering ways and means of giving concrete expression to the idea of channelling a significant part of the resources used for military purposes to socio-economic development, particularly that of the developing countries. Mongolia introduced a proposal on behalf of a group of Eastern European States, according to which the Commission would reaffirm that only the implementation of specific arms limitation and disarmament measures would release substantial resources that could then be reallocated to development purposes. Accordingly, the Conference on Disarmament should accelerate its negotiations with a view to concluding international agreements on all items of its agenda. The United States, for its part, recognized the need to respond to pleas for development assistance. It believed that security and stability were important for stimulating development and acknowledged the possible role of effective disarmament. A consensus document, envisaging that the scope and purpose of the international conference would include "all the various aspects and dimensions of the relationship between disarmament and development", was incorporated into the report of the Disarmament Commission.⁶ The discussions in the Commission showed that while the relationship between disarmament and development was, in principle, accepted by all, there was no agreement on the ways and means of implementing it effectively.

At its 1984 session, the General Assembly adopted by consensus resolution 39/160, by which it decided to convene an international conference. It also decided to set up a preparatory committee, composed of 54 members,⁷ to formulate and submit to it, at its next session, consensus recommendations on the provisional agenda, procedure, place, date and duration of the Conference.

The first session of the Preparatory Committee was held in New York from 29 July to 9 August 1985. The Committee elected Mr. Muchkund Dubey of India as its Chairman. It had before it draft provisional rules of procedure, prepared by the Secretariat. As amended, they were recommended by the Committee for adoption by the Conference. The Secretariat also made available to the Committee a preliminary list of United Nations documents relevant to the subject of the relationship between disarmament and development. In its report to the General Assembly,⁸ adopted by consensus, the Preparatory Committee recommended, *inter alia*, that favourable consideration be given

⁶ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/39/42)*, para. 27.

⁷ In accordance with resolution 39/160, paragraph 3, the President of the General Assembly, after consultations with the Chairmen of the regional groups, appointed the following countries to be members of the Preparatory Committee: Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, China, Colombia, Congo, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Italy, Jamaica, Kenya, Mexico, Mongolia, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Uganda, USSR, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zambia.

⁸ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fortieth Session, Supplement No. 51 (A/40/51)*. The Committee's recommendations are contained in section III, paragraphs 10 to 23.

to holding the Conference in Paris in July 1986 and that due attention be given to President Mitterrand's statement; that the Conference be held at a high political level; and that the Secretariat prepare a number of background papers and documents for the Preparatory Committee. The Committee also reached agreement on the provisional agenda for the Conference, which it included in its report.

In 1985 the General Assembly adopted without a vote resolution 40/155, initiated by France and co-sponsored by 52 Member States from both industrialized and developing regions and from different political groups, by which it decided to convene in 1986 the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development. The Assembly endorsed the report of the Preparatory Committee and decided that the Conference would be held in Paris from 15 July to 2 August.

The second session of the Preparatory Committee was held in New York from 1 to 11 April 1986. The United States did not participate and informed the Secretary-General that it did not plan to attend the Conference. In accordance with the Preparatory Committee's recommendation, the Secretary-General of the Conference, Mr. Jan Martenson, prepared a number of background papers based on available information.⁹ In the course of substantive discussions, an effort was made to identify elements that could be included in a draft final document of the Conference, and France submitted proposals¹⁰ for the Preparatory Committee's consideration. Following an exchange of views, the Chairman presented a working paper on the possible contents of a draft final document. In the end, the Committee agreed that more substantive preparations were needed.

The third session of the Preparatory Committee was held in New York later the same year, from 2 to 13 June 1986. The Secretariat submitted to the Committee a number of additional background papers. The Committee also had before it the text of the joint declaration unanimously adopted by the Panel of Eminent Personalities in the Field of Disarmament and Development, which had been convened by the Secretary-General of the Conference in accordance with resolution 40/155 and had met in New York from 16 to 18 April.¹¹ In addition, a paper proposing elements for inclusion in a final document for the Conference was submitted by Eastern European countries.¹² An open-ended consultative group of the Chairman made an effort to get broad agreement on the format and content of a draft final document. The outcome of that work was reflected in a paper annexed to the Committee's

⁹ For a list of the papers prepared by the Secretariat, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 11: 1986, chapter XIX.

¹⁰ A/CONF.130/PC/1.

¹¹ A/CONF.130/PC/INF/17 and Corr.1. The Panel consisted of: Ibrahim Hilmy Abdel-Rahman (Egypt), Tamas Bacskai (Hungary), Oleg T. Bogomolov (USSR), Gamani Corea (Sri Lanka), Edgar Faure (France), Alfonso García Robles (Mexico), Lawrence Klein (United States), Pei Monong (China), Olusegun Obasanjo (Nigeria), Raúl Prebisch (Argentina), Walter Scheel (Germany, Federal Republic of), Agha Shahi (Pakistan), Janez Stanovnik (Yugoslavia) and Inga Thorsson (Sweden). Oleg T. Bogomolov did not attend the meeting, but agreed later to the text of the declaration.

¹² A/CONF.130/PC/4.

report to the General Assembly,¹³ which contained elements adopted by consensus at a plenary meeting on 13 June. It was agreed that the elements would serve as the basis for the elaboration of a final document, but specific proposals of delegations for ways of releasing additional resources through disarmament measures for development purposes would be the subject of further consideration.

During the session, the Secretary-General of the United Nations received a letter dated 22 May from France,¹⁴ in which, stating that the positions of the participating countries were still far apart and that there was need for further preparation, France expressed its wish for a postponement of the Conference to 1987. The United Kingdom also stressed the need for more political preparation. For most delegations, including non-aligned, Nordic, socialist and some Western countries, the Committee had made adequate preparations to go ahead with the Conference in 1987, if not in 1986 as scheduled. Several Western delegations, for instance Canada, took the position that the differences over the substantive issues had been exaggerated.

The Committee held an exhaustive debate on possible postponement of the Conference to 1987 and on its specific dates and venue. Those wanting it to be held in 1987 insisted that the recommendation to the General Assembly be worded in such a way as to avoid any further postponement. In its report, the Committee recommended that, in view of the fact that the Conference could not be held in Paris as scheduled and it was too late to make arrangements for it to be held at another venue on the scheduled dates, the Assembly should decide at its resumed fortieth session to postpone the Conference to 1987, and at its forty-first session, should set the dates in 1987 and the venue for the Conference. The Committee further recommended that the General Assembly decide to convene one more session of the Preparatory Committee.

On that basis, at its resumed fortieth session, the General Assembly adopted decision 40/473, by which it postponed the Conference until 1987.

At the forty-first session of the General Assembly, several delegations voiced their disappointment at the postponement of the Conference and stressed the importance of holding it in 1987. They expressed satisfaction at the work done so far by the Preparatory Committee, which, they felt, provided a good basis for drafting the final document of the Conference. Others stressed that there was a need for further preparatory work.

On the basis of the recommendations of the Preparatory Committee, the General Assembly adopted, without a vote, decision 41/422, by which it decided to hold the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development in New York from 24 August to 11 September 1987; to convene the Preparatory Committee for one more session from 21 April to 1 May 1987; and to request Member States and the Secretary-General of the Conference to continue and intensify their participation in the final stage of the preparatory process, especially in making available their views

¹³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-first Session, Supplement No. 51 (A/41/51)*, annex.

¹⁴ A/CONF.130/PC/3.

and proposals on substantive issues, in order to ensure the best possible success of the Conference.

In statements welcoming the consensus reached concerning the organization of the Conference, delegations emphasized the complexity of the subject-matter and the significance of the preparations. The United States, however, announced that it had not participated in the decision and would not participate in the Conference.

Work of the Preparatory Committee, 1987

The fourth session of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference was held in New York from 21 April to 1 May 1987, with 86 States participating, as well as Observers from eight specialized agencies and other international organizations.

The Secretary-General of the Conference submitted to the Committee a number of additional background papers.¹⁵ The Committee also had before it working papers submitted by Belgium, on behalf of the twelve member States of the European Community,¹⁶ and China¹⁷

The Secretary-General of the Conference made a statement in the opening meeting of the session on the activities undertaken in pursuance of General Assembly decision 41/422. He informed the Committee that the Department for Disarmament Affairs, in co-operation with the Department of Public Information, had continued to disseminate information on the Conference and its preparatory work as widely as possible, and to incorporate the theme "disarmament and development" into meetings of experts and regional seminars held within the framework of the World Disarmament Campaign. Similarly, the relationship between disarmament and development had figured prominently as a theme in the activities carried out in connection with the observance of the International Year of Peace.

Delegates to the session devoted themselves to the preparation of the draft final document of the Conference. To that end, the Committee held seven open-ended informal meetings, using as a basis for its work the elements agreed upon in 1986.¹⁸ A wide range of views was expressed in the course of the discussion on a first draft of a final document, prepared by the Chairman in response to a proposal by Indonesia, which was supported by Canada, Norway and the German Democratic Republic. Member States belonging to the European Community expressed reluctance over generalizations about the

¹⁵ A/CONF.130/PC/INF/4/Add.1 (relationship between disarmament and development, a bibliographical survey of recent literature); A/CONF.130/PC/INF/9/Add.1 (overview of events in the disarmament-development relationship field since 1985); A/CONF.130/PC/INF/21 (background information provided by the World Health Organization); and A/CONF.130/PC/INF/30 (additional background information provided by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)).

¹⁶ A/CONF.130/PC/5 (views and comments of the twelve States members of the European Community presented in accordance with General Assembly decision 41/422 of 1986).

¹⁷ A/CONF.130/PC/6 (elements for inclusion in the final document of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development).

¹⁸ See footnote 13.

negative consequences of military expenditures at the national and international levels. Australia, France, India, the Philippines and the Soviet Union made specific proposals about an action programme. In discussing the format and tone of the draft, most Member States expressed preference for a forward-looking political document. On the basis of the discussion, the Chairman prepared a revised draft for a final document, but the Committee did not have time to discuss it. It therefore decided to transmit the revised text as a draft for a final document for consideration by the Conference.¹⁹

During its session the Committee also considered its report to the Conference. In addition to the recommendations contained in its 1986 report to the General Assembly, the Committee requested the Secretary-General of the Conference to give, in co-operation with the Department of Public Information, the widest publicity to the theme and purpose of the Conference as a major global political undertaking. To that end, all available means, including the international and national public media, were to be utilized, and the Governments of the participating countries were urged to extend their full co-operation. The Committee also decided to recommend that the Moderator of the Panel of Eminent Personalities be invited to present the Panel's joint declaration at the Conference and that non-governmental organizations invited to participate in the Conference be given the opportunity to make oral statements and/or submit written statements.

On 1 May the Preparatory Committee unanimously adopted its report to the Conference.²⁰

Consideration by the Conference on Disarmament, 1987

As before, the question of the relationship between disarmament and development was not a specific item on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament in 1987, but some member States commented on its significance in plenary meetings.²¹

Algeria, in underscoring the importance of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, stated that the challenge was to grasp the interrelated problems of disarmament and development and security and embark resolutely on the actions that must be taken to establish genuine collective security. India believed that the International Conference would provide all members with a historic opportunity to come to substantial agreement on a crucial issue and that it should avoid controversy, focusing instead on its universally important subject in a positive manner. Kenya stated that all developed and developing countries were affected in one way or another by the nuclear and conventional arms race.

Sri Lanka asserted that the global expenditure of almost a trillion dollars a year on armaments, both nuclear and conventional, was by all empirical standards inconsistent with stable and balanced social and economic devel-

¹⁹ A/CONF.130/1 and Corr.1, annex III.

²⁰ A/CONF.130/1 and Corr.1.

²¹ CD/787, appendix II, vols. I-IV.

opment and contributed to distortions and imbalances in the world economy. The International Conference could, with universal participation and intensive preparation, result in an agreed programme of disarmament measures that would release resources for development purposes. Yugoslavia emphasized the negative impact of the arms race on all spheres of human life, in particular the economic one. The arms race wasted enormous quantities of resources, the total annual value of which was equivalent to the overall debt burden of developing countries. That waste was taking place against the background of crises in the world economy, which especially affected the developing countries. Yugoslavia therefore attached importance to the International Conference as a way to reverse the arms race and create conditions conducive to the sustained development of the global economy. Zaire emphasized that through disarmament the nuclear Powers would release colossal sums that would fund a wide range of research in the economic and social areas.

France believed that disarmament negotiations should first serve the security of each State. If disarmament could contribute to development, France would be delighted. With that possibility in mind, it considered the International Conference to be extremely important. The Netherlands emphasized that 80 per cent of world military expenditure was allocated to conventional weapons and that the quickest rise in such expenditure was occurring in the developing world, where poverty was greatest. It hoped that all those matters would be considered at the International Conference.

Norway (a non-member) stated that the International Conference offered a valuable opportunity to elaborate guidelines for future activities at the national and international level and to give further impetus to both disarmament and development. For its part, the United Kingdom hoped that the International Conference would give a realistic assessment of the issues involved, including the importance of increasing regional security in order to reduce expenditures on arms in the developing world itself.

International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development

Participation and other organizational matters

The International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development was convened at United Nations Headquarters in New York on 24 August with a total of 150 States participating. In addition, Namibia was represented by the United Nations Council for Namibia. The Holy See and the Palestine Liberation Organization participated as Observers. Among other participants and Observers were nine specialized agencies, six intergovern-

mental organizations, seven other interested United Nations bodies and 183 non-governmental organizations.²²

At its first plenary meeting, opened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, the Conference elected by acclamation its President, Mr. Natwar Singh, Minister of State for External Affairs of India. At the same meeting, the Conference adopted its agenda, the substantive part of which reads as follows:

9. Consideration of the relationship between disarmament and development in all its aspects and dimensions with a view to reaching appropriate conclusions.
10. Consideration of the implications of the level and magnitude of continuing military expenditures, in particular those of the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily important States, for the world economy and the international economic and social situation, particularly for developing countries, and elaboration of appropriate recommendations for remedial measures.
11. Consideration of ways and means of releasing additional resources through disarmament measures, for development purposes, in particular in favour of developing countries.²³

The Conference further unanimously elected nine Vice-Presidents as well as the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole, the Chairmen of the three open-ended Working Groups established to deal in depth with each of the substantive items of the agenda, and the Rapporteur-General. Mr. Martin Huslid of Norway was elected Chairman of the Committee of the Whole, which was established to receive the reports of the Working Groups and to consider them before their submission to the plenary meeting. It was decided that the Working Groups would be chaired, respectively, by Mr. Dietmar Huckle of the German Democratic Republic, Mr. Oscar Oramas-Oliva of Cuba and Mr. Paul Bamela Engo of Cameroon. Mr. Alexander Morrison of Canada was elected Rapporteur-General. The Conference also established a credentials committee composed of 10 members, which, at its first meeting on 4 September, unanimously appointed Mr. Andres Aguilar of Venezuela as its Presiding Officer. In addition, at its opening meeting, the Conference adopted its rules of procedure as recommended by the Preparatory Committee, and

²² For a list of all participants, see A/CONF.130/39, paras. 16-24. The following States participated: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic People's Republic of Korea (non-Member of United Nations), Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea (non-Member of United Nations), Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland (non-Member of United Nations), Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

²³ A/CONF.130/9.

the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee presented the Committee's report to the Conference.²⁴

At the opening meeting, the Secretary-General of the United Nations stated that a link between security, disarmament and development had been very much in the mind of the framers of the Charter of the United Nations. However, because an ever-spiralling arms race had been consuming global resources for four decades, the issue had gained a far more impelling urgency than it had had at the time that the Charter was adopted. He hoped that the Conference would be able to achieve understandings that would encourage all States to take the relationship between disarmament and development into account in their plans and policies. The Secretary-General granted that it was simplistic to suppose that reduced expenditure on arms in wealthier countries would automatically result in increased aid to the less advantaged ones, nor did he believe that disarmament and development should be considered as dependent on each other in the sense that one could not be undertaken without the other: each needed to be pursued and achieved at its own pace and in its own way. He appealed to all States to view the subject of the Conference in a global perspective and stressed that it was one that affected not only the present generation, but future ones as well.

The President of the Conference noted that disarmament was not only a moral imperative, but also an immediate necessity. The continuing crisis of the global economy and the precarious position of the developing countries called for a revitalization of the development process in both developed and developing countries. The President felt that expectations of what the Conference might achieve should be tailored to what was realistically attainable. He wanted to allay apprehensions that the purpose of the Conference was to seek an immediate rechannelling of additional resources for development or instant disarmament measures.

Also during the opening meeting, Mrs. Inga Thorsson of Sweden introduced the joint declaration of the Panel of Eminent Personalities and summarized its main points.

General debate in plenary meetings

In the course of the general plenary debate during the Conference, a great number of participating States expressed their general views on the relationship between disarmament and development. In that connection, most delegations also addressed a third element, the concept of security.

Developing countries underlined the need to reconsider the idea that armaments were a source of security and called attention to the role of socio-economic factors in building up a global security system. Algeria noted that the discussion on the relationship between disarmament and development had highlighted the importance of security as the third element, but it should not lead to the legitimization of the security doctrines which were the source of

²⁴ A/CONF.130/1 and Corr. 1.

the arms race. It announced that developing countries expected the Conference to take sufficiently into account their specific security problems, which aggravated the problems of underdevelopment. Bangladesh believed that in the contemporary world threats to stability did not emanate from military sources: deprivation bred discontent, and therein lay the real threat to peace. The connotation of security had altered radically. Bolivia declared that the link between disarmament and development was of a political and economic character. The arms race, nuclear and conventional, had negative repercussions on the use of limited resources. The Conference, Bolivia believed, provided an opportunity to discuss the relationship between disarmament and development within the framework of security. Brazil felt that the Conference should strengthen the economic argument in favour of disarmament and the political argument in favour of development. No automatic and mechanistic linkage was suggested, but the two objectives should be harmonized. Ethiopia stated that, traditionally, armaments had served as a source of security for peoples and nations, but that currently, armaments, particularly nuclear arms, were proving to be a source of insecurity and instability. In its view, the Conference should seek ways and means of dispensing with the futile search for security through the arms race. The arms industry was thriving on the deprivation of developing countries, which were compelled to divert scarce resources from development to the defence of their territorial integrity and independence.

India called for a re-evaluation and widening of the concept of security to include non-military aspects, such as underdevelopment, maldevelopment and declining prospects for development. It expressed the hope that the follow-up action to be taken on the recommendations of the Conference would open new vistas for multilateral co-operation under the aegis of the United Nations. Indonesia noted that there was no disagreement in viewing disarmament and development as the twin pillars of a peaceful and prosperous world. They were parallel and distinct processes and both had an impact on security, the third element in the triad of peace.

Pakistan stressed that progress had to be made simultaneously in three areas: in security, in disarmament and in greater socio-economic development. The dilemma posed by the competing demands of security and development was particularly acute for the developing countries, which could not afford to postpone development until a perfect system of global security had been constructed.

Venezuela maintained that the security of a country depended on the equilibrium between its political-military, economic, and social dimensions. In many cases, security was threatened by factors which were not of a military character, but were the consequences of underdevelopment. Zimbabwe believed that the age of the unilateral pursuit of security through armament was over. It stressed that security was a function not only of disarmament, but also of development.

Western countries tended to put particular emphasis on the role that the concept of security played in the triad of disarmament, development and security. Thus, Canada held the view that there was no reason to believe that Governments were likely to disarm, at the expense of what they considered

their security, in order to divert funds to development. Security was the touchstone, and each nation would judge its own security on its own terms. Canada believed that the Conference should adopt a consensus statement to the effect that the security of everyone would be strengthened by both disarmament and development, two objectives, Canada noted, to which it was strongly committed. Denmark, speaking on behalf of the twelve member States of the European Community, pointed out the complexity of the disarmament-development relationship and held that it could only be correctly understood when disarmament and development were viewed in the larger context of their mutual relationship with security. Disarmament and development were two distinct processes; progress in development must not be held hostage to progress in arms control and disarmament.

France noted that disarmament and development were equally important goals of the international community and that each should be pursued for its own merits. France was convinced that there existed a synergism between actions that could be taken in the two fields, which necessarily rested on the enhancement of international security. Disarmament could not be made a precondition for development, because the benefits to be expected from disarmament agreements would not be, at least in the short term, proportionate to the needs of development. The complexity of the disarmament-development relationship arose from the diverse situations of various States. On the one hand, there were some rich countries with relatively few arms; on the other, there were some poor countries that had to devote an abnormally large part of their national product to defence. France held that international security was not the result of a single cause. Focusing exclusively on arms limitation could hide the collective responsibility of the international community to help improve the daily lot of millions of human beings through the elimination of sickness, hunger and all that was incompatible with the dignity of man and his individual rights. Those goals, France declared, should not be considered any less important than disarmament.

In referring to a joint document by the Nordic countries on the subject of the Conference,²⁵ Norway observed that the notion of security, traditionally understood in terms of political and military threats to national sovereignty, had to be expanded to include the growing impact of non-military factors. It was important for the outcome of the Conference to focus not on disarmament or development *per se*, but on their relationship. It was hardly possible to conclude that the link between them was automatic in nature; however, the primary objective should be to ensure that the moral aspect of the relationship received international political acceptance. The United Kingdom observed that the first duty of government was to provide security for its citizens. Security was a prerequisite for both real progress in disarmament and a rapid pace of economic development. The United Kingdom did not see a simple, automatic link between enhanced security at lower levels of armaments and an increased pace of development; there were several questions to be answered before the nature of any link could be elaborated with confidence.

²⁵ A/CONF.130/3.

A number of neutral and non-aligned States also emphasized the need to consider the non-military aspects of security. They stressed that the role and capacities of the United Nations in both disarmament and development should be strengthened. Austria stated that the promotion of a broader approach to the concept of peace and security was highly important and was a key issue of the Conference. Non-military threats to national and international security should be more widely recognized. Finland pointed out that if the Conference were to serve a useful purpose, it should not shy away from asking even painful questions about disarmament and development. The only clear and undisputed link between them was a moral one. If the Conference could show a way to development that would, at the same time, reduce conflicts and strengthen security through other than military means, it would make a significant contribution to disarmament.

Ireland also held that security could not be limited to the military sphere alone: living conditions, human rights and freedoms were key elements of both security and development. Sweden declared that if the gap between poor and rich countries did not diminish, everybody's security and world peace would be threatened. The arms race and its political, economic and social consequences were incompatible with the implementation of an international order based on justice, equity and co-operation. Yugoslavia considered that the Conference should provide, among other things, a realistic picture of the relationship between disarmament, development and security, assess the negative consequences of the arms race, and ensure that the idea of the relationship between disarmament and development would become one of the most important preoccupations of the United Nations. Switzerland indicated that disarmament could foster development but was not a pre-condition for it. There would be no automatic transfer of funds from disarmament to development.

Socialist States emphasized that both disarmament and development were organic elements of the comprehensive system of international peace and security that they advocated. In a message to the Conference, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, stated that the Conference could make a substantial contribution to the internationalization of efforts to make disarmament a factor in development. The Soviet Union would continue to do its utmost to strengthen the role of the United Nations in promoting development through disarmament.

Czechoslovakia believed that disarmament and development were profoundly and inseparably related. It noted that the socialist countries had elaborated a concept of comprehensive international security and a concrete programme for eliminating nuclear and other kinds of weapons of mass destruction by the year 2000. The German Democratic Republic held the view that if international security was to be sustained, there must be assurance that all peoples and States could advance economically and socially, that underdevelopment would be overcome, and that a new, democratic international economic order would be established. Disarmament measures would substantially improve conditions for achieving those objectives. They were a unique source of material and financial resources, which could be used to

step up the economic and social development of States, support the developing countries and solve global problems such as hunger, disease or environmental pollution.

Hungary stated that the non-military threats to international security were generated by the anomalies of socio-economic development. Developing countries suffered the most from the critical economic situation and found themselves in a situation of marginal security as well. However, security and economic problems were far from insurmountable; security must be maximized with the minimum possible loss to national economies. Poland welcomed the convening of the Conference, believing that it was timely, given current realities. In its view, the link between disarmament and development called for strengthening international economic security as part and parcel of stable and normal economic relations among States. Romania held that the Conference should launch an urgent appeal for the acceleration of all negotiations in all disarmament forums with a view to the adoption of a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

Most delegations made reference to military expenditures and the possibility of diverting them to development purposes.

The non-aligned countries emphasized the very high level those expenditures had reached and advocated their rechannelling to benefit socio-economic development. Egypt pointed out that history books were replete with evidence that lack of resources had hindered development while, at the same time, valuable resources had been directed towards armaments under the guise of increased security. In its view, the significance of the Conference lay in the fact that it was an admission by all participants that a very critical stage in the evolution of the international political system had been reached—one in which tangible and urgent remedial measures were imperative to promote economic and social development. Ghana stated that disarmament would increase the security of third world countries and enable them to direct their resources to more productive use. Ghana would support whatever conclusions the Conference might reach for more productive use of the resources of mankind. India held that the Conference should develop an array of arguments against the current irrational arms race that would be based on economic considerations as compelling as the political ones. In speaking of the implications of the magnitude of military spending, Indonesia found it disturbing that the arms race not only drained resources away from international development purposes, but also impinged on the scope and content of international economic relations. The centre-piece of the Conference's efforts should be consideration of the ways and means of releasing additional resources for development purposes.

Mexico noted that at a time of international economic crisis, military expenditures were growing faster than the world gross national product. To those who felt that disarmament was an expensive process, it pointed out that the cost of peace was always lower than the price of war. Nigeria stated that disarmament should be accorded high priority, since it would promote development through the release of additional resources, which could then be put to use to improve the general quality of life. In adopting the Declaration

on the Denuclearization of Africa, that continent had placed emphasis on security through the increased allocation of resources for development.

Senegal reiterated its proposal concerning a tax on military budgets for the benefit of development, stating that if there were such a tax, it would help to solve the problem of the transparency of military expenditures. Sri Lanka stressed that the human dimension of overarmament and underdevelopment had been brought into sharp focus by the polarization of wealth and poverty. The structure of peace should be built on the firm foundation of the security of all nations and the socio-economic well-being of all peoples. Venezuela stated that the arms race had not only increased global military expenditures, but had also contributed to increased insecurity. Moreover, economic growth had actually declined in many developing countries.

Yugoslavia held that the Conference should, among other things, point to the ways and means of providing additional resources for development and of bridging the gap between developed and developing countries. It should also address a resolute call for undertaking concrete measures to bring about the cessation of the arms race and the gradual reduction of military expenditures. Zimbabwe called upon the Conference to establish the fact that military expenditure had exacerbated non-military threats to security. The illusory search for security through enhanced armament should stop and resources should be released to accelerate development.

Socialist countries spoke in favour of arms reductions and held that the savings thus achieved should be channelled to increased assistance for development purposes. In that connection, they endorsed increased openness in military matters and expenditures. In his message to the Conference, General Secretary Gorbachev called for greater openness concerning military activities and military expenditures. He recalled that the Soviet Union had proposed a comparison of the military doctrines of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, an action which, he believed, would also make possible a realistic comparison of military budgets with a view to restricting them to the limits of reasonable sufficiency. He called on every State to prepare a national plan of conversion, which would testify to its resolve to curtail military production.

The Soviet Union further noted that it was imperative to begin promptly to divert resources from armament to development. That was the essence of the concept of the relationship between disarmament and development. An understanding could be reached that disarmament agreements would be accompanied by statements of their financial implications, indicating the share of the funds saved that could be earmarked for assistance to developing countries. All major military Powers, including the permanent members of the Security Council, should, in the Soviet Union's view, take part in the transfer of disarmament-related funds to development and thus supplement the already existing forms of assistance to developing countries. The resources could be transferred not only in the form of financial aid, but also in kind (commodities, fuel, materials, equipment and food), as well as services and expert assistance. Aid could be provided both multilaterally and bilaterally on non-discriminatory terms, taking into account the most urgent needs of recipients.

The German Democratic Republic urged action-oriented decisions to give concrete substance to the "disarmament and development" principle. Poland indicated that it was ready to allocate a specific part of released resources to development and to join efforts to find realistic solutions to the issues being addressed by the Conference. It was concerned about the militarization of scientific research and its increasing cost. Romania declared that a freeze and a reduction of military expenditures offered a practical method of halting the arms race and proceeding to disarmament. It urged the Conference to request all States to freeze their military budgets at the 1987 level and then move to significant reductions.

China stated that the level of its military spending had decreased yearly, from 17.5 per cent in 1979 to less than 10 per cent in 1986. Over recent years, a part of its military facilities had been turned to civilian use to promote the development of the national economy. Its armed forces were also engaged in agricultural production on a large scale. China believed that its experience showed that handling the relationship between national defence and economic construction rationally was not only necessary, but also possible.

Western States emphasized, among other things, the need for a reliable data base and thus increased transparency regarding military expenditures. Many of them also advocated a rethinking of the priorities in the spending plans of States, mentioning in particular restraint on military acquisitions. Belgium held that States should support the United Nations efforts by providing data on military budgets as well as economic and social indicators. The Conference should focus on possible concrete measures for promoting its objectives, such as the regional approach. Denmark, speaking on behalf of the twelve member States of the European Community, advocated restraint in military expenditures and greater efforts to promote social and economic development. It believed that a closer study of the disarmament and development relationship might identify the internal reallocation of resources from military to economic and social purposes as the approach most likely to have an early impact on development. A reassessment of ideas and an expression of political will were needed. It was in the interest of all nations to discuss the underlying causes of the continued growth in military expenditure around the world. A reliable data base and more transparency on military expenditures were also required.

France noted that appeals to the most heavily armed Powers to reduce by a fixed percentage their military expenditure and tax their own budgets for the benefit of development aid had not reached their aim because, by their very nature, such measures could not take into account the actual reasons that had led those States to acquire increasingly sophisticated and expensive weapons. In its view, efforts to eliminate underdevelopment in the least developed countries, to increase the participation of the poorest States in the world economy, to give assistance in economic restructuring and to search for solutions adapted to the various situations of indebtedness must have priority. Those goals should be pursued independently of negotiations on disarmament.

The Federal Republic of Germany believed that there were two “neur-
algie” points in the discussion. First, the Federal Republic stressed, the motive
for disarmament efforts was to ensure security and stable peace at a lower
level of forces and armaments, not to make the release of resources possible.
At the same time, it held that the fulfilment of urgent development tasks must
not be made contingent on the possibility of releasing funds through disar-
mament and transferring them to development at some point in the future.
Secondly, to avoid a tendency to view the disparity between disarmament and
development in summary fashion, one should carefully analyse what the most
serious problems and their causes were. In its view, the key concept was that
of overarming, as Governments which overarmed deprived themselves and
their neighbours of resources for development.

Japan held that disarmament could not be regarded simply as a means
of releasing human and material resources for development; there was no
automatic linkage between disarmament and development. More openness in
providing information on armaments and military expenditures was essential
for building confidence among States and for advancing disarmament. Thus,
the reporting of military spending by all Member States of the United Nations
should be a first step. National and international efforts for development
should not be allowed to slacken, and disarmament and development should
proceed independently and in parallel. The scale and nature of resources to
be released from disarmament for development would vary according to the
nature of a particular disarmament measure, and it would be difficult to
estimate the extent to which reallocation would be possible. Japan cautioned
that it would be necessary to carefully consider possible substantial costs in
the implementation of certain disarmament efforts, for instance, those entailed
in ensuring effective means of verification.

Norway stated that an extended data base and all States’ participation
in the United Nations standardized reporting system for military expenditures
would facilitate an understanding of the relationship between disarmament
and development. Similarly, Turkey emphasized the importance of openness
for confidence-building. It further noted that the possibility of releasing fi-
nancial resources through arms reductions represented only one facet of the
relationship between disarmament and development. The real impact of com-
prehensive, balanced and verifiable arms reductions would be on the structure
of national economies, international trade and co-operation. The United King-
dom declared that development should not depend only on the transfer of
resources from one country or group of countries to another; States could
enhance their own development by reordering the priorities in their spending
plans. In its view, it was incumbent upon all Governments to examine the
possibilities of reducing their acquisition of arms, thus allowing a greater
proportion of their resources to be devoted to their own socio-economic
development.

Neutral States underlined both the need for transparency with regard to
military outlays and the urgency of reallocating resources to human needs.
Austria stated that in order to carry out such a reallocation, it was necessary
to assess the resources involved, and it felt that an accurate data base on

military budgets and arms transfers would be required. It endorsed all meaningful efforts to supply the United Nations with full and objective information on the military budgets of its Member States. Finland noted that on a global level the arms race impeded prospects for economic growth and delayed the development process, but that on a national level the moral link became a question of the allocation of resources, with security often seen as an overriding priority. Many disarmament agreements did not lead to an immediate release of resources for other purposes and their financial effects could only be estimated when they had been translated into national action.

Ireland observed that many goals that developing countries were trying to attain remained unmet in some industrialized countries. It believed that resources released from military use would constitute a substantial reserve which could be used for supporting economic and social development, and that a transfer of even a part of those resources would prove to be in the interests of both developing and developed countries. Similarly, Sweden held that important domestic social needs of industrialized countries could be satisfied by the resources that an international disarmament process would free. Solidarity between groups within a country tended to increase solidarity with people in other countries; such solidarity was, therefore, equally important for poor and rich countries. Switzerland believed that the relationship between disarmament, development and security should be examined in greater depth. It would thus be useful to increase transparency regarding global military expenditures and to study their impact on the world's economic prospects. Attention should also be given to conditions under which military means could increasingly be used for humanitarian and development purposes.

A number of delegations made proposals and comments on the conversion of resources to socio-economic development. The Soviet Union proposed the elaboration of a new economic model of the world in conditions of disarmament, which would include conversion plans in developed countries with due regard for the needs of world economic development. It further suggested that consideration be given to ways of implementing major joint programmes and pooling the resources and intellectual potentials of States. Sweden stated that it was essential to examine measures for facilitating defence-industry diversification and conversion. A national study on the problem carried out in Sweden had shown that adjustment problems arising in connection with conversion from military to civil production were not insurmountable and that the transitional effects of disarmament for the economy as a whole would be manageable. Nepal believed that it was premature to speak of conversion of resources before specific measures of arms limitation had been adopted. While there was a need to make preparations for conversion in advance, it should not be used as an excuse for delaying disarmament. Zimbabwe held that the difficulties of conversion would be temporary, while the benefits of conversion would be lasting. For conversion-related studies proposed by Romania, the Soviet Union and Sweden, see below.

Some delegations made observations and/or put forward proposals on the question of arms transfers. The Federal Republic of Germany recalled its suggestion regarding the establishment of a United Nations register for in-

ternational arms transfers. Guatemala endorsed the view, previously expressed by Mexico, that the transfer of weapons, promoted by East-West tension and regional conflicts, drained resources that were indispensable for social well-being and served the political and commercial interests of weapon-producing countries. Sri Lanka recalled its proposal for the establishment of a world disarmament authority to monitor and control arms transfers. Sweden held that problems related to arms transfers must be discussed on an international level, but expected no easy solutions to the complex issues involved. In its view, it was necessary to engage both arms exporters and recipients in a dialogue. Sweden was presently considering further measures of restraint and control for its own arms exports.

The potential of regional efforts in promoting security, disarmament and development was underlined by a number of participating countries. Denmark, speaking on behalf of the Twelve, expressed the view that regional co-operation to enhance confidence, create stability and reduce tension assumed far-reaching importance in the current world situation, where single events might have global repercussions. The Twelve had actively participated in such efforts in Europe and supported similar ones in other parts of the world. Similarly, Belgium, Norway and the United Kingdom stressed the importance of regional initiatives. The Federal Republic of Germany expressed the view that regional associations would have to bear increased responsibility for the settlement of conflicts in their respective regions and could ultimately merge into a global peace structure. The Soviet Union expressed its readiness to respond positively, on the basis of reciprocity with the United States, to regional initiatives, provided that their results would meet the legitimate interests of all States in the respective regions.

