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Arms Control and Disarmament: A New Conceptual Approach

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United Nations
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PREFACE

In his report to the Millennium Assembly issued at the end of March, "We the peoples: the role of the United Nations in the twenty-first century," the Secretary-General urged the global community to seize a sense of the occasion that comes from the turning of the century, to step back from today's headlines and take a broader, longer-term view of the state of the world and the challenges it poses. In partnership with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA) is taking up precisely that challenge.

This panel discussion is part of a series of events sponsored by the Department to deepen the discussion on topical disarmament and security related issues. It is also part of the constant search for a new approach, a new concept, a new paradigm or vision for disarmament and arms control since the end of the cold war, the end of the post-cold war period and the beginning of the new century.

In October last year, in Stockholm, SIPRI sponsored the "Nobel Symposium on the Future Arms Control Agenda." The Symposium and the report shortly thereafter made a significant contribution to the intellectual and political debate on the subject in the light of the new world security involvement.

It is axiomatic that progress in disarmament is closely linked to the evolution of the security environment. Disarmament cannot be separated from the new geo-political and security configurations in Europe, new demonstrations of nuclear capability in Asia, the emergence of new conflicts that are being driven mainly by internal and ethnic strife and that are outrageous in their brutality in Europe, Asia and Africa.

Today's agenda is still full and diverse in the traditional areas of disarmament, nuclear, chemical and biological disarmament as well as ballistic missile defense and proliferation and conventional disarmament including landmines. Other threats have emerged and the agenda is evolving in the area of small arms and light weapons, advances in biotechnology and the new technologies driving the revolution in military affairs.

Like many organizations, research institutes, researchers and individuals in the field of security, DDA has set store on the reliability and credibility of the research and publications produced by SIPRI. As an independent international institute for research on problems for peace and conflict, disarmament and arms control founded in 1966, SIPRI's primary research has been consistently objective, timely, comprehensive and clearly presented. SIPRI's Yearbook has been a reference tool for disarmament and security researchers for many years and its arms control survey and other publications are widely used authoritative sources of information. DDA has benefited from a cross fertilization of ideas and the contribution to capacity building in the security field. It was an honour for the Department to have co-sponsored the discussion that follows and is grateful to the members of SIPRI that participated. I hope that this publication will serve to disseminate more widely the ideas and proposals presented by the participants and contribute to the long-range disarmament thinking in the next century.

Jayantha Dhanapala
Under-Secretary-General
for Disarmament Affairs

*SIPRI's new conceptual approach to
arms control and disarmament:*

*Adam Daniel Rotfeld**

Abstract

The end of the cold war deprioritized arms control and disarmament, and progress in the field was no longer a measure of relations among the major powers. In that context, the future of arms control and disarmament was discussed at the Nobel Symposium in October 1999. SIPRI views arms control as an instrument for shaping a new inclusive and cooperative security order. The author questions whether arms control challenges today can and should be resolved in the institutions established and the procedures elaborated in the bipolar framework.

Ten years ago, after the end of the cold war, we faced a dilemma—whether, and if so, to what degree we should keep the traditional research agenda of SIPRI. The prevailing view was that arms control and disarmament had lost importance. It was suggested to me that SIPRI should focus on conflict prevention, human rights, combating terrorism, etc. I was and still am of opinion that these issues are very important. However, while restructuring the SIPRI research pro-

** Adam Daniel Rotfeld is Director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). This paper is based on his presentation at a panel discussion organized by the Department for Disarmament Affairs and SIPRI, held at United Nations, New York on 1 May 2000.*

gramme, one had to seek an answer to the question: What should be done in the new political reality, after the collapse of the bipolar world, to prevent armaments from getting out of control?

Then fact is that after the end of the cold war arms control and disarmament are no longer a priority. In the past, arms control negotiations and agreements were a barometer of the international climate. The warming and rapprochement in relations between the great powers were marked by new treaties such as the NPT, SALT I and SALT II. The lack of progress in disarmament forums meant an increasing tension and the growth of confrontation between powers. One can claim that at some stage the arms race, and later its curbing, determined the conditions of international relations. This has changed due to the break-up of the bipolar system and the gradual departure from the policy of building security on the balance of power. The new international security environment supplied a reasonable dimension to the problems of arms control and disarmament.

A new question arose: Has arms control a future, and if so, what kind of future is that? This was the central question put to participants of the Nobel symposium on *A Future Arms Control Agenda*¹ (The Report, worked out on the basis of the symposium's outcome, was sent to heads of state and government, and its highlights will be presented later by Dr. Ian Anthony). In its search for answers concerning future arms control, the SIPRI research agenda has been focused in recent years around three clusters of issues:

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- Weapons of mass destruction and international security: Research is carried out in three projects—*Military Technology and International Security*; *Chemical and Biological Warfare*; and *Arms Control and Disarmament Documentary Survey*;
 - Military spending, arms production and arms transfers: Data collection and analyses are conducted in four projects: *Military Expenditure and Arms Production*; *Arms Transfers*; *Arms Procurement Decision Making*; and *Internet Online Database on European Arms Export Controls*; and
 - Conflicts, conflict prevention and regional security. Research is done in four projects: *Conflicts and Peace Enforcement and Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution*; as well as *Russia and Asia: The Emerging Security Agenda and Building a Cooperative Security System in and for Europe*, the latter dealing with the institutionalized security process, including NATO and EU enlargement, and the implementation and adaptation of the CFE Treaty, CSBMs and anti-personnel mines.

Our understanding of SIPRI's current mandate is to promote transparency in the field of security and arms control; to help prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and to contribute to conflict prevention and the search for regional resolution of conflicts throughout the world. In our view, now-

days, arms control is not a value *per se*, but an instrument and integral element of shaping a new inclusive and cooperative security order.

In this context, I would like to share with you three reflections of a general nature:

First, many of the optimistic expectations of the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s have not come true. Numerous states did not keep their promises. In effect, although we thought that there would be no need to publish data on the transfers of arms because of the existence of the United Nations Register on Conventional Arms, this kind of information produced by SIPRI is still looked for and useful. The same goes for world inventories on plutonium and highly enriched uranium—the volume produced by SIPRI should indeed be published periodically by states, not by an independent research centre. There are more examples of this kind. The implementation of the Wassenaar Arrangement encounters serious obstacles. And other agreements, including the Chemical Weapons Convention, are not fully implemented, either.

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Second, some powers make public documents where the arms control component is not addressed, being replaced by a pro-armaments rhetoric. A real risk is emerging that the process of reducing, limiting

and constraining armaments may be not only halted or restrained, but replaced by a new type of arms competition. Therefore, arms control should be seen as a useful tool to enhance security through limitations of the size and nature of military threats. Since the greatest threat is uncertainty, the answer to it, undoubtedly, is openness, transparency and predictability. In our research and publications, arms control is treated as an integral and valuable component of international security.

Finally, let me offer an historical remark. Last year, we marked the 100th anniversary of the First Hague Peace Conference of 1899, initiated by Tsar Nicholas II. He invited all the Powers diplomatically represented in St. Petersburg to send their delegates to a convention to discuss reductions of armaments as well as ways of avoiding war. A major explanation of this Russian initiative lay in the state of Russian economy. Some security analysts see an analogy with what Mikhail Gorbachev did 90 years later when he proposed

In SIPRI's research and publications, arms control is treated as an integral and valuable component of international security. strategic arms limitation talks. It was and is not only a problem of the former Soviet Union or Russia, but a great many states in different parts of the world who already are under heavy economic strain, being unable to keep up with the rearmaments and the new arms race, even if it is reflected mainly in small arms proliferation. The more dangerous is the

threat of nuclear proliferation. Secretary-General Kofi Annan was right in his report prepared for the United Nations Millennium Summit claiming that “We need a reaffirmation of political commitment to reduce the dangers from existing nuclear weapons and from further proliferation”.²

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In the view of some security analysts, the dominant world trends—globalization, democratization, fragmentation and proliferation—tend to make the major powers put their relations on the basis of a new bipolarity. The new polarization would be this time not an outcome of ideological antagonism, but rather of clash of interests. The new dividing line in the era of information technology would run along the degree of technological advancement. True, the authors of such vision make a reservation that a new bipolar world is not inevitable; they are eager, however, to add that “[h]istory need not repeat itself, but current trends are leading us in that direction”. Such reasoning seeks to conceptualize the new reality according to the old categories and well-known formulae of the past.

In search of a new security system, ways of effectively resolving specific problems are more important than institutionalization and creation of new structures following theoretical concepts. In this context, it is worth noting that, despite numerous pessimistic forecasts, many potential and real conflicts in

various parts of the world have been either settled or extinguished, or, at least, contacts have been ushered in between the main antagonists. In the Middle East, the peace process has been renewed and contacts between Israel and Syria have opened up. The US-North Korean relations have improved, and a summit meeting between North Korea and South Korea to start normalizing relations on the Korean Peninsula has been scheduled for June 2000.