In Pakistan's view, regional security, arms control and development could be promoted in a step-by-step process envisaging: (a) measures to build mutual trust and confidence; (b) efforts to resolve outstanding disputes or remove misunderstandings, through accepted international procedures, and to ease regional tensions; (c) promotion of economic and social co-operation on the basis of mutual benefit; (d) the evolution of co-ordinated positions among regional States regarding threats to the security of one or more of them from outside the region; (e) efforts to establish an acceptable military equilibrium among the States of the region; (f) the development, where necessary, of appropriate institutional mechanisms to promote confidence-building measures, security, disarmament and development; and (g) joint regional initiatives to promote disarmament and development in the regional and global context. For a related study proposed by Pakistan, see below.

A number of broad and/or specific targets for the Conference were proposed by delegations in addition to those mentioned in other contexts in this section and elsewhere in the chapter.

Egypt suggested the following targets for the Conference. First, States should commit themselves to include in any unilateral, bilateral or multilateral disarmament measures provisions for making resources resulting from such measures available for economic and social development. Secondly, pending the establishment of a fund, States should commit themselves to set aside

resources released through disarmament for assistance to States afflicted by natural disasters or development problems of a particularly acute nature. Thirdly, the Conference should enhance the role of the United Nations system in implementing concrete measures in disarmament and development, particularly in monitoring disarmament measures and reallocating resources released for development. For a related study proposed by Egypt, see below.

France suggested a number of specific actions, among which were the following. First, an evaluation might be made by a group of experts of the savings that could be achieved over the 10-year periods following conclusion of agreements in the chemical, conventional or nuclear fields. The Conference might recommend that the General Assembly invite a group of experts to make an initial assessment of savings through disarmament and also request the most heavily armed countries to calculate their potential savings. Thus, the United States and the Soviet Union should, *inter alia*, communicate their initial evaluation of the economic consequences of halving their strategic arsenals, which they had decided in principle to do at their summit meeting at Reykjavik in October 1986. Secondly, international co-operation was needed to make use of the resources and human and technical skills of countries' armed forces in development and humanitarian operations, for example, in rescue work during natural catastrophes. For France's views on possible new machinery, see below.

The German Democratic Republic held that the final document of the Conference could call upon the States concerned to intensify their disarmament negotiations, taking due account of the relationship between disarmament and development. The United Nations and the international mass media should be invited to give more coverage to the negative social and economic effects of the arms race and to ongoing disarmament efforts.

Hungary proposed: (a) establishing a disarmament agency for verification of compliance; (b) creating a disarmament fund for financing research programmes on problems of disarmament; (c) guaranteeing the security of peaceful nuclear facilities; (d) establishing greater openness in scientific activities to prevent their military application; and (e) establishing greater transparency regarding dual-purpose technologies.

India proposed that the participants to the Conference: (a) reaffirm their commitment in the fields of both disarmament and development and reiterate their determination to adopt appropriate measures to implement these commitments; (b) recognize the reality of the relationship between disarmament and development and the need to ensure an effective and mutually reinforcing relationship between them; (c) give practical shape to this relationship through specific measures at all levels; (d) reaffirm their commitment, in principle, to allocate a portion of the resources released through disarmament for development, particularly for the developing countries; and (e) undertake to give consideration to the establishment of an international financial mechanism to facilitate such transfers. In addition, India attached importance to: (a) analyses, on a regular basis, of the impact of global military expenditures on the world economy and the international economic system; (b) greater efforts by the United Nations to promote collective knowledge of the non-military

threats to international security; and (c) a United Nations undertaking to carry out public information and educational activities to alert the world to the consequences of the very high level of military expenditures and arouse world public opinion, particularly in the countries with the highest military expenditures, against such expenditures.

Ireland suggested five fundamental elements for a basic course of action: (a) renewed commitment by States to disarmament and development; (b) exploration of methods for redeploying resources from disarmament, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries; (c) promotion of confidence-building measures in order to reduce tensions and arms transfers in the conventional field; (d) an undertaking by active arms producers to examine how some of their arms industries could be prepared for conversion; and (e) strengthening the United Nations role in disarmament and development. In Ireland's view, those elements should be considered as a basis for a first step in a long process.

Japan held that the task of the Conference was to examine in a comprehensive manner and from a long-term perspective the conceptual relationship between disarmament and development, as described in the 1978 Final Document, and to produce results that would foster peace and prosperity throughout the world. The Conference should avoid attempting to find a "quick fix" for fundamental issues and instead seek to produce fruitful results that would be of mid-term and long-term benefit.

The Netherlands considered that the Conference should: (a) recommend that the United Nations find ways and means to create an adequate system for registering data on military expenditure; (b) recommend that an analysis of the arms trade be made on the basis of exact data on flows of arms; (c) reaffirm the objectives outlined in the 1978 Final Document, in particular, the desirability of releasing resources from disarmament to development; and (d) recommend that Member States make available military resources for humanitarian and economic purposes like disaster relief.

The Soviet Union made extensive proposals on possible measures in the field of disarmament and development. For example, it suggested that a broad, integrated approach, which would not be divided into political, economic or technological sectors, was needed to solve the problem of reducing military budgets. Moreover, it advocated that alternatives to military confrontation be found, for example, establishment of a world space organization. It urged all States to actively seek ways of reducing the amount of resources absorbed in the military sector of their economies, placing special emphasis on the question of the arms trade. For the Soviet Union's views on the transfer of resources through disarmament to development and the problems of conversion, see above, and for its suggestions for possible new machinery, see below.

In addition, Argentina stated that the Conference should try to seek solutions and not engage in recriminations. Australia believed that the essential purpose of the Conference was to reinforce the collective determination to conclude effective and durable arms control and disarmament agreements. The Conference should also focus on forging the new relationship between disarmament and development and resolve to diminish the share of limited

resources devoted to armaments. Bulgaria held that the basic purpose of the Conference was to reaffirm the inherent relationship between disarmament and development and to highlight the advantages to all countries that would flow from its practical implementation. It supported the idea that the final document should call on all States to carry out, as soon as possible, practical disarmament measures for development purposes. In Canada's view, practical solutions to the problem of the arms race were needed so that Member States could devote fewer resources to weapons and more to development, as security in the modern interdependent world demanded both disarmament and development.

New Zealand believed that broad consensus was within grasp, since agreement had been reached in the Preparatory Committee on the elements of a declaration and an action programme. Norway suggested that the Conference consider making a significant contribution to efforts to put military resources to peaceful uses by increasing the peace-keeping role of the United Nations. Yugoslavia held that the Conference should adopt a workable action programme, which would provide a framework for further efforts.

Some new ideas concerning studies in the general area of disarmament and development were suggested during the Conference. Egypt hoped that the Conference would set in motion a detailed study by the United Nations on ways and means of ensuring, through an international mechanism or fund, that resources saved from disarmament would be directed to social and economic development, particularly in the developing countries. Pakistan proposed that the Secretary-General be authorized to initiate a comprehensive study of how an integrated process for security, disarmament and development could be promoted at the regional level in various parts of the world. In Romania's opinion, an examination should be made, within the United Nations, of practical aspects concerning the conversion of military resources to peaceful, civilian uses. In that connection, it expressed the view that the ongoing study on the economic and social consequences of the arms race should pay particular attention to effects on the process of development. The Soviet Union spoke in favour of conversion-related studies, both national and international, public and private, to be conducted by any interested parties. It supported the idea of carrying out an international expert study on the conversion problem in all its aspects, together with an exploration of ways of monitoring the implementation of conversion measures. Sweden called for national follow-up studies to the United Nations study on the relationship between disarmament and development, as exemplified by the study that had been made in Sweden.

Some specific proposals were made regarding possible machinery to give effect to the disarmament-development relationship, especially a mechanism, usually envisaged as a fund, for reallocating resources to development purposes. The Soviet Union proposed setting up, within the United Nations framework, an international disarmament for development fund open to all States, with a view to transferring resources released through disarmament to the countries in need. The fund would receive part of the resources saved by a State as a result of disarmament measures and reductions in military

spending. The fund could be established on the basis of an international agreement regulating its activities and the distribution of its resources. The assets of the fund could be transferred to developing countries either directly or through the United Nations system.

The Soviet Union further held that international mechanisms and, above all, the United Nations, should be called upon to play a central role in implementing a "disarmament for development" strategy. It suggested that it should be the task of the Security Council to follow closely the issues of disarmament and development. Recommendations of the Conference, as well as the entire complex of disarmament and development problems, could be the subject of a special meeting of the leaders of the member States of the Security Council. The Soviet Union further proposed holding a review conference on the relationship between disarmament and development in three to five years and holding other such conferences on a regular basis thereafter. It also suggested that IAEA and other United Nations specialized agencies and bodies could and must play an increased role, within their terms of competence. A valuable contribution could also be made by two organizations it had proposed: a world space organization and an international centre for joint research and development of space equipment.

France stated that it remained committed to the idea of setting up an international financial mechanism to facilitate the allocation of a part of the resources gradually freed through the implementation of disarmament agreements to developing countries. It regretted that a consensus had not emerged on that count. It further called for the establishment of a United Nations "observatory", within UNIDIR's institutional framework, to assess military spending. Countries could report to the observatory their military budgets together with an evaluation of the impact of military expenditure on their economies. Denmark, speaking on behalf of the Twelve, also indicated that a monitoring centre to register and evaluate levels of military spending could be established under the auspices of the United Nations.

Austria and Norway suggested that the idea of a monitoring centre be further explored. Yugoslavia held that the Conference's final document should envisage the establishment of an appropriate international mechanism for providing additional resources released from disarmament for promoting development, particularly in developing countries.

Algeria stated that measures to set up financial mechanisms for channelling resources should be realistic and that they should fall within the framework of United Nations programmes in an integrated manner. Brazil recalled its 1964 proposal in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament for the creation of a fund for industrial conversion and economic development, which would apply savings produced by cuts in military budgets to the financing of development assistance programmes. For its part, Cuba reiterated its 1979 proposal for the allocation of a fund of \$300 billion for the development of the third world and its 1985 proposal for the establishment of a new international economic order as a means of ensuring that the crisis of the third world would yield to the thrust of accelerated and independent development processes. It also noted that a disarmament programme providing

for a 15-per cent cut in the military spending of both industrialized countries and third world nations would release a total of almost \$100 billion a year to development, amounting to approximately three times the total official development assistance allocated to the third world.

Indonesia held that the Conference should lay down at the very least a comprehensive basis and viable framework for future action and continuing efforts in the field of disarmament and development. In its view, the need to establish an international financial mechanism to facilitate the transfer of disarmament-released resources could not be denied. If such a facility were to take the form of a new autonomous agency within the United Nations system, it would constitute tangible evidence of the acknowledged relationship between disarmament and development. However, as a transitional measure, such a facility could also be set up within the organizational structure of an appropriate existing body.

Nigeria supported the proposal for the establishment of an international disarmament fund for development, a proposal, it recalled, that had been made at the United Nations as early as 1955. Pakistan stressed that the largest military spenders must assume the major obligation to promote the agreed goals of disarmament and development and should be urged to contribute generously to a special fund, which, in its view, should be established under the aegis of the United Nations. In the same vein, Sri Lanka recalled that it had proposed that the heaviest military spenders voluntarily reduce their military expenditures in any area of their choice and that the process of voluntary reduction progressively involve more States. The resources thus saved could be channelled through an interim development fund until a permanent fund was set up.

Togo called for a recommendation that a certain percentage of resources should be allocated to countries affected by natural calamities. Viet Nam strongly supported the Soviet proposal to establish an international fund for disarmament and development within the United Nations framework.

The German Democratic Republic believed that principles for the allocation of resources released by disarmament measures should be elaborated, along with an appropriate mechanism in the form of a disarmament for development fund. Poland held that the Conference should establish an international mechanism for promoting development through disarmament and involve the United Nations to a greater extent in the process. A positive role would be played by a high-level meeting of the Security Council, as proposed by the Soviet Union.

Several delegations, including Belgium, Finland, India, Kuwait, the Philippines, Romania, Poland and Switzerland, emphasized the need for informed and active public opinion on the issues addressed by the Conference. They felt that a larger section of the public should be made aware of the relationship between disarmament and development.

Work of the Committee of the Whole and its Working Groups

The Committee of the Whole held nine meetings from 26 August to 9 September. After adopting its programme of work, it decided to take as a basis for its work the draft for a final document which the Preparatory Committee had annexed to its report at its final session in May 1987 and had transmitted to the Conference.²⁶

The Committee of the Whole devoted its first three open meetings to a general exchange of views on the subject of the Conference and the preambular part of the draft for the final document. It also invited the Secretary-General of the Conference to report on the activities undertaken to publicize the themes and purposes of the Conference. A number of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations made statements during those meetings. A total of 36 oral statements were made; in addition, 61 written statements were submitted to the Conference, reflecting the different approaches of various segments of the public.²⁷

The three Working Groups of the Committee of the Whole held five closed meetings each and dealt in depth with each of the substantive items of the Conference. Working Group I considered agenda item 9, entitled "Consideration of the relationship between disarmament and development in all its aspects and dimensions with a view to reaching appropriate conclusions". Working Group II dealt with agenda item 10, entitled "Consideration of the implications of the level and magnitude of continuing military expenditures, in particular those of the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily important States, for the world economy and the international economic and social situation, particularly for developing countries, and elaboration of appropriate recommendations for remedial measures". Working Group III dealt with agenda item 11, entitled "Consideration of ways and means of releasing additional resources through disarmament measures, for development purposes, in particular in favour of developing countries".

In accordance with the decision taken by the Committee of the Whole, the Preparatory Committee's draft for a final document served as a basis for the deliberations of the Working Groups. The Groups also took into account all the documents submitted by delegations to the Conference.²⁸ In the course of their work, various views were expressed on the issues and a large number of proposals and amendments to the draft text for a final document were submitted. On that basis, the Chairmen of the Working Groups prepared papers for consideration by the Committee of the Whole with a view to achieving a consensus text. On 4 September they submitted the outcome of their work to that Committee.

The Chairman of the Committee of the Whole then conducted intensive consultations with individual delegations and groups of delegations and sub-

²⁶ A/CONF.130/1 and Corr.1, annex III.

²⁷ For a list of the written and oral statements by the non-governmental organizations, see A/CONF.130/INF/4.

²⁸ For the documents submitted by the delegations, see A/CONF.130/39, paragraph 26.

sequently submitted a consolidated paper to the Committee that took into account the three draft proposals of the Working Groups and the views expressed during his consultations. On 9 September the Committee of the Whole decided by consensus to recommend the draft final document to the Conference for adoption.²⁹

Concluding part of the Conference

At its final plenary meeting, on 11 September, the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development concluded its work by adopting by consensus its Final Document, as recommended by the Committee of the Whole and as contained in its report to the General Assembly.³⁰ The report was introduced by the Rapporteur-General and also adopted by consensus.

The Final Document begins with a brief preamble. Its subsequent paragraphs are organized under the following headings: "Relationship between disarmament and development in all its aspects and dimensions" (paragraphs 8 to 19), "Implications of the level and magnitude of the continuing military expenditures, in particular those of the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily important States, for the world economy and the international economic and social situation, particularly for developing countries" (paragraphs 20 to 29), and "Ways and means of releasing additional resources through disarmament measures for development purposes, in particular in favour of developing countries" (paragraphs 30 to 34). The Document ends with the "Action programme" (paragraph 35), aimed at, among other things, (a) fostering an interrelated perspective on disarmament, development and security, (b) promoting multilateralism in that context, and (c) strengthening the central role of the United Nations in the interrelated fields of disarmament and development. The text of the Final Document is reproduced in the annex to this chapter.

At the time of the adoption of the Final Document, a number of delegations commented on it and the Conference in general. Developing countries emphasized that the very holding of the Conference was a victory for multilateral efforts at a time of crisis. Algeria noted that the Final Document did not fulfil all the justifiable expectations of non-aligned countries, even taking into account the constraints imposed by the need for consensus, but that its adoption signified that the relationship between disarmament and development had for the first time been explicitly recognized on the intergovernmental level. Cameroon pointed out that it was the implementation of the Document that would determine its lasting value. It regretted what it perceived as an over-emphasis on the issue of security in the text.

India felt that some of the important achievements of the Conference were that it had posed the right questions, conducted its deliberations in a

²⁹ A/CONF.130/21.

³⁰ See the Report of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development (A/CONF.130/39), part II, for the Final Document. The Final Document was subsequently issued as a United Nations publication, Sales No. E.87.IX.8.

constructive spirit and formulated remedial suggestions. While there was no room for complacency, there was every reason to be satisfied with the advance towards shared goals. Mexico noted that the Document acknowledged the historic importance of the Conference, but established virtually no mechanisms for the follow-up and implementation of the action programme. It continued to have misgivings about rules of procedure, in particular consensus, which might paralyse the parliamentary functioning of multilateral forums. The success of consensus as a method of work depended, in its view, on the *a priori* recognition of the need for political will to make mutual concessions. Zimbabwe regretted what it considered as vagueness in the Document's provisions on machinery. It nevertheless welcomed the recognition in the Document that underdevelopment threatened security and that there were compelling economic arguments for disarmament.

The German Democratic Republic, speaking on behalf of the socialist countries, stated that they appreciated the constructive atmosphere in which the Conference had taken place. Although the Final Document would not satisfy all delegations completely, what counted was its positive basic line, which could give further momentum to international efforts to achieve progress in both disarmament and development. It felt that the Document rightly emphasized that the concept of security had become global, encompassing the whole gamut of military, political, economic, ecological and humanitarian problems. Recognition of the growing interdependence among nations, a collective approach to respond to the needs of humanity as a whole and multilateralism provided the framework within which the relationship between disarmament and development should be shaped. The German Democratic Republic reaffirmed the proposals put forward by the socialist States during the course of the Conference and stated that they stood ready to co-operate with all States and to participate constructively in the implementation of the action programme.

China supported the main thrust of the Final Document, but felt that it was not as good as one might wish. In its view, the Document should have pointed out that the super-Powers had the primary responsibility for halting the arms race, achieving disarmament and assisting development. No country should possess military forces exceeding the need for self-defence or shirk its responsibility for disarmament.

Western States welcomed the consensus achieved in the adoption of the Final Document. However, several of them expressed reservations concerning some of its aspects. Australia noted that the delegations had come to the Conference with considerable differences, and that those differences had been further highlighted by the fact that not all States participated. The consensus that had nevertheless been achieved would have effects beyond the Conference. The Final Document signaled a new approach to grave problems. Canada felt that the Conference had increased world consciousness of the fact that true security demanded both disarmament and development. The Final Document avoided pretensions of a "quick-fix" and responded to the sceptics who doubted that disarmament and development were interrelated through security. Denmark, speaking on behalf of the twelve member States of the

European Community, stated that they welcomed the consensus. Many delegations would have difficulties with parts of the text, but the outcome was a victory for multilateralism, not for any individual delegation. One of the achievements was the affirmation of the understanding that security was a broad concept encompassing social, humanitarian, environmental and developmental aspects as well as military ones.

France found it encouraging that it had been possible to overcome differences and produce a compromise document. The compromise, unlikely to satisfy everyone, embodied concrete points of convergence on essential items, such as the view that security played a key role in the complex relationship between disarmament and development. The participants had realized that progress was attainable only to the extent that one would concentrate on limited objectives. France regretted that certain elements, such as the importance of the visibility of military spending, had not been spelt out explicitly enough in the Final Document. The Federal Republic of Germany regarded the consensus arrived at as an important achievement, although the compromise text contained elements not adequately reflecting its position. For instance, it felt that the central role of security had not been sufficiently reflected in the Document, and it questioned the existence of a mechanical link between the release of resources through disarmament measures and the transfer of such resources to development assistance. The Federal Republic could not assume any legal or political commitment to that effect, but would continue to accord assistance in the spirit of partnership and solidarity with developing countries.

The Netherlands expressed largely similar reservations, but stated that it had joined the consensus in the spirit of compromise. New Zealand considered that the consensus represented a message of hope. It would not transform attitudes overnight, but it marked the beginning of a process of persuading policy-makers that real security called for all-embracing security policies that would address the needs of all countries and all regions. Norway believed that one of the central messages of the Document was that peace and security were not threatened by military factors only, but also by non-military ones. Its adoption had shown the outside world, including critics, that the Conference had not been in vain.

The United Kingdom reiterated its commitment to disarmament and development, each for its own sake, but believed that disarmament measures which did not take into account national security could not contribute to security on a broader plane. Resources could be released through disarmament measures, but to demonstrate that, accurate information on military expenditure was necessary. The United Kingdom reserved the right to allocate its development assistance in accordance with its own priorities through the channels it deemed most appropriate. It expressed reservations concerning some aspects of the Final Document, including what it considered improper citation of the Charter of the United Nations and lack of acknowledgement of high military budgets and arms production in many developing countries.

Mostly positive views on the outcome of the Conference were expressed by neutral States. Finland held that the learning process initiated in the Con-

ference would deepen understanding of the problems of disarmament and development. A basis for follow-up action had been created and a challenge had been addressed to Governments, the United Nations system, non-governmental organizations and individuals. Sweden felt that the Conference had achieved more than many had thought possible. The Final Document did not just analyse problems, it also pointed in a direction. The relationship between disarmament and development had been firmly put on the international agenda and would remain a priority item for the United Nations. A full evaluation of the Conference would have to wait, but Sweden believed that the Document had many positive aspects. For example, it rejected the view that security could be realized in a narrow national or regional perspective. Switzerland regretted that some passages of the Document had not been formulated in a more balanced way and took exception to certain descriptions of economic and military matters in it. While some parts of the action programme were, in its view, disputable, others—if applied by all parties—could lead to increased international security and thus facilitate the release of resources for development.

In his final statement, the President of the Conference expressed the view that the Final Document put together issues and ideas with very deep and wide significance. The international community had agreed that there existed a close and multi-dimensional relationship between disarmament and development. For the first time, Governments had agreed on a political level on the fact and substance of the linkage between those two issues and recognized the need to give practical expression to it. An array of arguments against the arms race, based on economic considerations, was now available to the international community. The President also considered the outcome of the Conference a victory for multilateralism and hoped that the new pragmatism which it reflected would be strengthened in the course of the follow-up action. He cautioned that the Conference was only a first step on a long journey that the international community would have to undertake.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1987

The successful conclusion of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development was welcomed by most delegations speaking on the subject in the First Committee³¹ during the forty-second session of the General Assembly. Some more reserved views were also expressed on the outcome and nature of the Conference.

Algeria noted that in spite of initial difficulties, the Conference had concluded its work with the adoption of a Final Document. It stressed, however, that it was necessary to note the limitations of the Document: all the promises it contained would be kept only to the extent that steady implementation of its action programme was ensured through suitable machinery. From that point of view, the third special session of the General Assembly

³¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, First Committee*, 3rd to 45th meetings, and *ibid.*, *Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

devoted to disarmament would provide the first opportunity to evaluate with sufficient detachment the real commitment shown by States to the measures they had agreed to consider or adopt.

Brazil considered the results of the Conference an encouraging expression of a general desire to find balance and consensus and described it as a meeting that reflected a growing maturity in the United Nations. India recalled that a certain amount of scepticism had been expressed about the possible results of the Conference and even about its validity. In its view, the results were clear proof that such doubts had been unwarranted. The discussions at the Conference had deepened the participants' understanding of the relationship between disarmament and development and its bearing on human welfare.

Nigeria expressed its disappointment at the Conference's inability to achieve its ultimate objective, but welcomed the adoption of a framework for future deliberation on the basic issues. In its view, the Conference would have achieved a major degree of success if it had put in place an organizational framework to rechannel military expenditure back to the productive sector of the global economy. Instead, under the pretext of ensuring security, it had been argued that increased military expenditure could be tolerated. Nigeria could not agree with that.

Pakistan regarded as historic the reaffirmation by the participating States of their commitment to allocate a portion of the resources released through disarmament for socio-economic development. It viewed the Conference as the beginning of a process which must be actively pursued in the coming years. Trinidad and Tobago reiterated the view that the Conference's adoption by consensus of its Final Document was a victory for the multilateral approach. By underlining the multidimensional links between the two concepts it addressed, the Conference had made it clear that they were not two separate issues facing two different world constituencies.

Yugoslavia admitted that the Conference fell short of fulfilling some expectations, but was convinced that its Final Document and the action programme provided a broad enough framework for an exploration of its central theme, redirecting resources. In Yugoslavia's view, the question of the relationship between disarmament and development must remain an important item on the agenda of the General Assembly. Sweden believed that henceforth all States would consider studying conversion and planning for it. International support for the principle of openness had grown, in Sweden's opinion, and to reinforce that trend, all States should report their military budgets to the United Nations. In accordance with the action programme, the General Assembly was to keep the relationship between disarmament and development under periodic review.

The Soviet Union believed that the Conference had demonstrated the resolve of a majority of States to channel scientific and technological progress exclusively towards meeting the needs of development and global prosperity. The work of the Conference had pointed to possible concrete international action to make disarmament a factor for development. The USSR held the view that action-oriented discussion of the question could play an important part in enhancing the authority of the United Nations and its role in promoting

development through disarmament. Those who had chosen to stand aloof from such efforts should show respect for the will of the world community.

Czechoslovakia considered that the Conference had fully confirmed an organic, mutual linkage between the two issues. In its view, the timeliness of the Conference's results was evident and its conclusions would strengthen the international community's ability to overcome confrontation. Mongolia pointed out that the most difficult task was the practical implementation of the action programme. That work would be greatly helped by the Security Council's consideration of the complex links between disarmament and development.

China noted that the Conference had formulated its Final Document in the spirit of seeking common ground while reserving differences and reached consensus through consultations. In spite of certain deficiencies, the Final Document was a positive one, China believed.

Canada stated that the Conference was an example of creative thinking and a landmark because, for the first time and through consensus, a broad approach to security had been taken. The Federal Republic of Germany felt that the Conference had raised important new issues and helped to clarify existing ideas on the relationship between excessive armaments and underdevelopment. It had also found answers to some questions. New Zealand was of the view that the Conference was a major event in the history of the United Nations involvement in the disarmament process. Norway considered it important that the problem of non-military threats to security had been dealt with by the Conference. In its view, that reflected the growing awareness that real security encompassed far more than security in the traditional, military sense. Factors such as poverty, unsustainable development, environmental stress and human rights were highly relevant in that context.

Denmark, speaking on behalf of the twelve member States of the European Community, also welcomed the outcome of the Conference. They believed that one of its achievements was the reaffirmation of the importance of the question of security—understood as a broad concept encompassing social, humanitarian, environmental, developmental and military aspects—in any detailed analysis of the relationship between disarmament and development. For the Twelve, both disarmament and development constituted fundamental objectives. They held that the reference in the Final Document to the importance of greater openness, transparency and confidence among nations was very pertinent. They also believed that it was a simplification to see the relationship between disarmament and development mainly from the perspective of international financial reallocations. While all States should promote the transfer of any resources released through arms control and disarmament measures for economic and social development, especially in the developing countries, it should be recognized that disarmament measures would not automatically lead to savings, particularly in the short run. The Twelve believed that the reallocation most likely to have an early impact on development would be made at the national level, when the assessment of the local or regional security situation permitted a country to move towards disarmament.

The United Kingdom held that the Conference had lost its way and failed to live up to the important role which the United Nations should be playing in the matter. It doubted that the results of the Conference justified the effort. An opportunity had been missed for a serious study of the real relationships between disarmament, development and the intimately connected subject of security. It regretted that a conference held to examine such important issues had not been more practical and constructive, and believed that such meetings could only harm the credibility of the United Nations.

On 27 October, Cameroon, Canada, Cuba, France, the German Democratic Republic, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Norway, Venezuela and Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution entitled "Relationship between disarmament and development", which was later also sponsored by Australia, Bolivia, the Congo, Greece, New Zealand, Romania and Rwanda. In its introduction of the draft on 4 November, India stated that the relationship between disarmament and development was an issue of the utmost importance. The two goals were linked because they both competed for the world's finite financial and material resources. The arms race not only consumed resources, but also distorted economic structures, undermined the economic system and adversely affected the attitude of nations towards co-operation. Just and equitable development, however, would make for stability and security and create an environment that would inhibit the arms race. Certain objectives had not been achieved at the Conference, including provisions for a financial mechanism to channel funds released by disarmament for development purposes. Nevertheless, the Conference remained a very important step and a landmark.

In expressing support for the draft in the course of the debate in the First Committee, the Sudan held that the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should give serious consideration to the establishment of an appropriate international instrument to distribute the resources released by disarmament.

On 16 November the Committee approved the draft without a vote. On that occasion, three States explained their positions.

The Federal Republic of Germany believed that the Conference had contributed to a better understanding of the interrelationship of two pressing issues and had clarified the way in which they were interconnected through security. It hoped that further discussion would lead to new insights and constitute a continuation of the process of multilateral review mentioned in the third preambular paragraph of the draft (see below). The Federal Republic would continue to accord assistance, in a spirit of partnership and solidarity, to the developing countries and would participate in consideration of the subject-matter in relevant forums, including the third special session.

The United Kingdom joined the consensus on the draft, but again made clear that it had reservations about the Final Document, which, in its view, did not adequately reflect the complex nature of the relationship between disarmament, development and security. It held that disarmament measures that did not take national security into account could not contribute to international security. It did not believe that aid disbursement should in any way depend upon progress in arms control. It further stated that the lack of attention

in the Final Document to the need for transparency in the provision of information on military expenditure detracted from its value. Regarding operative paragraph 4 of the draft, the United Kingdom understood that it applied only to that aspect of the action programme where action by the Secretary-General was specifically indicated, namely, paragraph 35 (c) (ix).

The United States announced that it would not participate in the action on the draft. It believed that disarmament and development were two distinct issues that could not be considered appropriately in terms of an interrelationship. Consequently, it had declined to participate in the Conference, the preparation of the draft resolution and the debate on the subject in the First Committee. The United States did not and would not consider itself bound or committed in any way by either the declarations in the Final Document or the terms of the draft.

On 30 November,³² the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution without a vote as resolution 42/45. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 38/71 B of 15 December 1983, 39/160 of 17 December 1984 and 40/155 of 16 December 1985 and its decisions 40/473 of 20 June 1986 and 41/422 of 4 December 1986,

Recalling also the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, related to the relationship between disarmament and development,

Stressing that the holding of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development in New York from 24 August to 11 September 1987 constituted a significant development in the process of the multilateral review, at a political level, of the relationship between disarmament and development,

1. *Welcomes* the adoption of the Final Document of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development;

2. *Decides* to have the report of the Conference brought to the attention of the Preparatory Committee for the Third Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament;

3. *Requests* that Committee to include in the agenda of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament an item entitled "Relationship between disarmament and development, in the light of the action programme adopted at the International Conference";

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to take action through the appropriate organs, within available resources, for the implementation of the action programme adopted at the International Conference.

Conclusion

In 1987, the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development adopted by consensus a Final Document aimed at fostering an interrelated perspective on disarmament, development and security, promoting multilateralism in that context, and strengthening the central role of the United Nations in the interrelated fields of disarmament and development. By the action programme contained in the Final Document, the States that participated reaffirmed their commitments in the fields of disarmament and development and reiterated their determination to adopt, both

³² *Ibid.*, *Plenary Meetings*, 85th meeting.

individually and collectively, appropriate measures to implement those commitments.

The delegations welcomed the adoption of the Document as a victory for multilateralism and as the first recognition of the relationship between disarmament and development at the intergovernmental level. Some of them, however, regretted that the Conference had not established mechanisms for follow-up and implementation of the action programme. Others noted that although the Final Document would not satisfy them completely, it would give further momentum to international efforts to achieve progress in both disarmament and development. A number of delegations expressed reservations on some of the aspects of the Final Document, for example, they reserved the right to allocate their development assistance in accordance with their own priorities. In sum, while there was wide acceptance of the significance of the Conference, it was recognized that it was a first step in a long process that the international community would have to undertake regarding the question.

At its forty-second session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 42/45, by which it welcomed the adoption of the Final Document, requested the Secretary-General to take action through the appropriate organs and within available resources for the implementation of the Document's action programme, and requested that the Preparatory Committee for the Third Special Session include a relevant item in the agenda of the special session.

ANNEX

Final Document of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development

The States participating in the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development,

Desirous of:

- (a) Enhancing and strengthening the commitment of the international community to disarmament and development and giving impetus to renewed efforts in both these fields;
- (b) Raising world consciousness that true and lasting peace and security in this interdependent world demands rapid progress in both disarmament and development;
- (c) Directing global attention at a high political level on the implications of world-wide military spending against the sombre background of the present world economic situation;
- (d) Looking at disarmament, development and security in their relationship in the context of the interdependence of nations, interrelationships among issues and mutuality of interests;
- (e) Taking greater account of the relationship between disarmament and development in political decision-making;
- (f) Furthering the international community's collective knowledge of the military and non-military threats to security;

Adopt the following Final Document:

1. In the Charter of the United Nations, Member States have undertaken to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources. The Member States also express in the Charter their determination to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples. The United Nations has thus a central role to play for the promotion of both disarmament and development.

2. Disarmament and development are two of the most urgent challenges facing the world today. They constitute priority concerns of the international community in which all nations—

developed and developing, big and small, nuclear and non-nuclear—have a common and equal stake. Disarmament and development are two pillars on which enduring international peace and security can be built.

3. The continuing arms race is absorbing far too great a proportion of the world's human, financial, natural and technological resources, placing a heavy burden on the economies of all countries and affecting the international flow of trade, finance and technology, in addition to hindering the process of confidence-building among States. The global military expenditures are in dramatic contrast to economic and social underdevelopment and to the misery and poverty afflicting more than two thirds of mankind. Thus, there is a commonality of interests in seeking security at lower levels of armaments and finding ways of reducing these expenditures.

4. The world can either continue to pursue the arms race with characteristic vigour or move consciously and with deliberate speed towards a more stable and balanced social and economic development within a more sustainable international economic and political order; it cannot do both.

5. Global interest in the relationship between disarmament and development is reflected in proposals by a politically and geographically broad spectrum of States since the early days of the United Nations. There is an increasing understanding of this relationship, in part due to the expert studies and reports prepared by the United Nations.

6. The contrast between the global military expenditures and the unmet socio-economic needs provides a compelling moral appeal for relating disarmament to development. There is also a growing recognition that both overarmament and underdevelopment constitute threats to international peace and security.

7. The convening under the aegis of the United Nations of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development is a landmark in the process of undertaking, at a political level, the multilateral consideration of the relationship between disarmament and development.

*Relationship between disarmament and development
in all its aspects and dimensions*

8. While disarmament and development both strengthen international peace and security and promote prosperity, they are distinct processes. Each should be pursued vigorously regardless of the pace of progress in the other; one should not be made a hostage to the other. Pursuit of development cannot wait for the release of resources from disarmament. Similarly, disarmament has its own imperative separate from the purpose of releasing resources for development.

9. However, disarmament and development have a close and multidimensional relationship. Each of them can have an impact at the national, regional and global levels in such a way as to create an environment conducive to the promotion of the other.

10. The relationship between disarmament and development in part derives from the fact that the continuing global arms race and development compete for the same finite resources at both the national and international levels. The allocation of massive resources for armaments impedes the pursuit of development to its optimal level.

11. Considering the present resource constraints of both developed and developing countries, reduced world military spending could contribute significantly to development. Disarmament can assist the process of development not only by releasing additional resources but also by positively affecting the global economy. It can create conditions conducive to promoting equitable economic and technological co-operation and to pursuing the objectives of a new international economic order.

12. Real economic growth as well as just and equitable development, and particularly the elimination of poverty, are necessary for a secure and stable environment at the national, regional and international levels. They can reduce tensions and conflicts and the need for armament.

13. In the relationship between disarmament and development, security plays a crucial role. Progress in any of these three areas would have a positive effect on the others.

14. Security is an overriding priority for all nations. It is also fundamental for both disarmament and development. Security consists of not only military, but also political, economic, social, humanitarian and human rights and ecological aspects. Enhanced security can, on the

one hand, create conditions conducive to disarmament and, on the other, provide the environment and confidence for the successful pursuit of development. The development process, by overcoming non-military threats to security and contributing to a more stable and sustainable international system, can enhance security and thereby promote arms reduction and disarmament. Disarmament would enhance security both directly and indirectly. A process of disarmament that provides for undiminished security at progressively lower levels of armaments could allow additional resources to be devoted to addressing non-military challenges to security, and thus result in enhanced overall security.

15. An effective implementation of the collective security provisions of the Charter of the United Nations would enhance international peace and security and thus reduce the need of Member States to seek security by exercising their inherent right of individual or collective self-defence, also recognized by the Charter. The judgement as to the level of arms and military expenditures essential for its security rests with each nation. However, the pursuit of national security regardless of its impact on the security of others can create overall international insecurity, thereby undermining the very security it aims at promoting. This is even more so in the context of the catastrophic consequences of a nuclear war.

16. It is widely accepted that the world is overarmed and that security should be sought at substantially lower levels of armaments. The continued arms race in all its dimensions, and its spreading into new areas, pose a growing threat to international peace and security and even to the very survival of mankind. Moreover, global military spending on nuclear and conventional arms threatens to stall the efforts aimed at reaching the goals of development so necessary to overcome non-military threats to peace and security.

17. The use or threat of use of force in international relations, external intervention, armed aggression, foreign occupation, colonial domination, policies of *apartheid* and all forms of racial discrimination, violation of territorial integrity, of national sovereignty, of the right to self-determination, and the encroachment of the right of all nations to pursue their economic and social development free from outside interference constitute threats to international peace and security. International security will be guaranteed in turn to the extent that peaceful and negotiated solutions to regional conflicts are promoted.

18. Recently, non-military threats to security have moved to the forefront of global concern. Underdevelopment and declining prospects for development, as well as mismanagement and waste of resources, constitute challenges to security. The degradation of the environment presents a threat to sustainable development. The world can hardly be regarded as secure so long as there is polarization of wealth and poverty at the national and international levels. Gross and systematic violations of human rights retard genuine socio-economic development and create tensions which contribute to instability. Mass poverty, illiteracy, disease, squalor and malnutrition afflicting a large proportion of the world's population often become the cause of social strain, tension and strife.

19. Growing interdependence among nations, interrelationship among global issues, mutuality of interests, collective approach responding to the needs of humanity as a whole and multilateralism provide the international framework within which the relationship between disarmament, development and security should be shaped.

Implications of the level and magnitude of the continuing military expenditures, in particular those of the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily important States, for the world economy and the international economic and social situation, particularly for developing countries

20. The current level of global military spending in pursuit of security interests represents a real increase of between four and five times since the end of the Second World War. It also reflects approximately 6 per cent of the world gross domestic product and has been estimated to be more than 20 times as large as all official development assistance to developing countries. During the 1980s, global military expenditure has grown on an average at a faster rate than during the second half of the 1970s.

21. The bulk of global military spending remains concentrated among some developed countries that also carry out almost all the world's military research and development. It has been estimated that global expenditure on military research and development represents approx-

imately one quarter of the world's expenditure on all research and development. During recent years, as weapons have become more sophisticated, the rate of increase in spending on military research and development has been higher than the general increase in military expenditures.

22. The military sector also consumes a significant proportion of world energy resources and non-energy minerals and diverts skilled human resources and industrial production, which could be utilized in other sectors. Moreover, the production and stockpiling of armaments, particularly of nuclear and chemical weapons, poses a significant threat to the environment.

23. While arms exports are dominated by a number of developed countries, the developing countries account for a major share of arms imports. The adverse development implications of such transfers outweigh immediate trade benefits to the suppliers and security gains to the recipients.

24. In contrast to the current level and trends in global military expenditure, the state of the world economy in the 1980s has been characterized by a slow-down in growth of demand and output compared with the preceding two decades, generally lower rates of inflation, difficulties in many countries in adapting to structural changes, a mounting stock of debt, high real interest rates, inadequate net flows of financial resources, shifts in exchange rates, high and increasing levels of protection, commodity prices depressed to their lowest level in 50 years, terms-of-trade losses sustained by commodity exporting countries, and a generally insecure economic environment in which millions of people still lack the basic conditions for a decent life.

25. The use of resources for military purposes amounts to a reduction of resources for the civilian sector. Military spending provides little basis for future industrial civilian production. Military goods are generally destroyed or soon used up. While there are some civilian by-products of military research and training, there are better direct, non-military routes to follow.

26. The opportunity cost of military expenditures over the past 40 years has been and continues to be borne by both developed and developing countries, as there is a pressing need for additional resources for development in both groups of countries. In developing countries, it has been estimated that close to 1 billion people are below the poverty line, 780 million people are undernourished, 850 million are illiterate, 1.5 billion have no access to medical facilities, an equally large number are unemployed, and 1 billion people are inadequately housed. In developed countries, resources are required, *inter alia*, for meeting the priority needs of urban renewal, the restoration of some of the infrastructures, the reduction of unemployment, the protection of the environment, the further development of welfare systems and the development of non-conventional sources of energy. The developing countries are doubly affected: (a) in proportion to the expenditure they incur themselves; and (b) because of the disturbing effect of military expenditure on the world economy.

27. The present world economic situation should also be seen in the context of the arms race. For certain countries the high deficits caused by military expenditures as well as the cumulative effect of subsequent rise in the interest rates have the effect of diverting substantial flows of capital away from development activities. In this sense, the whole world is affected by the arms race.

28. Moreover, military-related production tends to be capital-intensive, usually creating fewer jobs than would result if an equivalent amount of public funds had been spent on civil projects. Inefficiency associated with the non-competitive conditions of the military marketplace has a negative effect throughout the economy, including productivity and cost, and on its competitive position in the international market.

29. Global military expenditure has an impact on the world economy through interdependence among nations and the interrelationship between the global macro-economic variables. Attempts at understanding the present world economic situation and attaining stable and sustainable growth need to take account of the current levels of military expenditures.

Ways and means of releasing additional resources through disarmament measures for development purposes, in particular in favour of developing countries

30. Apart from promoting international peace, security and co-operation, disarmament can improve the environment for the pursuit of development by:

- (a) Releasing resources from the military to the civilian sector at the national level;
- (b) Removing the distortions in the national and international economy induced by military expenditure;

(c) Creating favourable conditions for international economic, scientific and technological co-operation and for releasing resources for development at the regional and international levels, on both a bilateral and a multilateral basis.

31. Resources released as a result of disarmament measures should be devoted to the promotion of the well-being of all peoples, the improvement of the economic conditions of the developing countries and the bridging of the economic gap between developed and developing countries. These resources should be additional to those otherwise available for assistance to developing countries.

32. The release of additional resources for the civilian sector is in the interest of both industrialized and developing countries, as it would mean the stimulation of economic growth, trade and investment. Among developing countries, this could also mean additional resources to meet pressing socio-economic needs, while in the developed countries it could contribute to the achievement of the goals of social welfare. However, working towards the release of resources through disarmament is not enough; an international development strategy is a vital stabilizing element in international relations.

33. The disarmament dividend may be obtained in a variety of forms. These could include trade expansion, technological transfers, the more efficient utilization of global resources, the more effective and dynamic international division of labour, the reduction of public debt and budgetary deficits, and increased flows of resources through development assistance, commercial and other private flows or transfers of resources to the developing countries.

34. Past experience has shown that conversion from military to civilian production need not present insurmountable problems.

Action programme

35. With a view:

- (a) To fostering an interrelated perspective on disarmament, development and security;
- (b) To promoting multilateralism as providing the international framework for shaping the relationship between disarmament, development and security based on interdependence among nations and mutuality of interests;

(c) To strengthening the central role of the United Nations in the interrelated fields of disarmament and development:

- (i) The States participating in the International Conference reaffirm their commitments in the fields of disarmament and development and reiterate their determination to adopt, both individually and collectively, appropriate measures to implement these commitments. These will include bilateral, regional and global initiatives for peaceful resolution of conflicts and disputes;
- (ii) They also stress the importance of respect of the international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts. Respect of this law makes it easier to pave the way for a solution to conflicts, and hence ultimately to release resources for development;
- (iii) They recognize the need to ensure an effective and mutually reinforcing relationship between disarmament and development and to give practical expression to it through specific measures at the national, regional and global levels;
- (iv) They reaffirm the international commitment to allocate a portion of the resources released through disarmament, for purposes of socio-economic development, with a view to bridging the economic gap between developed and developing countries;
- (v) In this connection, they will give further consideration:
 - a. To the adoption of measures to reduce the level and magnitude of military expenditures which, in addition to being an approach to disarmament, would be a means of reallocating additional resources for social and economic development particularly for the developing countries;
 - b. To the utilization of existing regional and international institutions for the reallocation of resources released through disarmament measures for socio-economic

- development, particularly in developing countries, taking due account of existing capabilities of the United Nations system;
- c. To accord priority to the allocation, within the framework of the United Nations, of part of the resources, including human and technical resources, presently devoted to military purposes for emergency humanitarian relief operations and critical development problems, pending the achievement of genuine disarmament under effective international control;
 - d. To the importance of greater openness, transparency and confidence among nations with a view to facilitating progress in both disarmament and development;
- (vi) They will consider:
- a. Keeping under review issues related to a conversion of military industry to civilian production and undertaking studies and planning for this purpose;
 - b. Undertaking studies to identify and publicize the benefits that could be derived from the reallocation of military resources;
 - c. Making the results of experience in, and preparations for, solving the problems of conversion in their respective countries, available to other countries;
- (vii) They agree:
- a. To continue to assess their political and security requirements and the level of their military spending, taking into account the need to keep these expenditures at the lowest possible level, and to keep the public informed on the subject;
 - b. To assess the nature and volume of resources that may be released through arms limitation and disarmament measures and to consider including in future disarmament negotiations provisions to facilitate the release of such resources;
 - c. To carry out regularly analyses of the economic and social consequences of their military spending and to inform their public and the United Nations about them;
 - d. To appeal to appropriate regional organizations and institutions to carry out, within their mandates as appropriate, analyses of the political, military and economic factors in their regions, with a view to encouraging regional measures of disarmament and development;
- (viii) They recognize that an informed public, including non-governmental organizations, has an invaluable role to play in helping to promote the objectives of disarmament and development and creating an awareness of the relationship between disarmament, development and security. They therefore agree to take appropriate measures to keep the public informed in this regard;
- (ix) They emphasize the need to strengthen the central role of the United Nations and its appropriate organs in the field of disarmament and development, in promoting an interrelated perspective of these issues within the overall objective of promoting international peace and security:
- a. The United Nations and the specialized agencies should give increased emphasis, in their disarmament-related public information and education activities, to the disarmament-development perspective;
 - b. They request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to intensify his efforts to foster and co-ordinate the incorporation of disarmament-development perspective in the activities of the United Nations system;
 - c. The United Nations should make greater efforts to promote collective knowledge of the non-military threats to international security;
 - d. An improved and comprehensive data base on global and national military expenditures would greatly facilitate the study and analysis of the impact of military expenditures on the world economy and the international economic system. To this end, the broadest possible number of States should provide objective information on their military budgets to the United Nations according to agreed and comparable definitions of the specific components of these budgets.

In this connection, the work under way in the United Nations for a systematic examination of various problems of defining, reporting and comparing military budget data should be intensified;

- e. The United Nations should continue to undertake, on a regular basis, analysis of the impact of global military expenditures on the world economy and the international economic system. Consideration should be given to the idea of establishing a mechanism within the existing framework of the United Nations to monitor the trends in military spending;
- f. The United Nations should facilitate an international exchange of views and experience in the field of conversion;
- g. The General Assembly, in receiving the report of this Conference, is requested to keep under periodic review the relationship between disarmament and development in the light of this action programme, including its consideration at the forthcoming third special session devoted to disarmament.

P A R T F I V E

Information and studies

CHAPTER XIX

United Nations disarmament studies programme

Introduction

AUTHORIZED BY GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS, United Nations disarmament studies are carried out by the Secretary-General with the assistance of experts and consultants appointed by him. Since the early 1960s, they have been prepared with the intention of, among other things, assisting the disarmament negotiating process through analysis and by providing information. In 1985, the General Assembly reaffirmed by resolution 40/152 K the value of United Nations studies as a useful means by which important issues in the field of arms limitation and disarmament could be addressed in a comprehensive and detailed manner.

In 1986, the General Assembly reaffirmed once again, by resolution 41/86 C, the value of United Nations disarmament studies. A number of Member States expressed their support for the studies, stating that they contributed to greater public awareness of the problems of the arms race and disarmament. Others reiterated their reservations and asked for restraints in commissioning new studies because of their increasing cost and the continuing financial difficulties of the United Nations.

This chapter deals with the developments in the area of studies in 1987. During the year, a comprehensive report on the question of United Nations disarmament studies was prepared by the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies. An update of the 1981 *Study on Israeli Nuclear Armament* was also submitted to the General Assembly.¹ For a discussion of the update and related General Assembly action, see chapter X. In addition, work began on two studies, one on the climatic and potential physical effects of nuclear war, including nuclear winter, and the other on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditures. Both studies had originally been requested in 1985, but had been deferred because of financial difficulties.² At its forty-second session, the General Assembly requested no new studies.

¹ The update of the *Study on Israeli Nuclear Armament* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.82.IX.2) was issued under the symbol A/42/581.

² A/40/1102, annex IV, para.7 (m) (climatic effects of nuclear war) and (l) (economic and social consequences of the arms race).

Report of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies

By its resolution 41/86 C, the General Assembly reaffirmed the need for a thorough appraisal of United Nations disarmament studies. A comprehensive report³ on the subject was prepared by the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies and transmitted by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly at its forty-second session.

The report consists of six chapters, of which chapter I is an introduction. Chapter II summarizes the activities that have taken place in the field since 1979 and also deals with the main purposes of the studies and the pattern of experience that has emerged. Chapter III is devoted to the role of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and chapter IV to the respective functions of the United Nations and UNIDIR. Chapter V examines how the Advisory Board, which also serves as the Board of Trustees of UNIDIR, carries out its function of advising the Secretary-General on various aspects of studies and research on disarmament. Chapter VI contains the conclusions and recommendations of the Advisory Board. Three appendices follow: the first is a list of the disarmament studies carried out under the auspices of the United Nations since 1978, the second is entitled "Experience gained and some thoughts for the future", and the third is a list of the publications of UNIDIR.

Among its conclusions and recommendations, the Board expresses its view that the disarmament studies have successfully served one or more of the three purposes identified in 1978, namely: (a) to assist in ongoing negotiations; (b) to identify possible new areas of negotiation; and (c) to promote public awareness of the problems involved in the arms race and disarmament. The published reports have made important contributions to a broader understanding of the complexities involved and differing points of view held on a series of important issues. Wide political and geographical participation has been achieved and the results have reflected the views and perceptions of many of the States Members of the United Nations. At the same time, the Board recognizes that the importance of disarmament studies should not be over-valued and that studies cannot be substitutes for formal negotiations.

The Board notes that, in the conduct of the studies, valuable experience has been gained and a number of useful principles established, which should be drawn to the attention of groups of experts carrying out studies in the future. With regard to the composition of study groups, the Board believes that financial constraints should be recognized by keeping the number of experts to a minimum consistent with the requirements of political balance, broad geographical representation and efficiency. The principle of consensus should continue to be the normal practice in study groups, while the expression of differing opinions where views cannot be reconciled should be permitted. The absence of a fully agreed text should not prevent a study group from presenting its report; in fact, the Board recognizes that from time to time some subjects under study will allow only the presentation of divergent views, with no likelihood of consensus.

The Board expresses its opinion that the question of careful selection of

³ A/42/300, annex.

subjects for study and the matter of costs are of special importance. It believes that UNIDIR offers opportunities that should be used to mutual advantage, primarily in the areas of independent comment and lower cost to the regular budget of the United Nations. Work could be allocated either to the United Nations for study or to UNIDIR for research, according to the nature and subject-matter of the topic or the time-frame within which a response may be needed.

Given its twin roles as the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies and the Board of Trustees of UNIDIR, the Board considers that it is in a prime position to advise on the whole study activity and, through the Secretary-General, to assist the General Assembly as appropriate without trespassing on the rights of sovereign States. It therefore recommends that, without prejudice to the rights of Member States, procedures should be instituted that would allow it to give timely consideration to study proposals and to the means by which they might best be carried out.

The Board considers that there is a need for subsequent review and follow-up of disarmament studies, particularly in respect of their recommendations. It intends to give the matter further attention when considering various subjects for study and research in the future.

In conclusion, the Board strongly reaffirms the significance of studies and research in the field of disarmament and the value of establishing a co-ordinated approach to make the most effective use of the facilities and resources available to the Department for Disarmament Affairs and UNIDIR.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1987

A number of States addressed the question of the United Nations studies programme either in general or by referring to specific studies during the debate in the First Committee.⁴ In addition to the report of the Advisory Board, the Committee had before it the replies that six Member States had communicated to the Secretary-General in accordance with resolution 41/86 C, containing their views and proposals on how the work of the United Nations in the field of disarmament studies could be further improved.⁵

Denmark, speaking on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community, noted that they had a long and consistent record of supporting the concept and objectives of the disarmament studies programme, believing that the studies could make a valuable contribution to the discussion and consideration of disarmament issues. In the light of the financial problems of the United Nations, they stressed that it was more essential than ever that Member States strive for the best possible use of resources and avoid unnecessary duplication of work. Denmark further stated that studies conducted

⁴ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, First Committee, 25th to 43rd meetings; and ibid., Sessional Fascicle, corrigendum.*

⁵ A/42/363 and Add.1. Replies were received from: Belgium (on behalf of the 12 Member States of the European Community), Bulgaria, Mongolia, Panama, Sri Lanka and Togo. See also the Secretary-General's corresponding report of 1986 (A/41/421 and Add.1 and 2).

under United Nations auspices should be related to specific practical objectives and be the subject of proper consultations. The Advisory Board had an important role to play in co-ordinating studies in order to avoid overlap among them.

The German Democratic Republic supported the principles for disarmament studies that had been agreed upon by the Advisory Board. It would be highly satisfactory, it believed, if the Board discussed proposals for new studies with due regard for those principles, before the General Assembly reached a decision on their elaboration. The Board was especially suited to allocate study activities between United Nations expert groups and UNIDIR in a politically and financially responsible manner.

Ethiopia felt that disarmament studies, conferences and fellowships could contribute to a better understanding of the real issues involved in the nuclear and space age. It had supported all the moves in that direction. Togo considered that in the light of the common concern to strengthen the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, it was indispensable that specific studies undertaken under the auspices of the United Nations serve as a guide for efforts to promote disarmament.

On 27 October, Cameroon, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom submitted a draft resolution entitled "United Nations disarmament studies". In introducing it on 6 November, the United Kingdom noted that the purpose of the draft was to pursue the conclusions and recommendations of the Advisory Board's report (discussed above). Thus, the draft took up, in operative paragraph 2, the Board's conclusion that consensus should be the normal practice in the preparation of studies, but that that should not preclude the expression of varying opinions. It further supported, in operative paragraph 3, the recommendation of the Board that Member States should present proposals for disarmament studies by 1 September annually and that the Board should recommend whether a study should be carried out by a group of experts or as part of the ongoing work programme of UNIDIR. The United Kingdom also expressed the sponsors' readiness to revise some of the paragraphs of the draft so as to take into account concerns expressed by some delegations.

On 6 November the sponsors submitted a revised draft resolution containing several minor changes, as well as a substantive change in the original operative paragraph 3 (operative paragraph 4 in subsequent versions, see below). On 10 November, Zimbabwe, speaking on behalf of the non-aligned countries, submitted amendments to the draft resolution. Two days later, after intensive consultations with the sponsors of the draft, leading to a second revision of the text, including further changes in operative paragraph 4, Zimbabwe announced that it had decided to withdraw the amendments. It expressed the hope that the twice-revised draft would be adopted without a vote.

In introducing the second revision at the same meeting, the United Kingdom stated that the sponsors believed that the Advisory Board's recommendations included much that was helpful and, as such, commended them to

Member States. That view constituted the main thrust of the draft, which had been amended to accommodate the concerns of a number of delegations.

On 12 November the First Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote. It was adopted by the General Assembly on 30 November,⁶ also without a vote, as resolution 42/42 J. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 40/152 K of 16 December 1985 and 41/86 C of 4 December 1986,

Reaffirming the valuable contribution that United Nations studies can make to the discussion and consideration of disarmament issues,

Noting with appreciation the views of Member States contained in the report of the Secretary-General,

Taking into consideration that the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies also functions as the Board of Trustees of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research,

Noting that the establishment of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research offers new opportunities regarding research in the field of disarmament,

1. *Takes note with appreciation* of the report of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies;
2. *Affirms* that the final decision on how United Nations disarmament studies should be prepared rests with the General Assembly;
3. *Takes note* of the conclusion of the Advisory Board that consensus should be the normal practice in study groups, but that the expression of differing opinions where views cannot be reconciled should be permitted;
4. *Invites* Member States to take note of the conclusions and recommendations of the Advisory Board in presenting proposals for disarmament studies or research.

Studies in progress in 1987

Study on the climatic and potential physical effects of nuclear war, including nuclear winter

By resolution 40/152 G of 1985, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of consultant experts, to carry out a study on the climatic and potential physical effects of nuclear war, including nuclear winter. However, because of the financial difficulties of the United Nations, elaboration of the study was deferred until 1987. By resolution 41/86 H of 1986, the Secretary-General was requested to submit the study in due time for consideration at the forty-third session, in 1988. Subsequently, 11 consultant experts, reflecting wide geographical representation and a broad range of scientific qualifications, were appointed. The list of experts appears in the annex to this chapter.

The Group of Consultant Experts held two sessions during 1987, from 23 to 27 March in New York and from 16 to 27 November in Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Henry A. Nix of Australia. While some of the scientists had previous knowledge of the nuclear winter hypothesis and experience in working with it, others had not previously addressed the issue in

⁶ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Plenary Meetings*, 84th meeting.

depth. A technical workshop was held on 24 March, at which leading scientists in the field from Canada and the United States informed the Group of the latest scientific work on the subject. For the first two days of the second session, the members of the Group sat in as observers of a workshop meeting of SCOPE-ENUWAR (Scientific Committee on the Protection of the Environment—Environmental Problems of Nuclear War). That workshop, at which some 27 leading scientific experts addressed the climatological and biological implications of nuclear war, had been arranged to take place at the same time as the United Nations consultant experts' meeting in order to promote interaction and exchange between the two groups of scientists. From 18 to 27 November, the United Nations Group of Experts discussed the first draft of its report, which had been prepared on the basis of an outline agreed upon at the first session. The Group gave extensive consideration to the problem of how to prepare a readable report on such a complex scientific subject in the short time available. The third and final session of the Group is expected to take place in New York at the beginning of April 1988.

Study on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditures

By resolution 40/150 of 1985, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to bring up to date, with the assistance of a group of consultant experts and making appropriate use of the capabilities of UNIDIR in a consultant capacity, the report entitled *Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures*,⁷ taking into account the significant developments that had occurred since it was completed, in 1982. However, because of the financial difficulties of the United Nations, the updating exercise was not begun until 1987. By resolution 41/86 I of 1986, the Secretary-General was requested to proceed so as to submit the updated report to the General Assembly at its forty-third session, in 1988, and to inform the Assembly at its forty-second session on the progress achieved in the implementation of the resolution.

By his note of 3 June 1987,⁸ the Secretary-General informed the General Assembly that he had appointed 13 consultant experts, reflecting all major geographical regions and political trends. The list of experts appears in the annex to this chapter.

The Group held two sessions in the year, from 16 to 20 March in New York and from 30 November to 11 December in Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Constantin Ene of Romania. At its first session, it agreed on an outline of the draft study and invited Governments, specialized agencies, other international organizations and institutions and non-governmental organizations to provide it with quantitative and qualitative information relevant to its work. At its second session, the Group discussed the first draft of the study. During the session, second drafts of some substantive chapters were

⁷ Issued as a United Nations publication, Sales No.E.83.IX.2.

⁸ A/42/301.

also prepared and subjected to preliminary review, as were a draft introduction and chapter conclusions, so that a consolidated second draft would be ready for the Group's third and final session, scheduled for April 1988.

Conclusion

In 1987, a comprehensive report on United Nations disarmament studies was prepared by the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies and transmitted by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly. The Assembly reaffirmed, by resolution 42/42 J, the valuable contribution that United Nations disarmament studies could make to the discussion and consideration of disarmament issues and invited Member States to take note of the conclusions and recommendations of the Advisory Board. During the year, the elaboration of two studies, one on the climatic and potential physical effects of nuclear war, including nuclear winter, and the other on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditures, deferred in 1986, was begun. No new studies were initiated in 1987.

ANNEX

Composition of study groups

Group of Consultant Experts to Carry Out a Study on the Climatic and Potential Physical Effects of Nuclear War, including Nuclear Winter

Sune Bergström, Sweden
Gyula Bora, Hungary
Messan K.L. Gnininvi, Togo
G.S. Golitsyn, USSR
Rafael Herrera, Venezuela
Mohammed Kassas, Egypt
Thomas F. Malone, United States
Henry A. Nix, Australia
D.V. Seshu, India
Yasumasa Tanaka, Japan
Ye Duzheng, China

Group of Consultant Experts on the Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures

Lazhar Bou Ouni, Tunisia
Hendrik de Haan, Netherlands
Dragomir Djokic, Yugoslavia
Constantin Ene, Romania
Juan E. Fischer, Uruguay
Ladislav Matejka, Czechoslovakia
Adrianus Mooy, Indonesia
Semen N. Nadel, USSR
Waliur Rahman, Bangladesh
Christian Schmidt, France
Amada Segarra, Ecuador
Darold W. Silkwood, United States
Margaret Vogt, Nigeria

World Disarmament Campaign and observance of Disarmament Week

Introduction

THE IMPORTANT ROLE WHICH WORLD PUBLIC OPINION CAN PLAY in efforts to promote the cause of disarmament was underlined by the General Assembly in the 1978 Final Document.¹ It was declared that in order for an international conscience to develop and for world public opinion to exercise a positive influence, the United Nations should increase the dissemination of information on the armaments race and disarmament with the full co-operation of Member States. The week starting 24 October, the day of the founding of the United Nations, was proclaimed as Disarmament Week, a week devoted to fostering the objectives of disarmament.

In 1980, the Secretary-General was requested by the General Assembly to carry out a study on the organization and financing of a world disarmament campaign under the auspices of the United Nations. The study,² submitted to the Assembly in 1981, emphasized the importance of raising public awareness of disarmament issues and stressed the need to involve as many segments of the world's population as possible in support of disarmament.

The questions involved in a campaign were widely discussed by the Preparatory Committee for the twelfth special session of the General Assembly. At its opening meeting on 7 June 1982, the Assembly took a formal decision to launch the World Disarmament Campaign under United Nations auspices. During the session, the Secretary-General presented a report³ outlining a programme for the Campaign that focused on (a) the extension of United Nations means of communication with the world public, the media and non-governmental organizations; (b) systematic co-operation with national and international non-governmental organizations that could stimulate public understanding; (c) special events such as Disarmament Week; and (d) a publicity programme for the Campaign itself. He recommended that the information materials produced for the Campaign be distributed as widely as possible through United Nations information centres and other regional offices. As only some of the projected activities could be carried out by using

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III, paras. 15, 99-107 and 123. The Final Document is reproduced *in extenso* in *The Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, appendix I.

² A/36/458.

³ A/S-12/27.

resources from the regular budget of the United Nations, the extent to which the entire programme could be implemented would depend on the availability of extrabudgetary funds. The Secretary-General stressed that the World Disarmament Campaign could succeed only through a concerted effort by the United Nations and its system of agencies and programmes, Member States and the concerned public.

Having considered the question at length,⁴ the Assembly agreed on a text defining the objectives of the World Disarmament Campaign, which was annexed to the special session's Concluding Document.⁵ Recognizing the need for additional human, financial and material resources to carry out an effective campaign, the Assembly urged the Secretary-General to explore the possibilities of redeploying existing resources. Furthermore, it recommended the establishment of a trust fund for the Campaign through voluntary contributions from Member States, non-governmental organizations, foundations, trusts and private sources.

At the regular session of the General Assembly the same year, the Secretary-General submitted a report⁶ concerning the general framework of the Campaign, based on the text adopted by the Assembly at the special session, and the programme of activities for 1983. The report set out the primary purposes of the Campaign as follows: to inform, to educate and to generate public understanding and support for the objectives of the United Nations in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. It further stated that the Campaign would focus primarily on five major constituencies—elected representatives, the media, non-governmental organizations, educational communities, and research institutes—and that it should be carried out in all regions of the world in a balanced, factual and objective manner. The General Assembly approved the general framework and programme of activities outlined in the report and decided that during its following session there should be a pledging conference for contributions from Member States. The First United Nations Pledging Conference for the World Disarmament Campaign was duly held during the 1983 Disarmament Week and similar sessions have been held each following year.

In 1985 and 1986, the Campaign, *inter alia*, organized six conferences or meetings at the regional and subregional levels, which generated wide interest and received much support from various constituencies. In addition, publications, some in languages other than the official ones, were produced for specialized constituencies and the general public. Among the resolutions that the General Assembly adopted on the Campaign in 1985, one concerned the establishment of a regional centre for peace and disarmament in Africa, to be located in Togo. The purpose of the Centre, established the following year, is to provide, upon request, substantive support for initiatives and other efforts of African States to achieve measures of peace, arms limitation

⁴ For details, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 7: 1982, chap. XXI.

⁵ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Special Session, Annexes*, agenda items 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13, document A/S-12/32, annex V; the Concluding Document is reproduced *in extenso* in *The Yearbook*, vol. 7: 1982, appendix I.

⁶ A/37/548.

and disarmament in the region. In 1986, a resolution was adopted on the establishment of a regional centre for peace, disarmament and development in Latin America, to be located in Peru, which is to provide similar support to Member States of the Latin American region.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1987

During the forty-second session of the General Assembly, a detailed discussion of the World Disarmament Campaign, as well as of Disarmament Week, took place in the First Committee,⁷ where six draft resolutions were submitted. Five of them—four on the World Disarmament Campaign and one on Disarmament Week—were subsequently adopted as resolutions by the Assembly.⁸ A sixth draft, concerning the World Disarmament Campaign, was not put to a vote.

World Disarmament Campaign

In response to resolution 41/60 B of 1986, the Secretary-General submitted to the General Assembly a report⁹ on the implementation of the programme of activities of the World Disarmament Campaign in 1987 and on the programme contemplated for 1988. The Secretary-General stated in his report that the 1987 programme of activities pursued the Campaign's goals in a more limited manner than in the past, due to financial constraints. Resources available for the implementation of the programme had diminished, as the level of contributions pledged to the Campaign's Trust Fund had declined. As a consequence, a number of adjustments had been made in several projects. For example, cost-cutting measures on information materials had consisted of a reduction in the print-run of *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook* in all six official languages and postponement of the printing and publication of other materials. The Secretary-General pointed out, however, that in recognition of financial difficulties, a number of Member States and interested non-governmental organizations had made a special effort to support the Campaign's activities financially. For instance, the two regional conferences held during the year were either partly or entirely financed by the host countries through their contributions to the Campaign Trust Fund.

The report noted the fact that under the Campaign's programme of regional seminars in 1987, a conference for Asia and the Pacific had been held in Beijing at the invitation of the Government of China. In addition, a United Nations Meeting of Experts had taken place in Dagomys, USSR, to discuss the topic: "After Reykjavik: planning for the nineties". The Meeting had been organized in co-operation with the Soviet Peace Committee. Several other States had indicated their willingness to host similar events.

⁷ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, First Committee*, 3rd to 42nd meetings, and *ibid.*, *Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

⁸ *Ibid.*, *Plenary Meetings*, 84th meeting.

⁹ A/42/543.

The Secretary-General noted that Member States had continued to promote the goals of the Campaign by developing individual projects and had co-operated with the United Nations in implementing its programme. They had organized disarmament-related meetings of their own, produced special disarmament bulletins and booklets, and facilitated the dissemination of United Nations information materials to constituencies of the Campaign. The non-governmental organizations around the world had supported the Campaign by developing activities and projects within its framework. In line with its mandate, the Department of Public Information had given wide coverage to the work of the United Nations on disarmament through radio, film, television and photography, in addition to press releases distributed to the press, delegations and non-governmental organizations at Headquarters and Geneva, and to United Nations information centres throughout the world. The report also dealt with other aspects of the Campaign, such as special events, its publicity programme, and the participation of field offices and United Nations information centres.

During the debate in the First Committee, Cameroon expressed the hope that the United Nations and Member States would continue to support the Central African States in their pursuit of disarmament objectives and in their endeavours to achieve security and development at the subregional level. In stressing the need to mobilize public support for banning nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, Ethiopia held that resolutions alone could not eliminate the danger of nuclear war; political will was indispensable. Indonesia stated that the Campaign had proven to be an effective instrument for reaching out to world public opinion and stimulating greater understanding and support for United Nations efforts in the field of disarmament. According to the Philippines, the new political activism towards disarmament that it saw might in part be attributed to the World Disarmament Campaign. The peoples of the world, it stated, were tired of rhetoric about disarmament and wanted to live in peace and security in a world free of weapons of destruction. Qatar expressed full support for the role played by the United Nations in respect of disarmament, especially through public information.

To ensure a greater dissemination of information on disarmament, particularly in the developing countries and the most remote corners of the globe, Togo suggested that certain publications be translated into local languages and that more radio and television programmes and films be presented. It noted that the Centre in Lomé, Togo, and the United Nations Secretariat were co-operating to organize a seminar on the role of Africa in the application of nuclear science to peace and development. Moreover, preparations were under way to set up a programme of activities to establish and strengthen confidence, security and development within the framework of the Economic Community of the Central African States. Trinidad and Tobago commended the establishment of United Nations regional centres for the promotion of peace and disarmament in Latin America and Africa. It believed that they could play a vital role in changing attitudes about military expenditure and in promoting regional stability.

China referred to the successful Asia-Pacific regional conference that was convened in Beijing in March, where, it stated, diplomats, disarmament experts, scholars and eminent figures from 18 countries had gathered in a joint effort to explore ways of achieving disarmament and maintaining peace.

Pursuant to resolution 41/60 B, the Fifth Pledging Conference for the World Disarmament Campaign was convened on 26 October, with 57 delegations participating. The Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, speaking on behalf of the Secretary-General, noted the improving atmosphere in disarmament negotiations and stated that the Campaign could contribute to the momentum created in those negotiations. However, the Campaign was faced with financial difficulties due to the decline in contributions to its Trust Fund. He therefore expressed the hope that Member States would help to preserve the financial viability and thereby the effectiveness of the Campaign.

The President of the Pledging Conference, Mr. Carlos Alzamora of Peru, stated that the establishment of United Nations regional disarmament centres had led to a resurgence of dynamism and had opened new horizons for potential action. He hoped that States would continue their support for the Campaign.

The pledges made at the Conference or at other times during the year were earmarked as follows among the Campaign, UNIDIR and the Regional Centres.

Australia	50,000 Australian dollars ¹⁰
Austria	10,000 United States dollars
Bahamas	1,000 United States dollars ¹¹
Canada	50,000 Canadian dollars ¹²
China	88,250 yuan renminbi
Colombia	1,000 United States dollars ¹³
Finland	50,000 Finnish markkaa
Germany, Federal Republic of	11,000 United States dollars ¹⁴
Greece	10,000 United States dollars ¹⁵
Indonesia	5,000 United States dollars
Jamaica	1,000 United States dollars ¹³
New Zealand	10,000 United States dollars
Norway	10,000 United States dollars ¹³
Peru	10,000 United States dollars ¹⁶
	25,000 United States dollars ¹⁷
Philippines	500 United States dollars
Sweden	100,000 Swedish kronor
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	200,000 roubles ¹¹
	20,000 United States dollars ¹¹
Uruguay	500 United States dollars ¹³

¹⁰ Of this amount, \$A 20,000 were earmarked for UNIDIR.

¹¹ Earmarked for UNIDIR.