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The Chinese-Taiwanese relations as well as those in the whole region of South-East Asia and Pacific are characterized by lessened tensions. With the advent of the new president, Vladimir Putin, a new opening has taken place in relations between Russia and NATO and the European Union; new ways of resolving politically the conflict in Chechnya are sought. The list of such positive changes in the world could be prolonged. Regrettably, it does not include regions and problems constituting a real or potential threat to international peace and security.

A complex approach is required not only to preventing and solving domestic and inter-state conflicts, but also to heading off effectively situations where armaments have slipped out of control. In the cold war period, arms control was in the focus of

attention of politicians and the public. Although after the end of the cold war other problems of international security claimed priority, a number of agreements on arms control and disarmament have been reached. Some of these agreements have not entered into force due to lack of necessary ratification; others encounter considerable obstacles in putting them into effect. The NPT Review Conference, convened in April–May 2000, faced a number of serious problems: the United States Senate rejected the ratification of the CTBT which was negotiated and signed thanks to years-long efforts by American diplomacy. Russia renounced its “no first use” policy and decided to rely more on its nuclear weapons under the new Russian military doctrine approved by the President Putin. For seven years, the Russian State Duma had rejected ratification of START II. The United States and Russia continue to maintain their potentials on the “hair-trigger alert”. India and Pakistan carried out tests with nuclear devices in the spring of 1998. Israel did not accede to the NPT regime and is counted as a country belonging to the group of states with recognized nuclear capability. It turned out that some states parties to the NPT (Iraq, North Korea), albeit they adopted the non-nuclear-state status, have had secret nuclear weapons programmes.

The United States has announced the possibility of revising unilaterally the 1972 ABM Treaty. The rationale for this decision is that the United States, although not threatened any longer by Russia, sees potential dangers coming from “rogue states”, such as Iraq or North Korea. To neutralize a potential inter-

continental ballistic missile attack from such countries, the United States is reverting to its modified concept, abandoned after the cold war, of building a "national missile defence" (NMD). The system is designed to shield the American people from potential nuclear harm. However, such unilateral moves by the United States risk having a destabilizing effect on the nuclear strategy and may set in motion a new global arms race.

These and other moves are a challenge for the international community. It remains an open question whether such issues can and should be resolved in the institutions established and with the procedures elaborated within the bipolar framework after the Second World War or should call for a functional and innovative approach taking into account the new premises and the new international security environment.

At SIPRI, we understand our mandate in such a way that our research agenda and publications have to help focus attention on the risks we confront and on the opportunities of reducing them through arms control and elimination of weapons of mass destruction.

Notes

¹ The Stockholm Agenda for Arms Control: Report based on the Rapporteur's Statement at the Nobel Symposium on a Future Arms Control Agenda, 1-2 October 1999 (SIPRI, November 1999).

² A/54/2000.

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International security and arms control

*Rolf Ekéus**

Abstract

The end of the cold war also ended the focus on the bilateral approach to arms control and disarmament. Key concepts of security needed to be revisited, along with their implications for the disarmament and arms control agenda. Though there is currently a unipolar global security environment, there remain important tasks on the multilateral arms control agenda. The major task is that of reducing and eliminating weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons. The author contends that maintaining reliance on the nuclear-weapons option makes little sense in a time when the major Powers are strengthening their partnerships in economics, trade, peace-making and building

During the cold war, arms control negotiations, agreements and implementation came to constitute the institutional framework structuring the relations between the east and the west, especially between the United States and the former Soviet Union. The arms control and disarmament process was in its turn the function of the logic of bilateralism. The Warsaw Pact was supposed to enjoy a considerable superiority over

** Mr. Rolf Ekéus, former Ambassador of Sweden to the United States, has recently assumed the Chairmanship of the SIPRI Governing Board. This paper is based on his presentation at a panel discussion organized by the Department for Disarmament Affairs and SIPRI, held at United Nations, New York on 1 May 2000.*

NATO as regards conventional air capabilities. According to the rules of the game, that had to be compensated on the NATO side with a nuclear capability guided by the first-use doctrine. From the early eighties and with the deployment in Europe of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) by NATO, the nuclear posture of the West constituted a continuum from tactical nuclear weapons to strategic levels. With the end of the cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the whole edifice of bilateralism in armaments and arms control had to change radically. The conventional superiority of the East melted away and resulted in a huge advantage on the NATO side. In my view the old rationale for nuclear first-use doctrine disappeared with that change.

Instead, signals have been heard from Moscow of an upgrading of the nuclear option and an end to the no-first-use policy was declared as a response to the perceived NATO superiority. For its part, NATO has retained its first-use policy without having articulated a clear rationale for it. The Russian Federation has declared itself a market economy state with democracy as its political system.

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The Warsaw Pact has been dissolved, most of the foreign members applied for membership in NATO, and some have been admitted. Communism, at least of the

Soviet brand, no longer constitutes an ideological challenge to the West. Thus, when the bipolar world ended, the key concepts of security had to be revisited, with serious implications for arms control and disarmament.

When the United States emerged as the only major power of global reach, a balancing dynamic which served as a controlling element disappeared.

When the bipolar world ended, the key concepts of security had to be revisited, with serious implications for arms control and disarmament.

The strategic scene was no longer unified by bipolar confrontation; regional and local dynamics have come to define the international security agenda. Conflicts and tensions in the world are now multipolar, while the prevailing capacity to generate global power has become unipolar. Policies of disarmament and arms control in

this new security environment are more difficult to pursue, because there are no components with which to balance the qualities and quantities of arms. At the same time, the security impact of any concrete step in this area would be difficult to calibrate. This does not mean that arms control and disarmament are superfluous in the twenty-first century. On the contrary, there are a number of especially complex and high risk challenges which must be responded to.

The most severe is the still lingering potential for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The possible use or threat of use of these weapons involve many States and are therefore multilateral by definition. Logically they should be dealt with by applying multilateral means. As arms control and disarmament have a direct impact on security, the future disarmament agenda must take into account the character of the multipolar world we live in. The multilateral approach is therefore inevitable, whether you are one of the many or the sole super power.

The immediate tasks of the multilateral disarmament and arms control agenda are already set. In the area of chemical weapons, the immediate task is the implementation of the convention in a manner which will not weaken it by allowing its implementation to drift from the original intention of the Convention's language, as it was drafted. In the field of biological weapons, the work is to complete the negotiations on the protocol dealing with verification and compliance. In respect of missile technology, the practices of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) must be further sharpened and the ranks of participating countries must be expanded. It is obvious that, as far as nuclear weapons are concerned, the primary task is the continued reduction of strategic nuclear weapons. Also pending is the cut off of production of fissile material, transparency as regards fissile material and measures to establish an international

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al control regime covering those materials everywhere.

Yet the major question is not resolved by tackling those immediate tasks. The major question, in my view, remains. For what purpose do the nuclear-weapon States insist that they need to retain nuclear weapons? Is not the cold war over? Should not the five Security Council members treat each other as partners, not as enemies? Deterrents and threats are meant for enemies. Why should they

be applied to partners in economic cooperation, partners in expansion of trade and partners in preventing deadly conflict? Are they not the same States that are partners in defending peace and building peace-enhancing structures? If not, they should be. What kind of scenarios for use of nuclear weapons against each other do they have in mind? Deterrence based on mutually assured destruction appears to be the answer to all those questions. This is a game of high risk, especially as parts of the nuclear arsenal are deployed, as we know, on hair-trigger alert. At the same time, the nuclear-weapon States are curiously reluctant to explain in concrete terms how they intend to put into effect their stated policy of the elimination of nuclear weapons. The continued retention of nuclear weapons means a continued risk of use and a continued pressure for proliferation. The Secretary-General, in his

The continued retention of nuclear weapons means a continued risk of use and a continued pressure for proliferation.

Millennium Report,¹ proposed an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers. This proposal in the prevailing situation should be supported by all. Such a conference would be a forum for jointly exploring and identifying security threats in a multipolar world. It could simultaneously engage the sole super power in the international system in a common framework outlining new structures commensurate with the complexities of the multipolar challenge.

Note

¹ A/54/2000.

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A comprehensive approach to nuclear arms control

*Steven E. Miller**

Abstract

Cold war nuclear arms control was characterized by American-Soviet hostility and the limits of verification; the end of the cold war allowed for a more cooperative approach. From this new situation emerged the idea of a new agenda for arms control and of exploring a more comprehensive approach to nuclear arms control. The author posits eight elements for such a comprehensive approach. Though such an approach seems unrealistic today, recent history teaches us to look beyond today's constraints.