¹² Of this amount, \$Can 25,000 were earmarked for UNIDIR.

¹³ Earmarked for the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America.

¹⁴ Earmarked for the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa.

¹⁵ Of this amount, \$US 5,000 were earmarked for UNIDIR.

¹⁶ Earmarked for the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America for fiscal year 1987.

¹⁷ Earmarked for the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America for fiscal year 1988.

In its Final Act, the Conference stated that the Secretary-General would keep a list of pledges until 31 March 1988, when the list would be issued. Subsequently, the General Assembly adopted resolution 42/39 G (discussed below), which provided for a sixth pledging conference for the World Disarmament Campaign.

On 26 October, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, the German Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Romania, the Ukrainian SSR and Viet Nam submitted a draft resolution entitled "World Disarmament Campaign: actions and activities". In introducing it on 4 November, Bulgaria stated that the draft as a whole followed the basic provisions of the previous year's corresponding resolution. A new element of the text reflected the conviction of the sponsors that the World Disarmament Campaign and world public opinion could and should contribute effectively to a positive outcome of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. By the draft, the General Assembly would have, *inter alia*, invited all mass peace and disarmament movements, non-governmental organizations and other bodies to express their demands, views, and suggestions with respect to the tasks and specific results of its third special session on disarmament; urged Governments, in formulating their policies on disarmament, to take into account the will and demands of the mass peace and disarmament movements and invited them to inform the Secretary-General annually of the actions taken to that end; and considered it necessary to pay more attention to the active involvement of children and youth in Campaign activities.

On 27 October, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela and Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution entitled "World Disarmament Campaign", which was later also sponsored by Romania. In introducing the draft on 9 November, Mexico emphasized the Secretary-General's statement of 1984 underlining the importance of world-wide participation and adequate funding for the Campaign. By the draft, the Assembly would reiterate its regret that most of the States with the largest military expenditures had not so far made any financial contribution to the Campaign.

On 10 November the original sponsors and Bulgaria submitted a revised draft, which was later also sponsored by the Byelorussian SSR and Viet Nam.

On 12 November, Mexico announced that as a result of consultations with the sponsors of the draft resolution introduced by Bulgaria, an agreement had been reached that a single draft should be submitted. The revised draft therefore incorporated the idea that appeared in Bulgaria's text, namely, emphasis on the important role that the World Disarmament Campaign could play in ensuring a positive outcome of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (see the fifth preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 8 of resolution 42/39 G, below).

At the same meeting, Bulgaria announced the decision of the sponsors not to press to a vote the draft it had introduced in order to ensure wider support for a single resolution on the World Disarmament Campaign and also

to respond to appeals for a reduction in the number of resolutions in the Committee.

On 12 November the draft was approved by the First Committee by a recorded vote of 119 to 1 (United States), with 10 abstentions. Four States explained their positions in connection with the vote.

The United States cast a negative vote because the text included what it considered objectionable language of an unrealistic nature. Moreover, it held that one third of the current funding for the Campaign came from assessed contributions, although under the decision taken by the second special session on disarmament the Campaign was to be financed solely from voluntary contributions. It would have preferred a procedural draft that could have been adopted by consensus.

France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom abstained because they objected to operative paragraph 4 of the draft, by which the Assembly would express regret that most of the States with the largest military expenditures had so far not made any financial contribution to the Campaign. France stressed that it had contributed over \$2 million to the activities of UNIDIR since the establishment of the Institute. It had therefore participated in the international community's efforts in the area of scientific research, which was one of the fundamental aspects of the Campaign. The Federal Republic of Germany pointed out that the draft continued the practice, found in earlier resolutions on the subject, of questioning the principle that contributions to the World Disarmament Campaign should be voluntary; it considered it unfortunate that a draft resolution on a cause as worthy as the World Disarmament Campaign should be burdened with non-consensus language that made its unanimous adoption impossible. The Federal Republic expressed satisfaction at the successful merger of the two draft resolutions and, thus, the reduction in the number of draft resolutions. It emphasized its support for the Campaign from the outset; in 1987 it had made a financial contribution to the Lomé Centre. The United Kingdom stated that it paid just under 5 per cent of the United Nations regular budget, part of which was used to fund United Nations services in support of the World Disarmament Campaign. In the financial years 1986 and 1987, the United Kingdom had contributed about \$75,000 to the total World Disarmament Campaign budget. In addition, it had devoted a substantial sum of money to disarmament information activities of its own, which were consistent with the aims of the Campaign.

On 30 November the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 146 to 1, with 9 abstentions, as resolution 42/39 G. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling that in paragraph 15 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, it declared that it was essential that not only Governments but also the peoples of the world recognize and understand the dangers in the present situation and stressed the importance of mobilizing world public opinion on behalf of disarmament,

Recalling also its resolutions 35/152 I of 12 December 1980, 36/92 C of 9 December 1981, 37/100 I of 13 December 1982, 38/73 D of 15 December 1983, 39/63 D of 12 December 1984,

40/151 B of 16 December 1985 and 41/60 B of 3 December 1986, as well as the reports of the Secretary-General of 17 September 1981, 11 June 1982, 3 November 1982, 30 August 1983, 4 October 1985, 19 September 1986 and 28 September 1987,

Having examined the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the programme of activities of the World Disarmament Campaign by the United Nations system during 1987 and the activities contemplated for 1988, as well as its main financial aspects,

Having also examined the part of the report of the Secretary-General dealing with the activities of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies relating to the implementation of the World Disarmament Campaign, as well as the Final Act of the 1987 United Nations Pledging Conference for the Campaign, held on 26 October 1987,

Believing that the World Disarmament Campaign has an important role to play for a positive outcome of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament by informing, educating and generating public understanding and support for the objectives of the United Nations in the field of arms limitations and disarmament,

1. *Reiterates its commendation* of the manner in which, as described in the above-mentioned reports, the World Disarmament Campaign has been geared by the Secretary-General in order to guarantee "the widest possible dissemination of information and unimpeded access for all sectors of the public to a broad range of information and opinions on questions of arms limitation and disarmament and the dangers relating to all aspects of the arms race and war, in particular nuclear war";

2. *Recalls* that, as was also agreed by consensus in the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly, the second special session devoted to disarmament, it is likewise an essential requisite for the universality of the Campaign that it receive "the co-operation and participation of all States";

3. *Endorses once more* the statement made by the Secretary-General on the occasion of the 1984 United Nations Pledging Conference for the World Disarmament Campaign to the effect that such co-operation implies that adequate funds be made available and that consequently the criterion of universality also applies to pledges, since a campaign without world-wide participation and funding will have difficulty in reflecting this principle in its implementation;

4. *Reiterates its regret* that most of the States that have the largest military expenditures have not so far made any financial contribution to the Campaign;

5. *Decides* that at its forty-third session there should be a sixth United Nations Pledging Conference for the World Disarmament Campaign, and expresses the hope that on that occasion all those Member States which have not yet announced any voluntary contribution may do so;

6. *Reiterates its recommendation* that the voluntary contributions made by Member States to the World Disarmament Campaign Voluntary Trust Fund should not be earmarked for specific activities inasmuch as it is most desirable that the Secretary-General enjoy full freedom to take the decisions he deems fit within the framework of the Campaign previously approved by the General Assembly and in exercise of the powers vested in him in connection with the Campaign;

7. *Notes with appreciation* that the Secretary-General has given permanent character to his instructions to the United Nations information centres and regional commissions to give wide publicity to the Campaign and, whenever necessary, to adapt, as far as possible, United Nations information materials to local languages;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in carrying out the activities of the Campaign contemplated for 1988, to give particular attention to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its forty-third session a report covering both the implementation of the programme of activities of the Campaign by the United Nations system during 1988 and the programme of activities contemplated by the system for 1989;

10. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "World Disarmament Campaign"

Three draft resolutions concerning regional centres were submitted to the First Committee. The first two dealt with the Regional Centre in Africa

and the Regional Centre in Latin America, respectively, and the third proposed the establishment of a centre in Asia. All three resolutions were adopted by the General Assembly without a vote. While considering these draft resolutions, the First Committee had before it reports of the Secretary-General¹⁸ on the functioning of the established Centres, in Africa and Latin America.

On 27 October, Madagascar, on behalf of the members of the African Group, submitted a draft resolution entitled "United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa". In introducing the draft on 3 November, Madagascar stated that the Regional Centre had disseminated information and promoted participation in conferences and seminars concerning peace, security, disarmament and development. In particular, the Centre had continued to expand contacts in Africa with various institutions and organizations, as well as with the general public.

On 10 November the First Committee approved the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 131 to none.

Three States explained their positions on one or more of the draft resolutions on the Regional Centres (for the two additional drafts, see below). Belgium considered that the Centres in Africa and Latin America could make a positive contribution to regional disarmament. In joining the consensus on the texts concerning the Centres in Africa, Latin America, and Asia, the United Kingdom and the United States indicated that they had proceeded on the basis that the draft resolutions had no programme-budget implications and that the Centres would continue to be funded by voluntary contributions. The United States noted that it had demonstrated its support for regional approaches to arms limitation by joining in the consensus adoption of all three draft resolutions, but it underscored its concern that they were resulting in an expansion of the physical plant of the United Nations during a period of fiscal austerity. It hoped that in 1988 reports on those Centres' activities would show that the Governments of the regions concerned had contributed to the Centres at a level commensurate with the political support that they had demonstrated during the adoption of the resolutions.

On 30 November the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution on the Regional Centre in Africa without a vote, as resolution 42/39 J. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 40/151 G of 16 December 1985 and 41/60 D of 3 December 1986,

Taking note of the Political Declaration adopted by the Eighth Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries, held at Harare from 1 to 6 September 1986, in which the Heads of State or Government, *inter alia*, reaffirmed the need to strengthen the role of the regional bodies in mobilizing support for the World Disarmament Campaign and, in this regard, welcomed the establishment of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa at Lomé,

Bearing in mind resolution AHG/Res.164 (XXIII), adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its twenty-third ordinary session, held at Addis Ababa from 27 to 29 July 1987, by which it, *inter alia*, endorsed the Lomé Declaration on Security, Disarmament and Development in Africa and the Programme of Action for Peace, Security and Co-operation in Africa,

¹⁸ A/42/609 (Africa) and A/42/544 (Latin America).

Taking into account the report of the Secretary-General,

1. *Expresses its satisfaction* that the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, inaugurated on 24 October 1986, has become operational;

2. *Commends* the efforts of the Secretary-General for taking the necessary measures to ensure the effective functioning of the Centre and requests him to continue to lend all the necessary support to the Centre;

3. *Expresses its gratitude* to those Member States and international, governmental and non-governmental organizations which have already made contributions to ensure the functioning of the Centre;

4. *Appeals once again* to Member States, as well as to international, governmental and non-governmental organizations, to make voluntary contributions in order to strengthen the effective operational activities of the Centre;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its forty-third session on the implementation of the present resolution.

In his report to the General Assembly on the establishment and functioning of the Regional Centre in Latin America (referred to above), the Secretary-General stated that in response to his note verbale of 2 February 1987 inviting Member States to contribute to a trust fund for the Latin American Centre, the Peruvian Government had pledged intis 200,000, which was commuted to \$US 8,000. Moreover, Peru had indicated that it had set aside a plot of land in Lima for the construction at a later date of premises for the Centre. The Secretary-General emphasized that in view of the continuing financial crisis of the Organization, it would not be possible to realize any savings from the regular budget to be allocated to the financing of the Centre. Consequently, voluntary contributions from Member States and interested organizations and individuals would be needed to meet not only staffing requirements and the basic administrative costs of the Centre, but also its substantive needs and activities.

On 27 October, Argentina, the Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Par aguay, Peru, Saint Lucia, Uruguay and Venezuela submitted a draft resolution entitled "United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America". In introducing it on 4 November, Peru stated that the sponsors were aware that, given the Organization's financial difficulties, the Centre would have to rely on voluntary contributions from Member States. In that regard, Peru felt encouraged by the contributions announced by some countries at the Fifth Pledging Conference for the Campaign. It informed the Committee of the recent inauguration of the Centre at Lima and expressed its support for the Regional Centre in Africa and the one proposed for Asia. The same day, the original sponsors, joined by Jamaica, submitted a revised text in which the proposed timing of a regional conference on political co-operation in Latin America, called for in operative paragraph 5, was changed from "the first half of 1988" to "in 1988".

On 10 November the First Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote.

After the vote, Peru, speaking on behalf of the sponsors of the draft resolution, expressed appreciation to Member States for supporting the Latin American Regional Centre.

Uruguay, one of the sponsors, welcomed the fact that the draft resolution had been adopted by consensus. It stated that it had just made its own voluntary contribution to the Centre and expressed the hope that such contributions would become more widespread in the very near future.

On 30 November the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution without a vote as resolution 42/39 K. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 41/60 J of 3 December 1986 on the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America,

Bearing in mind the report of the Secretary-General,

1. *Welcomes* the inauguration at Lima on 9 October 1987 of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America;

2. *Also welcomes* the promptness with which the Secretary-General has taken the necessary administrative measures to ensure the functioning of the Centre, and requests him to continue to give the Centre all necessary support;

3. *Expresses its thanks* to the host Member State for its valuable contribution to the functioning of the Regional Centre;

4. *Believes* that, in carrying out its activities, the Regional Centre will seek to promote relations of mutual trust and security between the countries of the region in a spirit of harmony, solidarity and co-operation for the implementation of measures for peace and disarmament, and for the promotion of economic and social development in Latin America;

5. *Recommends* that the Regional Centre hold, in 1988, a conference of experts on the strengthening of political co-operation in Latin America in the areas of peace, disarmament, development and security in the context of the World Disarmament Campaign;

6. *Again calls upon* Member States and international, governmental and non-governmental organizations to make voluntary contributions to the Centre;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit that appeal to all Member States in order to ensure the normal functioning of the Regional Centre;

8. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its forty-third session on the implementation of the present resolution.

On 27 October, Nepal submitted a draft resolution entitled "United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia". In introducing the draft on 6 November, Nepal stated that it had been particularly aware of the current financial constraints of the United Nations system and had therefore taken care to recommend that the establishment of the proposed Centre be based on existing resources and voluntary contributions by Member States. It drew the attention of the Committee to the modest scale of operations that had been suggested. Referring to operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution (see below), concerning the possible utilization of the existing United Nations infrastructure in Kathmandu with a view to the full employment of available resources, Nepal announced that it was prepared to make a contribution of nearly a quarter of a million Nepalese rupees, over a two-year period, towards meeting the local cost of establishing the Centre.

On 12 November, following extensive informal consultations with other delegations in order to ensure the adoption of the draft by consensus, Nepal orally revised operative paragraph 2 of the text. At the same meeting, the Committee had before it a note by the Secretariat concerning the requests

made to the Secretary-General in operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution, and the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs provided a further oral clarification at that time. He stated that the Department had come to the conclusion that, because of the nature of the functions envisaged, a member of the United Nations Information Centre in Kathmandu, assisted by appropriate local staff, would take charge of the Regional Centre on an interim basis. The Centre would be located on the premises of the United Nations Information Centre, with the office of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) providing administrative and logistic services. That arrangement had been discussed with UNDP and the Department of Public Information, both of which were agreeable to the provision of the services and to the distribution of functions.

On 12 November the First Committee approved the draft resolution, as orally revised, without a vote.

Australia, in joining in the consensus adoption of the draft, stated that such a centre could contribute to the examination of disarmament issues in Asia. However, it expressed concern that a proliferation of such regional centres could duplicate the work of other organizations, create pressure on the United Nations regular budget at a time of stringency and drain the capacity of the World Disarmament Campaign. In that respect, it was pleased to note that operative paragraph 1 of the text provided that the funding for the Centre would be based on existing United Nations resources and voluntary contributions that might be forthcoming. Mongolia expressed its satisfaction at the approval by consensus of the draft resolution, believing that the Centre would be a useful instrument in strengthening peace and security and enhancing understanding and co-operation among the States and peoples of Asia. It attached special importance to operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution, which set out the main goal of the Centre. In addition to its comments noted above, the United Kingdom expressed the hope that any new activities of the Regional Centre in Asia would be met from redeployed resources, and not from new appropriations.

On 30 November the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution without a vote as resolution 42/39 D. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 39/63 J of 12 December 1984, in which it requested the Secretary-General to provide assistance to such Member States in the regions concerned as might request it with a view to establishing regional and institutional arrangements for the implementation of the World Disarmament Campaign, on the basis of existing resources and of voluntary contributions that Member States might make to that end,

Reaffirming its resolutions 37/100 F of 13 December 1982, 38/73 J of 15 December 1983 and 39/63 F of 12 December 1984 on regional disarmament,

Bearing in mind resolutions 40/151 G of 16 December 1985, which established the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, and 41/60 J of 3 December 1986, which established the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America,

1. *Decides* to establish the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia with headquarters at Kathmandu, on the basis of existing resources and of voluntary contributions that Member States and interested organizations may make to that end;

2. *Decides also* that the Centre shall provide, on request, substantive support for the initiatives and other activities mutually agreed upon by the Member States of the Asian region for the implementation of measures for peace and disarmament, through appropriate utilization of available resources, and shall co-ordinate the implementation of regional activities in Asia under the World Disarmament Campaign;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to take the necessary administrative measures to ensure the establishment and functioning of the Centre, including, to that end, the possible utilization of the existing United Nations infrastructure at Kathmandu with a view to the full employment of available resources;

4. *Invites* Member States and interested organizations to make voluntary contributions to the Centre;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its forty-third session on the implementation of the present resolution.

Disarmament Week

Pursuant to resolution 41/86 D, the Secretary-General submitted in 1987 a report containing replies received from 14 Governments, as well as relevant units of the Secretariat, United Nations information centres and international non-governmental organizations on their activities to promote the objectives of Disarmament Week.¹⁹

On 26 October the First Committee convened a special meeting to commemorate Disarmament Week, during which statements were made by the Chairman of the Committee, the President of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General and representatives of the five regional groups.

The Chairman of the First Committee, observing the improvement in the East-West dialogue in 1987, stated that the international community had not merely taken note of the results of the meetings between the two major Powers, but had taken action by adopting without a vote a decision encouraging the United States and the Soviet Union to conclude a treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range nuclear weapons and to continue efforts to negotiate an agreement on a 50-per cent reduction of their strategic offensive weapons (see chapter VI). He expressed his desire to see equivalent progress achieved in the areas of conventional, chemical and space weapons.

The President of the General Assembly stated that the original aims of commemorating Disarmament Week were more timely and relevant than ever because of the growing urgency of genuine disarmament measures, for political, economic, ecological and other reasons, and because the survival of mankind was at stake. He called on Member States to rededicate themselves to their commitment to enhance the unique role of the United Nations in preserving peace, ending the arms race and promoting disarmament.

The Secretary-General noted that developments in 1987 in the various bilateral and multilateral forums for disarmament negotiations provided a positive backdrop for the observance of Disarmament Week. He said that the recent agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States on intermediate- and shorter-range weapons could pave the way for additional dis-

¹⁹ A/42/469.

armament measures in other important fields. However, he cautioned that there was still a need to recognize and overcome the ever-present threat of nuclear annihilation, the daily tragedy of the armed conflicts taking place in various parts of the world, and the unabated growth of arsenals of conventional weapons, which entailed enormous squandering of badly needed resources.

The representative of Madagascar, speaking on behalf of the Group of African States, declared that Africa, faced with the major problems of poverty, hunger, illiteracy, drought, external debt and slow economic growth, stood speechless at the knowledge that nearly \$1,000 billion was being spent annually for military purposes throughout the world.

Speaking on behalf of the Group of Asian States, the representative of Turkey noted encouraging developments in the field of disarmament, but held that a treaty on the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles would reduce by only a small percentage the nuclear weapons of the United States and the Soviet Union. The Asian Group therefore hoped that the conclusion of such a treaty would be followed by substantial reductions in the category of strategic nuclear arms.

The representative of Hungary, speaking on behalf of the Group of Eastern European States, said that the events of Disarmament Week organized in their countries had effectively acquainted broad segments of the public with questions of international peace and security and of disarmament. They had led the general public to develop related activities more fully and to manifest mass support for increasing the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament.

Speaking on behalf of the Group of Latin American States, the representative of Antigua and Barbuda welcomed the progress in the Geneva talks on reducing intermediate-range nuclear weapons. Though not participants in the negotiations on reducing and halting the testing of nuclear weapons, the members of the Group urged those States that were involved to take account of the Group's concern that the world be made safe and secure through effective and verifiable disarmament.

The representative of Italy, speaking on behalf of the Group of Western European and Other States, said that they remained committed to looking constructively at all possibilities for promoting disarmament agreements in conditions that would strengthen security and stability and therefore contribute to safeguarding international peace.

Also on 26 October, a world-wide artwork competition for a United Nations poster on disarmament was launched. The competition provided an opportunity for individuals all over the world to make a creative contribution to the objectives of the Campaign.

On 29 October, the Department for Disarmament Affairs and the NGO Committee on Disarmament co-sponsored the annual NGO Forum at Headquarters, with the theme "The chemical weapons convention: progress and remaining problems". About 160 participants, who included representatives of non-governmental organizations and the media and members of delegations, attended the Forum. The panellists were Ambassador Rolf Ekeus of

Sweden, Ambassador Max Friedersdorf of the United States, Ambassador Yuri Nazarkin of the USSR, and Ambassador Paul-Joachim von Stülpnagel of the Federal Republic of Germany. Speaking on behalf of the NGO community were former Ambassador Charles Floweree (currently with the Committee on National Security), Mr. John Barrett (Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament) and Mr. Gordon Burck (Federation of American Scientists).

In observance of Disarmament Week in Geneva, the Geneva Branch of the Department for Disarmament Affairs organized an exhibit of the Department's recent publications and other material relating to disarmament. Other activities included an international poster exhibition on disarmament and peace organized by the United Nations and Related Agencies Staff Movement for Disarmament and Peace (UNSM DP); conference debates organized by UNSM DP on the themes "Chemical weapons" and "Nuclear war and radiation", and a lecture on the theme "Security and disarmament—not only a question of arms?" given by Ambassador Martin Huslid of Norway, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development.

On 27 October, Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Mozambique, the Ukrainian SSR and Viet Nam submitted a draft resolution entitled "Disarmament Week". In introducing it on 3 November, Mongolia stated that the report of the Secretary-General and the statements made at the First Committee's special meeting in observance of Disarmament Week had demonstrated once again that Member States continued to view the Week as an excellent opportunity to reaffirm their commitment to strengthening peace and security, pursuing general and complete disarmament, and making the world public more aware of that cause. Although the draft was similar to corresponding texts of previous years, the sponsors had, in a spirit of compromise and co-operation and in the light of the positions of a number of delegations, made serious efforts to present a new draft by deleting and modifying in substance certain passages of the text of the 1986 resolution. For instance, the operative paragraphs by which the General Assembly had expressed its serious concern over the continued escalation of the arms race and had stressed the important role of the mass media had been deleted and a reference to the International Atomic Energy Agency had been omitted.

Before the vote in the First Committee on 10 November, Denmark made a statement on behalf of the 12 members of the European Community. It stated that while the Twelve could support the objectives of Disarmament Week, they were unable to support the draft text because of operative paragraph 5, by which the Assembly would invite relevant specialized and other agencies to disseminate information on the consequences of the arms race. The Twelve contended that specific deliberative and negotiating bodies had been established within the United Nations system for that purpose. In their view, the Assembly should concentrate on ways of making maximum use of the existing disarmament machinery of the United Nations, rather than en-

courage the specialized agencies to engage in activities that were likely to detract from the important tasks for which they had been specifically mandated. For those reasons, Denmark said, the Twelve would abstain on the draft.

At the same meeting, Mongolia orally slightly revised the draft. It pointed out that the changes had been made following consultations with the delegations involved and reflected a compromise.

On 10 November the First Committee approved the draft resolution without a vote.

After the First Committee took action on the draft resolution, Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Israel, the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States all stated that had the draft been put to a vote, they would have abstained. The United Kingdom said that there would certainly be a vote when the text came before the General Assembly. Belgium, France and the Federal Republic of Germany, in noting reservations concerning operative paragraph 5, stated that they subscribed to the remarks made by Denmark before the vote. Speaking once again on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community, Denmark expressed dissatisfaction that the draft had been approved without a vote, in spite of the fact that the Twelve had made clear ahead of time their intention to abstain. The United States, though concerned over what it considered hyperbolic language in the draft, felt that the text had been improved sufficiently to permit it to abstain in the vote in the plenary meeting. Canada noted with pleasure the oral amendments put forward by Mongolia and, like Australia, the Netherlands and the United States, hoped that in the future further consultations would be held so that a draft resolution on Disarmament Week could truly be adopted by consensus.

On 30 November the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 133 to none, with 21 abstentions, as resolution 42/42 H. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Gravely concerned over the continuing arms race,

Stressing the vital importance of eliminating the threat of a nuclear war, ending the nuclear-arms race and bringing about disarmament for the maintenance of world peace and security,

Emphasizing anew the need for and the importance of wide and continued mobilization of world public opinion in support of halting and reversing the arms race, especially the nuclear-arms race, in all its aspects,

Taking into account the aspirations of the world public to prevent an arms race in space and to terminate it on Earth and to eliminate nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction,

Urging all Member States not to interfere with the rights of their citizens to organize and participate in the anti-war and anti-nuclear-weapon-threat demonstrations and movement,

Noting with satisfaction the broad and active support by Governments and international and national organizations of the decision taken by the General Assembly at its tenth special session, the first special session devoted to disarmament, regarding the proclamation of the week starting 24 October, the day of the foundation of the United Nations, as a week devoted to fostering the objectives of disarmament,

Recalling the recommendations concerning the World Disarmament Campaign contained in annex V to the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly,

the second special session devoted to disarmament, in particular the recommendation that Disarmament Week should continue to be widely observed,

Recalling also its previous resolutions relating to the question of Disarmament Week,

1. *Takes note with satisfaction* of the report of the Secretary-General on the follow-up measures undertaken by governmental and non-governmental organizations in holding Disarmament Week;

2. *Expresses its appreciation* to all States and international and national governmental and non-governmental organizations for their energetic support of and active participation in Disarmament Week;

3. *Invites* all States that so desire, in carrying out appropriate measures at the local level on the occasion of Disarmament Week, to take into account the elements of the model programme for Disarmament Week prepared by the Secretary-General;

4. *Invites* Governments to continue, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 33/71 D of 14 December 1978, to inform the Secretary-General of activities undertaken to promote the objectives of Disarmament Week;

5. *Invites* the relevant specialized and other agencies to intensify activities, within their areas of competence, to disseminate information on the consequences of the arms race, especially the nuclear-arms race, and requests them to inform the Secretary-General accordingly;

6. *Also invites* international non-governmental organizations to take an active part in Disarmament Week and to inform the Secretary-General of the activities undertaken;

7. *Further invites* the Secretary-General to use the United Nations information organs as widely as possible to promote better understanding among the world public of disarmament problems and the objectives of Disarmament Week;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in accordance with paragraph 4 of resolution 33/71 D, to submit to the General Assembly at its forty-third session a report on the implementation of the provisions of the present resolution.

Conclusion

Disarmament Week, an annual event fostering the objectives of disarmament, was again widely observed throughout the world in 1987. During the Week, the Fifth United Nations Pledging Conference for the World Disarmament Campaign was convened in New York. Two major meetings were organized during the year by the Department for Disarmament Affairs within the framework of the Campaign: a regional conference in Beijing, China, and a meeting of experts in Dagomys, USSR. The year saw a decline in the level of contributions to the Campaign's Trust Fund, which necessitated the readjustment of the Campaign's programme of activities. However, a number of Governments and interested non-governmental organizations made special efforts to extend direct support to the Campaign.

In 1987, the General Assembly adopted five resolutions on the World Disarmament Campaign and Disarmament Week. Three resolutions relating to regional centres in Togo, Peru, and Nepal, respectively, were adopted by consensus. By one of them, resolution 42/39 D, the Assembly established the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia with headquarters at Kathmandu, Nepal. Two draft resolutions on the World Disarmament Campaign were submitted in the First Committee: one sponsored by a group of mainly socialist States, the other by mainly non-aligned countries. As a result of consultations, only one draft was put to a vote, and it was subsequently adopted as resolution 42/39 G. The 1987 resolution on Disarmament Week, 42/42 H, was adopted with no negative votes.

Work of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies

Introduction

AT ITS TENTH SPECIAL SESSION, in 1978, the General Assembly decided to establish an advisory board of eminent persons to advise the Secretary-General on various aspects of studies to be carried out under the auspices of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and arms limitation.¹ At its twelfth special session, in 1982, the Assembly discussed possible activities of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, and at its regular session later that year, by resolution 37/99 K, section III, it requested the Secretary-General to revive the Advisory Board, (which had not met in 1982) and to entrust it with the following functions:

(a) To advise the Secretary-General on various aspects of studies and research in the area of arms limitation and disarmament carried out under the auspices of the United Nations or institutions within the United Nations system, in particular on the integration of a programme of such studies with a comprehensive programme of disarmament, once this had been established;

(b) To serve as the Board of Trustees of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR);

(c) To advise the Secretary-General on the implementation of the World Disarmament Campaign;

(d) At the specific invitation of the Secretary-General, to provide him with advice on other matters within the area of disarmament and arms limitation.²

In 1983 the Secretary-General appointed 22 members to the revived Board, and in 1984, two more. At the two sessions that the Board has since held each year, it has mainly dealt with disarmament studies in general, the statute and the activities of UNIDIR,³ the implementation of the World Disarmament Campaign and the situation in the area of disarmament.

In 1983, several delegations suggested in the First Committee that the Board should be given an opportunity to review proposals for studies and that it would be more effective if the sponsors of proposals would seek the views of Member States and of the Board before submitting draft resolutions calling for new studies. The Board itself has frequently discussed that matter.

¹ See *The Yearbook*, vol. 3: 1978, chap. XXV.

² A/38/467; the Secretary-General's 1983 report contained certain reformulations of the language of his note of the previous year.

³ For details concerning the statute, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 8: 1983, chapter XXII, and vol. 9: 1984, chapter XXIV.

It recognizes that while it is, on the one hand, in a unique position to coordinate and supervise the United Nations programme for studies and research in the field of disarmament and arms limitation, it cannot, on the other hand, presume to censor proposals of Member States and to prevent them from being submitted to the General Assembly. In the course of its work, the Board has made or stimulated proposals for studies. The most recent example is the study on the implications of deterrence for disarmament, which was submitted to the General Assembly in 1986. In 1985, the Board discussed the hypothesis of nuclear winter; subsequently a request was made by the General Assembly for a study to be carried out on the subject of the climatic and potential physical effects of nuclear war, including nuclear winter.

Also in 1983, the First Committee began consideration of a draft statute of UNIDIR, as proposed by the Advisory Board in its capacity as Board of Trustees of the Institute. On the Committee's recommendation, the General Assembly decided to return the draft statute to the Board for further clarification, and in 1984, by resolution 39/148 H, it approved a revised version of it. The statute provides, *inter alia*, for a system of mixed funding—through both voluntary contributions and the regular budget of the United Nations—to which several Western States have repeatedly expressed objections.

In 1986, the Advisory Board continued its substantive consideration of the subject of United Nations studies on disarmament, taking into account the request made by the General Assembly in 1985 to prepare a comprehensive report on the matter for submission at the forty-second session (see chapter XIX). It also held a thorough exchange of views on the implementation of the World Disarmament Campaign and, in that context, commented favourably on the factual, objective and balanced way in which information was presented. In its capacity as Board of Trustees of UNIDIR, the Board discussed the absence from his duties of the Director of UNIDIR and noted the serious impairment that had caused to the work of the Institute. It agreed that the Secretary-General of the United Nations should be given every support by the Board in his efforts to find a solution satisfactory to all concerned. In accordance with the statute of UNIDIR, the Board also considered and approved the report on the activities of the Institute in 1986 and recommended it for submission to the General Assembly. Recognizing the financial situation of the United Nations as a whole, the Board made certain changes in the Institute's draft programme of work, as submitted to it by the acting director, and reduced the proposed budget.

Sessions of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, 1987

In 1987, the Advisory Board held its sixteenth and seventeenth sessions from 27 April to 1 May and from 21 to 25 September in New York, under the chairmanship of Mr. Edgar Faure of France. The members of the Advisory Board are listed in annex I to this chapter.

In discharging its functions, the Board held an extensive exchange of views on the following subjects: (a) United Nations studies on disarmament;

(b) implementation of the World Disarmament Campaign; (c) the situation in the area of disarmament; and (d) the work and budget of UNIDIR. The Board discussed the latter subject in its capacity as Board of Trustees of UNIDIR. The activities of the Advisory Board in 1987 are summarized in the report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly at its forty-second session.⁴

United Nations studies on disarmament

The Advisory Board addressed the subject of United Nations studies on disarmament at both its sessions.

At its sixteenth session, it approved its comprehensive report on the studies programme, requested by resolution 40/152 K of 1985. In that report, which was transmitted to the General Assembly by the Secretary-General,⁵ the Board reaffirmed the significance of studies and research in the field of disarmament and the value of establishing a co-ordinated approach to make the most effective use of the facilities and resources available. (For a detailed discussion of the report, see chapter XIX.)

At its seventeenth session, the Board held extensive discussions on the nature of future studies and research, taking into account the different means to carry out the work that the Department for Disarmament Affairs and UNIDIR offered. The Board also discussed possible subject areas and specific topics for study. There was a wide measure of support for such projects as the following: a study of battlefield nuclear weapons, a study of security in the Persian Gulf, a study of the security of third world countries, and a history of nuclear arms control negotiations. It was generally felt that the first proposal could best be implemented as a United Nations study, to be carried out by a group of governmental experts. The others were regarded as being more suitable for UNIDIR, on the understanding that the Institute would need additional funds to carry out that work.

Implementation of the World Disarmament Campaign

At its seventeenth session, the Advisory Board took note of the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the programme of activities of the Campaign in 1987.⁶ During its exchange of views, the Board commented favourably on the activities carried out in the framework of the Campaign and noted the improvement and enrichment of Campaign activities. In that context, members of the Board underscored the importance and value of regional conferences and seminars of experts. They were particularly interested in the status and development of the United Nations Regional Centres established at Lomé and Lima. They also expressed concern over the Campaign's shortage of funds and hoped that innovative ways and means could be found to attract new resources.

⁴ A/42/611.

⁵ A/42/300.

⁶ A/42/543.

In accordance with established practice, the Board invited representatives of the co-ordinating bodies of non-governmental organizations to address it at its September session. In the course of the exchange of views, the representatives emphasized the vitality and viability of the Campaign. They expressed satisfaction with the arrangements made for them at the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development and also with the Campaign's publications. They stressed the importance of greater involvement in the planning, participation and follow-up of Campaign activities and, in that context, hoped to be more closely associated with the preparations for the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Members of the Board expressed appreciation for the constructive efforts of the community of non-governmental organizations in the area of arms limitation and disarmament.

Situation in the area of disarmament

The Board's discussion of the situation in disarmament took place against the background of recent developments in both the bilateral and multilateral processes. The Board welcomed the announcement by the Soviet Union and the United States of their agreement in principle to conclude a treaty on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles (see chapter VI). They felt that such an agreement would do much to encourage energetic pursuit of 50-per cent reductions in the strategic weapons of the two major Powers. In the view of the Board, success in bilateral negotiations on nuclear and space issues, the agreement of the two States to begin full-scale, stage-by-stage negotiations on nuclear testing and a positive outcome of the multilateral negotiations on a global ban of chemical weapons, together with progress in conventional disarmament, would mark a significant turn for humanity in the pursuit of international security.

With regard to the forthcoming third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which is also expected to review United Nations disarmament machinery, the Board considered its own role and methods of work. It felt that there would be merit in the Secretary-General's giving consideration to enlarging the role of the Board so as to permit it to provide advice on any aspect of disarmament to him and through him to the General Assembly.

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

In accordance with UNIDIR's statute, the Advisory Board, in its capacity as Board of Trustees of the Institute, considered and approved for submission to the General Assembly the report of the Director of the Institute on UNIDIR's activities in 1987.⁷ (For an outline of UNIDIR's programme of work,

⁷ A/42/607, annex.

see annex II.) The Board also considered and approved the proposed budget of the Institute and its draft programme of work for 1988⁸ in the light of the comments and recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ).

The Board expressed its firm belief that in 1987 UNIDIR had continued to demonstrate its value to the international disarmament community and its developing ability to discharge the responsibilities of its statute. The Board was confident that further progress would be achieved in 1988, provided that the Institute was adequately funded. Taking into account UNIDIR's critical financial situation, the Board decided in principle to recommend a subvention for 1988 comparable to that of former years and also gave instructions that if a new director of the Institute were appointed, he should undertake a fund-raising campaign. The Board recommended a subvention from the regular budget of the United Nations amounting to \$169,700 for 1988. On 21 December,⁹ the General Assembly adopted resolution 42/226 A, on revised budget appropriations for the biennium 1988-1989, and thereby approved the subvention.

The Board discussed at its sixteenth session the subject of the post of Director of UNIDIR, which had been vacant since 1 January 1987, and recommended the candidature of Mr. Jayantha Dhanapala of Sri Lanka to fill that vacancy. The Secretary-General accepted that recommendation, and Mr. Dhanapala took up his duties as Director of UNIDIR on 1 July 1987.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1987

In the course of the debate in the First Committee, delegations referred to the activities of the Advisory Board mainly in connection with its report on United Nations studies on disarmament and the work of UNIDIR. In addressing those subjects, the Committee had before it the report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Advisory Board, a note by the Secretary-General transmitting the Board's report on disarmament studies and a separate note by the Secretary-General transmitting the report on the activities of UNIDIR.¹⁰

Denmark, speaking on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community, noted with pleasure that the Advisory Board had agreed upon a report on United Nations studies on disarmament and welcomed its comprehensive and detailed conclusions and recommendations. The Twelve also referred to the finding of the Board that the establishment of UNIDIR made new machinery available that, in appropriate circumstances, could provide useful opportunities for other ways of carrying out disarmament studies and research. They also underlined the co-ordinating role that the Board might

⁸ A/42/611, paras. 34-44.

⁹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Plenary Meetings*, 99th meeting.

¹⁰ A/42/611 (Advisory Board), A/42/300, annex (disarmament studies), and A/42/607, annex (activities of UNIDIR).

play to facilitate study and research activities. The Twelve welcomed the appointment of the new Director of UNIDIR.

The Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic felt that more use could be made of the Board's unique potential. The Soviet Union believed that it was time to take a fresh look at the possibility that the Advisory Board, which brought together experts on disarmament from many countries, might play a more substantial role. In expressing its continued support for UNIDIR, the Soviet Union announced a further voluntary financial contribution to the Institute. At the Fifth United Nations Pledging Conference for the World Disarmament Campaign, some other Member States also pledged voluntary financial contributions to UNIDIR's activities (see chapter XX). The German Democratic Republic was of the view that the Advisory Board could play a more important part in the co-ordination of study activities on disarmament and supported the principles for disarmament studies as agreed upon by the Board. It also stressed the importance of the Advisory Board's dual function, which made it especially suited to carrying out politically and financially responsible allocations of study activities between United Nations expert groups and UNIDIR.

Conclusion

In discharging its functions in 1987, the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies continued its deliberations and discussions on the main issues on its agenda. Emphasis was given to the finalization and approval of its comprehensive report on the subject of United Nations studies on disarmament, which was subsequently submitted to the General Assembly at its forty-second session. The Board also particularly commended the improvement and enrichment of the World Disarmament Campaign's activities.

In its capacity as Board of Trustees of UNIDIR, the Advisory Board again performed its annual functions. The Board was of the view that, in order for the Institute to fully discharge its responsibilities, it would need to be properly funded. It therefore recommended to the General Assembly a subvention from the regular budget of the United Nations, which was later approved by the Assembly.

ANNEX I

Members of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies

Oluyemi Adeniji, Ambassador, Ministry of External Affairs, Nigeria

Hadj Benabdelkader Azzout, President of the Court of Auditors, Algeria

Rolf Björnerstedt, Chairman, Governing Board of the Alva and Gunnar Myrdal Foundation, Stockholm, Sweden

James E. Dougherty, Professor of Politics, Saint Joseph's University, Philadelphia, United States

Omran El-Shafei, Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Egypt

Constantin Ene, Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Romania

Edgar Faure, Member of the French Academy and Member of the Senate, France

Alfonso García Robles, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Mexico to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva

Ignac Golob, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Yugoslavia to the United Nations

A. C. S. Hameed, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sri Lanka

Ryukichi Imai, Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan

Björn Inge Kristvik, Director General, Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway

Carlos Lechuga Hevia, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations Office at Geneva

Liang Yufan, Ambassador, Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations

Ronald Mason, School of Molecular Science, University of Sussex, United Kingdom

William Eteki Mboumoua, formerly Minister for Foreign Affairs, Cameroon

Manfred Mueller, Professor, Institute for International Relations of the Academy of Political Science and Legal Studies, Potsdam, German Democratic Republic

Carlos Ortiz de Rozas, Ambassador of Argentina to France

Maharajkrishna Rasgotra, formerly Foreign Secretary to the Government of India

Friedrich Ruth, Ambassador, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, Rome

Amada Segarra, Visiting Professor, Institute of Diplomacy and International Relations, Guayaquil, Ecuador

Agha Shahi, Professor Emeritus of International Relations to Universities in Pakistan, Pakistan

Tadeusz Strulak, Ambassador, Head of the Polish Delegation to the Vienna Talks on Mutual Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe, Vienna

Roland Timerbaev, Ambassador, First Deputy Permanent Representative of the Soviet Union to the United Nations

Jayantha Dhanapala, Director of UNIDIR, is an *ex officio* member of the Advisory Board when it is acting in its capacity as the Board of Trustees of UNIDIR.

ANNEX II

*United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research**

Introduction

The proposal to establish an international institute for disarmament research was put forward by the President of France at the tenth special session of the General Assembly, in 1978. UNIDIR was established at Geneva in 1980 within the framework of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR). In 1982, the General Assembly, by resolution 37/99 K, decided that UNIDIR should function as an autonomous institution working in close relationship with the Department for Disarmament Affairs and that the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies should function as its Board of Trustees and draft the statute of UNIDIR on the basis of its existing mandate. The Assembly also invited Governments to make contributions to UNIDIR. The statute of UNIDIR was approved by the General Assembly by resolution 39/148 H of December 1984, and it became effective 1 January 1985.^a

UNIDIR's purpose is to undertake independent research on disarmament and related problems, particularly international security issues. Disarmament research is an integral part of disarmament efforts. According to article II of its statute, the Institute's work aims at:

- (a) Providing the international community with more diversified and complete data on problems relating to international security, the armaments race and disarmament in all fields, particularly in the nuclear field, so as to facilitate progress, through negotiations, towards greater security for all States and towards the economic and social development of all peoples;
- (b) Promoting informed participation by all States in disarmament efforts;
- (c) Assisting ongoing negotiations on disarmament and continuing efforts to ensure greater international security at a

* Text contributed by UNIDIR.

^a For details on the origin of UNIDIR, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 6: 1981, chapter XX and annex II, and vol. 7: 1982, chapter XXIII and annex II.

progressively lower level of armaments, particularly nuclear armaments, by means of objective and factual studies and analyses;

(d) Carrying out more in-depth, forward-looking and long-term research on disarmament, so as to provide a general insight into the problems involved, and stimulating new initiatives for new negotiations.

UNIDIR takes into account relevant recommendations of the General Assembly and works on the basis of the provisions of the 1978 Final Document. It carries out its research projects within the Institute or commissions individual experts or research organizations. The Director of UNIDIR reports annually to the General Assembly on the Institute's activities. As discussed above in this chapter, the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies functions as UNIDIR's Board of Trustees.

UNIDIR has a fellowship programme to enable scholars from developing countries to do research on disarmament and related international security issues at the Institute. In 1987 UNIDIR had visiting fellows from Morocco and Argentina. In addition, a visiting professor from the United States and interns from Canada, France and the United States worked in UNIDIR during the year.

The Secretary-General, after consultation with the Board of Trustees, appointed Mr. Jayantha Dhanapala as Director of UNIDIR. Mr. Dhanapala assumed his duties on 1 July 1987.

Voluntary contributions from States and public and private organizations form the principal financing of the Institute's activities. A subvention towards meeting the costs of the Director and the staff of the Institute is provided from the regular budget of the United Nations, in conformity with the provisions of the Institute's statute.

During the period under review, the following countries and institutions made contributions to the Institute's Trust Fund: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Norway, Switzerland (a non-member of the United Nations), the Soviet Union, the Barrow and Cadbury Trust Fund (United Kingdom) and Inerg Industries Corporation (Panama). In addition, under an agreement with the Government of Japan, a three-year project from 1986 to 1989 for the establishment of a data base on disarmament is being financed from the Trust Fund for Interest on the Contributions to the United Nations Special Account.

Projects completed in 1987

Disarmament and development: some practical suggestions to bypass the present deadlock

A monograph entitled "Disarmament and development: some practical suggestions to bypass the present deadlock" was prepared by Nicole Gnesotto of the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI). It was published prior to the convening of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development.

Confidence-building measures in Africa

The research paper "Confidence-building measures in Africa" by Augustine Mahiga and Fidelis Nji evaluates the relevance of such measures in Africa. It concludes that the greatest potential for introducing confidence-building measures lies in political, economic and social co-operation among African States. The authors state that the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and various subregional institutions offer the venues and opportunities for evolving and implementing confidence-building measures in Africa. The research paper has been published and is available as a United Nations sales publication.^b

Arms transfers and dependence

A research project on arms transfers and dependence, which was finalized by Christian Catrina, analyses transfers of conventional arms in an attempt to delineate their implications for creating or reinforcing relationships of politico-military dependence among States. In order to provide a background to the analyses, quantitative and qualitative trends in conventional arms transfers are described on the basis of publicly available data and a large body of scientific writings. The project does not centre on proposals to control the transfer of conventional arms. Rather, its main purpose is to outline how imports and exports of arms may lead to dependence, so that

^b Sales No. G.V.E.87.0.5.

concerned Governments can adapt the structure of their imports or exports so as to minimize dependence, if they wish to do so.

***The verification issue in United Nations
disarmament negotiations***

The research report by Ellis Morris entitled "The verification issue in United Nations disarmament negotiations" follows the development of national positions on verification in the multilateral negotiations and discussions conducted in the Conference on Disarmament and its precursor bodies. It focuses on the political aspects of verification, investigating the principles underlying the various national approaches. The report was published in November 1987 and is available as a UNIDIR publication in English.^c

The international non-proliferation régime 1987

A monograph by David Fischer entitled "The international non-proliferation régime 1987" analyses the current international nuclear non-proliferation régime. In addition to examining the overall interest of States in restraining the spread of nuclear weapons, both horizontal and vertical, the study discusses the subject from many angles, its objectives, how far they have been reached, and future prospects, as well as complementary regional treaties, IAEA safeguards and relevant ancillary measures. The monograph has been published and is available in English as a United Nations sales publication.^d

***Satellite warfare: a challenge for the
international community***

The research report entitled "Satellite warfare: a challenge for the international community" was prepared by a group of experts under the auspices of IFRI. It analyses the anti-satellite threat and examines the possibility of establishing a legal régime to safeguard and protect satellites. The manuscript was received by UNIDIR and submitted to a critical examination by the staff of the Institute. The report has been published and is available in both English and French as a United Nations sales publication.^e

***Interrelationship of bilateral and multilateral
disarmament negotiations***

The publication "Interrelationship of bilateral and multilateral disarmament negotiations" contains the proceedings of a conference organized by UNIDIR with the assistance of the Institute for World Economics and International Relations of the USSR, which took place in Baku, USSR, from 2 to 4 June 1987. The Conference was attended by 50 participants from different parts of the world.

Disarmament: problems related to outer space

The research report "Disarmament: problems related to outer space" was issued in late 1987 and made available to delegations during the forty-second session of the General Assembly. The 190-page publication identifies and analyses the different issues relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, including current military uses of outer space, the possibility of further developments, the nature of the existing legal régime and proposals put forward by States to prevent an arms race in outer space.

The research work was carried out by a team within the Institute, consisting initially of Professor Hubert Thierry and Dr. Julie Dahlitz, and later of Professor Serge Sur and Christian Catrina. In preparing the report, UNIDIR worked in co-operation with a group of experts representing various schools of thought. Those experts were: Alexei Arbatov (Soviet Union), Yves Boyer (France), James Dougherty (United States), Sergio de Queiroz Duarte (Brazil), Rikhi Jaipal (India), Andrei Karkoszka (Poland), Roberto García Moritan (Argentina), Boris Maiorsky

^c Sales No. G.V.E.87.0.4.

^d Sales No. G.V.E.87.0.2.

^e Sales No. G.V.E.87.0.1 and G.V.F.87.0.1.

(Soviet Union), later succeeded by Ednan Agaev (Soviet Union) and Stephan Freiherr von Welck (Federal Republic of Germany).

The publication is available to the public at the sales section of the Palais des Nations in Geneva and at United Nations Headquarters, New York.^f

Programme of work for 1988

Establishment of a data base on disarmament

Work will continue on a three-year project to establish a computerized data base from United Nations documents, governmental statements, parliamentary records and scientific literature on selected security and disarmament issues.

National security concepts

It is planned to continue, in an expanded format, the existing series of monographs on national concepts of security, including national approaches to disarmament.

Conventional disarmament in Europe

Two research reports are being prepared by IFRI and the Institute for International Relations of the German Democratic Republic. On this basis, experts from various parts of the world will attend a conference in the second half of 1988 on the theme "Conventional disarmament in Europe: options and perspectives", covering a wide range of views on the issue.

Medium-term perspectives in disarmament and arms limitation

It is planned to carry out a survey of medium-term perspectives in the field of disarmament and arms limitation that will address major problems, the most essential measures and the ways and means to be utilized with a view to helping define research needs.

Maintenance and development of co-operation with and among research institutes

This programme will involve two activities:

- (a) A UNIDIR newsletter: a quarterly liaison bulletin to develop as well as enhance contacts with research institutes and individual experts from various parts of the world;
- (b) A symposium for directors of disarmament research institutes to review the status of disarmament research, exchange views and discuss the contribution of research institutes to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament.

Verification in multilateral disarmament: a Soviet approach

A detailed project and analysis of the Soviet approach to verification in multilateral disarmament will constitute a contribution to the ongoing discussion of the subject in multilateral disarmament forums.

Confidence- and security-building measures

A project entitled "Confidence- and security-building measures: concepts and approaches" is being planned. It will provide an in-depth investigation of the subject, based upon a comparative analysis of various concepts and approaches.

Disarmament and development

UNIDIR is developing projects that will contain follow-up research in implementation of the action programme contained in the Final Document of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development. The Board will give further consideration to this at its next session, in April 1988.

^f Sales No. G.V.E.87.0.7.

Problems of verification

A discussion paper on problems of verification will be prepared to assist the Board's consideration of the matter at its session in April 1988.

UNIDIR fellowships

UNIDIR will continue its programme of short-term fellowships for a small number of scholars and diplomats from developing countries to enable them to work at the Institute.

A P P E N D I C E S

APPENDIX I

Status of multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements

The information contained in this appendix reproduces data furnished by the Secretary-General where he is the depositary of the treaties or agreements concerned and by those Governments that are depositaries in the other cases.

The Secretary-General is the depositary of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques; the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies; and the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

France is the depositary of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.

Mexico is the depositary of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco).

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America are depositaries of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water; the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies; the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof; and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.

The United States of America is the depositary of the Antarctic Treaty.

The Director of the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation is the depositary for the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga).

Inclusion of information concerning the treaties and agreements of which the Secretary-General is not the depositary is as reported by the respective depositaries and implies no position on the part of the United Nations with respect to the data reported.

Actions reported in the period 1 January to 31 December 1987

The following list shows actions reported,^a if any, during the period 1 January to 31 December 1987 with regard to the arms regulation and disarmament agreements for which full information

^a Accession is indicated by (a), acceptance by (A) and succession by (s). In the case of multi-depositary clauses which make the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America depositaries, depositary action may be completed with one of more of the several depositaries. The letters "M", "L" and "W" indicate where the reported action was completed: "M" meaning Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, "L" the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and "W" the United States of America.

is provided in the second edition of the publication entitled *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*.^b

Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare

SIGNED AT GENEVA: 17 June 1925

ENTERED INTO FORCE: for each signatory as from the date of deposit of its ratification; accessions take effect on the date of the notification of the depositary Government

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENT: France

NEW PARTIES: none

The Antarctic Treaty

SIGNED AT WASHINGTON: 1 December 1959

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 23 June 1961

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENT: United States of America

NEW PARTIES: Greece — 8 January 1987 (a) ✓
Democratic People's Republic of Korea — 21 January 1987 (a) ✓
Austria — 25 August 1987 (a) ✓
Ecuador — 15 September 1987 (a) ✓

Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water

SIGNED BY THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN MOSCOW: 5 August 1963

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 8 August 1963

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 10 October 1963

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W)

NEW PARTIES: none

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 27 January 1967

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 10 October 1967

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W)

NEW PARTIES: none ✓

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT MEXICO CITY: 14 February 1967

ENTERED INTO FORCE: for each Government individually

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENT: Mexico

^b *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 2nd edition: 1982 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.83.IX.5).

TREATY—NEW SIGNATORIES: none

NEW PARTIES: none

ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I—NEW PARTIES: none

ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II—NEW PARTIES: none

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 1 July 1968

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 5 March 1970

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W)

NEW ACCESSIONS REPORTED: People's Republic of Kampuchea—25 September 1987 ✓

(M) (a)

Spain— 5 November 1987 ✓

(M) (L) (W) (a)

Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 11 February 1971

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 18 May 1972

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W)

NEW PARTIES: Republic of Korea—25 June 1987 (L) (W) ✓

Spain

—15 July 1987 (M) (L) (W) (a) ✓

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 10 April 1972

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 26 March 1975

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W)

NEW PARTIES: Democratic People's Republic of Korea—13 March 1987 (M) (a) ✓

Republic of Korea

—25 June 1987 (L) (W) ✓

Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT GENEVA: 18 May 1977

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 5 October 1978

DEPOSITARY: The Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW PARTIES: Argentina—20 March 1987 (a)^c ✓

Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT NEW YORK: 18 December 1979

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 11 July 1984

^c With the following interpretative declaration:

“The Argentine Republic interprets the terms ‘widespread, long-lasting or severe effects’ in article I, paragraph 1, of the Convention in accordance with the definitions agreed upon in the understanding on that article. It likewise interprets articles II, III and VIII in accordance with the relevant understandings.”

DEPOSITORY: The Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW PARTIES: none

Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT NEW YORK: 10 April 1981

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 2 December 1983

DEPOSITORY: The Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW PARTIES: Cuba — 2 March 1987 ✓
Tunisia — 15 May 1987 (a) ✓
Netherlands—18 June 1987 (A)^d ✓

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga)

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT RAROTONGA: 6 August 1985

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 11 December 1986

DEPOSITORY: Director of the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation

TREATY—NEW SIGNATORIES: Solomon Islands—29 May 1987 ✓
NEW PARTIES: Nauru — 13 April 1987 ✓
PROTOCOL 1—SIGNATORIES: none
PROTOCOL 2—SIGNATORIES: China—10 February 1987 ✓
PROTOCOL 3—SIGNATORIES: China—10 February 1987 ✓

^d With the following declaration:

“1. With regard to Article 2, paragraph 4, of Protocol II: It is the understanding of the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands that a specific area of land may also be a military objective if, because of its location or other reasons specified in paragraph 4, its total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definitive military advantage;

“2. With regard to Article 3, paragraph 3, under c, of Protocol II: It is the understanding of the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands that military advantage refers to the advantage anticipated from the attack considered as a whole and not only from isolated or particular parts of the attack;

“3. With regard to Article 8, paragraph 1, of Protocol II: It is the understanding of the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands that the words “as far as it is able” mean “as far as it is technically able”.

“4. With regard to Article 1, paragraph 3, of Protocol III: It is the understanding of the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands that a specific area of land may also be a military objective if, because of its location or other reasons specified in paragraph 3, its total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definitive military advantage.”

Composite table of signatories and parties as of 31 December 1987, as reported by depositaries
(s) signed; (r) ratified (including accessions, acceptances and successions)

Signatory or party reported	Geneva Protocol	Antarctic Treaty	Partial test ban	Outer space	Treaty of Tlatelolco	Non-proliferation	Sea-Bed	BW Convention	ENMOD	Celestial bodies	Conventional weapons [§]	Treaty of Rarotonga
Afghanistan	r		S r	S		S r	S r	S r	r		S	
Albania												
Algeria			S									
Angola												
Antigua and Barbuda					S r	r						
Argentina	r	S r	S r	S r	S		S r	S r	r		S	
Australia	r	S r	S r	S r		S r	S r	S r	S r	r	S r	S r
Austria	S r	r	S r	S r		S r	S r	S r	S r	S r	S r	
Bahamas			r	r	S r	r						
Bahrain												
Bangladesh			r	r		r			r			
Barbados	r		r	r	S r	S r		S r				
Belgium	S r	S r	S r	S r		S r	S r	S r	S r		S	
Belize						r		r				
Benin	r		S r	r		S r	S r	S r	S r			
Bhutan	r		r		r			r				
Bolivia	r		S r	S	S r	S r	S	S r	S			
Botswana			r	S		S r	S r	S				
Brazil	S r	r	S r	S r	S r†		S	S r	S r			
Brunei Darussalam						r						
Bulgaria	S r	r	S r	S r		S r	S r	S r	S r		S r	
Burkina Faso	r		S	S r		S r						

Composite table of signatories and parties as of 31 December 1987, as reported by depositaries (continued)

Signatory or party reported	Geneva Protocol	Antarctic Treaty	Partial test ban	Outer space	Treaty of Tlatelolco	Non-proliferation	Sea-Bed Convention	BW Convention	ENMOD	Celestial bodies	Conventional weapons	Treaty of Rarotonga
Burma			S	S	S		S					
Burundi			S	S		I	S	S				
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic			S	S			S	S	S			S
Cameroun			S	S		S	S					
Canada	S		S	S	S	S	S	S	S			S
Cape Verde			I			I	I	I				
Central African Republic			I	S	I	I	S	S				
Chad			S			S						
Chile	S	S	S	S	S		S	S		S		
China			I	I	S		I	I			S	S
					(A.P.II)†							(P.2&3)*
Colombia			S	S	S	S	S	S				
Comoros												
Congo						I	I	I				S
Cook Islands												
Costa Rica			S	S	S	S	S	S				
Côte d'Ivoire			S	S	S	S	I	S				
Cuba			I	I		I	I	S	S		S	
Cyprus			S	S	S	S	S	S	S			
Czechoslovakia	S		S	S	S	S	S	S	S		S	
Democratic Kampuchea						I	S	S				
Democratic People's Republic of Korea						I	I	I				
Democratic Yemen			I	I		S	S	S	S		S	I

Composite table of signatories and parties as of 31 December 1987, as reported by depositaries (continued)

Signatory or party reported	Geneva Protocol	Antarctic Treaty	Partial test ban	Outer space	Treaty of Tlatelolco	Non-proliferation	Sea-Bed	Convention	ENMOD	Celestial bodies	Conventional weapons ⁵	Treaty of Rarotonga
Haiti			S	S	S	S		S				
Holy See	I			S		I			S			
Honduras			S	S	S	S	S	S				
Hungary	I	I	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	
Iceland	I		S	S	S	S	S	S	S		S	
India	S	I	S	S	S	S	I	S	S	S	S	
Indonesia	I		S	S	S	S		S				
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	I		S	S	S	S	S	S	S			
Iraq	I		S	S	S	S	S	S	S			
Ireland	I		S	S	S	S	S	S	S		S	
Israel	I		S	S	S	S						
Italy	S	I	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	
Jamaica	I		S	S	S	S	S	I				
Japan	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	I		S	
Jordan	I		S	S	S	S	S	S				
Kenya	I		I		S	S		I				
Kiribati						I						S
Kuwait	I		S	I	S	S	S	S	I			
Lao People's Democratic Republic			S	S	S	S	S	S	S			I
Lebanon	I		S	S	S	S	S	S	S			
Lesotho	I		S		S	S	S	S				
Liberia	I		S	S	S	S	S	S	S			
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	I		S	I	S	S						

Composite table of signatories and parties as of 31 December 1987, as reported by depositaries (continued)

Signatory or party reported	Geneva Protocol	Antarctic Treaty	Partial test ban	Outer space	Treaty of Tlatelolco	Non-proliferation	Sea-Bed Convention	EMMOD	Celestial bodies	Conventional weapons\$	Treaty of Rarotonga
Pakistan	I		S	S I			S I	I	I	S I	
Panama	I		S I	S	S I	S I	S I				
Papua New Guinea	I	I	I	I		I	I	I			S
Paraguay	I		S		S I	S I	S	I			
People's Republic of Kampuchea											
Peru	I	I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I		S		
Philippines	I		S I	S	S I	S I	S I		S I	S	
Poland	S I	I	S I	S I		S I	S I	S I		S I	
Portugal	S I		S			I	I	S I	S	S	
Qatar	I						I	S I			
Republic of Korea		I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	I			
Romania	S I	I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S	S	
Rwanda	I		S I	S		I	S I	S I			
Saint Kitts and Nevis											
Saint Lucia							I				
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines											
Samoa			S I								S I
San Marino			S I	S I	S I		S I				
Sao Tome and Principe						I	I	I			
Saudi Arabia	I			I			S I	S I			
Senegal	I		S I			S I	S	S I			
Seychelles				I		I	I				
Sierra Leone	I		S I	S I		I	S	S I	S	S	
Singapore			I	I		S I	S I	S I			
Solomon Islands	I					I	I	I	I		S

Somalia	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
South Africa	I	S I	I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I
Spain	S I	I	S I	I	I	I	S I	S I	S
Sri Lanka	I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I
Sudan	I	S I	S I	S I	S	S	S	S	S
Suriname				S I	I				
Swaziland		I		S I	S I				
Sweden	S I	I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	I	S I
Switzerland	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I
Syrian Arab Republic	I	S I	I	S I	S I	S	S	S	S
Thailand	S I	S I	S I	I	I	S I	S I	S I	S
Togo	I	S I	S	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S
Tonga	I	I	I	I	I				
Trinidad and Tobago	I	S I	S	S I	S I				
Tunisia	I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	I
Turkey	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S
Tuvalu				I					S I
Uganda	I	S I	I	I		S			
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic		S I	S I		S I	S I	S I	S I	S I
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I
United Arab Emirates				(A.P.II)					S (P.2&3)*
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S

Composite table of signatories and parties as of 31 December 1987, as reported by depositaries (continued)

Signatory or party reported	Geneva Protocol	Antarctic Treaty	Partial test ban	Outer space	Treaty of Tlatelolco	Non-proliferation	Sea-Bed	BW Convention	ENMOD	Celestial bodies	Conventional weapons	Treaty of Rarotonga
United Republic of Tanzania	I		S				S	S				
United States of America	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	
Uruguay	S	I	S	S	S	S	S	I		S		
Vanuatu												
Venezuela	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S				
Viet Nam	I			I			I	I			S	
Yemen	I		S			S	S	S	S			
Yugoslavia	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S			S	
Zaire	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S			
Zambia				I								
Zimbabwe												

NOTE: This table updates, to 31 December 1987, information contained in the Secretary-General's report 'Status of multilateral disarmament agreements' (A/42(610) of 7 October 1987. The report is prepared for each regular session of the General Assembly pursuant to resolution 36/92 II of 9 December 1981.

* P. means Protocol to the Treaty of Rarotonga.

† State has not waived the requirements under article 28 of the Treaty.

‡ A.P. means Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

§ All States ratifying the Convention so far have given notification of their acceptance of Protocols I, II and III.

¶ S.A.T.C. has accepted Protocols I, II and III.

§§ State has accepted Protocols I and II.

Activities of the United Nations Environment Programme related to disarmament*

Introduction

The Declaration on the Human Environment, adopted by the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment at Stockholm in June 1972 and endorsed by the General Assembly, clearly states in principle 26 that:

Man and his environment must be spared the effects of nuclear weapons and all other means of mass destruction. States must strive to reach prompt agreement, in the relevant international organs, on the elimination and complete destruction of such weapons.

Since the creation of UNEP, its Governing Council has adopted a number of resolutions concerning that principle for the enhancement of the environment, and some of the activities of UNEP are also related to it. A brief review of such resolutions and activities is given in this appendix.

Resolutions and reports

A. *Effects of weapons on ecosystems*

The United Nations Conference on Desertification, held in 1977, adopted resolution 4, concerning the effect of weapons of mass destruction on ecosystems. It noted that the use of chemical and biological weapons during wars was one of the factors contributing to desertification in certain parts of the world and that those factors were most seriously felt in developing countries, including those which were currently engaged in armed struggle for independence and those which had recently achieved independence through armed struggle. It condemned the use of any techniques that cause the desertification of the environment and denounced the effects of destructive weapons and practices on the ecosystems of all countries. The use of chemical and biological weapons which destroy or diminish the potential of ecosystems and are conducive to desertification was also condemned and the prohibition of the use of poisons in water as a weapon of war was demanded. Resolution 4 of the Desertification Conference was endorsed by General Assembly resolution 32/172. In implementation of the resolution, UNEP and the former United Nations Centre for Disarmament prepared a study on the effect of weapons of mass destruction on ecosystems.^a On the basis of that study, the Secretary-General presented a report to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session.

B. *Remnants of war^b*

The problem of material remnants of war has been the subject of several decisions of the UNEP Governing Council and the General Assembly since 1975. At its thirtieth session, the General Assembly requested UNEP to undertake a study of the problem of the material remnants of wars, particularly mines, and their effects on the environment, and to submit a report on the

* Text contributed by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).

^a *UNEP Studies*, vol. 1, "The effects of weapons on ecosystems", by J. P. Robinson of the Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex, Brighton, England. (Published for UNEP by Pergamon Press.)

^b For further details of action taken on this subject, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 8: 1983, appendix III.

subject. The Governing Council of UNEP, in April 1976, authorized the Executive Director to proceed with the study. In 1977 the report entitled "Material remnants of wars and their effect on the environment" was submitted to the General Assembly.

In 1981, the Secretary-General submitted to the General Assembly a report entitled "Problems of remnants of war", and the Assembly requested him to continue his contacts and consultations with Member States in order to find ways and means of solving the problem, including the possibility of convening a conference under the auspices of the United Nations. The views of all States were sought by a letter from the Executive Director of UNEP on behalf of the Secretary-General and a report on the replies was submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session. The Assembly thereupon requested the Secretary-General, in co-operation with the Executive Director, to prepare a factual study on the problem of remnants of war, particularly mines. The study, entitled "Explosive remnants of conventional war", was prepared by a group of experts within the framework of a joint UNEP/SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) programme of studies on military activities and the human environment, and was submitted to the General Assembly in 1983.

At that session, the General Assembly adopted a resolution by which it requested the Secretary-General, in co-operation with the Executive Director of UNEP, to continue to seek the views of States on the recommendations contained in the study and to intensify his efforts to urge the States concerned immediately to conduct bilateral consultations with the aim of concluding agreements for the solution of that problem, it being understood that the legitimate right of the affected developing countries to full compensation for damages due to them should be ensured; and called upon all States to co-operate with the Secretary-General in carrying out the tasks requested of him so as to enable him, in co-operation with the Executive Director of UNEP, to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session a report on the results of his consultations and endeavours with the States concerned.

At its thirty-ninth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 39/167, by which it requested the Secretary-General, in co-operation with UNEP and other organizations of the United Nations system, within their mandates, to collect all information on expertise and available equipment so as to evaluate, on request, the actual needs of the developing countries in their efforts to detect and clear material remnants of war, and to submit a detailed and comprehensive report on the implementation of that resolution to the General Assembly at its fortieth session.

At its fortieth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 40/197, by which it requested the Secretary-General, in co-operation with the Executive Director of UNEP, to continue his efforts with the countries responsible for planting the mines and the affected developing countries in order to ensure the implementation of the relevant resolutions. A detailed and comprehensive report on the matter was submitted to the General Assembly at its forty-second session.^c

C. *Pernicious effects of the arms race on nature*

At its thirty-fifth session, the General Assembly adopted, by a recorded vote of 68 to none, with 47 abstentions, resolution 35/8, on the historical responsibility of States for the preservation of nature for present and future generations, and asked UNEP to prepare a report on the pernicious effects of the arms race on nature and to seek the views of States on possible measures to be taken at the international level for its preservation. A summarized version of a study on the subject was submitted to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament, in 1982.

D. *State of the world environment*

The Governing Council of UNEP, at its seventh session, in May 1979, decided to include the topic "Environmental effects of military activity" in the report on the state of the environment. In pursuance of that request, the publication *The State of the World Environment: Selected Topics* included a chapter on the environmental effects of military activity (chapter V).

^c A/42/514.

The UNEP report *The World Environment 1972-1982*, prepared with the main objective of assessing the state of the world environment a decade after the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, included a chapter on peace and security (chapter 16).⁴

E. Hostile use of environmental modification techniques

The Governing Council of UNEP, at its fifth session, in May 1977, took note of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques annexed to General Assembly resolution 31/72 of 10 December 1976, and requested Member States to facilitate exchanges of information on the use of environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes (UNEP/GC/102(V)).

The Governing Council of UNEP, at its eighth session, adopted decision 8/7, section (a) of which was entitled "Provision for co-operation between States in weather modification". In paragraph 1 of that decision, the Governing Council decided, *inter alia*, that weather modification should be dedicated to the benefit of mankind and the environment.

The issue of environmental modification techniques is one of the activities included in the joint UNEP/SIPRI programme of studies on military activities and the human environment. A symposium on the legal and technical aspects of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques was held in co-operation with UNIDIR in April 1984.

F. Military activity and the environment in the context of the System-Wide Medium-Term Environment Programme (SWMTEP)

In its decision 9/10, section (b), the UNEP Governing Council approved, on a provisional basis, the structure and objectives of SWMTEP.

The Governing Council of UNEP, meeting in a Session of Special Character in May 1982, adopted resolution I, which drew attention to the fact that the continuing increase in the production of weapons of mass destruction and the development of new types of chemical and bacteriological weapons not only posed a major threat to the environment and to life on Earth, but also competed for limited resources that could be better used for constructive purposes. At the same session, the Council approved resolution III, on arms and the environment, which appealed to Governments and the world community as a whole to do the utmost to halt the arms race and thereby prevent a major threat to the environment.

The structure of SWMTEP was approved by the Council by decision 10/13 of 31 May 1982. This structure included chapter XV, on the arms race and the environment (UNEP/GC/10/7 and UNEP/GC/11/7), which indicated, *inter alia*, the following activities that UNEP could implement in co-operation with other agencies: preparation of reports on possible effects of military activity on the environment, examination of the issues of ecologically important areas in relation to potential damage of military activity, analysis of existing treaties in relation to environmental effects of military activities, study of the use of natural resources for military activities, etc.

Some of the above-mentioned activities are considered in a joint programme of studies on military activities and the human environment that UNEP has with SIPRI. Since 1985, as part of that programme, SIPRI has published four books:

- (a) *Environmental Warfare: A Technical, Legal and Policy Appraisal*;
- (b) *Herbicides in War: The Long-Term Ecological and Human Consequences*;
- (c) *Explosive Remnants of War: Mitigating the Environmental Effects*;
- (d) *Global Resources and International Conflicts: Environmental Factors in Strategic Policies and Actions*.

In 1986, UNEP published a booklet entitled "Disarmament, Environment and Sustainable Development—A Time for Action" by Essam El-Hinnawi.

⁴ *The World Environment 1972-1982*. A report by UNEP. Edited by M. W. Holdgate, M. Kassas and G. F. White and co-ordinated by E. El-Hinnawi, Tycooly International, Dublin, 1982.