With the end of the cold war more than a decade ago, hopes soared that a more cooperative international security order might be possible. Those hopes have waned as Russia's relations with the West (particularly with the United States) have deteriorated and as progress in arms control has proven disappointing. Nevertheless, the post-cold war order remains unsettled in many respects and the hopeful aspirations remain. Many are still interested in thinking carefully about how it might be possible to develop a more

** Steven E. Miller is a Professor at Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government. This paper is based on his presentation at a panel discussion organized by the Department for Disarmament Affairs and SIPRI, held at United Nations, New York on 1 May 2000.*

cooperative order in which arms control is a prominent element. Further, there is a perceived need to develop a new arms control agenda to supplant the troubled arms control inheritance of the cold war period.

It is obvious that the path towards a more cooperative security order is long and difficult. Nor does it seem evident that we are even on that path today.

Similarly, nuclear arms control is presently marked more by disappointment and setbacks than by steady progress towards a world in which nuclear weapons are deeply reduced and reliably regulated. Nevertheless, a change of course is unlikely if the effort to envision a

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new and more desirable destination is lacking. This is the challenge posed by the Stockholm Agenda for Arms Control: to identify a bolder and more far-reaching international agenda for arms control that could contribute to, as well as benefit from, the emergence of a new international security order. What might this mean in the realm of nuclear weapons? The Stockholm Agenda offers a broad answer: "In the long term, ambitious measures are needed that will lead to the cooperative management of nuclear weapons inventories."¹ This implies, among other things, a more ambitious and integrated approach to nuclear arms control than has been witnessed in the past. This brief paper focuses on nuclear arms control as practiced by Washington and Moscow as a starting point to explore what a com-

prehensive approach to nuclear arms control might entail and to highlight what a departure such an approach would be from past practice.

The past as point of departure

Much of the history of Soviet-American nuclear arms control consists of long and difficult negotiations that, when they produced results at all, resulted in the placing of modest limitations on those weapons most easily counted by non-intrusive means of verification. The most successful or ambitious agreements reduced numbers of easily counted items or, in one instance, the 1987 agreement on the elimination of intermediate and shorter-range nuclear weapons (INF), eliminated one narrowly defined class of weapons. These efforts helped to constrain the Soviet-American nuclear arms race in some respects and provided a framework within which much of the bilateral diplomacy of the cold war took place. But this was far short of a comprehensive approach to nuclear arms control.

Past approaches to nuclear arms control were governed and constrained by two fundamental premises. First, it was conducted in the context of the deep rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. Arms control was played out against the background of unquestioned hostility. Hence, it was viewed by many as an essentially competitive activity whose goal was not to address the challenge of managing nuclear weapons in any systematic way but to manage the Soviet-American arms race, preferably on terms as advantageous as possible to oneself. The

political configuration of the cold war international order circumscribed ambitions for arms control. Second, the possibilities for arms control were strictly defined by the limits of verification. In an atmosphere of rivalry and mistrust, intrusive means of verification were unacceptable to both Moscow and Washington. Compliance with treaties was by no means assumed. Hence, nuclear arms control was heavily shaped by the

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need to focus treaties on those weapons that could be confidently monitored by satellites or other remote sensors. In practice, this meant a preoccupation with large, difficult to hide objects such as ICBM silos or ballistic missile submarines. These may not have been the most important objects to limit but the fact that they are observable by remote means facilitated the achievement of agreements that imposed limits upon them.

The end of the cold war undermined both of the premises that so deeply constrained the practice of nuclear arms control in the cold war. Deep rivalry was replaced by an uncompetitive relationship and even by hopes for strategic partnership between Russia and the United States. This in turn opened the possibility for a more cooperative approach to transparency in which highly intrusive means of inspection could augment existing national technical means to expand the range of acceptably verifiable arms control limitations. It is

in this altered context that the idea of a new agenda for arms control emerged. Exploration of a more comprehensive approach to nuclear arms control seemed warranted.

Elements of a comprehensive approach

A more comprehensive approach to nuclear arms control would represent a significant departure from the past. What would the elements of such an approach be? The answer consists of at least eight characteristics:²

1 *A comprehensive approach to nuclear arms control would seek to constrain warheads, not merely launchers.* Past nuclear arms control agreements contained no direct controls on numbers of warheads. Rather, they primarily limited launchers—that is, ICBMs, ballistic missile submarines, and strategic bombers. The first strategic arms control agreement, the 1972 SALT I, essentially froze the number of delivery systems that then existed on both sides. The 1979 SALT II agreement, though exceedingly complex in detail, boiled down to an equal aggregate limit on what were then termed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs), accompanied by sublimits on particular categories of delivery systems. The qualitative restraints in SALT II consisted primarily of restrictions applied to launchers in terms of modernization or upgrading. The START agreements, whose origins date to the Reagan Administration, do in fact include numerical limits on the number of deployed strategic warheads, but these

numbers are derived from limits on launchers and an associated set of counting rules that attributed warhead counts to particular delivery systems. The preoccupation with launchers was linked to the fact that these were the most verifiable units of account upon which to build strategic arms control agreements. A more ambitious approach, requiring a more transparent world, would be to focus directly on warheads as the item to be counted and limited.

2 *A comprehensive approach to nuclear arms control would seek to constrain all warheads, not just strategic warheads.* Over nearly four decades, Soviet-American nuclear arms control negotiations focused on deployed strategic nuclear weapons. (The only exception is the 1987 INF Treaty.) Yet deployed strategic weapons have never constituted more than a part of the overall warhead inventories of the United States and the Soviet Union, and not necessarily the largest part. For significant portions of the cold war, the largest category of nuclear weapons for both Washington and Moscow consisted of non-strategic (ie, tactical) weapons—that is, those that were not subject of negotiation and not constrained by agreement.³ The 1991 Bush-Gorbachev reciprocal unilateral initiative (that involved parallel unilateral moves rather than negotiated and verified agreement) resulted in the removal from service of large numbers of tactical nuclear weapons and brought total deployed inventories on both sides down to levels not seen in several decades. Nevertheless, the United States retains a tactical nuclear inventory of nearly 2000 weapons, Russia of more than 5000. No comprehen-

sive approach to nuclear arms control could ignore these holdings.

3 *A comprehensive approach to nuclear arms control would seek to control warheads in reserve as well as deployed warheads.*

Washington and Moscow generally have retained inventories of nuclear weapons that were not actually deployed with either strategic or tactical forces. These "reserves" represent another component of overall inventories of nuclear weapons that has never been constrained by negotiated agreement. When reserve inventories exist and are infinitely expandable, weapons removed from service in order to conform to treaty limitations can simply be placed into the reserve. In such instances, the effect of the treaty is not to eliminate nuclear weapons but merely to change the inventory category in which they sit. Intact warheads in reserve can be (and are intended to be) easily restored to active deployment if either party decides for whatever reason to reverse the reduction process. Such a situation is incompatible with the genuine attainment of a world in which deep reductions had been achieved.

4 *A comprehensive approach to nuclear arms control would seek dismantlement of warheads, not simply withdrawal from service.*

If reserve holdings of nuclear weapons are to be limited, reduced, or eliminated, it follows that weapons withdrawn from deployment, whether due to negotiated agreement or unilateral decision, will need to be dismantled. If such dismantlement is to be an integral and

essential element of a comprehensive approach to nuclear arms control, it will need to be undertaken in a way that is transparent, reassuring, and verifiable. This will take nuclear arms control into unprecedented territory. Simply counting and directly limiting deployed warheads has been beyond the practice of arms control heretofore, but regulating and monitoring dismantlement will require exposing national nuclear weapons complexes to routine international scrutiny—a much more difficult and ambitious task (politically if not technically). Even in the context of United States-Russian nuclear cooperation in the 1990s (under the United States Cooperative Threat Reduction program) it has not yet proven to be possible to negotiate a reciprocal regime for monitoring the extensive dismantlement that has taken place on both sides since the end of the cold war. The result is that uncertainties exist about both the pace and the cumulative extent of dismantlement—uncertainties that are incompatible with a nuclear order marked by regulation, restraint, reductions, and high levels of transparency. In addition, a requirement to dismantle demobilized warheads will produce (at least for some lengthy transitional period) another category in the overall inventory of nuclear weapons to be regulated and managed: weapons awaiting dismantlement. Indeed, in recent years, this category has constituted the largest fraction of Russia's holdings of nuclear weapons; as of the end of 1996, roughly half of its nuclear arsenal was found in this category (which numbered in excess of 12,000). Until dismantlement actually takes place, weapons so desig-

nated are, in effect, reserves unless rules requiring the disablement of weapons awaiting dismantlement are put in place. Such rules would be a desirable component of a comprehensive approach to nuclear arms control, since this would prevent rapid redeployment of weapons slated for destruction.

5 *A comprehensive approach to nuclear arms control would seek the safe and secure disposition of nuclear material from dismantled warheads, not simply the disassembly of demobilized inventories.* The process of dismantling thousands, even tens of thousands, of nuclear weapons will inevitably result in the accumulation of truly enormous quantities of the fissile materials (plutonium or highly enriched uranium) that are the necessary and essential ingredients in making a nuclear bomb. This raises two dangers. First, large inventories of weapons-usable fissile materials can easily be reused in weapons. They provide the raw material for rapid nuclear rearmament. To minimize the reversibility of nuclear arms reductions, nuclear material that is directly weapons-usable should not be stored, especially not in huge quantities. Second, if accumulations of weapons-usable fissile material are not held in appropriate conditions of safety and security, they could contribute to nuclear proliferation via theft, leakage, or diversion. Since the end of the cold war, this has been a particular concern in Russia, whose vast holdings of nuclear weapons and fissile material have existed in a society that has been subjected to serious political dislocation and severe economic distress.⁴ Despite years of cooperative efforts to increase

the safety and security of fissile material inventories in Russia, concerns still exist that it remains vulnerable to illicit use. The theft or purchase of significant quantities of such material by a potential proliferator is the shortest and most direct route to the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Any large hemorrhage of weapons-usable fissile material out of Russia could literally jeopardize the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Hence, a comprehensive approach to containing global nuclear dangers would seek, first, to enforce high standards of safety and security for inventories of weapons-usable material and second, to encourage or require the conversion of such material into forms that could not be used directly in nuclear weapons.⁵ This would entail treating it as waste and mixing it with other highly radioactive wastes or treating it as an energy source and converting it into reactor fuel.

6 *A comprehensive approach to nuclear arms control would seek not simply to eliminate existing weapons and fissile material holdings but to prevent the manufacture of additional material and new nuclear weapons.* No great end is served if existing nuclear weapons are retired and destroyed, only to be replaced by newly fabricated nuclear weapons. This consideration links directly to an intimately related concern: difficult and costly efforts to dispose of existing stocks of weapons-usable fissile materials will be undermined if new fissile material continues to be manufactured. Hence, a coherent and systematic approach to nuclear arms control will seek to halt the production of fissile material and thereby foreclose the option of manufacturing new

material to permit the fabrication of new nuclear weapons. The issue of negotiating a fissile material cut-off treaty is on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, but so far there has been little progress toward the realization of this goal.

7 *A comprehensive approach to nuclear arms control would seek to address the holdings of all nuclear-armed states, not merely those of the United States and Russia.* Past nuclear arms control has been preoccupied above all

Comprehensive nuclear arms control requires greater transparency...

with the nuclear forces of Washington and Moscow and has been conducted primarily in a bilateral context. Obviously, to be truly comprehensive, nuclear arms control will eventually have to confront directly the fact that there are at least six other states in possession of nuclear weapons (the United Kingdom, France, China, Israel, India, and Pakistan). Complicating the picture still further is the fact that several other states are thought to be interested in acquiring nuclear arms (including Iraq, Islamic Republic of Iran, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and possibly others). A cooperative security order in which deep reductions in and strict limitations on nuclear arms had been achieved would inevitably have to find a way of bringing all nuclear armed states into the regime. Indeed, it is likely that Russia and the United States will be unwilling to reduce their own forces beyond a certain point unless those of the other nuclear powers are con-

strained as well. If China's nuclear capability is growing unconstrained by agreement, if India and Pakistan are similarly augmenting their nuclear weapons capabilities, and if nuclear weapons are spreading to additional states, there is little likelihood of constructing a global nuclear order marked by reduction, restraint, and regulation. Again, however, this will pull nuclear arms control into unprecedented ground since there have never been multilateral negotiations aimed at constraining the force levels of all nuclear weapon states. It is not entirely clear that all the current weapon states would be willing to participate in such negotiations. Further-more, in those domains in which multilateral nuclear arms control has been attempted—such as the comprehensive test ban treaty or the fissile material cutoff negotiations—progress has been exceedingly slow and difficult and it has proven impossible so far to achieve a ratified and implemented treaty. This fact attests yet again to the ambitiousness of a truly comprehensive approach to nuclear arms control.

*...but greater
transparency
is no panacea
for verification
of a nuclear
weapons prohibition.*

8 *A comprehensive approach to nuclear arms control would seek a highly intrusive and highly cooperative approach to transparency rather than rely solely upon remote verification by satellite reconnaissance and other national technical means of verification.* A nuclear order in which nuclear forces are substantially reduced or eliminated,

warheads are regulated, dismantlement is monitored, fissile material stocks are held to international standards of safety and security, and the production of fissile material is forbidden, will require the emergence of a highly transparent world. Past verification practices will not be sufficient to permit the achievement of this much more ambitious arms control agenda. Verification during the cold war was conducted in a political setting of intense rivalry. Though President Reagan many times repeated the motto, "Trust, but verify," in fact there was precious little trust during most of the period of Soviet-American rivalry. Indeed, during the cold war, arms control verification was both a cause and a consequence of mistrust, with suspicion reigning supreme and mutual accusations of noncompliance flung back and forth. This environment of limited and skeptical transparency allowed only modest arms control measures to be reached. If nuclear arms control is to play a much larger role in the future, more transparency will be needed. As one thoughtful analysis put it, "The confrontational style of cold war verification is not appropriate for a security system in which reassurance is the primary objective."⁶ A more cooperative international order, however, could facilitate the more intrusive verification techniques required if a comprehensive approach to nuclear arms control is to be pursued. But the point must be underlined that envisioning a world of comprehensive nuclear arms control necessarily implies a world of high transparency, however achieved. Moreover, evening assuming high levels of transparency leaves room for debate

about how much nuclear arms control this would permit. The experience of the United Nations in Iraq, for example, suggests that there may be real limits to the utility even of very intrusive inspection regimes, particularly when inescapable political considerations are taken into account.⁷ There continues to be contention about the verifiability of such measures as the CTBT and the fissile material cutoff; and the question of whether it would be possible to verify the prohibition of nuclear weapons even in a highly transparent world continues to provoke disagreement.⁸ Greater transparency, in short, is not necessarily a panacea. Even if it is not sufficient, however, it is necessary. What is clear is that greater transparency is required if a more ambitious nuclear arms control agenda is to become feasible, and the feasibility and value of that transparency will depend very much on the political conditions in which any verification scheme must function.

Conclusion

The foregoing discussion has sought to sketch briefly the components of a more ambitious and comprehensive approach to nuclear arms control. It has started from the premise that in the new international political environment, it may be possible to cooperatively manage a process of nuclear reduction and restraint rather than, as in the cold war period, competitively manage a nuclear arms race. It has attempted to look beyond current political realities and constraints to identify at least some of the major components of a systematic approach to constraining nuclear

weapons by negotiated agreement. Such an approach requires moving well beyond the SALT/ START paradigm that has governed most bilateral United States-Russian arms control in the past. That old approach had its value and its day. But one cannot move the nuclear arms control agenda dramatically forward if preoccupied with only one category of nuclear weapons, with launchers more than with the weapons themselves, with counting rules rather than direct limits on warheads, with the nuclear forces of only two of the eight known nuclear powers. What is required instead, as outlined above, is a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of nuclear warheads. This will entail the achievement of a highly transparent world in which there are direct limits on all categories of nuclear warheads, regulation of the dismantlement process, negotiated management of the disposition of weapons-usable materials, and prohibition on the production of new fissile material that might be fabricated into new weapons. Only by proceeding down something like this path will it be possible to reach verifiable agreements calling for deep reductions to very low numbers.

Is such a world possible? Certainly, judging by today's political realities and current trends, such an ambitious scheme seems beyond reach. The hopeful visions that seemed plausible at the time the Soviet Union collapsed have given way to growing rancor and distemper. The inability to avoid acrimonious collisions of interests, especially in American relations with Russia and China, has done real damage to the prospects for harmonious relations among the largest

and most important players—a result that seems all the more disheartening when the policies producing such collisions were short-sighted, dubious, and unnecessary.⁹ A cooperative security order surely will not emerge if there is tension, rivalry, and even at times hostility among the major powers.

But still, the world today remains very much more conducive to a bolder approach than was true during the cold war. America's relations with Russia, though frayed, are not inevitably beyond repair. A Russia that emerged from the present time of troubles as a more prosperous and reliably democratic state could revive thoughts of genuine partnership. International politics could move onto a more positive trajectory. Moreover, many elements of a more comprehensive approach to nuclear arms control are already on the agenda in one fashion or another. In the context of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, for example, the United States and Russia have achieved once unthinkable degrees of intrusiveness and transparency—however disappointing is the current state of affairs compared to the ideal. Items such as the fissile material cutoff are already under discussion, with formal negotiations commenced (though stymied). Though many have been disappointed by the pace of nuclear reductions, United States and Russian nuclear forces have been reduced by thousands of warheads, to a degree that would have been unimaginable a decade ago, and dismantlement of retired warheads continued through the 1990s at an unprecedented pace.