G. *Radiation from nuclear explosions*

Artificial radioactive material from nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere has been the cause of widespread contamination of the environment. The United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR)^e has regularly assessed the exposure to which the population of the world has been subjected as a result of the atmospheric nuclear tests.

^e *Genetic and Somatic Effects of Ionizing Radiation*. United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, 1986 Report to the General Assembly, with annexes.

APPENDIX III

Activities of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization related to disarmament*

Research and publications

In the framework of its programme on the study of the causes and consequences of the arms race and of its effects on UNESCO's fields of competence, the Division of Human Rights and Peace, in co-operation with the International Social Science Council and the Research Group on Peace Research and European Security Studies (Chairman, Dr. Hans Günter Brauch, University of Stuttgart, Federal Republic of Germany), has prepared an analysis of research activities in the social and human sciences. The work covers activities relating to the causes and consequences of the arms race and the relationship between peace, security, development and disarmament that have already been carried out or are in progress within the United Nations system and international, regional or national institutions in education, science, culture and communication in the field of disarmament. The analysis is complemented by a directory of the institutions, including those of the United Nations system, which conduct research on all disarmament questions as defined above and a selective bibliography of the studies completed or currently being carried out by those institutions.

The findings mainly cover such areas as the present-day utilization of resources for military purposes, the economic and social effects of a continuing arms race and of the implementation of disarmament measures, the conversion and redeployment of resources released from military purposes through disarmament measures for the international reallocation of resources from armament to development, the role of scientists/universities/research institutions, and problems relating to negotiations and verification.

The purpose of this survey of research in the social and human sciences is to examine the focus and assess the results of research already carried out or in progress; to enhance the exchange of information in order to facilitate scientific co-operation; and to support academic contacts and to create awareness within the scientific community, the United Nations system and among the attentive public at large of issues related to disarmament efforts as they come within UNESCO's fields of competence.

Given the scientific importance and complexity of the subject and the amount of literature that has been published on disarmament matters, this survey aims at providing a general and overall introduction to the analytic context of disarmament research. It is meant to be an information tool to provide access to this vast field and to assist, *inter alia*, in the preparation of courses and seminars at institutions of higher education on the educational, scientific, social and cultural aspects of disarmament issues.

The analysis, directory and bibliography are available from the Division of Human Rights and Peace, UNESCO, Paris. They will be published in the *UNESCO Yearbook on Peace and Conflict Studies*, vol. IX (1988).

UNESCO Yearbook on Peace and Conflict Studies

The *Yearbook* is published in co-edition by UNESCO and Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, United States.

* Text contributed by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

Volume VI (1985) of the *Yearbook*, currently available, is concerned with the Second World War. The essays in this volume represent the contributions of 12 international authorities on these critical issues. They deal with European currents of war such as the rise of fascism; the psychological mobilization of the German people; the policies of the Third Reich towards Jews, Gypsies and Slavs; the Polish resistance; some lessons of the Second World War; the opening of the Western front; the impact of the German and Italian occupation of North Africa; and Irish neutrality. They also treat movements in Asia, including the impact of militarism on Japanese society before and during the war; China's resistance to Japan and the founding of the new China; and the impact of the war on independence movements in Asia. The international perspectives of the writers make the volume a valuable contribution to peace studies and the study of the impact of the Second World War. The *Yearbook* will provide enlightening reading for political scientists and those taking courses in peace studies.

Volume VII (1986) of the *Yearbook* will be available in mid-1988. The topics treated therein are: plural society and conflict, ethnic violence, human rights and early warning systems, social conflict in South Africa, conflict situations in newly independent African countries, and international responses to conflict. The papers are the outcome of an international symposium organized jointly by UNESCO and the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO).

Volume VIII (1987), which is scheduled to appear in late 1988, will highlight the impact of the arms race on education, science and technology, culture and communication; the arms trade and technology transfer to the developing countries; and the arms race and the process of national reconstruction in developing countries.

Volume IX (1988) is in preparation. It will deal, within UNESCO's fields of competence, with the relationship of disarmament and development and will present the analysis of research activities referred to in the first section of this appendix.

Each volume ends with a brief survey of UNESCO's activities to promote peace and international understanding. It also outlines some of the many activities undertaken in the fields of peace and disarmament research, at both international and regional levels, by institutions such as the United Nations University, the International Peace Research Association (IPRA), the Pugwash Movement and PRIO, and provides information received from specialized national institutions.

UNESCO Prize for Peace Education

The 1987 UNESCO Prize for Peace Education was shared between the celebrated Swiss journalist and writer Ms. Laurence Deonna and Servicio Paz y Justicia en América Latina, an ecumenical non-violent organization founded in 1971. Since 1967, Ms. Deonna has been working with unflinching determination and devotion in favour of peace education, being especially alive to problems of women in the Middle East. Servicio Paz y Justicia undertakes education for peace, consciousness-raising, educational activities relating to human rights and the rights of peoples, and the training of grass-roots leaders.

The aim of the prize, which was created in 1981 thanks to a donation from the Japan Shipbuilding Industry Foundation and is awarded annually, is to promote all forms of action designed to "construct the defences of peace in the minds of men" by rewarding a particularly outstanding example of activity designed to alert public opinion and mobilize the conscience of mankind in the cause of peace, in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution of UNESCO and the Charter of the United Nations.

Meetings and training programmes

Under contract with UNESCO, the Centre for Continuing Education of the Australian National University prepared teaching material for a peace course for adults. The aim of the course is to help adults gain a better understanding of the relationship between peace, disarmament, security and development; appreciate what they can contribute to peace and disarmament; and enhance their motivation and skills for making that contribution.

The Swedish National Commission for UNESCO prepared, under contract with UNESCO, a training programme on the relationship between peace, disarmament, security and development and on the dangers of nuclear war. The programme is intended for use in training non-formal literacy and adult education personnel. Its main purpose is to help develop a greater awareness

among education personnel and other adults of the important contribution they can make to the cause of peace, disarmament, international understanding and respect for human rights.

For the 24th session of the General Conference of UNESCO, the Secretariat prepared a "report on the activities undertaken to give effect to the recommendations of the intergovernmental Conference on education for international understanding, co-operation and peace and education relating to human rights and fundamental freedoms, with a view to developing a climate of opinion favourable to the strengthening of security and disarmament" (1983) (24/C/92).

A practical seminar was held in March 1987 in Belgium to draw up experimental projects at the level of higher education in order to provide students with the requisite knowledge concerning problems relating to peace, respect for human rights and the rights of peoples, the dangers of nuclear war, the arms race, and certain harmful uses of science and technology.

During 1987 as well, four experimental projects were launched in universities of Brazil, the German Democratic Republic, Thailand and Tunisia. A training seminar was organized in Finland in June for non-formal and adult education personnel on the relationship between peace, disarmament, security and development. The seminar contributed to the finalization of teaching materials that were prepared within pilot projects launched by UNESCO during the 1986-1987 biennium.

24th session of the General Conference of UNESCO

At its 24th session, held from 20 October to 20 November 1987, the General Conference of UNESCO adopted by consensus resolution 13.1, concerning Major Programme XIII—*Peace, International Understanding, Human Rights and the Rights of Peoples*. In the text's operative paragraph relating to disarmament, the Director-General is invited: (a) to contribute to the broadest possible dissemination of information and to facilitate unhindered access by the public at large to all information, including particularly that produced by the appropriate bodies of the United Nations system, likely to give the public adequate knowledge and better understanding of the level of armaments and of the questions of arms limitation, disarmament and the consequences of the arms race, in order that public opinion may be in a position to exert a positive influence on the achievement of the objectives of peace and disarmament; (b) to promote capacities for research in the social and human sciences and exchanges of information, academic contacts and awareness among experts and institutions specializing in the field of disarmament concerning all aspects of disarmament, including the causes and consequences of the arms race and the relationship between peace, security and disarmament and the potential interrelations between disarmament and educational, scientific and cultural development; and to contribute, in UNESCO's fields of competence, to a better knowledge and understanding of all questions concerning disarmament, particularly through measures calculated to improve the use of materials produced by the competent bodies of the United Nations system and through the preparation of a comprehensive survey of research in the social and human sciences carried out by national, regional or international scientific institutions, with the aim of encouraging such work; and (c) to promote reflection on the question of how the defences of peace can be constructed in the minds of men, including particularly a programme for the world-wide "eradication of hostile preconceptions", and a study on their psychological, ideological, historical and sociological foundations and the use that is made of them.

Co-operation with other United Nations bodies

In 1987, UNESCO continued to examine with the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, New York, and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), Geneva, and in consultation with non-governmental organizations and learned bodies, the ways and means to improve the dissemination of the studies and information relating to disarmament.

These consultations, which will be continued in 1988, have already improved procedures of mutual information and have helped to avoid duplication.

Activities of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations related to disarmament*

The constitutional mandate of FAO to raise levels of nutrition and standards of living, to improve efficiency in the production and distribution of all food and agricultural products and to better the condition of rural populations, thus contributing towards an expanding world economy and ensuring humanity's freedom from hunger, is closely linked with peace and disarmament.

There is a growing awareness that hunger and poverty on a massive scale, accompanied by environmental disasters, pose a dangerous threat to peaceful relations within and between States.

Research carried out by FAO has revealed that, by the year 2000, the lands of most developing countries will scarcely be sufficient to feed their expected populations if traditional farming methods are continued. Two fifths of their land area, with 60 per cent of the total population, will be carrying more people than it can support. One of the most disturbing features of this scenario is that population growth will be fastest precisely in those areas where land resources are least capable of meeting the needs of the population and where the risk of desertification and fuel-wood deficiency is highest.

Other complex political and social factors, not least of which is the disproportionate share of often limited national budgets that is spent on swords rather than on ploughshares, will compound the dangers and delay solutions. The action taken over the next 40 years will be crucial to human history, as during this period it will be decided whether the needs of populations can be accommodated to available national resources without widespread suffering from hunger and poverty, disruption, conflict or irreversible degradation of the environment. The outcome of current trends concerns not only the potentially critical countries, but the entire human race.

FAO is working with developing countries to reverse these trends by: (a) creating a climate conducive to agricultural development; (b) increasing food and agricultural production; (c) assisting with harvest and post-harvest phases of production; (d) managing and conserving the Earth's natural resources; and (e) financing agricultural development activities.

FAO has made specific reference to the relationship between development and disarmament on numerous occasions, for example, in publications such as *Ceres* (1986) and through World Food Day, which is celebrated on 16 October every year throughout the world.

* Text contributed by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).

Activities of the World Health Organization related to disarmament*

In 1987 the WHO Management Group to study the effects of nuclear war on health and health services completed the second phase of work begun in this field in 1981. It will be recalled that an international committee of experts in medical sciences and public health had submitted a report to the World Health Assembly in 1983, which was published in 1984.^a The report concluded that it was not possible to prepare health services to deal in any systematic way with a catastrophe resulting from nuclear warfare or its aftermath.

The Management Group, known as "WHOPAX", was established by the Director-General in compliance with World Health Assembly resolution WHA36.28 (1983) to continue the work of "collecting and analysing and regularly publishing accounts of activities and further studies on the effects of nuclear war on health and health services . . .". It is composed of scientists who already served in the international committee mentioned above or have special experience in this field. In the ensuing three years, members of WHOPAX participated in numerous studies carried out throughout the world, notably by the Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment of the International Council of Scientific Unions, the Institute of Medicine of the United States National Academy of Sciences, the Greater London Area War Risk Study Commission, and the United States-Japan Joint Workshop for Reassessment of Atomic Bomb Radiation Dosimetry. The results of these studies, which brought to bear a wide variety of disciplines and modern analytical techniques, were incorporated by the Group into a revised and updated version of the report.

The WHOPAX report, which constitutes WHO's major contribution to the International Year of Peace 1986, was submitted to the Fortieth World Health Assembly in May 1987. The report states that the destructive power of the nuclear weapons now amassed is such that:

. . . if only 1% of them were utilized on urban areas, more people could be killed in a few hours than during the whole of the Second World War.

In addition to the immediate effects of blast and heat, the radiation and fallout of nuclear explosions have devastating effects in both the short and long term.

The many individual fires caused by the heat wave would result in huge superfires that could spread widely. In such a conflagration no one would survive, even in underground shelters. The number of fatalities caused by such a superfire could be 3-4 times greater than that caused by the blast wave.

After the extinction of the fires, the clouds of smoke, together with millions of tons of particulate matter from bomb craters, would lead to a sudden temperature decrease. Even though the extent and duration of this decrease cannot be exactly predicted, a fall of a few degrees in temperature could seriously affect the growth of crops and create other environmental disturbances over large areas of the globe. These effects would not be limited only to the countries directly involved in the conflict, but would also influence people in other parts of the world and affect their health.

After a major nuclear war, famine and diseases would be widespread and social, communication and economic systems around the world would be disrupted.

The Group also studied the psychosocial aspects of the *threat* of nuclear war on both adults and children. The most consistent reaction seemed to be "habituation to the threat, which is met with fatalism or a feeling of helplessness". However, young people most anxious about the threat "were also more confident about preventing it by their own and others' efforts"

The study clearly shows that it would be impossible to prepare the health services in the

* Text contributed by the World Health Organization (WHO).

^a WHO, *Effects of Nuclear War on Health and Health Services* (Geneva, 1984).

world to deal in any significant way with the appalling health consequences of a nuclear war in either the short or long term. There would be radiation injury from radioactive fall-out, suppression of the immune response, physical trauma and psychological stress, infectious diseases and a higher incidence of cancer and genetic diseases. Moreover, in a nuclear war the health services themselves would be largely destroyed or incapacitated. The report therefore concluded:

It is a tragic irony that, whereas the initial warning time in a nuclear war has shrunk to hours and minutes, the detriment to health that it could cause would persist for years, decades, and generations.

When treatment is ineffective, the only solution available to the health professions is prevention. Prevention is obviously the only possibility in case of a nuclear war.

The Fortieth World Health Assembly, in resolution WHA40.24 of May 1987, expressed its deep concern at the conclusions contained in the report and urged the Governments of member States to take into consideration in their activities its main points and conclusions. The Health Assembly decided that "the investigation of other health aspects of the effects of nuclear war that are not reflected in the report should be continued, in collaboration with interested United Nations bodies and other international organizations". It therefore requested the Director-General of the World Health Organization to make the report widely known by publishing it with all its scientific annexes and to transmit it to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and to the executive heads of other international organizations with a view to its consideration by the appropriate United Nations bodies and other organizations.

In accordance with resolution WHA40.24, the WHOPAX report has been published^b in the six official languages of WHO (English, French, Spanish, Russian, Chinese and Arabic) and will be widely distributed.

^b *Ibid.*, 2nd edition (Geneva, 1987).

Activities of the World Meteorological Organization related to disarmament*

Introduction

WMO is not directly involved in questions of disarmament. Some of the activities of the Organization, however, have some relevance to article III of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (General Assembly resolution 31/72, annex) and the understandings of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament relating thereto.* A brief review of the major WMO programmes concerned and of the relevant activities in 1987 is given in the present note.

World Weather Watch

The World Weather Watch is the basic programme of WMO. Its primary function is the real-time provision of meteorological and related geophysical and environmental information, analyses, short- and medium-range forecasts and extended-range weather outlooks to WMO members, according to their specific needs. It should be noted that the World Weather Watch programme contains the following provision:

The World Weather Watch shall be used only for peaceful purposes, due account being taken of the national sovereignty and security of States, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the spirit and traditions of the World Meteorological Organization.

The World Weather Watch is divided into three essential elements:

(a) The Global Observing System (GOS), consisting of facilities and arrangements for making observations on land, at sea, from aircraft and meteorological satellites;

(b) The Global Data Processing System (GDPS), consisting of meteorological centres with arrangements for the processing of observational data and preparation of analyses and forecast products;

(c) The Global Telecommunication System (GTS), consisting of telecommunication facilities and arrangements for the rapid and reliable collection and distribution of observational data and processed information.

Since 1984, the World Weather Watch Programme has supported the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, established by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in 1976, by providing for the regular exchange of seismic data on the GTS.

Environmental pollution monitoring and research

The Environmental Pollution Monitoring and Research Programme assists meteorological services in their responsibilities to monitor, assess and forecast the levels and trends of atmospheric and environmental pollution and contributes to the research in understanding pollution exchange, transformation and transport processes. Thereby, WMO contributes to the international work to monitor and control environmental pollution, in particular to UNEP/GEMS. The global WMO

* Text contributed by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO).

* See *The Yearbook*, vol. 1: 1976 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.77.IX.2), appendix IX.

Background Air Pollution Monitoring Network (BAPMON) provides information on material contained in the atmosphere and in wet and dry depositions that can be harmful to the human environment and that is coming from natural and man-made sources.

Cloud physics and weather modification

The main objectives of the WMO Cloud Physics and Weather Modification Research Programme, which was confirmed by the Tenth World Meteorological Congress (1987), are:

(a) To promote sound scientific foundations for weather modification based on cloud physics and other relevant investigations;

(b) To provide the rationale underlying all aspects of weather modification.

The goal of the programme is to enable WMO to provide sound scientific and technical advice to its members on the status of weather modification and on the planning, implementation and evaluation of economically beneficial, intentional weather modification projects. Highest priority has been given to precipitation enhancement and hail suppression. Falling also within the scope of the programme are tropical cyclone moderation, lightning suppression and fog dispersal, as well as unintentional weather modification on the cloud and mesoscales.

WMO maintains and periodically publishes its "Register of national weather modification projects", which summarizes world-wide activities in weather modification. Its "Review of the current status of weather modification" is also kept up to date and published. This information is regularly sent to the secretariat for the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques.

Ozone research and monitoring

The implementation of the WMO Global Ozone Research and Monitoring Project has taken on added significance in the light of the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and the recent discovery of Antarctic ozone decrease. The project is co-ordinated with UNEP and other international programmes and with a large number of national programmes.

The main activities of the WMO project are the improvement of ozone data quality in the WMO world-wide network, modernization and strengthening of the network itself, acquisition of ancillary data for better ozone retrievals, investigations of the linkage between ozone change and climate change, facilitation of data exchange and the organization of periodic international assessments of the state of ozone research.

World climate

The World Climate Programme, established by the Eighth World Meteorological Congress (1979), is one of the major programmes of WMO. The objectives of the programme as defined in the WMO second long-term plan (1988-1997) are:

(a) To apply existing climate information to the benefit of mankind;

(b) To improve understanding of climate processes so as to accelerate the:

—Determination of the predictability of climate;

—Development of long-range weather forecasting;

—Determination of the extent of man's influence on climate;

(c) To monitor significant climate variations or changes, either natural or man-made, and to develop the capability to warn Governments of impacts which could markedly affect economic and social activities of mankind.

The work is distributed among four component programmes:

—The World Climate Data Programme (WCDP);

—The World Climate Applications Programme (WCAP);

—The World Climate Research Programme (WCRP) (conducted jointly by WMO and the International Council of Scientific Unions);

—The World Climate Impact Studies Programme (WCIP), the activities of which are carried out by UNEP in close co-operation with WMO.

The World Climate Programme is one of very wide scope, and the planning and implementation of the wide-ranging activities demand co-operation with many other international governmental organizations and non-governmental organizations.

Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles*

Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind,

Guided by the objective of strengthening strategic stability,

Convinced that the measures set forth in this Treaty will help to reduce the risk of outbreak of war and strengthen international peace and security, and

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

In accordance with the provisions of this Treaty which includes the Memorandum of Understanding and Protocols which form an integral part thereof, each Party shall eliminate its intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, not have such systems thereafter, and carry out the other obligations set forth in this Treaty. --

Article II

For the purposes of this Treaty:

1. The term "ballistic missile" means a missile that has a ballistic trajectory over most of its flight path. The term "ground-launched ballistic missile (GLBM)" means a ground-launched ballistic missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle.

2. The term "cruise missile" means an unmanned, self-propelled vehicle that sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path. The term "ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM)" means a ground-launched cruise missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle.

3. The term "GLBM launcher" means a fixed launcher or a mobile land-based transporter-erector-launcher mechanism for launching a GLBM.

* The text of the Treaty, together with the Protocol on Elimination, the Protocol on Inspection and the Memorandum of Understanding regarding the Establishment of the Data Base for the Treaty, was circulated in 1988 as a document of the Conference on Disarmament at the request of the United States (CD/798) and at the request of the Soviet Union (CD/800). The Treaty and its two Protocols are reproduced in this appendix. The Memorandum of Understanding, which is not reproduced here, contains data exchanged by the parties, current as of 1 November 1987, on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers.

4. The term "GLCM launcher" means a fixed launcher or a mobile land-based transporter-erector-launcher mechanism for launching a GLCM.

5. The term "intermediate-range missile" means a GLBM or a GLCM having a range capability in excess of 1000 kilometers but not in excess of 5500 kilometers.

6. The term "shorter-range missile" means a GLBM or a GLCM having a range capability equal to or in excess of 500 kilometers but not in excess of 1000 kilometers.

7. The term "deployment area" means a designated area within which intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles may operate and within which one or more missile operating bases are located.

8. The term "missile operating base" means:

(a) in the case of intermediate-range missiles, a complex of facilities, located within a deployment area, at which intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles normally operate, in which support structures associated with such missiles and launchers are also located and in which support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers is normally located; and

(b) in the case of shorter-range missiles, a complex of facilities, located any place, at which shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles normally operate and in which support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers is normally located.

9. The term "missile support facility," as regards intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles, means a missile production facility or a launcher production facility, a missile repair facility or a launcher repair facility, a training facility, a missile storage facility or a launcher storage facility, a test range, or an elimination facility as those terms are defined in the Memorandum of Understanding.

10. The term "transit" means movement, notified in accordance with paragraph 5 (f) of Article IX of this Treaty, of an intermediate-range missile or a launcher of such a missile between missile support facilities, between such a facility and a deployment area or between deployment areas, or of a shorter-range missile or a launcher of such a missile from a missile support facility or a missile operating base to an elimination facility.

11. The term "deployed missile" means an intermediate-range missile located within a deployment area or a shorter-range missile located at a missile operating base.

12. The term "non-deployed missile" means an intermediate-range missile located outside a deployment area or a shorter-range missile located outside a missile operating base.

13. The term "deployed launcher" means a launcher of an intermediate-range missile located within a deployment area or a launcher of a shorter-range missile located at a missile operating base.

14. The term "non-deployed launcher" means a launcher of an intermediate-range missile located outside a deployment area or a launcher of a shorter-range missile located outside a missile operating base.

15. The term "basing country" means a country other than the United States of America or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on whose territory intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles of the Parties, launchers of such missiles or support structures associated with such missiles and launchers were located at any time after November 1, 1987. Missiles or launchers in transit are not considered to be "located."

Article III

1. For the purposes of this Treaty, existing types of intermediate-range missiles are:

(a) for the United States of America, missiles of the types designated by the United States of America as the Pershing II and the BGM-109G, which are known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designations; and

(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the types designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RSD-10, the R-12 and the R-14, which are known to the United States of America as the SS-20, the SS-4 and the SS-5, respectively.

2. For the purposes of this Treaty, existing types of shorter-range missiles are:

(a) for the United States of America, missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Pershing IA, which is known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation; and

(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the types designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the OTR-22 and the OTR-23, which are known to the United States of America as the SS-12 and the SS-23, respectively.

Article IV

1. Each Party shall eliminate all its intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles, and all support structures and support equipment of the categories listed in the Memorandum of Understanding associated with such missiles and launchers, so that no later than three years after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter no such missiles, launchers, support structures or support equipment shall be possessed by either Party.

2. To implement paragraph 1 of this Article, upon entry into force of this Treaty, both Parties shall begin and continue throughout the duration of each phase, the reduction of all types of their deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range missiles and deployed and non-deployed launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty. These reductions shall be implemented in two phases so that:

(a) by the end of the first phase, that is, no later than 29 months after entry into force of this Treaty:

- (i) the number of deployed launchers of intermediate-range missiles for each Party shall not exceed the number of launchers that are capable of carrying or containing at one time missiles considered by the Parties to carry 171 warheads;
- (ii) the number of deployed intermediate-range missiles for each Party shall not exceed the number of such missiles considered by the Parties to carry 180 warheads;
- (iii) the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed launchers of intermediate-range missiles for each Party shall not exceed the number of launchers that are capable of carrying or containing at one time missiles considered by the Parties to carry 200 warheads;
- (iv) the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range missiles for each Party shall not exceed the number of such missiles considered by the Parties to carry 200 warheads; and
- (v) the ratio of the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range GLBMs of existing types for each Party to the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range missiles of existing types possessed by that Party shall not exceed the ratio of such intermediate-range GLBMs to such intermediate-range missiles for that Party as of November 1, 1987, as set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding; and

(b) by the end of the second phase, that is, no later than three years after entry into force of this Treaty, all intermediate-range missiles of each Party, launchers of such missiles and all support structures and support equipment of the categories listed in the Memorandum of Understanding associated with such missiles and launchers, shall be eliminated.

Article V

1. Each Party shall eliminate all its shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles, and all support equipment of the categories listed in the Memorandum of Understanding associated with such missiles and launchers, so that no later than 18 months after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter no such missiles, launchers or support equipment shall be possessed by either Party.

2. No later than 90 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall complete the removal of all its deployed shorter-range missiles and deployed and non-deployed launchers of such missiles to elimination facilities and shall retain them at those locations until they are eliminated in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination. No later than 12 months after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall complete the removal of

all its non-deployed shorter-range missiles to elimination facilities and shall retain them at those locations until they are eliminated in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination.

3. Shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles shall not be located at the same elimination facility. Such facilities shall be separated by no less than 1000 kilometers.

Article VI

1. Upon entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, neither Party shall:

(a) produce or flight-test any intermediate-range missiles or produce any stages of such missiles or any launchers of such missiles; or

(b) produce, flight-test or launch any shorter-range missiles or produce any stages of such missiles or any launchers of such missiles.

2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this Article, each Party shall have the right to produce a type of GLBM not limited by this Treaty which uses a stage which is outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, a stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM having more than one stage, providing that that Party does not produce any other stage which is outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, any other stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM.

Article VII

For the purposes of this Treaty:

1. If a ballistic missile or a cruise missile has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all missiles of that type shall be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles.

2. If a GLBM or GLCM is an intermediate-range missile, all GLBMs or GLCMs of that type shall be considered to be intermediate-range missiles. If a GLBM or GLCM is a shorter-range missile, all GLBMs or GLCMs of that type shall be considered to be shorter-range missiles.

3. If a GLBM is of a type developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of the Earth, it shall not be considered to be a missile to which the limitations of this Treaty apply.

4. The range capability of a GLBM not listed in Article III of this Treaty shall be considered to be the maximum range to which it has been tested. The range capability of a GLCM not listed in Article III of this Treaty shall be considered to be the maximum distance which can be covered by the missile in its standard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion, determined by projecting its flight path onto the earth's sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact. GLBMs or GLCMs that have a range capability equal to or in excess of 500 kilometers but not in excess of 1000 kilometers shall be considered to be shorter-range missiles. GLBMs or GLCMs that have a range capability in excess of 1000 kilometers but not in excess of 5500 kilometers shall be considered to be intermediate-range missiles.

5. The maximum number of warheads an existing type of intermediate-range missile or shorter-range missile carries shall be considered to be the number listed for missiles of that type in the Memorandum of Understanding.

6. Each GLBM or GLCM shall be considered to carry the maximum number of warheads listed for a GLBM or GLCM of that type in the Memorandum of Understanding.

7. If a launcher has been tested for launching a GLBM or a GLCM, all launchers of that type shall be considered to have been tested for launching GLBMs or GLCMs.

8. If a launcher has contained or launched a particular type of GLBM or GLCM, all launchers of that type shall be considered to be launchers of that type of GLBM or GLCM.

9. The number of missiles each launcher of an existing type of intermediate-range missile or shorter-range missile shall be considered to be capable of carrying or containing at one time is the number listed for launchers of missiles of that type in the Memorandum of Understanding.

10. Except in the case of elimination in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination, the following shall apply:

(a) for GLBMs which are stored or moved in separate stages, the longest stage of an intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBM shall be counted as a complete missile;

(b) for GLBMs which are not stored or moved in separate stages, a canister of the type used in the launch of an intermediate-range GLBM, unless a Party proves to the satisfaction of the other Party that it does not contain such a missile, or an assembled intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBM, shall be counted as a complete missile; and

(c) for GLCMs, the airframe of an intermediate-range or shorter-range GLCM shall be counted as a complete missile.

11. A ballistic missile which is not a missile to be used in a ground-based mode shall not be considered to be a GLBM if it is test-launched at a test site from a fixed land-based launcher which is used solely for test purposes and which is distinguishable from GLBM launchers. A cruise missile which is not a missile to be used in a ground-based mode shall not be considered to be a GLCM if it is test-launched at a test site from a fixed land-based launcher which is used solely for test purposes and which is distinguishable from GLCM launchers.

12. Each Party shall have the right to produce and use for booster systems, which might otherwise be considered to be intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles, only existing types of booster stages for such booster systems. Launches of such booster systems shall not be considered to be flight-testing of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles provided that:

(a) stages used in such booster systems are different from stages used in those missiles listed as existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles in Article III of this Treaty;

(b) such booster systems are used only for research and development purposes to test objects other than the booster systems themselves;

(c) the aggregate number of launchers for such booster systems shall not exceed 35 for each Party at any one time; and

(d) the launchers for such booster systems are fixed, emplaced above ground and located only at research and development launch sites which are specified in the Memorandum of Understanding.

Research and development launch sites shall not be subject to inspection pursuant to Article XI of this Treaty.

Article VIII

1. All intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles shall be located in deployment areas, at missile support facilities or shall be in transit. Intermediate-range missiles or launchers of such missiles shall not be located elsewhere.

2. Stages of intermediate-range missiles shall be located in deployment areas, at missile support facilities or moving between deployment areas, between missile support facilities or between missile support facilities and deployment areas.

3. Until their removal to elimination facilities as required by paragraph 2 of Article V of this Treaty, all shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles shall be located at missile operating bases, at missile support facilities or shall be in transit. Shorter-range missiles or launchers of such missiles shall not be located elsewhere.

4. Transit of a missile or launcher subject to the provisions of this Treaty shall be completed within 25 days.

5. All deployment areas, missile operating bases and missile support facilities are specified in the Memorandum of Understanding or in subsequent updates of data pursuant to paragraphs 3, 5 (a) or 5 (b) of Article IX of this Treaty. Neither Party shall increase the number of, or change the location or boundaries of, deployment areas, missile operating bases or missile support facilities, except for elimination facilities, from those set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding. A missile support facility shall not be considered to be part of a deployment area even though it may be located within the geographic boundaries of a deployment area.

6. Beginning 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, neither Party shall locate intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles, including stages of such missiles, or launchers of such missiles at missile production facilities, launcher production facilities or test ranges listed in the Memorandum of Understanding.

7. Neither Party shall locate any intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles at training facilities.

8. A non-deployed intermediate-range or shorter-range missile shall not be carried on or contained within a launcher of such a type of missile, except as required for maintenance conducted at repair facilities or for elimination by means of launching conducted at elimination facilities.

9. Training missiles and training launchers for intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles shall be subject to the same locational restrictions as are set forth for intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles in paragraphs 1 and 3 of this Article.

Article IX

1. The Memorandum of Understanding contains categories of data relevant to obligations undertaken with regard to this Treaty and lists all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles, and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers, possessed by the Parties as of November 1, 1987. Updates of that data and notifications required by this Article shall be provided according to the categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding.

2. The Parties shall update that data and provide the notifications required by this Treaty through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, established pursuant to the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987.

3. No later than 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall provide the other Party with updated data, as of the date of entry into force of this Treaty, for all categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding.

4. No later than 30 days after the end of each six-month interval following the entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall provide updated data for all categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding by informing the other Party of all changes, completed and in process, in that data, which have occurred during the six-month interval since the preceding data exchange, and the net effect of those changes.

5. Upon entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, each Party shall provide the following notifications to the other Party:

(a) notification, no less than 30 days in advance, of the scheduled date of the elimination of a specific deployment area, missile operating base or missile support facility;

(b) notification, no less than 30 days in advance, of changes in the number or location of elimination facilities, including the location and scheduled date of each change;

(c) notification, except with respect to launches of intermediate-range missiles for the purpose of their elimination, no less than 30 days in advance, of the scheduled date of the initiation of the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, and stages of such missiles, and launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers, including:

(i) the number and type of items of missile systems to be eliminated;

(ii) the elimination site;

(iii) for intermediate-range missiles, the location from which such missiles, launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers are moved to the elimination facility; and

(iv) except in the case of support structures, the point of entry to be used by an inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article XI of this Treaty and the estimated time of departure of an inspection team from the point of entry to the elimination facility;

(d) notification, no less than ten days in advance, of the scheduled date of the launch, or the scheduled date of the initiation of a series of launches, of intermediate-range missiles for the purpose of their elimination, including:

(i) the type of missiles to be eliminated;

(ii) the location of the launch, or, if elimination is by a series of launches, the location of such launches and the number of launches in the series;

- (iii) the point of entry to be used by an inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article XI of this Treaty; and
 - (iv) the estimated time of departure of an inspection team from the point of entry to the elimination facility;
- (e) notification, no later than 48 hours after they occur, of changes in the number of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers resulting from elimination as described in the Protocol on Elimination, including:
- (i) the number and type of items of a missile system which were eliminated; and
 - (ii) the date and location of such elimination; and
- (f) notification of transit of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles or launchers of such missiles, or the movement of training missiles or training launchers for such intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, no later than 48 hours after it has been completed, including:
- (i) the number of missiles or launchers;
 - (ii) the points, dates and times of departure and arrival;
 - (iii) the mode of transport; and
 - (iv) the location and time at that location at least once every four days during the period of transit.

6. Upon entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, each Party shall notify the other Party, no less than ten days in advance, of the scheduled date and location of the launch of a research and development booster system as described in paragraph 12 of Article VII of this Treaty.

Article X

1. Each Party shall eliminate its intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination.

2. Verification by on-site inspection of the elimination of items of missile systems specified in the Protocol on Elimination shall be carried out in accordance with Article XI of this Treaty, the Protocol on Elimination and the Protocol on Inspection.

3. When a Party removes its intermediate-range missiles, launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers from deployment areas to elimination facilities for the purpose of their elimination, it shall do so in complete deployed organizational units. For the United States of America, these units shall be Pershing II batteries and BGM-109G flights. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, these units shall be SS-20 regiments composed of two or three battalions.

4. Elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers shall be carried out at the facilities that are specified in the Memorandum of Understanding or notified in accordance with paragraph 5 (b) of Article IX of this Treaty, unless eliminated in accordance with Sections IV or V of the Protocol on Elimination. Support structures, associated with the missiles and launchers subject to this Treaty, that are subject to elimination shall be eliminated *in situ*.

5. Each Party shall have the right, during the first six months after entry into force of this Treaty, to eliminate by means of launching no more than 100 of its intermediate-range missiles.

6. Intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles which have been tested prior to entry into force of this Treaty, but never deployed, and which are not existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles listed in Article III of this Treaty, and launchers of such missiles, shall be eliminated within six months after entry into force of this Treaty in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination. Such missiles are:

(a) for the United States of America, missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Pershing IB, which is known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation; and

(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RK-55, which is known to the United States of America as the SSC-X-4.

7. Intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers shall be considered to be eliminated after completion of the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination and upon the notification provided for in paragraph 5 (e) of Article IX of this Treaty.

8. Each Party shall eliminate its deployment areas, missile operating bases and missile support facilities. A Party shall notify the other Party pursuant to paragraph 5 (a) of Article IX of this Treaty once the conditions set forth below are fulfilled:

(a) all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers located there have been removed;

(b) all support structures associated with such missiles and launchers located there have been eliminated; and

(c) all activity related to production, flight-testing, training, repair, storage or deployment of such missiles and launchers has ceased there.