So the picture is mixed and not entirely without grounds for hope. A more comprehensive approach to nuclear arms control, by any realistic assessment of today's world, remains unlikely. But the unlikely sometimes happens: Gorbachev arose, the Wall came down, Germany unified, the Soviet Union collapsed. Not so long ago any of these would have been regarded as unthinkable, and yet they happened. This is why it is worthwhile occasionally to lift one's eyes to the horizon and look at the possibilities that lie beyond immediate constraints.

Notes:

¹ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *The Stockholm Agenda for Arms Control*, (Stockholm: SIPRI, 1999), p. 27.

² My thinking on this question has been influenced by the work of my colleague, Matthew Bunn. See, for example, his "Verified Reductions in Nuclear Warhead and Material Stockpiles as Part of START III," March 20, 1998, available at <http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/BCSIA/Library.nsf/pubs/ispvu>. In what follows, I have drawn on the data he has assembled in this document.

³ See, for example, Theodore B. Taylor, "Verified Elimination of Nuclear Warheads," *Science and Global Security*, Vol. 1, Nos. 1-2 (1989), p. 3, which estimated that total combined holdings of nuclear warheads by the United States and the Soviet Union at the end of the cold war was approximately 56,000, of which only 26,000 were strategic.

⁴ For detailed analyses of this crucial issue, see Graham Allison, Owen Cote Jr., Richard Falkenrath, and Steven Miller, *Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material*, (Cambridge:

MIT Press, 1996); Matthew Bunn and John Holdren, "Managing Military Uranium and Plutonium in the United States and the Former Soviet Union," *Annual Review of Energy and the Environment*, 1997, pp. 403-486; and especially Matthew Bunn, *The Next Wave: Urgently Needed New Steps to Control Warheads and Fissile Material*, (Harvard Managing the Atom Project and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Nonproliferation Project, April 2000).

⁵ An extensive discussion of this issue can be found in Matthew Bunn, "Ensuring Security for Weapons-Usable Nuclear Materials Worldwide: Expanding International Cooperation, Strengthening Global Safeguards," in American Nuclear Society, *Proceedings of Global 99: Nuclear Technology - Bridging the Millenia*, (La Grange Park, IL: American Nuclear Society, 1999).

⁶ Antonia Handler Chayes and Abram Chayes, "Regime Architecture: Elements and Principles," in Janne E. Nolan, ed., *Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century*, (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994), p. 87.

⁷ See, for example, Stephen Black, *Reacting to Noncompliance: Lessons from the Disarming of Iraq* (UN Special Commission, September 9, 1995).

⁸ Illustrative discussions include Annette Schaper and Katja Frank, *A Nuclear Weapon Free World - Can it be Verified?*, PRIF Report No. 53 (Frankfurt: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, 1998); and Steve Fetter, "Verifying Nuclear Disarmament," in Joseph Rotblat, ed., *Nuclear Weapons: The Road to Zero*, (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1998), pp. 71-100.

⁹ See, for example, Johanna Granville, "After Kosovo: The Impact of NATO Expansion on Russian Political Parties," *Demokratizatsiya*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Winter 2000), pp. 24-43, which shows the negative impact in Russia of NATO enlargement.

* * *

Conventional arms control in Europe

*Zdzislaw Lachowski**

Abstract

An analysis is given of the 1999 CFE Adaptation Agreement. The principle that informs the agreement is that of a common and indivisible security space. The balance of power has been replaced by peaceful security cooperation. The challenge facing the agreement is ratification, which is being held up by the Russian Federation. Political changes there suggest new approaches to arms control. The 1999 Vienna Document on confidence- and security-building measures is briefly reviewed.

Unlike other regions in the world, Europe, or at least its major part, is in a unique situation: it is building a cooperative security regime, a constituent part of which is cooperative arms control. Conventional arms control in Europe is by far the most advanced regime in the world. Its record is impressive. It reached a peak in the early 1990s with the conclusion of several "grand accords": the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), the 1992 Treaty on Open Skies and the 1992 Agreement on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

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(CFE 1-A); the Vienna Document on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) was successively revised in 1990, 1992, 1994 and 1999; and a (sub)regional arms control agreement for the former Yugoslavia was concluded in 1996. Finally, the Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty was signed last year.

New features

The year 1999 saw a breakthrough in conventional arms control in Europe. Two major agreements were adapted and modernized: the CFE Treaty and the Vienna Document. This did not arouse such vivid public reaction as the CFE Treaty did nine years before, which shows the degree to which normalization has prevailed on the European continent.

Under the CFE regime some 40 per cent of the arsenals have been cut in Europe since 1990. However, in the latter half of the 1990s the primary challenge for the parties to the conventional arms control regime in Europe was to turn the balance-of-forces system into an asymmetrical non-threatening regime. The change made in 1999 was less dramatic in terms of the magnitude of reductions, but it turned out revolutionary in terms of principles. The basic tenets of the agreement stand in contrast to the original treaty. Instead of rivalry and division, the principle of a common and indivisible security space underlies politico-military relations in the new Europe. The balance of power is replaced by peaceful security cooperation. A system of individual state-to-state limits is to substi-

tute for the pattern of balance-of-forces symmetry between two blocs (NATO vs. the former WTO). Finally, the exclusive bloc-related character of the treaty is to be abandoned.

The new regime will be devoid of its cold war straitjacket; instead, it will be based on mutual reassurance, partnership and cooperative security. What is more, when in force, the new arms control regime will become open to the remaining states on the continent.

The CFE 1999 adaptation was revolutionary. Instead of rivalry and division, the principle of a common and indivisible security space underlies politico-military relations in the new Europe.

One important feature of the CFE adaptation talks was that the negotiations no longer reflected exclusively the old pattern of the East/West divide. Their 30 participants demonstrated differing interests and concepts as to how to secure military stability in Europe.

An outlook

The immediate challenge is ratification of the CFE Agreement on Adaptation. The main obstacle is Russia. As long as Russia is in breach of the provisions of the CFE Treaty (Chechnya), the chances of others ratifying the agreement are virtually non-existent. Another problem is the domestic ratification process in the State Duma. Certainly, the outcome of

the Russian parliamentary elections in December 1999, the new composition of the Duma and the new leadership in the Kremlin, as well as the ratifications of the CTBT and the START 2 in April 2000 suggest that Russia's approach to arms control approach is becoming less entrenched and more collaborative.

If the CFE Adaptation Agreement is ratified, it will stand a chance of being extended to cover other European states and gradually become a pan-European system. The absence of bloc divisions makes ratification possible for the non-aligned European countries—Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland. The Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) face a more difficult choice, with their armed forces being insignificant and at the stage of formation. At present they are left in the grey zone in military security terms; within the adapted CFE regime they would have a stronger say in the politico-military conduct of their neighbour, Russia. However, joining the CFE regime is seen by the Baltic states as potentially weakening their case for early NATO membership.

In the Balkans, some of the states—Serbia and Montenegro, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina including its two entities: Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska—have a CFE-like arms control regime (the 1996 Florence Agreement) in operation, imposed by the international community and supported by an international military presence. (In addition, Bosnia and Herzegovina has its own CSBM regime.) Some countries are states parties to the CFE Treaty (Bulgaria, Greece, Romania), and

others are outside any “hard” arms control framework (Albania, Macedonia and Slovenia). The on-going negotiation on regional stability, conducted under the Dayton Peace Agreement mandate, for the whole Balkan region is at an early stage. Its main characteristic (and advantage) is that it started from broad political-military rather than technical-military premises. Given the complex situation in the area, the course of the negotiation is likely to be tortuous. One can hardly expect rapid progress unless the status of Kosovo is clarified, if not solved.

Efforts by the OSCE states to modernize the European CSBM regime were concluded in 1999. The outcome—the Vienna Document 1999—is modest, at least in comparison with the hopes pinned on the review begun in 1997 and

Outside Europe, arms control is pursued only in regions that either enjoy a sufficiently high degree of security dialogue or lack major incentives to engage in an arms race.

the host of proposals submitted to improve that politically-binding accord. Nevertheless, the process of assessing and recommending improvements in CBM implementation continues, thus ensuring the continuous monitoring of developments in the security situation. Regional approaches, the most promising change introduced to the Vienna Document, should help better handle contingencies below the pan-European level. The “regionalization” of CSBMs is by no means new: there are examples of regional arrangements in

the Baltic Sea region (CSBMs), the Black Sea region (maritime operations), and South Eastern Europe (defence ministers' meetings); there also exist a host of bilateral confidence-building agreements between states concerned. These and other arrangements can now refer to a new framework, criteria and guidelines.

Outside Europe, arms control is pursued only in regions that either enjoy a sufficiently high degree of security dialogue (South East Asia) or lack major incentives to engage in an arms race (Latin America). One disturbing feature is that there is a widening gap between European accomplishments and the experience of the other regions. As a rule, the arms control-related steps in non-European regions are confined to some basic CBMs of a voluntary character linked to other non-military cooperative arrangements.

Europe is not, and probably cannot be, treated as a ready-made blueprint for non-European solutions in arms control. However, it is and can be a useful source of inspiration for similar measures and regimes.

* * *

Arms control and conflicts in Africa

Wuyi Omitoogun*

Abstract

Africa has never had an arms control regime, though some processes have emerged recently. Urgent action, especially to stem the proliferation of small arms and light weapons is needed. Small arms should not, however, be the only focus. Major weapons systems can also destabilise in Africa. Subregional efforts seem to hold the most promise. Arms control regimes need sustained institutional support to effectively work. Arms suppliers and African Governments must work together on specific measures.

The twin issue of arms control and conflict in Africa is open to two interpretations: one is that there is already an existing arms control regime in Africa that has failed to prevent widespread conflict on the continent and thus requires an examination. The other is that due to deteriorating security on the continent there is need to discuss how an effective arms control regime can be put in place to contain the ravaging conflicts. Both interpretations are correct and explain the African situation. Africa has never really had an arms

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control regime, such a regime or regimes (processes) are just emerging. Thus, there is the need for more discussion about them in order to strengthen them to achieve their objectives.

Calls for arms control

Until the last decade or so arms control issues were not taken seriously in Africa. There are several reasons for this. 1) At independence, many African states regarded well-equipped armed forces as part of the nation-building process and as such paid high priority to bringing them up to the standards they considered were befitting their new status as sovereign states. The army was seen by many as a symbol of nationhood. 2) Most African states had a narrow interpretation of security which was seen in terms of arms procurement: the bigger the size of your arsenal the more secure you were! 3) Africa's share of the world arms trade was very small, so much so that there was little reason to contemplate an arms control regime for the region. 4) The notion that weapons do not cause war did not give room for the initiation of arms control for Africa. If weapons did not cause war in regions that imported a significant share of world's arms trade, how could they be a problem in a region with little or no imports? These factors combined to ensure lack of due consideration of an arms control regime for the continent.

The cold war did not help matters as the continent, in spite of its avowed non-aligned stance, was

effectively divided into the camps of the superpowers. That maintained some form of stability on the continent. It was only in the 1990s, after the end of the cold war that the issue of arms control in Africa started arousing internal and external interest.

The reason for this new interest was the increasing deterioration of security in the region owing to widespread armed conflicts. Out of the 27 major armed conflicts in the world in 1999, 11 were in Africa. Yet the debilitating effects

The proliferation and movement of arms from conflict to conflict and new weapons making their way to conflict scenes call for urgent action to be taken...

of years of accumulation of weapons were evident on the continent before the end of the cold war. The roll call of Africa's failed and collapsed states is a "Who's Who" list of the continent's major arms importers: Democratic Republic of the Congo, Angola, Chad, Mozambique (until lately), Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Liberia, Uganda (before Museveni). Virtually all of the continent's major importers of arms have experienced either internal or inter-state war or both, whereas nearly all of the small importers have stayed out of conflict. "Incidences" of state failure and state collapse in Africa's major arms-importing nations would suggest a need for a reexamination, within the African context, of the widely held notion that weapons do not cause war. The proliferation of arms, especially small arms and light weapons, and their movement from one scene of war to another to destabilize relatively peace-

ful states are becoming sources of concern for many including international donors. These phenomena, in addition to new weapons making their way to conflict scenes, call for urgent action to be taken by all stakeholders to control the proliferation of weapons in the region.

The issue of arms control however, raises some fundamental questions. What should be the organizing principles of such controls? What should be their geographical coverage? What institutional framework would support their operations?

Organizing principles

All major arms control regimes in the world share certain basic objectives in addition to their specific goals. These basic objectives are, first, to help reduce the likelihood of war, or in the case of war, to limit the scope and level of violence and, second, to free resources for more productive uses. The specific goal of the CFE process, for instance, was to reduce those armed forces capable of taking and holding large amounts of territory from another state. The specific goal of the Chemical Weapons Convention is the complete elimination of chemical weapons. It is around these specific goals for these two regimes that the organizing principles revolve. Given the multifarious nature of security problems facing the continent, what would be the specific objectives of arms control processes in Africa? Will they focus mainly on small arms issues, as is currently the practice? Or will they

also examine the issue of major conventional weapons? In Western and Southern Africa, the main focus of the arms limitation talks has been on the issue of small arms and light weapons. In West Africa the ECOWAS Moratorium is aimed at limiting arms imports generally, but the main focus for now is small arms and light weapons. In East Africa where effort at controlling arms is just evolving, the focus of the nascent meetings has also been on small arms and light weapons.

Notwithstanding the impact of transfers of major conventional weapons, the deteriorating security situation on the continent is no less significant. The implications of continuous importation of major weapons systems by regional powers like South Africa and Nigeria on subregional stability is being ignored. What would happen if Zimbabwe were to decide also to import some major weapons system in response to the recent South African initiative, given the subtle rivalry between the leaderships of the two countries? And what would be the effect on Cameroon if, given the dispute between the two countries on the Bakassi peninsula, Nigeria were to decide as part of the re-professionalization of its armed forces to acquire more advanced major weapons? The border war between Eritrea and Ethiopia has further demonstrated the need for restraint in the acquisition of conventional weapons. While the focus on small arms is okay for now, there is need to also open discussion on major conventional weapons. Again the focus on small arms is limited to what is called illicit weapons when it is

obvious that the dividing line between licit and illicit weapons is rather thin and the connection between the two strong.

If major weapons were to be included in an arms control process, what would be the focus of such a process? Reduction in the total volumes of arms transfers to the region? Or the elimination of certain kinds of arms? In this case, which ones? Or would it

The present focus on small arms is too limited.

be to prevent arms reaching particular types of end users, sub-state actors? Or to prevent certain kind of end uses for arms (arms may be acquired but rules would be established for their use). These questions will need to be addressed in establishing effective arms control regimes for the continent. The present focus on small arms is too limited.

Geographical coverage

Beyond the issue of organizing principles there is also the problem of coverage. Given the weakness of the Organization of African Unity in responding to or taking initiatives on continental problems, the present subregional initiative is highly commendable. Most countries in the same subregion are, willy-nilly, tied together in terms of security and therefore affected almost equally by the effect of uncontrolled arms, licit and illicit. Thus an arms control regime that is subregionally based will therefore address more effectively their security concerns. Nonetheless, there is

still a need for overarching guiding principles from a continental organization like the OAU that will cover all facets of arms-related security problems. They can serve as baseline rules for subregional initiatives which can be adapted to suit local (subregional) situations. Since Africa produces very little of its arms, it is necessary to involve the main arms exporters in the various processes across the continent if only to make them appreciate the gravity of the problem they are trying to cope with and to ensure their support. The support of major external powers will be crucial here even if they are not major arms suppliers to the continent.

Institutional framework

Although the Western and Southern Africa processes for controlling arms are already afoot, the mechanisms of control are just being worked out or at best still in their infancy. The mechanism of executing the objectives of the regime is very important, perhaps as important as the decisions themselves. The mechanism for carrying out the ECOWAS moratorium is the Programme for Co-ordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED). Although it is supposed to be functional, there is doubt as to whether it is operating at the expected capacity due to one problem or the

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other. It enjoys nonetheless the full support of the ECOWAS heads of state. Its main drawback is that it relies mainly on external donors for financial support, and the source of funding for the future is not guaranteed. An institution bestowed with so much responsibility requires more assured sources of funding than what PCASED has at the moment. Nor has it got its full staff complement since inception a few years back. The same applies for the Southern Africa Regional Police Chiefs Conference Organization (SARPCCO) which is subregional in scope. It operates from the Interpol regional bureau and deals in large measure on firearms. It was recently strengthened by the Interstate Defence Council of Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) to fully engage in small arms issues. In East Africa similar attempts as in Western and Southern Africa are being made. The effort so far has been left to NGOs concentrating mainly on small arms. The leaders of the region met at the summit level recently to support the efforts of the NGOS. By and large, the institutions (in Western and Southern Africa) for executing most agreements are still weak and inchoate. There is need to further develop them into strong entities that would be able to sustain the current effort to stem the tide of these weapons.

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but the fundamental
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no longer applicable
in Africa today.*

Towards an effective arms control regime for Africa

The process of establishing an arms control regime is a long and tortuous one. It took Europe over fifty years to arrive at the present level of arms control in the region. While the experience of Europe will be valuable to draw on and their architecture copied, it should be borne in mind that the fundamental assumptions of their arms control are no longer applicable today especially for the African situation. The issue of well-armed non-state actors was never part of the European arms control agenda, but is a common feature in Africa today. An African arms control regime should therefore be constructed on realistic assumptions or principles that reflect the regions short and long term security concerns. To this end, both sides of the arms equation, that is, the demand side (African governments) and the supply side (arms producers) will need to shift their positions in order to accommodate the others view. The ECOWAS Moratorium has factored into the equation the Wassenaar Arrangement¹ (informal group of arms exporters) as part of the process of its moratorium on arms import. The same process is being encouraged for the Southern African processes. The present situation whereby government and arms producers see the other as the source of the problem will only delay the beginning of a process that is long over due. There are as much weapons in Africa needing proper control and monitoring, as there are new weapons entering the

continent. Humanitarian organizations and a United Nations report recently confirmed this.