Such deployment areas, missile operating bases and missile support facilities shall be considered to be eliminated either when they have been inspected pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article XI of this Treaty or when 60 days have elapsed since the date of the scheduled elimination which was notified pursuant to paragraph 5 (a) of Article IX of this Treaty. A deployment area, missile operating base or missile support facility listed in the Memorandum of Understanding that met the above conditions prior to entry into force of this Treaty, and is not included in the initial data exchange pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IX of this Treaty, shall be considered to be eliminated.

9. If a Party intends to convert a missile operating base listed in the Memorandum of Understanding for use as a base associated with GLBM or GLCM systems not subject to this Treaty, then that Party shall notify the other Party, no less than 30 days in advance of the scheduled date of the initiation of the conversion, of the scheduled date and the purpose for which the base will be converted.

Article XI

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct on-site inspections. The Parties shall implement on-site inspections in accordance with this Article, the Protocol on Inspection and the Protocol on Elimination.

2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections provided for by this Article both within the territory of the other Party and within the territories of basing countries.

3. Beginning 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections at all missile operating bases and missile support facilities specified in the Memorandum of Understanding other than missile production facilities, and at all elimination facilities included in the initial data update required by paragraph 3 of Article IX of this Treaty. These inspections shall be completed no later than 90 days after entry into force of this Treaty. The purpose of these inspections shall be to verify the number of missiles, launchers, support structures and support equipment and other data, as of the date of entry into force of this Treaty, provided pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IX of this Treaty.

4. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections to verify the elimination, notified pursuant to paragraph 5 (a) of Article IX of this Treaty, of missile operating bases and missile support facilities other than missile production facilities, which are thus no longer subject to inspections pursuant to paragraph 5 (a) of this Article. Such an inspection shall be carried out within 60 days after the scheduled date of the elimination of that facility. If a Party conducts an inspection at a particular facility pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article after the scheduled date of the elimination of that facility, then no additional inspection of that facility pursuant to this paragraph shall be permitted.

5. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections pursuant to this paragraph for 13 years after entry into force of this Treaty. Each Party shall have the right to conduct 20 such

inspections per calendar year during the first three years after entry into force of this Treaty, 15 such inspections per calendar year during the subsequent five years, and ten such inspections per calendar year during the last five years. Neither Party shall use more than half of its total number of these inspections per calendar year within the territory of any one basing country. Each Party shall have the right to conduct:

(a) inspections, beginning 90 days after entry into force of this Treaty, of missile operating bases and missile support facilities other than elimination facilities and missile production facilities, to ascertain, according to the categories of data specified in the Memorandum of Understanding, the numbers of missiles, launchers, support structures and support equipment located at each missile operating base or missile support facility at the time of the inspection; and

(b) inspections of former missile operating bases and former missile support facilities eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X of this Treaty other than former missile production facilities.

6. Beginning 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right, for 13 years after entry into force of this Treaty, to inspect by means of continuous monitoring:

(a) the portals of any facility of the other Party at which the final assembly of a GLBM using stages, any of which is outwardly similar to a stage of a solid-propellant GLBM listed in Article III of this Treaty, is accomplished; or

(b) if a Party has no such facility, the portals of an agreed former missile production facility at which existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBMs were produced. The Party whose facility is to be inspected pursuant to this paragraph shall ensure that the other Party is able to establish a permanent continuous monitoring system at that facility within six months after entry into force of this Treaty or within six months of initiation of the process of final assembly described in subparagraph (a). If, after the end of the second year after entry into force of this Treaty, neither Party conducts the process of final assembly described in subparagraph (a) for a period of 12 consecutive months, then neither Party shall have the right to inspect by means of continuous monitoring any missile production facility of the other Party unless the process of final assembly as described in subparagraph (a) is initiated again. Upon entry into force of this Treaty, the facilities to be inspected by continuous monitoring shall be: in accordance with subparagraph (b), for the United States of America, Hercules Plant Number 1, at Magna, Utah; in accordance with subparagraph (a), for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, Udmurt Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic.

7. Each Party shall conduct inspections of the process of elimination, including elimination of intermediate-range missiles by means of launching, of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers carried out at elimination facilities in accordance with Article X of this Treaty and the Protocol on Elimination. Inspectors conducting inspections provided for in this paragraph shall determine that the processes specified for the elimination of the missiles, launchers and support equipment have been completed.

8. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections to confirm the completion of the process of elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers eliminated pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on Elimination, and of training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers eliminated pursuant to Sections II, IV and V of the Protocol on Elimination.

Article XII

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Neither Party shall:

(a) interfere with national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article; or

(b) use concealment measures which impede verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty by national technical means of verification carried out in accordance with paragraph

1 of this Article. This obligation does not apply to cover or concealment practices, within a deployment area, associated with normal training, maintenance and operations, including the use of environmental shelters to protect missiles and launchers.

3. To enhance observation by national technical means of verification, each Party shall have the right until a treaty between the Parties reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms enters into force, but in any event for no more than three years after entry into force of this Treaty, to request the implementation of cooperative measures at deployment bases for road-mobile GLBMs with a range capability in excess of 5500 kilometers, which are not former missile operating bases eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X of this Treaty. The Party making such a request shall inform the other Party of the deployment base at which cooperative measures shall be implemented. The Party whose base is to be observed shall carry out the following cooperative measures:

(a) no later than six hours after such a request, the Party shall have opened the roofs of all fixed structures for launchers located at the base, removed completely all missiles on launchers from such fixed structures for launchers and displayed such missiles on launchers in the open without using concealment measures; and

(b) the Party shall leave the roofs open and the missiles on launchers in place until twelve hours have elapsed from the time of the receipt of a request for such an observation.

Each Party shall have the right to make six such requests per calendar year. Only one deployment base shall be subject to these cooperative measures at any one time.

Article XIII

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties hereby establish the Special Verification Commission. The Parties agree that, if either Party so requests, they shall meet within the framework of the Special Verification Commission to:

(a) resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed; and

(b) agree upon such measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty.

2. The Parties shall use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, which provide for continuous communication between the Parties, to:

(a) exchange data and provide notifications as required by paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Article IX of this Treaty and the Protocol on Elimination;

(b) provide and receive the information required by paragraph 9 of Article X of this Treaty;

(c) provide and receive notifications of inspections as required by Article XI of this Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection; and

(d) provide and receive requests for cooperative measures as provided for in paragraph 3 of Article XII of this Treaty.

Article XIV

The Parties shall comply with this Treaty and shall not assume any international obligations or undertakings which would conflict with its provisions.

Article XV

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to withdraw to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Article XVI

Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures set forth in Article XVII governing the entry into force of this Treaty.

Article XVII

1. This Treaty, including the Memorandum of Understanding and Protocols, which form an integral part thereof, shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

DONE at Washington on December 8, 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA:

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

*President of the
United States of America*

*General Secretary of the
Central Committee of the CPSU*

**Protocol on Procedures Governing the Elimination
of the Missile Systems Subject to the Treaty between
the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles**

Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles of December 8, 1987, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties hereby agree upon procedures governing the elimination of the missile systems subject to the Treaty.

I. Items of Missile Systems Subject to Elimination

The specific items for each type of missile system to be eliminated are:

1. For the United States of America:

Pershing II: missile, launcher and launch pad shelter;

BGM-109G: missile, launch canister and launcher;

Pershing IA: missile and launcher; and

Pershing IB: missile.

2. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

SS-20: missile, launch canister, launcher, missile transporter vehicle and fixed structure for a launcher;

SS-4: missile, missile transporter vehicle, missile erector, launch stand and propellant tanks;

SS-5: missile;

SSC-X-4: missile, launch canister and launcher;

SS-12: missile, launcher and missile transporter vehicle; and

SS-23: missile, launcher and missile transporter vehicle.

3. For both Parties, all training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers shall be subject to elimination.

4. For both Parties, all stages of intermediate-range and shorter-range GLBMs shall be subject to elimination.

5. For both Parties, all front sections of deployed intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles shall be subject to elimination.

II. Procedures for Elimination at Elimination Facilities

1. In order to ensure the reliable determination of the type and number of missiles, missile stages, front sections, launch canisters, launchers, missile transporter vehicles, missile erectors

and launch stands, as well as training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers, indicated in Section I of this Protocol, being eliminated at elimination facilities, and to preclude the possibility of restoration of such items for purposes inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty, the Parties shall fulfill the requirements below.

2. The conduct of the elimination procedures for the items of missile systems listed in paragraph 1 of this Section, except for training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers, shall be subject to on-site inspection in accordance with Article XI of the Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection. The Parties shall have the right to conduct on-site inspections to confirm the completion of the elimination procedures set forth in paragraph 11 of this Section for training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers. The Party possessing such a training missile, training missile stage, training launch canister or training launcher shall inform the other Party of the name and coordinates of the elimination facility at which the on-site inspection may be conducted as well as the date on which it may be conducted. Such information shall be provided no less than 30 days in advance of that date.

3. Prior to a missile's arrival at the elimination facility, its nuclear warhead device and guidance elements may be removed.

4. Each Party shall select the particular technological means necessary to implement the procedures required in paragraphs 10 and 11 of this Section and to allow for on-site inspection of the conduct of the elimination procedures required in paragraph 10 of this Section in accordance with Article XI of the Treaty, this Protocol and the Protocol on Inspection.

5. The initiation of the elimination of the items of missile systems subject to this Section shall be considered to be the commencement of the procedures set forth in paragraph 10 or 11 of this Section.

6. Immediately prior to the initiation of the elimination procedures set forth in paragraph 10 of this Section, an inspector from the Party receiving the pertinent notification required by paragraph 5 (c) of Article IX of the Treaty shall confirm and record the type and number of items of missile systems, listed in paragraph 1 of this Section, which are to be eliminated. If the inspecting Party deems it necessary, this shall include a visual inspection of the contents of launch canisters.

7. A missile stage being eliminated by burning in accordance with the procedures set forth in paragraph 10 of this Section shall not be instrumented for data collection. Prior to the initiation of the elimination procedures set forth in paragraph 10 of this Section, an inspector from the inspecting Party shall confirm that such missile stages are not instrumented for data collection. Those missile stages shall be subject to continuous observation by such an inspector from the time of that inspection until the burning is completed.

8. The completion of the elimination procedures set forth in this Section, except those for training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers, along with the type and number of items of missile systems for which those procedures have been completed, shall be confirmed in writing by the representative of the Party carrying out the elimination and by the inspection team leader of the other Party. The elimination of a training missile, training missile stage, training launch canister or training launcher shall be considered to have been completed upon completion of the procedures set forth in paragraph 11 of this Section and notification as required by paragraph 5 (e) of Article IX of the Treaty following the date specified pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Section.

9. The Parties agree that all United States and Soviet intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and their associated reentry vehicles shall be eliminated within an agreed overall period of elimination. It is further agreed that all such missiles shall, in fact, be eliminated fifteen days prior to the end of the overall period of elimination. During the last fifteen days, a Party shall withdraw to its national territory reentry vehicles which, by unilateral decision, have been released from existing programs of cooperation and eliminate them during the same timeframe in accordance with the procedures set forth in this Section.

10. The specific procedures for the elimination of the items of missile systems listed in paragraph 1 of this Section shall be as follows, unless the Parties agree upon different procedures to achieve the same result as the procedures identified in this paragraph:

For the Pershing II:

Missile:

- (a) missile stages shall be eliminated by explosive demolition or burning;
- (b) solid fuel, rocket nozzles and motor cases not destroyed in this process shall be burned, crushed, flattened or destroyed by explosion; and
- (c) front section, minus nuclear warhead device and guidance elements, shall be crushed or flattened.

Launcher:

- (a) erector-launcher mechanism shall be removed from launcher chassis;
- (b) all components of erector-launcher mechanism shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;
- (c) missile launch support equipment, including external instrumentation compartments, shall be removed from launcher chassis; and
- (d) launcher chassis shall be cut at a location that is not an assembly joint into two pieces of approximately equal size.

For the BGM-109G:

Missile:

- (a) missile airframe shall be cut longitudinally into two pieces;
- (b) wings and tail section shall be severed from missile airframe at locations that are not assembly joints; and
- (c) front section, minus nuclear warhead device and guidance elements, shall be crushed or flattened.

Launch Canister:

launch canister shall be crushed, flattened, cut into two pieces of approximately equal size or destroyed by explosion.

Launcher:

- (a) erector-launcher mechanism shall be removed from launcher chassis;
- (b) all components of erector-launcher mechanism shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;
- (c) missile launch support equipment, including external instrumentation compartments, shall be removed from launcher chassis; and
- (d) launcher chassis shall be cut at a location that is not an assembly joint into two pieces of approximately equal size.

For the Pershing IA:

Missile:

- (a) missile stages shall be eliminated by explosive demolition or burning;
- (b) solid fuel, rocket nozzles and motor cases not destroyed in this process shall be burned, crushed, flattened or destroyed by explosion; and
- (c) front section, minus nuclear warhead device and guidance elements, shall be crushed or flattened.

Launcher:

- (a) erector-launcher mechanism shall be removed from launcher chassis;
- (b) all components of erector-launcher mechanism shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;
- (c) missile launch support equipment, including external instrumentation compartments, shall be removed from launcher chassis; and
- (d) launcher chassis shall be cut at a location that is not an assembly joint into two pieces of approximately equal size.

For the Pershing IB:

Missile:

- (a) missile stage shall be eliminated by explosive demolition or burning;
- (b) solid fuel, rocket nozzle and motor case not destroyed in this process shall be burned, crushed, flattened or destroyed by explosion; and
- (c) front section, minus nuclear warhead device and guidance elements, shall be crushed or flattened.

For the SS-20:

Missile:

- (a) missile shall be eliminated by explosive demolition of the missile in its launch canister or by burning missile stages;
- (b) solid fuel, rocket nozzles and motor cases not destroyed in this process shall be burned, crushed, flattened or destroyed by explosion; and
- (c) front section, including reentry vehicles, minus nuclear warhead devices, and instrumentation compartment, minus guidance elements, shall be crushed or flattened.

Launch Canister:

launch canister shall be destroyed by explosive demolition together with a missile, or shall be destroyed separately by explosion, cut into two pieces of approximately equal size, crushed or flattened.

Launcher:

- (a) erector-launcher mechanism shall be removed from launcher chassis;
- (b) all components of erector-launcher mechanism shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;
- (c) missile launch support equipment, including external instrumentation compartments, shall be removed from launcher chassis;
- (d) mountings of erector-launcher mechanism and launcher leveling supports shall be cut off launcher chassis;
- (e) launcher leveling supports shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size; and
- (f) a portion of the launcher chassis, at least 0.78 meters in length, shall be cut off aft of the rear axle.

Missile Transporter Vehicle:

- (a) all mechanisms associated with missile loading and mounting shall be removed from transporter vehicle chassis;
- (b) all mountings of such mechanisms shall be cut off transporter vehicle chassis;
- (c) all components of the mechanisms associated with missile loading and mounting shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;
- (d) external instrumentation compartments shall be removed from transporter vehicle chassis;
- (e) transporter vehicle leveling supports shall be cut off transporter vehicle chassis and cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size; and
- (f) a portion of the transporter vehicle chassis, at least 0.78 meters in length, shall be cut off aft of the rear axle.

For the SS-4:

Missile:

- (a) nozzles of propulsion system shall be cut off at locations that are not assembly joints;
- (b) all propellant tanks shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size;

- (c) instrumentation compartment, minus guidance elements, shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size; and
- (d) front section, minus nuclear warhead device, shall be crushed or flattened.

Launch Stand:

launch stand components shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size.

Missile Erector:

- (a) jib, missile erector leveling supports and missile erector mechanism shall be cut off missile erector at locations that are not assembly joints; and
- (b) jib and missile erector leveling supports shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size.

Missile Transporter Vehicle:

mounting components for a missile and for a missile erector mechanism as well as supports for erecting a missile onto a launcher shall be cut off transporter vehicle at locations that are not assembly joints.

For the SS-5:

Missile:

- (a) nozzles of propulsion system shall be cut off at locations that are not assembly joints;
- (b) all propellant tanks shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size; and
- (c) instrumentation compartment, minus guidance elements, shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size.

For the SSC-X-4:

Missile:

- (a) missile airframe shall be cut longitudinally into two pieces;
- (b) wings and tail section shall be severed from missile airframe at locations that are not assembly joints; and
- (c) front section, minus nuclear warhead device and guidance elements, shall be crushed or flattened.

Launch Canister:

launch canister shall be crushed, flattened, cut into two pieces of approximately equal size or destroyed by explosion.

Launcher:

- (a) erector-launcher mechanism shall be removed from launcher chassis;
- (b) all components of erector-launcher mechanism shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;
- (c) missile launch support equipment, including external instrumentation compartments, shall be removed from launcher chassis;
- (d) mountings of erector-launcher mechanism and launcher leveling supports shall be cut off launcher chassis;
- (e) launcher leveling supports shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size; and
- (f) the launcher chassis shall be severed at a location determined by measuring no more than 0.70 meters rearward from the rear axle.

For the SS-12:

Missile:

- (a) missile shall be eliminated by explosive demolition or by burning missile stages;
- (b) solid fuel, rocket nozzles and motor cases not destroyed in this process shall be burned, crushed, flattened or destroyed by explosion; and

- (c) front section, minus nuclear warhead device, and instrumentation compartment, minus guidance elements, shall be crushed, flattened or destroyed by explosive demolition together with a missile.

Launcher:

- (a) erector-launcher mechanism shall be removed from launcher chassis;
- (b) all components of erector-launcher mechanism shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;
- (c) missile launch support equipment, including external instrumentation compartments, shall be removed from launcher chassis;
- (d) mountings of erector-launcher mechanism and launcher leveling supports shall be cut off launcher chassis;
- (e) launcher leveling supports shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size; and
- (f) a portion of the launcher chassis, at least 1.10 meters in length, shall be cut off aft of the rear axle.

Missile Transporter Vehicle:

- (a) all mechanisms associated with missile loading and mounting shall be removed from transporter vehicle chassis;
- (b) all mountings of such mechanisms shall be cut off transporter vehicle chassis;
- (c) all components of the mechanisms associated with missile loading and mounting shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;
- (d) external instrumentation compartments shall be removed from transporter vehicle chassis;
- (e) transporter vehicle leveling supports shall be cut off transporter vehicle chassis and cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size; and
- (f) a portion of the transporter vehicle chassis, at least 1.10 meters in length, shall be cut off aft of the rear axle.

For the SS-23:

Missile:

- (a) missile shall be eliminated by explosive demolition or by burning the missile stage;
- (b) solid fuel, rocket nozzle and motor case not destroyed in this process shall be burned, crushed, flattened or destroyed by explosion; and
- (c) front section, minus nuclear warhead device, and instrumentation compartment, minus guidance elements, shall be crushed, flattened, or destroyed by explosive demolition together with a missile.

Launcher:

- (a) erector-launcher mechanism shall be removed from launcher body;
- (b) all components of erector-launcher mechanism shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;
- (c) missile launch support equipment shall be removed from launcher body;
- (d) mountings of erector-launcher mechanism and launcher leveling supports shall be cut off launcher body;
- (e) launcher leveling supports shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;
- (f) each environmental cover of the launcher body shall be removed and cut into two pieces of approximately equal size; and
- (g) a portion of the launcher body, at least 0.85 meters in length, shall be cut off aft of the rear axle.

Missile Transporter Vehicle:

- (a) all mechanisms associated with missile loading and mounting shall be removed from transporter vehicle body;
- (b) all mountings of such mechanisms shall be cut off transporter vehicle body;
- (c) all components of mechanisms associated with missile loading and mounting shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;
- (d) control equipment of the mechanism associated with missile loading shall be removed from transporter vehicle body;
- (e) transporter vehicle leveling supports shall be cut off transporter vehicle body and cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size; and
- (f) a portion of the transporter vehicle body, at least 0.85 meters in length, shall be cut off aft of the rear axle.

11. The specific procedures for the elimination of the training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers indicated in paragraph 1 of this Section shall be as follows:

Training Missile and Training Missile Stage:

training missile and training missile stage shall be crushed, flattened, cut into two pieces of approximately equal size or destroyed by explosion.

Training Launch Canister:

training launch canister shall be crushed, flattened, cut into two pieces of approximately equal size or destroyed by explosion.

Training Launcher:

training launcher chassis shall be cut at the same location designated in paragraph 10 of this Section for launcher of the same type of missile.

III. Elimination of Missiles by Means of Launching

1. Elimination of missiles by means of launching pursuant to paragraph 5 of Article X of the Treaty shall be subject to on-site inspection in accordance with paragraph 7 of Article XI of the Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection. Immediately prior to each launch conducted for the purpose of elimination, an inspector from the inspecting Party shall confirm by visual observation the type of missile to be launched.

2. All missiles being eliminated by means of launching shall be launched from designated elimination facilities to existing impact areas for such missiles. No such missile shall be used as a target vehicle for a ballistic missile interceptor.

3. Missiles being eliminated by means of launching shall be launched one at a time, and no less than six hours shall elapse between such launches.

4. Such launches shall involve ignition of all missile stages. Neither Party shall transmit or recover data from missiles being eliminated by means of launching except for unencrypted data used for range safety purposes.

5. The completion of the elimination procedures set forth in this Section, and the type and number of missiles for which those procedures have been completed, shall be confirmed in writing by the representative of the Party carrying out the elimination and by the inspection team leader of the other Party.

6. A missile shall be considered to be eliminated by means of launching after completion of the procedures set forth in this Section and upon notification required by paragraph 5 (e) of Article IX of the Treaty.

IV. Procedures for Elimination *In Situ*

1. Support Structures

- (a) Support structures listed in Section I of this Protocol shall be eliminated *in situ*.
- (b) The initiation of the elimination of support structures shall be considered to be the commencement of the elimination procedures required in paragraph 1 (d) of this Section.
- (c) The elimination of support structures shall be subject to verification by on-site inspection in accordance with paragraph 4 of Article XI of the Treaty.
- (d) The specific elimination procedures for support structures shall be as follows:
 - (i) the superstructure of the fixed structure or shelter shall be dismantled or demolished, and removed from its base or foundation;
 - (ii) the base or foundation of the fixed structure or shelter shall be destroyed by excavation or explosion;
 - (iii) the destroyed base or foundation of a fixed structure or shelter shall remain visible to national technical means of verification for six months or until completion of an on-site inspection conducted in accordance with Article XI of the Treaty; and
 - (iv) upon completion of the above requirements, the elimination procedures shall be considered to have been completed.

2. Propellant Tanks for SS-4 Missiles

Fixed and transportable propellant tanks for SS-4 missiles shall be removed from launch sites.

3. Training Missiles, Training Missile Stages, Training Launch Canisters and Training Launchers

- (a) Training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers not eliminated at elimination facilities shall be eliminated *in situ*.
- (b) Training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers being eliminated *in situ* shall be eliminated in accordance with the specific procedures set forth in paragraph 11 of Section II of this Protocol.
- (c) Each Party shall have the right to conduct an on-site inspection to confirm the completion of the elimination procedures for training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers.
- (d) The Party possessing such a training missile, training missile stage, training launch canister or training launcher shall inform the other Party of the place-name and coordinates of the location at which the on-site inspection provided for in paragraph 3 (c) of this Section may be conducted as well as the date on which it may be conducted. Such information shall be provided no less than 30 days in advance of that date.
- (e) Elimination of a training missile, training missile stage, training launch canister or training launcher shall be considered to have been completed upon the completion of the procedures required by this paragraph and upon notification as required by paragraph 5 (e) of Article IX of the Treaty following the date specified pursuant to paragraph 3 (d) of this Section.

V. Other Types of Elimination

1. Loss or Accidental Destruction

- (a) If an item listed in Section I of this Protocol is lost or destroyed as a result of an accident, the possessing Party shall notify the other Party within 48 hours, as required in paragraph 5 (e) of Article IX of the Treaty, that the item has been eliminated.
- (b) Such notification shall include the type of the eliminated item, its approximate or assumed location and the circumstances related to the loss or accidental destruction.

- (c) In such a case, the other Party shall have the right to conduct an inspection of the specific point at which the accident occurred to provide confidence that the item has been eliminated.

2. *Static Display*

- (a) The Parties shall have the right to eliminate missiles, launch canisters and launchers, as well as training missiles, training launch canisters and training launchers, listed in Section I of this Protocol by placing them on static display. Each Party shall be limited to a total of 15 missiles, 15 launch canisters and 15 launchers on such static display.
- (b) Prior to being placed on static display, a missile, launch canister or launcher shall be rendered unusable for purposes inconsistent with the Treaty. Missile propellant shall be removed and erector-launcher mechanisms shall be rendered inoperative.
- (c) The Party possessing a missile, launch canister or launcher, as well as a training missile, training launch canister or training launcher that is to be eliminated by placing it on static display shall provide the other Party with the place-name and coordinates of the location at which such a missile, launch canister or launcher is to be on static display, as well as the location at which the on-site inspection provided for in paragraph 2 (d) of this Section, may take place.
- (d) Each Party shall have the right to conduct an on-site inspection of such a missile, launch canister or launcher within 60 days of receipt of the notification required in paragraph 2 (c) of this Section.
- (e) Elimination of a missile, launch canister or launcher, as well as a training missile, training launch canister or training launcher, by placing it on static display shall be considered to have been completed upon completion of the procedures required by this paragraph and notification as required by paragraph 5 (e) of Article IX of the Treaty.

This Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty. It shall enter into force on the date of the entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force. As provided for in paragraph 1 (b) of Article XIII of the Treaty, the Parties may agree upon such measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of this Protocol. Such measures shall not be deemed amendments to the Treaty.

DONE at Washington on December 8, 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA:

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

*President of the
United States of America*

*General Secretary of the
Central Committee of the CPSU*

**Protocol regarding Inspections relating to the
Treaty between the United States of America and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination
of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles**

Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles of December 8, 1987, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties hereby agree upon procedures governing the conduct of inspections provided for in Article XI of the Treaty.

I. Definitions

For the purposes of this Protocol, the Treaty, the Memorandum of Understanding and the

Protocol on Elimination:

1. The term "inspected Party" means the Party to the Treaty whose sites are subject to inspection as provided for by Article XI of the Treaty.

2. The term "inspecting Party" means the Party to the Treaty carrying out an inspection.

3. The term "inspector" means an individual designated by one of the Parties to carry out inspections and included on that Party's list of inspectors in accordance with the provisions of Section III of this Protocol.

4. The term "inspection team" means the group of inspectors assigned by the inspecting Party to conduct a particular inspection.

5. The term "inspection site" means an area, location or facility at which an inspection is carried out.

6. The term "period of inspection" means the period of time from arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site until its departure from the inspection site, exclusive of time spent on any pre- and post-inspection procedures.

7. The term "point of entry" means: Washington, D.C., or San Francisco, California, the United States of America; Brussels (National Airport), the Kingdom of Belgium; Frankfurt (Rhein Main Airbase), the Federal Republic of Germany; Rome (Ciampino), the Republic of Italy; Schiphol, the Kingdom of the Netherlands; RAF Greenham Common, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; Moscow, or Irkutsk, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; Schkeuditz Airport, the German Democratic Republic; and International Airport Ruzyně, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

8. The term "in-country period" means the period from the arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry until its departure from the country through the point of entry.

9. The term "in-country escort" means individuals specified by the inspected Party to accompany and assist inspectors and aircrew members as necessary throughout the in-country period.

10. The term "aircrew member" means an individual who performs duties related to the operation of an airplane and who is included on a Party's list of aircrew members in accordance with the provisions of Section III of this Protocol.

II. General Obligations

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, each Party shall facilitate inspection by the other Party pursuant to this Protocol.

2. Each Party takes note of the assurances received from the other Party regarding understandings reached between the other Party and the basing countries to the effect that the basing countries have agreed to the conduct of inspections, in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol, on their territories.

III. Pre-Inspection Requirements

1. Inspections to ensure verification of compliance by the Parties with the obligations assumed under the Treaty shall be carried out by inspectors designated in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Section.

2. No later than one day after entry into force of the Treaty, each Party shall provide to the other Party: a list of its proposed aircrew members; a list of its proposed inspectors who will carry out inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8 of Article XI of the Treaty; and a list of its proposed inspectors who will carry out inspection activities pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty. None of these lists shall contain at any time more than 200 individuals.

3. Each Party shall review the lists of inspectors and aircrew members proposed by the other Party. With respect to an individual included on the list of proposed inspectors who will carry out inspection activities pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty, if such an individual is unacceptable to the Party reviewing the list, that Party shall, within 20 days, so inform the Party providing the list, and the individual shall be deemed not accepted and shall be deleted from the list. With respect to an individual on the list of proposed aircrew members or the list of proposed inspectors who will carry out inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 5,

7 and 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, each Party, within 20 days after the receipt of such lists, shall inform the other Party of its agreement to the designation of each inspector and aircrew member proposed. Inspectors shall be citizens of the inspecting Party.

4. Each Party shall have the right to amend its lists of inspectors and aircrew members. New inspectors and aircrew members shall be designated in the same manner as set forth in paragraph 3 of this Section with respect to the initial lists.

5. Within 30 days of receipt of the initial lists of inspectors and aircrew members, or of subsequent changes thereto, the Party receiving such information shall provide, or shall ensure the provision of, such visas and other documents to each individual to whom it has agreed as may be required to ensure that each inspector or aircrew member may enter and remain in the territory of the Party or basing country in which an inspection site is located throughout the in-country period for the purpose of carrying out inspection activities in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol. Such visas and documents shall be valid for a period of at least 24 months.

6. To exercise their functions effectively, inspectors and aircrew members shall be accorded, throughout the in-country period, privileges and immunities in the country of the inspection site as set forth in the Annex to this Protocol.

7. Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, inspectors and aircrew members shall be obliged to respect the laws and regulations of the State on whose territory an inspection is carried out and shall be obliged not to interfere in the internal affairs of that State. In the event the inspected Party determines that an inspector or aircrew member of the other Party has violated the conditions governing inspection activities set forth in this Protocol, or has ever committed a criminal offense on the territory of the inspected Party or a basing country, or has ever been sentenced for committing a criminal offense or expelled by the inspected Party or a basing country, the inspected Party making such a determination shall so notify the inspecting Party, which shall immediately strike the individual from the lists of inspectors or the list of aircrew members. If, at that time, the individual is on the territory of the inspected Party or a basing country, the inspecting Party shall immediately remove that individual from the country.

8. Within 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty, each Party shall inform the other Party of the standing diplomatic clearance number for airplanes of the Party transporting inspectors and equipment necessary for inspection into and out of the territory of the Party or basing country in which an inspection site is located. Aircraft routings to and from the designated point of entry shall be along established international airways that are agreed upon by the Parties as the basis for such diplomatic clearance.

IV. Notifications

1. Notification of an intention to conduct an inspection shall be made through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers. The receipt of this notification shall be acknowledged through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers by the inspected Party within one hour of its receipt.

- (a) For inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4 or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty, such notifications shall be made no less than 16 hours in advance of the estimated time of arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry and shall include:
- (i) the point of entry;
 - (ii) the date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry;
 - (iii) the date and time when the specification of the inspection site will be provided; and
 - (iv) the names of inspectors and aircrew members.
- (b) For inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, such notifications shall be made no less than 72 hours in advance of the estimated time of arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry and shall include:
- (i) the point of entry;
 - (ii) the date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry;
 - (iii) the site to be inspected and the type of inspection; and
 - (iv) the names of inspectors and aircrew members.

2. The date and time of the specification of the inspection site as notified pursuant to paragraph 1 (a) of this Section shall fall within the following time intervals:

- (a) for inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 4 or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty, neither less than four hours nor more than 24 hours after the estimated date and time of arrival at the point of entry; and
- (b) for inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article XI of the Treaty, neither less than four hours nor more than 48 hours after the estimated date and time of arrival at the point of entry.

3. The inspecting Party shall provide the inspected Party with a flight plan, through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, for its flight from the last airfield prior to entering the airspace of the country in which the inspection site is located to the point of entry, no less than six hours before the scheduled departure time from that airfield. Such a plan shall be filed in accordance with the procedures of the International Civil Aviation Organization applicable to civil aircraft. The inspecting Party shall include in the remarks section of each flight plan the standing diplomatic clearance number and the notation: "Inspection aircraft. Priority clearance processing required."

4. No less than three hours prior to the scheduled departure of the inspection team from the last airfield prior to entering the airspace of the country in which the inspection is to take place, the inspected Party shall ensure that the flight plan filed in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Section is approved so that the inspection team may arrive at the point of entry by the estimated arrival time.

5. Either Party may change the point or points of entry to the territories of the countries within which its deployment areas, missile operating bases or missile support facilities are located, by giving notice of such change to the other Party. A change in a point of entry shall become effective five months after receipt of such notification by the other Party.

V. Activities Beginning upon Arrival at the Point of Entry

1. The in-country escort and a diplomatic aircrew escort accredited to the Government of either the inspected Party or the basing country in which the inspection site is located shall meet the inspection team and aircrew members at the point of entry as soon as the airplane of the inspecting Party lands. The number of aircrew members for each airplane shall not exceed ten. The in-country escort shall expedite the entry of the inspection team and aircrew, their baggage, and equipment and supplies necessary for inspection, into the country in which the inspection site is located. A diplomatic aircrew escort shall have the right to accompany and assist aircrew members throughout the in-country period. In the case of an inspection taking place on the territory of a basing country, the in-country escort may include representatives of that basing country.

2. An inspector shall be considered to have assumed his duties upon arrival at the point of entry on the territory of the inspected Party or a basing country, and shall be considered to have ceased performing those duties when he has left the territory of the inspected Party or basing country.

3. Each Party shall ensure that equipment and supplies are exempt from all customs duties.

4. Equipment and supplies which the inspecting Party brings into the country in which an inspection site is located shall be subject to examination at the point of entry each time they are brought into that country. This examination shall be completed prior to the departure of the inspection team from the point of entry to conduct an inspection. Such equipment and supplies shall be examined by the in-country escort in the presence of the inspection team members to ascertain to the satisfaction of each Party that the equipment and supplies cannot perform functions unconnected with the inspection requirements of the Treaty. If it is established upon examination that the equipment or supplies are unconnected with these inspection requirements, then they shall not be cleared for use and shall be impounded at the point of entry until the departure of the inspection team from the country where the inspection is conducted. Storage of the inspecting Party's equipment and supplies at each point of entry shall be within tamper-proof containers within a secure facility. Access to each secure facility shall be controlled by a "dual key" system requiring the presence of both Parties to gain access to the equipment and supplies.

5. Throughout the in-country period, the inspected Party shall provide, or arrange for the provision of, meals, lodging, work space, transportation and, as necessary, medical care for the

inspection team and aircrew of the inspecting Party. All the costs in connection with the stay of inspectors carrying out inspection activities pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty, on the territory of the inspected Party, including meals, services, lodging, work space, transportation and medical care shall be borne by the inspecting Party.

6. The inspected Party shall provide parking, security protection, servicing and fuel for the airplane of the inspecting Party at the point of entry. The inspecting Party shall bear the cost of such fuel and servicing.

7. For inspections conducted on the territory of the Parties, the inspection team shall enter at the point of entry on the territory of the inspected Party that is closest to the inspection site. In the case of inspections carried out in accordance with paragraphs 3, 4 or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty, the inspection team leader shall, at or before the time notified pursuant to paragraph 1 (a)(iii) of Section IV of this Protocol, inform the inspected Party at the point of entry through the in-country escort of the type of inspection and the inspection site, by place-name and geographic coordinates.

VI. General Rules for Conducting Inspections

1. Inspectors shall discharge their functions in accordance with this Protocol.

2. Inspectors shall not disclose information received during inspections except with the express permission of the inspecting Party. They shall remain bound by this obligation after their assignment as inspectors has ended.

3. In discharging their functions, inspectors shall not interfere directly with on-going activities at the inspection site and shall avoid unnecessarily hampering or delaying the operation of a facility or taking actions affecting its safe operation.