The present subregional efforts are necessary steps towards evolving a common security and arms control. But countries still need to address the fundamental causes of conflict in their individual countries and subregions as a whole to stem the need for arms.

On the supply side, the EU Code of Conduct, the efforts of the OSCE and the Security Council of the United Nations on arms transfers should go a long way in bringing some sanity into the whole business of arms transfers. However, these organizations need to go further than restraining themselves from exporting arms to Africa's war scenes. They need to further help by putting pressure on East European countries aspiring to EU membership who disregard the rule of restraint in arms export to African non-state actors and conflict zones. The issue of arms dealers also needs to be dealt with in a fashion that will discourage the current practice of registering companies overseas to perpetuate crime in foreign lands. It is in the long-term interest of the EU and OECD to integrate these into their programme on Security Sector Reform currently going on in a number of African states.

Notes

¹ Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Control for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, with membership of 33 States: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan,

Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation,
Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United
Kingdom and United States.

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A future agenda for arms control

*Ian Anthony**

Abstract

Little progress has been recorded in arms control since 1995, and great weight needs to be given to its political dimension. The author suggests six objectives of arms control core to efforts to restore it as a useful instrument of risk management and international security: 1) focus a cooperative security system not only on arms control but also on democratisation, protection of human rights and economic growth, 2) organize groups with relevant memberships to revitalize institutional frameworks, 3) organize in ways that minimize risks of war between major powers, 4) engage the United States in the international system within a common framework, 5) manage relations with a few States outside the normative framework, and 6) examine preventive approaches.

Although the normative framework on which arms control rests is not in danger of immediate collapse, there has been little progress since 1995. Developments in 1998 and 1999 can be considered setbacks to some arms control processes.

Under these conditions it is necessary to give great weight to the political dimension of arms control. This does not mean that senior political figures will

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pay as much attention to arms control as was the case during the cold war. Under the conditions of bipolar competition, arms control represented one of a very few channels (and sometimes the only channel) through which adversaries could communicate. This gave arms control a central position in international relations.

After the end of the cold war the most senior political leaders have been more closely engaged in domestic affairs than was previously the case. Where their foreign affairs are concerned, senior political leaders have devoted much of their attention to economic, constitutional, social and environmental matters. This situation is normal and to recreate the abnormal conditions of near obsession with questions of military security would not be desirable.

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At the same time, recent events have underlined that the military aspects of international relations will not manage themselves effectively without engagement by the senior leaders of concerned states. The balance has shifted too far and military matters have been relegated to a lower than optimal position on the agenda of senior leaders.

Moreover, in their public statements on military matters responsible officials at the highest levels

often use language that pays attention exclusively to the role of force in the management of national and international security. The reduction of security risks through dialogue—which is the essential feature of arms control—is sometimes relegated to a subordinate position.

Arms control can not be seen exclusively as an element of international law. To focus on treaties, conventions and other legal instruments alone will not be sufficient to achieve the broad objectives set for arms control. Against the backdrop of deteriorating political relations it will not be possible to make progress in the legal dimension of arms control.

Against such a political backdrop concentrating on the legal dimension of arms control may have a perverse effect in that it suggests that the achievement of conventions and treaties is an objective in itself. In reality these legal instruments are valuable only to the extent that they contribute to the effective management of security problems.

These observations suggest a need to pay close attention to the context in which arms control is taking place and to create the strategic conditions in which arms control can succeed.

The main objectives of arms control in present conditions

Six objectives can be identified that form the core of current efforts to restore arms control as a useful instrument in managing risks to international and national security.

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- To initiate a focused dialogue of the political context in which arms control is being carried out.
 - To organize the relations between major powers in ways that minimize the risk of war.
 - To revitalize the institutional framework for making and implementing arms control policy without assuming the primacy of any single institution.
 - To engage the United States in the international system on the basis of responsible leadership within a common framework.
 - To manage relations with the few states outside the normative framework for nuclear, biological and chemical weapons-related arms control and disarmament.
 - To establish a rule-based agreed framework for the legitimate use of force in the new security environment.

None of these objectives can be achieved by a single state or pursued within the framework of a single international organization. Therefore, the question naturally arises, what measures can be taken to contribute to reaching the objectives defined and how can these measures be organized? It is necessary for a future agenda to pay close attention to this practical question of implementation.

At this particular moment the flexibility of informal networks may allow governments to implement some of the agreed objectives for arms control

The criterion of relevant participation in informal networks should be assigned greater value...

although legal instruments (treaties and conventions) are experiencing difficulties. These networks need to be of different kinds, reflecting the variety of problems that need to be solved.

Informal networks should not be formally integrated or hierarchical but should be established on the basis of relevant participation. That is, they should include representatives of the parties most directly affected by a given problem as well as the parties that have the human, technical and financial resources that would be needed to address that problem.

This criterion of relevant participation is more important and should be assigned greater value than alternatives such as universal participation or participation balanced by geography.

While informal networks may be able to address problems in a flexible and creative manner, recent events suggest that

There is no requirement for new organizations or institutions.

states and existing organizations can assemble and marshall the resources needed to implement proposals that are compelling and clear. There is no requirement for new organizations or institutions.

Focus on the political context in which arms control is being carried out

Enhancing security and creating stability should not be regarded as synonymous in a time of rapid political and technological development. The main priority in security policy is the peaceful management of change.

Arms control cannot carry the full burden of this exercise. It follows that arms control should be seen as one element in the development of a common and cooperative international security system.

Not all security problems can or should be addressed using the instrument of arms control, which can be addressed mainly to questions of military security. Excessive claims or unrealistic expectations about what can be achieved will weaken the utility of arms control. Arms control can play a role in reducing the risk that parties will turn to the use of armed force to resolve their disputes. However, a common and cooperative security system would need to include other pillars—related to democratization, the protection of human rights and economic growth.

Within the domain of military security, arms control should not substitute for peace settlements or conflict resolution. However, experience suggests that arms control can be a useful supplement in a wider process of post-conflict settlement and reconstruction.

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Where military potential is outside state control and in the hands of non-state actors, traditional arms control approaches are difficult to apply. The attempt should be made to build a consensus that possession of military-style arms can only be legitimate in the hands of the state. Respect for principles of the kind contained in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security would be a necessary element in building this consensus.

Arms control, a political and legal concept, is not likely to apply where military potential is employed only in pursuit of financial gain. Where the political class has become criminalized and/or the criminal class has entered politics there will not be a sufficient basis of trust to conduct successful arms control.

Similarly, while enhanced international cooperation may be needed to address terrorist acts, arms control is not likely to play a role in this cooperation.

*Revitalize the institutional framework
for making and implementing arms control
policy without assuming the primacy
of any single institution*

At present there is no general common and cooperative security system based on the peaceful resolution of disputes and the progressive demilitarization of international politics outside the Euro-Atlantic area. Creating such a system will depend on "order

building diplomacy”—developing tacit and explicit rules that should be respected but, if violated, can be enforced through actions that enjoy the legitimacy conferred by broad international agreement.

In the absence of a general common and cooperative security system states should cooperate to solve specific problems in groups organized according to the principle of “relevant membership” outlined above. That is to say, in trying to solve a given problem, participation is needed from those that are most affected and have the most at stake and those with the requisite resources.

The revitalization of institutions can come from two directions—from above and from outside.

Success in solving problems in any particular specific area of arms control requires a clear commitment from the highest political levels. This level of commitment has been difficult to secure in the face of competition from other pressing priorities—domestic and international.

The level of attention paid to arms control by the most senior political leaders has been insufficient in the recent past. At the same time it must be recognized that arms control will not occupy the same place in international affairs that it did under cold war conditions. An attempt by any state to bring arms control back to the centre of international relations would be unlikely to succeed. Senior political leaders need to address the most fundamental issues of arms control, in particular by seeking a common approach to the

role that armed force is expected to play in the conduct of their international relations.

The revitalization of institutions from outside supposes a deepening interaction between national governments and international organizations on the one hand with elements of civil society on the other. Only states can mobilize the level of resources required to implement arms control in a sustainable way. Interaction demonstrates and underlines to civil society the essential role played by states and international organizations in problem solving.

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At the same time, different parts of civil society—whether political parties, the private sector, non-governmental organizations or the research community—have useful assets that can be contributed towards the solution of particular problems.

*Organize in ways that minimize the
risks of war between major powers*

The new international security environment notwithstanding, differential growth rates in political, economic and military power in the political entities that populate world politics still have to be accommodated in a decentralized system.