4. Inspections shall be conducted in accordance with the objectives set forth in Article XI of the Treaty as applicable for the type of inspection specified by the inspecting Party under paragraph 1 (b) of Section IV or paragraph 7 of Section V of this Protocol.

5. The in-country escort shall have the right to accompany and assist inspectors and aircrew members as considered necessary by the inspected Party throughout the in-country period. Except as otherwise provided in this Protocol, the movement and travel of inspectors and aircrew members shall be at the discretion of the in-country escort.

6. Inspectors carrying out inspection activities pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty shall be allowed to travel within 50 kilometers from the inspection site with the permission of the in-country escort, and as considered necessary by the inspected Party, shall be accompanied by the in-country escort. Such travel shall be taken solely as a leisure activity.

7. Inspectors shall have the right throughout the period of inspection to be in communication with the embassy of the inspecting Party located within the territory of the country where the inspection is taking place using the telephone communications provided by the inspected Party.

8. At the inspection site, representatives of the inspected facility shall be included among the in-country escort.

9. The inspection team may bring onto the inspection site such documents as needed to conduct the inspection, as well as linear measurement devices; cameras; portable weighing devices; radiation detection devices; and other equipment, as agreed by the Parties. The characteristics and method of use of the equipment listed above shall also be agreed upon within 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty. During inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 5 (a), 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, the inspection team may use any of the equipment listed above, except for cameras, which shall be for use only by the inspected Party at the request of the inspecting Party. During inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 5 (b) of Article XI of the Treaty, all measurements shall be made by the inspected Party at the request of the inspecting Party. At the request of inspectors, the in-country escort shall take photographs of the inspected facilities using the inspecting Party's camera systems which are capable of producing duplicate, instant development photographic prints. Each Party shall receive one copy of every photograph.

10. For inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, inspectors shall permit the in-country escort to observe the equipment used during the inspection by the inspection team.

11. Measurements recorded during inspections shall be certified by the signature of a member of the inspection team and a member of the in-country escort when they are taken. Such certified data shall be included in the inspection report.

12. Inspectors shall have the right to request clarifications in connection with ambiguities that arise during an inspection. Such requests shall be made promptly through the in-country escort. The in-country escort shall provide the inspection team, during the inspection, with such clarifications as may be necessary to remove the ambiguity. In the event questions relating to an object or building located within the inspection site are not resolved, the inspected Party shall photograph the object or building as requested by the inspecting Party for the purpose of clarifying its nature and function. If the ambiguity cannot be removed during the inspection, then the question, relevant clarifications and a copy of any photographs taken shall be included in the inspection report.

13. In carrying out their activities, inspectors shall observe safety regulations established at the inspection site, including those for the protection of controlled environments within a facility and for personal safety. Individual protective clothing and equipment shall be provided by the inspected Party, as necessary.

14. For inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, pre-inspection procedures, including briefings and safety-related activities, shall begin upon arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site and shall be completed within one hour. The inspection team shall begin the inspection immediately upon completion of the pre-inspection procedures. The period of inspection shall not exceed 24 hours, except for inspections pursuant to paragraphs 6, 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty. The period of inspection may be extended, by agreement with the in-country escort, by no more than eight hours. Post-inspection procedures, which include completing the inspection report in accordance with the provisions of Section XI of this Protocol, shall begin immediately upon completion of the inspection and shall be completed at the inspection site within four hours.

15. An inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to Article XI of the Treaty shall include no more than ten inspectors, except for an inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to paragraphs 7 or 8 of that Article, which shall include no more than 20 inspectors and an inspection team conducting inspection activities pursuant to paragraph 6 of that Article, which shall include no more than 30 inspectors. At least two inspectors on each team must speak the language of the inspected Party. An inspection team shall operate under the direction of the team leader and deputy team leader. Upon arrival at the inspection site, the inspection team may divide itself into subgroups consisting of no fewer than two inspectors each. There shall be no more than one inspection team at an inspection site at any one time.

16. Except in the case of inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, upon completion of the post-inspection procedures, the inspection team shall return promptly to the point of entry from which it commenced inspection activities and shall then leave, within 24 hours, the territory of the country in which the inspection site is located, using its own airplane. In the case of inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, if the inspection team intends to conduct another inspection it shall either:

- (a) notify the inspected Party of its intent upon return to the point of entry; or
- (b) notify the inspected Party of the type of inspection and the inspection site upon completion of the post-inspection procedures. In this case it shall be the responsibility of the inspected Party to ensure that the inspection team reaches the next inspection site without unjustified delay. The inspected Party shall determine the means of transportation and route involved in such travel.

With respect to subparagraph (a), the procedures set forth in paragraph 7 of Section V of this Protocol and paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section VII of this Protocol shall apply.

VII. Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraphs 3, 4 or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty

1. Within one hour after the time for the specification of the inspection site notified pursuant to paragraph 1 (a) of Section IV of this Protocol, the inspected Party shall implement pre-

inspection movement restrictions at the inspection site, which shall remain in effect until the inspection team arrives at the inspection site. During the period that pre-inspection movement restrictions are in effect, missiles, stages of such missiles, launchers or support equipment subject to the Treaty shall not be removed from the inspection site.

2. The inspected Party shall transport the inspection team from the point of entry to the inspection site so that the inspection team arrives at the inspection site no later than nine hours after the time for the specification of the inspection site notified pursuant to paragraph 1 (a) of Section IV of this Protocol.

3. In the event that an inspection is conducted in a basing country, the aircrew of the inspected Party may include representatives of the basing country.

4. Neither Party shall conduct more than one inspection pursuant to paragraph 5 (a) of Article XI of the Treaty at any one time, more than one inspection pursuant to paragraph 5 (b) of Article XI of the Treaty at any one time, or more than 10 inspections pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article XI of the Treaty at any one time.

5. The boundaries of the inspection site at the facility to be inspected shall be the boundaries of that facility set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding.

6. Except in the case of an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraphs 4 or 5 (b) of Article XI of the Treaty, upon arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site, the in-country escort shall inform the inspection team leader of the number of missiles, stages of missiles, launchers, support structures and support equipment at the site that are subject to the Treaty and provide the inspection team leader with a diagram of the inspection site indicating the location of these missiles, stages of missiles, launchers, support structures and support equipment at the inspection site.

7. Subject to the procedures of paragraphs 8 through 14 of this Section, inspectors shall have the right to inspect the entire inspection site, including the interior of structures, containers or vehicles, or including covered objects, whose dimensions are equal to or greater than the dimensions specified in Section VI of the Memorandum of Understanding for the missiles, stages of such missiles, launchers or support equipment of the inspected Party.

8. A missile, a stage of such a missile or a launcher subject to the Treaty shall be subject to inspection only by external visual observation, including measuring, as necessary, the dimensions of such a missile, stage of such a missile or launcher. A container that the inspected Party declares to contain a missile or stage of a missile subject to the Treaty, and which is not sufficiently large to be capable of containing more than one missile or stage of such a missile of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty, shall be subject to inspection only by external visual observation, including measuring as necessary, the dimensions of such a container to confirm that it cannot contain more than one missile or stage of such a missile of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty. Except as provided for in paragraph 14 of this Section, a container that is sufficiently large to contain a missile or stage of such a missile of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty that the inspected Party declares not to contain a missile or stage of such a missile subject to the Treaty shall be subject to inspection only by means of weighing or visual observation of the interior of the container, as necessary, to confirm that it does not, in fact, contain a missile or stage of such a missile of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty. If such a container is a launch canister associated with a type of missile not subject to the Treaty, and declared by the inspected Party to contain such a missile, it shall be subject to external inspection only, including use of radiation detection devices, visual observation and linear measurement, as necessary, of the dimensions of such a canister.

9. A structure or container that is not sufficiently large to contain a missile, stage of such a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty shall be subject to inspection only by external visual observation including measuring, as necessary, the dimensions of such a structure or container to confirm that it is not sufficiently large to be capable of containing a missile, stage of such a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty.

10. Within a structure, a space which is sufficiently large to contain a missile, stage of such a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty, but which is demonstrated to the satisfaction of the inspection team not to be accessible by the smallest missile, stage of a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty shall not be subject to further inspection. If the inspected Party demonstrates to the satisfaction of the inspection team by

means of a visual inspection of the interior of an enclosed space from its entrance that the enclosed space does not contain any missile, stage of such a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty, such an enclosed space shall not be subject to further inspection.

11. The inspection team shall be permitted to patrol the perimeter of the inspection site and station inspectors at the exits of the site for the duration of the inspection.

12. The inspection team shall be permitted to inspect any vehicle capable of carrying missiles, stages of such missiles, launchers or support equipment of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty at any time during the course of an inspection and no such vehicle shall leave the inspection site during the course of the inspection until inspected at site exits by the inspection team.

13. Prior to inspection of a building within the inspection site, the inspection team may station subgroups at the exits of the building that are large enough to permit passage of any missile, stage of such a missile, launcher or support equipment of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty. During the time that the building is being inspected, no vehicle or object capable of containing any missile, stage of such a missile, launcher or support equipment of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty shall be permitted to leave the building until inspected.

14. During an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 5 (b) of Article XI of the Treaty, it shall be the responsibility of the inspected Party to demonstrate that a shrouded or environmentally protected object which is equal to or larger than the smallest missile, stage of a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty is not, in fact, a missile, stage of such a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty. This may be accomplished by partial removal of the shroud or environmental protection cover, measuring, or weighing the covered object or by other methods. If the inspected Party satisfies the inspection team by its demonstration that the object is not a missile, stage of such a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty, then there shall be no further inspection of that object. If the container is a launch canister associated with a type of missile not subject to the Treaty, and declared by the inspected Party to contain such a missile, then it shall be subject to external inspection only, including use of radiation detection devices, visual observation and linear measurement, as necessary, of the dimensions of such a canister.

VIII. Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraphs 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty

1. Inspections of the process of elimination of items of missile systems specified in the Protocol on Elimination carried out pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article XI of the Treaty shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures set forth in this paragraph and the Protocol on Elimination.

- (a) Upon arrival at the elimination facility, inspectors shall be provided with a schedule of elimination activities.
- (b) Inspectors shall check the data which are specified in the notification provided by the inspected Party regarding the number and type of items of missile systems to be eliminated against the number and type of such items which are at the elimination facility prior to the initiation of the elimination procedures.
- (c) Subject to paragraphs 3 and 11 of Section VI of this Protocol, inspectors shall observe the execution of the specific procedures for the elimination of the items of missile systems as provided for in the Protocol on Elimination. If any deviations from the agreed elimination procedures are found, the inspectors shall have the right to call the attention of the in-country escort to the need for strict compliance with the above-mentioned procedures. The completion of such procedures shall be confirmed in accordance with the procedures specified in the Protocol on Elimination.
- (d) During the elimination of missiles by means of launching, the inspectors shall have the right to ascertain by visual observation that a missile prepared for launch is a missile of the type subject to elimination. The inspectors shall also be allowed to observe such a missile from a safe location specified by the inspected Party until the completion of its launch. During the inspection of a series of launches for the elimination of missiles by means of launching, the inspected Party shall determine the means of transport and route for the transportation of inspectors between inspection sites.

2. Inspections of the elimination of items of missile systems specified in the Protocol on Elimination carried out pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article XI of the Treaty shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures set forth in Sections II, IV or V of the Protocol on Elimination or as otherwise agreed by the Parties.

IX. Inspection Activities Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty

1. The inspected Party shall maintain an agreed perimeter around the periphery of the inspection site and shall designate a portal with not more than one rail line and one road which shall be within 50 meters of each other. All vehicles which can contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party shall exit only through this portal.

2. For the purposes of this Section, the provisions of paragraph 10 of Article VII of the Treaty shall be applied to intermediate-range GLBMs of the inspected Party and the longest stage of such GLBMs.

3. There shall not be more than two other exits from the inspection site. Such exits shall be monitored by appropriate sensors. The perimeter of and exits from the inspection site may be monitored as provided for by paragraph 11 of Section VII of this Protocol.

4. The inspecting Party shall have the right to establish continuous monitoring systems at the portal specified in paragraph 1 of this Section and appropriate sensors at the exits specified in paragraph 3 of this Section and carry out necessary engineering surveys, construction, repair and replacement of monitoring systems.

5. The inspected Party shall, at the request of and at the expense of the inspecting Party, provide the following:

- (a) all necessary utilities for the construction and operation of the monitoring systems, including electrical power, water, fuel, heating and sewage;
- (b) basic construction materials including concrete and lumber;
- (c) the site preparation necessary to accommodate the installation of continuously operating systems for monitoring the portal specified in paragraph 1 of this Section, appropriate sensors for other exits specified in paragraph 3 of this Section and the center for collecting data obtained during inspections. Such preparation may include ground excavation, laying of concrete foundations, trenching between equipment locations and utility connections;
- (d) transportation for necessary installation tools, materials and equipment from the point of entry to the inspection site; and
- (e) a minimum of two telephone lines and, as necessary, high frequency radio equipment capable of allowing direct communication with the embassy of the inspecting Party in the country in which the site is located.

6. Outside the perimeter of the inspection site, the inspecting Party shall have the right to:

- (a) build no more than three buildings with a total floor space of not more than 150 square meters for a data center and inspection team headquarters, and one additional building with floor space not to exceed 500 square meters for the storage of supplies and equipment;
- (b) install systems to monitor the exits to include weight sensors, vehicle sensors, surveillance systems and vehicle dimensional measuring equipment;
- (c) install at the portal specified in paragraph 1 of this Section equipment for measuring the length and diameter of missile stages contained inside of launch canisters or shipping containers;
- (d) install at the portal specified in paragraph 1 of this Section non-damaging image producing equipment for imaging the contents of launch canisters or shipping containers declared to contain missiles or missile stages as provided for in paragraph 11 of this Section;
- (e) install a primary and back-up power source; and (f) use, as necessary, data authentication devices.

7. During the installation or operation of the monitoring systems, the inspecting Party shall not deny the inspected Party access to any existing structures or security systems. The inspecting Party shall not take any actions with respect to such structures without consent of the inspected Party. If the Parties agree that such structures are to be rebuilt or demolished, either partially or completely, the inspecting Party shall provide the necessary compensation.

8. The inspected Party shall not interfere with the installed equipment or restrict the access of the inspection team to such equipment.

9. The inspecting Party shall have the right to use its own two-way systems of radio communication between inspectors patrolling the perimeter and the data collection center. Such systems shall conform to power and frequency restrictions established on the territory of the inspected Party.

10. Aircraft shall not be permitted to land within the perimeter of the monitored site except for emergencies at the site and with prior notification to the inspection team.

11. Any shipment exiting through the portal specified in paragraph 1 of this Section which is large enough and heavy enough to contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party shall be declared by the inspected Party to the inspection team before the shipment arrives at the portal. The declaration shall state whether such a shipment contains a missile or missile stage as large or larger than and as heavy or heavier than an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party.

12. The inspection team shall have the right to weigh and measure the dimensions of any vehicle, including railcars, exiting the site to ascertain whether it is large enough and heavy enough to contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party. These measurements shall be performed so as to minimize the delay of vehicles exiting the site. Vehicles that are either not large enough or not heavy enough to contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party shall not be subject to further inspection.

13. Vehicles exiting through the portal specified in paragraph 1 of this Section that are large enough and heavy enough to contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party but that are declared not to contain a missile or missile stage as large or larger than and as heavy or heavier than an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party shall be subject to the following procedures.

- (a) The inspecting Party shall have the right to inspect the interior of all such vehicles.
- (b) If the inspecting Party can determine by visual observation or dimensional measurement that, inside a particular vehicle, there are no containers or shrouded objects large enough to be or to contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party, then that vehicle shall not be subject to further inspection.
- (c) If inside a vehicle there are one or more containers or shrouded objects large enough to be or to contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party, it shall be the responsibility of the inspected Party to demonstrate that such containers or shrouded objects are not and do not contain intermediate-range GLBMs or the longest stages of such GLBMs of the inspected Party.

14. Vehicles exiting through the portal specified in paragraph 1 of this Section that are declared to contain a missile or missile stage as large or larger than and as heavy or heavier than an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party shall be subject to the following procedures.

- (a) The inspecting Party shall preserve the integrity of the inspected missile or stage of a missile.
- (b) Measuring equipment shall be placed only outside of the launch canister or shipping container; all measurements shall be made by the inspecting Party using the equipment provided for in paragraph 6 of this Section. Such measurements shall be observed and certified by the in-country escort.

- (c) The inspecting Party shall have the right to weigh and measure the dimensions of any launch canister or of any shipping container declared to contain such a missile or missile stage and to image the contents of any launch canister or of any shipping container declared to contain such a missile or missile stage; it shall have the right to view such missiles or missile stages contained in launch canisters or shipping containers eight times per calendar year. The in-country escort shall be present during all phases of such viewing. During such interior viewing:
- (i) the front end of the launch canister or the cover of the shipping container shall be opened;
 - (ii) the missile or missile stage shall not be removed from its launch canister or shipping container; and
 - (iii) the length and diameter of the stages of the missile shall be measured in accordance with the methods agreed by the Parties so as to ascertain that the missile or missile stage is not an intermediate-range GLBM of the inspected Party, or the longest stage of such a GLBM, and that the missile has no more than one stage which is outwardly similar to a stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM.
- (d) The inspecting Party shall also have the right to inspect any other containers or shrouded objects inside the vehicle containing such a missile or missile stage in accordance with the procedures in paragraph 13 of this Section.

X. Cancellation of Inspection

An inspection shall be cancelled if, due to circumstances brought about by *force majeure*, it cannot be carried out. In the case of a delay that prevents an inspection team performing an inspection pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4 or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty, from arriving at the inspection site during the time specified in paragraph 2 of Section VII of this Protocol, the inspecting Party may either cancel or carry out the inspection. If an inspection is cancelled due to circumstances brought about by *force majeure* or delay, then the number of inspections to which the inspecting Party is entitled shall not be reduced.

XI. Inspection Report

1. For inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, during post-inspection procedures, and no later than two hours after the inspection has been completed, the inspection team leader shall provide the in-country escort with a written inspection report in both the English and Russian languages. The report shall be factual. It shall include the type of inspection carried out, the inspection site, the number of missiles, stages of missiles, launchers and items of support equipment subject to the Treaty observed during the period of inspection and any measurements recorded pursuant to paragraph 10 of Section VI of this Protocol. Photographs taken during the inspection in accordance with agreed procedures, as well as the inspection site diagram provided for by paragraph 6 of Section VII of this Protocol, shall be attached to this report.

2. For inspection activities conducted pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty, within 3 days after the end of each month, the inspection team leader shall provide the in-country escort with a written inspection report both in the English and Russian languages. The report shall be factual. It shall include the number of vehicles declared to contain a missile or stage of a missile as large or larger than and as heavy or heavier than an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party that left the inspection site through the portal specified in paragraph 1 of Section IX of this Protocol during that month. The report shall also include any measurements of launch canisters or shipping containers contained in these vehicles recorded pursuant to paragraph 1 of Section VI of this Protocol. In the event the inspecting Party, under the provisions of paragraph 14 (c) of Section IX of this Protocol, has viewed the interior of a launch canister or shipping container declared to contain a missile or stage of a missile as large or larger than and as heavy or heavier than an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party, the report shall also include the measurements of the length and diameter of missile stages obtained during the inspection and recorded

pursuant to paragraph 11 of Section VI of this Protocol. Photographs taken during the inspection in accordance with agreed procedures shall be attached to this report.

3. The inspected Party shall have the right to include written comments in the report.

4. The Parties shall, when possible, resolve ambiguities regarding factual information contained in the inspection report. Relevant clarifications shall be recorded in the report. The report shall be signed by the inspection team leader and by one of the members of the in-country escort. Each Party shall retain one copy of the report.

This Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty. It shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force. As provided for in paragraph 1 (b) of Article XIII of the Treaty, the Parties may agree upon such measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of this Protocol. Such measures shall not be deemed amendments to the Treaty.

DONE at Washington on December 8, 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA:

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

*President of the
United States of America*

*General Secretary of the
Central Committee of the CPSU*

ANNEX

Provisions on Privileges and Immunities of Inspectors and Aircrew Members

In order to exercise their functions effectively, for the purpose of implementing the Treaty and not for their personal benefit, the inspectors and aircrew members referred to in Section III of this Protocol shall be accorded the privileges and immunities contained in this Annex. Privileges and immunities shall be accorded for the entire in-country period in the country in which an inspection site is located, and thereafter with respect to acts previously performed in the exercise of official functions as an inspector or aircrew member.

1. Inspectors and aircrew members shall be accorded the inviolability enjoyed by diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of April 18, 1961.

2. The living quarters and office premises occupied by an inspector carrying out inspection activities pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty shall be accorded the inviolability and protection accorded the premises of diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

3. The papers and correspondence of inspectors and aircrew members shall enjoy the inviolability accorded to the papers and correspondence of diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. In addition, the aircraft of the inspection team shall be inviolable.

4. Inspectors and aircrew members shall be accorded the immunities accorded diplomatic agents pursuant to paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The immunity from jurisdiction of an inspector or an aircrew member may be waived by the inspecting Party in those cases when it is of the opinion that immunity would impede the course of justice and that it can be waived without prejudice to the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty. Waiver must always be express.

5. Inspectors carrying out inspection activities pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty shall be accorded the exemption from dues and taxes accorded to diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

6. Inspectors and aircrew members of a Party shall be permitted to bring into the territory of the other Party or a basing country in which an inspection site is located, without payment

of any customs duties or related charges, articles for their personal use, with the exception of articles the import or export of which is prohibited by law or controlled by quarantine regulations.

7. An inspector or aircrew member shall not engage in any professional or commercial activity for personal profit on the territory of the inspected Party or that of the basing countries.

8. If the inspected Party considers that there has been an abuse of privileges and immunities specified in this Annex, consultations shall be held between the Parties to determine whether such an abuse has occurred and, if so determined, to prevent a repetition of such an abuse.

List of resolutions and decisions on disarmament and related questions adopted by the General Assembly at its forty-second session, held from 15 September to 21 December 1987 (including voting)

*Reference
in text*

Resolutions on disarmament questions

- 42/25 Implementation of General Assembly resolution 41/45 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) 206

Adopted by a recorded vote of 147 to none, with 7 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: Argentina, Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, France, Guinea, Guyana

42/26 Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions

Resolution A

177

Adopted by a recorded vote of 137 to 3, with 14 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zimbabwe

Against: France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Germany, Federal Republic of, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, Zambia

Resolution B

179

Adopted by a recorded vote of 128 to 3, with 22 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia,

42/26 Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zimbabwe

Against: France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Samoa, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Zambia

42/27 Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty

179

Adopted by a recorded vote of 143 to 2, with 8 abstentions, as follows:*

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: France, United States of America

Abstaining: Angola, Argentina, Brazil, China, Cuba, India, Israel, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

42/28 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East

212

Adopted without a vote

* The delegation of St. Kitts and Nevis subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

- 42/29 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia

Adopted by a recorded vote of 114 to 3, with 36 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Kampuchea, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Bhutan, India, Mauritius

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Austria, Benin, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Madagascar, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Norway, Poland, Seychelles, Sweden, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia

- 42/30 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects

326

Adopted without a vote

- 42/31 Conclusion of effective international arrangements on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

191

Adopted by a recorded vote of 112 to 18, with 20 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama,

42/31 (cont.) Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Burma, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Malta, Paraguay, Sudan, Sweden, Uruguay

42/32 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

192

Adopted by a recorded vote of 151 to none, with 3 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: Brazil, India, United States of America

42/33 Prevention of an arms race in outer space

289

Adopted by a recorded vote of 154 to 1, as follows:

42/33 *In favour:* Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: United States of America

Abstaining: None

42/34 Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa
Resolution A—Implementation of the Declaration

208

Adopted by a recorded vote of 151 to none, with 4 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia,

42/34 Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: France, Israel, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Resolution B—Nuclear capability of South Africa

210

Adopted by a recorded vote of 140 to 4, with 13 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: France, Israel, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Germany, Federal Republic of Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Uruguay

42/35 Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons

301

Adopted by a recorded vote of 135 to 1, with 18 abstentions,^b as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argen-

^b The delegation of Ethiopia subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

42/35 tina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhu-
(cont.) tan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso,
Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape
Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo,
Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen,
Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial
Guinea, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana,
Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hon-
duras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq,
Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic,
Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi,
Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia,
Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan,
Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Ro-
mania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sey-
chelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Su-
dan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo,
Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic,
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic
of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia,
Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: United States of America

Abstaining: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, France, Ger-
many, Federal Republic of, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland

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|-------|---|-----|
| 42/36 | Reduction of military budgets | 337 |
| | <i>Adopted without a vote</i> | |
| 42/37 | Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons | |
| | Resolution A—Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons | 271 |
| | <i>Adopted without a vote</i> | |
| | Resolution B—Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bac-
teriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction | 273 |
| | <i>Adopted without a vote</i> | |
| | Resolution C—Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol
and to support the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention | 272 |
| | <i>Adopted without a vote</i> | |
| 42/38 | General and complete disarmament | |
| | Resolution A—Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations | 133 |
| | <i>Adopted by a recorded vote of 115 to none, with 39 abstentions,^c as follows:</i> | |

^c The delegation of Cameroon subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour; the delegation of Mexico had intended to abstain.

42/38 (cont.) Afghanistan, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia

Against: None

Abstaining: Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Maldives, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zimbabwe

Resolution B—Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons 302

Adopted without a vote

Resolution C—Notification of nuclear tests 180

Adopted by a recorded vote of 147 to 1, with 8 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands,

42/38 New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New
(cont.) Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania,
Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines,
Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra
Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sur-
iname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad
and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic,
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic
of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia,
Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: France

Abstaining: Angola, Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Nicaragua, United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Resolution D—Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations

134

Adopted by a recorded vote of 143 to none, with 13 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argen-
tina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize,
Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Bur-
kina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Came-
roon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia,
Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia,
Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji,
Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece,
Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hun-
gary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland,
Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic,
Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi,
Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia,
Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria,
Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Phil-
ippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia,
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi
Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, So-
malia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Re-
public, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian
Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab
Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet
Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: Belgium, Chile, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Israel,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Resolution E—Conventional disarmament

320

Adopted without a vote

Resolution F—Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and
use of radiological weapons

303

42/38 *Adopted by a recorded vote of 119 to 2, with 32 abstentions,^d as follows:*
(cont.)

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, Vanuatu, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Israel, United States of America

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Belize, Canada, Denmark, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Grenada, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Samoa, Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela

Resolution G—Conventional disarmament 322

Adopted without a vote

Resolution H—Nuclear disarmament 113

Adopted without a vote

Resolution I—Objective information on military matters 84

Adopted by a recorded vote of 133 to none, with 12 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic,

^d The delegation of Jamaica subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to abstain.

42/38 (cont.) Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: Algeria, Brazil, Cuba, Egypt, Grenada, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Kuwait, Nicaragua, Sudan, Zambia

Resolution J—Implementation of General Assembly resolutions in the field of disarmament

27

Adopted by a recorded vote of 128 to 2, with 24 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Israel, United States of America

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Grenada, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Resolution K—Naval armaments and disarmament

86

42/38 *Adopted by a recorded vote of 154 to 1, with 2 abstentions, as follows:*
(cont.)

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: United States of America

Abstaining: Grenada, India

Resolution L—Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes

118

Adopted by a recorded vote of 149 to 1, with 6 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines,

42/38 (cont.) Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: France

Abstaining: Argentina, Brazil, China, India, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Resolution M—Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements 87

Adopted without a vote

Resolution N—Conventional disarmament on a regional scale 323

Adopted by a recorded vote of 154 to none, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: None

Resolution O—Review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament

25

Adopted without a vote

42/39 Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly

Resolution A—Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly

62

Adopted by a recorded vote of 129 to 1, with 23 abstentions,^e as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: United States of America

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Grenada, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Resolution B—Freeze on nuclear weapons

116

Adopted by a recorded vote of 139 to 12, with 4 abstentions,^f as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's

^e The delegations of Djibouti and Greece subsequently advised the Secretariat that they had intended to vote in favour.

^f The delegation of Djibouti subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

42/39 Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, (cont.) Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Australia, China, Japan, Spain

Resolution C—Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

152

Adopted by a recorded vote of 135 to 17, with 4 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Greece, Ireland, Israel, Japan

Resolution D—United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia

399

Adopted without a vote

42/39 Resolution E—Regional disarmament
(cont.)

Adopted without a vote

Resolution F—Consideration of guidelines for confidence-building measures 64

Adopted without a vote

Resolution G—World Disarmament Campaign 394

Adopted by a recorded vote of 146 to 1, with 9 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: United States of America

Abstaining: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Resolution H—Implementation of General Assembly resolution 41/60 I on a nuclear-arms freeze 117

Adopted by a recorded vote of 140 to 13, with 2 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,

42/39
(cont.) Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: China, Spain

Resolution I—United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament

65

Adopted by a recorded vote of 156 to 1, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: United States of America

- 42/39 *Abstaining:* None
(cont.)
- Resolution J—United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa 396
- Adopted without a vote*
- Resolution K—United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America 398
- Adopted without a vote*
- 42/40 Convening of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament 41
- Adopted without a vote*
- 42/41 World Disarmament Conference 49
- Adopted without a vote*
- 42/42 Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session
- Resolution A—Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war 149
- Adopted by a recorded vote of 125 to 17, with 12 abstentions, as follows:*
- In favour:* Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe
- Against:* Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America
- Abstaining:* Bahamas, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Fiji, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Paraguay, Samoa

42/42 Resolution B—Review of the implementation of the recommendations and
(cont.) decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session.

34

Adopted by a recorded vote of 137 to 1, with 14 abstentions, as follows:*

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, France, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Iran (Islamic Republic of)

Abstaining: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, Germany, Federal Republic of, India, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Nigeria, Portugal, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Resolution C—Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament

114

Adopted by a recorded vote of 137 to 13, with 7 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab

* The delegation of Ethiopia subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to abstain.

42/42 (cont.) Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Denmark, Greece, Iceland, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Spain

Resolution D—Prevention of nuclear war

150

Adopted by a recorded vote of 140 to 3, with 14 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Federal Republic of Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey

Resolution E—International co-operation for disarmament

66

Adopted by a recorded vote of 118 to 18, with 14 abstentions, as follows:

42/42 *In favour:* Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Austria, Bahamas, Brazil, Chile, Finland, Greece, Guatemala, Iceland, Ireland, Jamaica, Malta, Samoa, Sweden, Uruguay

Resolution F—Verification in all its aspects 69

Adopted without a vote

Resolution G—Report of the Disarmament Commission 28

Adopted without a vote

Resolution H—Disarmament Week 403

Adopted by a recorded vote of 133 to none, with 21 abstentions,^h as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic,

^h The delegation of Oman subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour; the delegation of Ecuador had intended to abstain.

42/42 (cont.) Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Resolution I—Comprehensive programme of disarmament 97

Adopted without a vote

Resolution J—United Nations disarmament studies 385

Adopted without a vote

Resolution K—Report of the Conference on Disarmament 31

Adopted by a recorded vote of 127 to none, with 28 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zaire

Against: None

42/42 *Abstaining:* Algeria, Angola, Brazil, Cameroon, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen, Egypt, Ghana, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Vanuatu, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Resolution L—Report of the Conference on Disarmament

32

Adopted by a recorded vote of 135 to 5, with 15 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Belgium, France, Portugal, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Turkey

Resolution M—Implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session

72

Adopted by a recorded vote of 142 to 12, with 3 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of),

42/42 (cont.) Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Japan, Norway, Spain

Resolution N—Rationalization of the work of the First Committee

35

Adopted by a recorded vote of 134 to none, with 20 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: Argentina, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brazil, Burma, China, Cuba, Cyprus, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Maldives, Mexico, Nepal, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Sri Lanka, Venezuela, Yugoslavia

42/43 Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace

46

Adopted without a vote

42/44 Israeli nuclear armament

215

Adopted by a recorded vote of 97 to 2, with 52 abstentions,¹ as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Israel, United States of America

Abstaining: Australia, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bolivia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malta, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Portugal, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Zaire

42/45 Relationship between disarmament and development

371

Adopted without a vote

Decisions

42/407 General and complete disarmament

132

The General Assembly, on the recommendation of the First Committee, having noted the joint statement released by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the end of the meeting between the

¹ The delegation of the Philippines subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour; the delegations of Austria, Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines had intended to abstain.

42/407 Secretary of State and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, held at Washington, D.C., from 15 to 17 September 1987, urged the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of the United States of America to spare no effort in concluding, in accordance with the agreement in principle reached at that meeting, at the earliest possible date, a treaty on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles to be signed at a summit meeting to be held in the fall of 1987 between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, as it was agreed, and to make a similarly intensive effort to achieve a treaty on 50 per cent reductions in their strategic offensive arms within the framework of the Geneva Nuclear and Space Talks.

Adopted without a vote

42/412 Implementation of General Assembly resolution 41/54 on the immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests —

The General Assembly took note of the report of the First Committee.

Resolutions on related questions

42/6 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 233

Adopted without a vote

42/23 Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa

Resolution C—Comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against the racist régime of South Africa 211

Adopted by a recorded vote of 126 to 11, with 17 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

42/23 *Against:* Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Israel, (cont.) Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Côte d'Ivoire, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Lesotho, Malawi, Malta, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden

Resolution D—Relations between Israel and South Africa

211

Adopted by a recorded vote of 103 to 29, with 23 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Chad, China, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Cameroon, Canada, Côte d'Ivoire, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Malawi, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire

Abstaining: Bahamas, Barbados, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Grenada, Jamaica, Japan, Lesotho, Liberia, Malta, Panama, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Swaziland, Uruguay

Resolution G—Concerted international action for the elimination of *apartheid*

211

Adopted by a recorded vote of 149 to 2, with 4 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia,

- 42/23 Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe
- Against:* United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America
- Abstaining:* Côte d'Ivoire, Germany, Federal Republic of, Lesotho, Malawi
- 42/24 United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy 234
- Adopted without a vote*
- 42/46 Question of Antarctica 219
- Resolution A
- Adopted by a roll-call vote of 122 to none, with 9 abstentions,^j as follows:*
- In favour:* Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra

^j During the course of the roll-call vote the following Members announced that they were not participating: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Grenada, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Paraguay, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and Uruguay.

42/46 Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: Canada, Côte d'Ivoire, Ireland, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malta, Mauritius, Portugal

Resolution B

219

Adopted by a roll-call vote of 100 to none, with 10 abstentions,^k as follows:

In favour: Albania, Algeria, Angola, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Democratic Kampuchea, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: Antigua and Barbuda, Canada, China, Fiji, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Solomon Islands, Turkey, Venezuela

42/90 Strengthening of security and co-operation in the Mediterranean region —

Adopted without a vote

42/91 Implementation of the Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace —

Adopted by a recorded vote of 128 to none, with 24 abstentions,^l as follows:

^k During the course of the roll-call vote the following Members announced that they were not participating: Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Poland, Spain, Sweden, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, Uruguay and Viet Nam.

^l The delegation of Saint Lucia subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

42/91 *In favour:* Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

42/92 Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security

89

Adopted by a recorded vote of 131 to 1, with 23 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist

42/92 Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay,
(cont.) Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: United States of America

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

42/93 Comprehensive system of international peace and security

90

Adopted by a recorded vote of 76 to 12, with 63 abstentions,^m as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Colombia, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Belgium, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, France, Haiti, Israel, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Bahamas, Barbados, Brunei Darussalam, Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Kampuchea, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Malta, Morocco, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Zaire

^m The delegation of Sao Tome and Principe subsequently advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

كيفية الحصول على منشورات الأمم المتحدة

يمكن الحصول على منشورات الأمم المتحدة من المكتبات بדרך التوزيع في جميع أنحاء العالم . استعلم عنها من المكتبة التي تتعامل معها أو اكتب إلى . الأمم المتحدة . قسم البيع في نيويورك أو في جنيف .

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