Historically, discontinuities of this type—as some powers rise and others decline—have led to con-

flicts between major powers if not managed effectively. There is no consensus on whether the prospect of great power war has been eliminated or whether we are currently in an interim period, after which a new constellation of forces will crystallize around poles that will once again seek to balance one another, including by military means.

In the framework of a common and cooperative security system based on the concept of relevant membership, the traditional definitions of the term 'major power' need to be supplemented. In addition to traditional measures of power using economic, political and military indicators, an additional criterion needs to be added. A major power is one that is willing to engage in collective problem solving.

At present several centres of power are in a process of profound internal change.

The European Union is strengthening its ability to act in a coherent way in the international arena in future even though the Union itself is not, so far, an actor with a legal personality in the field of foreign policy. In its

focus on security, the European Union member states could complement its discussion of military capacity with stronger efforts to define common strategies towards arms control problems. Where common strategies can be defined they could be pursued through joint actions.

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Russia is interested in developing a common and cooperative security system that acknowledges the importance of non-military aspects of security. To achieve such a system, Russia has a strong self-interest in ensuring that it does not contribute—by accident or design—to material breaches of nuclear, biological and chemical weapon-related agreements.

Implementing disarmament and non-proliferation agreements is made more difficult by the frustration felt in Russia about the decline of domestic society and international status. An emphasis by Russia on the duty to accept the responsibilities and burdens associated with implementing these agreements could generate a new willingness in other states to assist Russia in developing habits of social cooperation and productivity that will be the basis for economic regeneration.

While China places the highest priority on managing the rapid changes in its domestic political and economic environment, there has been a progressive integration of China into international discussions of arms control and disarmament. Moreover, there is a mutual interest in accelerating the pace of this integration if that could reduce the risk that an adversarial relationship may develop between China and other major powers. However, this integration depends on reaffirmation by China that a commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes is a cornerstone of membership in a common and cooperative security system.

In some areas, for example, in trying to develop a normative framework for conventional arms control, other states, perhaps not usually regarded as major powers, have been prominent. These states currently lack permanent representation in many of the organizations and even in informal institutions where important security-related discussions take place.

Within a common and cooperative security system, states willing to engage in collective efforts to solve specific arms control problems—including the commitment of significant resources—would participate fully in relevant organizations and institutions. In that way the effectiveness of the organizations and institutions would be enhanced.

Engage the United States in the international system on the basis of responsible leadership within a common framework

The United States is under no strong pressure to accommodate the interests of other states and finds it difficult to modify approaches that no doubt appear perfectly sensible viewed from Washington.

The temptation to develop solutions alone and to see international organizations and institutions as agents for implementation is strong during a unipolar moment. Moreover, the temptation to defend the existing status quo is strong for the United States under current conditions if it is feared that change could dilute its power and influence.

To defuse increasing complaints about the perceived tendency to act unilaterally, the United States would be wise to go out of its way to pay attention to the views and interests of other actors when crafting its arm control policies.

Nevertheless if, as of today, United States involvement in the management of international security can sometimes seem to cause problems, far greater problems could arise from its non-involvement.

In addition to the American role in responding to the historic inability of European states to manage their affairs using peaceful means, the United States has played a central role in the search for security in every part of the world.

Success in securing United States participation will mainly depend on the capacity of American actors to win their arguments with those domestic constituencies opposed to continued engagement. However, many United States interests will have to be accommodated by other states in order to strengthen the positive incentives for continued engagement.

*Managing relations with the few states
outside the normative framework for nuclear,
biological and chemical weapons-related
arms control and disarmament*

There is a wide agreement on the normative framework in place related to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. This means that voluntary compliance by states can be expected in most cases.

Accurate information about the presence and scope of nuclear, biological and chemical weapon programmes along with their delivery systems is a precondition for effective action whether in the framework of treaties or through other instruments, such as export controls.

Among the group of states committed to voluntary compliance with arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation norms there is a need to communicate information about programmes of concern efficiently.

There are a small number of states outside this framework of voluntary cooperation. These states fall into two categories that need to be treated differently.

First, a small group of states has been discovered to be in systematic material breach of arms control and disarmament undertakings that they have accepted through treaties. This is the greatest threat to the arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation regime because such activities undermine the cooperation between states in compliance for the purpose of mutual reassurance. Moreover, events in the 1990s demonstrated that in the absence of effective alternatives, powerful states will not formally exclude the option of responding with coercive diplomacy or even force in cases of treaty non-compliance.

There has been a contrast in the international response to illegal nuclear programmes in Iraq and North Korea.

In the case of Iraq, the Security Council has maintained a direct and continuous involvement in the

process of bringing it into compliance with its legal commitments. In the case of North Korea, the Security Council provided a general authorization, encouraging member states to facilitate a solution to the problem of North Korean non-compliance with the safeguards obligations associated with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

In both cases specialized agencies have assisted the world community and major states in the search for a solution to the problem of non-compliance. In Iraq, UNSCOM, the IAEA and recently the OPCW have played important roles. In North Korea, the IAEA has both revealed the problem and remained actively engaged.

At the time of writing, neither approach to managing non-compliance had succeeded. Both Iraqi and North Korean programmes remain a serious cause for concern. However, the coordination of policies towards North Korean weapon programmes of concern among the most interested states outside the framework of the Security Council demonstrate that a new and flexible approach to arms control treaty compliance is possible.

Secondly, weapon programmes of concern exist in states outside the normative framework on which nuclear arms control has been built. These programmes of concern consist mainly of nuclear programmes in India, Israel and Pakistan and chemical weapon programmes, in particular those of Middle Eastern states.

Existing treaties create international law only for the states party to them. States have a right to remain outside the negotiation of a treaty or not to sign a treaty that has been negotiated. It is illegal to coerce a state into accepting a treaty.

To try to make a state comply with an agreement that it had not signed would be particularly difficult in the area of arms control. The effect would probably be to raise the importance of military capability in the eyes of governments that fear coercion. A reversion to power politics in a particularly raw form could be one consequence and political momentum could be generated for a build-up of military power.

The small group of states that cannot be persuaded to join existing arrangements may not modify a legal and normative arms control framework in which they do not participate. Neither can these states reasonably expect to benefit from the climate of confidence and security that exists between treaty partners. However, the basis for managing relations with this group of states has to be found between the extremes of confrontation and concession.

There is a need to accommodate the concerns of the states that do not see value in arms control as a security policy instrument. This could be achieved through support to regional processes aimed at the normalization of relations between states in areas of conflict, including the discussion of confidence- and security-building measures.

Examine preventive approaches that focus on establishing a rule-based agreed framework for the legitimate use of force

In most parts of the world a commitment to the concept of cooperative security is lacking along with the institutional framework needed to conduct arms control and disarmament talks at the regional level.

Security sector reform has been defined as a preliminary step. This is a process of building the capacity of states to conduct a dialogue on the political and administrative arrangements needed to manage the security sector, including not only the military but also paramilitary and other internal security forces. The objective of the process of security sector reform is partly professional training and partly the development of a common vocabulary, without which it will be extremely difficult even to discuss arms control in a serious way.

The most useful issue for the arms control agenda at this point is to consider state-sponsored military assistance to sub-state actors.

The discussion of arms control will need to include the specific security environment of a given region or subregion as well as the policies of external states that play an important role in creating the military potential of armed forces through international arms and technology transfers.

Under these conditions the most useful issue for the arms control agenda at this point is to consider state-sponsored military assistance to sub-state actors.

The logic of military assistance to sub-state groups was fairly well understood during the cold war. It would be useful to consider under what conditions (if any) it would be legitimate for states to supply arms and military technology to sub-state actors under present conditions.

It has not been possible to agree an operational definition of an illicit arms and technology transfer while all agree that that illicit arms and technology transfers should be prevented. This means that many aspects of preventing illicit arms transfers raise law enforcement rather than politico-military questions.

It has been difficult to engage in technical discussions of licensing and enforcement provisions of national export/import control procedures because, outside a relatively small number of states, these procedures are insufficiently developed to make such a dialogue meaningful.

The main approach to achieving the objectives

The common and cooperative security system is defined outside the framework of existing institutions and organizations.

Therefore, achieving the objectives of the Stockholm Agenda for Arms Control will depend on

actions taken by states and in international organizations. No single organization and no single state can carry the burden of implementation.

It would not be desirable if widening the circle of participation in the discussion of arms control and disarmament led to a reduction in coherence.

Since an integrated security architecture is not proposed, the question naturally arises how communications will be achieved between the different state and non-state actors that exist within the system.

This communication could be conducted through informal networks at this particular moment in time.

Such networks need to be of different kinds, reflecting the variety of problems identified. Informal networks should not be formally integrated or hierarchical.

It would be useful to organize a regular annual meeting at which participants in the informal networks can exchange information and ideas about steps they have taken and problems they have encountered in implementation of the Agenda.

It would also be useful to organize in a systematic manner forms of communication relying on new developments in telecommunications, including the internet, that could play an important role in information exchange between annual meetings.

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